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SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 02508

DECAPTIONED

FROM DRAPER

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, MOPS, MARR, LE, US, IS, XF

SUBJECT: DRAPER MISSION: SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE
TERMINATION OF THE STATE OF WAR, MARCH 3

1. [REDACTED]
2. SUMMARY: MARCH 3 SESSION OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE
ON TERMINATION OF STATE OF WAR WAS DEVOTED PRIMARILY
TO FURTHER DISCUSSION (WITHOUT RESOLUTION) OF THE
THREE MAJOR PROBLEMS OUTSTANDING IN ITS WORK:
(1) RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TERMINATION OF STATE OF
WAR AND ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL; (2) DISPUTE RESOLUTION;
AND (3) EFFECT OF THE AGREEMENT ON INCONSISTENT
LEGISLATION, IN PARTICULAR LEBANESE BOYCOTT LEGISLA-

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TION. SUBCOMMITTEE ALSO CONFIRMED, WITH MINOR
MODIFICATION, THE TEXTS OF SEVERAL ARTICLES WHICH
HAD BEEN AGREED PREVIOUSLY. END SUMMARY.

3. PARTICIPANTS IN MARCH 3 SESSION OF SUBCOMMITTEE
ON TERMINATION OF STATE OF WAR WERE FATTAL (LEBANON),
RUBINSTEIN AND LIFF (ISRAEL) AND KRECZKO (US).

4. SESSION BEGAN WITH A REVIEW OF SEVERAL ARTICLES

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WHICH HAD PREVIOUSLY BEEN AGREED, AD REFERENDUM:

(A) RUBINSTEIN SAID THAT PM BEGIN HAD REVIEWED THE PREAMBLE AND FOUND IT ACCEPTABLE, ALTHOUGH HE THOUGHT IT WAS HEAVY ON REFERENCES TO INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS (E.G. U.N. CHARTER) AND SHORT ON BILATERAL CONTENT. DESPITE THE FACT THAT SENIOR LEBANESE OFFICIALS HAD TOLD HABIB AND DRAPER THAT THEY FOUND THE PREAMBLE OBJECTIONABLE, FATTAL LIMITED HIS COMMENT TO SAYING THAT "WHILE HIS MINISTERS HAD DIFFICULTIES WITH THE PREAMBLE AND WOULD HAVE PREFERRED NO PREAMBLE, HE (FATTAL) FOUND THE PREAMBLE ACCEPTABLE AND WOULD HAVE TO CONVINCE HIS MINISTERS OF THAT."

(B) RUBINSTEIN SAID THAT BEGIN HAD ALSO ACCEPTED THE TWO DRAFT ARTICLES ON (1) MUTUAL RESPECT "AND RECOGNITION" FOR THE BORDER AND FOR THE POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE, TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY AND SOVEREIGNTY OF EACH STATE, AND (2) AN OBLIGATION TO RESOLVE ALL DISPUTES PEACEFULLY. DESPITE THE FACT THAT SENIOR LEBANESE OFFICIALS HAD TOLD HABIB AND DRAPER THAT THEY COULD ACCEPT THE WORD "RESPECT" BUT NOT "RECOGNITION", FATTAL DID NOT RAISE ANY OBJECTION

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TO THESE ARTICLES.

(C) RUBINSTEIN ALSO CONFIRMED ISRAELI ACCEPTANCE OF THE SEVERAL PARAGRAPH ARTICLE ON THE PREVENTION OF HOSTILE ACTS, WITH ONE EXCEPTION. RUBINSTEIN ASKED FOR DELETION OF THE WORD "REPRISALS" ON THE GROUNDS THAT IT WAS A LOADED TERM. FATTAL SAID THAT "TERRORISM" WAS ALSO A LOADED TERM, BUT RUBINSTEIN COUNTERED THAT "TERRORISM" WAS NOT AIMED AT LEBANON WHEREAS "REPRISALS" WAS AIMED AT ISRAEL. THEY ULTIMATELY AGREED TO REPLACE "REPRISALS" WITH A MORE GENERAL REFERENCE TO "ANY ACT OF AGGRESSION" AND TO MOVE THE REFERENCE TO TERRORISM FROM THE STATE ACTIONS PARAGRAPH TO A PARAGRAPH ON ACTS BY GROUPS OR INDIVIDUALS.

5. AFTER THIS QUICK REVIEW OF AGREED ARTICLES, SUBCOMMITTEE TURNED TO THE THREE MAJOR ISSUES WHICH REMAIN UNRESOLVED IN ITS WORK.

6. TERMINATION OF STATE OF WAR. RUBINSTEIN RE- STATED THAT ISRAEL FIRMLY REJECTS LEBANESE POSITION THAT THE STATE OF WAR WILL NOT BE TERMINATED UNTIL WITHDRAWAL IS COMPLETE. LIFF EXPLAINED THAT ISRAEL'S POSITION IS THE OPPOSITE OF LEBANON'S. ISRAEL IS WILL-

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ING TO WITHDRAW BECAUSE THE WAR IS BEING TERMINATED,
WHILE LEBANON IS WILLING TO TERMINATE THE STATE OF
WAR BECAUSE ISRAEL IS WITHDRAWING.

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7. FATTAL SUGGESTED A COMPROMISE WHICH WOULD PRO-
VIDE FOR THE ARTICLE ON WITHDRAWAL TO IMMEDIATELY
FOLLOW THE ARTICLE ON THE TERMINATION OF THE STATE
OF WAR, AND BEGIN "TO GIVE EFFECT TO THE TERMINATION
OF THE STATE OF WAR, ISRAEL UNDERTAKES TO WITHDRAW...".
KRECZKO SAID THIS CONSTITUTED A SIGNIFICANT CHANGE
IN THE LEBANESE POSITION. LEBANON HAD ORIGINALLY IN-

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SISTED THAT TERMINATION WOULD ONLY COME INTO FORCE WHEN THE LAST ISRAELI TROOP HAD WITHDRAWN. FATTAL NOW WAS SUGGESTING THAT TERMINATION WOULD BE EFFECTIVE UPON ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THE AGREEMENT, PROVIDED THERE WAS A CLEAR INDICATION THAT LEBANON WAS AGREEING TO TERMINATE THE STATE OF WAR IN THE CONTEXT OF ISRAEL'S WILLINGNESS TO WITHDRAW ITS FORCES.

RUBINSTEIN ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THIS WAS A SIGNIFICANT SHIFT IN LEBANESE APPROACH BUT SAID THAT HE COULD NOT

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ACCEPT AN EXPLICIT LINK BETWEEN TERMINATION OF THE STATE OF WAR AND WITHDRAWAL. IN ISRAEL'S VIEW, ALL OF THE AGREEMENT, INCLUDING SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS AND MUTUAL RELATIONS, IS LINKED. AFTER FURTHER DISCUSSION, RUBINSTEIN SUGGESTED THAT THE TERMINATION OF WAR ARTICLE AND THE WITHDRAWAL PARAGRAPH MIGHT BE TWO PARAGRAPHS OF THE SAME ARTICLE. THIS DID NOT COMPLETELY SATISFY FATTAL, WHO CONTINUED TO PRESS FOR LANGUAGE INDICATING A LINK BETWEEN THE TWO PARAGRAPHS. BOTH DELEGATIONS AGREED TO CONSIDER SEVERAL ALTERNATIVE POSSIBILITIES, INCLUDING USE OF LANGUAGE FROM THE AGENDA, WHICH STATES THAT ALL AGENDA ITEMS ARE BEING ADDRESSED CONCURRENTLY BECAUSE OF THEIR "INTER-RELATIONSHIP".

8. PROCEEDING ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT THE LINKAGE QUESTION WOULD BE RESOLVED, FATTAL AND RUBINSTEIN AGREED THAT THE FIRST ARTICLE OF THE AGREEMENT SHOULD READ "THE PARTIES AGREE THAT THE STATE OF WAR BETWEEN THEM HAS BEEN TERMINATED AND NO LONGER EXISTS".

9. DISPUTE RESOLUTION. FATTAL PRESSED HARD FOR SOME FORMULA WHICH WOULD INCLUDE ARBITRATION IN THE EVENT NEGOTIATIONS FAILED TO RESOLVE A DISPUTE. RUBINSTEIN SUGGESTED CONCILIATION INSTEAD OF ARBITRATION. FATTAL SAID THAT CONCILIATION COULD BE AN INTERMEDIATE STEP, PROVIDED ARBITRATION WAS AVAILABLE IF CONCILIATION FAILED. RUBINSTEIN HINTED THAT ARBITRATION MIGHT BE ACCEPTABLE AS THE LAST STEP IN A DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROCESS WHICH BEGAN WITH BILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS. KRECZKO SUGGESTED ADDING A FOURTH STEP TO FATTAL'S THREE-STEP PROCESS, SO THAT DISPUTES WOULD BE SUBMITTED

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FIRST TO A BILATERAL SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE JOINT LIAISON COMMITTEE, WITH EITHER PARTY FREE TO MOVE THE ISSUE TO THE JOINT LIAISON COMMITTEE (WHERE THE U.S. WOULD PARTICIPATE). IN THE EVENT NEGOTIATIONS IN THE JOINT LIAISON COMMITTEE DID NOT SUCCEED, THE DISPUTE WOULD BE SUBMITTED TO CONCILIATION, AND THEREAFTER, TO ARBITRATION. DISCUSSION ENDED INCONCLUSIVELY.

10. INCONSISTENT LAWS AND TREATIES. RUBINSTEIN EXPLAINED THAT THIS INCLUDED THREE SEPARATE ISSUES FROM THE ISRAELI POINT OF VIEW:

(A) LEBANON SHOULD REMOVE ITS RESERVATIONS CONCERNING ISRAEL TO MULTILATERAL AGREEMENTS TO WHICH BOTH IT AND ISRAEL ARE PARTY. FATTAL SAID THAT HE THOUGHT IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE FOR LEBANON TO APPLY SOME OF THESE CONVENTIONS VIS-A-VIS ISRAEL (SUCH AS TELECOMMUNICATIONS), BUT HE QUESTIONED THE NEED FOR LEBANON TO FORMALLY REMOVE ITS RESERVATIONS. RUBINSTEIN SAID MAINTENANCE OF THE RESERVATIONS WAS INCONSISTENT WITH THE TERMINATION OF THE STATE OF WAR.

(B) LEBANON SHOULD WITHDRAW FROM THE ARAB DEFENSE PACT. FATTAL ASKED RUBINSTEIN TO EXPLAIN HOW THIS HAD BEEN HANDLED IN THE EGYPT PEACE TREATY, AND RUBINSTEIN ADMITTED THAT IT HAD BEEN HANDLED THROUGH AN AMBIGUOUS FORMULA BECAUSE EGYPT REFUSED TO ACCEPT AN OBLIGATION TO WITHDRAW FROM THE DEFENSE PACT. ***

(C) THE BOYCOTT RUBINSTEIN REITERATED THAT ISRAEL

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AS NOT AT ALL SATISFIED WITH LEBANON'S EXPLANATIONS OF WHAT WOULD HAPPEN TO THE BOYCOTT LAW. PREVIOUSLY, LEBANON HAD ASSERTED THAT AN AGREEMENT RATIFIED BY THE LEBANESE PARLIAMENT AUTOMATICALLY ABROGATED INCONSISTENT LAWS. BUT, THE LEBANESE POSITION NOW WAS THAT THE AGREEMENT ITSELF WOULD CONTAIN ONLY A COMMITMENT TO NEGOTIATE A TRADE AGREEMENT. IMMEDIATE UNDERTAKIN

GS CONCERNING THE MOVEMENT OF GOODS AND PERSONS WOULD BE CONTAINED IN "VERBAL COMMITMENTS" WHICH WOULD NOT BE SUBMITTED TO THE LEBANESE PARLIAMENT. THUS, RUBINSTEIN CONCLUDED, THERE WOULD NOT EVEN BE AN ALLUSION TO THE ABROGATION OF THE BOYCOTT. RUBINSTEIN SAID THIS WAS UNACCEPTABLE TO ISRAEL. FATTAL LIMITED HIS RESPONSE TO SAYING THAT HE UNDERSTOOD RUBINSTEIN'S COMMENTS, THAT THE ISSUE REQUIRED A POLITICAL DECISION AT THE HIGHEST LEVELS, AND THAT "ISRAEL SHOULD ENSURE THAT HABIB

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UNDERSTANDS ISRAEL'S POSITION".

11. COMMENT: FATTAL WAS PRESENT WHEN HIS SUPERIORS TOLD HABIB AND DRAPER THAT SEVERAL OF THE PROVISIONS THAT HAD BEEN AGREED AD REFERENDUM, IN PARTICULAR THE PREAMBLE, WERE UNACCEPTABLE. IT IS DIFFICULT TO EXPLAIN FATTAL'S BEHAVIOR, EXCEPT TO CONCLUDE THAT HE IS PERSONALLY SYMPATHETIC TO MANY OF THE ISRAELI ARGUMENTS. THIS MAY ALSO EXPLAIN HIS STATEMENT TO RUBINSTEIN THAT ISRAEL SHOULD MAKE SURE THAT HABIB UNDERSTANDS WHAT ISRAEL NEEDS CONCERNING ABROGATION OF THE BOYCOTT. (AT THEIR MARCH 4 MEETING, SHAMIR TOLD HABIB THAT IT MUST BE AGREED NOW THAT THE FORMAL

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AGREEMENT ON THE MOVEMENT OF GOODS AND PERSONS, TO
BE NEGOTIATED SIX MONTHS FOLLOWING ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL,
WOULD TERMINATE THE ECONOMIC BOYCOTT OF ISRAEL.)
END COMMENT. PUGH

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SUBJECT: DEC. 9 PRESS BRIEFING BY AMBASSADORS HABIB,
DRAPER

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THE FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF THE DEC. 9 BRIEFING TO THE
PRESS GIVEN BY AMBASSADORS HABIB AND DRAPER AFTER THEIR
WORKING LUNCHEON WITH THE PRESIDENT AND SENIOR FOREIGN
POLICY ADVISORS AT THE WHITE HOUSE.

AMBASSADOR HABIB: AMBASSADOR DRAPER AND I HAD THE
OPPORUNITY TO REVIEW THE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST,
PARTICULARLY THE SITUATION IN LEBANON, WITH THE
PRESIDENT. WE HAVE, AS IS NORMAL IN THESE MATTERS, TAKEN
THIS OCCASION TO TAKE A LOOK AT WHERE WE'VE BEEN AND
WHERE WE'RE GOING. WE HAD A CHANCE TO HAVE OUR
INSTRUCTIONS REFRESHED. WE'RE WORKING WITHIN THE
PRESIDENT'S POLICIES WITH RESPECT TO THE SITUATION IN
LEBANON REGARDING THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL
EXTERNAL FORCES FROM THAT COUNTRY, SO THAT OUR POLICY OF
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GENERAL SUPPORT FOR THE SOVEREIGNTY AND INTEGRITY OF
LEBANON CAN BE SUSTAINED.

SECONDLY, OF COURSE, WE DISCUSSED AND RECEIVED ANEW THE
PRESIDENT'S VIEWS WITH RESPECT TO THE INITIATIVE WHICH HE
SET FORTH IN HIS SPEECH OF SEPTEMBER FIRST AND WHICH IS
ONGOING IN ACCORDANCE WITH ITS PURPOSES. WE'RE BOTH OF
US RETURNING TO THE MIDDLE EAST IN JUST A FEW DAYS --
WE'LL BE THERE NEXT WEEK -- TO CONTINUE THE DISCUSSIONS

THAT WE'VE BEEN HAVING WITH THE RELEVANT PARTIES AND, IN PARTICULAR, IN THIS CASE, WE WILL START WITH TRYING TO ACCELERATE THE PROCESS ON THE LEBANESE SITUATION.

Q. VIEWED FROM THIS PERSPECTIVE, IT SURE LOOKS LIKE BOTH THE PRESIDENT'S PEACE INITIATIVE AND THE WITHDRAWAL OF FOREIGN FORCES FROM LEBANON ARE REALLY STALLED.

AMBASSADOR HABIB: NO, I JUST COULDN'T AGREE WITH YOU LESS. I THINK THAT YOU'RE PRESUMING MORE THAN YOU SHOULD. IN THE FIRST PLACE, WHEN THIS THING STARTED OUT, NOBODY EXPECTED THIS TO BE AN EXERCISE OF A COUPLE OF WEEKS. ALL OF YOU WHO ARE FAMILIAR WITH THE PROBLEMS IN THAT PART OF THE WORLD KNOW THAT YOU'VE GOT A GREAT DEAL OF TALKING TO DO. YOU'RE DEALING WITH A COMPLEX SITUATION. YOU'RE DEALING WITH A LOT OF PARTIES. WHATEVER AMBITIONS WE MAY HAVE, YOU ALWAYS FIND YOURSELF HAVING TO GO THROUGH A PROCESS OF THOROUGH DISCUSSION. THE UNITED STATES JUST DOESN'T HAVE THE AUTHORITY TO JUST DECIDE WITHIN DEADLINES; YOU HAVE TO CONVINCE PEOPLE, AND THAT'S WHAT WE'RE IN THE PROCESS OF DOING. I THINK THAT THERE HAS BEEN CONSIDERABLE SUCCESS IN NARROWING THE ISSUES, AND I SUSPECT THAT WE'LL HAVE TO GO A LITTLE FURTHER ALONG THAT ROAD.

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Q. DO YOU AGREE WITH PRESIDENT GEMAYEL THAT THE WITHDRAWAL WILL NOT WORK UNLESS YOU INCREASE THE NUMBER OF TROOPS, DOUBLE THEM?

AMBASSADOR HABIB: I THINK THE QUESTION OF WHETHER OR NOT THERE'LL BE A NECESSARY INCREASE IN THE MULTINATIONAL FORCE, NOT JUST IN AMERICAN FORCES, IS A QUESTION THAT WE SHOULD ADDRESS AT THE TIME WHEN AND IF SUCH A NEED IS EVIDENT. NOW SUCH A NEED IS NOT EVIDENT AT THIS MOMENT BECAUSE YOU HAVEN'T YET GOT TO THE POSITION OF FULL AGREEMENT ON THE WITHDRAWAL. I WOULD SAY WHEN YOU GET THAT THEN YOU HAVE TO TAKE THAT INTO ACCOUNT, AND, AT SUCH TIME, OF COURSE THE MATTER WILL BE DISCUSSED IN THE NORMAL WAYS.

Q. WELL THEN YOU DISAGREE THAT IT'S NEEDED NOW. HE IS ASKING FOR NOW, IS THAT RIGHT?

AMBASSADOR HABIB: WELL, I WOULD SAY THAT HE'S ASKING THE ANTICIPATION OF CERTAIN THINGS. I WOULD ARGUE AT THIS MOMENT THAT WE SHOULD MAINTAIN THAT ANTICIPATION, BUT WE DON'T HAVE TO GIVE A RESPONSE IMMEDIATELY, AND I THINK HE UNDERSTANDS THAT. THIS IS NOT BASICALLY A DIFFERENCE OF OPINION BETWEEN US.

Q. WHAT ARRANGEMENT WOULD BE NECESSARY AND AGREEABLE TO GIVE ISRAEL A BUFFER ZONE, IF ANY, IN SOUTHERN LEBANON.

AMBASSADOR HABIB: THAT'S PART OF THE NEGOTIATION. IT'S QUITE CLEAR THAT THE UNITED STATES HAS BEEN AND WILL BE AND IS COMMITTED TO THE SECURITY OF ISRAEL. AND THERE'S NO QUESTION ABOUT THAT. THE ARRANGEMENTS THAT ARE GOING TO HAVE TO BE MADE -- AND I USE THE WORD ARRANGEMENTS WITH RESPECT TO SOUTHERN LEBANON-- ARE A MATTER THAT IS GOING TO HAVE TO BE RESOLVED BETWEEN ISRAEL AND LEBANON,
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AND WE, OF COURSE, WILL BE OF ASSISTANCE IN THE RESOLUTION OF THAT PROBLEM. I DO NOT THINK THAT THAT IS A MAJOR HURDLE THAT CANNOT BE RESOLVED. ON THE BASIS OF THE WORK THAT MORRIS HAS BEEN DOING AND MY OWN CONVERSATIONS, I WOULD SAY THAT I CAN SEE OUR WAY CLEAR TO RESOLVING THOSE KINDS OF ISSUES.

Q. WE'VE BEEN READING ABOUT A "NORTH BANK." THEY'RE CALLING SOUTHERN LEBANON ISRAEL'S NORTH BANK.

AMBASSADOR HABIB: I WOULDN'T ACCEPT THAT CHARACTERIZATION.

Q. DOES THE PRESIDENT FEEL THAT ISRAEL HAS BEEN FORTHCOMING ENOUGH IN THIS PROCESS?

AMBASSADOR HABIB: I THINK THE PRESIDENT, LIKE OURSELVES, UNDERSTANDS THAT THIS IS A PROCESS OF NEGOTIATION, AND I HAVEN'T GOTTEN ANY SENSE OF CHARACTERIZATION AT THIS POINT.

Q. WHEN YOU REFERRED TO ALL EXTERNAL FORCES...

AMBASSADOR HABIB: YES, I MEAN ISRAELI, SYRIAN, AND PALESTINIAN.

Q. ON THE EXTERNAL FORCES, IN NEGOTIATING TO GET THE ISRAELIS OUT, EITHER YOU OR AMBASSADOR DRAPER WILL GO TO JERUSALEM; IN NEGOTIATING TO GET THE SYRIANS OUT, YOU GO TO DAMASCUS... WITH WHAT DO YOU NEGOTIATE TO GET THE PLO OUT?

AMBASSADOR HABIB: THE PROCESS OF NEGOTIATION IS A
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QUESTION OF GETTING THE WORD FROM THE RIGHT PERSON TO THE RIGHT PERSON. THERE ARE DIFFERENT WAYS THAT IT CAN BE DONE. FOR EXAMPLE, WHEN WE ARRANGED THE EVACUATION OF THE PLO FROM WEST BEIRUT, WHICH YOU WILL RECALL WAS DONE THROUGH AN AMERICAN PARTICIPATION IN THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS, WE MANAGED WITHOUT TOO MUCH DIFFICULTY TO FIND SOMEONE WHO COULD PLAY THAT ROLE OF INTERMEDIARY IN THE NEGOTIATIONS IN SUCH A MANNER THAT THERE WERE VERY CLEAR CHANNELS AND CLEAR UNDERSTANDINGS OF WHAT HAD HAPPENED. I CAN ASSURE YOU WE HAVE THE SAME CAPACITY, AND THE LEBANESE HAVE THE SAME CAPACITY TODAY AS WE HAD THEN. SO I DON'T ANTICIPATE ANY PROBLEM IN COMMUNICATION.

Q. THERE HAD BEEN A LOT OF TALK EARLIER ABOUT GETTING ALL THE MARINES OUT BY THE END OF THE YEAR. IS THAT NOW BY THE BOARDS?

AMBASSADOR HABIB: I DON'T THINK ANYBODY IS SETTING THAT KIND OF DEADLINE AT THIS POINT. I THINK THAT IT'S FAIRLY WELL RECOGNIZED THAT IT'S PURPOSE, FUNCTION, AND UTILITY THAT COUNT, AND YOU DON'T NEED TO SET THAT KIND OF DEADLINE.

Q. THE U.S. ANTICIPATED THAT TALKS BETWEEN ISRAEL AND LEBANON ON WITHDRAWAL WOULD HAVE BEGUN AT LEAST FIVE WEEKS AGO. SENIOR AMERICAN OFFICIALS AT THAT TIME PREDICTED THAT THEY WERE GOING TO BEGIN IMMINENTLY...

AMBASSADOR HABIB: I WOULDN'T QUITE PUT IT THAT WAY. THERE HAS BEEN A GREAT DEAL OF CONTACT; THERE'S BEEN A CONSIDERABLE AMOUNT OF EXCHANGES BETWEEN THE VARIOUS PARTIES. IF YOU WANT TO TALK ABOUT FORMAL, SIT-DOWN-AROUND-THE-TABLE NEGOTIATIONS, IT'S TRUE. BUT THERE'S BEEN A GREAT DEAL OF "TOING AND FROING". IN OTHER WORDS ONE COULD ARGUE THAT SOME FORM OF DIALOGUE HAS BEEN GOING ON, BUT IT HAS NOT BEEN OF THE FORMAL

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NATURE THAT AT ONE TIME HAD BEEN DISCUSSED. NOW THERE ARE LOTS OF WAYS TO SKIN THE CAT, AND IN MY OPINION THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS IS ALIVE. IT IS DEALING WITH THE RELEVANT ISSUES.- IT IS CONSISTENT WITH THE PRESIDENT'S STATEMENTS AND HIS POLICIES, AND THAT'S WHAT WE'RE GOING BACK TO PURSUE.

Q. AMBASSADOR DRAPER, WHEN YOU CALLED THE ISRAELIS ON 18 SEPTEMBER AND DEMANDED THAT THE MASSACRE STOP, WHAT DID THEY TELL YOU?

AMBASSADOR DRAPER: I HAVEN'T COMMENTED IN PRIVATE OR

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PUBLIC ON ANY OF THE EVENTS SURROUNDING THOSE EVENTS, AND
I'M NOT GOING TO CHANGE MY MIND.

Q. AMBASSADOR HABIB, WHAT IS YOUR REACTION TO THE DEMAND
PUBLISHED THIS MORNING BY SEVERAL LEADERS LIKE DANIEL
BERRIGAN AND JESSE JACKSON THAT THE NOBEL PEACE PRIZE BE
WITHDRAWN FROM PRIME MINISTER BEGIN?

AMBASSADOR HABIB: IN THE FIRST PLACE, I HAVEN'T SEEN THE
STORY. IN THE SECOND PLACE, THAT IS NOT SOMETHING I
WOULD COMMENT ON. I WOULD NEVER COMMENT ON SOMETHING
LIKE THAT.

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JERUSALEM FOR AMBASSADORS HABIB AND DRAPER

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, MOPS, ICRC, PLO, IS, SY

SUBJECT: HABIB MISSION: MEETING WITH FAMILIES OF FIVE
ISRAELI MIAS

1. [REDACTED]
2. AMBASSADOR HABIB MET FOR ONE HOUR MORNING OF MARCH 3
WITH MEMBERS OF THE FAMILIES OF THE FIVE ISRAELIS MISSING
IN ACTION LEBANON. SISTER OF MISSING TANK CREWMAN
YEHUDA KATZ OPENED THE MEETING BY READING A MESSAGE TO
AMBASSADOR HABIB FROM THE FIVE FAMILIES. TEXT OF MESSAGE
IS CONTAINED IN PARAGRAPH NINE BELOW.
3. AMBASSADOR HABIB EXPRESSED HIS GREAT SYMPATHY WITH
THE PLIGHT OF THE FIVE FAMILIES. HE REPEATEDLY STRESSED
THAT NEITHER THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL NOR THE GOVERNMENT
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

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OF THE UNITED STATES WOULD FORGET THE PRISONERS. HE
ASSURED THE FAMILIES THAT THEIR PAIN WAS VERY MUCH ON
THE PRIME MINISTER'S MIND, AS WELL AS HIS OWN, AND THAT
THE PRIME MINISTER NEVER FAILED TO RAISE THE ISSUE WITH
HIM. HE ADDED THAT HE ALWAYS FOLLOWED THROUGH ON RE-
QUESTS FROM THE PRIME MINISTER ON THE PRISONER ISSUE,
AND ADDED THAT OCCASIONALLY HE GOES BEYOND THE REQUESTS
MADE BY THE PRIME MINISTER IN ORDER TO ENSURE THAT EVERY
POSSIBLE AVENUE IS COVERED.

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4. HE EMPHASIZED THAT NOT A WEEK GOES BY THAT THE U.S. DOES NOT RAISE THE ISSUE WITH THE SYRIANS. THE ICRC RAISES IT EVEN MORE FREQUENTLY. HE POINTED OUT THAT IT IS IMPORTANT TO CONTINUE TO KEEP THE ISSUE IN FRONT OF THE SYRIANS AS OFTEN AND IN AS MANY WAYS AS POSSIBLE. HE OBSERVED THAT THE SYRIANS SOMETIMES REPLY THAT THE U.S. SHOULD NOT BE TAKING UP THE ISSUE, BUT SHOULD LEAVE IT IN THE HANDS OF THE RED CROSS, ADDING THAT WE DO NOT ACCEPT THAT AS AN ANSWER. WE WILL CONTINUE TO RAISE THE ISSUE ON A HUMANITARIAN BASIS.

5. HE STRESSED THAT IT IS IMPORTANT FOR THE FAMILIES TO REMEMBER AT ALL TIMES THAT THE GOI WILL DO EVERYTHING IT CAN TO RESOLVE THE ISSUE, AS WILL THE UNITED STATES. WE HAVE MADE IT ABSOLUTELY CLEAR TO ALL PARTIES THAT THE ISSUE OF THE POWS/MIAS MUST BE RESOLVED BEFORE THERE WILL BE ANY WITHDRAWAL IN LEBANON. THERE CAN BE NO DOUBT THEY UNDERSTAND THIS. HE POINTED OUT THAT THIS HAD BEEN THE CASE IN AUGUST WITH THE PLO EVACUATION FROM BEIRUT, AND WE HAD BEEN SUCCESSFUL IN RESOLVING THE SITUATION THERE WITH PRISONERS AND REMAINS IN PLO HANDS. HE EXPRESSED CONFIDENCE THAT MORE INFORMATION WOULD BECOME AVAILABLE IN THE DAYS BEFORE THE WITHDRAWAL OF FOREIGN

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FORCES FROM LEBANON BEGAN, BUT CAUTIONED THE FAMILIES NOT TO LET THEIR HOPES GET TOO HIGH. HE STRESSED THAT THEY MUST CONTINUE TO HAVE FAITH THAT EVERYTHING THAT COULD BE DONE WOULD BE DONE.

6. THE FAMILIES ASKED AMBASSADOR HABIB TO PASS A LETTER AND A GIFT (A COPY OF THE KORAN) FROM THEM TO PRESIDENT ASSAD AND TO SEEK THE ASSISTANCE OF THE SOVIET UNION IN GETTING MORE INFORMATION FROM THE SYRIANS ON THE MISSING MEN. MAKING CLEAR THAT HE COULD NOT DELIVER THE GIFT AND LETTER TO PRESIDENT ASSAD HIMSELF, AMBASSADOR HABIB PROMISED TO ENSURE THAT THE PACKAGE WOULD GET TO DAMASCUS FOR DELIVERY TO THE PRESIDENT'S OFFICE. HE SAID HE WOULD EXPLORE THE POSSIBILITY OF APPROACHING THE SOVIETS, BUT CAUTIONED THAT IN HIS VIEW IT WOULD PROVE FUTILE.

7. FOR DAMASCUS: WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR THOUGHTS ON THE POSSIBILITY OF AN APPROACH ON THE ISSUE TO THE SYRIANS THROUGH THE SOVIETS, AND WHETHER SUCH AN APPROACH MIGHT BETTER BE MADE THROUGH EMBASSY DAMASCUS TO THE SOVIET EMBASSY THERE, OR VIA ANOTHER CHANNEL, E.G., THE ISRAELIS GETTING A MESSAGE TO THE SOVIETS THROUGH THEIR OWN DEVICES.

8. AFTER THE MEETING HAD BROKEN UP, MR. AND MRS.

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BAUMEL STAYED BEHIND FOR A FEW MOMENTS TO ASK AMBASSADOR HABIB ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF THEIR REQUESTING FORMER PRESIDENT CARTER TO RAISE THE ISSUE WITH PRESIDENT ASSAD. HE REPLIED THAT HE WOULD TAKE THE MATTER UP WITH THE FORMER PRESIDENT.

9. COMMENCE TEXT OF FAMILIES' PRESENTATION:

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DEAR AND ESTEEMED AMBASSADOR HABIB:

WE HAVE GATHERED HERE, 5 BROKEN FAMILIES OF 5 MISSING SOLDIERS WHO TOOK PART IN THE BATTLE AGAINST THE SYRIANS, ON 11TH JUNE 1982, AND NEVER AGAIN WERE SEEN. FOR THE LAST 9 MONTHS, WE PHYSICALLY LIVE BUT THIS CANNOT BE NAMED LIFE. WE MOVE CONSTANTLY FROM HOPE TO DESPAIR NOT KNOWING WHETHER OUR BOYS ARE STILL ALIVE OR GOD FORBID--DEAD.

[REDACTED]

DURING THESE 9 MONTHS WE HAVE GONE THROUGH ENORMOUS TROUBLES AND EFFORTS TRYING TO RECEIVE A SIGN OF LIFE FROM OUR DEARS.

ON 15 AUGUST 1982 ISRAEL EXCHANGED, THROUGH THE INTERNATIONAL RED CROSS, LISTS OF PRISONERS WITH SYRIA. ISRAEL SUBMITTED A FULL LIST AND THE SYRIANS ADMITTED IN HAVING 1 BODY AND 3 PRISONERS ALIVE. ONE OF THEM IS LIBERMAN WHOSE 3 OTHER MEMBERS OF CREW

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ARE STILL MISSING.

SINCE IT ALL HAPPENED IN TERRITORY CONTROLLED BY THE SYRIANS, AND SINCE THE BATTLE WAS AGAINST SYRIAN FORCES, IT IS BEYOND ANY QUESTION THAT THE SYRIAN AUTHORITIES ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE FATE OF OUR 5 MISSING SOLDIERS. THERE'S NO WAY THAT SYRIA WON'T BE ABLE TO FIND OUT, SINCE THE BOYS WERE LEFT ALIVE, THE AREA OF SULTAN YACOB IS SMALL AND THE TANKS WERE DRAGGED BY THEM WITHIN FEW HOURS AFTER CEASE-FIRE CAME INTO FORCE.

THE INTERNATIONAL RED CROSS, WHEN REALIZING THAT THE SYRIAN LIST OF PRISONERS WAS NOT COMPLETE, IMMEDIATELY ASKED FOR DETAILS REGARDING OUR 5 MISSING SOLDIERS. ONLY 6 WEEKS LATER, SYRIA RESPONDED TO THAT APPEAL SAYING: "THEY ARE NOT WITH US."

DURING THAT PERIOD ON THE 4TH OF JULY 1982 AN EXHIBITION-ISTIC BURIAL OF FOUR COFFINS TOOK PLACE IN DAMASCUS. THIS BURIAL RAISES TOO MANY QUESTIONS. THE 4 NAMES GIVEN BY THE SYRIANS PROVED TO BE WRONG, AND THE PICTURES OF LIVING SOLDIERS POSTED ON EACH COFFIN PROVE THAT NO IDENTIFICATION WAS MADE.

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THE CEREMONY ITSELF WAS OUT OF ALL PROPORTION AS TO HOW TO BURY AN ENEMY'S BODY. BESIDES, WHERE WERE THE BODIES BETWEEN 11TH JUNE AND 4TH JULY? WHERE IS THE FIFTH? IF THEY HONOR ENEMY'S BODY SO MUCH, HOW COME THEY DID NOT BURY THE DEAD PILOT?

THE PRISONER LIBERMAN WAS SURELY INTERROGATED

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REGARDING THE MEMBERS OF HIS CREW. THERE IS NO WAY THAT SUCH A TERRIBLE MISTAKE OF GIVING WRONG NAMES COULD HAPPEN. IT IS A VIOLATION OF THE ELEMENTARY AND BASIC NORMS, ACCORDING TO THE BIBLE, THE KORAN AND THE GENEVA CONVENTION.

NONETHELESS, SINCE ISRAEL BELIEVED THAT THE SYRIANS WOULD LET AUSTRIAN PATHOLOGISTS TO MAKE IDENTIFICATION, WE RELEASED ON 8/12/82 2 FISHERMEN AS A GESTURE, EVER SINCE, THE SYRIANS HAVE NOT PERMITTED SUCH IDENTIFICATION TO TAKE PLACE. DURING ALL THIS PERIOD, VARIOUS RUMORS AND DECLARATIONS WERE MADE:

- 1) AHMED GIBRIL CLAIMED TO HAVE "MORE" PRISONERS APART FROM THE 2 KIDNAPPED SOLDIERS.
- 2) ABU ZIAD, PALESTINIAN COMMANDER OF THE BEKKA VALLEY DECLARED BEFORE CBS CORRESPONDENT THAT: "THE FATE OF AT LEAST FIVE OTHER ISRAELIS NOW IN PALESTINIAN HANDS RESTS WITH NEGOTIATIONS THROUGH THE INTERNATIONAL RED CROSS."
- 3) THE FRENCH INTELLIGENCE REPORTED AT FIRST STAGES THAT THE SYRIANS HOLD MORE PRISONERS THAN HAD BEEN REPORTED.
- 4) THE INTERNATIONAL RED CROSS CLAIMED TO FEEL AND SUSPECT THAT SUCH CONCEALMENT OF PRISONERS REALLY EXISTS.
- 5) MUZTAFI TELATH, A SYRIAN MINISTER, TOLD THE RED CROSS REPRESENTATIVE IN DAMASCUS THAT THEY HAVE MORE PRISONERS IN THEIR HANDS.

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IT ALL LEADS SIR TO VERY ABSOLUTE AND DECISIVE
CONCLUSIONS:

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- 1) THAT SUCH A BLACKOUT COMES TO COVER THAT THE 5 BOYS ARE ALIVE.
 - 2) THAT THE ONE AND ONLY PURPOSE OF THE SYRIANS IS TO CAUSE BEWILDERNESS, SORROW AND FEAR ON OUR SIDE.

PLEASE BEAR IN MIND SIR THAT THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT DECIDED NOT TO WITHDRAW ONE INCH FROM LEBANON BEFORE ALL PRISONERS, ALIVE OR DEAD, RETURN TO ISRAEL. WELL, IT IS NOT ONLY A GOVERNMENTAL DECISION, BUT A NATIONAL CONSENSUS THAT WE'LL NEVER LEAVE ISRAELI SOLDIERS UNDER HOSTILE HANDS. PLEASE REMEMBER, SIR, 2 DIFFICULT PERIODS IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, THE FIRST WHEN ENORMOUS NUMBER OF SOLDIERS WERE MISSING FROM VIETNAM, AND THE SECOND, WHEN AMERICAN

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DIPLOMATS WERE KIDNAPPED IN IRAN.


WE ARE QUITE SURE THAT SYRIAN MOTHERS OF 293 SYRIAN PRISONERS NOW HELD IN ISRAEL MISS THEIR CHILDREN AS MUCH AS WE DO, YET THEY ARE SURE ABOUT THE SAFETY OF THEIR CHILDREN, SINCE ISRAEL OBEYS ALL LAWS OF THE GENEVA CONVENTION. TO OUR GREAT SORROW, WE CANNOT BE THAT SURE REGARDING OUR PRISONERS IN SYRIA.

THE JEWISH RELIGION, SIR, INSTRUCTIONS US TO FULFIL HUNDREDS OF LAWS REGARDING ALL ASPECTS OF LIFE, YET IN CASE OF LIFE DANGER, THE DUTY OF SAVING HUMAN LIFE OVERRIDES THESE LAWS.


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WE KNOW YOUR DEDICATION AND EFFORTS YOU HAVE PUT IN TRYING
TO SOLVE OUR PROBLEM, AND BRING US SALVATION. YOU ARE
OUR ONLY DIRECT CONTACT WITH THE SYRIANS. WE ASK YOU
TO GO TO DAMASCUS AND DEMAND UNEQUIVOCALLY FROM
PRESIDENT ASSAD TO CLARIFY THIS MATTER, OR TO TAKE
SOME UNUSUAL STEP AND PUT AN END TO THIS HORRIBLE
NIGHTMARE. MAY GOD BE WITH YOU. THANK YOU. END
TEXT.
LEWIS



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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, EG, IS, LE

SUBJECT: HABIB MEETING WITH ALI

1. [REDACTED]

2. SUMMARY. HABIB, ACCOMPANIED BY AMBASSADOR AND POLOFF, HELD ONE HOUR MEETING WITH DEP PRIMIN AND FORMIN KAMAL HASSAN ALI EVENING OF MARCH 1. HE BROUGHT ALI UP-TO-DATE ON CURRENT STATE OF NEGOTIATIONS ON LEBANON. ALI EXPRESSED SUPPORT FOR HABIB'S EFFORTS. HE ALSO UNDERTOOK TO TALK TO PRINCE SAUD AT NEW DELHI TO ELICIT SAUDI UNDERSTANDING OF NEED FOR SOME ISRAELI-LEBANESE CONTACTS AS PART OF AN AGREEMENT ON ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL. END SUMMARY.

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3. AFTER EXCHANGING INITIAL PLEASANTRIES, HABIB AND ALI BRIEFLY DISCUSSED THE UPCOMING NAM SUMMIT. ALI SAID THAT EGYPT HAD IMPROVED THE SECTION OF THE NAM DRAFT ON LEBANON BY USING LANGUAGE PROPOSED BY THE GOL DURING THE LAST VISIT OF BOUTROS GHALI AND OSAMA EL BAZ. HABIB EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT LEBANESE PRESIDENT GEMAYEL WOULD ATTEND THE NAM SUMMIT, NOTING THAT THIS WOULD GIVE HIM A CHANCE TO TALK TO SYRIAN PRESIDENT ASSAD WITHOUT

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THE NECESSITY OF TRAVELLING TO DAMASCUS.

4. HABIB THEN TURNED TO THE CURRENT STATE OF NEGOTIATIONS, BRINGING ALI UP-TO-DATE SINCE THE LAST BRIEFING IN WASHINGTON DURING MUBARAK'S VISIT. HABIB STARTED OUT WITH HIS RETURN TO ISRAEL AT THE TIME OF THE PUBLICATION OF THE KAHAN COMMISSION REPORT. THIS HAD BROUGHT PROGRESS TO A STANDSTILL WHILE THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT REORGANIZED ITSELF. THINGS ARE NOW BACK ON TRACK, HOWEVER. HABIB DESCRIBED HIS CURRENT TACTIC TO MOVE THE TALKS ALONG MORE QUICKLY BY GETTING THE PARTIES TO WORK ON DRAFTING. IN THAT PROCESS, TWO KEY ISSUES HAVE CLEARLY EMERGED: (1) SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS, AND (2) MUTUAL RELATIONS.

5. THE U.S. SIDE HAD DEVELOPED CONCEPTS TO DEAL WITH THESE ISSUES. ON SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS, THE U.S. POSITION IS THAT THERE SHOULD NOT BE ANY RESIDUAL IDF PRESENCE IN LEBANON. INSTEAD, WE WERE ATTEMPTING TO SUBSTITUTE A SECURITY AREA. THIS WAS LESS IN SOME PLACES THAN THE 45-50 KM ARRANGEMENT DEMANDED BY ISRAEL. THE SECURITY ZONE WOULD FOLLOW THE AWALI RIVER AND VARY IN DEPTH BETWEEN 30-45 KMS. IN ESSENCE, WE WERE

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ATTEMPTING TO FOLLOW NATURAL TERRAIN FEATURES. CURRENTLY, THE BIG ARGUMENT IS WHETHER OR NOT JEBEL BARUK SHOULD BE INCLUDED. IN HABIB'S VIEW, ISRAEL WANTED IT INCLUDED TO WATCH SYRIA, NOT TO PROTECT ISRAEL FROM ATTACKS FROM LEBANON, AND HE THEREFORE DID NOT THINK IT SHOULD BE INCLUDED. ALI AGREED THAT INCLUSION OF JEBEL BARUK WOULD UPSET THE SYRIANS.

6. ANOTHER AREA OF DISAGREEMENT WAS THE FUTURE ROLE OF SAAD HADDAD. ISRAEL IS DEMANDING THAT HADDAD BE COMMANDER OR GOVERNOR OF SOUTHERN LEBANON, USING HIS FORCE TO SECURE MOST THE AREA UP TO THE ZAHRANI RIVER. LEBANON AGREED THAT HADDAD'S FORCES SHOULD BE INTEGRATED INTO THE LAF AND THAT IT WOULD DEAL WITH HADDAD ON AN HONORABLE BASIS. IN HABIB'S VIEW, THIS SHOULD BE SUFFICIENT. LEBANON ALSO WANTS A ROLE FOR UNIFIL. FOR EXAMPLE, A GROUP OF UNIFIL BATTALIONS MIGHT BE ASSIGNED TO GUARD PALESTINIAN CAMPS IN THE SOUTH ALONG WITH SOME LAF UNITS. GOL MIGHT ALSO WISH TO USE UNIFIL IN THE NORTH. OF COURSE, THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL WOULD HAVE TO ENLARGE UNIFIL'S MANDATE BUT IF IT IS USED TO GUARD THE PALESTINIANS, WE ASSUME THE COUNCIL WILL AGREE. ALI SAID THAT HE

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WAS VERY WORRIED ABOUT THE CAMPS. HABIB AGREED THAT THE SAFETY OF THE PALESTINIANS IS AN IMPORTANT ISSUE BY ITSELF AND IMPORTANT IN THE CONTEXT OF PERSUADING THE PLO TO WITHDRAW AS WELL.

7. HABIB THEN BRIEFLY DESCRIBED THE OTHER SECURITY CONCEPTS: THE MILITARY COMMITTEE (AND THE QUESTION

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OF A U.S. ROLE), AND JOINT SUPERVISORY TEAMS UNDER THE MILITARY COMMITTEE. HABIB SAID THERE WAS FULL AGREEMENT THAT THERE BE NO HOSTILE FORCE IN THE

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SECURITY ZONE, NO HEAVY WEAPONS OTHER THAN THOSE INTEGRAL TO THE LAF BRIGADES, NO LARGE ARTILLERY AND NO SAMS.

8. ON NORMALIZATION, HABIB SAID OUR CONCEPT WAS THAT NOT LATER THAN 6 MONTHS AFTER ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL NEGOTIATIONS ON A FINAL AGREEMENT WOULD BEGIN. IN THE INTERIM PERIOD, ISRAEL WANTS, DE FACTO, VIRTUALLY FULL FREE MOVEMENT OF PEOPLE AND GOODS. LEBANON DOES NOT WANT TO GO THAT

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FAR THAT FAST. LEBANON'S TRADE IS ALREADY BEING HURT. FOR EXAMPLE, THE SAUDIS ARE PREVENTING THE ENTRY OF LEBANESE GOODS. 96 OF LEBANON'S TRADE IS WITH THE ARAB WORLD; 50 WITH SAUDI ARABIA. LEBANON, THEREFORE, FAVORS SMALL STEPS. WE HAVE NOT YET FOUND THE RIGHT FORMULA TO RESOLVE THIS ISSUE.

9. HABIB SAID HE TOLD ISRAEL THAT IT MUST AGREE TO ABANDON ITS ATTEMPTS TO RETAIN A RESIDUAL PRESENCE. HE WAS TO RECEIVE ISRAEL'S ANSWER MARCH 2, AFTER THE ISRAELI CABINET STEERING GROUP MEETS ON THIS ISSUE. HE WAS NOT OPTIMISTIC THAT THE ISRAELIS WOULD ACCEPT THE POSITIONS HE HAD PUT TO THEM FOLLOWING HIS LATEST INTENSIVE TALKS IN LEBANON; IF ISRAEL MAKES ANY CONCESSIONS THEY ARE LIKELY TO BE CONDITIONAL. HE WAS GOING TO TRY TO GET THE PARTIES BACK TO DRAFTING.

10. ALI ASKED HOW SOON AN AGREEMENT MIGHT BE REACHED. HABIB SAID IT COULD COME IN 1 OR 2 WEEKS, 1 OR 2 MONTHS OR IT MIGHT TAKE 6 MONTHS. IT WOULD DEPEND ON THE FLEXIBILITY EXHIBITED BY THE PARTIES. ALI NEXT ASKED HOW LONG WITHDRAWAL WOULD TAKE AFTER AN AGREEMENT IS REACHED, HABIB REPLIED THAT IT MIGHT TAKE 10 WEEKS, BUT IF SYRIA WERE TO WITHDRAW QUICKLY, IT COULD TAKE SOMEWHAT LESS TIME, PERHAPS 8 WEEKS. ISRAEL IS STILL INSISTING THAT THE PLO WITHDRAW FIRST. WE HAVE SOME INDICATION THAT THE PLO MAY AGREE TO BEGIN WITHDRAWAL FIRST, BUT ONLY IF IT ENDS SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE SYRIANS. HE WOULD ALSO HAVE TO RESOLVE THE ISSUE OF POWS,

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MIAS AND THE RETURN OF BODIES. ACCORDING TO AMIN, SYRIAN AGREEMENT TO WITHDRAW IS FIRM. STILL KHADDAM IS ALWAYS SAYING SOMETHING DIFFERENT AND THIS CAUSES PROBLEMS AS THE ISRAELIS REACT TO HIS STATEMENTS. WE BELIEVE THE SYRIANS WILL WITHDRAW AS LONG AS THERE IS NO THREAT TO THEIR SECURITY. HOWEVER, IF THERE IS A RESIDUAL IDF PRESENCE, THERE WILL BE NO SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL.

11. ALI AND HABIB AGREED THAT THE MODALITIES OF WITHDRAWAL ARE IMPORTANT. WE HAVE TO BE CAREFUL THAT THERE IS NO VACUUM DURING THINNING OF IDF FORCES IN THE SOUTH; THIS COULD POSE A REAL THREAT TO THE PALESTINIANS. IT WILL BE NECESSARY TO INTRODUCE LAF AND UNIFIL FORCES DURING THE IDF WITHDRAWAL.

12. HABIB THEN DESCRIBED OUR EFFORTS TO RECONSTITUTE THE LAF. HE SAID OUR GOAL WAS TO CREATE A 7 BRIGADE ARMY. BY MARCH 15, 70 OF THE EQUIPMENT FOR THE FIRST 4 BRIGADES WILL HAVE BEEN DELIVERED. WE PLAN TO HAVE THE 5TH BRIGADE READY BY APRIL. AT THE SAME TIME, THE LAF MUST REGROUP AND RETRAIN MANY EXISTING INEFFECTIVE UNITS. WHILE WE ARE BEGINNING TO SEE RESULTS FROM U.S. TRAINING TEAMS, THE LEBANESE HAVE A DIFFICULT PROBLEM. THEY ARE TRYING TO INCREASE THE SIZE OF THE ARMY FROM 20,000 TO 60,000 AND ARE SHORTLY PLANNING TO INSTITUTE CONSCRIPTION. BUT TO DO THIS, THEY NEED REAL SOVEREIGNTY OVER THEIR TERRITORY AND THEY NEED SELF CONFIDENCE.

13. ALI ASKED WHERE THE PLO WOULD GO. HABIB

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SAID HE HAD HEARD JORDAN, IRAQ AND SYRIA, ALTHOUGH
HE PERSONALLY QUESTIONED IRAQ. ALI SAID THAT
THE PLO MAY GO TO IRAQ, BUT ONLY TEMPORARILY.
HABIB SAID THAT LEBANON NEEDS TO TALK TO THE
PLO, AND WILL THIS WEEK IN TUNIS. IN ADDITION
TO THE DESTINATION, THEY ALSO HAVE TO DISCUSS
HOW TH
E PLO WILL LEAVE. ALI SAID THE PLO WOULD
PROBABLY GO TO TUNISIA AND ALGERIA.

14. HABIB SAID THAT LEBANON WOULD NEED HELP FROM
ITS FRIENDS AND ASKED ALI IF EGYPT COULD INFLU-
ENCE THE SAUDIS TO BE MORE OBJECTIVE. AS SOON
AS AN AGREEMENT IS REACHED, HABIB PLANS TO GO

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TO RIYADH AND TALK TO KING FAHD TO TRY TO GET
HIM TO UNDERSTAND THAT A REASONABLE AGREEMENT HAS
TO INCLUDE SOME PROVISION FOR LEBANESE AND ISRAELI
CONTACTS. WITHOUT IT, THERE WOULD BE NO WITHDRAWAL.
ALI AGREED, BUT POINTED OUT THAT LEBANON IS
WORRIED ABOUT ITS ECONOMY. HABIB REASSURED ALI
THAT NEGOTIATIONS HAVE TAKEN THIS CONCERN INTO
ACCOUNT. ISRAEL WILL AGREE TO NORMALIZE CUSTOMS
PROCEDURES AND LICENSING REQUIREMENTS, BUT IT
INSISTS UPON NONDISCRIMINATORY TREATMENT. ISRAEL
WILL, HOWEVER, ALSO AGREE TO LIMIT EXPORTS ON
A COMMODITY BASIS PROVIDING PROTECTION FOR
LEBANESE AGRICULTURE AND INDUSTRY. ALI SAID

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THAT EGYPT WOULD SHORTLY RENEW ITS 1965 TRADE AGREEMENT WITH LEBANON IN ORDER TO ENCOURAGE AND SUPPORT AMIN. CURRENTLY, EGYPT WAS NOT A MAJOR CUSTOMER, BUT HAD PREVIOUSLY BEEN A MAJOR CONSUMER OF LEBANESE FRUIT. PERHAPS IT WOULD BE SO AGAIN. ALI ALSO AGREED TO DISCUSS THESE ISSUES WITH SAUDI FORMIN PRINCE SAUD IN NEW DELHI. THE AMBASSADOR SUGGESTED THAT ALI USE THE ARGUMENT THAT WE NEEDED PROGRESS ON LEBANON IN ORDER TO GET THE REAGAN INITIATIVE MOVING. HABIB ADDED THAT THE SAUDIS ALSO FAVORED RESTORATION OF LEBANESE SOVEREIGNTY.

15. HABIB WELCOMED ALI'S INITIATIVE, STRESSING THAT GEMAYEL DESERVED ARAB SUPPORT. HE WANTS TO BE THE PRESIDENT OF ALL LEBANON. HE DOES NOT FAVOR PARTITION. HE HAS DEMONSTRATED SOME ABILITY TO CONTROL THE PHALANGE. AMIN HAS DEVELOPED WELL AND GROWN IN THE JOB. HE IS ABLE TO WORK WITH THE SHI'A, SUNNI, DRUZE AND THE CHRISTIANS.

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16. HABIB CONCLUDED BY SAYING THAT HE WOULD NOT GO TO SYRIA UNTIL AN AGREEMENT WAS REACHED BECAUSE KHADDAM WOULD MERELY GIVE HIM A LIST OF DEMANDS WHICH HE COULD NOT FULFILL. LEBANON WILL INFORM SYRIA ON THE NATURE OF THE AGREEMENT, AT THE APPROPRIATE TIME, BUT WOULD NOT GIVE SYRIA A VETO.

17. AMBASSADOR HABIB HAS NOT SEEN THIS MESSAGE.
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AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE

AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY JIDDA PRIORITY

USELO RIYADH PRIORITY

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

IM/IPS/CR/IR

Date: 11/2/97

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FOIA Exemptions

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SECTION 01 OF 04 TEL AVIV 02862

DECAPTIONED

CAIRO FOR AMB. HABIB

E.O. 12356: DECLP OADR

TAGS: PREL, MOPS, MARR, LE, US, IS, XF

SUBJECT: HABIB/DRAPER MISSION: MEETING WITH PRIME MINISTER

- BEGIN MARCH 1, 1983

1. [REDACTED]

2. SUMMARY AND COMMENT. HABIB AND LEWIS MET WITH BEGIN FOR ONE HALF HOUR MARCH 1 TO ENABLE HABIB TO REVIEW COMPREHENSIVELY FOR BEGIN THE RESULTS OF HIS LAST ROUND OF MEETINGS IN BEIRUT AND TO PROVIDE PERSUASIVE ARGUMENTS FOR MODIFICATION OF CERTAIN ISRAELI POSITIONS AND ACCEPTANCE OF THE LATEST LEBANESE PROPOSALS ON SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS AND NORMAL

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RELATIONS. BEGIN LISTENED INTENTLY FOR NEARLY TWENTY FIVE MINUTES TO HABIB'S PRESENTATION BUT HAD TIME ONLY FOR A BRIEF, NON-COMMITTAL REPLY BEFORE HE HAD TO LEAVE FOR ANOTHER APPOINTMENT. BEGIN ASSURED HABIB THAT THERE WOULD BE A MEETING OF THE ISRAELI CABINET STEERING COMMITTEE WEDNESDAY MORNING TO CONSIDER THE PROPOSALS AS HABIB HAS PRESENTED THEM AND THAT SOME RESPONSE WOULD BE PROVIDED WEDNESDAY AFTERNOON. THIS MEETING PROVIDED LITTLE CLUE AS TO

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HOW BEGIN HIMSELF OR THE STEERING COMMITTEE WILL REACT. HOWEVER, IT WAS IMPORTANT TO MAKE SURE THAT BEGIN UNDERSTOOD DIRECTLY FROM HABIB WHY THE ARRANGEMENTS NOW BEING PROPOSED DO MEET ISRAEL'S MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS AND REPRESENT THE LIMIT OF FEASIBLE LEBANESE FLEXIBILITY, IF SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL IS NOT TO BE JEOPARDIZED AND LEBANON'S ECONOMY IS NOT DAMAGED BY ARAB ECONOMIC RETALIATION, ESPECIALLY FROM SAUDI ARABIA. SINCE SHAMIR HAD APPARENTLY GIVEN BEGIN A RATHER NEGATIVE REACTION TO HABIB'S PRESENTATION THE PREVIOUS DAY, DIRECT EXPOSURE FOR BEGIN TO HABIB'S ARGUMENTS WAS ESSENTIAL, WHATEVER THE OUTCOME TOMORROW MAY BE. END SUMMARY AND COMMENT.

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3. AMBASSADORS HABIB AND LEWIS MET WITH PRIME MINISTER BEGIN AND HIS ASSISTANT, YEHUDA AVNER, FOR THIRTY MINUTES AT MID-DAY ON MARCH 1, 1983. WE HAD ASKED FOR THIS MEETING IN ORDER TO EXPOSE BEGIN DIRECTLY TO HABIB'S ARGUMENTS FOR LOOKING FAVORABLY ON THE PROPOSALS AS THEY NOW STAND. (AFTER THE RATHER DISCOURAGING SESSION WITH FOREIGN MINISTER SHAMIR MONDAY, DAVID KIMCHE HAD URGED THE IMPORTANCE OF NOT RELYING ONLY ON SHAMIR AS

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AN ADVOCATE IN THE STEERING COMMITTEE MEETING.) BEGIN RECEIVED US VERY CORDIALLY, THOUGH APOLOGIZING THAT HIS SCHEDULE WAS SO TIGHT TODAY THAT HE COULD SPEND ONLY ABOUT ONE HALF HOUR WITH HABIB AT THIS TIME.

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4. HABIB THEN TOOK NEARLY ALL OF THE HALF HOUR TO GIVE BEGIN WHAT HE CHARACTERIZED AS A "PERSONAL REPORT" ON HIS FOUR DAYS OF MEETINGS IN BEIRUT AND ON THE PRESENT STAGE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. HE REVIEWED HIS INTENSIVE DISCUSSIONS WITH BEGIN'S NEGOTIATING TEAM BEFORE HIS TRIP TO BEIRUT AND SAID THAT HE WENT THERE WITH A FULL UNDERSTANDING OF THE BASIC ISRAELI REQUIREMENTS IN THE TWO KEY AREAS: NORMAL RELATIONS AND SECURITY.

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5. HABIB DESCRIBED IN SUMMARY FORM HIS CONVERSATIONS IN BEIRUT WITH PRESIDENT GEMAYEL, STRESSING GEMAYEL'S CONTINUED READINESS TO "GO A LONG WAY, BUT NOT ALL AT ONCE," AND STATING THAT GEMAYEL'S LONG-RUN OBJECTIVE IS TO NORMALIZE RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL IN SUCH A WAY AS TO HAVE A FRIENDLY AND COOPERATIVE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE TWO NATIONS. HABIB SAID THAT PRESIDENT GEMAYEL HAS NOW TAKEN A DIFFICULT AND IMPORTANT

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DECISION TO PERMIT VARIOUS HIGH LEVEL ISRAELI-
LEBANESE CONTACTS, FOR EXAMPLE, THAT BETWEEN THE
TWO CHIEFS OF STAFF OF THE RESPECTIVE ARMED
FORCES AND THAT HE HAD STRESSED TO PRESIDENT
GEMAYEL THE IMPORTANCE OF PERSONAL CONTACT OF
THIS KIND TO BUILD MUTUAL CONFIDENCE AND TO

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AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY JIDDA PRIORITY
USELO RIYADH PRIORITY

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CORRECTED COPY (EXDIS CAPTION ADDED)

INCREASE THE CREDIBILITY ON BOTH SIDES ABOUT THE
ARRANGEMENTS WHICH WERE BEING WORKED OUT FOR THE
POST-WITHDRAWAL. HABIB STRESSED THAT PRESIDENT
GEMAYEL HAS NOW MANAGED TO PRODUCE A GENUINE

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CONSENSUS INCLUDING HIS MUSLIM COLLEAGUES IN SUPPORT OF THE EXTENT TO WHICH HE IS NOW PREPARED HIMSELF TO GO, BRINGING ALONG PRIME MINISTER WAZZAN WITH THIS CONSENSUS VERY WELL TO ACCEPT THE NEED TO MAKE CERTAIN ARRANGEMENTS IN THE FIELD OF RELATIONS AND OF SECURITY WHICH PREVIOUSLY HE COULD NOT HAVE ACCEPTED. HABIB ALSO DESCRIBED HIS MEETING WITH KAMAL ASSAD AND UNDERScoreD THE FACT THAT HE WAS PREPARING TO PUT THE AGREEMENT THROUGH THE LEBANESE

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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PARLIAMENT IN A VERY RAPID PROCEDURE OF PERHAPS FOUR TO FIVE DAYS ONCE IT IS ACHIEVED. HABIB ALSO MENTIONED A NUMBER OF HIS OTHER MEETINGS IN BEIRUT.

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6. HABIB REPORTED THAT PRESIDENT GEMAYEL HAD RECEIVED FURTHER ASSURANCES VIA HIS EMISSARY JEAN OBEID WHO HAD JUST RETURNED AGAIN FROM DAMASCUS, THAT THE SYRIAN COMMITMENT REMAINS CLEAR FOR SIMULTANEOUS WITHDRAWAL WITH THE ISRAELIS, REGARDLESS OF WHAT ELSE THE SYRIANS MAY SAY PUBLICLY. HABIB ALSO DESCRIBED THE STATE OF LEBANESE CONTACTS WITH THE PLO AND THE PLO POSITION AS THEY UNDERSTAND IT.

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7. HABIB THEN SUMMED UP PRESIDENT GEMAYEL'S MAIN WORRIES AS FOLLOWS: (A) WHETHER THE SYRIANS INDEED WILL WITHDRAW WHEN THE TIME COMES, DESPITE THEIR REPEATED COMMITMENT, A WORRY WHICH FOCUSES ON THE ISRAELI DEMAND FOR "OBSERVATION POSTS" OR OTHER FORM OF RESIDUAL MILITARY PRESENCE. (B) SAUDI ARABIAN ACTIONS OF A PUNITIVE SORT AGAINST LEBANESE EXPORTS, AND THE DEGREE OF NORMAL MOVEMENT OF GOODS AND SERVICES WHICH CAN BE ACCEPTED IN LIGHT OF SAUDI AND SYRIAN, AND OTHER ARAB, ATTITUDES. (HABIB STRESSED THE TOTAL DEPENDENCE OF LEBANON ON THE ARAB MARKET AND PRESIDENT GEMAYEL'S DEEP CONCERNS THAT NOTHING BE DONE WHICH WILL SACRIFICE THAT MARKET OR REMITTANCES FROM LEBANESE WORKERS.)

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8. IN LIGHT OF THESE MAJOR CONCERNS OF

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[REDACTED]

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PRESIDENT GEMAYEL'S, HABIB THEN DESCRIBED THE APPROACH WHICH THE LEBANESE ARE NOW PREPARED TO FOLLOW: THE CONCEPT OF A FORMAL AGREEMENT GOVERNING ALL ASPECTS OF RELATIONS TO BE NEGOTIATED AFTER SIX MONTHS HAD ELAPSED, A CONCEPT NOW FULLY ACCEPTED IN BEIRUT; AN INTERIM ARRANGEMENT BETWEEN WITHDRAWAL AND THE NEGOTIATION OF THAT FORMAL AGREEMENT IN WHICH THE PRIMARY PROBLEM FOR THE LEBANESE WILL BE HOW TO HANDLE THE MOVEMENT OF GOODS, SINCE THE MOVEMENT OF PEOPLE SEEMS TO BE EASIER TO PANEL THROUGH THE DEVICE OF HAVING ALL DECISIONS TAKEN IN THE JOINT SUPERVISORY COMMITTEE, WITH FULL ISRAELI PARTICIPATION. HABIB SAID REPEATEDLY THAT PRESIDENT GEMAYEL HAD NO PROBLEM WITH FREE MOVEMENT OF PEOPLE, SUBJECT TO NORMAL SECURITY CONCERNS WHICH WILL BE DEALT WITH IN A REGULAR FASHION THROUGH THE JOINT COMMITTEE, AND IN A FASHION WHICH IS NON-DISCRIMINATORY WITH RESPECT TO VARIOUS CATEGORIES OF ISRAELIS.

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9. HOWEVER, WITH RESPECT TO THE MOVEMENT OF GOODS, HABIB DESCRIBED THE SITUATION AS MORE COMPLICATED IN THE INTERIM PERIOD BECAUSE OF THE RESTRICTIONS ALREADY PLACED BY THE SAUDIS AND THE IMPLICATION THAT LEBANON'S ECONOMY COULD BE DESTROYED IF THIS ISSUE IS NOT HANDLED VERY CAREFULLY.

--
10. HABIB THEN WENT ON TO DESCRIBE THE LEBANESE PROPOSAL FOR AN AGREED AND CONTROLLED MOVEMENT OF GOODS DURING INTERIM PERIOD, WITH LIMITATION ON TYPES AND AMOUNTS AND A CAREFUL, CONTINUOUS REVIEW OF THE TRENDS. HE STRESSED THAT THIS WOULD IN EFFECT MAKE THE ARAB BOYCOTT INAPPLICABLE

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1894
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AND WOULD BE AN IMPORTANT FIRST STEP. THE LEBANESE
- "CANNOT DO IT ALL IN ONE JUMP, BUT WILL TAKE
SMALLER BITES, ALWAYS IN FULL CONSULTATIO
N." AND
AFTER SIX MONTHS, HABIB SAID, THERE WILL BE A
NEGOTIATED FORMAL AGREEMENT. THEREFORE, IT IS
CLEAR, SAID HABIB, THAT NORMALIZATION AS A CONCEPT
IS FULLY ACCEPTED NOW BY THE LEBANESE LEADERS,
INCLUDING BY THE FOREIGN MINISTER AND THE PRIME
MINISTER.

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11. HABIB THEN TOLD BEGIN THAT BRINGING THE
LEBANESE TO THIS POINT HAD BEEN A DIFFICULT
AND TIME CONSUMING TASK. WHEN HE HAD ARRIVED
IN BEIRUT THE LEBANESE HAD WANTED TO CLOSE THE
BORDER COMPLETELY FOR AT LEAST THREE MONTHS
AFTER ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL AND THEN TO "SEE
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WHAT CAN BE DONE." HABIB DESCRIBED FOR BEGIN
HOW HE HAD PERSUADED THEM THAT THIS WAS
AN IMPOSSIBLE PROPOSAL AND FINALLY BROUGHT THEM
TO ACCEPT THE LIMITED AND CONTROLLED CONCEPT
FOR MOVEMENT OF GOODS BEGINNING ON THE FIRST DAY
AFTER WITHDRAWAL, UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF THE
JOINT COMMITTEE IN WHICH BOTH ISRAEL AND THE U.S.
WOULD SIT. HABIB ALSO SAID THAT THESE INTERIM
ARRANGEMENTS WILL BE WRITTEN DOWN IN A SIDE PAPER,
OF SOME SORT, WHICH WILL BE BINDING AS AN AGREEMENT.

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12. TURNING THEN TO SECURITY ISSUES, HABIB SAID
THAT THE KEY ELEMENT CONTINUES TO BE THE ABSOLUTE
TOTAL LEBANESE RESISTENCE TO ANY RESIDUAL ISRAELI
MILITARY PRESENCE AFTER WITHDRAWAL. HE SAID THAT
THE LEBANESE POSITION IS BASED ON TWO CONSIDERATIONS:
FIRST, THAT AN IDF RESIDUAL PRESENCE IS NOT NEEDED
TO POLICE THE AREA, BUT MUCH MORE IMPORTANT,
SECOND, THAT IF THERE WERE ANY RESIDUAL PRESENCE
THE SYRIANS WOULD NOT WITHDRAW. HABIB THEN ALSO
UNDERScored THE FACT THAT THE LEBANESE LEADERS
ARE UNANIMOUS IN REJECTING ANY FORM OF PARTIAL
WITHDRAWAL; THEY WANT TO NEGOTIATE A COMPLETE
WITHDRAWAL AGREEMENT AND NOTHING ELSE. HABIB
SAID THAT IN PLACE OF ANY IDF RESIDUAL PRESENCE,
THE LEBANESE WILL DEFINITELY ACCEPT BROAD AND
VERY COMPREHENSIVE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS OF A
VARIETY OF SORTS WITH MANY PROPOSALS IN THIS AREA
WHICH THE ISRAELIS HAVE BROUGHT FORWARD. HOWEVER,

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HABIB HIGHLIGHTED TWO ISSUES WHICH HE FOUND WERE IMPOSSIBLE FOR THE LEBANESE TO ACCEPT FOR VERY IMPORTANT POLITICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL REASONS OF WHICH HE HAD BECOME CONVINCED DURING HIS

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CONVERSATIONS: A) THAT THE PEAK OF MT. JABUL BARUK CANNOT BE INCLUDED IN THE SECURITY ZONE BECAUSE OF THE ALMOST MYSTIC SIGNIFICANCE IT SEEMS TO HAVE FOR THE LEBANESE AS THE "HEART OF THEIR COUNTRY", AND B) ANY SUGGESTION THAT MAJOR HADDAD CAN REMAIN AS A COMMANDER OF THE FORCES IN THE SOUTH. IN THIS CONNECTION, HABIB STRESSED THAT HADDAD FORCES WOULD BE INTEGRATED INTO THE LEBANESE BRIGADE WHICH WILL BE STATIONED TO COVER THE SOUTHERN ZONE OF THE SECURITY AREA, AND THAT HADDAD HIMSELF WILL BE TREATED HONORABLY AND SATISFACTORILY IN SOME FASHION BY THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT.

13. AT THIS POINT BEGIN ASKED THE ONLY QUESTION HE RAISED IN THE COURSE OF HABIB'S PRESENTATION: "WHAT WILL HAPPEN TO HADDAD?" HABIB RESPONDED THAT PRESIDENT GEMAYEL AND HIS COLLEAGUES HAD RESPONDED TO THIS QUESTION BY SAYING: "LEAVE THAT ENTIRELY TO US. WE WILL TAKE CARE OF IT IN A SATISFACTORY MANNER, SATISFACTORY AS WELL TO HADDAD."

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14. HABIB WENT ON TO DESCRIBE AND ARGUE FOR THE VARIETY OF MILITARY AND INTELLIGENCE ARRANGEMENTS WHICH WOULD GIVE ADEQUATE ASSURANCE TO THE ISRAELIS THAT THE SECURITY ZONE WOULD BE KEPT FREE OF INFILTRATION BY ISRAEL'S ENEMIES.

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15. IN CONCLUDING, HABIB SUMMED UP BY SAYING THAT THE LEBANESE LEADERS, FROM PRESIDENT GEMAYEL DOWN, NOW HAVE ACHIEVED AN INTERNAL CONSENSUS WHICH WILL PERMIT THEM GOING VERY FAR WITH ISRAEL, AND THEY MERELY ASK ISRAELI UNDERSTANDING OF THEIR GENUINE AND SERIOUS PROBLEMS IN THE INTERIM PERIOD

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AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY JIDDA PRIORITY
USELO RIYADH PRIORITY

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IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL.

16. AS WE WERE LEAVING, BEGIN THEN RESPONDED BRIEFLY THAT HE HAD HAD ONLY A TELEPHONE REPORT THUS FAR FROM FOREIGN MINISTER SHAMIR ABOUT HABIB'S PREVIOUS MEETINGS, AND THAT SHAMIR'S IMPRESSION HAD BEEN THAT THE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS WERE NOT SUFFICIENT TO MEET ISRAEL'S REQUIREMENTS. HABIB ATTEMPTED TO REBUT THIS IMPRESSION BRIEFLY AND STRESSED AGAIN THAT THERE WERE TWO CRUCIAL ELEMENTS ON WHICH THE STEERING COMMITTEE SHOULD FOCUS ITS ATTENTION: A) AN ABSOLUTE REQUIREMENT THAT THERE BE NO RESIDUAL IDF PRESENCE AND B) THAT ON THE ISSUES OF NORMAL RELATIONS, THE LEBANESE COULD AGREE TO A SMALL STEP ON TRADE IN GOODS IMMEDIATELY AFTER WITHDRAWAL AND A VERY BIG STEP

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ON THE MOVEMENT OF PEOPLE.

17. BEGIN SAID THAT HE WOULD CONSIDER ALL OF THIS VERY CAREFULLY AS HE REVIEWED TOMORROW WITH THE

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STEERING COMMITTEE THE MORE DETAILED RECORD
OF THE DISCUSSIONS AND THE PROPOSALS SUBMITTED.
HE UNDERSTOOD THAT HABIB WANTED A RESPONSE ON
THE KEY ELEMENTS TOMORROW IF POSSIBLE, AND HE SAID
HE WOULD TRY TO GET WORD TO HABIB AFTER THEIR
MEETING, THAT IS SOMETIME LATE WEDNESDAY AFTERNOON.
LEWIS

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*** Current Classification ***

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LOCATOR= TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM

ERRORS= N/A

CONCEPTS= DISCUSSION, MINISTER, POLICY, TROOP WITHDRAWAL, NEGOTIATION, SECURITY, SITUATION, PEACEKEEPING FORCE

TAGS= PREL, PGOV, SY, LE, IS, XF, US, (SHAR, FARUQ AL)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE IM/IPS/CR/IR Date: 11/7/9-
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AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
USELO RIYADH
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

[REDACTED] DAMASCUS 01570

EXID **DECAPTIONED**

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, US, SY, LE, IS, XF
SUBJ: DISCUSSION WITH SYRIAN MINISTER OF STATE ON LEBANON

1. [REDACTED]

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2. DURING MARCH 1 DISCUSSION WITH SYRIAN FOREIGN MINISTRY MINISTER OF STATE FARUQ SHAR', AMBASSADOR ASKED ABOUT LATEST ROUND OF CONVERSATIONS WITH LEBANESE SPECIAL ENVOY JEAN OBEID. SHAR' RESPONDED THAT THE SYRIANS "HAVE THE IMPRESSION" THAT THE UNITED STATES IS NOT REPEAT NOT PLAYING A STRONG ENOUGH ROLE IN KEEPING THE ISRAELIS, BACKED BY THEIR OCCUPATION ARMY, FROM IMPOSING UNACCEPTABLE CONDITIONS ON THE LEBANESE FOR ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL. WE ASKED SPECIFICALLY IF OBEID HAD TOLD THE SYRIANS THAT. SHAR' REITERATED THAT THIS WAS SARG "IMPRESSION" FROM TALKS WITH OBEID.

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[REDACTED]

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3. SHAR' THEN PROBED INTENSIVELY FOR DETAILS OF ONGOING ISRAELI-LEBANESE-U.S. TALKS. HE SAID THERE ARE REPORTS THAT AN AGREEMENT HAS BEEN REACHED. WE RESPONDED THAT THERE IS NO REPEAT NO AGREEMENT PER SE AS YET ALTHOUGH THERE IS MUCH WORK GOING ON IN DRAFTING SUBCOMMITTEES AND THERE HAS BEEN PROGRESS ON NUTS AND BOLTS ISSUES ABOUT WHICH WE WERE ONLY GENERALLY INFORMED.

4. IN RESPONSE TO SHAR'S QUERY, WE SAID THAT THE PARTIES WERE STILL FAR APART ON THE BASIC ISSUES OF SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS IN SOUTHERN LEBANON AND NORMALIZATION MEASURES AND IT WAS HABIB/DRAPER'S CURRENT EFFORT TO BRIDGE THESE DIFFERENCES IN A WAY THAT WOULD ENSURE ISRAELI, SYRIAN AND PLO TROOP WITHDRAWAL, REESTABLISHMENT OF LEBANESE SOVEREIGNTY IN ALL OF LEBANON AND SECURITY FOR ISRAEL'S NORTHERN BORDER. ADDRESSING SHAR'S CONTENTION THAT THE U.S. WAS NOT DOING ENOUGH TO KEEP ISRAEL FROM IMPOSING UNACCEPTABLE CONDITIONS ON LEBANON, WE NOTED THAT THE U.S. AND LEBANESE WERE AGREED THAT EXTERNAL FORCES WITHDRAWAL MUST BE TOTAL AND THAT MEANT THAT THERE SHOULD BE NO RESIDUAL ISRAELI TROOP PRESENCE IN SOUTHERN LEBANON AFTER WITHDRAWAL AND THIS, IN U.S.-GOL

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VIEW, PRECLUDED ISRAEL'S DEMAND FOR SURVEILLANCE STATIONS MANNED BY ISRAELIS.

5. SHAR' THEN ASKED ABOUT ROLE OF HADDAD'S FORCES, UNIFIL AND POSSIBLY MNF IN SECURITY ZONE IN SOUTHERN LEBANON. HE NOTED REPORT THAT PRESIDENT REAGAN WAS PREPARED TO SEND 50,000 U.S. MARINES AS A SECURITY FORCE FOR SOUTHERN LEBANON. WE REPLIED THAT THERE WERE A NUMBER OF OPTIONS FOR THE SECURITY PRESENCE IN SOUTHERN

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[REDACTED]

PAGE 03 DAMASC 01570 011510Z

LEBANON. U.S. AND LEBANESE PREFERENCES APPEARED TO BE FOR THE SECURITY ZONE TO BE IDEALLY POLICED BY LEBANESE FORCES. THERE HAD BEEN SOME MENTION OF A ROLE FOR UNIFIL, POSSIBLY AS PROTECTION FOR PALESTINIAN REFUGEE CAMPS. RE HADDAD AND HIS FORCES, WE SAID THIS WAS A LEBANESE PROBLEM TO BE RESOLVED BY THE GOL AND THERE WAS POSSIBILITY THAT SOME OF HADDAD'S TROOPS COULD BE REINTEGRATED INTO THE LEBANESE ARMY. WE REITERATED OUR GENERAL GOAL AND THAT OF THE GOL WAS THE REESTABLISHMENT OF LEBANESE SOVEREIGNTY IN THE SOUTH AND ALL LEBANON IN THE CONTEXT OF THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL EXTERNAL FORCES AND WE WOULD CONTINUE WORKING FOR THAT GOAL. WE UNDERLINED THAT THIS WAS PRESIDENT REAGAN'S WISH AND HAD THE FULL FORCE OF THE USG BEHIND IT.

6. SHAR' EXPRESSED WISH THAT WE COULD PROVIDE HIM WITH MORE DETAILED INFORMATION ON ACTUAL PROVISIONS OF DRAFT AGREEMENTS NOW UNDER CONSIDERATION. WE SAID WE WERE UNABLE TO DO THIS SINCE WE WERE ONLY GENERALLY INFORMED. WE THEN TOOK OPPORTUNITY TO ASK SHAR' FOR RESTATEMENT OF SYRIAN POSITION ON SYRIAN TROOP WITHDRAWAL. HE RESPONDED WITH STANDARD SARG STANCE THAT THERE WOULD BE NO OBSTACLE TO SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL IN CONTEXT OF AN ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL WHICH WOULD NOT PREJUDICE LEBANESE SOVEREIGNTY AND SYRIAN SECURITY. PAGANELLI

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AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY JIDDA PRIORITY

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USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY

WHITEHOUSE WASHDC PRIORITY

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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Date: 11/7/97

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FOIA Exemptions

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E.O. 12356: DECAPTIONED

CAIRO FOR HABIB

FROM HABIB/DRAPER

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, MOPS, MARR, LE, US, IS, XF

SUBJECT: HABIB/DRAPER MISSION: MARCH 1 DISCUSSION
- ON MUTUAL RELATIONS (NORMALIZATION)

1. [REDACTED]

2. SUMMARY: ECHOING THE BLAST HE UTTERED IN THE
PLENARY SESSION ON MARCH 1, KIMCHE IN THE MUTUAL
RELATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE EXPRESSED DEEP DISSATIS-
FACTION WITH THE LEBANESE PROPOSALS ON (A) INTERIM

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ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE MOVEMENT OF GOODS AND PEOPLE
AND (2) THE LANGUAGE ON MUTUAL RELATIONS FOR THE
COVERING AGREEMENT. HE FOCUSED PARTICULARLY ON THE
DISCRIMINATORY ASPECTS OF THE INTERIM REGIME ON TRADE
WHICH PLACED CEILINGS AND LIMITS ON ISRAELI EXPORTS
TO LEBANON. KIMCHE WANTS DE FACTO ARRANGEMENTS, EVEN
DURING THE INTERIM PERIOD, EQUIVALENT TO THOSE BE-
TWEEN ITALY AND LEBANON. KHARMA DANCED AROUND THE
ISSUE AND IMPLIED THERE WAS VIRTUALLY NO DIFFERENCE

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BETWEEN THE POSITIONS OF ISRAEL AND LEBANON. DRAPER DESCRIBED THE VERY REAL LEBANESE FEARS OF ARAB RETALIATION IF TRADE FLOWS DID NOT BEGIN IN A MODEST WAY. HE ARGUED THERE WAS NOTHING INHERENTLY WRONG WITH LESS-THAN-NORMAL ARRANGEMENTS DURING AN INTERIM PERIOD (GIVEN THE HISTORY OF NON-TRADE FOR 34 YEARS), OR WITH THE PRINCIPLE OF SETTING CEILINGS WHICH COULD BE REVIEWED MONTHLY TO PROVIDE FOR EVOLUTIONARY GROWTH. IT WAS AGREED THAT ISRAELI AND LEBANESE EXPERTS SHOULD MEET TO EXAMINE THIS SUBJECT AND PREPARE LISTS OF ACCEPTABLE TERMS OF TRADE. KIMCHE ALSO THOUGHT IT WAS IMPORTANT TO DETERMINE NOW WHAT WOULD BE ADDRESSED IN THE FORMAL AGREEMENT TO BE NEGOTIATED AFTER SIX MONTHS. HE SAID THIS WAS IMPORTANT IN LIGHT OF A CERTAIN ISRAELI LOSS OF CONFIDENCE IN LEBANESE INTENTIONS AFTER ISRAEL HAD RECEIVED THE LATEST LEBANESE PROPOSALS ON MUTUAL RELATIONS FROM AMBASSADOR HABIB. THE ISRAELIS PRESSED FOR STRONGER

--
LANGUAGE IN THE COVERING AGREEMENT RELATING TO THE PRINCIPLE OF MOVEMENT OF GOODS AND PEOPLE. ON AN INFORMAL BASIS, KHARMA OFFERED SOME LANGUAGE CHANGES TO ASSIST ISRAELI CONCERNS. DURING THE AFTERNOON SESSION, THE U.S. "NON-PAPER" ON ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE

[REDACTED]

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INTERIM PERIOD WAS SIGNIFICANTLY REVISED, NOTABLY IN DESCRIBING "ENTRY AUTHORIZATIONS" AS "DE FACTO VISAS" AND IN REGULATING TRADE DURING THE INTERIM PERIOD "ACCORDING TO MUTUAL ECONOMIC INTERESTS". THIS WILL HELP KIMCHE AS HE TRIES TO SELL THE LEBANESE CONCEPTS TO THE ISRAELI CABINET STEERING COMMITTEE ON WEDNESDAY. KHARMA ACCEPTED THESE REVISIONS AD REFERENDUM. END SUMMARY.

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3. FOLLOWING UP ON HIS EARLIER STRONG BLAST IN THE PLENARY (SEPTTEL), KIMCHE OPENED THE MARCH 1 MEETING OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON MUTUAL RELATIONS BY SAYING THAT HE HAD THOUGHT IF ISRAEL WERE TO ABANDON ITS ORIGINAL POSITION ON THE MOVEMENT OF GOODS AND PERSONS, THEN THE LEBANESE PROPOSAL FOR DE FACTO ARRANGEMENTS IN THE INTERIM PERIOD WOULD ALLOW FOR AN "ALMOST FULL MOVEMENT OF PEOPLE AND GOODS". HOWEVER, IN CONTRAST TO UNDERSTOOD LIMITATIONS ON TRADE BASED ON ECONOMIC CONSIDERATION, THE ISRAELIS HAD BEEN SURPRISED TO HEAR AMBASSADOR HABIB SAY THAT THE LIMITATIONS NEEDED TO BE IMPOSED FOR POLITICAL, AS WELL AS ECONOMIC REASONS. HE ALSO STRESSED THAT ISRAEL WAS UNHAPPY WITH FORMULATIONS WHICH APPEARED TO BE RESTRICTIVE AND GIVEN GRUDGINGLY, INCLUDING ON THE MOVEMENT OF PEOPLE. HE SUGGESTED THAT THE DRAFTS

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SHOULD BE ALTERED AND SPECIFICALLY PROPOSED THAT
EXPERTS MEET IMMEDIATELY TO DISCUSS PRACTICAL TRADE
ARRANGEMENTS.

4. DRAPER DESCRIBED THE HISTORY OF THE "NON-PAPERS"
PRESENTED TO THE ISRAELIS AS A REFLECTION OF LEBANON'S

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EXDIS

POSITIONS. HE SAID IN EFFECT THAT THE ISRAELIS SHOULD
FOCUS ON THE SUBSTANCE OF THE PROPOSALS, INSTEAD OF
GETTING UPSET OVER "PRESENTATIONAL PROBLEMS".

5. AMBASSADOR KHARMA DANCED AROUND THE SUBJECT OF

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CEILINGS AND RESTRICTIONS ON TRADE, SAYING IT WAS NOT LEBANON'S INTENTION TO BE DISCRIMINATORY; NOR WERE THE TRADE RESTRICTIONS POLITICALLY MOTIVATED. HOWEVER, HE DID ALLUDE TO LEBANON'S PRACTICAL PROBLEM OF ARAB RETALIATION.

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6. KIMCHE ASKED DRAPER TO EXPLAIN WHY KHARMA WAS DESCRIBING LEBANON'S POSITION DIFFERENTLY FROM THAT CONVEYED BY AMBASSADOR HABIB TO FOREIGN MINISTER SHAMIR. DRAPER REPLIED THAT HABIB HAD DESCRIBED

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LEBANON'S VERY REAL FEAR OF ARAB RETALIATION, WHICH HAD ALREADY STARTED IN THE FORM OF SERIOUS SAUDI MEASURES, AND THE NEED TO MOVE FORWARD MODESTLY AT THE OUTSET. THERE WAS A PROBLEM OF BEING TOO CONSPICUOUS. KIMCHE ADDED THAT HABIB HAD SAID IN THE ABSENCE OF PEACE, ISRAEL COULD NOT EXPECT NORMAL RELATIONS WITH LEBANON. KHARMA SIMPLY SAID HABIB HAD REFLECTED LEBANON'S VIEWS WELL. HOWEVER, HE KEPT REITERATING THAT THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN ISRAEL AND LEBANON WERE ONLY ONES OF MAGNITUDE AND NOT DISCRIMINATION.

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7. KIMCHE SAID THAT ISRAEL FRANKLY HAD VERY LITTLE CONFIDENCE IN WHAT WOULD HAPPEN AFTER SIX MONTHS. HE SUGGESTED THAT, IN ADDITION TO A MEETING OF EXPERTS TO DECIDE UPON INTERIM TRADE ARRANGEMENTS, THE PARTIES SHOULD DECIDE NOW ON WHAT THE FDRM OF THE FINAL AGREEMENT WILL LOOK LIKE.

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8. DRAPER VIGOROUSLY INTERPOSED THAT EVERYONE SHOULD UNDERSTAND THAT THE UNITED STATES WAS TOTALLY INVOLVED IN THE PROCESS AND WAS COMMITTED TO THE ULTIMATE EXPANSION OF RELATIONS BETWEEN ISRAEL AND LEBANON. INCLUDING UP TO A PEACE TREATY. ISRAEL HAD TO ASSUME A CERTAIN AMOUNT OF CONFIDENCE IN U.S., AS WELL AS OF THE LEBANESE. WE WOULD BE IN THE JOINT COMMITTEE AND INTENDED TO PLAY A STRONG ROLE, INCLUDING AS REGARDS THE INTERPRETATION OF UNDERSTANDINGS REACHED. DRAPER SAID WE WERE WITNESS TO A DRAMATIC CHANGE IN THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES AND EVERYONE SHOULD FOCUS ON THE GLASS BEING HALF-FULL, AND NOT HALF-EMPTY. IT WAS ONLY REASONABLE, HE SAID, THAT MOVEMENTS OF PEOPLE AND GOODS IN AN INTERIM PERIOD COULD NOT BE FULLY "NORMAL". THE IMPORTANT

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THING WAS THAT THEY WOULD BEGIN. FINALLY, DRAPER SUGGESTED THAT EXPERTS MEET TO DISCUSS THE SPECIFICS OF THE TRADE RELATIONSHIP, DRAW UP LISTS OF AGREED ITEMS OF TRADE, AND DISCUSS TRADE LEVELS. KHARMA AGREED.

9. AFTER THIS DISCUSSION, THE DRAFT PARAGRAPHS IN THE COVERING AGREEMENT ON MUTUAL RELATIONS WERE REVIEWED. THE ISRAELIS IN VARIOUS WAYS TRIED ESPECIALLY TO INCORPORATE STRONGER LANGUAGE ON THE MOVEMENT OF GOODS AND PEOPLE IN ORDER TO COVER, AMONG OTHER THINGS, THE BOYCOTT ISSUE. KHARMA AND FATTAL INITIALLY RESISTED, CITING THE DIFFICULTIES TO WHICH LEBANON WOULD BE SUBJECT IF THIS SUBJECT WAS TOO BALDLY DEFINED IN A FORMAL AGREEMENT. AT THE END AND ON AN ENTIRELY INFORMAL BASIS, KHARMA SUGGESTED ADDITIONAL LANGUAGE WHICH WENT PART WAY TO MEET ISRAELI INTERESTS AND WHICH WOULD STRENGTHEN THE ARTICLE ON THE MOVEMENT OF GOODS AND PEOPLE.

10. IN THE AFTERNOON SESSION, KIMCHE, KHARMA, AND DRAPER MET ALONE. KIMCHE'S CLEAR PURPOSE WAS TO ACHIEVE A REDRAFT OF OUR U.S. "NON-PAPER" ON PROPOSED "ARRANGEMENTS DURING THE INTERIM PERIOD" FOR THE MOVEMENT OF PEOPLE AND GOODS, SO THAT HE COULD MAKE A GOOD CASE WITH THE CABINET STEERING COMMITTEE ON WEDNESDAY, MARCH 2. THE U.S. PAPER WAS ACCORDINGLY REVISED SIGNIFICANTLY, BASICALLY TO CUT OUT UNNECESSARY CODE WORDS WHICH HAD UPSET SHAMIR, ALTHOUGH KHARMA STRESSED HIS CONCURRENCE WAS ONLY AD REFERENDUM. ALSO, IN LIEU OF AGREEING TO PUT AN AGREED LIMIT ON THE AMOUNT OF TRADE WHICH COULD TAKE PLACE IN ANY GIVEN MONTH, KIMCHE SOMEHOW PERSUADED

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KHARMA TO A FORMULA FOR REGULATING TRADE "...ACCORD-
ING TO MUTUAL ECONOMIC INTERESTS". (KHARMA PROBABLY
DECIDED THAT THIS MEANT THE SAME THING IN ANY EVENT.
HE WAS EXTRAORDINARILY EAGER TO PLEASE KIMCHE.)
THE OTHER BREAKTHROUGH WAS TO SAY THAT THE "ENTRY
AUTHORIZATIONS" WHICH WOULD BE PLACED WITHIN
ISRAELI PASSPORTS FOR TRAVEL INTO LEBANON WOULD ALSO
BE KNOWN FOR PRESENTATION PURPOSES AS "DE FACTO
VISAS". "ENTRY AUTHORIZATION" IS THE NEW DESCRIPTION
OF "TRAVEL AUTHORIZATION", OUR ORIGINAL IDEA.

11. KHARMA ALSO VOLUNTEERED THAT HE WAS PREPARED
TO RECOMMEND TO HIS AUTHORITIES THAT THERE BE NO
RESTRICTIONS WHATSOEVER ON THE TRAVEL BETWEEN THE
TWO COUNTRIES ON THIRD-COUNTRY NATIONALS. HE

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AGAIN SAID HE WOULD TRY TO GET AUTHORIZATION TO DROP
THE PRESENT LEBANESE REQUIREMENT THAT PASSPORTS WITH
ISRAELI VISAS OR STAMPS NOT BE HONORED. IN
GENERAL, KHARMA PAINTED A ROSY PICTURE OF WHAT MIGHT
BE POSSIBLE IN THE INTERIM PERIOD (PROBABLY A GREAT
DEAL ROSIER THAN WHAT THE LEBANESE LEADERSHIP WILL
ALLOW), BUT DREW THE LINE, HOWEVER, AGAINST ALLOW-
ING ISRAELI GOODS AND PERSONS TO ENTER LEBANON VIA
THE PORTS OR THE INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT IN BEIRUT,
AT LEAST IN THE INTERIM PERIOD. FINALLY, KHARMA
AGREED TO EXPLORE WITH HIS GOVERNMENT IN MORE DETAIL
EXACTLY HOW THE INTERIM ARRANGEMENTS COULD BE
RECORDED (E.G., IN THE FORM OF ORAL COMMITMENTS, A

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SIDE LETTER TO THE U.S. DELEGATION, A U.S. RECORD OF
AN EXCHANGE OF REMARKS BY DELEGATION HEADS, ETC.).
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9302566

FOR AMBASSAOR PAGANELLI FROM HABIB/DRAPER

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, MOPS, PLO, XF, SY, LE, US, IS

SUBJ: HABIB/DRAPER MISSION: PROPOSED JOINT ISRAELI-
LEBANESE SUPERVISORY TEAMS

REF: DAMASCUS 1520 (NOTAL)

1. [REDACTED]
2. WE KNOW THAT WE HAVE BEEN MOVING ON EXTREMELY SENSITIVE GROUND AS REGARDS SUPERVISORY TEAMS TO OPERATE IN THE SECURITY ZONE. OUR COMMON CONCEPT IS THAT THEY WILL BE LIMITED IN NUMBER, WITH PERHAPS FOUR OR FIVE TEAMS AT MOST, WITH ONE OR TWO OFFICERS EACH FROM THE LEBANESE AND ISRAELI SIDES ON EACH TEAM.

3. THE ISRAELIS WILL NOT LIVE OR REMAIN OVERNIGHT IN LEBANON. AS DIRECTED BY THE MILITARY COMMITTEE, THEY WILL COME TO LEBANON WHEN NECESSARY AND USE LAF TRANS-

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PORT ONLY, ALWAYS IN THE COMPANY OF LEBANESE. EVEN THOUGH THE ISRAELIS MIGHT LIKE IT, THERE WILL BE NO REPEAT NO ACCOMPANYING IDF PROTECTION. ANY PROTECTION WOULD BE PROVIDED BY THE LAF AND THEN ONLY IF REQUIRED.

4. IN OTHER WORDS, WHILE ISRAELIS WILL COME INTO THE SECURITY ZONE, IT WILL NOT BE AS PART OF A RESIDUAL ISRAELI PRESENCE. THERE WILL ALSO BE ISRAEL-LEBANON CONTACT GOING BEYOND THIS, INCLUDING IN MEETINGS IN

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LEBANON OF THE MILITARY COMMITTEE.

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5. LET US MAKE IT CLEAR: THERE WILL BE NO RESIDUAL IDF PRESENCE IN LEBANON, AND THAT WILL BE THE BASIC THEME OF WHATEVER WE MENTION TO THE SYRIANS AND OTHERS. NEEDLESS TO SAY, THIS SENSITIVE SUBJECT SHOULD NOT BE ALLUDED TO IN ANY WAY WITH THE SYRIANS, UNTIL WE ARE READY TO DO SO.

6. WHEN AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE ISRAELIS AND LEBANESE IS CLOSE TO BEING REACHED, THE LEBANESE WILL BE IN TOUCH WITH THE SYRIANS, AND SO WILL WE, TO GO INTO AT LEAST SOME DETAILS INCLUDING AN IDF WITHDRAWAL. BUT UNTIL THE FINAL DIMENSIONS OF THE AGREEMENT ARE CLEAR, WE DO NOT BELIEVE IT WOULD BE WISE TO MOVE TO DETAILS ON THE GROUNDS THAT THE SYRIANS WOULD LAY DOWN DEMANDS, CONDITIONS, OR WARNINGS THAT COULD COMPLICATE THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS. GROVE

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9302566

FOR AMBASSADOR HABIB FROM AMBASSADOR DRAPER

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, MOPS, MARR, XF, LE, IS, US

SUBJECT: HABIB/DRAPER MISSION: ISRAELIS ON LATEST PRO-
POSALS

1. [REDACTED]

2. FOR YOUR MEETING WITH PRIME MINISTER BEGIN, YOU SHOULD BE AWARE THAT DURING THE OPENING PLENARY AT KHALDAH TODAY, MARCH 1, KIMCHE STATED ISRAELI REJECTION OF "YOUR LATEST (LEBANESE) PROPOSALS BROUGHT TO US THESE LAST FEW DAYS. I STATE CATEGORICALLY THAT WE CANNOT ACCEPT OR AGREE TO THE PROPOSALS WE HAVE RECEIVED." KIMCHE THREATENED, IF THE LEBANESE REFUSED TO DISCUSS CHANGES, TO RETURN TO ISRAEL FORTHWITH.

3. ALTHOUGH KIMCHE MENTIONED THAT, "IF THERE ARE TO BE NO OBSERVATION POSTS, THE OTHER SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS MUST BE STRENGTHENED," HE RESERVED HIS STRONGEST REACTION TO THE PROPOSALS ON INTERIM ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE MOVEMENT

[REDACTED]

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OF GOODS AND PERSONS: "IF THE AGREEMENT IS NOT TO GO INTO DETAIL, THE INTERIM ARRANGEMENTS MUST BE STRONG. THIS IS NOT THE CASE IN THE FORMULAS WE HAVE SEEN, AND WE CANNOT ACCEPT THEM."

4. THE ISRAELI MOOD WAS BLACKENED BY AN INCIDENT THAT OCCURRED LAST NIGHT IN BEIT MERI, WHEN THE LEBANESE ARMY WITHOUT EXPLANATION PREVENTED THE OCCURRENCE OF A CHARITY FASHION SHOW TO WHICH THE ISRAELIS HAD MADE

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ELABORATE ARRANGEMENTS TO PROVIDE ISRAELI FASHIONS. TAKING A SWIPE AT THE LEBANESE, KIMCHE COMPLAINED THAT "IN THE LAST FEW DAYS WE HAVE SEEN SOME EXAMPLES OF HOW YOU INTERPRET DE FACTO MUTUAL RELATIONS.... IF WE CANNOT WORK OUT MORE REALISTIC FORMULAS, LET'S CALL THINGS OFF AND YOU CAN CONTRIBUTE THE EXPENSES OF YOUR LUNCHEONS FOR US TO CHARITY.... OUR CONFIDENCE IN PRACTICAL ARRANGEMENTS HAS BEEN WEAKENED BY WHAT HAS HAPPENED."

5. DRAPER BACKED THE DELEGATIONS AWAY FROM AN UNPRODUCTIVE SPAT BY FOCUSING ON THE PROGRESS THAT HAD BEEN MADE IN NARROWING DIFFERENCES SINCE THE BEGINNING OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. HE CHARACTERIZED THE CONCRETE IDEAS THAT HAD BEEN PRESENTED UNDER AMB. HABIB'S AUSPICES AS "ANOTHER STEP IN THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS MEANT TO REACH ISRAELI-LEBANESE UNDERSTANDING." NOTING THAT THE THREE PARTIES COULD NOT BE EXPECTED TO HAVE REACHED FULL AGREEMENT AT THIS STAGE, HE URGED THE DELEGATIONS TO GIVE SERIOUS CONSIDERATION TO THE EFFORTS BEING MADE, AND HE CALLED UPON THE SUBCOMMITTEES THAT WOULD MEET IN THE COURSE OF THE DAY TO WORK TOWARD A GREATER DEGREE OF MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING.

6. THE SUBCOMMITTEES ARE NOW MEETING, BUT KIMCHE'S

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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REMARKS ARE SURE TO BE PROVIDED TO THE PRESS IMMEDIATELY.
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FOR ROSS FROM HABIB/DRAPER

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, MOPS, MARR, LE, US, IS, XF

SUBJECT: HABIB/DRAPER MISSION: ADVICE CONCERNING
MARCH 1 KHALDAH SESSION

1. [REDACTED]

2. DRAPER, COOLEY, HARE AND KRECZKO WILL LEAVE BEN-GURION VIA SPAR AIRCRAFT TOMORROW, MARCH 1, AT 0815 LOCAL, ARRIVING BEIRUT 0900. DRAPER AND PARTY WILL RETURN TO BEN-GURION IN THE LATE AFTER-NOON, FOLLOWING THE KHALDAH SESSIONS, WITHOUT TOUCHING BASE WITH SALEM AND OTHER LEBANESE LEADERS ON WHAT HAS TRANSPIRED IN ISRAEL SINCE WE CAME HERE.

3. YOU SHOULD IMMEDIATELY, HOWEVER, GET IN TOUCH WITH SALEM AND OTHER APPROPRIATE LEBANESE LEADERS, INCLUDING FATTAL, TO PROVIDE THE FOLLOWING GUIDANCE CONCERNING THE SESSIONS IN KHALDAH TOMORROW, WHICH DRAPER WILL REENFORCE WHEN HE SEES FATTAL AND OTHERS

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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TOMORROW:

-- A. THE LEBANESE SHDULD NOT RPT NOT TABLE ANY FULL-BLOWN DOCUMENTS, IN PARTICULAR THEIR PRESENT VERSION OF THEIR OVERALL AGREEMENT AND THE MILITARY ANNEX AND APPENDIX. THIS WOULD BE PREMATURE AND POSSIBLY COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE AT THIS STAGE.

-- B. IN THE SECURITY FIELD, THE LEBANESE SHOULD,

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HOWEVER, USE THE MILITARY ANNEX AS THE BASIS FOR WHAT THEY ARE STRIVING TO ACHIEVE WITH THE ISRAELIS IN THE SUBCOMMITTEE SESSIONS AND IN DRAFTING.. THE LEBANESE SHOULD PRESS FOR THE DETAILS WHICH SALEM MENTIONED WOULD BE NEEDED IN ORDER TO INTEGRATE THE LOCAL FORCES AND MILITIAS INTO THE MILITARY AND OTHER UNITS IN THE SOUTH. THE LEBANESE SHOULD TRY TO EXPLAIN TO THE ISRAELIS -- IN TERMS THEY USED WITH US -- HOW IMPORTANT IT IS THAT MOST OF JABAL BARUK NOT RPT NOT REMAIN IN THE SECURITY REGION. ABOVE ALL, THE LEBANESE SHOULD CONTINUE TO MAKE CLEAR HOW IMPORTANT IT IS THAT THERE BE NO RESIDUAL IDF PRESENCE IN LEBANON.

*-- C. KHARMA (AND FATTAL) SHOULD BE ENCOURAGED TO EXPOUND ON THE LEBANESE CONCEPTION FOR THE MOVEMENT OF GOODS AND PEOPLE, PARTICULARLY GOODS. THE ISRAELIS SHOULD BE MADE TO UNDERSTAND FROM THE LEBANESE THAT THERE WILL BE A SIGNIFICANT MOVEMENT OF PEOPLE, SUBJECT BASICALLY TO SECURITY AND SIMILAR RESTRICTIONS. AS FOR THE MOVEMENT OF GOODS, KHARMA SHOULD EXPLAIN HOW THEIR CONCEPT WOULD WORK IN PRACTICE. HE SHOULD NOT RPT NOT, HOWEVER, MENTION ANYTHING ABOUT THE "PRE-DATED LICENSING PROCEDURE" WHICH WAZZAN SURFACED

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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WITH US. WE HAVE NOT MENTIONED THIS IDEA TO THE ISRAELIS.

4. IN MAKING THE ABOVE POINTS, AVOID CHARACTERIZATION OF THE INITIAL ISRAELI POSITIONS IN RESPONSE TO OUR PRESENTATIONS HERE. SAY ONLY THAT THE ISRAELIS ARE CAREFULLY CONSIDERING WHAT WE HAVE PRESENTED AND THAT WE HOPE THERE WILL BE WITHIN A FEW DAYS A MEETING OF THE CABINET STEERING COMMITTEE TO CONSIDER WHAT WE HAVE SUGGESTED. GROVE

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AMEMBASSY JIDDA PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY

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DECAPTIONED

FROM AMBASSADOR HABIB

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, MOPS, MARR, LE, US, IS, XF

SUBJECT: HABIB/DRAPER MISSION: MEETING WITH KIMCHE AND

TAMIR, FEBRUARY 27

1. [REDACTED]

2. SUMMARY: DURING A TWO- AND A HALF-HOUR MEETING
SUNDAY EVENING, FEBRUARY 27, I REVIEWED IN GREAT DETAIL
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

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OUR LENGTHY DISCUSSIONS IN BEIRUT DURING THE PREVIOUS SEVERAL DAYS, FOCUSING PARTICULARLY ON THE ISSUES OF MUTUAL RELATIONS, INCLUDING AD HOC INTERIM ARRANGEMENTS, AND SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS. IN BOTH AREAS, I STRESSED THAT THE LEBANESE HAD GONE A LONG WAY TO MEETING THE ISRAELI POSITIONS, THOUGH THERE WERE STILL SEVERAL AREAS OF SPECIAL LEBANESE SENSITIVITIES OR "RED LINES" WHICH COULD NOT BE CROSSED. WE PRESENTED THREE PAPERS: A) THE AGREED LEBANESE

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LANGUAGE ON MUTUAL RELATIONS (NORMALIZATION); B) U.S.-LEBANESE AGREED UNDERSTANDINGS ON THE MOVEMENT OF GOODS AND PERSONS DURING THE INTERIM PERIOD; AND C) THE LEBANESE-APPROVED DRAFT MILITARY ANNEX AND MILITARY APPENDIX. THE ISRAELIS DID NOT REJECT LEBANESE CONCEPTS ON LANGUAGE TO DESCRIBE THE "MOVEMENT OF GOODS AND PEOPLE" IN THE COVERING AGREEMENT AND ON HOW AD HOC INTERIM ARRANGEMENTS WOULD BE HANDLED, THOUGH THEY REGISTERED SEVERAL STRONG RESERVATIONS. ON THE DRAFT MILITARY ANNEX, TAMIR REJECTED THE LEBANESE POSITIONS ON THE DRAWING OF THE SECURITY ZONE LINE WHICH WOULD EXCLUDE JABAL BARUK, ON HAVING THE U.S. PARTICIPATE IN THE MILITARY COMMITTEE, AND ON HAVING LIMITED UNIFIL DEPLOYMENT AT SIDON AND TYRE, AS WELL AS VOICING RESERVATIONS ON SEVERAL OTHER LESSER SECURITY POINTS. I REITERATED MOST EMPHATICALLY THAT THE LEBANESE CANNOT ACCEPT JABAL BARUK IN THE SECURITY ZONE. IF ISRAEL DID NOT ALSO RELINQUISH ITS POSITION ON THE FIVE "OBSERVATION POSTS", THERE WOULD BE NO AGREEMENT. WE ARE TO MEET WITH FOREIGN MINISTER SHAMIR AT 1100 HOURS, FEBRUARY 28 TO CONTINUE OUR DISCUSSIONS. END SUMMARY.

3. WE MET WITH KIMCHE, TAMIR AND THEIR AIDES FOR
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[REDACTED]

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TWO AND A HALF HOURS SUNDAY EVENING, FEBRUARY 27. I WAS ACCOMPANIED BY AMBASSADORS DRAPER AND LEWIS, GENERAL COOLEY, AND HARE.

4. I DESCRIBED THE ATMOSPHERICS OF MY TALKS IN BEIRUT, WHICH I SAID WERE VERY GOOD. GEMAYEL WAS PLAYING A STRONG AND POSITIVE ROLE AND WAZZAN WAS DEFINITELY COOPERATING. I ALSO DESCRIBED IN GENERAL TERMS LEBANON'S MOST RECENT CONTACTS WITH SYRIA, WHICH HAD BEEN VERY IMPORTANT, AND TOLD KIMCHE THAT I WOULD NOT GO TO DAMASCUS UNTIL WE WERE CLOSER TO HAVING AN AGREEMENT IN HAND. OTHERWISE, THE SYRIANS WOULD RAISE OBJECTIONS AND OTHERWISE INTERFERE IN THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS ON WHICH WE WERE EMBARKED. I ALSO DESCRIBED LEBANESE CONCERN ABOUT VARIOUS STRONG SAUDI ACTIONS CUTTING OFF TRADE FROM LEBANON AND MY PROMISE TO GEMAYEL THAT I WOULD ATTEMPT TO PERSUADE KING FADH ON THE MERITS OF THE AGREEMENT, ONCE IT WAS REACHED.

5. AFTER THIS INTRODUCTION, I DESCRIBED IN DETAIL HOW THE LEBANESE PROPOSED TO HANDLE LANGUAGE IN THE COVERING AGREEMENT ON MUTUAL RELATIONS. I PRESENTED DRAFT LANGUAGE ON THIS CONCEPT. I ALSO PROVIDED A PAPER ON U.S.-LEBANESE UNDERSTANDINGS REACHED

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SO FAR ON HOW INTERIM ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE
"MOVEMENT OF GOODS AND PERSONS" COULD BE HANDLED.
I ALSO WENT INTO CONSIDERABLE DETAIL BEYOND THE PAPER
ON HOW AD HOC INTERIM ARRANGEMENTS WOULD BE ADDRESSED
AND EMPHASIZED HOW FAR THE LEBANESE HAD GONE TO MEET
ISRAELI REQUIREMENTS IN THIS RESPECT. I ESPECIALLY
STRESSED THAT THE LEBANESE COULD GO QUITE FAR IN MAK-
ING SIDE ARRANGEMENTS ON INTERIM STEPS, INCLUDING ON
MATTERS PERTAINING TO TRADE, BUT THERE WAS A LIMIT
TO WHAT THEY COULD ACCEPT IN THE FORMAL AGREEMENT.

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EXDIS

FROM AMBASSADOR HABIB

PREDICTABLY, KIMCHE RAISED A NUMBER OF RESERVATIONS--
MOSTLY ON THE WAY MATTERS WERE "PRESENTED"-- BUT
SAID HE WANTED TO REFLECT ON THIS FURTHER. HE IS
PARTICULARLY CONCERNED HOW THE LEBANESE POSITIONS
CAN BE PUT IN A MORE PALATABLE AND ACCEPTABLE
FASHION TO HIS MINISTERS.

6. I PRESENTED THE LEBANESE DRAFT MILITARY ANNEX
AND APPENDIX (LARGELY DRAWN FROM OUR OWN CONCEPT

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PAPERS). I SAID WE HAD MADE A GENUINE EFFORT TO BRIDGE ALL OF THE POINTS WHICH TAMIR HAD RAISED AT OUR LAST SESSION. TAMIR REGISTERED STRONG OPPOSITION ON SEVERAL POINTS. HE REJECTED THE LEBANESE PROPOSAL TO DRAW THE SECURITY ZONE LINE IN A MANNER WHICH WOULD EXCLUDE PART OF JABAL BARUK. HE STATED THAT BECAUSE JABAL BARUK WAS 40 KILOMETERS FROM METULLA, THIS WAS A VITAL ISRAELI REQUIREMENT, ON WHICH THERE WAS A NATIONAL CONSENSUS. I REPLIED THAT THERE WERE EQUALLY IMPORTANT POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS ON THE LEBANESE SIDE, AND STRESSED THAT THE PROPOSED ZONE REACHED 45 KILOMETERS IN DEPTH FROM METULLA IN SEVERAL POINTS, AS WELL AS 60 KILOMETERS OR MORE FROM OTHER POINTS ON THE ISRAELI BORDER. TAMIR VOICED AGAIN ISRAEL'S OPPOSITION TO AMERICAN PARTICIPATION ON THE MILITARY COMMITTEE (EXCEPT POSSIBLY THROUGH INVITATIONS FROM TIME TO TIME) AND HIS GOVERNMENT'S REFUSAL TO ALLOW ANY UNIFIL UNITS IN THE SECURITY ZONE. HE ALSO RAISED A NUMBER OF RESERVATIONS ON SOME OTHER SECONDARY POINTS IN THE WAY OF A PRELIMINARY REACTION.

7. KIMCHE ASKED IF I HAD DISCUSSED THE FUTURE OF HADDAD. I REPLIED THAT GEMAYEL HAD SAID HIS GOVERNMENT WOULD HANDLE THIS MATTER DIRECTLY WITH HADDAD AND COME TO AN AGREEMENT TO DEAL WITH HIM IN AN HONORABLE MANNER. I INDICATED THAT THIS OUGHT TO BE SATISFACTORY TO ALL PARTIES. AS WE WERE CLOSING OUR DISCUSSION, I ALSO TOLD KIMCHE AND TAMIR UNEQUIVOCALLY THAT IT WAS NOW UP TO ISRAEL TO RELINQUISH ITS POSITION ON THE FIVE "OBSERVATION POSTS". IF THIS WAS NOT AGREED TO, I SAID FLATLY, THERE WOULD BE "NO AGREEMENT". THE SAME WAS TRUE

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AS REGARDS JABAL BARUK. THIS WAS THE ULTIMATE RED LINE FOR THE LEBANESE. ALL WERE UNITED ON THIS POINT.

8. COMMENT: WHILE INTENSIVE, AND AT TIMES QUITE HEATED, OUR DISCUSSIONS TODAY WERE NECESSARILY PRELIMINARY IN NATURE. WE HAVE AGREED TO MEET AGAIN TOMORROW MORNING WITH SHAMIR TO CONTINUE OUR DIALOGUE. WE WILL THEN SEEK TO GET THE ISRAELIS TO THE POINT OF GOING OVER A COMPLETE DRAFT AGREEMENT, ARTICLE BY ARTICLE. IT IS UNLIKELY THAT THE ISRAELI STEERING COMMITTEE WILL MEET UNTIL MID-WEEK. IN THE MEANTIME, I INTEND TO TAKE THE POSITION THAT, WHILE WE CAN CHANGE LANGUAGE HERE AND THERE, ISRAEL SHOULD ACCEPT THE THRUST OF THE LEBANESE POSITIONS ON THE TWO KEY ISSUES--SECURITY

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AND MUTUAL RELATIONS--WHICH HAVE ALREADY MOVED IN
MANY IMPORTANT WAYS TOWARDS ISRAEL'S BASIC OBJECTIVES.
END COMMENT. GROVE

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MILITARY ADDEES TREAT AS SPECAT EXCLUSIVE

FROM AMBASSADOR HABIB

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: MDPS, PREL, MARR, LE, US, IS, XF

SUBJECT: HABIB/DRAPER MISSION: PRODUCTIVE TALKS
IN LEBANON, FEBRUARY 23-26.

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1. [REDACTED]

2. SUMMARY: IN AN IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING CABLE, WE
GAVE A SUMMARY REPORT OF OUR TALKS IN LEBANON,
FEBRUARY 23-26. THE FOLLOWING REPORT IS A FULLER
DESCRIPTION OF WHAT OCCURRED. END SUMMARY.

3. IN OUR SESSIONS IN BEIRUT, FROM WEDNESDAY NIGHT

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THROUGH SATURDAY NIGHT, WE EXPLAINED THE NATURE OF OUR EXCHANGES IN ISRAEL, PARTICULARLY ON SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS AND MUTUAL RELATIONS, AND HIGHLIGHTED WHAT WOULD BE NECESSARY TO MOVE THE ISRAELIS OFF THEIR DEMANDS FOR A RESIDUAL MILITARY PRESENCE WHILE PROBING FOR A SUITABLE LEBANESE FORMULATION FOR THE MOVEMENT OF GOODS AND PEOPLE. WE PUT FORTH A NUMBER OF BRIDGING CONCEPTS THAT MIGHT MEET ISRAEL'S CONCERNS WHILE NOT CROSSING (TOO FAR) LEBANON'S RED-LINE POSITIONS. WHILE THE LEBANESE WANTED INITIALLY TO GO OVER THEIR DRAFT AGREEMENT LINE-BY-LINE, WE PERSUADED THEM TO REVIEW OUR BRIDGING FORMULATIONS ON THE KEY ISSUES FIRST.

--
4. SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS

-- WE REVIEWED SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS ON THE BASIS OF A U.S.-DRAFT "CONCEPT PAPER" WHICH TOOK INTO ACCOUNT ISRAELI COMMENTS ON AN EARLIER VERSION GIVEN TO THE ISRAELIS. OUR MAJOR POINT WAS THAT, IN ORDER TO GET THE ISRAELI CABINET STEERING COMMITTEE TO ABANDON THE ISRAELI DEMAND FOR A RESIDUAL MILITARY PRESENCE (NOW CALLED "OBSERVATION POSTS"), LEBANON WOULD HAVE TO AGREE TO CREDIBLE ALTERNATIVE SECURITY

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ARRANGEMENTS. WE MADE GOOD PROGRESS, AND THIS IS WHERE WE NOW STAND ON EACH OF THE MAJOR ISSUES:

--
5. THE SIZE OF THE SECURITY REGION

-- WE DESCRIBED AS CONCESSIONS WHAT WE HAD GOTTEN FROM THE ISRAELIS ON THE DEPTH OF THE SECURITY REGION. THEY WERE NO LONGER INSISTING ON THE "DAMUR LINE", BUT WERE PREPARED TO LOOK SERIOUSLY AT A LINE THAT FOLLOWS THE AWWALI RIVER JUST NORTH OF SIDON (37 KMS FROM METULLA) INTO THE MOUNTAINS, INCLUDING JABAL BARUK, AND THEN MOVES ALONG TOPOGRAPHICAL FEATURES ACROSS THE MOUNTAINS AND THE BIQA VALLEY WHERE IT WOULD REACH THE "POLITICALLY NECESSARY" DEPTH OF 45 KMS.

-- GEMAYEL, SALEM, WAZZAN, AND TUENI FOUGHT HARD TO KEEP JABAL BARUK -- OR AT LEAST PART OF JABAL BARUK -- OUTSIDE THE SECURITY REGION. TO THEM, JABAL BARUK WAS A POWERFUL POLITICAL SYMBOL. GEMAYEL CALLED IT "THE HEART OF LEBANON". TUENI SAID ITS EXCLUSION FROM THE SECURITY REGION WAS THE KEY TO THE ATTITUDE OF WALID JUMBLATT AND THE DRUZE TO THE ENTIRE AGREEMENT. WAZZAN SAID HE COULD NOT SURVIVE IN PARLIAMENT IF JABAL BARUK WERE IN THE ZONE. SALEM

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FEARED THAT SYRIA WOULD ALLEGE AN ISRAELI-AMERICAN CONSPIRACY HOSTILE TO SYRIAN INTERESTS IF JABAL BARUK WERE INCLUDED.

-- AFTER HEARING THE LEBANESE ARGUMENTS, I AGREED THAT WE SHOULD GO BACK TO THE ISRAELIS WITH A LINE EXCLUDING JABAL BARUK. (WE SUBSEQUENTLY DEVELOPED A NEW LINE, ADOPTED BY THE LEBANESE, WHICH EXCLUDES

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MUCH OF JABAL BARUK BUT WHICH INCLUDES--SIGNIFICANTLY--
THE ENTRANCE TO THE KEY KIFRAYAH PASS.

6. SECURITY REGION IN ISRAEL

IN PRO-FORMA TERMS, SALEM REOPENED THE POSSIBILITY
OF A SHALLOW SECURITY REGION IN ISRAEL OSTENSIBLY TO
PREVENT THE MASSING OF TROOPS ON THE BORDER BUT
ACTUALLY FOR THE PURPOSE OF EQUITY. I TOLD HIM TO
FORGET THIS IDEA AS A NON-STARTER.

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7. U.S. PARTICIPATION IN MILITARY COMMITTEE

-- AFTER I DESCRIBED ISRAELI OPPOSITION TO PERMANENT
U.S. MEMBERSHIP IN THE MILITARY COMMITTEE, SALEM AND
TUENI COUNTERED REPEATEDLY THAT U.S. PARTICIPATION
WAS ESSENTIAL AS A GUARANTEE, AS A WAY OF OVER-
COMING DIFFICULTIES ("THE ISRAELIS DO NOT DISCUSS,
THEY DICTATE", GEN. HAMDAN SAID), AND AS A POLITICAL
UMBRELLA TO NEGATE THE HOSTILE REACTION THAT BI-
LATERAL MILITARY COOPERATION WOULD ENGENDER IN THE
LEBANESE PARLIAMENT AND THE ARAB WORLD.

-- DRAPER PRESENTED TWO BRIDGING IDEAS: U.S.
PARTICIPATION FOR 12-18 MONTHS, OR U.S. PARTICIPATION
ON AN AD HOC BASIS AT THE INVITATION OF EITHER OF
THE PARTIES. HIGHLIGHTING THE LATTER, I TOLD THE
LEBANESE WE WERE NOT KEEN ON BECOMING INVOLVED IN
DAY-TO-DAY OPERATIONAL MATTERS AND VIEWED AS ADE-
QUATE THE SAFETY VALVES OF A MECHANISM FOR INVITING
U.S. ATTENDANCE IN THE MILITARY COMMITTEE FROM TIME
TO TIME AND THE REFERRAL OF DISPUTES TO THE JOINT
LIAISON COMMITTEE.

-- I SUGGESTED THAT MEETINGS OF THE MILITARY COM-
MITTEE SHOULD BE HELD SOMEWHERE WELL WITHIN THE
SECURITY REGION IN A PERMANENT LOCALE, (WHICH ALSO
COULD BE THE BASE FROM WHICH SUPERVISORY TEAMS MIGHT
MOVE). I MADE CLEAR THIS WOULD NOT BE A PLACE IN
WHICH ISRAELIS MIGHT REMAIN OVERNIGHT. THE LEBANESE
AGREED IN PRINCIPLE (THIS WILL BE HELPFUL IN OUR
EFFORTS TO GET THE ISRAELIS OFF THEIR STAND ON A
RESIDUAL IDF PRESENCE).

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--
8. JOINT SUPERVISORY TEAMS

-- WE CLARIFIED THE ISRAELI CONCEPT OF USING FOUR TO FIVE TEAMS OF ABOUT TWO OFFICERS FROM EACH PARTY FOR "DAILY" VERIFICATION AND SIMILAR ACTIVITIES IN THE SECURITY REGION, BUT EMPHASIZED THAT THE DETAILS OF THE OPERATIONS OF THESE TEAMS WOULD HAVE TO BE AGREED IN THE MILITARY COMMITTEE. WE CONFIRMED THAT THEY SHOULD NOT AND WOULD NOT OPERATE OUTSIDE THE SECURITY REGION.

--
-- THE LEBANESE DEMURRED ONLY ON INCLUDING THE NOTION OF DAILY VERIFICATION IN THE AGREEMENT. SALEM SAID THE AGREEMENT SHOULD USE "REGULAR" IN LIEU OF "DAILY", EVEN IF IN PRACTICE IT WERE DAILY.

9. INTELLIGENCE EXCHANGES AND COOPERATION

THE LEBANESE AGAIN MADE IT CLEAR OUR PROPOSALS OF SOME WEEKS AGO WOULD POSE NO PROBLEM.

--
10. FORCE LIMITATIONS

-- WE PROPOSED THAT THE LEBANESE AGREE THAT TWO LAF BRIGADES WOULD ORDINARILY BE STATIONED IN THE SECURITY ZONE, RATHER THAN THREE, AND POINTED OUT THAT ISRAEL HAD RETREATED FROM ITS OPENING POSITION OF ONLY ONE BRIGADE. GIVEN ISRAELI ACCEPTANCE OF THE ENTRY OF ADDITIONAL UNITS FOR TRAINING AND FOR EMERGENCY PURPOSES, FOLLOWING COORDINATION WITHIN THE MILITARY COMMITTEE, WE THOUGHT THIS WOULD BE SATIS-

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EXDIS

MILITARY ADDEES TREAT AS SPECAT EXCLUSIVE

FROM AMBASSADOR HABIB

FACTORY. WE SAID WE WOULD CERTAINLY SUPPORT ANY
REASONABLE LEBANESE PROPOSAL IN THE MILITARY COMMITTEE
TO BRING IN ADDED UNITS.

--

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-- ONCE WE CLARIFIED THAT OUR CONCEPT ALSO WOULD
NOT LIMIT NORMAL "CONSCRIPTION" ACTIVITIES, THE
LEBANESE ACCEPTED OUR POSITION.

11. LIMITATIONS ON ARMAMENTS

AGREEMENT WAS REACHED ON AN APPENDIX TO MILITARY
ANNEX, WHICH FORECLOSES MAN-HELD AND OTHER ANTI-
AIRCRAFT MISSILES IN THE SECURITY ZONE, BUT WHICH
OTHERWISE SHOULD GIVE THE ISRAELIS AND LEBANESE NO
PROBLEMS.

--

12. INTEG
RATION OF LOCAL FORCES

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-- WE OUTLINED WHAT WE SAW AS NECESSARY IN THIS AREA: INTEGRATION OF THE 400-500 FORMER LEBANESE ARMY PERSONNEL INTO THE BRIGADE NORMALLY STATIONED IN THE BORDER AREA; INTEGRATION OF THE 1200-1300 ADDITIONAL MILITIAMEN INTO SOME KIND OF ASSOCIATED MILITARY STRUCTURE; AND AN HONORABLE SOLUTION FOR HADDAD SHORT OF NAMING HIM MILITARY COMMANDER OR GOVERNOR OF THE SOUTH. WE STRESSED THIS SHOULD BE WORKED OUT BETWEEN HADDAD AND THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT. WE STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF THESE MEASURES TO THE PROCESS OF BUILDING UP ISRAELI CONFIDENCE IN THE SECURITY MEASURES.

-- SALEM RESPONDED CATEGORICALLY THAT THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT WOULD INTEGRATE THE FORMER LEBANESE ARMY PERSONNEL INTO THE SOUTHERN BRIGADE (TO OPERATE SOUTH OF THE ZAHRANI RIVER), WOULD INTEGRATE THE ADDITIONAL MILITIAMEN INTO SOME KIND OF MILITARY STRUCTURE (PERHAPS THE "ANSAR", OR AUXIL-

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IARIES) AND WOULD FIND A NON-REPRESSIVE SOLUTION FOR HADDAD. HE ASKED FOR DETAILS OF THE PERSONNEL TO BE INTEGRATED--NAMES, FIGURES, BREAKDOWNS--SO THAT THE COMMITMENT DID NOT BECOME OPEN-ENDED. I SAID WE WOULD SEEK SUCH DETAILS.

13. INTERNATIONAL FORCES

-- I STRESSED OUR VIEW THAT THE ONLY WAY U.N. FORCES COULD BE FORESEEN IN THE SECURITY REGION WAS IF THEY WERE GIVEN SPECIFIC TASKS ASSOCIATED WITH THE PALESTINIAN CAMPS. THEIR MANDATE MIGHT BE MADE COUNTRYWIDE, BUT IT SHOULD BE FOCUSED ON SPECIFIC TASKS ASSOCIATED WITH THE CAMPS AND THE ASSERTION OF LEBANESE AUTHORITY. ANYTHING ELSE WOULD BRING TROUBLE.

-- REGARDING THE MNF, I SAID THE USE OF U.N. FORCES WOULD MAKE ITS USE IN THE SECURITY REGION SUPERFLUOUS. IT WAS BETTER USED OUTSIDE THE SECURITY ZONE, FOR INSTANCE DURING THE WITHDRAWAL PERIOD ALONG THE BEIRUT-DAMASCUS HIGHWAY.

-- ON U.N. OBSERVERS, I ADVISED THE LEBANESE TO SAY NOTHING. ANY USE OF OBSERVERS IN THE SECURITY ZONE WOULD HAVE TO BE ON A DE FACTO BASIS. DRAPER STRESSED THAT THERE COULD BE NO FIXED POSTS, AS PRESENTLY USED BY UNTSO.

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-- COMMENT: I HAVE DELIBERATELY HELD BACK ON
ANY HINT THAT THE MNF COULD BE USED IN ANY WAY
IN THE SECURITY REGION. I DO NOT RPT NOT INTEND
TO EXAMINE THIS POSSIBILITY IN ANY WAY AS LONG
AS THE PROSPECTS OF USING UNIFIL IN THE SOUTH
REMAIN ALIVE.

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-----SALEM AND TUENI BOTH ARGUED FOR MORE FLEXIBLE

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EXDIS

MILITARY ADDEES TREAT AS SPECAT EXCLUSIVE

FROM AMBASSADOR HABIB

USE OF BOTH U.N. AND MNF UNITS, INCLUDING SERVING
SECURITY RESPONSIBILITIES IN THE SECURITY ZONE BEYOND
THE CAMP AREAS (E.G., ALONG THE TYRE-SIDON HIGHWAY).
I TOLD THEM THE ISRAELIS WOULD REJECT THIS CATEGORICALLY.

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14. MILITARY CONTACTS

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-- WE SAID THAT RAPID AND DIRECT TELEPHONE OR

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RADIO COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN LEBANESE AND ISRAELI HEADQUARTERS ALONG THE BORDER WOULD BE ESSENTIAL TO PREVENT MISUNDERSTANDINGS.

--

-- THE LEBANESE AGREED THIS COULD OCCUR, BUT PREFERRED TO KEEP THEIR AGREEMENT ORAL. I SAID THIS COULD BE DONE.

15. MUTUAL RELATIONS

WE REVIEWED MUTUAL RELATIONS ISSUES ON THE BASIS OF (A) A U.S.-DRAFT ARTICLE OF SEVERAL PARAGRAPHS, AND (B) A PAPER OUTLINING THE SPECIFIC ARRANGEMENTS COVERING COMMUNICATIONS AND THE MOVEMENT OF PEOPLE DURING THE INTERIM PERIOD PRIOR TO CONCLUSION OF MORE PERMANENT ARRANGEMENTS. WE MADE SOME PROGRESS, AND THIS IS WHERE NOW STAND ON THE MAJOR ELEMENTS:

--

-- A) MOVEMENT OF PERSONS:

- THE LEBANESE AGREED WITH OUR FORMULATION INVOLVING THE USE OF THE JOINT LIAISON COMMITTEE (WHICH WE BELIEVE THE ISRAELIS CAN ALSO ACCEPT).

-- B) MOVEMENT OF GOODS:

- HOURS WERE SPENT ON THIS ISSUE, WHICH SALEM CALLED "THE CORE OF THE DISCUSSION". BECAUSE OF ITS HIGH POLITICAL VISIBILITY IN THE ARAB WORLD,

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HE SAID, IT WAS A "MAKE-OR-BREAK, LIFE-AND-DEATH ISSUE" FOR LEBANON.

--

- WE NOTED THE IMPORTANCE OF AT LEAST "SOME LIMITED" MOVEMENT OF GOODS FOR THE ISRAELIS FROM DAY ONE. TO REFUSE ANY MOVEMENT MIGHT, I WARNED, DELAY THE ENTIRE AGREEMENT INDEFINITELY. WE PROVIDED A FORMULA WHICH THE LEBANESE REJECTED. I SAID THEN THAT THE LEBANESE HAD TO DEFINE WHAT MOVEMENT OF GOODS THEY COULD TOLERATE AND THEN TELL THE ARAB WORLD THAT WAS THE MINIMUM PRICE FOR ACHIEVING THE COMMON GOAL OF ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL. THE ISRAELIS COULD PROBABLY ACCEPT SPECIFIED AND LIMITED CATEGORIES AND PERHAPS EVEN A REASONABLE CEILING ON VOLUME.

--

- THE LEBANESE, CITING RECENT, EXTREMELY SERIOUS SAUDI ACTIONS AGAINST LEBANON, REFUSED INITIALLY TO CONTEMPLATE ANY MOVEMENT OF GOODS DURING THE INTERIM PERIOD UNLESS WE COULD ENSURE ARAB ACCEPTANCE OF

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THIS MOVEMENT. THEY CITED FIGURES TO SHOW THAT 46 PERCENT OF THEIR EXPORTS WENT TO SAUDI ARABIA AND 95 PERCENT TO THE ARAB WORLD AS A WHOLE. WITH THE SAUDIS ALREADY TAKING SERIOUS MEASURES TO INTERRUPT SAUDI-LEBANESE TRADE AS A STRONG WARNING, IT WAS ONLY A QUESTION OF TIME BEFORE THE LESS MODERATE STATES FOLLOWED SUIT. SAUDI FINANCIAL AID, LEBANESE JOBS IN SAUDI ARABIA, AND SAUDI OIL WERE ALL BEING JEOPARDIZED AS WELL. THE LEBANESE ARE AFRAID THAT THE SAUDIS WILL STOP RENEWING VISAS AND WORK PERMITS FOR LEBANESE.

- AFTER REPEATED INSISTENCE ON MY PART THAT THEY HAD TO BE MORE FLEXIBLE, THE LEBANESE BEGAN TO TALK IN TERMS OF A THREE-MONTH MORATORIUM ON "ANY" MOVEMENT OF GOODS AFTER IDF WITHDRAWAL (ALTHOUGH

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THE MOVEMENT OF PERSONS WOULD TAKE PLACE). AFTER

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MILITARY ADDEES TREAT AS SPECAT EXCLUSIVE

FROM AMBASSADOR HABIB

THAT, THEY SAID, SOME THINGS MIGHT BE POSSIBLE.
EVEN DURING THE THREE-MONTH PERIOD, IT MIGHT BE
POSSIBLE TO OPEN THE BORDER TO EXPORTS FROM THE
WEST BANK AND GAZA, END THE SECONDARY BOYCOTT, AND

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TOLERATE A CERTAIN AMOUNT OF "SMUGGLING". TO DO ANYTHING MORE, HOWEVER, WOULD LEGITIMIZE THE OPEN BORDER AND BRING ARAB WRATH TO BEAR ON LEBANON. THE SYRIANS MIGHT REFUSE TO PULL OUT THEIR TROOPS.

--
- THE LEBANESE--IN THE MOUTH OF PRIME MINISTER WAZZAN--FINALLY BROUGHT OUT ANOTHER FORMULA FOR THE LIMITED MOVEMENT OF CERTAIN GOODS, AGAIN USING THE JOINT LIAISON COMMITTEE AS A PARTIAL COVER. WITH SOME AMENDMENT, I INTEND TO EXPLORE THIS IDEA FURTHER WITH THE ISRAELIS.

-- C) COMMUNICATIONS:

THE LEBANESE BALKED OF WHAT THEY CONSIDERED AN OPEN-ENDED COMMITMENT TO DROP THEIR RESERVATIONS ON CERTAIN MULTILATERAL CONVENTIONS IN THE COMMUNICATIONS FIELD, WHICH INTER ALIA WOULD OPEN UP MAIL AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS LINKS. WE WILL TAKE THIS UP AGAIN WITH THE LEBANESE, BUT WE BELIEVE THAT IN THE END THEY WILL AGREE TO MAIL, TELEPHONE, AND OTHER COMMUNICATIONS LINKS.

--
16. OTHER ISSUES: WE DISCUSSED IN DETAIL MANY OTHER ISSUES, INCLUDING THE TIMING OF LEBANESE RATIFICATION. THE LEBANESE WANT TO MOVE THIS PROCESS RAPIDLY AFTER SIGNATURE OF THE AGREEMENT AND HAVE A COMPLICATED SCENARIO IN MIND, INCLUDING CONSULTATIONS WITH THE SYRIANS. WE ALSO DISCUSSED HOW MARTIAL LAW WOULD BE APPLIED IN PARTS OF THE SECURITY REGION, BELOW THE ZAHRANI RIVER. AFTER GOING OVER THESE AND OTHER ISSUES, I PROPOSED THAT DRAPER AND FATTAL, AND THEIR TEAMS, GO INTO A DRAFTING SESSION TO CLARIFY

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AND REFINE WHAT HAD BEEN DEVELOPED IN OUR CONSULTATIONS.

--
17. IN DRAFTING SESSIONS WHICH ALTOGETHER COVERED SOME NINE HOURS, WE PRODUCED A COVERING ISRAELI-LEBANESE AGREEMENT, WITH A MILITARY ANNEX AND AN APPENDIX DESCRIBING ARMS ORGANIC TO A LEBANESE BRIGADE. FOREIGN MINISTER SALEM ON THE EVENING OF FEBRUARY 26 CONFIRMED TO US THAT THESE DRAFTS WERE GENERALLY ACCEPTABLE TO THE LEBANESE LEADERSHIP, A FEW NITPICKS ASIDE. THE MILITARY ANNEX AND APPENDIX ARE IN GOOD ORDER AND SHOULD NOT

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CAUSE GRAVE PROBLEMS FOR THE ISRAELIS, ALTHOUGH THE NEW LINE EXCLUDING JABAL BARUK WILL BE A PROBLEM. WE STILL ASSUME THE ISRAELIS ULTIMATELY CAN BE INDUCED TO RETREAT FROM THEIR INSISTENCE ON FIVE OBSERVATION POSTS, WITH THE ADDED LEBANESE CONCESSIONS. THE COVERING AGREEMENT, HOWEVER, WHICH THE LEBANESE ARE SEEKING, STILL HAS MANY PRESENTATIONS AND OMISSIONS WHICH WILL BE TROUBLE-SOME FOR THE ISRAELIS, INCLUDING:

-- LEBANESE INSISTENCE ON LANGUAGE LINKING THE TERMINATION OF THE STATE OF WAR AND ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL, ALTHOUGH THE TWO SUBJECTS ARE IN SEPARATE MAJOR ARTICLES OF THE AGREEMENT;

-- ON THE RESOLUTION OF DISPUTES, DRAPER WAS ABLE TO WEAN FATTAL AWAY FROM THE CONCEPT OF COMPULSORY ARBITRATION, WHICH THE ISRAELIS WILL NEVER ACCEPT, BUT THE NEW FORMULATION IS NOT AS SIMPLE AS THE ISRAELIS WOULD PREFER;

-- THE LEBANESE PREFER TO ELIMINATE MUCH OF THE ISRAELI-INSPIRED PREAMBULAR LANGUAGE;

-- THE LEBANESE STILL SEEK AN ASSURANCE THAT IN

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EFFECT PREVENTS ISRAEL FROM USING LEBANESE

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FROM AMBASSADOR HABIB

TERRITORY IN A WAY THAT WOULD BE HOSTILE TO OR
ENDANGER THE SECURITY OF A THIRD PARTY, MEANING
SYRIA (ISRAEL OBJECTS TO ANYTHING SINGLING OUT
POSSIBLE ISRAELI INTENTIONS);

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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-- THE LEBANESE DO NOT WANT ANY REFERENCE TO
INTERIM ARRANGEMENTS, ALTHOUGH THEY ARE WILLING TO
DO SOMETHING IN A SIDE LETTER OR SIDE UNDERSTANDING;

-- THE LEBANESE WANT A COMMISSION TO RESOLVE PROPERTY
CLAIMS;

-- THE LEBANESE DO NOT WANT TO DECLARE IMMEDIATELY
AS NULL AND VOID UNDERTAKINGS IN TREATIES, AGREE-
MENTS, LAWS, ETC. IN CONFLICT WITH THE AGREEMENT.
WHILE THEY HAVE RETREATED FROM THE IDEA OF WAITING
A YEAR TO DO SO, THE COMPROMISE FORMULATION WE
SUGGESTED WILL BE DIFFICULT FOR THE ISRAELIS
TO ACCEPT;

-- THE LEBANESE HAVE BRACKETED OTHER LANGUAGE WHICH
THE ISRAELIS WANT, INCLUDING AGREEMENT TO APPLY IN
THEIR MUTUAL RELATIONS ALL MULTILATERAL CONVENTIONS
TO WHICH THEY ARE A PARTY (ON THE OTHER HAND,
WE SUSPECT THEY CAN BE PERSUADED TO OPEN MAIL,
TELEPHONE AND OTHER COMMUNICATIONS LINKS AFTER
WITHDRAWAL). GROVE

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MILITARY ADDEES TREAT AS SPECAT EXCLUSIVE

FROM AMBASSADOR HABIB

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, MOPS, MARR, LE, US, IS, XF

SUBJECT: HABIB/DRAPER MISSION: PRODUCTIVE TALKS IN
LEBANON, FEBRUARY 23-26

1. [REDACTED]

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2. SUMMARY: DRAPER AND I CARRIED OUT EXTENSIVE
ROUNDS OF NEGOTIATIONS AND CONSULTATIONS IN BEIRUT
FEBRUARY 23-26, JOINED BY GENERAL COOLEY AND ROSS.
WE MET AT LENGTH WITH GEMAYEL, WAZZAN, SALEM, TUENI,
TANNOUS, FATTAL, HAMDAN, ETC. -- INCLUDING IN AN ALL-
DAY SESSION WITH THE LEBANESE STEERING COMMITTEE
AND NEGOTIATING TEAM -- AND I FITTED IN TALKS SEPARATELY
WITH FIGURES OUTSIDE THE GOVERNMENT. WE FOCUSED
PRIMARILY ON CLOSING THE GAPS IN THE TWO MAJOR

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ISSUES -- SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS AND MUTUAL RELATIONS (NORMALIZATION) -- BUT ALSO WENT OVER IN DEPTH ALL OTHER ISSUES AND APPROACHES. AMONG OTHER THINGS, WE GAVE THE LEBANESE U.S.-PREPARED PAPERS ON: A) A CONCEPTUAL APPROACH TO SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS, MODELED ON THE PAPER WE HAD GIVEN THE ISRAELIS; B) SPECIFIC LANGUAGE ON NORMALIZATION FOR USE IN THE COVERING AGREEMENT; AND C) EXPLICITLY WHAT MIGHT TAKE PLACE IN "MUTUAL RELATIONS" DURING THE INTERIM PERIOD BETWEEN THE COMING INTO FORCE OF THE AGREEMENT AND THE CONCLUSION OF MORE FORMAL ARRANGEMENTS, ON WHICH NEGOTIATIONS MIGHT COMMENCE SIX MONTHS AFTER RATIFICATION.

3. WE SECURED INTER ALIA:

- A) SIGNIFICANT LEBANESE COMPROMISES ON SOME ISSUES, PARTICULARLY IN THE SECURITY FIELD;
- B) LEBANESE CLARIFICATION OF THEIR RED-LINE POSITIONS IN CERTAIN AREAS;
- C) A NEW LEBANESE APPROACH TO THE MOVEMENT OF GOODS ACROSS THE BORDER; AND

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- D) A DRAFTING EXERCISE OF SOME NINE HOURS BY DRAPER AND FATTAL, AND THEIR TEAMS, WHICH PRODUCED A COVERING ISRAELI-LEBANESE AGREEMENT, WITH A MILITARY ANNEX AND APPENDIX, WHICH FOREIGN MINISTER SALEM CONFIRMED TO US WERE GENERALLY ACCEPTABLE TO THE LEBANESE LEADERSHIP, AS OF THE EVENING OF FEBRUARY 26, A FEW NITPICKS ASIDE.

WHILE THESE DRAFT AGREEMENTS ARE NOT FULLY ACCEPTABLE TO US IN EVERY DETAIL, AND WHILE ISRAEL WILL CONTINUE TO HAVE DIFFICULTIES WITH CERTAIN OF THE FORMULATIONS AND PRESENTATIONS, THEY CONSTITUTE A BETTER BASIS ON WHICH TO IRON OUT WITH THE ISRAELIS THE REMAINING DIFFERENCES. IN THE PROCESS, WE REMAIN HOPEFUL THAT THE ISRAELIS AT THE CABINET LEVEL WILL AGREE TO RETREAT FROM THEIR PRESENT POSITION CALLING FOR RESIDUAL IDF PRESENCE IN LEBANON IN THE FORM OF FIVE OBSERVATION POSTS. I WILL BE HAVING MEETINGS WITH THE ISRAELIS COMMENCING AT FIVE P.M. TODAY, FEB. 27.
END SUMMARY.

4. THIS IS A SUMMARY REPORT. A FULLER REPORT OF OUR MEETINGS IN LEBANON WILL BE SENT IN THE NEXT NUMBERED CABLE. GROVE

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FROM AMBASSADOR HABIB

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, MOPS, MARR, LE, US, IS, XF

SUBJECT: HABIB/DRAPER MISSION: MEETING WITH FOREIGN
MINISTER SHAMIR, FEBRUARY 23

1. [REDACTED]

2. SUMMARY: I TOLD SHAMIR THAT I WAS PLEASED WITH THE PROGRESS WE HAD MADE OVER THE LAST SEVERAL DAYS AND WOULD NOW GO TO BEIRUT TO NARROW DOWN THE REMAINING DIFFERENCES. I SAID IT WAS "ESSENTIAL" THAT ISRAEL ABANDON THE CONCEPT OF FIVE OBSERVATION POSTS IF AN AGREEMENT WAS TO BE REACHED. SHAMIR SAID OUR SECURITY CONCEPT PAPER STILL NEEDED TO BE CONSIDERED

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BY THE STEERING COMMITTEE WHICH WOULD PROBABLY NOT MEET UNTIL EARLY NEXT WEEK. HE ALSO STRESSED THE NEED OF HAVING DIRECT CONTACT WITH LEBANON'S POLITICAL LEADERS IF CONFIDENCE IS TO BE ESTABLISHED BETWEEN THE TWO GOVERNMENTS. I SAID I WOULD SEE WHAT MIGHT BE DONE. SHAMIR ALSO WANTS TO HAVE A CLEARER UNDERSTANDING AND COMMITMENT FROM LEBANON ON WHAT THE FUTURE OF NORMALIZATION WILL HOLD. DURING A FOLLOW-UP MEETING WITH KIMCHE AND TAMIR, TAMIR LISTED A

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NUMBER OF SECURITY ISSUES WHICH HE SAID HAD TO BE EXPEDITIOUSLY RESOLVED IF THE TWO PRINCIPAL STUMBLING BLOCKS--THE FIVE OBSERVATION POSTS AND UNIFIL--ARE TO BE OVERCOME. END SUMMARY.

--

3. I MET WITH FOREIGN MINISTER SHAMIR AND HIS MFA COLLEAGUES FOR OVER ONE HOUR FEBRUARY 23 TO REVIEW THE STATUS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS PRIOR TO MY GOING TO BEIRUT THIS AFTERNOON. I WAS ACCOMPANIED BY AMBASSADORS DRAPER AND LEWIS, GENERAL COOLEY, AND HARE. FOLLOWING MY MEETING WITH SHAMIR, WE MET WITH KIMCHE AND TAMIR FOR A FURTHER DISCUSSION ON SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS.

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4. I TOLD SHAMIR I WAS QUITE PLEASED ON HOW MY DISCUSSIONS HAD GONE WITH KIMCHE AND TAMIR DURING THE LAST SEVERAL DAYS. IT WAS CLEAR THAT WHILE SOME THINGS WOULD HAVE TO BE PUT IN A FORMAL AGREEMENT, OTHER ISSUES WOULD HAVE TO BE DEALT WITH BY SIDE ARRANGEMENTS IN SOME FORM, REFERRING ESPECIALLY TO DE FACTO ARRANGEMENTS DURING THE INTERIM PERIOD. CONTINUING, I SAID IT WAS MY INTENTION NOW TO GO TO BEIRUT AND REVIEW POINT BY POINT ALL OF THE AREAS OF THE FORMAL AGREEMENT, AS WELL AS AD HOC ARRANGEMENTS, WITH PRESIDENT GEMAYEL AND HIS KEY ADVISORS, AS I HAD

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DONE IN JERUSALEM. I WOULD THEN PLAN TO RETURN TO ISRAEL ON SATURDAY OR SUNDAY TO CONTINUE THE PROCESS ON THIS END. MY HOPE WAS THAT IF EVERYTHING MOVED AHEAD WELL, WE COULD SOON REACH A POINT WHERE THE LEBANESE WOULD BE ABLE TO PUT A PROPOSED AGREEMENT ON THE TABLE IN THE NETANYA/KHALDE FORUM, WHERE ANY REMAINING ISSUES COULD BE QUICKLY RESOLVED. IN THIS CONTEXT, I STRESSED THE NEED OF RECEIVING A SIGNAL FROM ISRAEL THAT THE GOVERNMENT HAD MOVED AWAY FROM ITS POSITION ON THE FIVE OBSERVATION POSTS. I TOLD SHAMIR THAT THIS WAS ABSOLUTELY "ESSENTIAL," IF AN AGREEMENT WAS TO BE REACHED.

--

5. AFTER MY OPENING COMMENTS, SHAMIR STATED THAT ISRAEL NEEDED TO GAIN CONFIDENCE IN THE LEBANESE LEADERS AND ARGUED THAT IN THE ABSENCE OF DIRECT CONTACT EXCEPT WITH AMBASSADOR FATTAL AND HIS COLLEAGUES, IT WAS DIFFICULT TO DEVELOP SUCH TRUST. I SAID I UNDERSTOOD AND WOULD EXPLORE THIS POINT WHEN I WENT TO BEIRUT. ON SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS, SHAMIR SAID OUR SECURITY CONCEPT PAPER WOULD HAVE TO BE STUDIED AND CONSIDERED BY THE STEERING COMMITTEE. (SHAMIR INDICATED THE STEERING COMMITTEE WOULD PROBABLY NOT MEET UNTIL EARLY NEXT WEEK AFTER THE RETURN OF MOSHE ARENS.) SHAMIR ADDED THAT IT WAS VERY IMPORTANT FOR

HADDAD TO REMAIN IN A COMMAND POSITION IN SOUTH LEBANON IF ISRAEL WAS TO HAVE SOME CONFIDENCE IN THE SECURITY OF ITS NORTHERN BORDER. I RESTATED MY POSITION THAT HADDAD'S FUTURE WAS SOMETHING WHICH SHOULD BE WORKED OUT DIRECTLY BETWEEN THE LEBANESE AND HADDAD, AND IN AN HONORABLE MANNER.

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6. ON NORMALIZATION, SHAMIR SAID HE UNDERSTOOD, EVEN IF HE DID NOT ACCEPT, LEBANON'S NEED TO DEFER NEGOTIATIONS FOR SIX MONTHS ON A FORMAL AGREEMENT. HOWEVER, HE EMPHASIZED THE IMPORTANCE OF HAVING A CLEARER IDEA OF WHAT THE NEGOTIATIONS WOULD ACTUALLY LEAD TO IN CONCRETE TERMS, AS WELL AS HAVING A FIRMER UNDERSTANDING

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OF WHAT WOULD HAPPEN ACROSS THE BORDERS DURING THE INTERIM PERIOD. ON THE LATTER POINT, I SAID ONE COULD EXPECT A RATHER LIBERAL APPROACH TO THE MOVEMENT OF PEOPLE DURING THE INTERIM PERIOD BUT BELIEVED LEBANON WOULD TAKE A GRADUAL APPROACH TO TRADE. I SAID THE LEBANESE WERE DEEPLY WORRIED ABOUT SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL, AS WE WERE ALSO, AND WE HAD TO BE CAREFUL IN NOT GIVING THE SYRIANS A REASON FOR NOT WITHDRAWING. I TOLD SHAMIR, HOWEVER, THAT I WOULD EXPLORE WITH THE LEBANESE WAYS IN WHICH THEY COULD GIVE A FIRMER VIEW

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OF WHAT THE FUTURE WOULD HOLD, AND ADDED THAT THE AMERICAN ASSOCIATION SHOULD GIVE ASSURANCE TO ISRAEL THAT UNDERSTANDINGS AND COMMITMENTS WOULD BE MET ONCE WITHDRAWAL WAS COMPLETED.

7. FOLLOWING THIS MEETING, WE MET WITH KIMCHE AND TAMIR. TAMIR SAID THAT IF WE WERE GOING TO OVERCOME THE TWO PRINCIPAL OBSTACLES ON THE SECURITY SIDE, NAMELY, THE FIVE OBSERVATION POSTS AND UNIFIL, A NUMBER OF LESSER ISSUES HAD TO BE RESOLVED EXPEDITIOUSLY. HE WAS MAKING THIS POINT IN LIGHT OF THE SUBMISSION OF LEBANON'S MILITARY PAPER YESTERDAY IN NETANYA WHICH TAMIR SAID PUT MANY OF THE ISSUES BACK TO SQUARE ONE. THESE ISSUES INCLUDED: THE SIZE OF THE SECURITY ZONE, THE NUMBER OF BRIGADES IN THE SECURITY ZONE AND DEPLOYMENT OF THE TERRITORIAL BRIGADE, THE INTEGRATION OF LOCAL FORCES, LIMITATION OF WEAPONS, THE COMPOSITION OF THE MILITARY COMMITTEE, UN OBSERVERS, AND A RECIPROCAL SECURITY ZONE INSIDE ISRAEL. IN VIRTUALLY ALL OF THESE AREAS, TAMIR SAID LEBANON WAS BACKTRACKING OR INTRODUCING NEW ELEMENTS. SPEAKING OFF THE RECORD, TAMIR SAID HADDAD'S FUTURE WOULD HAVE TO BE RESOLVED BETWEEN HIM AND THE LEBANESE, THOUGH WE COULD NOT EXPECT ISRAEL TO BACK AWAY FROM ITS PUBLIC SUPPORT OF HADDAD.

8. TAMIR SAID THERE WAS A CONTINUING STRUGGLE IN THE GOVERNMENT BETWEEN TWO CONCEPTS. THE FIRST, WHICH HE SUBSCRIBED TO, SAW THE AGREEMENT AS BEING REACHED BETWEEN TWO LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENTS IN WHICH LEBANON WOULD HAVE RESPONSIBILITY THROUGHOUT ITS TERRITORY. THE SECOND CONCEPT, WHICH WAS STILL DOMINANT, SAW THE NEED FOR ISRAEL TO EXERCISE CONTROL OVER LEBANESE LOCAL FORCES IN THE SOUTH. THE FIVE OBSERVATION POSTS FIT

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INTO THIS LATTER CONCEPT. WHILE THE SECOND CONCEPT MIGHT PROVIDE ISRAEL WITH GREATER SHORT-TERM SECURITY, TAMIR FELT THAT THE FIRST WOULD ALLOW ISRAELI/LEBANESE RELATIONS TO DEVELOP MORE CONSTRUCTIVELY OVER THE LONG TERM. TAMIR SAID THIS WAS WHY HE PLACED SUCH IMPORTANCE ON DEVELOPING ALTERNATIVE MECHANISMS, PRIMARILY THROUGH THE MILITARY COMMITTEE, INTELLIGENCE COOPERATION, AND DIRECT COMMUNICATIONS LINKS BETWEEN COMMANDS ON BOTH SIDES OF THE BORDER, WHICH COULD SATISFY ISRAEL'S SECURITY REQUIREMENTS. KIMCHE ADDED THIS WAS WHY IT WAS ALSO IMPORTANT TO ESTABLISH, FOR EXAMPLE, THE MILITARY COMMITTEE'S OFFICE IN SIDON AND TO DEVELOP ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE FREE MOVEMENT OF PERSONS ACROSS THE BORDER DURING THE INTERIM PERIOD. THIS WOULD MAKE, KIMCHE SAID, THE TASK OF SELLING A NEW SECURITY CONCEPT TO THE MINISTERS MUCH EASIER. I SAID I UNDERSTOOD AND AGREED WITH MANY OF TAMIR'S POINTS AND WOULD PUT THEM ON MY AGENDA FOR MY DISCUSSIONS IN BEIRUT. I SAID IT WAS NECESSARY TO SHORT-CIRCUIT THE INTRODUCTION OF UNNECESSARY PROBLEMS WHICH COULD DELAY REACHING AN EARLY AGREEMENT.

9. COMMENT: I HOPE TO BE ABLE TO PIN DOWN THE LEBANESE MORE PRECISELY ON WHAT THEY CAN ACCEPT ON A DE FACTO BASIS ON THE MOVEMENT OF GOODS AND PEOPLE DURING THE INTERIM PERIOD. I SHALL ALSO TRY TO BREAK THROUGH THE VARIOUS SECONDARY SECURITY ISSUES WHICH TAMIR RAISED SO THAT WE CAN FOCUS ON BREAKING THE OBSERVATION POSTS/UNIFIL LOGJAM ON MY RETURN TO JERUSALEM. END COMMENT. LEWIS

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SECTION 01 OF 03 JERUSALEM 00620

DECAPTIONED

FROM AMBASSADOR DRAPER

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, MOPS, MARR, LE, US, IS, XF

SUBJECT: HABIB/DRAPER MISSION: FURTHER DISCUSSION
OF AD HOC ARRANGEMENTS IN THE MUTUAL RELATIONS
(NORMALIZATION) FIELD

1. [REDACTED]
2. SUMMARY: ALTERING THE POSITION HE HAD TAKEN
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

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WITH US ON FEBRUARY 21, KIMCHE TODAY AT NETANYA.
AGREED TO THE LEBANESE POSITION THAT TALKS ON A
FUTURE AGREEMENT ON THE MOVEMENT OF PEOPLE AND GOODS
COULD START SOME SIX MONTHS AFTER ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL
IN LIEU OF SIX MONTHS AFTER COMING INTO FORCE OF
THE OVERALL AGREEMENT. KHARMA ASKED FOR A MEETING
ALONE WITH KIMCHE AND ME, DURING WHICH HE EXPOSED
LEBANESE IDEAS FOR AD HOC ARRANGEMENTS DURING THE
INTERIM PERIOD TO GOVERN THE MOVEMENT OF PEOPLE AND

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GOODS, STRESSING THAT THERE COULD BE NO WRITTEN AGREEMENT, ONLY THE EQUIVALENT OF ORAL COMMITMENTS. KIMCHE SAID HE WOULD NOT RULE OUT "VERBAL" COMMITMENTS (SEE BELOW), WITNESSED BY THE U.S. SIDE, BUT STRESSED THAT IF HE WERE TO BE ABLE TO SELL THIS CONCEPT TO HIS GOVERNMENT, IT WOULD BE NECESSARY TO DESCRIBE THE PROPOSED ARRANGEMENTS IN GREAT DETAIL. IN ESSENCE, THE ISRAELI-LEBANESE DIALOGUE ON THE "MUTUAL RELATIONS" ISSUE IS PRESENTLY MOVING IN THE DIRECTION WE HAVE BEEN URGING, IN ACCORD WITH IDEAS WE HAD PROPOSED. END SUMMARY.

3. IN THE MEETING OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON MUTUAL RELATIONS HELD TODAY, FEBRUARY 22, IN NETANYA, ATTENDED BY KHARMA AND KIMCHE, AND BY ROSS AND ME, KHARMA TABLED A MORE POSITIVE FORMULATION FULLY APPROVED BY HIS GOVERNMENT. IN LIEU OF AGREEING TO CONDUCT "EXPLORATORY" TALKS SIX MONTHS AFTER IDF WITHDRAWAL, KHARMA TODAY USED THE PHRASE "...WITH A VIEW TO REACHING AGREEMENT ON THE MOVEMENT OF GOODS, PRODUCTS, AND PERSONS". KIMCHE COUNTER-PROPOSED THE FOLLOWING SENTENCE AS THE KEY TO THE AGREEMENT (DRAWING UPON THE FORMULATION HE HAD PRESENTED TO HABIB IN YESTERDAY'S MEETING, FEBRUARY 21): QUOTE

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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NOT LATER THAN SIX MONTHS AFTER THE ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THIS AGREEMENT, THE PARTIES SHALL COMMENCE, WITHIN THE JOINT LIAISON COMMITTEE, NEGOTIATIONS ON AGREEMENTS PERTAINING TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE MOVEMENT OF GOODS, PRODUCTS, AND PERSONS BETWEEN THEM ON A NON-DISCRIMINATORY BASIS END QUOTE.

4. KHARMA OBJECTED STRONGLY TO THE REFERENCE TO MOVEMENT "ON A NON-DISCRIMINATORY BASIS"... HE ALSO INSISTED THAT, FOR POLITICAL REASONS, IT WAS NECESSARY TO LINK ANY FUTURE NEGOTIATIONS ON A MORE FORMAL AGREEMENT COVERING MOVEMENT OF PEOPLE AND GOODS TO THE WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAELI FORCES AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF LEBANESE AUTHORITY ON THE BORDERS, RATHER THAN THE COMING INTO FORCE OF THE OVERALL AGREEMENT, AS KIMCHE HAD PROPOSED.

5. KIMCHE APPEARED UNUSUALLY DETERMINED TO REACH A REAL UNDERSTANDING AND BASICALLY DID NOT ARGUE HIS POSITION AT LENGTH. HE SUGGESTED SOME TIGHTENING UP OF THE LANGUAGE OF KHARMA'S DRAFT TO MAKE IT LESS SUBJECTIVE, AND ALSO REQUESTED THAT NEGOTIATIONS START "NOT LATER THAN SIX MONTHS". KHARMA APPEARED TO AGREE AD REFERENDUM TO THE FOLLOWING LANGUAGE (WHICH I TOLD HIM REFLECTED A SIGNIFICANT CONCES-

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SION ON THE ISRAELI SIDE): QUOTE NOT LATER THAN SIX MONTHS AFTER THE (COMPLETE) EVACUATION OF (THE) ISRAELI FORCES FROM LEBANON IN ACCORDANCE WITH ARTICLE OF THE AGREEMENT, UPON WHICH LEBANESE AUTHORITY WILL BE ESTABLISHED ALONG THE BOUNDARY BETWEEN ISRAEL AND LEBANON, AND IN THE LIGHT OF THE TERMINATION OF THE STATE OF WAR, THE PARTIES SHALL INITIATE, WITHIN THE JOINT LIAISON COMMITTEE, THE EXPLORATION OF FUTURE RELATIONS WITH A VIEW TO REACHING AGREEMENT DN THE MOVEMENT OF GOODS, PRODUCTS,

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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AND PERSONS END QUOTE.

6. KHARMA THEN ASKED THAT HE, KIMCHE, AND ME
MEET ALONE, WHICH WE DID FOR THE REST OF THE DAY.
IN THIS DISCUSSION, HE OUTLINED THE FOLLOWING CON-
CEPTS AND APPROACHES WHICH, IN GENERAL, TRACK WITH
WHAT GEMAYEL AND SALEM TOLD US WOULD BE THE POSI-
TION, AT LEAST AS REGARDS TO MOVEMENT OF PERSONS.
ON THE MOVEMENT OF GOODS, KHARMA GOT OUT IN FRONT
OF WHAT WE KNOW OF THE OFFICIAL LEBANESE POSITIONS,
BUT STRESSED THAT HIS COMMENTS ON THIS POINT WERE

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EXPLORATORY, PRELIMINARY AND INFORMAL. THE BASICS ARE AS FOLLOWS:

A. THE MOVEMENT OF PEOPLE AND GOODS IN THE INTERIM PERIOD BETWEEN IDF WITHDRAWAL AND THE NEGOTIATION OF A MORE FORMAL AGREEMENT BEGINNING NOT LATER THAN SIX MONTHS AFTER WITHDRAWAL HAS TO BE BASED ON "ORAL" UNDERSTANDINGS BETWEEN ISRAEL AND LEBANON WHICH, HOWEVER, COULD BE WITNESSED AND RECORDED BY THE U.S. HE STRESSED THAT THERE COULD BE NOTHING IN WRITING, SINCE THIS COULD STIMULATE THE SYRIANS TO REFUSE TO WITHDRAW. KIMCHE SUBSEQUENTLY GOT KHARMA TO AGREE AD REFERENDUM THAT THE "ORAL" UNDERSTANDINGS COULD BE MADE "VERBAL" UNDERSTANDINGS, THROUGH THE DEVICE OF HAVING EACH SIDE PUT DOWN ON PAPER ITS OWN UNDERSTANDING, A PAPER WHICH WOULD BE KEPT AND NOT EXCHANGED; THE U.S., HOWEVER, WOULD WITNESS -- PROBABLY THROUGH A SIGNATURE -- EACH PAPER, AND KEEP COPIES OF BOTH.

B. KIMCHE STRESSED THAT, IN ORDER TO SELL SUCH A CONCEPT TO HIS AUTHORITIES, THE "VERBAL" UNDERSTANDINGS WOULD HAVE TO BE FULL AND DETAILED.

C. PERMISSION FOR ISRAELIS TO ENTER LEBANON WOULD BE EFFECTED THROUGH THE MECHANISM OF THE JOINT LIAISON COMMITTEE, TO TAKE THE CURSE OFF THE DECISIONS WHICH LEBANON WOULD HAVE TO MAKE. IN ESSENCE, ISRAELIS WISHING TO VISIT LEBANON FOR ANY REASON WOULD SEND AN APPLICATION TO THE JOINT LIAISON COMMITTEE, WHICH WOULD APPROVE OR DISAPPROVE IT, AFTER WHICH APPROPRIATE INSTRUCTIONS WOULD BE ISSUED TO THE LEBANESE AUTHORITIES AT THE

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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BORDER TO PERMIT ENTRY TO THE APPLICANT OR APPLICANTS.

D. THERE WOULD BE NO DISCRIMINATION BETWEEN CATEGORIES OF ISRAELI CITIZENS, INCLUDING TOURISTS, ALTHOUGH KHARMA WAS EMPHATIC IN SAYING THAT THE LEBANESE IN THE JOINT LIAISON COMMITTEE AND ELSEWHERE WOULD PROBABLY PROHIBIT THE ENTRY OF VIRTUALLY ALL ISRAELI ARABS AS WELL AS ARABS FROM THE WEST BANK AND GAZA REGARDLESS OF THEIR PASSPORTS.

E. KHARMA WAS DOUBTFUL THAT AN OFFICIAL VISA COULD BE ISSUED AND STAMPED INTO ISRAELI PASSPORTS BUT SUGGESTED THAT A PIECE OF PAPER BE ATTACHED WITHIN THE PASSPORT WHICH WOULD BE TO ALL INTENTS AND PURPOSES A VISA. HE SAID, IN ESSENCE, THIS COULD

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BE A LAISSEZ-PASSER, BUT KIMCHE SAID THAT GIVING A PAPER THAT NAME WOULD CAUSE HIM PROBLEMS, AND KHARMA SAID THAT PERHAPS THE PAPER COULD BE CALLED AN "AUTHORIZATION".

F. IN THE INITIAL MONTHS OF THE INTERIM PERIOD, ENTRY COULD ONLY BE MADE AT AUTHORIZED POINTS ALONG THE BORDER. AFTER SOME MONTHS, ENTRY VIA AIRPORTS OR THE PORT OF BEIRUT COULD BE CONSIDERED.

G. SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS WOULD BE THE PRIME REASON FOR DENIAL OF INDIVIDUAL OR GROUP TRAVEL TO LEBANON. THE SAME, HOWEVER, WOULD APPLY TO LEBANESE CITIZENS WISHING TO GO TO ISRAEL. PERMISSION TO GO TO ISRAEL MIGHT BE WITHHELD BY THE LEBANESE AUTHORITIES IF THE LEBANESE AUTHORITIES HAD REASON TO SUSPECT SOMEONE OF SUBVERSION, CRIMINAL INTENT, ETC.

H. KHARMA THOUGHT IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE FROM THE

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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BEGINNING TO PERMIT THIRD COUNTRY NATIONALS, AND ISRAELIS ULTIMATELY AS WELL, TO TRANSIT

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LEBANON ENROUTE TO ISRAEL OR COMING FROM THERE,
AGAIN SUBJECT TO SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS.

I. AS FOR THE MOVEMENT OF GOODS, KHARMA SAID THIS
WAS MUCH MORE DELICATE. LEBANON SIMPLY COULD NOT
ABROGATE THE ARAB ECONOMIC BOYCOTT FROM DAY ONE.
IT COULD BE BROKEN DE FACTO BUT NOT DE JURE AND,

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[REDACTED]

FDR COSMETIC REASONS, THE ARAB BOYCOTT OFFICE IN LEBANON WOULD HAVE TO REMAIN OPEN. (KIMCHE WAS SURPRISINGLY SOFT ON THIS MATTER AND DID NOT ARGUE THE POINT.)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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J. EVEN GIVEN THIS STRICTURE, KHARMA SAID HE THOUGHT IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO ALLOW THE EXCHANGE OF GOODS AND PRODUCE BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES, EXCLUDING ITEMS WHICH WOULD BE DAMAGING TO THE RESPECTIVE ECONOMIES, ON A CASE BY CASE BASIS WITH THE GENERAL GUIDELINES TO BE DETERMINED BY THE JOINT LIAISON COMMITTEE. HE SAID THAT EFFORTS SHOULD BE MADE TO ACHIEVE A ROUGH EQUIVALENT BALANCE IN TRADE.

K. STANDARD TARIFFS AND FEES WOULD BE APPLIED TO ISRAELI GOODS COMING INTO LEBANON. THERE WOULD BE NO PREFERENTIAL TARIFFS.

L. IN ANSWER TO KIMCHE'S QUESTION AS TO WHAT WOULD HAPPEN IF A LEBANESE IMPORTER OF ISRAELI GOODS WERE ACCUSED OF BREAKING THE BOYCOTT, KHARMA SAID THAT THE LEBANESE BUSINESSMAN WOULD SIMPLY DRAW OUT HIS CUSTOMS RECEIPT OR ANY OTHER LICENSING DOCUMENTATION TO MAKE THE POINT THAT HE HAD BROKEN NO LEBANESE LAWS; KIMCHE APPEARED SURPRISINGLY SATISFIED WITH THIS ANSWER.

7. THROUGHOUT THIS DISCUSSION, KIMCHE ENCOURAGED KHARMA TO DEVELOP THESE IDEAS AND CONCEPTS IN MORE DETAIL. HE STRESSED CONTINUOUSLY THAT HE COULD NOT GUARANTEE THAT HIS HIGHER AUTHORITIES WOULD AGREE TO ANYTHING LIKE A VERBAL COMMITMENT, BUT SAID HE WAS READY TO ADDRESS THE ISSUES CONSTRUCTIVELY. KHARMA EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT HE WOULD BE ABLE TO SPEAK NOT LATER THAN NEXT WEEK ON GREATER AUTHORITY, PARTICULARLY ON THE QUESTION OF THE MOVE-

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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MENT OF GOODS. HE ALSO AGREED AD REFERENDUM THAT IT MIGHT BE DESIRABLE FOR REPRESENTATIVES OF THE TWO CENTRAL BANKS TO TALK OVER INFORMALLY THE BEST MEANS OF EFFECTING FINANCIAL TRANSACTIONS. FINALLY, KHARMA SAID HE WOULD RECOMMEND THAT THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT ELIMINATE ITS PRESENT REGULA-

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TION THAT NO FOREIGNER BE PERMITTED TO ENTER LEBANON WHILE BEARING AN ISRAELI STAMP OR VISA IN HIS PASSPORT. KHARMA NOTED THAT LEBANESE PASSPORTS NOW BEING ISSUED NO LONGER BEAR THE NOTATION "VALID FOR ALL COUNTRIES EXCEPT ISRAEL" ..

8. COMMENT: TODAY'S DIALOGUE BETWEEN THE ISRAELIS AND LEBANESE ON MUTUAL RELATIONS PROCEEDED IN A DIRECTION WE HAVE BEEN ENCOURAGING AND IN ACCORDANCE WITH CERTAIN PROPOSALS WE HAD BEEN MAKING. (E.G., POSSIBLE USE OF THE JOINT LIAISON COMMITTEE, ORAL COMMITMENTS ONLY, NO CATEGORIES OF PEOPLE, ETC.)
END COMMENT. COVEY

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JERUSALEM 00558

EXDIS

9302566

FOR ROSS FROM DRAPER

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, IS, LE, US, XF, MARR, MOPS
SUBJECT: HABIB/DRAPER MISSION: DRAPER TRAVEL TO AND
FROM BEIRUT FEBRUARY 17-18

1. [REDACTED] - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. I INTEND TO MAKE A QUICK TRIP TO BEIRUT AND
BACK COMMENCING THE LATE AFTERNOON OF THURSDAY,
FEBRUARY 17, FOLLOWING THE NEGOTIATING SESSION IN
NETANYA. PRESUMING I ARRIVE AT BEIRUT AIRPORT BY
NO LATER THAN 1730 LOCAL, THE TWO OF US SHOULD GO
TO SEE SALEM AND IDEALLY TUENI AS WELL. SUBJECT WOULD
BE FORMULAS ON MUTUAL RELATIONS. IF KHARMA DOES
NOT COME TO THE NETANYA MEETING, I WOULD
AT LEAST LIKE TO TOUCH BASE WITH HIM SOMETIME IN
THE EVENING.

3. I WOULD THEN RETURN TO ISRAEL THE FOLLOWING
MORNING, FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 18, IN TIME TO

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ATTEND THE NETANYA SESSION.

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[REDACTED]

4. TRANSPORT ARRANGEMENTS: PLEASE NOTIFY MARINES THAT THEIR HELO SHOULD WAIT AT NETANYA THURSDAY TO TRANSPORT ME TO BEIRUT THAT AFTERNOON. ALSO NOTIFY MARINES TO HAVE HELO RETURN ME TO NETANYA FRIDAY MORNING, DEPARTING BEIRUT 0800, WEATHER PERMITTING. WILL USE SPAR ONE OR BOTH WAYS IF WEATHER IS BAD.
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AMEMBASSY TUNIS PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY

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AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY

USELO RIYADH PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY

USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY

JCS WASHDC PRIORITY

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EXDIS

MILITARY ADDEES TREAT AS SPECAT EXCLUSIVE

FROM AMBASSADOR DRAPER

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, MOPS, HARR, LE, US, IS, XF

SUBJECT: HABIB/DRAPER MISSION: FEBRUARY 10 MEETING
AT KIRYAT SHMONA

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1. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT.

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2. SUMMARY: DESPITE THE INTERNAL CRISIS IN ISRAEL, THE 14TH PLENARY MEETING CONDUCTED ITS WORK IN A BUSINESSLIKE AND CONSTRUCTIVE MANNER. WHILE SKIRTING THE PRINCIPAL STUMBLING BLOCKS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS (EARLY WARNING STATIONS, UN OBSERVERS, UNIFIL, MOVEMENTS OF GOODS AND PEOPLE), THE SUBCOMMITTEES DID MAKE PROGRESS IN DRAFTING AND NARROWING GAPS IN OTHER AREAS. AN AD REFERENDUM TEXT OF A PREAMBLE WAS AGREED TO. VERY SIGNIFICANTLY, AND TO THE GREAT SATISFACTION OF THE LEBANESE, THE ISSUE OF PROGRAMMED WITHDRAWALS WAS ALSO AIRE. THE U.S. SIDE STRONGLY SUPPORTED THE LEBANESE REQUEST FOR DISCUSSION OF THIS TOPIC. ON MUTUAL RELATIONS, THERE WAS A FRANK PRIVATE EXCHANGE BETWEEN THE HEADS OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE OUTER LIMITS OF THE ISRAELI AND LEBANESE POSITIONS ON "MOVEMENT OF GOODS AND PERSONS" ISSUE. SOME FORWARD MOVEMENT WAS ALSO REGISTERED IN SCHEDULING INFORMAL MEETINGS OF EXPERTS NEXT WEEK. END SUMMARY.

3. AT THE BEGINNING OF THE PLENARY SESSION, KIMCHE REFERRED TO THE VISIT OF AMBASSADOR HABIB TO THE REGION AND THE INTERNAL DEBATE IN ISRAEL FOLLOWING THE ISSUANCE OF THE COMMISSION OF INQUIRY'S REPORT. HE HOPED THAT THESE TWO EVENTS WOULD NOT DISTRACT FROM THE WORK OF THE CONFERENCE. DRAPER AND FATTAL AGREED THAT THE WORK OF THE CONFERENCE SHOULD CONTINUE UNABATED AND IN A BUSINESSLIKE MANNER. KIMCHE ALSO SAID HE WANTED TO REJECT WHAT HE DESCRIBED AS "COMPLETELY UNFOUNDED" REPORTS

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APPEARING IN THE LEBANESE PRESS WHICH CAST DOUBT ON ISRAELI INTENTIONS TO LEAVE LEBANON. FATTAL REPLIED THAT HE COULD ACCEPT KIMCHE'S ASSERTION BUT NEVERTHELESS DREW ATTENTION TO THE FACT THAT MANY OF THESE REPORTS (FATTAL SPECIFICALLY CITED AN ARTICLE BY PROFESSOR AMOS PURLMUTTER IN "FOREIGN AFFAIRS") ORIGINATED OUTSIDE OF LEBANON AND FUELED SUSPICIONS AMONG THE LEBANESE PUBLIC.

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4. FATTAL ALSO RAISED THE ISSUE OF THE EVACUATION OF FOREIGN FORCES FROM LEBANON, SAYING THAT THE PLO

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AND THE SYRIANS HAD AGREED TO LEAVE LEBANON WITHIN A FRAMEWORK OF AN EVACUATION PROGRAM. HE THOUGHT THAT THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON SECURITY ISSUES SHOULD ADDRESS THE ISSUE OF ESTABLISHING A CALENDAR FOR EVACUATION. KINCHE IMMEDIATELY LISTED THE FOUR FAMILIAR CONDITIONS FOR ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL AND ADDED THAT IF THE PLO BEGAN TO LEAVE LEBANON, THIS WOULD GREATLY ACCELERATE THE ENTIRE NEGOTIATING PROCESS. HE ALSO REFERRED BACK TO THE PREVIOUS ISRAELI PROPOSAL FOR A PARTIAL WITHDRAWAL.

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5. DRAPER INTERVENED TO SAY THAT HE THOUGHT IT WOULD BE HELPFUL IN THE NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE SYRIANS AND PLO IF THE ISRAELIS COULD AT LEAST PRESENT THEIR GENERAL CONCEPTS FOR WITHDRAWAL, NOT JUST ON THE MATTER OF TIMIT ALSO ON HOW IT WOULD BE PHASED IN GEOGRAPHICAL TERMS. KINCHE REPLIED THAT THE ISRAELI SIDE WOULD BE PREPARED TO DISCUSS THESE ISSUES IN THE MILITARY SUBCOMMITTEE. HE ALSO REFERRED BACK TO EARLIER DECLARATIONS BY GENERAL TAMIR IN WHICH TAMIR HAD SAID ISRAEL WOULD BE READY TO WITHDRAW

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EXDIS

IN THE SAME TIME FRAME AS THE SYRIANS, WHATEVER
THAT MIGHT BE. HE ALSO SAID IT WOULD BE HELPFUL TO
HAVE SOMETHING MORE SPECIFIC ON HOW THE SYRIANS
ENVISAGED THE WITHDRAWAL PROCESS. FATTAL AND DRAPER
REITERATED THAT IT WOULD BE USEFUL IF THE CONFERENCE
COULD AT LEAST CRYSTALLIZE ITS OWN THINKING ON A
WITHDRAWAL CALENDAR. THE POSITIVE ISRAELI RESPONSE
TO U.S.-LEBANESE URGINGS WAS A CONSTRUCTIVE DEVELOPMENT.

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6. FOLLOWING ARE SUBCOMMITTEE REPORTS OF THE THREE

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SUBCOMMITTEES.

SECURITY AND WITHDRAWAL SUBCOMMITTEE

7. KEY ISSUES ADDRESSED WERE WITHDRAWAL AND SECURITY ZONE ARRANGEMENTS. ON WITHDRAWAL, THE ISRAELIS PREFACED DISCUSSION BY REITERATING THEIR PREVIOUS CONDITIONS, THEN INDICATED THEY WOULD NEED ABOUT TEN WEEKS TO COMPLETE A WITHDRAWAL FROM LEBANON, BUT THIS WAS TOTALLY LOGISTICS DEPENDENT AND IT COULD BE ACCELERATED IF THE SYRIANS WITHDREW MORE RAPIDLY. THE ISRAELIS OFFERED A PARTIAL WITHDRAWAL FROM PRESENT POSITIONS IN WESTERN LEBANON TO THE DAMUR ROAD IN FIVE WEEKS BUT SAID THAT IN NO CASE WOULD THEY WITHDRAW FROM THEIR PRESENT POSITIONS IN THE BEKA'A UNLESS IT WAS IN THE CONTEXT OF A TOTAL WITHDRAWAL. THE KEY POINT IN THE DISCUSSIONS WAS AN ISRAELI ASSURANCE THAT, ONCE THE WITHDRAWAL BEGAN, IT WOULD BE A MOVE ON TO A TOTAL WITHDRAWAL ALL THE WAY BACK TO THE ISRAELI BORDER. IT WOULD NOT BE DONE IN STAGES, OTHER THAN IN THE CASE OF THE INITIAL PULLBACK. THE ISRAELI DELEGATION WAS RELUCTANT TO COMMIT THEMSELVES TO FINAL TIME SCHEDULES AS THEY SAID THAT WAS A PROBLEM FOR THE LOGISTICIANS TO HANDLE. HOWEVER, THEY WOULD BE WILLING TO DISCUSS DETAILS SUCH AS ENTRY OF LEBANESE UNITS OR LIAISON PERSONNEL FOR COORDINATION TO FACILITATE THE WITHDRAWAL AND LEBANESE TAKEOVER. THIS, HOWEVER, WAS A VERY TENTATIVE OFFER AND HEAVILY CAVEATED BY STATEMENTS THAT THESE ACTIONS DEPENDED UPON THE SITUATION BOTH

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WITH THE NEGOTIATIONS AND SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL.

8. THE AFTERNOON SESSION OF THE SECURITY AND WITHDRAWAL SUBCOMMITTEE WAS DEVOTED TO DISCUSSING THE BOUNDARIES OF THE SECURITY ZONE AT ISRAELI INSISTENCE. IN A SMALL GROUP SESSION BETWEEN THE DELEGATION HEADS AND IN RESPONSE TO HYPOTHETICAL SITUATIONS, THE ISRAELI HEAD OF THE DELEGATION INDICATED THAT THERE COULD BE FLEXIBILITY ON FORCE AND OTHER LIMITATIONS IN THE SECURITY ZONE PROPOSED BY ISRAEL IF THE 45 KILOMETER LIMIT WAS AGREED TO AND CERTAIN CONCESSIONS TO

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[REDACTED]

THE ASSIMILATION OF LOCAL FORCES WERE MADE. HOWEVER, THE ISRAELIS SAID THEY COULD NOT DISCUSS THIS IN ANY DETAIL AT THIS TIME SINCE THEY HAD SPECIFIC INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE CURRENT NEGOTIATING SESSIONS.

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SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE TERMINATION OF STATE OF WAR

9. SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERMINATION OF STATE OF WAR REACHED AD REFERENDUM AGREEMENT ON A PREAMBLE. SUBCOMMITTEE ALSO CONTINUED DRAFTING WORK ON

(1) TECHNICAL CLAUSES TO BRING THE AGREEMENT INTO FORCE; AND

(2) THE SECTION OF THE AGREEMENT WHICH WILL DEAL WITH THE TERMINATION OF THE STATE OF WAR AND RELATED ISSUES.

ON BOTH OF THESE SUBJECTS ISRAELI DELEGATION PRESENTED REVISED DRAFTS WHICH OMITTED SOME PREVIOUS POLITICAL LANGUAGE. SESSION WAS PRODUCTIVE, WITH ISRAELI NEGOTIATORS SHOWING A FAIR AMOUNT OF SENSITIVITY TO LEBANESE DRAFTING CONCERNS.

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SUBCOMMITTEE ON MUTUAL RELATIONS

10. AMBASSADOR KHARMA WAS NOT PREPARED --OTHER
THAN IN A PRIVATE TALK--TO DISCUSS THE CORE ISSUE
OF THE MOVEMENT OF GOODS AND PERSONS. HOWEVER, IT IS
HOPED THAT THIS SUBJECT WILL BE DISCUSSED IN KHALDAH
ON MONDAY. BOTH SIDES HAD SOME ADDITIONAL COMMENTS

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ON THE AD REFERENDUM TEXT ON LIAISON. THE ISRAELIS
SUBMITTED TWO ADDITIONAL DRAFT ARTICLES FOR CONSIDERA-

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TION: NAMELY, ON MULTINATIONAL CONVENTIONS AND AN UMBRELLA ARTICLE SPELLING OUT THE VARIOUS FIELDS (COMMERICAL, TRANSPORTATION, TOURISM, ETC) TO BE DEVELOPED IN THE NEW RELATIONSHIP. KHARMA TOOK BOTH ARTICLES UNDER ADVISEMENT, BUT BRISTLED ON THE INTRODUCTION OF THE SECOND ISRAELI UMBRELLA PROPOSAL. KHARMA SAID HIS SIDE WAS IN THE PROCESS OF FORMING TEAMS IN THE AREAS OF NARCOTICS, SMUGGLING, ECONOMICS, AND COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY, WHICH COULD MEET AS EARLY AS NEXT WEEK. HE EMPHASIZED THAT THESE MEETINGS WOULD BE COMPLETELY UNOFFICIAL, INFORMAL AND WITHOUT PUBLICITY. KIMCHE SUGGESTED THAT THE EXPERTS BEGIN MEETING IN NETANYA NEXT WEEK. OVERALL, THE TONE OF THE MEETING WAS CONSTRUCTIVE AND BUSINESSLIKE. DURING THE AFTERNOON SESSION, THE HEADS OF THE SUBCOMMITTEES MET PRIVATELY AND HAD A USEFUL EXCHANGE OF THEIR RESPECTIVE LIMITS ON THE "MOVEMENT OF GOODS AND PERSONS" ISSUE.

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PRESS GUIDANCE AND FUTURE MEETINGS

11. SIGNIFICANTLY, IT WAS AGREED THAT IMPORTANT PROGRESS HAD BEEN MADE IN TODAY'S MEETINGS AND THE PRESS GUIDANCE REFLECTED THIS CONCLUSION (SEPTEL). THE LEBANESE WERE PARTICULARLY PLEASED THAT PRESS GUIDANCE REFLECTED THE FACT THAT A DISCUSSION--FOR THE FIRST TIME--HAD OCCURRED ON ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL SCHEDULES, EVEN IF IT WERE PUT IN THE CONTEXT OF "FUTURE WITHDRAWALS." THE ISRAELI-LEBANESE NEGOTIATIONS WILL RESUME IN

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PLENARY AND SUBCOMMITTEE SESSION ON MONDAY, FEBRUARY 14, IN KHALDAH. SESSIONS THEREAFTER WILL BE HELD IN NETANYA ON THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 17, AND FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 18, UP TO MID-DAY.

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12. COMMENT: THE INTERESTING ASPECT OF TODAY'S MEETING WAS THAT SUBSTANTIAL PROGRESS WAS MADE DESPITE THE ISRAELI CABINET CRISIS OVER THE KAHAN COMMISSION REPORT AND THE ARRIVAL OF AMBASSADOR HABIB IN THE AREA. IT WAS MADE CLEAR BY THE ISRAELI DELEGATION THAT NO SIGNIFICANT RETREAT FROM THE ISRAELI HARD-

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LINE POSITION ON SUCH MATTERS AS ISRAELI "STATIONS" IN SOUTHERN LEBANON COULD BE MADE AT THIS TIME. IN FACT, THE PROPOSALS TO HAVE SESSIONS LATER NEXT WEEK IN NETANYA REFLECTED THE FACT THAT THE ISRAELI DELEGATION DID NOT BELIEVE THAT IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO DEBATE CERTAIN BASIC ISSUES BEFORE THEN. KIMCHE END SHOWED HIS WILLINGNESS TO ENGAGE IN DETAILED BUT INFORMAL DEBATES ON THE NORMALIZATION ISSUE, WHILE MAKING IT CLEAR THAT HE WOULD NOT BE MAKING DAY-BY-DAY REPORTS BACK TO THE CABINET STEERING COMMITTEE. THIS IS A HELPFUL AND CONSTRUCTIVE DEVELOPMENT, AND SUGGESTS THAT SOME PROGRESS CAN BE MADE EVEN IF THE ISRAELI DELEGATION IS HEMMED IN BY CONSTRAINTS RELATED TO THE CABINET CRISIS. END COMMENT. COVEY.

NOTE BY OC/T: PARA. 12., LINE 13 AS RECEIVED. CORRECTION TO FOLLOW.

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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PINT, PINS, MOPS, MILI, SY, LE, SY, US, IS, XF
SUBJECT: HABIB/DRAPER MISSION: MEETING WITH PRIME
MINISTER BEGIN, JANUARY 3, 1983

1. ENTIRE TEXT

2. SUMMARY: I MET WITH BEGIN, SHARON, AND SHAMIR ON
SUNDAY NIGHT, JANUARY 23, FOR AN EXTENDED SUMMARY OF
WHERE WE STAND NOW IN THE LEBANON TALKS. I BRIEFED THE

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ISRAELIS ON MY MEETINGS IN BEIRUT, CAIRO, AND RIYADH AND

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GAVE THEM A DETAILED BLOW BY BLOW OF LEBANESE REACTION TO THE LATEST ISRAELI POSITIONS. THE LEBANESE HAD MADE AN IMPASSIONED APPEAL TO ME TO TRY TO HELP THE ISRAELIS UNDERSTAND THAT AMIN GEMAYEL COULD NOT GO BEYOND CERTAIN LIMITS IN NORMALIZATION AND SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS. I SAID THE LEBANESE HAD INSISTED THAT THERE MUST BE NO RESIDUAL ISRAELI MILITARY PRESENCE REMAINING IN LEBANON, BUT THAT THEY HAD NOT MADE THEIR OWN CAREFUL ANALYSIS OF HOW FAR THEY COULD GO ON NORMALIZATION. I DESCRIBED MUBARAK'S WILLINGNESS TO SUPPORT THE LEBANESE IN LIMITED NORMALIZATION WITH ISRAEL AS WELL AS MUBARAK'S DESCRIPTION OF THE DIFFICULTIES THE LEBANESE WILL HAVE IN GOING TOO FAR. I ALSO DESCRIBED FAHD'S INSISTENCE ON TOTAL ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM LEBANON AND HIS REJECTION OF ANY CONCEPTS OF NORMALIZATION BETWEEN LEBANON AND ISRAEL, BUT ALSO NOTED THAT FAHD WAS REASSURING ON THE SIMULTANEOUS WITHDRAWAL OF SYRIAN FORCES.

SHARON ADDED ADDITIONAL DESCRIPTION OF THE WATCH STATIONS WHICH HE NOW DESCRIBES AS ANTI-TERRORIST SUPERVISION STATIONS, NOT RELYING ON ELECTRONIC GEAR BUT ON PEOPLE. BEGIN SAID THAT A MAJORITY OF THE CABINET HAD AGREED AGAIN TODAY TO STAND BY THE DEMAND FOR THESE SUPERVISION STATIONS AND TO SUPPORT THE ISRAELI NEGOTIATING POSITION WHICH HAD BEEN DESCRIBED TO US. BEGIN SAID ISRAEL ALSO WANTS COMPLETE WITHDRAWAL FROM LEBANON BUT CANNOT WITHDRAW WITHOUT SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS. SHARON FURTHER DESCRIBED THE SPECIAL STATUS OF THE LOCAL MILITIAS IN THE SOUTHERN PART OF LEBANON CONCLUDING THAT THERE MUST BE SOME LEFT IN SOUTH LEBANON THAT THE ISRAELIS TRUST MORE THAN OTHER FORCES. BEGIN SAID ISRAEL MUST HAVE SOME MORE PATIENCE AND TALK THROUGH THE DIFFICULTIES DIRECTLY WITH

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THE LEBANESE. HE THANKED ME FOR DOING WHAT HAD BEEN DONE. I CONCLUDED BY NOTING THAT I WAS DISAPPOINTED THAT WE REMAINED SO FAR APART, THAT PERHAPS WE COULD BRIDGE THIS GAP LATER. I THEN SPENT A FEW MINUTES PRIVATELY ALI IKOL 48.3 .8 .8 534 \$748, & 2#8: # 8 \$3)8:343\$ 5#3 048:-53 .3 -&3 2#8: # 5#3 043 8\$3,5 #- \$ - (3\$.3 59 \$3)8:34.
END SUMMARY.

3. I MET WITH PRIME MINISTER BEGIN THE EVENING OF JANUARY 23 FOR TWO HOURS. BEGIN WAS JOINED BY DEFENSE

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MINISTER SHARON, FOREIGN MINISTER SHAMIR, KIMCHE, BEN MEIR, RUBENSTEIN, TAMIR, MERIDOR AND AIDES FROM THE PRIME MINISTER'S OFFICE AND THE DEFENSE MINISTRY. AMBASSADORS LEWIS AND DRAPER, DCM FLATEN AND KRECZKO JOINED ME.

4. AT BEGIN'S REQUEST, I PROVIDED A SUMMARY OF MY MEETINGS IN LEBANON, EGYPT AND SAUDI ARABIA.

5. LEBANON. I TOLD BEGIN I HAD REVIEWED ALL OF THE MAJOR POINTS WITH GEMAYEL PRIVATELY AND WITH HIS WORKING TEAM. GEMAYEL HAD RECENTLY RECEIVED MESSAGES FROM SAUDI ARABIA AND SYRIA, AND WAS VERY CONSCIOUS OF THE DILEMMA OF MAINTAINING GOOD ARAB RELATIONS, OBTAINING SYRIAN AND PLO WITHDRAWAL, AND MEETING ISRAELI POSITIONS. HE HAD ASKED ME TO IMPRESS ON BEGIN THE LIMITS ON HOW FAR HE COULD GO IMMEDIATELY, ALTHOUGH HE REAFFIRMED HIS DESIRE FOR A MORE NORMAL ISRAEL/LEBANON RELATION OVER TIME.

6. I SAID GEMAYEL WAS READY TO ACCEPT REASONABLE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS, SO THAT LEBANON WOULD NEVER BE A BASE FOR HOSTILE ACTS AGAINST ISRAEL. HOWEVER, GEMAYEL REJECTS ANY RESIDUAL ISRAELI PRESENCE, INCLUDING EARLY WARNING STATIONS, AND HE INSISTS ON SOME INTERNATIONAL PRESENCE-- EITHER MNF OR UNIFIL--ALONGSIDE THE LEBANESE ARMY IN THE SOUTH. HOWEVER, GEMAYEL WILL ACCEPT STATIONS MANNED

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BY UNIFIL, MNF OR AN ACCEPTABLE THIRD PARTY. WITH RESPECT TO WITHDRAWAL, GEMAYEL ACCEPTS THE CONCEPT OF SIMULTANEOUS SYRIAN AND ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL. HE UNDERSTANDS THE ISRAELI POSITION THAT THE PLO SHOULD WITHDRAW COMPLETELY FIRST BUT HE IS UNWILLING TO COMMIT HIMSELF TO OBTAINING THIS BECAUSE IT WILL BE DIFFICULT TO BRING ABOUT.

7. I EXPLAINED THAT GEMAYEL OPPOSED PARTIAL WITHDRAWAL, EXCEPT AS PART OF AN AGREED PACKAGE FOR TOTAL WITHDRAWAL. OTHERWISE, HE WAS CONCERNED THAT AFTER THE PARTIAL WITHDRAWAL, THERE WOULD BE A PROTRACTED NEGOTIATION, DURING WHICH SOUTHERN LEBANON WOULD BECOME AN ISRAELI PROTECTORATE AND THE BEKAA WOULD BECOME A SYRIAN PROTECTORATE.

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8. WITH RESPECT TO NORMALIZATION, I SAID THAT THE LEBANESE HAD STILL NOT FORMULATED A PRECISE POSITION, AS HAD BEEN REFLECTED BY THE APPROACH OF THE LEBANESE NEGOTIATORS AT THE LAST PUBLIC NEGOTIATING SESSION (KIMCHE CONCURRED WITH THIS ASSESSMENT). GEMAYEL SEEMED PREPARED TO GO SOME DISTANCE, BUT COULD NOT ACCEPT NORMALIZATION IMMEDIATELY. HE NEEDED TO START MODESTLY, AND WAS WILLING TO STATE THAT THERE WAS NO STATE OF WAR BETWEEN ISRAEL AND LEBANON. HE WOULD ACCEPT ARRANGEMENTS CONCERNING THE MOVEMENT OF GOODS AND PEOPLE, AND PROBABLY SELL THEM ON THE BASIS THAT LEBANON WAS ONLY NOW BEGINNING TO REGULATE THEIR FLOW. HOWEVER, HE WAS CONVINCED THAT USE OF WORDS LIKE "FREE MOVEMENT" OR "OPEN BORDERS" WOULD PRECLUDE SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL AND BRING SAUDI RETALIATION. THEREFORE, GEMAYEL WOULD STRESS A MODEST BEGINNING, AND A CONTINUING DIALOGUE. I SAID

[REDACTED]

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I THOUGHT I HAD SUCCEEDED IN CONVINCING THE LEBANESE THEY NEEDED TO BEGIN PUTTING FORWARD PRECISE POSITIONS AT THIS WEEKS' NEGOTIATING SESSIONS.

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9. FINALLY, I POINTED OUT TO BEGIN THAT GEMAYEL HAS REMPHASIZED THAT ISRAELI PRESS TREATMENT OF THE ISSUES UNDER NEGOTIATION HAD ATTRACTED ADVERSE ARAB COMMENT AND WERE MAKING THINGS MUCH MORE DIFFICULT FOR HIM. I STRESSED GEMAYEL'S "PLEA" THAT ISRAEL BE MORE UNDERSTANDING OF THE LIMITS ON HIM AT THE OUTSET.

10. EGYPT. I EXPLAINED THAT EGYPT UNDERSTANDS THAT LEBANON MUST ACCEPT SOME ELEMENTS OF NORMALIZATION. HUBARAK DENIES HAVING ADVISED GEMAYEL AGAINST NORMALIZATION AND IN FACT SAYS THAT AN ELEMENT OF NORMALIZATION WOULD BE DESIRABLE. HOWEVER, HUBARAK UNDERSTANDS THAT GEMAYEL HAS INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL PROBLEMS IN MOVING FORWARD TOO QUICKLY ON NORMALIZATION.

11. SAUDI ARABIA. I TOLD BEGIN THAT I HAD QUESTIONED KING FAHD CLOSELY CONCERNING REPORTED SYRIAN WILLINGNESS TO WITHDRAW SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH ISRAEL. ON THE BASIS OF FAHD'S RESPONSE, I SAID I WAS NOW 90 PERCENT SURE THAT SYRIA HAD ACCEPTED THIS. ON THE OTHER HAND, FAHD'S POSITION CONCERNING PLO WITHDRAWAL IS THAT IT SHOULD

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BE SIMULTANEOUS, NOT PRIOR, ALTHOUGH HE FULLY AGREES THAT THE PLO SHOULD NOT OPERATE FROM LEBANON AGAINST ISRAEL. FAHD ALSO UNDERSTANDS THAT ISRAEL WILL INSIST ON FULL SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS, BUT HE IS COMPLETELY OPPOSED TO ANY RESIDUAL ISRAEL PRESENCE IN LEBANON SUCH AS EARLY WARNING STATIONS.

ON NORMALIZATION, FAHD TOTALLY REJECTED THE CONCEPT OF MOVEMENT OF PEOPLE AND GOODS, DESPITE MY ARGUMENT THAT SOME SUCH MOVEMENT WOULD BE NECESSARY TO OBTAIN ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL. NO MATTER HOW OFTEN I REPEATED THIS

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ARGUMENT, FAHD REMAINED FIRM THAT LEBANON SHOULD NOT ACCEPT ANY NORMALIZATION AND SAID THAT IF LEBANON DID, THERE WOULD BE DIRECT ECONOMIC MEASURES AGAINST IT. FAHD MAINTAINED THIS POSITION EVEN WHEN I SAID THAT GEMAYEL ACCEPTS SOME MOVEMENT OF GOODS.

12. BEGIN THANKED ME FOR MY PRESENTATION AND THEN ASKED FOR A CLARIFICATION CONCERNING THE SAUDI AND LEBANESE POSITIONS ON SYRIAN AND PLO WITHDRAWAL. I REPEATED THAT BOTH LEBANON AND SAUDI ARABIA SUPPORTED SIMULTANEOUS SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL AND THAT, ON THE BASIS OF THEIR TALKS WITH ASSAD, IT IS MORE AND MORE CLEAR THAT SYRIA HAS ACCEPTED THIS POSITION. I SAID THERE WAS MUCH LESS CERTAINTY CONCERNING PLO WITHDRAWAL. THE LEBANESE UNDERSTAND ISRAEL'S REQUEST FOR PRIOR PLO WITHDRAWAL BUT ARE NOT SURE THAT IT IS ACHIEVABLE. I EXPLAINED THAT ARAFAT HAD WRITTEN A LETTER TO GEMAYEL WHICH PROMISED PLO WITHDRAWAL BUT DID NOT ADDRESS THE ISSUE OF TIMING.

13. BEGIN THEN SAID THE CABINET HAD MET EARLIER IN THE DAY AND THAT THE OVERWHELMING MAJORITY STANDS BY THE ISRAELI NEGOTIATING POSITION INCLUDING THE ISRAELI DEMAND TO MAINTAIN ISRAELI OBSERVATION POSTS IN SOUTHERN LEBANON FOR A CERTAIN PERIOD OF TIME. (SHARON HAS RENAMED THE STATIONS ?ANTI-TERRORIST SUPERVISORY STATIONS." HE NOW SAYS THESE WOULD NOT RELY PRIMARILY ON ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE EQUIPMENT, BUT ON THE PERSONNEL ASSIGNED TO THEM.) BEGIN SAID ISRAEL WOULD DEAL WITH LEBANON DIRECTLY ON EACH OF THE ISSUES. HE SAID THAT I HAD THE LEBANESE POSITION AND THE ISRAELI POSITION AND THAT HE

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UNDERSTOOD I WOULD NOW REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT. HE URGED ME TO REAFFIRM THAT ISRAEL DESIRED THE TOTAL WITHDRAWAL

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OF FOREIGN FORCES AND DOES NOT SEE ISRAELI MANNED OBSERVATION POSTS FOR AN AGREED PERIOD OF TIME AS INCONSISTENT WITH THIS POSITION. HE ALSO EXPLAINED AGAIN THAT ISRAEL WAS UNWILLING TO ACCEPT INTERNATIONAL FORCES IN THE SECURITY ZONE BECAUSE OF ISRAELI EXPERIENCE WITH UNIFIL AFTER 1978. HE REJECTED THE ARGUMENT THAT SYRIA MIGHT DEMAND OBSERVATION POSTS IN THE BEKAA TO COUNTERBALANCE ISRAELI WARNING STATIONS, ARGUING THAT SYRIA HAD NEVER BEEN ATTACKED FROM LEBANON. AT A LATER POINT HE REPORTED THAT THE DEFENSE MINISTER HAD CONCLUDED THAT SYRIAN MANNED OBSERVATION POSTS IN THE BEKAA WOULD NOT BE A THREAT TO ISRAEL.

14. I SAID THAT BOTH ISRAELI AND SYRIAN STATIONS WERE UNACCEPTABLE TO THE LEBANESE. I TOLD BEGIN THAT THE MAINTENANCE OF ISRAELI OBSERVATION POSTS WAS LIKELY TO PREVENT ANY SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL. WITH RESPECT TO INTERNATIONAL FORCES I SAID THAT THE LEBANESE WERE WILLING TO DISCUSS WAYS TO STRUCTURE UNIFIL'S ROLE TO MAKE IT MORE EFFECTIVE. I URGED BEGIN TO RECONSIDER HIS TOTAL OPPOSITION TO AN INTERNATIONAL PRESENCE IN THE SECURITY ZONE.

15. BEGIN REPEATED THAT I UNDERSTOOD ISRAEL'S POSITION. HE SAID THAT I HAD TRIED MY BEST TO REACH AGREEMENT IN ONE WEEK BUT IT HAD PROVED IMPOSSIBLE. HE SAID THAT I HAD "FULFILLED MY MISSION". (I SAID THAT I HAD FULFILLED ONLY ITS FIRST STEP.) BEGIN SAID NOW THERE WOULD BE DIRECT TALKS BETWEEN ISRAEL AND LEBANON, IN WHICH ISRAEL WOULD TRY TO DEMONSTRATE THAT ITS POSITIONS WERE ADVANTAGEOUS TO BOTH ISRAEL AND LEBANON.

16. SHAMIR AND SHARON THEN CHALLENGED THE UNITED STATES FOR PLACING MORE EMPHASIS ON THE ISRAELI/LEBANESE TALKS THAN ON LEBANON'S DISCUSSIONS WITH THE PLO AND SYRIA. THEY SAID THAT ISRAEL WAS THE ONLY COUNTRY BEING

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BLAMED FOR STUBBORNNESS. WHEREAS DISCUSSIONS WERE NOT EVEN GOING ON WITH THE SYRIANS AND THE PLO. DRAPER, LEWIS AND I ALL RESPONDED. WE POINTED OUT THAT WE HAD HELD DISCUSSIONS WITH THE SYRIANS, DIRECTLY, AND THROUGH THE LEBANESE AND THE SAUDIS. ISRAEL SHOULD UNDERSTAND THAT THERE WAS NOT AS MUCH FOR THE LEBANESE TO DISCUSS WITH THE SYRIANS SINCE SYRIA WAS NOT RAISING PRECONDITIONS FOR ITS WITHDRAWAL. WE HAD RECEIVED STRONG INDICATIONS THAT THE SYRIANS WERE WILLING TO -WITHDRAW SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH ISRAEL. IT WOULD NOT BE WISE TO TRY TO NAIL THIS DOWN UNTIL THE ISRAELI/LEBANESE TALKS HAD PROCEEDED FURTHER. (HOWEVER, I SAID I MIGHT GO TO SYRIA AS EARLY AS NEXT WEEK.) REGARDING THE PLO, I AGREED THAT THE LEBANESE SHOULD BE DOING MORE AND SAID WE WOULD CONTINUE TO URGE THEM TO DO SO.

17. SHAMIR ARGUED THAT WE GAVE TOO MUCH WEIGHT TO THE SAUDI OPINION. LEBANON SHOULD BE INDEPENDENT AND YET FAHD SPOKE OF LEBANON AS IFNIT WERE A PROTECTORATE OF SAUDI ARABIA. SHAMIR SAID THE U.S. SHOULD NOT ACCEPT THIS. I SAID THAT THE U.S. DID NOT ACCEPT FAHD'S POSITION AND THAT I HAD ARGUED TO HIM THAT LEBANON WOULD HAVE TO TAKE SOME STEPS IN ORDER TO SECURE ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL. HOWEVER, THE SAUDI REACTION HAD TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT BY GEMAYEL.

18. I ALSO HAD A BRIEF DISCUSSION WITH SHARON AND SHAMIR ON THE SUBJECT OF PARTIAL WITHDRAWAL. I EXPLAINED THAT GEMAYEL DID NOT ACCEPT THE CONCEPT UNLESS IT WAS THE FIRST STEP IN AN AGREED SCHEDULE FOR TOTAL WITHDRAWAL. SHARON SAID THAT HE HAD NO DIFFICULTY WITH GEMAYEL'S POSITION. HE HAD ORIGINALLY ADVOCATED IN THE ISRAELI CABINET THE IDEA OF AN INITIAL WITHDRAWAL BECAUSE HE THOUGHT IT MIGHT BE HELPFUL TO GEMAYEL TO

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SHOW SOME IMMEDIATE PROGRESS. HOWEVER, IF GEMAYEL WAS NOT INTERESTED, SHARON SAID HE WAS HAPPY TO SEE THE IDF REMAIN IN PLACE, BECAUSE "IT ENABLED HIM TO GO TO BEIRUT AND INCREASED THE AREA IN WHICH HE COULD ENCOURAGE NORMALIZATION". SHARON ALSO SAID THAT GEMAYEL SHOULD NOT CONCLUDE THAT THERE IS PRESSURE ON ISRAEL WHICH IT CANNOT WITHSTAND TO WITHDRAW FROM THE SHOUF MOUNTAINS.

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19. PHARON ALSO BROUGHT UP THE ISSUES OF PRISONERS AND HADDAD'S FORCES. HE SAID SOMETHING MUST BE DONE ABOUT THE PRISONER ISSUE SOON. I SAID THAT THE RED CROSS, THE AUSTRIANS AND WE HAD ALL TRIED AND WOULD CONTINUE TO DO SO. SHARON ALSO REITERATED THAT ISRAEL FORESAW A MAJOR ROLE FOR LOCAL FORCES IN THE SECURITY ZONE, FOLLOWING THEIR RE-INTEGRATION. SHARON SAID HE HAD SEEN THESE FORCES AS A KEY ELEMENT IN THE SECURITY ZONE. HE SAID ISRAEL MUST HAVE SOME FORCES IN THE SOUTH THAT ISRAEL CAN TRUST. I SAID THAT I THOUGHT THE LEBANESE ACCEPTED THAT THE FORCES WOULD BE RE-INTEGRATED AND DREW SHARON'S ATTENTION TO THE FACT THAT WE HAD INCORPORATED THIS OUTCOME IN OUR DRAFT TEXT. I SAID THAT I THOUGHT THIS WOULD NOT BE A SERIOUS PROBLEM.

20. AS THE MEETING CLOSED, I SAID THAT I WAS DISAPPOINTED THAT THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN OUR DRAFT AGREEMENT AND THE ISRAELI DRAFT HAD BEEN SO GREAT. I SAID THE GAP WAS SO WIDE IT WAS CLEARLY UNBRIDGEABLE AT THIS TIME. THE ISRAELI DRAFT WAS A TREATY IN EVERYTHING BUT NAME, LOOKING TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF COMPLEX RELATIONSHIPS WITHOUT PROVIDING FOR TOTAL WITHDRAWAL. IF ISRAEL PROCEEDED IN THIS APPROACH THERE WOULD BE A PROLONGED NEGOTIATION FOLLOWED BY NO WITHDRAWAL OR A QUICK BREAKDOWN IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. I URGED BEGIN TO TAKE OUR DRAFT AND CONSIDER WHAT COULD BE DONE BY WAY OF AMENDMENTS TO MAKE IT ACCEPTABLE.

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BEGIN THANKED ME AGAIN FOR MY EFFORTS. I TOLD HIM THAT I WOULD BE REPORTING TO THE PRESIDENT AND SECRETARY SHULTZ AND MIGHT RETURN NEXT WEEKEND OR A FEW DAYS THEREAFTER.

1. AFTER THE FULL MEETING, I MET WITH BEGIN PRIVATELY. I TOLD BEGIN FLATLY THAT I WAS CONVINCED THAT THE ISRAELI DEMANDS WERE EXCESSIVE. I GAVE HIM THE PRIVATE COMMENTS I HAD BEEN AUTHORIZED TO CONVEY BY THE PRESIDENT ON THE NECESSITY FOR WITHDRAWAL. HE ASSURED ME THAT HE STILL FAVORED TOTAL WITHDRAWAL FROM LEBANON BUT BELIEVED THAT ISRAEL'S DEMANDS WERE CONSISTENT WITH SECURITY NEEDS. HE SAID HE WOULD BE LOOKING FORWARD

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TO RESUMING DISCUSSIONS WITH ME AFTER MY CONSULTATIONS
IN WASHINGTON.

22. COMMENT: AS THE ABOVE RECORD INDICATES, BEGIN
HAD VERY LITTLE TO SAY THROUGHOUT OUR ENTIRE MEETING.
HE LISTENED CAREFULLY TO MY PRESENTATION, AND THEREFORE
HAD TO BE IN NO DOUBT THAT THERE ARE MAJOR PROBLEMS
WITH CURRENT ISRAELI POSITIONS. THAT HE LIMITED HIMSELF
TO SAYING THAT "MY MISSION WAS COMPLETE" AND "ISRAEL
WOULD EXPLAIN ITS POSITION DIRECTLY TO LEBANON" SUGGESTS
THAT HE HAS DECIDED TO HOLD OUT FOR ISRAELI DEMANDS,
STILL HOPING TO GET THE LEBANESE TO AGREE. END COMMENT.
GROVE UNQUOTE SHULTZ

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AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS PRIORITY

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PA Exemptions _____ () CLASSIFY as () S or () C Sec. _____
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SECTION 01 OF 03 JERUSALEM 00592

EXDIS

MILITARY ADDEES TREAT AS SPECAT EXCLUSIVE

FROM DRAPER

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, MOPS, HARR, LE, US, IS, XF

SUBJECT: HABIB/DRAPER MISSION: SUBCOMMITTEE ON
THE TERMINATION OF THE STATE OF WAR, FEBRUARY 17 AND 18

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1. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT.

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2. SUMMARY: AT FEBRUARY 17 AND 18 SESSIONS, SUBCOMMITTEE COMPLETED A DRAFT SECTION ON THE TERMINATION OF THE STATE OF WAR, PRODUCING AGREED ARTICLES ON THE PREVENTION OF TERRORISM, NON-INTERFERENCE IN INTERNAL AFFAIRS, AND RESTRICTIONS ON THE STATIONING OF CERTAIN FOREIGN FORCES IN EITHER ISRAEL OR LEBANON. SUBCOMMITTEE HAS NOW COMPLETED DRAFT TEXTS ON THE PREAMBLE, TERMINATION OF THE STATE OF WAR, AND "FINAL CLAUSES" (TECHNICAL CLAUSES REGARDING ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THE AGREEMENT), ALTHOUGH SOME BRACKETED LANGUAGE REMAINS IN EACH SECTION. SUBCOMMITTEE HAS DECIDED TO CONVERT INTO A GENERAL DRAFTING COMMITTEE (WITH THE PARTICIPATION OF HEADS OF DELEGATION, AS NEEDED) AND RECOMMENDS THAT IT BE ENTRUSTED WITH SUCH ADDITIONAL ISSUES AS THE WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAELI FORCES. END SUMMARY.
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3. SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERMINATION OF STATE OF WAR MET FEBRUARY 17 AND 18. PARTICIPANTS WERE FATTAL AND MAAMARI (LEBANON); RUBINSTEIN, BAKER AND LIFF (ISRAEL); AND KRECZKO, ROSS AND HARE (U.S.).

4. TERMINATION OF THE STATE OF WAR. A BASIC DIFFERENCE REMAINS ON THE FIRST PARAGRAPH OF A SECTION ON THE TERMINATION OF THE STATE OF WAR, BECAUSE OF DIFFERING VIEWS ON WHETHER TERMINATION SHOULD BE EFFECTIVE ON THE ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THE AGREEMENT (ISRAEL) OR ON THE COMPLETION OF THE WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAELI FORCES (LEBANON). HOWEVER, THE REMAINING PROVISIONS OF THIS SECTION HAVE NOW BEEN AGREED, AD

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REFERENDUM:

- 2. THE PARTIES CONSIDER THE EXISTING BOUNDARY BETWEEN THEM INVIOABLE AND AGREE TO RESPECT AND RECOGNIZE THE SOVEREIGNTY, TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY AND POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE OF EACH OTHER.

- 3. THE PARTIES, BEING GUIDED BY THE PRINCIPLES OF THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER AND OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, UNDERTAKE TO SETTLE THEIR DISPUTES BY PEACEFUL MEANS IN SUCH A MANNER AS TO PROMOTE INTERNATIONAL

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USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY
JCS WASHDC PRIORITY
SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
WHITEHOUSE WASHDC PRIORITY

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EXDIS

(A) WITHDRAWAL. LEBANESE WANT PROVISIONS ON
WITHDRAWAL INCLUDED IN THE MAIN AGREEMENT, AND NOT
JUST IN THE ANNEX, AS ISRAEL ORIGINALLY SUGGESTED.
U.S. HAS SUPPORTED LEBANESE POSITION, AND HAS URGED
LEBANESE TO BRING A DRAFT TEXT TO OUR NEXT SESSION.

(B) SECURITY. ISRAELIS AGREE THAT ONLY A FEW,
GENERAL PARAGRAPHS ARE NEEDED IN THE SECURITY SECTION

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OF THE MAIN AGREEMENT, WITH THE DETAILS HANDLED IN
AN ANNEX. WE HAVE SUGGESTED CHANGES TO THREE ISRAELI-

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DRAFTED PARAGRAPHS ON THIS ISSUE, AND URGED ISRAEL TO PUT
THEM FORWARD AT THE NEXT SESSION.
COVEY

[REDACTED]

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PEACE AND SECURITY, AND JUSTICE.

- 4. (A) THE TERRITORY OF EACH PARTY WILL NOT BE USED AS A BASE FOR HOSTILE AND TERRORIST ACTIVITY AGAINST THE OTHER PARTY, ITS TERRITORY AND PEOPLE ANYWHERE.

- (B) EACH PARTY WILL PREVENT THE EXISTENCE OR ORGANIZATION OF IRREGULAR FORCES, ARMED BANDS, ORGANIZATIONS, BASES, OFFICES OR INFRASTRUCTURES, THE AIMS AND PURPOSES OF WHICH INCLUDE INCURSIONS INTO THE TERRITORY OF THE OTHER PARTY, OR ANY OTHER ACTIVITY AIMED AT THREATENING OR ENDANGERING THE SECURITY OF THE OTHER PARTY OR THE WELFARE AND SAFETY OF ITS POPULATION.

TO THIS END ALL AGREEMENTS AND ARRANGEMENTS ENABLING THE PRESENCE AND FUNCTIONING ON THEIR RESPECTIVE TERRITORIES OF ELEMENTS HOSTILE TO THE OTHER PARTY ARE NULL AND VOID.

- (C) WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO THE INHERENT



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EXDIS
RIGHT OF SELF-DEFENSE IN ACCORDANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL
LAW EACH PARTY WILL REFRAIN:

- (1) FROM ORGANIZING, INSTIGATING, ASSISTING
OR PARTICIPATING IN THREATS OR ACTS OF BELLIGERENCY,
TERRORISM, REPRISALS, SUBVERSION, OR INCITEMENT
DIRECTED AGAINST THE OTHER PARTY, ITS POPULATION OR
PROPERTY, BOTH WITHIN ITS TERRITORY AND ORIGINATING
THEREFROM, AND IN THE TERRITORY OF THE OTHER PARTY.

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- (2) FROM INTERVENING IN THE INTERNAL OR
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS OF THE OTHER PARTY.

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- (3) FROM USING ECONOMIC, POLITICAL OR OTHER TYPES OF MEASURES TO HARM THE OTHER PARTY, ITS RIGHTS, THE WELFARE OF ITS POPULATION OR ITS ECONOMY.

- (D) EACH PARTY UNDERTAKES TO ENSURE THAT PREVENTIVE ACTION AND DUE PROCEEDINGS WILL BE TAKEN AGAINST PERSONS OR ORGANIZATIONS PERPETRATING ACTS IN VIOLATION OF THIS ARTICLE.

- 5. EACH PARTY WILL PREVENT ENTRY INTO, DEPLOYMENT IN OR PASSAGE THROUGH ITS TERRITORY, INCLUDING ITS TERRITORIAL SEA AND AIRSPACE, BY FOREIGN MILITARY FORCES, FOREIGN ARMAMENT OR FOREIGN MILITARY EQUIPMENT FROM ANY STATE WHICH DOES NOT MAINTAIN DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH BOTH PARTIES, OR FROM ANY STATE WHICH (#)

(#)

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HAD PREVIOUSLY BEEN AGREED THAT UPON ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THE AGREEMENT, ALL INCONSISTENT LAWS WOULD BE ABROGATED. LEBANESE HAVE NOW REOPENED THIS PROVISION, AND SUGGESTED THAT INCONSISTENT LAWS BE ABROGATED WITHIN ONE YEAR. AT U.S. SUGGESTION, IT HAS BEEN AGREED TO DEFER DISCUSSION OF THIS ISSUE UNTIL THE SUBSTANTIVE PROVISION ON THE MOVEMENT OF GOODS AND PERSONS IS RESOLVED.

- (B) DISPUTE SETTLEMENT. PARTIES STILL MAINTAIN

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THEIR ORIGINAL POSITIONS CONCERNING THE DESIRABILITY OF A DEFINITIVE MECHANISM FOR THE SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES. LEBANESE HAVE POINTED OUT THAT ISRAELIS ACCEPTED ARBITRATION IN THEIR PEACE TREATY WITH EGYPT AND HAVE ARGUED THAT AN ARBITRATION PROCESS IS EVEN MORE IMPORTANT IN AN AGREEMENT WHICH STOPS SHORT OF BEING A PEACE TREATY, IN ORDER TO PROVIDE AN ALTERNATIVE TO RESORTING TO FORCE WHEN ISSUES ARE NOT RESOLVED THROUGH NEGOTIATIONS.

- (C) LANGUAGES. DESPITE ISRAELI AND LEBANESE AGREE-

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MENT TO FOUR (ARABIC, HEBREW, ENGLISH AND FRENCH)
AUTHENTIC TEXTS OF THE AGREEMENT, U.S. HAS CONTINUED
TO PRESS FOR ONE TEXT (ENGLISH) IN ORDER TO AVOID
WASTING TIME ON A NEGOTIATION OVER AGREED
TRANSLATIONS.

7. OTHER ISSUES. WITH THE COMPLETION OF DRAFT TEXTS
ON THE PREAMBLE, TERMINATION OF STATE OF WAR, AND FINAL
CLAUSES, (ALBEIT WITH CERTAIN BRACKETS), THE
SUBCOMMITTEE HAS RECOMMENDED THAT IT BECOME A DRAFTING
COMMITTEE FOR OTHER ISSUES (WITH THE PARTICIPATION
OF THE HEADS OF DELEGATION, AS NEEDED), INCLUDING:

NOTE BY OC/T: PARA 5 (*) OMISSION, CORRECTION TO FOLLOW

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INFO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT PRIORITY
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AMEMBASSY VIENNA PRIORITY
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE Date: 11/9/97
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SECTION 01 OF 02 JERUSALEM 00602

DECAPTIONED
EXISTS

FROM AMBASSADOR DRAPER

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, MOPS, SY, IS, LE, ICRC
SUBJECT: HABIB/DRAPER MISSION: DISCUSSION OF
POW/MIA ISSUES, FEBRUARY 21

REF: (A) JERUSALEM 597✓ (B) DAMASCUS 1309✓

1. [REDACTED]

2. DRAPER HAD A FOLLOW-UP MEETING WITH DEPUTY
DIRECTOR GENERAL BAR-ON AND OTHER MFA AND IDF
OFFICIALS ON POW/MIA ISSUES MONDAY, FEBRUARY 21.
THE MFA HUMAN RIGHTS EXPERT, ANN MARIE LAMBERT,
STATED CATEGORICALLY THAT ISRAEL HAD NEVER RECEIVED

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A LIST OF SYRIAN MISSING FROM THE ICRC OR THROUGH
ANY OTHER CHANNEL. SHE DID REITERATE THAT ISRAEL
HAD "VOLUNTARILY" SUBMITTED A LIST OF 72 SYRIAN
DEAD THROUGH ONE ICRC, OF WHOM 30 WERE IDENTIFIED.
SHE ALSO SAID ISRAEL HAD PROPOSED THROUGH THE
ICRC THAT THERE BE A "SIMULTANEOUS IDENTIFICATION"
OF THE 42 SYRIAN BODIES AND THE BODIES IN THE FOUR
COFFINS BURIED AT THE JEWISH CEMETERY IN DAMASCUS.

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3. LAMBERT DESCRIBED ISRAEL'S BASIC PROBLEMS AS OBTAINING INFORMATION ON THE FIVE MISSING, PRESUMED TO BE IN SYRIAN HANDS. SHE STATED THAT ISRAEL KNOWS THAT AT LEAST THREE (3) OF THE FIVE MISSING WERE SEEN ALIVE SINCE THE TIME OF THEIR CAPTURE, THOUGH SHE DID NOT SPECIFY THE REASONS FOR THIS ASSERTION. SECOND, ISRAEL WANTED TO HAVE ICRC ACCESS TO THE TWO ISRAELI POW'S HELD BY THE JABRIL FORCES. THIRD, THEY WANT THE FOUR COFFINS OPENED AND THE REMAINS IDENTIFIED.

4. DRAPER ASKED WHETHER OUR EFFORTS MIGHT COMPLICATE THE TASK OF THE ICRC. LAMBERT REPLIED THAT THE ICRC HAD REACHED A DEADEND AND HAD ADVISED THE ISRAELIS TO PURSUE THE POW/MIA ISSUES IN OTHER CHANNELS AS WELL.

5. DRAPER ALSO INFORMED THE ISRAELIS THAT GENERAL KURAYTIM WOULD BE GOING TO TUNIS SHORTLY AND ASKED HOW HE SHOULD RESPOND IF THE PLO WANTED TO EXTRACT A PRICE FOR A PRISONER EXCHANGE. THERE WAS ALSO THE QUESTION OF WHAT CHANNEL FOR FUTURE DE FACTO ISRAELI-PLO NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD BE USED. THE ISRAELIS REPLIED THAT THE ICRC WOULD BE THE BEST

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CHANNEL. THEY ALSO SAID KURAYTIM SHOULD EMPHASIZE TO THE PLO THAT THE ICRC SHALL BE ALLOWED TO VISIT THE TWO POW'S HELD BY JABRIL, AS WELL AS ANY OTHER ISRAELIS, DEAD OR ALIVE, HELD BY JABRIL. IN THIS CONTEXT, THE ISRAELIS POINTED OUT THAT JABRIL HAS PUBLICLY SPOKEN OF HAVING MORE THAN TWO POW'S UNDER HIS CONTROL, THOUGH IT IS UNCLEAR IF THEY ARE DEAD OR ALIVE. BAR-ON SPECULATED IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THE SYRIANS MAY HAVE TRANSFERRED ALL OR SOME OF FIVE ISRAELI MISSING INTO JABRIL'S HANDS.

6. DRAPER ASKED IF THE ISRAELIS COULD SHED ANY LIGHT ON ABU IYAD'S PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT CONCERNING THE RELEASE OF 1012 PALESTINIANS DETAINED INSIDE ISRAEL. LAMBERT VOLUNTEERED THAT SUCH A LIST HAD BEEN TURNED OVER TO THE ICRC BUT IT HAD NOT BEEN CHECKED THUS FAR. SHE DID SAY, HOWEVER, THAT IT APPEARED TO REPRESENT A CROSS-SECTION OF VARIOUS FACTIONS WITHIN THE PLO. LAMBERT SAID THAT THE SUBMISSION OF THE LIST SUGGESTED THAT THE PLO MAY HAVE DECIDED TO START THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS. DRAPER COMMENTED THE LEBANESE WERE CONCERNED THAT ANY PALESTINIANS WHICH MIGHT BE RELEASED SHOULD NOT BE RELEASED IN OR SENT TO LEBANON. BAR-ON DID NOT BELIEVE THIS WOULD OCCUR.

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7. IN SUMMING, DRAPER SAID HE WOULD IMPRESS UPON KURAYTIM THE NEED TO GET THE NEGOTIATIONS STARTED WITH THE PLO, NOTING ALSO THAT CHRIS ROSS WOULD BE GOING TO TUNIS WITH KURAYTIM. KURAYTIM WOULD ALSO BE TOLD THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT FOR THE ICRC TO HAVE ACCESS TO THE TWO ISRAELIS HELD BY JABRIL, AS WELL AS SEEING/RECEIVING INFORMATION ON ANY OTHER ISRAELIS HELD BY JABRIL'S FORCES. SECOND, OUR AMBASSADOR IN DAMASCUS WOULD CONTINUE HIS EFFORTS WITH THE SYRIANS IN AN EFFORT TO GET ANSWERS TO

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EXDIS

ISRAEL'S QUESTIONS. HE WOULD ALSO BE ASKED TO SEE
IF SYRIA WOULD USE ITS GOOD OFFICES WITH JABRIL,
SINCE ISRAEL BELIEVED HIS FORCES WERE EFFECTIVELY
UNDER SYRIAN INFLUENCE. FINALLY, DRAPER SUGGESTED
THAT THE ISRAELIS EXPLORE OTHER CHANNELS TO THE PLO,
SUCH AS THE ITALIANS, WHO DRAPER BELIEVED WOULD BE
HELPFUL. BAR-ON SAID THEY WOULD DO SO.

8. DRAPER IS BRINGING TO BEIRUT SOME DOSSIERS
SUPPLIED BY THE ISRAELIS WHICH KURAYTIM COULD USE
IN HIS NEGOTIATIONS IN TUNIS WITH THE PLO. COVEY

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JERUSALEM 00597

EXDIS

DECAPTIONED

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, MOPS, SY, IS, LE, ICRC

SUBJECT: HABIB/DRAPER MISSION: DISCUSSION OF POW/MIA
ISSUES, FEBRUARY 20REFS: A. DAMASCUS 974, B. JERUSALEM 542, C. DAMASCUS 277, NR
D. DAMASCUS 1309

2. AT THE CONCLUSION OF OUR WORKING LEVEL MEETING WITH KIMCHE ON THE LEBANON NEGOTIATIONS FEBRUARY 20 (SEPTTEL), AMBASSADOR DRAPER BRIEFED THE ISRAELI SIDE ON AMBASSADOR PAGANELLI'S LATEST INTERVENTION (REF. D) WITH THE SYRIAN FOREIGN MINISTRY, FOLLOWING SHAMIR'S SPECIFIC REQUEST TO HABIB THAT THE MATTER BE PURSUED. DRAPER SAID THE

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SYRIAN FOREIGN MINISTRY HAD REPLIED THAT THEY WERE STILL WAITING TO HEAR FROM THE COMPETENT SYRIAN AUTHORITIES ON THE PREVIOUSLY SUBMITTED LIST OF ISRAELI QUESTIONS. HOWEVER, THEY HAD ALSO SAID THE SYRIANS HAD SENT A LIST ON SYRIAN MIA'S TO ISRAEL VIA THE ICRC BUT HAD NOT RECEIVED AN ANSWER.

3. DRAPER SAID THERE SEEMED TO BE SOME CONFUSION ABOUT WHAT LISTS HAD ACTUALLY BEEN PASSED BASED ON

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OUR SEPARATE CONVERSATIONS WITH THE ICRC. THE ICRC HAD INFORMED US THAT SOME TWENTY SYRIAN FAMILIES HAD ASKED ABOUT MISSING SYRIAN SOLDIERS AND ISRAEL HAD RESPONDED TO A NUMBER OF THESE INQUIRIES. WE ALSO UNDERSTOOD THAT THE IDF HAD PROVIDED A LIST OF 72 SYRIAN DEAD, OF WHICH ABOUT 30 HAD BEEN IDENTIFIED, TO THE ICRC. WE PRESUMED THIS INFORMATION HAD BEEN PASSED TO THE SYRIANS. BUT, DRAPER NOTED, THERE SEEMED TO BE A QUESTION AS TO WHETHER SYRIANS HAD SUBMITTED A LIST OF MIA'S TO THE ICRC. NEVERTHELESS, DRAPER OBSERVED IT WAS AN ENCOURAGING SIGN THAT THE SYRIANS WERE SHOWING INTEREST IN THIS MATTER.

4. DRAPER ALSO SAID HE HAD SPOKEN TO GENERAL KURAYTIM (THE LEBANESE EMISSARY IN THE PLO NEGOTIATIONS), WHO HAD SAID HE EXPECTS TO GO AGAIN SOON TO TUNIS, ONCE THE ALGIERS PNC MEETING IS COMPLETED. KURAYTIM WILL CONTINUE TO PURSUE THE POW'S AND MIA'S ISSUE WITH THE PLO. DRAPER ASKED IF THE ISRAELIS COULD OFFER ANY GUIDANCE FOR KURAYTIM, SPECIFICALLY IN RELATION TO ABU IYAD'S PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT CONCERNING THE RETURN OF PALESTINIANS HELD BY THE ISRAELIS. HABIB SPECIFICALLY ASKED IF THIS ISSUE HAD BEEN

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RAISED IN THE AUSTRIA CHANNEL AND IF SO, WHAT WAS THE NATURE OF ISRAEL'S RESPONSE. MFA DEPUTY DIRECTOR GENERAL HANAN BAR-ON SAID IT HAD ONLY BEEN RAISED IN A MOST INDIRECT WAY AND NO SPECIFIC PLO REQUEST HAD BEEN MADE. IT WAS THEREFORE STILL HANGING AS FAR AS ISRAEL WAS CONCERNED.

5. WE AGREED TO MEET TOMORROW, FEBRUARY 21, WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF ALL INTERESTED ISRAELI ORGANIZATIONS TO REVIEW WHAT HAS TO BE DONE.

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SECTION 01 OF 03 JERUSALEM 00596

DECAPTIONED

MILITARY ADDEES TREAT AS SPECAT EXCLUSIVE

FROM AMBASSADOR HABIB

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, MOPS, MARR, LE, US, IS, XF

SUBJECT: HABIB/DRAPER MISSION: MEETING WITH KIMCHE
AND TAMIR, FEBRUARY 20

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1. [REDACTED]

2. SUMMARY: DURING A PRODUCTIVE THREE AND A HALF
HOUR WORKING MEETING FEBRUARY 19, WE TABLED
PROPOSED DRAFT ARTICLES IN THE AGREEMENT ON MUTUAL
RELATIONS AND A PROPOSED APPROACH ON INTERIM ARRANGE-
MENTS FOR MOVEMENTS OF PEOPLE AND GOODS (WHICH WOULD
BE THE BASIS OF A SIDE-UNDERSTANDING, PERHAPS EVEN

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AN ORAL COMMITMENT). THE ISRAELIS MADE SOME PRELIMINARY COMMENTS AND WILL OFFER SOME ADDITIONAL ELABORATION TOMORROW. (NOTE: AT LEBANESE REQUEST, MONDAY'S MEETING IN NETANYA HAS BEEN CANCELLED OWING TO BAD WEATHER.) I ALSO ORALLY REVIEWED OUR CONCEPTS FOR SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS. THE ISRAELIS EMPHASIZED THAT IF THEIR MINISTERS WERE TO REVERSE THE GOVERNMENT'S POSITION OF FIVE OBSERVATION POSTS IN SOUTHERN LEBANON, THEY NEEDED ANOTHER CONCEPT WHICH WOULD SATISFY ISRAEL'S SECURITY CONCERNS. WE AGREED TO SUBMIT A PAPER AT TOMORROW'S MEETING. ALL IN ALL, WE MADE A GOOD START IN TRYING TO BRIDGE THE KEY GAPS AND TO DEVELOP COMMON LANGUAGE. HOWEVER, IT IS STILL TOO EARLY TO PREDICT HOW FAR AND HOW QUICKLY WE WILL BE ABLE TO MOVE DOWN THIS TRACK. OUR PURPOSE IN THESE TALKS IS TO DEVELOP AGREED TEXTS WITH THE ISRAELIS ON THE TWO CRITICAL ISSUES OF THE MOVEMENT OF GOODS AND PEOPLE (MUTUAL RELATIONS) AND SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. OUR PROPOSALS WOULD THEN GO TO THE CABINET STEERING GROUP. IF WE CAN SECURE AGREEMENT OR UNDERSTANDING THERE, THE REMAINING PIECES IN THE AGREEMENT SHOULD READILY FALL INTO PLACE. AFTER REACHING AGREEMENT WITH THE ISRAELIS, I WOULD THEN GO TO LEBANON

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TO SECURE LEBANESE APPROVAL. THE TEXT OF THE AGREEMENT WOULD THEN BE PRESENTED TO THE PLENARY IN THE TRIPARTITE FORUM FOR FINAL ENDORSEMENT. END SUMMARY.

3. WE HAD A PRODUCTIVE THREE AND A HALF HOUR SESSION WITH DAVID KIMCHE, GENERAL TAMIR AND AIDES IN JERUSALEM FEBRUARY 20 TO REVIEW IN DETAIL WRITTEN U.S.-PROPOSED DRAFTS ON MUTUAL RELATIONS AND TO DISCUSS ORALLY OUR CONCEPTS FOR SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS. I WAS ACCOMPANIED BY AMBASSADORS DRAPER AND LEWIS, GENERAL COOLEY AND HARE.

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MUTUAL RELATIONS - MOVEMENT OF GOODS AND PEOPLE

4. I TABLED A COMPLETE DRAFT OF THE ARTICLES ON MUTUAL RELATIONS WHICH WOULD BE INCLUDED IN THE FINAL AGREEMENT (SUPPLEMENTING ALREADY AGREED LANGUAGE REACHED IN THE TRILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS) AND A SEPARATE DRAFT OUTLINING OUR CONCEPT ON INTERIM ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE MOVEMENT OF PEOPLE AND GOODS. I STRESSED THAT THE INTERIM ARRANGEMENTS COULD BE HANDLED BY A SIDE LETTER, ORAL UNDERSTANDING, OR SOME OTHER AGREED PROCEDURE, BUT THEY WOULD NOT BE MADE PUBLIC.

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5. PREDICTABLY, THE ISRAELIS WANTED TO STRENGTHEN THE LANGUAGE IN THE COVERING AGREEMENT WHICH WOULD DESCRIBE THE MOVEMENT OF GOODS AND PEOPLE ACROSS THE BORDER. THEY ASKED SPECIFICALLY THAT WE INCLUDE LANGUAGE WHICH WOULD CATEGORICALLY SAY, "PEOPLE AND

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GOODS WILL MOVE ACROSS THE BORDER OF THE TWO COUNTRIES." GENERAL TAMIR SUGGESTED THAT THE DIFFICULTY MIGHT BE OVERCOME BY TAKING LANGUAGE FROM THE AGREED AGENDA FOR THE NEGOTIATIONS AND USING IT AS THE OPENING PREAMBLE TO THE SECTION ON MUTUAL RELATIONS. I AGREED THAT THIS WAS A PROMISING APPROACH. THE ISRAELIS WILL LOOK AGAIN AT OUR DRAFT LANGUAGE, AS MODIFIED AND RESPOND TOMORROW.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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6. UNDER THE MUTUAL RELATIONS RUBRIC, WE ALSO INTRODUCED DRAFT LANGUAGE ON HOW PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES COULD BE HANDLED PENDING A FINAL AGREEMENT. THE ISRAELIS AGREED TO CONSIDER OUR SIMPLIFIED APPROACH (BASED ON THE VIENNA CONVENTION FOR SPECIAL MISSIONS) AS A FALLBACK POSITION IF A FINAL AGREEMENT COULD NOT BE REACHED IN THE TRILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS.

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7. THE ISRAELIS WERE INTERESTED IN OUR APPROACH TO INTERIM ARRANGEMENTS, THOUGH THEY PROPOSED VARIOUS CHANGES TO OUR PROPOSED TEXT. OUR CONCEPT ESSENTIALLY CALLS FOR THE JOINT LIAISON COMMITTEE TO MAKE "PRACTICAL ARRANGEMENTS" FOR THE MOVEMENT OF GOODS AND PEOPLE DURING THE INTERIM PERIOD. THESE DE FACTO ARRANGEMENTS WILL BE IN FORCE UNTIL A FINAL AGREEMENT IS REACHED, ON WHICH NEGOTIATIONS ARE TO BEGIN NOT LATER THAN SIX MONTHS AFTER THE WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAELI DEFENSE FORCES FROM LEBANON. THE ISRAELIS WANT TO ELABORATE THE TERMS OF REFERENCE UNDER WHICH THE JOINT LIAISON COMMITTEE WILL OPERATE AND WILL BE SUBMITTING FURTHER LANGUAGE ON THIS POINT AT TOMORROW'S SESSION.

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SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS

8. I OUTLINED OUR CONCEPTUAL APPROACH TO SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS IN THE SOUTHERN ZONE. ON THE DEFINITION OF THE ZONE, WE WOULD DRAW THE LINE ON THE WEST FROM THE AWALI RIVER AND THEN MOVE FURTHER NORTH INTO THE MOUNTAINS AND TO THE BEQA', BASED ON TOPOGRAPHICAL

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FEATURES. TAMIR SAID THE "LINE" PROBLEM COULD BE HANDLED BY SIMPLY REFERRING TO A MAP WHICH WOULD NOT SPELL OUT ACTUAL DISTANCES FROM METULLA.

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9. I DESCRIBED HOW THE LOCAL FORCES IN THE ZONE COULD BE INTEGRATED INTO THE VARIOUS LEBANESE SECURITY FORCES. IN THIS CONTEXT, I EMPHASIZED THAT HADDAD COULD NOT BECOME A BRIGADE COMMANDER OR MILITARY GOVERNOR IN SOUTHERN LEBANON. THE LEBANESE, I SAID, WOULD HANDLE HADDAD'S FUTURE IN AN HONORABLE WAY. WITH RESPECT TO UNIFIL, WE WOULD PROPOSE PUTTING TWO BATTALIONS FOR A LIMITED DURATION RESPECTIVELY AROUND THE PALESTINIAN CAMPS IN SIDON AND TYRE IN ORDER TO ALLAY PALESTINIAN FEARS OF INTIMIDATION OR MASSACRE ONCE THE ISRAELI FORCES WITHDREW.

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10. I SAID THE LEBANESE WERE PREPARED TO COOPERATE FULLY IN THE AREA OF INTELLIGENCE, AND IT SEEMED TO ME THAT THIS WAS AN ANSWER TO ISRAEL'S REQUEST TO LEAVE A RESIDUAL PRESENCE IN LEBANON. I REPEATEDLY STRESSED THAT THE CONCEPT OF HAVING FIVE OBSERVATION POSTS IN SOUTHERN LEBANON WAS IMPOSSIBLE AND A NON-STARTER. I ALSO SAID IT WAS IMPERATIVE THAT THE FUNCTIONS OF THE MILITARY COMMITTEE SHOULD BE CAREFULLY DEFINED, AS WELL AS THOSE OF THE JOINT SUPERVISORY TEAMS, TO AVOID ANY IMPRESSION THAT A RESIDUAL FORCE WAS IN FACT BEING LEFT BEHIND.

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11. GENERAL TAMIR REPLIED THAT THE GOVERNMENT STILL WAS STANDING BY ITS ORIGINAL CONCEPT OF FIVE

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EXDIS

STATIONS IN SOUTHERN LEBANON, COUPLED WITH A CONTINUED SPECIAL ISRAELI RELATIONSHIP WITH THE LOCAL FORCES IN THE SOUTH EVEN IF INTEGRATED INTO THE LEBANESE SECURITY NETWORK. HE ARGUED THAT IF THE MINISTERS WERE TO CHANGE THE GOVERNMENT'S POSITION, A DIFFERENT BUT SOLIDLY BASED CONCEPT HAD TO BE PUT BEFORE THEM. IN ORDER TO REPLACE THE CONCEPT OF ISRAELI PERMANENT PRESENCE, HE SAID A CONCEPT OF

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IN-DEPTH COOPERATION HAD TO BE DEVELOPED. IN THIS RESPECT, HE SPECIALLY POINTED TO THE NEED TO DEFINE ARRANGEMENTS FOR COOPERATION BETWEEN THE SECURITY/INTELLIGENCE SERVICES, THE PRECISE ROLE OF THE MILITARY COMMITTEE AND THE JOINT SUPERVISORY TEAMS, AND TO ESTABLISH DIRECT COMMUNICATIONS LINKS BETWEEN THE COMMANDERS ON BOTH SIDES OF THE BORDER. AFTER A PROTRACTED DISCUSSION, IT WAS AGREED THAT WE WOULD SUBMIT A PAPER FOR CONSIDERATION AT TOMORROW'S MEETING. (NOTE: OWING TO WEATHER, THE LEBANESE HAVE ASKED TO CANCEL TOMORROW'S MEETING IN NETANYA.) COVEY

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JERUSALEM 00590

DECAPTIONED

FROM HABIB AND DRAPER

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, MOPS, MARR, IS, LE, US, XF
SUBJECT: HABIB/DRAPER MISSION: LEBANON-ISRAEL

1. [REDACTED]

2. AT LUNCH TODAY WITH KIMCHE IT WAS AGREED THAT WE
WOULD BEGIN A DETAILED DIRECT EXCHANGE WITH THE ISRAELIS
OF SPECIFIC SOLUTIONS TO DEAL WITH THE TWO KEY
ISSUES THAT REMAIN UNRESOLVED IN THE NEGOTIATIONS
BETWEEN THE ISRAELIS AND THE LEBANESE. KIMCHE AND
HIS COLLEAGUES HAVE INDICATED READINESS TO BACK AWAY
FROM SOME OF THE PREVIOUS RIGIDLY HELD POSITIONS
REGARDING MUTUAL RELATIONS (NORMALIZATION) AND SECUR-

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ITY ARRANGEMENTS.

3. FOLLOWING OUR EARLIER MEETINGS THIS WEEK WITH
FOREIGN MINISTER SHAMIR, AT WHICH WE URGED A JOINT
ATTEMPT TO DEAL WITH THESE TWO ISSUES ON A NEW
COURSE, AND WITH THE QUIETING DOWN OF THE ISRAELI
CABINET CRISIS, THE ISRAELIS HAVE RESPONDED TO OUR
DESIRE FOR A DETAILED DIALOGUE. WE WILL BE MEETING ON
SUNDAY, FEBRUARY 20, AT WHICH TIME WE WILL BE SEEKING

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TO ARRANGE THE SPECIFIC LANGUAGE TO BE INCLUDED IN THE AGREEMENT GOVERNING THE MUTUAL RELATIONS ISSUE. IT IS NOW CLEARLY ESTABLISHED THAT QUESTIONS INVOLVING THE MOVEMENT OF PEOPLE AND GOODS WILL BE DIVIDED INTO TWO PARTS: FIRST, WILL BE THOSE ARRANGEMENTS GOVERNING SUCH MOVEMENT IN THE PERIOD IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING THE WITHDRAWAL OF FORCES. SECOND, A COMMITMENT TO NEGOTIATE AFTER A SIX-MONTH INTERVAL A FORMAL AGREEMENT COVERING THE MOVEMENT OF PEOPLE AND GOODS. THIS TWO-PART FORMULA IS ACCEPTABLE TO THE LEBANESE AS WELL.

4. ON SECURITY ISSUES, KIMCHE INDICATED THAT THE ISRAELIS ARE WILLING TO "LISTEN" TO SPECIFIC PROPOSALS WHICH WE MAY HAVE. THE PROBLEM OF A RESIDUAL ISRAELI PRESENCE IN WATCH STATIONS HAS BECOME MANAGEABLE. THE ISRAELIS ARE NOW WILLING TO CONSIDER ALTERNATIVES WHICH INVOLVE A SATISFACTORY DEGREE OF ISRAELI SURVEILLANCE OF THE SECURITY ZONES AND INTELLIGENCE EXCHANGES IN COOPERATION WITH THE LEBANESE. THEY ARE STILL APPROACHING AGREEMENT ON SECURITY ISSUES CAUTIOUSLY AND THEY MAY HAVE OVER-AMBITIOUS SCHEMES FOR THE USE OF HADDAD'S FORCES IN A MANNER BEYOND WHAT THE LEBANESE WOULD WISH. OVERALL THEY ARE EXHIBITING SIGNS OF FLEXIBILITY WHICH WE HOPE WILL LEAD INTO WORKABLE PROPOSALS.

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5. KIMCHE ALSO INDICATED MORE AWARENESS THAN HAS HITHERTO BEEN EXPRESSED OF THE NEED TO AVOID A SITUATION WHICH WOULD ALLOW THE SYRIANS TO UPSET ARRANGEMENTS BY REFUSING TO WITHDRAW. THIS HAS LED TO GREATER READINESS TO CONSIDER THE POSSIBILITY OF USING SIDE ARRANGEMENTS AND ALLOWING FOR TREATMENT OF CRITICAL ISSUES WITHOUT FORMAL AGREEMENTS THAT WOULD BECOME PUBLICLY KNOWN AT AN INAPPROPRIATE TIME.

6. WE DO NOT WISH TO GIVE THE IMPRESSION THAT AN EARLY SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEMS WE HAVE BEEN FACING OVER THE PAST SEVERAL WEEKS IS IMMEDIATELY ACHIEVABLE. HOWEVER, WE HAVE NOW REACHED THE POINT WHERE SERIOUS DIALOGUE ON THE TWO CRITICAL ISSUES IS ABOUT TO BE JOINED WITH THE SPECIFIC PURPOSE OF REACHING AGREEMENT BETWEEN US. OVER THE NEXT WEEK WE SHALL BE ABLE TO DISCOVER THE EXTENT TO WHICH THIS WILL PERMIT US TO ACCELERATE THE NEGOTIATIONS TO REACH AN AGREEMENT REASONABLY SOON. WE MAY STILL FIND THAT ISRAELI DEMANDS WILL FAR EXCEED LEBANESE LIMITS ON NORMALIZATION. WE MAY ALSO BE FACED WITH WHAT HAS HERETOFORE BEEN AN UNWAVERING ISRAELI DESIRE TO DOMINATE THE SITUATION IN SOUTHERN LEBANON, WITH EMPHASIS NO ON THE USE OF THE HADDAD FORCES. WE WILL CONTINUE TO SEARCH

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FOR ISRAELI FLEXIBILITY IN THESE REGARDS. COVEY

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LOCATOR= TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM

ERRORS= N/A

CONCEPTS= POW, MIA, TRANSFER, NEGOTIATION, REPORT, PRISONER, VITAL

TAGS= PREL, MOPS, SY, IS, LE, ICRC

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JERUSALEM FOR HABIB

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, MOPS, SY, IS, LE, ICRC
SUBJECT: FURTHER EXCHANGES WITH SYRIANS AND ICRC ON
ISRAELI POWS AND MIAS

REFS: (A) DAMASCUS 974, (B) JERUSALEM 542, (C) DAMASCUS

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1. [REDACTED] ENTIRE TEXT.

2. ON FEBRUARY 17, AMBASSADOR RAISED POW-MIA PROBLEM WITH SYRIAN FOREIGN MINISTRY DIRECTOR OF AMERICAN AFFAIRS, SAMI GLAIEL. WE PRESSED AGAIN FOR ANSWERS TO ISRAELI QUESTIONS SUBMITTED TO SYRIANS LAST MONTH ALONG LINES OF DAMASCUS 974.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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3. GLAIEL REITERATED THAT HE HAD PASSED THE ISRAELI LIST OF QUESTIONS TO "THE COMPETENT SYRIAN AUTHORITIES" AND WAS STILL AWAITING A REPLY.

4. GLAIEL THEN MADE FOLLOWING POINTS ABOUT SYRIAN-ISRAELI POW-MIA SITUATION. HE OBSERVED THAT ICRC HAS VISITED SYRIAN AND ISRAELI POWS. ACCORDING GLAIEL, SARG HAS NOTED THAT SYRIAN PRISONERS ARE NOT REPEAT NOT BEING WELL-TREATED AND, IN ADDITION, SARG HAS REPORTS THAT BODIES OF SYRIAN DEAD ALSO MISTREATED. GLAIEL CONTINUED THAT THE SYRIANS HAVE SENT TO THE ISRAELIS VIA THE ICRC A LIST OF SYRIAN MIAS WITH REQUEST FOR INFORMATION BUT, AS YET, ISRAELIS HAVE NOT ANSWERED.

5. WE TOLD GLAIEL THAT WE WOULD REPORT THESE SYRIAN COMMENTS AND THEY WOULD BE CONVEYED TO THE ISRAELIS BY HABIB/DRAPER OR THROUGH OUR EMBASSY IN TEL AVIV. (ACTION REQUESTED: WOULD APPRECIATE THIS BEING DONE.)

6. EMBASSY OFFICER CONTACTED ICRC DAMASCUS DELEGATE GAUTHIER (PROTECT) FEBRUARY 17 AND HEARD THAT THE THREE ISRAELI POWS IN SYRIAN HANDS AND THE SIX UNDER FATAH CONTROL ARE RECEIVING REGULAR RED CROSS VISITS AND ARE BEING TREATED PROPERLY. THE PFLP-GC STILL HAS NOT ALLOWED HIM TO VISIT THE TWO ISRAELIS IT HOLDS, ALTHOUGH OTHER NON-

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OFFICIAL VISITORS (INCLUDING KING HUSSEIN'S FIRST WIFE) SAY THE TWO ARE ALIVE AND WELL. GAUTHIER SAID THAT HIS PLO CONTACT ON THE PRISONER QUESTION, ABU ZIAD, HAS TRIED TO HELP HIM GAIN ACCESS TO THE TWO ISRAELIS WITHOUT SUCCESS. GAUTHIER BELIEVES THAT THE PFLP-GC IS FAR MORE RESPONSIVE TO SYRIAN GOVERNMENT DESIRES THAN TO THOSE OF THE FATAH-DOMINATED PLO.

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7. GAUTHIER HAS RECEIVED NO INFORMATION FROM THE SYRIANS CONCERNING THE ISRAELI MIAS BEYOND WHAT HE HAD KNOWN IN JANUARY (SEE REFTEL).

8. HE REPORTED THAT THE SYRIAN GOVERNMENT AND NUMEROUS SYRIAN FAMILIES HAD ASKED HIM TO HELP FIND SOME 400 SYRIAN SOLDIERS AND CIVILIANS MISSING IN THE FIGHTING IN LEBANON. IN RESPONSE TO THE ICRC INQUIRIES ABOUT THESE PEOPLE, THE ISRAELIS REPLIED THAT THEY HAD NO INFORMATION ABOUT THE MISSING SYRIANS. GAUTHIER SAID HE HAD ALSO BEEN ASKED FOR SIMILAR HELP BY MANY PALESTINIAN FAMILIES; THE ISRAELI REPOSENSE HAD BEEN THE SAME.

9. GAUTHEIR ASSURED US THAT CONTINUED ACTIVE U.S. INTEREST IN THIS MATTER SUPPORTED HIS OWN EFFORTS.

10. COMMENT: WE WILL CONTINUE TO PRESS SYRIANS FOR ANSWERS TO ISRAELI QUESTIONS. GLAIEL'S PRESENTATION ON SYRIAN POWS AND MIAS INDICATES THAT AT LEAST SYRIANS ARE GIVING SOME THOUGHT TO THEIR SIDE OF THE PROBLEM. IN ADDITION, ICRC CONFIRMED ISRAELI NON-RESPONSE ON SYRIAN MIAS. ALTHOUGH IT IS A HOPEFUL SIGN THAT SYRIANS BEGINNING TO SHOW SOME MOTION ON THIS PROBLEM, IT IS OUR VIEW THAT THEY WILL NOT COME TO GRIPS WITH IT SERIOUSLY UNTIL THERE ARE INDICATIONS OF SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS IN LEBANESE-ISRAELI NEGOTIATIONS ON ISRAELI TROOP WITHDRAWAL. PAGANELLI

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FROM DRAPER

JERUSALEM FOR AMBASSADOR HABIB

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, MOPS, MARR, LE, US, IS, XF

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SUBJECT: HABIB/DRAPER MISSION: LAF DEPLOYMENT
INTO EAST BEIRUT AND HADDAD'S FORCES

1. [REDACTED]

2. SUMMARY: IN A PRIVATE MEETING WITH KIMCHE IN
NETANYA FEBRUARY 17, I RAISED THE PROBLEM OF LAF/IDF
CONFRONTATION FOLLOWING THE LAF'S DEPLOYMENT INTO
EAST BEIRUT, CITING SPECIFICALLY YESTERDAY'S**UNCLASSIFIED**

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INCIDENT AT THE MKALLES CIRCLE IN EAST BEIRUT. I POINTED OUT THE IDF'S MOVEMENT INTO PARTS OF EAST BEIRUT WAS CONTRARY TO THE UNDERSTANDINGS REACHED WITH ISRAEL LAST SEPTEMBER. DURING THE PLENARY SESSION, KIMCHE SPECIFICALLY WELCOMED THE EXTENSION OF LEBANESE AUTHORITY INTO EAST BEIRUT, BUT POINTED TO THE WORRISOME DEVELOPMENT OF PLO REINFILTRATION INTO WEST BEIRUT WHICH REQUIRED ISRAEL TO TAKE CERTAIN SECURITY MEASURES IN THE "BEIRUT AREA." I URGED THAT THE LEBANESE AND ISRAELI MILITARY REPRESENTATIVES PRESENT IN NETANYA DISCUSS THE SITUATION INFORMALLY TO AVERT FURTHER RISKY CONFRONTATIONS. (SEPTTEL DESCRIBES SUBSEQUENT MOVEMENT ON THIS ISSUE.)

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3. I ALSO TOLD KIMCHE PRIVATELY I WAS CONCERNED BY THE OSTENTATIOUS DISPLAY BY HADDAD'S FORCES IN SIDON AND OTHER LOCATIONS IN SOUTHERN LEBANON IN THE LAST SEVERAL DAYS, AND POINTED OUT THIS DID NOT CONTRIBUTE TO THE PRESENT NEGOTIATING ATMOSPHERE. DURING THE PLENARY, KIMCHE TOOK THE OCCASION TO SAY THAT THE FUTURE OF HADDAD'S MILITIA WAS ONE OF THE MAJOR ITEMS BEING NEGOTIATED IN THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS. HE

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STRESSED HADDAD'S RECENT MOVEMENTS SHOULD NOT AFFECT THE CURRENT NEGOTIATIONS. FATTAL SIMPLY REPLIED THAT HIS GOVERNMENT HAD A SOLUTION ON THE HADDAD ISSUE BUT WAS CONCERNED BY THE "SPECTACULAR" NATURE OF HADDAD'S DISPLAY, WHICH WAS BEING INTERPRETED AS A COUNTER TO THE LAF'S DEPLOYMENT INTO EAST BEIRUT. END SUMMARY.

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4. DURING A PRIVATE MEETING WITH DAVID KIMCHE IN NETANYA FEBRUARY 17 PRIOR TO THE PLENARY, I RAISED THE INCIDENT OF THE IDF/LAF CONFRONTATION YESTERDAY AT THE NEWLY-ESTABLISHED LAF CHECKPOINT AT THE MKALLES CIRCLE IN EAST BEIRUT. I TOLD KIMCHE THAT IT WAS CLEAR FROM MY PREVIOUS CONVERSATIONS WITH GENERALS DRORI AND EINAN THAT THE IDF HAD BEEN OPERATING ON INSTRUCTIONS WHICH ALLOWED THE IDF TO MOVE INTO LARGE AREAS OF EAST BEIRUT. I TOLD KIMCHE THAT I WAS SURPRISED WHEN I HAD HEARD THIS, SINCE IT WAS CONTRARY TO THE UNDERSTANDINGS WHICH HAD BEEN REACHED LAST SEPTEMBER AT SHARON'S FARM. I TOLD KIMCHE UNEQUIVOCALLY THAT I WAS VERY CONCERNED BY THE LATEST INCIDENT AND ITS LARGER POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS.

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5. KIMCHE REPLIED THAT HE ONLY HAD AN ORAL

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RECOLLECTION OF THE UNDERSTANDINGS WHICH HAD BEEN
REACHED AT SHARON'S FARM LAST YEAR. HE THOUGHT
IT WOULD BE USEFUL IF I COULD PROVIDE A WRITTEN
RECORD OF WHAT WAS AGREED TO DURING THOSE
DISCUSSIONS. HE AGREED THAT IT WAS IN NO ONE'S
INTEREST TO ALLOW SIMILAR INCIDENTS TO REOCCUR

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MILITARY ADDEES TREAT AS SPECAT EXCLUSIVE

AND HOPED A SATISFACTORY ARRANGEMENT COULD BE WORKED OUT.

6. I ALSO RAISED THE ISSUE OF HADDAD'S OSTENTATIOUS DISPLAY OF FORCES IN SIDON AND OTHER PARTS OF SOUTHERN LEBANON IN THE LAST SEVERAL DAYS.

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I SAID THAT THIS DISPLAY OF FORCE WAS CREATING OBVIOUS PROBLEMS IN LEBANON AND POINTED OUT THAT IT DID NOT CONTRIBUTE TO THE OBJECTIVES WHICH WE WERE TRYING TO ACHIEVE IN THE CURRENT NEGOTIATIONS. KIMCHE OFFERED NO SPECIFIC REPLY, ALTHOUGH HE NOTED THAT HADDAD HAD BEEN IN AND OUT OF SIDON AND OTHER PARTS IN SOUTHERN LEBANON DURING THE LAST SEVERAL MONTHS. I REPEATED THE POINT THAT THIS TYPE OF CONDUCT WAS NOT HELPFUL AND BELIEVE KIMCHE UNDERSTOOD MY POINT.

7. DURING THE OPENING PLENARY SESSION WHICH FOLLOWED, KIMCHE TOOK THE OCCASION TO ADDRESS BOTH ISSUES. AT THE OUTSET, HE SAID HE WISHED TO OFFICIALLY WELCOME THE FACT THAT THE LEBANESE AUTHORITY HAS BEEN EXTENDED TO ALL OF BEIRUT. HE WISHED TO MAKE THIS POINT IN A CATEGORIC FASHION IN VIEW OF SOME PRESS STORIES WHICH HAD ALLEGED THAT ISRAEL WAS OPPOSED TO THIS STEP. HOWEVER, KIMCHE PROCEEDED TO ELABORATE THAT ISRAEL WAS CONCERNED ABOUT THE STEADY GROWTH OF PLO INFILTRATION INTO WEST BEIRUT. WHILE NOT CITING SPECIFIC NUMBERS, HE DID SAY THAT ISRAEL FEARED "SEVERAL HUNDRED" HAD INFILTRATED AND BELIEVED IN VIEW OF THIS DEVELOPMENT THAT ISRAEL NEEDED TO CONTINUE ITS SECURITY ACTIVITIES IN THE "BEIRUT AREA." KIMCHE STATED THAT THESE ISRAELI ACTIVITIES DID NOT NEED TO INTERFERE WITH LEBANESE ACTIONS IN BEIRUT AND SAW NO REASON WHY ISRAEL AND LEBANON COULD NOT REACH AN AMICABLE UNDERSTANDING ON THIS SUBJECT. KIMCHE ADDED THAT HE ALSO WISHED TO STATE THE WISH OF HIS GOVERNMENT THAT THE LEBANESE AUTHORITIES WOULD DEAL WITH THE WORRISOME DEVELOPMENT OF PLO INFILTRATORS IN

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"AS FIRM A MANNER AS ABSOLUTELY POSSIBLE. FINALLY, HE SAID THAT WHEN ISRAEL SPOKE OF PLO'S TOTAL DEPARTURE FROM LEBANON, IT NATURALLY INCLUDED THOSE TERRORISTS WHO HAD RE-INFILTRATED WEST BEIRUT.

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8. KIMCHE THEN ADDRESSED THE SUBJECT OF HADDAD'S RECENT ACTIVITIES IN SOUTHERN LEBANON, SAYING THAT AS WAS WELL KNOWN, ISRAEL CONSIDERED HADDAD TO BE A "GOOD LEBANESE PATRIOT." WITH RESPECT TO HADDAD'S PRESENT MOVEMENTS, KIMCHE SAID WE WERE NOW IN THE PROCESS OF NEGOTIATING SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS, ESPECIALLY FOR THE SOUTHERN ZONE, AND THAT ONE OF THE ISSUES WHICH NEEDED TO BE ADDRESSED WAS THE QUESTION OF THE FUTURE OF HADDAD'S MILITIA. KIMCHE POINTED OUT THAT THIS SUBJECT WAS A BIG PART OF THE AGENDA, AND HE HOPED THAT ALL SIDES COULD REACH AN AGREEMENT THAT THIS ISSUE WOULD BE RESOLVED. KIMCHE STATED FLATLY THAT HADDAD'S RECENT MOVEMENTS SHOULD NOT AFFECT THE PRESENT NEGOTIATIONS; HE WISHED TO STRESS THIS POINT BECAUSE HE HAD SEEN PRESS REPORTS WHICH STATED THAT HADDAD'S MOVEMENTS WERE CONTRARY TO THE SPIRIT OF THE PRESENT NEGOTIATIONS.

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9. AMBASSADOR FATTAL REPLIED BRIEFLY TO KIMCHE'S PRESENTATION. ON THE ISSUE OF PLO INFILTRATION, HE SAID HE WAS UNAWARE OF WHAT WAS EXACTLY THE SITUATION. HOWEVER, IF THE ISRAELI REPORTS WERE TRUE, FATTAL POINTED OUT IT WOULD BE MORE OF A "BOTHER" TO THE LEBANESE THAN TO THE ISRAELIS. (NOTE: FATTAL DID NOT REPLY TO KIMCHE'S STATEMENT THAT ANY PLO ELEMENTS WHO HAD REINFILTRATED WEST BEIRUT SHOULD BE EVACUATED IN THE CONTEXT OF TOTAL PLO DEPARTURE FROM LEBANON.) ON HADDAD, FATTAL WAS RELATIVELY

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EXDIS

MILITARY ADDEES TREAT AS SPECAT EXCLUSIVE

RELAXED. HE SAID HADDAD WAS NOT A REAL PROBLEM
AND THAT HIS GOVERNMENT HAD A SOLUTION ON HOW
THIS ISSUE COULD BE ARRANGED IN A SATISFACTORY
MANNER. FATTAL DID ADD, HOWEVER, THAT WHAT DID
WORRY HIS GOVERNMENT WAS THE "SPECTACULAR"
NATURE OF HADDAD'S RECENT MOVEMENTS IN SIDON AND

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IN ABATIYA. HE WAS CONCERNED INTER
ALIA THAT THIS COULD LEAD TO THE IMPRESSION THAT
HADDAD'S MOVEMENTS WERE SOMEHOW RELATED TO THE RECENT
LAF DEPLOYMENTS INTO EAST BEIRUT.

10. I WELCOMED THE ISRAELI ASSURANCES ON THE
EXTENSION OF LEBANESE CONTROL OVER ALL OF BEIRUT.
UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES, I ALSO THOUGHT IT WOULD BE
A VERY GOOD IDEA IF THE ISRAELI AND LEBANESE
MILITARY REPRESENTATIVES AT THIS MEETING COULD GET
TOGETHER INFORMALLY TO DISCUSS THE RECENT LEBANESE
ARMY DEPLOYMENTS. THIS COULD AVERT A POTENTIALLY
DANGEROUS INCIDENT, SUCH AS HAD OCCURRED AT THE
CHECKPOINT YESTERDAY. I STATED THAT IT WAS SIMPLY
TOO RISKY TO ALLOW A SIMILAR INCIDENT TO OCCUR AGAIN.
KIMCHE REPLIED THAT ISRAEL DID NOT WANT ANY
MISUNDERSTANDINGS AND FELT THAT AN AGREEMENT COULD
BE REACHED FAIRLY EASILY ON THIS ISSUE. HE POINTED
OUT, HOWEVER, THAT THE ISRAELI REPRESENTATIVES IN
BEIRUT HAD ALREADY HAD A MEETING WITH THE LEBANESE
AND BELIEVED THAT THE CONTACT SHOULD BE PRIMARILY
MAINTAINED IN BEIRUT WITH THE NORTHERN COMMAND
WHICH HAD DIRECT AND ON-THE-GROUND RESPONSIBILITY
(SEE SEPTTEL FOR UPDATE ON MORE POSITIVE DEVELOPMENTS
ON THIS ISSUE).

11. COMMENT: DURING MY PRIVATE MEETING WITH
KIMCHE, WE DISCUSSED THE FUTURE OF HADDAD.
KIMCHE WAS TALKING IN TERMS OF HADDAD'S POSSIBLY

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STAYING ON IN THE SOUTHERN SECURITY ZONE AFTER
THE WITHDRAWAL. I TOLD KIMCHE THAT THIS WAS NOT
IN THE CARDS. HADDAD COULD NOT RPT NOT BECOME
EITHER MILITARY GOVERNOR OR COMMANDER OF THE
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

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BRIGADE TO BE STATIONED IN THE BORDER REGION.
IT WOULD BE TOO MUCH FOR THE LEBANESE TO SWALLOW.
I SAID THAT THE LEBANESE WERE VERY MUCH AWARE OF
BEGIN'S SENSITIVITIES WITH RESPECT TO HADDAD AND
THE NEED TO FIND AN "HONORABLE" SOLUTION. I TOLD
KIMCHE THAT I HAD HEARD VARIOUS POSSIBLE WAYS OF
RESOLVING HADDAD'S FUTURE, AMONG THEM BEING ASSIGNED
AS AN AMBASSADOR OR MILITARY ATTACHE TO A MAJOR
LEBANESE MISSION OVERSEAS, OR ASSUMING ANOTHER
COMMAND IN LEBANON. KIMCHE TOOK CAREFUL NOTES.
END COMMENT. LEWIS

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TO AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS PRIORITY DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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FROM HABIB/DRAPER

9302566

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, LE, IS, US, SY

SUBJ: HABIB/DRAPER MISSION: REPLY TO SYRIAN DEMARCHE N
ISRAEL-LEBANON NEGOTIATIONS

REF: (A) DAMASCUS 1191 ✓ (B) STATE 36454 ✓

1. [REDACTED]

2. WE HAVE NO OBJECTIONS TO YOUR PROCEEDING TO GIVE THE
MFA THE NON-PAPER TRANSMITTED IN STATE REFTEL. GOOD
LUCK. COVEY

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MILITARY ADDEES TREAT AS SPECAT EXCLUSIVE

FROM HABIB

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, MOPS, LE, US, IS, XF, MARR

SUBJECT: HABIB/DRAPER MISSION: MEETING WITH FOREIGN
MINISTER SHAMIR, TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 15

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1. [REDACTED]

2. SUMMARY: I USED MY MEETING FEBRUARY 15 WITH SHAMIR TO UNDERLINE THAT FUNDAMENTAL DIFFERENCES REMAIN BETWEEN ISRAEL AND LEBANON ON A FEW KEY ISSUES (WARNING STATIONS, AND MOVEMENT OF GOODS AND PERSONS); TO EMPHASIZE THE REAL LIMITS ON WHAT LEBANON COULD DO IMMEDIATELY; AND, TO LAY OUT IN GENERAL TERMS THE POSSIBLE COMPROMISES ON THE KEY

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ISSUES. I PRESSED FOR ISRAELI AGREEMENT TO BILATERAL TALKS ON THESE AND OTHER ISSUES AND SAID THAT ONCE WE RESOLVED THESE ISSUES WE WOULD BE ABLE TO PRODUCE QUICKLY A TEXT WHICH I WOULD TRY TO GET LEBANON TO ACCEPT.

3. SHAMIR WAS SOMEWHAT FORTHCOMING ON THE SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES. FOR THE FIRST TIME, HE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO HANDLE DE FACTO UNDERSTANDINGS ON THE INTERIM MOVEMENT OF GOODS AND PERSONS OUTSIDE THE TEXT OF THE AGREEMENT. BAR-ON TOLD ME PRIVATELY THAT SHAMIR WAS CONVINCED THAT ISRAEL NEEDED TO SHIFT ITS POSITION ON "STATIONS" AND OTHER SECURITY ISSUES. HOWEVER, SHAMIR WAS VERY CAUTIOUS ABOUT WHAT MIGHT BE ACCOMPLISHED IN THE NEAR FUTURE. SHAMIR SAID AT ONE POINT THAT SERIOUS DISCUSSIONS, PARTICULARLY ON SECURITY, WOULD NOT BE POSSIBLE UNTIL THE NEW DEFMIN AND HIS EXPERTS WERE INSTALLED. AT ANOTHER POINT, HE SAID THAT THE GENERAL POLITICAL CLIMATE FOLLOWING THE KAHAN REPORT WAS NOT CONDUCTIVE TO ANY CHANGES IN ISRAELI NEGOTIATING POSITIONS.

4. I SAID WE COULD NOT AFFORD TO MARK TIME FOR TWO

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WEEKS. I URGED SHAMIR TO SEEK APPROVAL AT TOMORROW'S STEERING COMMITTEE MEETING FOR ISRAEL'S TEAM TO SIT DOWN WITH THE U.S. TO GO OVER THE CORE ISSUES AND TO LOOK AT CONCRETE LANGUAGE. I STRESSED THAT AS TIME PASSED, NEGATIVE INFLUENCES WOULD BE AT WORK AND IT WOULD BE HARDER FOR THE LEBANESE TO BE FORTHCOMING. HOWEVER, WHILE THE FOREIGN MINISTRY MAY NOW SHARE OUR ASSESSMENT THAT IT IS TIME TO BRING THE NEGOTIATIONS TO A QUICK CONCLUSION, SHAMIR MADE IT CLEAR THAT INTERNAL ISRAELI POLITICAL SITUATION MAY MAKE THIS DIFFICULT, AT LEAST IN THE VERY NEAR TERM. ALSO, THE ISRAELIS STILL FEEL THEY CAN GET MORE FROM THE NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE LEBANESE THAN IN ANY PARALLEL NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE U.S. END SUMMARY.

5. I MET WITH FOREIGN MINISTER SHAMIR AND HIS FOREIGN MINISTRY COLLEAGUES (NO MILITARY REPRESENTATIVES WERE PRESENT) FOR ABOUT ONE HOUR AND A HALF TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 15, TO REVIEW MY DISCUSSIONS IN BEIRUT AND TO TRY TO DETERMINE HOW TO PROCEED IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE CRISIS PRECIPITATED BY THE KAHAN COMMISSION REPORT. I WAS ACCOMPANIED BY AMBASSADOR DRAPER, DCM FLATEN, KRECZKO, AND HARE. OTHER TOPICS COVERED--ISRAELI POW ISSUES AND LAF ENTRY INTO

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EAST BEIRUT--ARE BEING REPORTED SEPTEL.

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6. AT THE OUTSET, KIMCHE BRIEFLY REVIEWED YESTERDAY'S MEETING IN KHALDAH, WHICH HE DESCRIBED AS "NOT ONE OF OUR BETTER DAYS." HE SAID THAT THE LEBANESE HAD UNFORTUNATELY COME TO THE MEETING WITHOUT ANY

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FRESH INSTRUCTIONS ON THE "MOVEMENT OF GOODS AND PEOPLE" AND THAT, OWING TO AMBASSADOR KHARMA'S ILLNESS, THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON MUTUAL RELATIONS HAD NOT MET. KIMCHE DESCRIBED THE "UNOFFICIAL" MEETING WITH AMBASSADORS FATTAL AND DRAPER, SAYING THAT HE TOLD FATTAL FIRMLY THAT THE LEBANESE HAD NOT YET COME UP WITH ANY CLEAR COUNTERPROPOSALS TO THE ORIGINAL ISRAELI REQUESTS ON THIS SUBJECT AND THAT

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ONE COULD NOT CONTINUE TO NEGOTIATE IN THIS MANNER. KIMCHE SAID THAT FATTAL HAD RESPONDED THAT HE WAS WITHOUT INSTRUCTIONS BUT WOULD PASS ON THIS MESSAGE TO HIS SUPERIORS. ON OTHER SUBJECTS, KIMCHE DESCRIBED THE SLOW BUT IMPORTANT DRAFTING DONE ON OTHER CLAUSES OF THE AGREEMENT, BUT NOTED THERE WERE DIFFERENCES ON THE TIMETABLE FOR TERMINATING THE STATE OF WAR AND ON THE SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES ISSUE. THE SECURITY SUBCOMMITTEE HAD ALSO DRAFTED TWO NEW ARTICLES ON MISSILES AND THE COORDINATION OF AIR TRAFFIC. HOWEVER, KIMCHE ALLOWED THAT THE FIVE TO SIX CRITICAL ISSUES IN THE SECURITY DOMAIN HAD NOT BEEN ADDRESSED YESTERDAY.

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7. I THEN PROVIDED A GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF MY TALKS IN BEIRUT OVER THE WEEKEND AS WELL AS SOME SEPARATE DISCUSSIONS DRAPER HAD. I FIRST STRESSED THAT I HAD URGED THE LEBANESE TO PURSUE THEIR DISCUSSIONS WITH THE PLO AND SYRIANS ON WITHDRAWAL. THE LEBANESE THOUGHT THEY HAD ENOUGH IN HAND IN THE FORM OF A LETTER FROM THE SYRIANS AT THIS POINT AND FEARED THAT, IF THEY TRIED TO GO INTO GREATER DETAIL, THE SYRIANS WOULD PRESS FOR MORE INFORMATION THAN THEY WANTED TO GIVE ON THE LEBANESE/ISRAELI NEGOTIATIONS. ALSO, I HAD SPECIFICALLY ASKED IF THE LEBANESE WERE KEEPING THE SYRIANS INFORMED ON THE NEGOTIATIONS AND HAD BEEN TOLD THEY WERE NOT. IT WAS CLEAR, I SAID, THAT THE LEBANESE DID NOT TRUST THE SYRIANS AND BELIEVED IT WAS BETTER TO PRESENT THE ENTIRE PACKAGE WHEN IT WAS COMPLETED. I SAID I TENDED TO AGREE WITH THE LEBANESE ASSESSMENT. I ADDED THAT THE LEBANESE WERE VERY WORRIED ABOUT THE SYRIAN ROLE AND THAT THEY FEARED SYRIA WAS "LYING IN

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THE WEEDS" IN PREPARATION TO AMBUSH THE AGREEMENT. QUITE FRANKLY, I STATED THAT I SHARED THE LEBANESE CONCERN THAT SYRIA COULD PLAY A SPOILER ROLE.

8. DURING MY CONVERSATIONS IN BEIRUT, IT HAD ALSO BECOME EVIDENT THAT THE LEBANESE WERE EXTREMELY DISAPPOINTED WITH THE ATTITUDE OF THE SAUDIS. I HAD BEEN INFORMED THAT THE SAUDIS HAD TURNED OFF ALL TRADE FROM LEBANON AND HAD CONDITIONED ANY PROMISES OF FINANCIAL CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE EVENTUAL AGREEMENT THAT WAS REACHED. I HAD TOLD THE LEBANESE THAT I WOULD GO TO SAUDI ARABIA AT THE RIGHT MOMENT AND THAT I DID NOT BELIEVE THE SAUDIS WERE NECESSARILY DUG INTO AN INTRANSIGENT POSITION. NEVERTHELESS, THE CURRENT SAUDI ATTITUDE WAS A MATTER OF DEEP CONCERN TO LEBANON, EVEN THOUGH IT WAS NOT ON THE SAME PAR AS THE LEBANESE FEAR OF SYRIA.

9. ON MUTUAL RELATIONS, I TOLD SHAMIR THAT IN OUR DISCUSSIONS DN AMBASSADOR KHARMA'S TWO-PHASED APPROACH ON THE MOVEMENT OF GOODS AND PEOPLE, WE HAD IMPRESSED THE LEBANESE TO BE MORE SPECIFIC ON AD HOC ARRANGEMENTS. WE HAD ALSO REMINDED THE LEBANESE OF ISRAEL'S AVERSION TO ANYTHING WHICH SMACKED OF A DISCRIMINATORY REGIME OR WHICH PUT THE ISRAELIS INTO CATEGORIES. I FELT THAT THE LEBANESE UNDERSTOOD THIS POINT, THOUGH THEY HAD DIFFICULTY IN COMING TO GRIPS ON HOW TO HANDLE THIS PROBLEM.

10. ON SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS, I HAD ENCOUNTERED TOTAL LEBANESE RESISTANCE TO THE IDEA OF LEAVING RESIDUAL FORCES IN LEBANON AFTER THE WITHDRAWAL. THEY BELIEVED QUITE SIMPLY THAT SYRIA WOULD NOT WITHDRAW UNDER THESE

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CES. IT WAS NOT, I SAID, A QUESTION OF SYRIANS
DEMANDING EQUIVALENT CONCESSIONS FROM LEBANON, AS HAD BEEN
PREVIOUSLY SUGGESTED IN MY DISCUSSIONS IN JERUSALEM.
MAKING CLEAR THAT A RESIDUAL IDF PRESENCE WAS OUT OF THE
QUESTION AS FAR AS THE U.S. WAS CONCERNED, I SAID THAT
IT WAS NECESSARY TO FIND A DIFFERENT FORMULA ON THIS
ISSUE, BASED UPON TOTAL WITHDRAWAL OF ALL EXTERNAL
FORCES.

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11. I SAID THAT WHILE THE LEBANESE ACCEPTED THE INTE-
GRATION OF HADDAD'S FORCES, THEY DID NOT APPEAR TO
FULLY GRASP THE LIMITED TIME FRAMES WHICH WOULD BE
AVAILABLE FOR THE DEPLOYMENT OF THEIR FORCES ONCE AN
AGREEMENT WAS REACHED AND (PERHAPS AN EIGHT-WEEK) WITH-
DRAWAL STARTED. I HOPED I HAD STIMULATED SOME FRESH
THINKING ON THIS SUBJECT. OVERALL, I STATED THAT
WHILE THE MOBILIZATION AND BUILDUP OF THE LEBANESE
ARMY WAS BEHIND SCHEDULE, GENERAL TANNOUS WAS TAKING
CHARGE IN A GOOD WAY AND OUR EQUIPMENT DELIVERIES WERE
ON SCHEDULE.

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12. WHILE NOT DIRECTLY RELATED TO THE TALKS, I ALSO COMMENTED ON LEBANESE VIEWS ON THE SITUATION IN THE SHUF. THERE WAS A GENERAL CONCERN ABOUT ALLEGED ISRAELI AND SYRIAN ACTIVITIES IN THAT AREA AND A BELIEF THAT LEBANON COULD NOT REALLY DEAL WITH THE ISSUE WHILE THE SYRIANS AND ISRAELIS REMAINED. IF THE SYRIANS AND LEBANESE DEPARTED, THE LEBANESE SEEMED OPTIMISTIC THAT THEY COULD RESOLVE THE SITUATION.

13. IN CONCLUDING MY PRESENTATION, I SAID I HAD RECEIVED THE CLEAR IMPRESSION THAT THE LEBANESE WERE VERY ANXIOUS TO COMPLETE THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS AND WOULD BE QUITE HAPPY IF WE HELPED OBTAIN AN EARLY OUTCOME. I STRESSED THAT I HAD NOT, HOWEVER, DISCUSSED SPECIFIC DRAFTS WITH THE LEBANESE. OVERALL, I THOUGHT "NORMALIZATION" WAS THE MOST CRITICAL ISSUE. I COULD SEE HOW SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS MIGHT BE WORKED OUT. ON NORMALIZATION, I STATED THAT THIS WOULD REQUIRE GREATER UNDERSTANDING ON THE PART OF ISRAEL. THE PROCESS COULD GO A LONG WAY BUT HAD TO BE GIVEN TIME. THE LEBANESE WERE VERY RELUC-

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TANT TO PUT DOWN MANY THINGS ON PAPER BECAUSE THEY FEARED THE SYRIAN REACTION. THEY WERE TRULY CONCERNED THAT THE SYRIANS WOULD CLOSE THE BORDER. THE LEBANESE COULD NOT, IN OTHER WORDS, MAKE ANY DIRECT REFERENCE TO THE BOYCOTT BUT COULD IN VARIOUS PRACTICAL "DE FACTO" WAYS BEHAVE SO THAT THE BOYCOTT IS NOT APPLICABLE.

14. SHAMIR SAID HE WAS CONCERNED THAT THE LEBANESE WERE SO WORRIED ABOUT THE SYRIANS. IF THE SYRIANS STOOD FAST, HE SAID, THIS WOULD MAKE ALL OUR EFFORTS FUTILE. I HASTENED TO ASSURE SHAMIR THAT THE SYRIANS HAD AGREED TO WITHDRAW IN WRITING BUT THE LEBANESE WERE CONCERNED ABOUT HOW THE "NORMALIZATION" ASPECTS COULD UNHINGE SYRIA'S AGREEMENT. SHAMIR SAID HE UNDERSTOOD BUT REFERRED TO WORRISOME SIGNS FROM SYRIA RECENTLY, AS WELL AS VARIOUS STATEMENTS BY THE SOVIETS, WHICH COULD COMPLICATE THE SITUATION. THESE SIGNS WORRIED ISRAEL AND RECALLED THE SITUATION WHICH PREVAILED PRIOR TO THE 1967 WAR.

15. I THEN FOCUSED ON HOW WE COULD TRY TO BRIDGE THE GAPS ON VARIOUS KEY ISSUES. I SAID I DID NOT THINK THERE WAS MUCH USEFULNESS IN FURTHER ARGUMENT ON THE DEFINITION OF THE SIZE OF THE SECURITY ZONE. THIS COULD BE HANDLED BY TAKING A SENSIBLE LOOK AT THE TOPOGRAPHY. WITH RESPECT TO EARLY WARNING STATIONS, I THOUGHT THIS CONCEPT OUGHT TO BE RECONSIDERED IN THE LIGHT OF OTHER LIAISON MECHANISMS WHICH

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COULD BE DEVELOPED, INCLUDING IN CONJUNCTION
WITH AIR RECONNAISSANCE. I CAUTIONED HOWEVER
THAT I THOUGHT RECONNAISSANCE AND INTELLIGENCE
EXCHANGE AGREEMENTS IN THE END COULD NOT BE
WRITTEN EXPLICITLY INTO THE AGREEMENT, THOUGH THE
UNDERSTANDINGS COULD BE IMPLEMENTED THROUGH THE
JOINT MILITARY LIAISON COMMITTEE. (I SAID THIS, NOT-

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[REDACTED]

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WITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT THE LEBANESE AT THE
DELEGATION LEVEL HAVE AGREED AD REFERENDUM ON SOME OF THIS

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LANGUAGE).

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16. ON MUTUAL RELATIONS, I THOUGHT A FORMULA COULD
BE DEVELOPED WHICH WOULD HAVE NEGOTIATIONS TO
BEGIN AFTER SIX MONTHS TO REACH AN AGREEMENT ON
THE MOVEMENT OF GOODS AND PEOPLE. I SAID KHARMA'S
ORIGINAL USE OF THE WORD "EXPLORATION" IN THIS
CONTEXT WAS NOT SUFFICIENTLY CLEAR. SECOND, IT WAS

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NECESSARY TO SPECIFY WHAT WOULD HAPPEN DURING THE
INTERIM PERIOD; IN OTHER WORDS, WHAT SORT OF
UNDERSTANDINGS COULD BE REACHED. I STRESSED THAT
WHAT SHOULD BE IMPORTANT FOR ISRAEL WAS TO HAVE

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SOMETHING IN HAND WHICH WOULD HAVE THE EFFECT OF
BREAKING THE BOYCOTT ON A DE FACTO BASIS.

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17. SHAMIR RESPONDED THAT HE SAW TWO GROUPS OF
ISSUES INVOLVING SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS AND NORMAL
RELATIONS. ON THE FIRST, SHAMIR SAID HE DID NOT
BELIEVE DECISIONS COULD BE TAKEN UNTIL THE NEW
MINISTER OF DEFENSE WAS IN PLACE. THIS WAS AN
OBJECTIVE FACT, HE ADDED. SHAMIR SAID THAT THE
STEERING COMMITTEE WOULD MEET TOMORROW AND WOULD
PROBABLY DECIDE TO WAIT "ONE OR TWO WEEKS" UNTIL THE
NEW MINISTER ARRIVED. ON MUTUAL RELATIONS, SHAMIR
SAID THAT ISRAEL HAD RECEIVED INFORMATION FROM
SOME LEBANESE THAT THE UNITED STATES WAS OPPOSED
TO ANY AGREEMENT IN THIS DOMAIN BECAUSE OF THE DAMAGE
IT WOULD DO TO LEBANON'S RELATIONS WITH THE
ARABS. I REPLIED EMPHATICALLY THAT WE BELIEVED
LEBANON DID HAVE LIMITS BASED UPON WHAT WE HAD BEEN
TOLD. THIS WAS NOT A CONCEPT WE HAD INVENTED. IN
FACT, WE HAD PRESSED THE LEBANESE TO EXPLAIN
THEIR OUTER LIMITS SO THAT WE COULD ATTEMPT TO MATCH
THEM WITH ISRAEL'S MINIMUM DEMANDS. I EMPHASIZED
THAT LEBANON HAD NO INTENTION OF RETURNING TO THE
STATUS QUO ANTE BUT HAD TO BALANCE THE NEED FOR
SOME NORMALIZATION AGAINST THE OBJECTIVE OF HAVING
ALL FOREIGN FORCES LEAVE LEBANON.

--
18. ON ISRAEL'S IMMEDIATE POLITICAL PROBLEMS, I
SAID I WAS AWARE OF THE DIFFICULTIES. NEVERTHELESS,
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

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THE GOVERNMENT WAS STILL IN PLACE AND IN MY VIEW
IT WAS NOT NECESSARY TO MARK TIME UNTIL THE NEW
DEFENSE MINISTER WAS IN OFFICE. I SAW GREAT
UTILITY IN SITTING TOGETHER NOW TO GO OVER THE
AGREEMENT PARAGRAPH BY PARAGRAPH, EVEN WITHOUT THE NEW
DEFENSE MINISTER. WE COULD DO IMPORTANT WORK IN
REFINING THE EXISTING DIFFERENCES. I ASKED SHAMIR
TO MAKE THIS PROPOSAL TO THE STEERING COMMITTEE ON MY
BEHALF AT TOMORROW'S MEETING. SHAMIR REPLIED THAT THIS
WAS A MOMENT OF SOME POLITICAL SENSITIVITY. HE
COULD NOT ASK THE PRIME MINISTER, WHO IS CURRENTLY
DEFENSE MINISTER, TO GO INTO THE DETAILS OF THE
AGREEMENT WHEN HE HAD SO MUCH ON HIS MIND. MOREOVER,
THERE WAS THE PROBLEM OF APPOINTING EXPERTS FROM THE
MINISTRY OF DEFENSE. (NOTE: THIS MAY HAVE BEEN A VEILED
ALLUSION TO THE UNCERTAIN STATUS OF GENERAL TAMIR,
NOW THAT SHARON HAS LEFT THE DEFENSE MINISTRY.)
NEVERTHELESS, SHAMIR SAID HE WAS NOT PROPOSING TO
STOP THE NEGOTIATIONS; HE MERELY WANTED TO SAY IT
MAY TAKE MORE TIME THAN WOULD NORMALLY BE THE

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CASE. I PRESSED THE NEED FOR MOVING AHEAD EXPEDITIOUSLY, AT LEAST AT THE WORKING LEVEL. FINALLY, SHAMIR AGREED TO BE BACK IN TOUCH AFTER THE MEETING OF THE STEERING COMMITTEE TOMORROW MORNING TO REVIEW THE SITUATION.

19. AFTER THIS DISCUSSION, WE RETURNED TO THE ISSUE OF THE MOVEMENT OF GOODS AND PEOPLE WHICH FALLS UNDER SHAMIR'S DIRECT COMPETENCE. SIGNIFICANTLY, SHAMIR SAID THERE MUST FIRST BE AN AGREEMENT ON THE PRINCIPLE: "THERE MUST BE FREE MOVEMENT OF GOODS AND PEOPLE." ONCE THIS WAS AGREED TO, IT WAS ANOTHER MATTER TO DECIDE WHAT WAS PUT ON PAPER. I REPLIED THAT

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WHILE I COULD NOT SEE THE PRINCIPLE BEING PUT EXPLICITLY INTO WRITING, IT SHOULD BE POSSIBLE (A) TO AGREE TO BEGIN TO NEGOTIATE AN AGREEMENT AFTER SIX MONTHS, AND (B) TO BE PREPARED TO ESTABLISH AN INTERIM REGIME. TO THESE POINTS, KIMCHE ADDED, "AND TO MAKE THE BOYCOTT LAWS REDUNDANT." I REPLIED THAT A STATEMENT IN THE AGREEMENT WHICH WOULD DESCRIBE NEGOTIATIONS "FOR AN AGREEMENT ON THE MOVEMENT

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OF GOODS AND PEOPLE" WOULD HAVE THE IMPLICIT EFFECT OF WIPING OUT BOYCOTT ARRANGEMENTS. IN ADDITION, DE FACTO ARRANGEMENTS WOULD BE ANOTHER WAY TO DEAL WITH THE PROBLEM. DESPITE ELI RUBEINSTEIN'S HARDLINE POSITION ON THE BOYCOTT ISSUE, I BELIEVE MY ARGUMENTS HAD SOME EFFECT ON SHAMIR AND KIMCHE.

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20. COMMENT: AS WE WERE LEAVING THE FOREIGN MINISTRY, HANAN BAR-ON TOLD ME THAT SHAMIR BELIEVES IT WILL BE NECESSARY TO MAKE ADJUSTMENTS IN ISRAEL'S POSITIONS ON SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS. THEY ALSO UNDERSTAND MY POINT THAT NEGOTIATING ENVIRONMENT WILL BECOME MORE DIFFICULT IF THE NEGOTIATIONS DRAG ON. HOWEVER, WE WILL HAVE TO WAIT UNTIL TOMORROW TO SEE IF THE ISRAELIS ARE PREPARED TO DISCUSS SPECIFICS IN THE SECURITY AS WELL AS NORMALIZATION FIELDS, EVEN IF IT IS ONLY AT THE WORKING LEVEL. THE PRESENT ISRAELI INDECISION IS NOT ONLY A REFLECTION OF THE GENERAL POLITICAL CLIMATE IN ISRAEL AT THIS MOMENT. THERE IS ALSO A QUESTION OF WHAT CHANGES, IF ANY, THERE MAY BE IN ISRAEL'S NEGOTIATING TEAM ON THE MILITARY SIDE, NOW THAT SHARON HAS DEPARTED. END COMMENT.
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DAMASCUS 01191

JERUSALEM FOR HABIB

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, LE, IS, US, SY
SUBJ: HABIB/DRAPER MISSION: REPLY TO SYRIAN DEMARCHE
- ON ISRAEL-LEBANON NEGOTIATIONS

REF: (A) DAMASCUS 843✓ (B) STATE 036454✓

1. [REDACTED]

2. IT HAS BEEN TWO WEEKS SINCE I UNDERTOOK TO GIVE
THE SYRIANS A WRITTEN CLARIFICATION OF THE U.S. POSITION
ON LEBANESE-ISRAEL NEGOTIATIONS IN RESPONSE TO SARG
DEMARCHE (REF A).3. I WOULD LIKE TO DO THIS SOONEST BY GIVING THE MFA
THE NON-PAPER TRANSMITTED IN REF B WHICH IS ACCURATE
EXPOSITION OF OUR VIEWS AS I UNDERSTAND THEM. I BELIEVE
IT IS ESSENTIAL TO CORRECT IN WRITING THE DISTORTIONS
IN THE SYRIAN DEMARCHE FOR THE RECORD. IT WILL ALSO
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

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SERVE PURPOSE OF LAYING BASIS FOR FURTHER DISCUSSION.

4. I SEE NO REASON FOR FURTHER DELAY AND WILL PROCEED
IN THE NEXT DAY OR SO UNLESS I HEAR OTHERWISE FROM YOU.
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JERUSALEM 00541

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FROM HABIB

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, MOPS, MARR, LE, US, IS, XF

SUBJECT: HABIB/DRAPER MISSION: MOVE OF THE LAF INTO
EAST BEIRUT

1. [REDACTED]

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2. IN MY MEETING WITH FONMIN SHAMIR FEBRUARY 15, I RAISED THE NEED FOR ISRAELI NON-INTERFERENCE IN THE DEPLOYMENT OF THE LAF INTO EAST BEIRUT (ALLUDING TO WHAT DRAPER AND DEPUTY SECRETARY HAVE ALREADY TAKEN UP). I SAID THAT GEMAYEL HAD NEGOTIATED THIS MOVE FOR A LONG TIME WITH THE LEBANESE FORCES, AND THAT IT WAS CRITICALLY IMPORTANT THAT THE AGREEMENT BE IMPLEMENTED. IN THIS REGARD, I NOTED THAT ISRAEL HAD

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RAISED QUESTIONS ABOUT ITS RIGHT TO MOVE THROUGH EAST BEIRUT. I SAID THAT WE HAD ASSURANCES FROM THE GOL THAT THE DEPLOYMENT OF THE LAF WOULD NOT INTERFERE WITH ESTABLISHED IDF LOGISTICS ROUTES. WE HOPED THAT THIS ISSUE WAS BEING WORKED OUT TODAY BETWEEN GENERALS HAMDAN AND DRORI.

3. I TOLD SHAMIR THAT, IF DRORI AND HAMDAN COULD NOT REACH AN UNDERSTANDING, THEN I THOUGHT WE SHOULD GET BACK TOGETHER LATER TODAY. I ALSO SAID THAT THE MNF WOULD BE TAKING ADDED STEPS TO ASSIST THE LAF EFFORT IN EAST BEIRUT, IN ACCORDANCE WITH ARRANGEMENTS WHICH WERE BEING WORKED OUT NOW. COVEY

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FROM HABIB

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, XF, IS, LE, US, MOPS, SY, PLO

SUBJECT: HABIB/DRAPER MISSION: MEETING ON FEBRUARY
12 WITH PRIME MINISTER WAZZAN

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1. [REDACTED]

2. SUMMARY: I STRESSED TO WAZZAN THAT IT WAS NECESSARY FOR ME TO DETERMINE THE LIMITS OF THE CONCESSIONS THE LEBANESE COULD MAKE IN NEGOTIATING WITH THE ISRAELIS SO THAT THE U.S. COULD BE OF MAXIMUM HELP. I SAID I WANTED TO DETERMINE THE DISTANCE BETWEEN THE LEBANESE AND ISRAELI POSITIONS

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ON THE TWO MAIN QUESTIONS: SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS AND FUTURE MUTUAL RELATIONS, AND THEN TRY TO RECONCILE THE DIFFERENCES IN THE TWO POSITIONS. WAZZAN STRESSED THAT TIME WAS OF THE ESSENCE AND AGREED THAT A DOCUMENT HAD TO BE SIGNED, BUT DID NOT REVEAL MUCH FLEXIBILITY ON "NORMALIZATION," WHICH HE STRESSED MUST OCCUR ONLY WHEN OTHER ARABS ARE IN THE PROCESS ALSO.

3. I MET WITH PRIME MINISTER SHAFIQ AL-WAZZAN FROM 1330 TO 1430 ON SATURDAY, FEBRUARY 12. AMBASSADORS DRAPER, DILLON, AND POLOFF FOSTER ACCOMPANIED ME. WAZZAN SAID HE WAS SICK BUT HAD SO MUCH WORK TO DO HE COULD NOT REMAIN AT HOME.

4. I BEGAN BY TELLING WAZZAN THAT MY PRESIDENT AND GOVERNMENT WERE IMPATIENT TO BRING THE NEGOTIATIONS TO A SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION. THE ISSUES OF SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS AND MUTUAL RELATIONS WERE PARTICULARLY DIFFICULT. I WANTED TO KNOW HOW FAR LEBANON COULD GO ON THESE ISSUES. I SAID IT WAS NECESSARY TO BE AS SPECIFIC AS POSSIBLE AND THE LEBANESE COULD NOT REALISTICALLY EXPECT TO MAKE NO CONCESSIONS AT ALL. WAZZAN BEGAN HIS ANSWER BY SAYING "WE LEBANESE HAVE

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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NOTHING TO GIVE ISRAEL. THE ISRAELIS DID NOT ENTER LEBANON TO MAKE PEACE." HE WENT ON TO SAY THAT LEBANON HAD AGREED TO MAKE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS WITH ISRAEL. HOWEVER, AFTER THE DEPARTURE OF THE PLO, THERE WOULD BE NO THREAT TO ISRAEL FROM LEBANON; RATHER, THERE WOULD BE AN ISRAELI THREAT TO LEBANON THAT HAD TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT.

5. I REPLIED THAT THE PURPOSE OF A SECURITY AGREEMENT WAS ALSO TO PREVENT THIRD PARTIES FROM USING LEBANON AS A BASE FROM WHICH TO LAUNCH ATTACKS ON ISRAEL. WAZZAN AGREED BUT THEN ADDRESSED MUTUAL RELATIONS ISSUES BY SAYING "WE WILL NOT ACCEPT NORMALIZATION BEYOND THE DOMAIN OF SECURITY." HE SAID THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT HAD ASKED THE APPROPRIATE EXPERTS IN ECONOMIC AND COMMERCIAL MATTERS TO COME UP WITH SUGGESTIONS CONSISTENT WITH LEBANON'S POSITION. I ASKED WHAT THEY HAD COME UP WITH. WAZZAN REPLIED THEY WERE TRYING TO FIND CERTAIN CATEGORIES OF PERSONS WHO WOULD BE ALLOWED TO TRAVEL BETWEEN LEBANON AND ISRAEL. I CAUTIONED THAT THE ISRAELIS DO NOT LIKE CATEGORIES THAT SEPARATE PEOPLE AND THAT THERE WERE HISTORICAL/PSYCHOLOGICAL REASONS THAT EXPLAINED THIS. WAZZAN SAID IT SHOULD BE POSSIBLE TO FASHION LANGUAGE ON THIS POINT THAT WOULD

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SATISFY THE ISRAELIS.

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6. WAZZAN LAUNCHED INTO AN EXPLANATION OF WHY PEOPLE
COULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO TRAVEL FREELY FROM ISRAEL TO

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LEBANON. HE SAID THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT WAS UNABLE TO EXERCISE CONTROL OVER "ALL THESE PEOPLE (PRESUMABLY PALESTINIANS) WHO ARE LIVING IN OUR COUNTRY." HE SAID IT WAS NECESSARY TO WAIT "A CERTAIN AMOUNT OF TIME" FOR NORMALIZATION AND THAT OTHER ARAB COUNTRIES IN THE REGION MUST JOIN LEBANON IN THIS NORMALIZATION WITH ISRAEL. HE SAID THAT, UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES THAT CURRENTLY OBTAINED, LEBANON COULD NOT DO MORE.

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7. I RESPONDED THAT WAZZAN'S FORMULA REFLECTED SOME FORWARD THINKING OVER THE PAST. I NOTED THAT IT WAS NECESSARY TO BE SPECIFIC ABOUT THE NATURE OF RELATIONS DURING THE SIX-MONTHS DELAY THAT WOULD PRECEDE MORE SPECIFIC NEGOTIATIONS ON FUTURE RELATIONS (ACCORDING TO THE FORMULA PUT OUT BY THE LEBANESE DELEGATION). HOW MUCH CONTACT BETWEEN LEBANON AND ISRAEL? OPEN BORDERS OR PARTIALLY OPEN BORDERS? WAZZAN RESPONDED, "PARTIALLY OPEN BORDERS." WHEN I ASKED WHETHER THIS MEANT PARTIALLY OPEN FOR BOTH PERSONS AND GOODS, HE SAID YES FOR PERSONS. THIS MEANT, HE SAID, ALLOWING PEOPLE SUCH AS RELIGIOUS PILGRIMS TO TRAVEL BETWEEN LEBANON AND ISRAEL. IN GENERAL, HE ADDED, PERMISSION MIGHT BE GIVEN TO TRAVEL BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES FOR HUMANITARIAN REASONS. HE ALSO MENTIONED POSSIBLE LEBANESE/ISRAELI COOPERATION IN THE CONTROL OF DRUG TRAFFIC. HE SAID HE AS YET HAD NO CLEAR-CUT IDEAS TO OFFER ON THE POSSIBLE "TRANSIT TRADE," BUT, IN ANY EVENT, LEBANON COULD NOT AGREE TO ISRAEL'S (GENERAL) DEMANDS REGARDING TRADE.

8. I ASKED WAZZAN HOW HE WOULD CHARACTERIZE THE BEGINNING STATE OF THE EVOLUTION TOWARD NORMAL RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL. WAZZAN SAID IT WAS NECESSARY TO DEAL WITH OTHER PROBLEMS FIRST, AND THAT NORMALIZATION WOULD BE THE "LAST PHASE." I THEN TOLD WAZZAN IT WAS NECESSARY THAT LEBANON GO AS FAR AS IT COULD IN ORDER TO ACCELERATE THE NEGOTIATIONS. IF NOT, THEY WOULD STALL AND THERE WOULD BE MORE AND MORE TURMOIL IN LEBANON. I SAID I WOULD ATTEMPT TO BRIDGE THE GAP BETWEEN ISRAELI DESIRES AND THE LIMITS TO WHICH LEBANON COULD GO. WAZZAN AGREED.

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9. I SAID THERE HAD BEEN SOME PROGRESS IN THE TALKS ON SECURITY. I GAVE AS EXAMPLES THE FACT THAT THE ISRAELIS SEEMED WILLING TO ACCEPT A SMALLER SECURITY BUFFER ZONE, AND NOW APPEARED SOMEWHAT LESS HOSTILE TO A CONTINUED UNIFIL PRESENCE, PROVIDING UNIFIL WERE GIVEN A LIMITED AND WELL-DEFINED MISSION AS OPPOSED TO A REGION OF POLICE.

10. WAZZAN RAISED IN THIS CONNECTION THE RECENT KILLINGS OF PALESTINIANS AT MIYAH MIYAH AND AYN AL-HILWAH CAMPS AND IN SIDON. HE SAID HE WAS ALSO GOING TO INSTRUCT THE LEBANESE NEGOTIATING TEAM TO BRING UP THIS PROBLEM AT THE NEXT SESSION OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. I RESPONDED THAT WE HAD ALREADY SPOKEN WITH THE ISRAELIS ABOUT THESE KILLINGS AND OTHER INTIMIDATION. WE HAD TOLD THEM IT WAS NECESSARY THAT THE IDF PROVIDE SECURITY FOR THESE PALESTINIANS. I SAID WE HAD ALSO BEEN IN TOUCH WITH THE LEBANESE FORCES (LF) HEAD FADI AFAM. WAZZAN SAID THE ISRAELIS WERE INDIRECTLY RESPONSIBLE FOR THE KILLINGS BECAUSE THEY WERE DIRECTLY RESPONSIBLE FOR SECURITY. I SAID THE ISRAELIS RECOGNIZED THIS.

11. WAZZAN SAID THAT ARAFAT HAD BEEN VERY CONCERNED ABOUT SECURITY FOR PALESTINIANS WHEN HE AND WAZZAN MET RECENTLY IN TUNIS. I NOTED THAT AT SABRA/SHATILA THE ITALIAN CONTINGENT OF THE MNF WAS MAINTAINING GOOD SECURITY. I SAID IT SHOULD BE POSSIBLE TO ARRANGE COMPARABLE SECURITY FOR PALESTINIANS AT

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OTHER SPECIFIC AREAS SUCH AS THE REFUGEE CAMPS, BUT
NOT EVERYWHERE. I SAID IN THIS CONNECTION I COULD
NOT ACCEPT ARAFAT'S CONTENTION THAT THE SABRA/
SHATILA MASSACRE WAS ALSO THE FAULT OF THE U.S.

12. WAZZAN SAID THAT THE SOVIETS WERE RAPIDLY INCREASING
THEIR NUMBERS AND ACTIVITY IN SYRIA AND THAT THIS WAS
HAVING N
EGATIVE REPERCUSSIONS IN LEBANON. HE SAID

[REDACTED]

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THAT ALL SORTS OF GROUPS, PRIMARILY LEFTIST, AND THE
'COMMUNISTS' IN PARTICULAR, WERE TRYING TO REASSERT
THEMSELVES IN LEBANON.

13. I RETURNED TO THE PRINCIPAL TOPICS AND SAID THAT
WE HAD MADE SOME PROGRESS ON THE TWO MOST IMPORTANT
QUESTIONS, MUTUAL RELATIONS AND SECURITY. I GAVE
AS AN EXAMPLE AMBASSADOR DRAPER'S REPORT THAT
THE ISRAELIS ARE BEGINNING TO RECOGNIZE THAT FIVE BASES
MANNED BY ISRAELIS INSIDE LEBANON ARE UNREALISTIC
AND UNACCEPTABLE. WAZZAN SAID IT WAS NECESSARY TO
TAKE ADVANTAGE OF CURRENT FAVORABLE CIRCUMSTANCES,
AND THAT TIME WAS OF THE ESSENCE. I SAID THAT AFTER
MY PREDICTIONS OF LAST SEPTEMBER, I WAS NOT ABOUT

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TO GIVE ANY SPECIFIC DATE AS TO WHEN WE MIGHT REALLY ACCOMPLISH SOMETHING IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS, BUT THAT I THOUGHT WE MIGHT HAVE SOME RESULTS IN THE NEXT SEVERAL WEEKS.

14. I THEN ASKED WAZZAN WHETHER, HAVING MET ARAFAT IN TUNIS, HE THOUGHT THE PLO WOULD REALLY LEAVE LEBANON. HE SAID YES. ARAFAT WAS PREPARED TO PULL THE PLO OUT PROVIDED IT WERE PART OF AN OVERALL AGREEMENT THAT INCLUDED A TIMETABLE FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES FROM LEBANON.

15. I SAID I THOUGHT THE PALESTINIAN NATIONAL COUNCIL MEETING IN ALGIERS, SCHEDULED TO BEGIN ON MONDAY, FEBRUARY 14, WOULD BE VERY IMPORTANT. IT WAS DESIRABLE THAT ARAFAT GAIN AGREEMENT TO COOPERATE WITH JORDAN'S KING HUSSEIN AND OBTAIN THE CONSENT OF "CONSTRUCTIVE" ARAB COUNTRIES. WE DISCUSSED A LARGER MIDDLE EAST SETTLEMENT. I INSISTED THAT LEBANON'S IMMEDIATE PROBLEMS COULD AND DESERVED TO BE

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RESOLVED FIRST.

16. I THEN RETURNED TO MY ORIGINAL ADVICE AND TOLD WAZZAN LEBANON MUST FIND THE OUTER LIMITS OF THE CONCESSIONS IT CAN MAKE AND MOVE TOWARD THOSE WHILE TRYING TO LIMIT ISRAELI DEMANDS. I REITERATED THAT WE WERE NOT ASKING LEBANON TO GO BEYOND THESE LIMITS. WAZZAN RESPONDED THAT THERE WERE "ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL IMPERATIVES" WHICH CONSTRAINED LEBANON'S ABILITY TO MAKE CONCESSIONS. "LATER," HE SAID, "WE MAY BE ABLE TO GO FURTHER." I SAID THE PROMISE TO GO FURTHER LATER MIGHT BE USEFULLY PRESENTED TO THE ISRAELIS. IN THE MEANTIME, IT WAS NECESSARY TO SIGN AN AGREEMENT. WAZZAN AGREED.

17. I THEN EXPLAINED THAT THE U.S. COULD NOT SIGN AN AGREEMENT AS ONE OF THE "PARTIES." WE SHOULD BEGIN THINKING ABOUT THE U.S. "PARTICIPATION" IN AND "WITNESSING" OF THE AGREEMENT. I SAID IT WOULD NOT BE A PEACE TREATY AND IT COULD NOT BE AN AGREEMENT WHICH REQUIRED ANY TYPE OF RATIFICATION BY THE U.S. GOVERNMENT. WAZZAN OBSERVED DRILY THAT ISRAEL HAD NEVER ABIDED BY A SINGLE TREATY NOR HAD IT KEPT A SINGLE PROMISE. I TOLD WAZZAN I WANTED TO LEAVE HIM THINKING ABOUT "LIMITS AND FLEXIBILITY." WAZZAN SAID IN RESPONSE THAT THE U.S. SHOULD USE ALL POSSIBLE MEANS TO PUT PRESSURE ON THE ISRAELIS.

18. WAZZAN ASKED WHETHER I THOUGHT THE KAHAN REPORT

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WOULD HELP THE NEGOTIATIONS. I SAID THAT I DID NOT KNOW AND THAT SHARON MIGHT REMAIN IN THE CABINET. I NOTED THAT MOST ISRAELIS WANTED TO REACH AN AGREEMENT WITH LEBANON AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

19. WAZZAN SAID THE ISRAELIS HAD SUPPOSEDLY INVADED LEBANON IN ORDER TO BRING PEACE TO GALILEE AND THAT

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THE U.S. SHOULD MAKE ISRAEL KEEP ITS WORD. HE SAID THAT ISRAEL WAS INCITING LEBANON'S DRUZE TO SEEK AUTONOMY, TO THE DETRIMENT OF THE OBJECTIVES OF THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT. I SAID THAT THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT SHOULD BE ABLE TO REACH AN INTERNAL POLITICAL SOLUTION TO THIS PROBLEM. I REAFFIRMED THAT THE U.S. OPPOSED PARTITION OF LEBANON AND SUPPORTED THE

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MILITARY ADDEES TREAT AS SPECAT EXCLUSIVE

FROM DRAPER

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, MOPS, MARR, XF, LE, US, IS, PINT

SUBJECT: HABIB DRAPER MISSION: ISRAELI REACTION TO LAF

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MOVE INTO EAST BEIRUT

1. [REDACTED]

2. IN WHAT COULD BE A POTENTIALLY SERIOUS DEVELOPMENT,
THE ISRAELIS TODAY, FEBRUARY 14, NOTIFIED THE
LEBANESE THROUGH REGULAR MILITARY LIAISON CHANNELS
THAT "THERE COULD BE PROBLEMS" IF THE LAF MOVES INTO
EAST BEIRUT IN FORCE TONIGHT IN ACCORDANCE WITH AN

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AGREEMENT REACHED BETWEEN PRESIDENT GEMAYEL AND THE SO-CALLED "LEBANESE FORCES" (MEANING THE PHALANGE). THIS WAS REVEALED TO ME AT ABOUT MID-DAY BY LAF LIAISON COLONEL ABU SARHAT DURING THE ISRAELI-LEBANESE NEGOTIATING SESSION AT KHALDAH. ABU FARHAT WENT ON TO SAY THAT THE ISRAELIS HAD TOLD HIM THAT THE IDF STILL HAD THE RIGHT TO PATROL IN ALL AREAS OF BEIRUT EAST OF THE RAILWAY LINE, WHICH COULD MEAN THAT THEY COULD GO INTO THE QARANTINA AREA OF EAST BEIRUT, ADJACENT TO AND ENCOMPASSING PART OF THE PORT OF BEIRUT ITSELF (AND WHERE THE PHALANGE HAS A HEADQUARTERS). ABU FARHAT REITERATED THE LEBANESE UNDERSTANDING THAT THE IDF HAD THE RIGHT ONLY TO USE THE SO-CALLED "LOGISTICAL ROUTE" FROM THE KHALDAH TRIANGLE AND ONTO THE OLD SIDON ROAD AND BEYOND THERE TO IDF POSITIONS IN THE METN (BEIT MERI) AND THE ALAYN AND SHUF REGIONS. THE ISRAELIS COUNTERED THAT THERE SHOULD BE A MEETING BETWEEN NORTHERN FRONT COMMANDER DRORI AND A "HIGH LEVEL LEBANESE OFFICER."

3. I GOT IMMEDIATELY IN TOUCH WITH DAVID KIMCHE AS WELL AS WITH GENERAL EINAN, THE SENIOR IDF REPRESENTATIVE PRESENT, AND SAID AMONG OTHER THINGS THAT THIS WAS AN EXTREMELY UNWELCOME AND POTENTIALLY DANGEROUS

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DEVELOPMENT. THERE HAD NEVER BEEN ANY AGREEMENT WHEN THE IDF PULLED OUT OF THE BEIRUT AREA THAT THE IDF HAD THE RIGHT TO SEND TROOPS ANYWHERE EAST OF THE RAILWAY LINE. I HAD BEEN INVOLVED IN THE UNDERSTANDING WITH SHARON AND THIS WAS ONLY THAT THE IDF COULD USE THE SO-CALLED LOGISTICAL ROUTE. ACCORDING TO WHAT I HAD HEARD, THE IDF WAS PROFESSING TO BE ABLE TO MOVE INTO AREAS WHERE THERE HAD BEEN NO IDF TROOPS SINCE WITHDRAWAL IN LATE SEPTEMBER-EARLY OCTOBER, INCLUDING EVEN ASHRIFIYAH. I URGED THAT THE IDF NOT PUSH THIS POSITION AND NOT INTERFERE WITH THE PLANNED LAF TAKEOVER OF EAST BEIRUT. I SAID VERY FIRMLY THAT THE UNITED STATES COULD NOT POSSIBLY UNDERSTAND OR SUPPORT THE ISRAELI POSTURE IF INCIDENTS OCCURED IN THE AREA INTO WHICH THE LAF WAS MOVING. IT IS THEIR CITY, I SAID, AND THE LEBANESE OUGHT TO BE ABLE TO TAKE IT OVER.

4. KIMCHE'S POSITION BASICALLY WAS THAT THIS WAS A MILITARY MATTER BUT THAT HE WOULD ADVISE THE LEBANESE NOT TO TAKE ANY STEPS UNTIL THEY HAD CONSULTED THROUGH LIAISON CHANNELS WITH THE IDF. EINAN'S POSITION WAS THAT HE HAD BEEN COMMANDER OF THE CENTRAL SECTOR IN THE BEIRUT AREA UP TO AND BEYOND THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE IDF. FOLLOWING WITHDRAWAL, HE HAD BEEN TOLD THAT

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THE IDF WOULD CONTINUE TO SEND PATROLS ANYWHERE EAST OF THE RAILWAY LINE AND THIS HE HAD DONE REGULARLY. HE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE IDF HAD NOT GONE INTO ASHRAFIYAH AS SUCH BUT HAD SKIRTED THE AREA IN GOING TO THE PORT AREA FROM TIME TO TIME. EINAN ADMITTED HE

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COULD NOT SAY WHAT THE PRESENT GROUND RULES WERE, SINCE HE HAD LEFT THAT COMMAND SOME MONTHS AGO. EINAN ADDED ONE OTHER POINT: THIS WAS THAT THE IDF HAD THE RIGHT TO USE THE ROADS THROUGH BAABDA AS WELL AS THE SO-CALLED LOGISTICAL ROAD. I NOT ONLY REPEATED OUR UNDERSTANDING OF IDF PRIVILEGES ALONG THE LOGISTICAL ROAD BUT SAID THAT SHARON HIMSELF HAD AGREED IN OUR SEPTEMBER MEETING WITH HIM THAT THE IDF WOULD NOT MOVE THROUGH THE BAABDA-YARZE AREAS BECAUSE IT WAS

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EMBARRASSING TO THE PRESIDENT.

5. IN THE MIDST OF THESE SEVERAL DISCUSSIONS, FOREIGN MINISTER SALEM WAS IN TOUCH WITH ME ON TWO OCCASIONS THROUGH THE LEBANESE SECURE TELEPHONE. HIS BASIC MESSAGE TO ME--WHICH I PASSED TO THE ISRAELIS--WAS AS FOLLOWS:

--THE LEBANESE ARE DETERMINED TO GO AHEAD WITH THE EAST BEIRUT TAKEOVER TONIGHT. A CABINET MEETING WILL BEGIN AT 1800 TO REVIEW THE ISSUES. THE LEBANESE DO NOT WANT TO BE HELD UP BY ISRAELI CONCERNS OR COMPLICATIONS INTRODUCED AT THE LAST MOMENT.

--THE LEBANESE ARE READY, HOWEVER, TO DISCUSS THEIR PLANNED MOVES WITH THE ISRAELIS THROUGH MILITARY LIAISON CHANNELS. THEY ARE READY TO HOLD A MEETING RIGHT AWAY. DISCUSSION OF THE PLANS WAS A COURTESY ON THEIR PART. THEY HAD NO OBLIGATION TO REVIEW PLANS WITH THE IDF.

--(IN ANSWER TO MY SUGGESTION THE ISRAELIS MIGHT BE WORRIED THAT THE LAF WAS GOING TO PUT CHECKPOINTS AND BARRIERS ALONG THE LOGISTICAL ROAD,) SALEM SAID I COULD TELL THE ISRAELIS AUTHORITATIVELY THAT THERE WOULD BE NO LAF CHECKPOINTS OR INTERFERENCE OF ANY KIND ALONG THE LOGISTICAL ROAD, INCLUDING TO BEIT MERI AS WELL AS ON THE DAMASCUS-BEIRUT HIGHWAY.

6. AFTER I CONVEYED THESE POINTS TO KIMCHE, HE AND EINAN SAID IT WOULD NOT BE POSSIBLE TODAY IN THE AFTERNOON OR EARLY EVENING TO HOLD SUCH A MEETING. THE TURN-OVER OF THE DEFENSE MINISTRY WAS AT THAT MOMENT

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TAKING PLACE, AND ALL SENIOR ISRAELI MILITARY MEN WERE OCCUPIED. A MEETING TOMORROW MORNING, TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 15, WOULD BE POSSIBLE.

7. I THEN MADE THE POINT THAT, SINCE THE LOGISTICAL ROAD WOULD STILL BE FREE, THE ISRAELIS SHOULD NOT COURT ANY PROBLEMS BY SENDING PATROLS OR TROOPS INTO THE AREAS BEING OCCUPIED BY THE LAF. THE IDF HAD NO POSITIONS IN ANY OF THESE AREAS, AND THERE WOULD BE NO REASON FOR THE IDF TO MOVE THERE. EINAN MUMBLED ONLY SOMETHING TO THE EFFECT THAT MILITARY COMMANDERS HAD TO TAKE PRECAUTIONS WITH PATROLS GOING BEYOND THE LOGISTICAL ROAD IN ORDER TO FORESTALL AMBUSHES.

8. THE FOLLOWING DESCRIBES THE SITUATION AS OF EARLY EVENING, FEBRUARY 14:

--THE IDF AND LAF REPRESENTATIVES, WITH GENERAL HAMDAN REPRESENTING THE LEBANESE, WILL PROBABLY MEET TOMORROW MORNING.

--THE LEBANESE HAVE PROMISED THE VARIOUS MNF CONTINGENTS THROUGH THE COORDINATING COMMITTEE THAT ALL OF US WOULD BE NOTIFIED 6-12 HOURS IN ADVANCE OF THE LAF MOVE INTO EAST BEIRUT. THIS ALERT WOULD NOT BE FOR THE PURPOSE OF BRINGING IN ADDITIONAL MNF UNITS AND MAKING MNF ARRANGEMENTS IN SUPPORT OF THE LAF MOVE, WHICH MIGHT OCCUR A FEW DAYS AFTER

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HE LAF HAD MOVED IN AND MATTERS HAD SETTLED DOWN.
IN ANY EVENT, AS OF 1900 HOURS, NO HEADS UP ALERT HAD
BEEN GIVEN.

--WE HAVE ALERTED THE FRENCH, ITALIANS AND BRITISH
TO THESE LATEST DEVELOPMENTS; AND THE MARINES HAVE BEEN
BRIEFED FULLY. THE MARINES WILL BE TAKING CERTAIN
PRECAUTIONS AS REGARDS THEIR PATROLS EAST OF THE
RAILWAY LINE, IN THE BAABDA AREA, ETC

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--TANNOUS TOLD GENERAL COOLEY THAT THE MOVE WILL
TAKE PLACE 0400, TUESDAY, IF GEMAYEL SO CONFIRMS.

9. CLEARLY, THE ISRAELIS WERE INFORMED OF THE PLAN
BY THE "LEBANESE FORCES." EINAN REVEALED AS MUCH
WHEN HE SAID THAT IT IS IMPORTANT THAT THE LAF
CONSULT WITH THE IDF ON ALL THEIR PLANS. EINAN ALSO
REVEALED DETAILS OF THE LAF PLAN, INCLUDING USE OF
THE EIGHTH BRIGADE.

--THIS LEADS US TO WONDER WHETHER THE LEBANESE FORCES
HAD STIMULATED THE ISRAELIS INTO SUGGESTING "THERE

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COULD BE TROUBLE." ON THE ONE HAND, IT IS CLEAR FROM EMBASSY REPORTING AND OBSERVATIONS THROUGH TODAY THAT THE LEBANESE FORCES DID MAKE A DEAL WITH GEMAYEL AND THEY SEEM TO BE PULLING OUT OF EAST BEIRUT. ON THE OTHER HAND, ONE PHALANGE POLITICAL OFFICIAL TOLD US A FEW DAYS AGO THAT THE LAF WOULD NOT TAKE OVER THE PHALANGE-CONTROLLED "ILLEGAL PORT" (BASIN FIVE), BUT GEMAYEL SAID THE SAME DAY THAT THE PORT WOULD BE TAKEN OVER, ALTHOUGH HE DID NOT SPECIFY EXACTLY WHEN. SEIZURE OF THE ILLEGAL PORT WOULD, OF COURSE, CUT OFF THE BULK OF THE PHALANGE'S REVENUES.

--WE ACCORDINGLY HAVE CHECKED LEBANESE INTENTIONS ABOUT TH PORT WITH GENERAL TANNUS AND FOREIGN MINISTER SALEM. BOTH HAVE CONFIRMED THAT THE ILLEGAL PORT WOULD NOT REPEAT NOT BE TAKEN OVER. SALEM CRYPTICALLY EXPLAINED THAT THE ADMINISTRATION AND INCOME FROM THE ILLEGAL PORT WOULD NOT BE TOUCHED IN THE LAF TAKEOVER, BUT IMPLIED THAT THE LAF WOULD STILL BE SEEN COSMETICALLY AS HAVING CONTROL OF THE AREA.

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RECOMMENDATIONS

10. SALEM CALLED ME AT ABOUT 1815 TO SAY THAT THERE WAS NO WAY THE LAF OPERATION COULD BE POSTPONED. IF IT WERE POSTPONED FOR ANY REASON, THIS COULD SPELL THE END OF WHAT GEMAYEL AND HIS GOVERNMENT ARE TRYING TO ACCOMPLISH. HE THEREFORE URGED THAT THE U.S. USE ALL ITS WEIGHT WITH THE ISRAELIS TO ENSURE THAT THERE IS NO FORCEFUL IDF INTERFERENCE WITH WHAT THE LAF WILL BE TRYING TO DO.

11. UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES, I RECOMMEND THAT WE GET IN TOUCH WITH APPROPRIATE ISRAELIS BOTH IN WASHINGTON AND IN ISRAEL TO UNDERSCORE WHAT I HAVE ALREADY SAID AND TO URGE SIMPLY THAT THERE BE NO INTERFERENCE WITH THE LAF MOVES, REPEATING THE ASSURANCES CONVEYED BY SALEM THAT THERE WOULD BE NO LAF INTERFERENCE ON THE ROADS THE IDF REQUIRE TO SUPPLY AND SUPPORT ITS POSITIONS IN THE BEIT MERI AREA AND IN THE ALAYH AND SHUF REGIONS.

12. THIS MESSAGE HAS BEEN COORDINATED WITH THE EMBASSY. DILLON

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MILITARY ADDEES TREAT AS SPECAT EXCLUSIVE

FROM HABIB

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, MARR, MOPS, LE, US, IS, SY, PLO, XF

SUBJECT: HABIB/DRAPER MISSION: MEETING WITH GEMAYEL

FEBRUARY 11

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1.

2. SUMMARY: IN A MEETING WITH PRESIDENT GEMAYEL FEBRUARY 11, HABIB EXPLORED HIS LIMITS ON KEY ISSUES IN PREPARATION FOR THE NEXT PHASE OF SUBSTANTIVE DIALOGUE WITH ISRAEL AND SOUGHT DETAILS OF LEBANESE CONTACTS WITH SYRIA, THE PLO AND SAUDI ARABIA. HABIB STRESSED HE WANTED TO ACCELERATE THE FORMAL DIRECT

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NEGOTIATIONS BY BRIDGING DIFFERENCES ON SUCH ISSUES AS MOVEMENT OF PERSONS AND GOODS, SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS, AND THE ROLE OF UNIFIL. HE ALSO NEEDED TO KNOW WHERE THINGS STOOD WITH SYRIA, THE PLO AND SAUDI ARABIA. AFTER A PASSING DISPLAY OF DISAPPOINTMENT THAT NOT MORE HAD BEEN DONE WITH THE "U.S. IDEAS" HABIB HAD PRESENTED IN JANUARY, GEMAYEL WENT THROUGH THE VARIOUS ISSUES. ON MUTUAL RELATIONS, HE REVEALED LITTLE FLEXIBILITY BEYOND LEBANON'S PRESENT POSITION. HE REPEATED THE STANDARD LEBANESE POSITION ON THE MOVEMENT OF PERSONS WHICH WOULD RESTRICT THIS MOVEMENT TO SPECIFIED CATEGORIES, BUT HE WAS WILLING TO ENVISAGE FLEXIBLE DE FACTO ARRANGEMENTS AT THE LAND BORDER FOR MOST LEBANESE AND CERTAIN ISRAELIS. ON UNIFIL, HE WAS WILLING TO ENVISAGE A MANDATE PERMITTING IT TO GUARD PALESTINIAN CAMPS. AS FOR IDF "STATIONS," HE WANTED "NO ISRAELI FLAG ON LEBANESE TERRITORY." HE HAD NO PROBLEM WITH EXCHANGES OF INTELLIGENCE. ON THE LEBANESE CONCEPT OF "JOINT (MILITARY) SUPERVISORY TEAMS," HE SAID HE THOUGHT THEY WERE PROBABLY MEANT TO OPERATE ONLY DURING THE WITHDRAWAL PERIOD. ON THE TERMINATION OF THE STATE OF WAR, HE INSISTED SUCH A DECLARATION COULD COME INTO EFFECT ONLY "WHEN THE LAST ISRAELI SOLDIER LEAVES." TURNING TO LEBANESE

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DISCUSSIONS WITH SYRIA, THE PLO, AND SAUDI ARABIA, GEMAYEL REPEATED THAT BOTH SYRIA AND THE PLO WERE COMMITTED TO WITHDRAWAL. HE EXPRESSED BITTERNESS AT THE SAUDI STANCE, SAYING THAT LEBANESE EXPORTS HAD BEEN BARRED AND THE SAUDI AMBASSADOR HAD BEEN WITHDRAWN. IN HIS VIEW, SAUDI ARABIA WAS CLEARLY TRYING TO DISTANCE ITSELF FROM LEBANESE ISSUES, PROVIDING NO SUPPORT. COMMENT: GEMAYEL'S RESPONSES WERE NOT FULLY ILLUMINATING. IT APPEARS, AMONG OTHER THINGS, THAT HE IS NOT FULLY AWARE OF DETAILS OF SOME PROPOSALS HIS DELEGATION IS PUTTING FORTH TO THE ISRAELIS. HABIB WILL PROBE FURTHER DURING A FEBRUARY 12 WORKING DINNER WITH GEMAYEL, SALEM, TUENI, AND HADDAD. END SUMMARY.

3. HABIB, DRAPER, DILLON AND ROSS MET WITH PRESIDENT GEMAYEL FOR ONE AND ONE-HALF HOURS FEBRUARY 11. HABIB'S OBJECTIVES WERE TWO-FOLD:

(A) TO EXPLORE FURTHER GEMAYEL'S LIMITS ON CERTAIN KEY ISSUES UNDER NEGOTIATION IN PREPARATION FOR THE NEXT PHASE OF OUR SUBSTANTIVE DIALOGUE WITH THE ISRAELI LEADERSHIP; AND (B) TO GET A CLEARER IDEA OF THE STATE OF PLAY IN LEBANESE NEGOTIATIONS WITH SYRIA AND THE PLO AND LEBANESE DISCUSSIONS WITH THE SAUDIS.

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4. HABIB SET THE STAGE BY DESCRIBING THE TIMING AND PURPOSE OF HIS VISIT TO LEBANON. DURING HIS VISIT TO ISRAEL, HE SAID BEGIN AND SHARON HAD MADE IT CLEAR THAT THE CABINET CRISIS HAD TO BE SETTLED BEFORE WE COULD GO ON TO SERIOUS DISCUSSIONS. THE CABINET STEERING GROUP WOULD NOT MEET FOR A FEW DAYS. HABIB SAID HE HAD COME TO LEBANON FOR TWO OR THREE DAYS TO GET A MORE PRECISE UNDERSTANDING OF

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THE LEBANESE POSITION. HE WOULD THEN GO BACK TO ISRAEL FOR FURTHER DISCUSSIONS AND THEN COME BACK TO LEBANON, SEEKING THROUGH THIS PROCESS TO ACCELERATE THE FORMAL DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS, WHICH WOULD MEANWHILE CONTINUE.

5. HABIB EMPHASIZED TO GEMAYEL THAT, WHATEVER HE MIGHT BE HEARING FROM OTHERS, U.S. POLICY REMAINED WITHOUT QUESTION ONE OF FULL SUPPORT FOR HIM AND FOR LEBANON'S INDEPENDENCE, TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY, AND SOVEREIGNTY WITHIN ITS INTERNATIONALLY RECOGNIZED BORDERS. PRESIDENT REAGAN WAS VERY IMPATIENT FOR RAPID PROGRESS.

KEY ISSUES BETWEEN LEBANON AND ISRAEL

6. HABIB OUTLINED OUR GAME PLAN AS ONE OF TRYING TO BRIDGE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE LEBANESE AND ISRAELI POSITIONS WHERE THEY REMAINED FAR APART. TO DO THIS, HE NEEDED TO KNOW GEMAYEL'S LIMITS ON THE KEY ISSUES, PARTICULARLY THE DEGREE AND PACING OF MUTUAL RELATIONS AND THE ORGANIZATION OF SECURITY ZONE.

7. MUTUAL RELATIONS. NOTING THAT THE LEBANESE HAD NOT ADDRESSED THE ISSUE OF MUTUAL RELATIONS IN DE UP TO NOW, HABIB SET FORTH OUR UNDERSTANDING OF THE TWO-PHASE APPROACH THAT THE LEBANESE WERE DEVELOPING ON THE MOVEMENT OF GOODS AND PERSONS ACROSS THE BORDER: ONE PHASE OF INTERIM, AD HOC ARRANGEMENTS FOR A CERTAIN PERIOD UP TO SIX MONTHS AFTER WITHDRAWAL, AND A SUBSEQUENT PHASE OF NEGOTIATION EITHER TO CONSOLIDATE THE ARRANGEMENTS OR TO MAKE EXPANDED ONES. HABIB ASKED GEMAYEL HOW FAR AND IN

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WHAT DIRECTION HE COULD MOVE ON AN INTERIM BASIS AND HOW, IN THE AGREEMENT BEING NEGOTIATED, HE COULD DEFINE AND SPECIFY THE PURPOSE AND TERMS OF REFERENCE OF THE SUBSEQUENT NEGOTIATION. WHILE THE TWO-PHASE CONCEPT WAS CLEVER AND CLEAR, THE SPECIFICS WERE NOT, AND THE ISRAELIS WOULD HOLD BACK UNTIL THE SPECIFICS OF BOTH PHASES WERE ADDRESSED.

8. SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS. MOVING TO THE SECURITY FIELD, HABIB HIGHLIGHTED TWO ISSUES:

--UNIFIL: HABIB TOLD GEMAYEL THE GEOGRAPHIC AND OTHER PARTS OF ITS MANDATE WOULD HAVE TO BE CHANGED. HOW DID GEMAYEL VIEW THE ROLE OF UNIFIL? WOULD THE LEBANESE ASK FOR THIS NEW MANDATE? WOULD IT BE ACCEPTABLE TO THE SOVIETS?

--RESIDUAL ISRAELI PRESENCE: LEBANON, HABIB NOTED, HAD TAKEN A FIRM POSITION AGAINST SUCH A PRESENCE. THE U.S. HAD ALSO MADE IT CLEAR THAT IT DID NOT FIND SUCH A BLOCK THE OTHER WITHDRAWALS. DID GEMAYEL HAVE ANY FURTHER THOUGHTS ON THIS?

9. TERMINATION OF THE STATE OF WAR. HABIB SAID HE WAS AWARE THAT THE LEBANESE DELEGATION HAD TAKEN THE POSITION THAT THE DECLARATION ON THE TERMINATION OF THE STATE OF WAR WOULD NOT COME INTO EFFECT UNTIL AFTER THE ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL. SINCE THE ISRAELIS WANTED THE STATE OF WAR TERMINATED WHEN THE AGREEMENT CAME INTO FORCE, HABIB PROBED TO DETERMINE WHAT FLEXIBILITY EXISTED ON GEMAYEL'S PART.

TALKS WITH SYRIA, THE PLO AND SAUDI ARABIA

10. HABIB ASKED GEMAYEL WHAT HE COULD SAY ABOUT RECENT CONTACTS WITH SYRIA, THE PLO, AND SAUDI ARABIA. BEGIN HIMSELF HAD ASKED HABIB, HE ADDED, WHAT ASSURANCE

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ANYONE HAD THAT THE SYRIANS WOULD INDEED WITHDRAW. WHILE HABIB HAD RESPONDED THAT WE HAD SUFFICIENT ASSURANCE, THE ISRAELIS WERE PUTTING OUT THE LINE THAT THE U.S. WAS BEING UNFAIR TO ISRAEL BY PUTTING PRESSURE FOR RAPID RESULTS ON IT ALONE AT A TIME WHEN NO PROGRESS HAD BEEN MADE WITH SYRIA AND THE PLO.

GEMAYEL'S RESPONSE AND DISCUSSION

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11. INTRODUCTION. HAVING HEARD HABIB OUT ALMOST WITHOUT INTERRUPTION, GEMAYEL BEGAN HIS RESPONSE BY TAKING OUT A SET OF INDEX CARDS AND SAYING IN A TONE OF DISAPPOINTMENT THAT HE WELL REMEMBERED THE "JANUARY 21 IDEAS" (HE WAS REFERRING TO THE BRIEFING HABIB HAD GIVEN HIM ON THE BASIS OF THE JANUARY 18 DRAFT AGREEMENT WE HAD GIVEN THE ISRAELIS). HABIB SAID THAT THESE HAD BEEN MODIFIED TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT

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THE POSITIONS DEVELOPED IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. WITH THE BENEFIT OF THE TALKS IN LEBANON, HABIB SAID, HE WOULD GO TO ISRAEL, REWORK THESE IDEAS, AND THEN COME BACK TO PRESENT THEM IN LEBANON. GEMAYEL WENT ON THAT NOTHING HAD CHANGED ON THE LEBANESE SIDE SINCE HABIB'S LAST VISIT EXCEPT THE FIRMNESS OF THE LEBANESE DELEGATION. (FOR THIS, GEMAYEL COMPLAINED, HE HAD GOTTEN "NICE WORDS" FROM SHARON--I.E., THREATS CONVEYED THROUGH GEMAYEL'S FATHER THAT SHARON WOULD TURN GEMAYEL INTO "PRESIDENT OF B'ABDA" ALONE.) THERE HAD BEEN AN IMPROVEMENT IN THE ATMOSPHERE OF THE DISCUSSIONS, HOWEVER, AND SOME POINTS HAD BEEN CLARIFIED.

12. MUTUAL RELATIONS: MOVEMENT OF GOODS. THERE HAD BEEN NO PROGRESS, GEMAYEL AFFIRMED, ON THIS ISSUE. THERE WAS NO AGREED CONCEPT, AND BOTH PARTIES WERE SIMPLY AVOIDING IT. MEANWHILE, THERE WAS MORE AND MORE PRESSURE FROM CERTAIN ARAB STATES, ESPECIALLY SAUDI ARABIA, WHICH HAD QUIETLY BANNED IMPORTS FROM LEBANON AND REMOVED ITS AMBASSADOR (OTHER LEBANESE TELL US THAT LEBANESE EXPORTS TO THE KINGDOM HAVE BEEN RESUMED.) ANY ATTEMPT TO FIND WORKABLE ARRANGEMENTS, GEMAYEL SAID, HAD TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT LEBANON'S DESIRE TO CLOSE ALL BORDERS AND ENTRY POINTS TO WHAT HE DESCRIBED WITH A SMILE AS "OFFICIAL" OR "TOLERATED CONTRABAND." AS PART OF THE PLAN TO DEPLOY THE ARMY FULLY INTO EAST BEIRUT, THOSE ILLEGAL PORTS THAT WOULD FALL UNDER ITS CONTROL (THE

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"FIFTH BASIN" OF BEIRUT PORT AND DUBAYYAH PORT) WOULD BE CLOSED TO ILLEGAL TRAFFIC BRINGING IN "OFFICIAL CONTRABAND." AS PART OF THE "THINKING OUT LOUD" THAT WAS GOING ON, GEMAYEL CONFIDED, HE WAS THINKING OF

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PROPOSING TO THE SYRIANS AND THE ISRAELIS THAT THEY ALLOW ROVING CUSTOMS BRIGADES INTO THE AREAS UNDER THEIR CONTROL TO DEAL WITH SMUGGLED GOODS OR GOODS ILLEGALLY MOVING INTO LEBANON WITHOUT LICENSING OR WITHOUT PAYING CUSTOMS. SOME GOODS, WHOSE IMPORTATION WAS FORBIDDEN, WOULD BE SEIZED. OTHERS WOULD BE ALLOWED TO PASS UPON PAYMENT OF A "FINE" ROUGHLY EQUAL TO THE CUSTOMS DUTY THAT WOULD HAVE BEEN LEVIED AT THE LAND BORDER. ALTHOUGH THE MEASURES WOULD BE RESTRICTIVE AT FIRST, THEY COULD EVOLVE. (THIS CONCEPT IS SOMEWHAT DIFFERENT FROM WHAT KHARMA PROPOSED TO KIMCHE. KHARMA LEARNED LAST WEEK THAT HE WAS OUT IN FRONT OF HIS GOVERNMENT AND HAS NOT REALLY DISCUSSED THE SUBJECT SINCE.) EVEN SO, GEMAYEL CONTINUED, THE ARABS (ESPECIALLY THE SAUDIS) WOULD BE WATCHING CLOSELY. WITH A BITTER EDGE TO HIS VOICE, GEMAYEL SAID THE SAUDIS WERE LIKE POETS ("THE POET HAS LICENSE TO DO THINGS THAT NO ONE ELSE CAN DO.")

13. MUTUAL RELATIONS: MOVEMENT OF PERSONS. SINCE GEMAYEL HAD FAILED TO MENTION THE MOVEMENT OF PERSONS, HABIB PROBED, AND GEMAYEL RESPONDED WITH THE STANDARD LEBANESE POSITION THAT CERTAIN LIMITED CATEGORIES OF PEOPLE COULD MOVE (PILGRIMS, PERSONS IN NEED OF MEDICAL CARE, ETC.). HABIB POINTED OUT THAT THE ISRAELIS CONSIDERED THE ESTABLISHMENT OF CATEGORIES A FORM OF DISCRIMINATION AND WOULD REJECT IT. HABIB ASKED WHAT WOULD HAPPEN IF AN ORDINARY ISRAELI TRIED TO GET A VISA IN ATHENS FOR TRAVEL TO BEIRUT. GEMAYEL SAID SUCH TRAVEL WOULD HAVE TO WAIT UNTIL AFTER A FULL PEACE TREATY, ALTHOUGH DE FACTO, FLEXIBLE, ARRANGEMENTS THAT DID NOT INVOLVE STAMPING A PASSPORT COULD BE WORKED OUT ON THE LAND BORDER FOR PERSONS IN TRANSIT OR ATTACHED TO THE ISRAELI LIAISON OFFICE. AS FOR THE

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LEBANESE GOING TO ISRAEL, THEY ALL COULD BE "PILGRIMS."
HABIB PRESSED GEMAYEL, REPEATING HE NEEDED TO KNOW
HIS LIMITS ON THIS ISSUE--DID HE WANT TO LIMIT THE
MOVEMENT OF ISRAELIS? "ABSOLUTELY," HE SAID, IF
ONLY FOR SECURITY REASONS. WITH HUNDREDS OF THOUSANDS
OF PALESTINIANS STILL IN LEBANON, THERE WAS NO
WAY HE COULD PROTECT ISRAELIS IN LEBANON. HE DECLINED
TO GO FURTHER IN DISCUSSING THIS POINT, ARGUING THAT

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"THIS WOULD COMMIT ME." (AGAIN, THE LEBANESE DELEGATION
IS OUT IN FRONT OF GEMAYEL ON THIS POINT.)

14. SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS. GEMAYEL EXPRESSED HIS
BELIEF THAT A "GREAT STEP" HAD OCCURRED ON SECURITY

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ISSUES WHEN THE LEBANESE HAD OBLIGED THE ISRAELIS TO DESIST FROM CERTAIN DEMANDS THAT WERE ILLOGICAL. (HE WAS REFERRING TO THE SOFTENING OF THE ISRAELI POSITION ON THE EXACT BOUNDARIES OF THE SECURITY ZONE AND ON THE FORCE LIMITATIONS TO BE APPLIED IN THAT ZONE.) ON UNIFIL, HE ALLOWED THAT, IN THE DIVISION OF LABOR THAT HE FORESAW AS NECESSARY AMONG THE LAF, THE MNF, AND UNIFIL, UNIFIL COULD PROTECT THE PALESTINIAN CAMPS AND THE MNF THE INTERNATIONAL HIGHWAYS. ON A RESIDUAL ISRAELI MILITARY PRESENCE, HE STATED SOMEWHAT AMBIGUOUSLY THAT HE WANTED "NO ISRAELI FLAG ON LEBANESE TERRITORY." HE HAD NO PROBLEM WITH REGULAR EXCHANGES OF INTELLIGENCE. HABIB PROBED HIM ON THE "JOINT (MILITARY) SUPERVISORY TEAMS" THAT THE LEBANESE HAD PROPOSED AT THE FEBRUARY 10 NEGOTIATING SESSION. GEMAYEL PROFESSED IGNORANCE, CLAIMING THAT NO ONE HAD DISCUSSED SUCH A PROPOSAL IN HIS PRESENCE. PERHAPS, HE SAID, THE PROPOSED TEAMS WERE MEANT TO OPERATE ONLY DURING THE WITHDRAWAL PERIOD.

15. TERMINATION OF THE STATE OF WAR. TWICE DURING THE MEETING, GEMAYEL INSISTED THAT THE DECLARATION OF THE TERMINATION OF THE STATE OF WAR WOULD COME INTO EFFECT "WHEN THE LAST ISRAELI SOLDIER LEAVES."

16. EXCHANGES WITH THE SYRIANS. GEMAYEL CONFIRMED THAT THERE HAD BEEN NO EXCHANGES WITH THE SYRIANS SINCE JEAN OBEID'S LAST TRIP IN JANUARY. HE INDICATED HE WAS WILLING TO SEND OBEID TO DAMASCUS AGAIN, BUT OBSERVED THAT THERE WAS LITTLE TO SAY AT THIS

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POINT. GEMAYEL HIMSELF WOULD BE READY TO GO TO DAMASCUS IF HE HAD ANYTHING IN HAND FROM THE ISRAELIS. IN ANY CASE, THE LEBANESE DID HAVE A LETTER FROM SYRIA CONFIRMING IT WOULD WITHDRAW ITS FORCES IN THE FRAMEWORK OF AN ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL. SYRIA HAD STATED NO CONDITIONS BEYOND THIS, BUT OTHER CONDITIONS OBVIOUSLY EXISTED WITHOUT HAVING TO BE STATED. THE SYRIANS WOULD BE WATCHING TO SEE WHAT CONCESSIONS THE LEBANESE MADE TO THE ISRAELIS IN ORDER TO GET THE SAME OR BETTER.

17. EXCHANGES WITH THE PLO. GEMAYEL REPEATED THAT ARAFAT HAD TOLD THE LEBANESE THAT HE HAD NO PROBLEM WITHDRAWING. HIS ONLY DIFFICULTY WAS WITH DESTINATIONS. FROM WHAT HE KNEW, GEMAYEL SAID, IRAQ WAS READY TO RECEIVE THE PLO FIGHTERS. HOWEVER, THE DISCUSSIONS HAD NOT PROCEEDED TO THESE DETAILS, BECAUSE THE PLO WAS SEEKING TO HAVE ITS WITHDRAWAL LINKED TO THAT OF THE SYRIANS. HABIB OBSERVED THAT ARAFAT'S APPARENT WILLINGNESS TO BE THE FIRST TO BEGIN THE WITHDRAWALS COULD BE USEFUL AS WE MOVED TO

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DESIGNING A WITHDRAWAL PACKAGE, ALTHOUGH LINKAGE WITH SYRIAN WITHDRAWALS WOULD CAUSE DIFFICLTIES WITH ISRAEL.

18. EXCHANGES WITH SAUDI ARABIA. GEMAYEL SPOKE REPEATEDLY OF THE SAUDIS IN BITTER TERMS. NOT ONLY HAD THEYS STOPPED LEBANESE IMPORTS AND WITHDRAWN THEIR AMBASSADOR, HE SAID, BUT THEY HAD SOUGHT TO DISTANCE THEMSELVES FROM LEBANESE ISSUES EACH TIME. GEMAYEL'S SPECIAL EMISSARY, PIERRE HILU, HAD SEEN THEM. THEY HAD ALSO REBUFFED GEMAYEL'S ATTEMPT TO GET HIMSELF INVITED TO A PART OF THE RECENT FAHD-HUSSEIN SUMMIT. THE SAUDIS WERE GREAT AT STATING THEIR AFFECTION TO FOR HIM, GEMAYEL COMPLAINED, BUT NOTHING EVER ENSUED.

19. COMMENT: GEMAYEL WAS IN A PENSIVE AND PREOCCUPIED MOOD. THE COMMUNAL FIGHTING IN THE 'ALAYH DISTRICT

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(WHICH WE DISCUSSED, WITH GEMAYEL ARGUING FOR THE DEPARTURE OF THE IDF IN FAVOR OF THE LAF), THE DIS-APPOINTING SAUDI STANCE, AND THE ABSENCE OF A MIRACLE SOLUTION ALL SEEMED TO BE WEIGHING ON HIM. HE NEEDS TO BE PRESSED FURTHER. WE WILL BE HAVING A WORKING DINNER WITH HIM, SALEM, TUENI, AND HADDAD ON SATURDAY EVENING, FEBRUARY 12. THIS WILL GIVE US THE OPPORTNITY TO PROBE FURTHER ON THE KEY ISSUES. END COMMENT. DILLON

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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, MOPS, MARR, LE, US, IS, XF
SUBJECT: HABIB/DRAPER MISSION: MEETING WITH FOREIGN
- MINISTER SHAMIR, FEBRUARY 11

1.

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2. SUMMARY: I MET FOR ONE HOUR WITH FOREIGN MINISTER SHAMIR AND HIS FOREIGN MINISTRY COLLEAGUES FRIDAY MORNING, FEBRUARY 11, TO REVIEW THE NEGOTIATING SITUATION AND TO DECIDE ON NEXT STEPS. OUR MEETING CAME ON THE HEELS OF LAST NIGHT'S DRAMATIC CABINET SESSION IN WHICH IT WAS ANNOUNCED THAT THE CABINET ACCEPTED THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE KAHAN REPORT. AT THE BEGINNING OF OUR DISCUSSION, SHAMIR SAID ISRAEL

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WAS NOT IN A POSITION TO HAVE FORMAL TALKS ON THE NEGOTIATIONS, BUT HE HOPED THE SITUATION WOULD SETTLE DOWN IN THE NEXT FEW DAYS. (WE LEARNED THAT SHARON SUBMITTED HIS RESIGNATION AS DEFENSE MINISTER THIS MORNING ON LEAVING SHAMIR'S OFFICE.) WE THEN HAD A GENERAL REVIEW OF THE KHALDAH/KIRYAT SHEMONA/NETANYA TALKS. AT THE END OF THE MEETING, I SAID THAT ONCE ISRAEL'S INTERNAL SITUATION WAS RESOLVED, I HOPED THAT WE COULD SIT DOWN IMMEDIATELY AND BEGIN DISCUSSIONS TO REACH AN AGREED TEXT OR TO BRIDGE THE KEY GAPS WHICH ARE NOW SEPARATING THE PARTIES. I SUGGESTED WE MEET AGAIN AFTER THE MONDAY MEETING IN KHALDAH. SHAMIR BASICALLY AGREED THOUGH HE THOUGHT IT WOULD BE MORE USEFUL IF THE ISRAELI MINISTERIAL STEERING COMMITTEE COULD FIRST MEET. WE AGREED TO STAY IN TOUCH ON SCHEDULING. IN THE MEANTIME, I TOLD SHAMIR THAT I WOULD GO TO LEBANON AND WOULD TRY TO INVIGORATE THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS ON THAT SIDE. END SUMMARY.

3. I MET WITH FOREIGN MINISTER SHAMIR AND HIS FOREIGN MINISTRY NEGOTIATING TEAM (NO ISRAELI MILITARY REPRESENTATIVES WERE PRESENT) FOR ABOUT ONE HOUR FRIDAY MORNING, FEBRUARY 11. I WAS ACCOMPANIED BY AMBASSADORS LEWIS AND DRAPER, AND HARE. OUR MEETING CAME ON THE

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HEELS OF LAST NIGHT'S DRAMATIC CABINET MEETING, PUNCTUATED BY AN UGLY BOMB INCIDENT, IN WHICH IT WAS ANNOUNCED THAT THE CABINET ACCEPTED THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE KAHAN COMMISSION REPORT. NOT SURPRISINGLY, SHAMIR WAS REFLECTING FATIGUE FROM YESTERDAY NIGHT'S EMOTIONAL EVENTS, THOUGH HE APPEARED TO BE RELIEVED THAT THE NECESSARY DECISIONS HAD BEEN TAKEN TO RESOLVE THE INTERNAL CRISIS.

4. AT THE OUTSET, SHAMIR SAID ISRAEL WAS NOT IN A SITUATION TO HAVE FORMAL TALKS ON THE NEGOTIATIONS BUT HE HOPED MATTERS WOULD BE RESOLVED IN A FEW DAYS. HE THEN SUGGESTED THAT KIMCHE REVIEW WHERE THE NEGOTIATIONS STOOD.

5. KIMCHE SAID THAT HE HAD NOTHING DRAMATIC TO REPORT, WHICH WAS INHERENT IN ANY NEGOTIATING PROCESS. NEVERTHELESS, HE BELIEVED GOOD WORK HAD BEEN DONE IN THE VARIOUS SUBCOMMITTEES AT YESTERDAY'S SESSION IN KIRYAT SHEMONA, AS WELL AS IN PREVIOUS MEETINGS. IN THE MILITARY SUBCOMMITTEE, KIMCHE NOTED THEY HAD BEGUN DRAFTING FOR THE FIRST TIME, FOCUSING ON MILITARY LIAISON MECHANISMS. HE ALSO THOUGHT IT IMPORTANT THAT THE LEBANESE HAD AGREED TO THE PRINCIPLE OF JOINT SUPERVISORY TEAMS OPERATING ON LEBANESE SOIL. (KIMCHE COMMENTED THAT THIS DECISION MIGHT EXPLAIN THE PECULIAR

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REPORT ATTRIBUTED TO LEBANESE FOREIGN MINISTER SALIM
THAT ISRAEL HAD BACKED AWAY FROM ITS DEMAND FOR EARLY
WARNING STATIONS.) DRAPER COMMENTED THAT LEBANON
HAD ALSO AGREED TO A SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE MILITARY LIAISON SYSTEM.
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6. KIMCHE EXPLAINED THAT THE WITHDRAWAL ISSUE HAD ALSO BEEN ADDRESSED, ADDING THAT FATTAL HAD TOLD HIM HE WAS UNDER INSTRUCTIONS TO RAISE THIS ISSUE. THE ISRAELI SIDE HAD EXPLAINED IN THE MILITARY SUBCOMMITTEE THAT THEY WERE THINKING OF A TEN-WEEK TIME FRAME FOR TOTAL WITHDRAWAL OF WHICH FIVE - SIX WEEKS COULD BE DEVOTED TO A PARTIAL WITHDRAWAL, IF THAT CONCEPT WERE ADOPTED. THE TIME FRAME, HOWEVER, COULD BE SHORTENED,

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IF NECESSARY. KIMCHE SAID THE LEBANESE WERE VERY SATISFIED WITH THIS DISCUSSION. I SAID THIS DISCUSSION WOULD BE HELPFUL IN THE CONTINUING TALKS WITH THE PLO AND SYRIANS ON WITHDRAWAL ISSUES.

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7. KIMCHE SAID THERE WERE A FEW PROBLEMS WITH RESPECT TO LIMITATIONS IN THE SECURITY ZONE. THE LEBANESE WANT THREE BRIGADES TO BE ABLE TO OPERATE IN THE ZONE (EVEN THOUGH THEY MAY NOT IMMEDIATELY HAVE SUFFICIENT READY MANPOWER TO REACH THIS CEILING) WHILE THE ISRAELIS WANTED ONE TERRITORIAL BRIGADE (HADDAD'S FORCES) AND HAVE AGREED TO ONE OTHER AUGMENTED BRIGADE. THERE WAS ALSO THE ISSUE OF DEFINING THE LIMITS OF THE SECURITY ZONE IN THE SOUTH. KIMCHE SAID THE LEBANESE DO NOT WANT ANY SPECIFIC REFERENCE TO A 45-KILOMETER ZONE IN THE AGREEMENT. THIS ISSUE COULD POSSIBLY BE AVOIDED BY ONLY REFERRING TO A MAP IN THE TEXT OF THE AGREEMENT. DIVON, THE MFA REPRESENTATIVE SITTING IN ON THE MILITARY SUBCOMMITTEE, ALSO NOTED THAT THE LEBANESE HAD TOLD HIM THAT THEY COULD ACCEPT DE FACTO LIMITATIONS NORTH OF THE AWALI RIVER. I SAID THAT I HAD ALSO READ WHERE THE ISRAELI SIDE HAD SUGGESTED POSSIBLY DRAWING A LINE EXTENDING ALONG THE AWALI RIVER AND THEN GOING NORTH TO JABAL BARUK. I ALSO SAID I SAW SOME VALUE IN HAVING RESTRICTIONS WITHIN THE SUB-ZONES, AS THE LEBANESE HAD PROPOSED.

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8. ON UNIFIL, KIMCHE EXPLAINED ISRAEL'S OPPOSITION TO DEPLOYMENTS AROUND THE CAMPS, SAYING THEY WOULD FORM A SCREEN BEHIND WHICH THE TERRORIST INFRASTRUCTURE COULD BE RE-ESTABLISHED. HE NOTED THAT THE LEBANESE HAD RESPONDED THEY WOULD ENSURE THE LEBANESE ARMY AND POLICE WOULD HAVE FREE ACCESS TO THE CAMPS. I SAID

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THE PLO HAD ALREADY RAISED SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE CAMPS WITH LEBANON. DIVON REPLIED THAT THE LEBANESE HAD TOLD HIM INFORMALLY THAT ARAPAT HAD NOT SPECIFICALLY RAISED UNIFIL WITH THEM AND THAT SOME LEBANESE ON THE DELEGATION HAD EVEN QUESTIONED THE UTILITY OF UNIFIL FORCES AT THE CAMPS. I SAID THEY COULD SERVE AS A USEFUL PRESENCE AND DRAPER SAID IT WAS CLEAR FROM HIS DISCUSSIONS WITH GENERAL KURAYTIM, WHO HAD TALKED DIRECTLY TO THE PLO, THAT HE BELIEVES STRONGLY IN THE NEED FOR BETTER SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE CAMPS. I SPECIFICALLY ASKED ABOUT OTHER POSSIBLE DEVELOPMENTS FOR UNIFIL IN SPECIFIED LOCATIONS, FOR EXAMPLE--TYRE AND SIDON. KIMCHE RESPONDED THAT ISRAEL HAD NO OBJECTIONS TO UNIFIL DEPLOYMENTS IN THE NORTH AND IN THE BEKA'A, WHERE IN ANY EVENT GREATER SECURITY THREATS WERE POSED AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT. CLEARLY, HOWEVER, KIMCHE'S OPPOSITION TO UNIFIL IN LIMITED AREA IN THE SOUTH HAS BEGUN TO EASE.

9. DRAPER SAID HE WAS GLAD THAT ISRAEL HAD SAID IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO MOVE THE LEBANESE ARMY IN AND OUT OF THE SECURITY ZONE BEFORE WITHDRAWAL. THIS WAS NECESSARY NOT ONLY TO PREVENT A SECURITY VACUUM, BUT ALSO PRACTICALLY TO REFIT AND REARM THE LEBANESE ARMY.

10. ON MUTUAL RELATIONS, KIMCHE SAID THAT ANOTHER ARTICLE HAD BEEN DRAFTED AT YESTERDAY'S SESSION ON MULTINATIONAL CONVENTIONS. (NOTE: KHARMA DID NOT IN FACT ACCEPT THE ARTICLE AD REFERENDUM, THOUGH HE SAID HE WOULD CONVEY IT TO HIS GOVERNMENT.) HE ALSO NOTED THAT THE LEBANESE HAD REOPENED THE "TRIPARTITE" ISSUE IN DESCRIBING THE UMBRELLA LIAISON COMMITTEE, BUT HE THOUGHT DRAPER HAD PERSUADED KHARMA TO DROP

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THIS TITLE. I AGREED IT WAS PREFERABLE IF THE U.S.
WAS DESCRIBED ONLY AS PARTICIPATING IN THE COMMITTEE
SYSTEM.

11. KIMCHE REFERRED TO YESTERDAY'S PRIVATE DISCUSSION
WITH AMBASSADORS KHARMA AND DRAPER ON THE MOVEMENT OF
GOODS AND PEOPLE. AT VARIOUS POINTS IN THE CONVERSATION,
KIMCHE DESCRIBED THIS AS THE MOST IMPORTANT AND

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DIFFICULT ISSUE IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. ACCORDING TO
KHARMA, THERE SHOULD BE STRONG DE FACTO ARRANGEMENTS
ON THE GROUND BUT A WEAK DE JURE DESCRIPTION OF
THIS PRINCIPLE ON PAPER. KHARMA HAD ALSO SAID THERE
COULD BE A DE FACTO STOP TO THE BOYCOTT. KIMCHE SAID
ISRAEL FELT VERY STRONGLY ON THE BOYCOTT ISSUE AND
THAT A GENERAL ARTICLE SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN THE
AGREEMENT, STATING ALL LAWS AND REGULATIONS INCOMPATIBLE
WITH THE AGREEMENT WOULD BE NULL AND VOID. I ASKED
WHY THIS NEEDED TO BE STATED EXPLICITLY IF THE
AGREEMENT ITSELF WOULD BE OVERRIDING, AS I UNDERSTOOD
TO BE THE CASE. ELI RUBENSTEIN SAID THAT ISRAEL NEEDED
TWO THINGS: 1) A SOLID COMMITMENT ON THE PRINCIPLE OF

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MOVEMENT IN THE AGREEMENT ITSELF AND 2) A GENERAL ARTICLE IN THE FINAL CLAUSES OF THE AGREEMENT AS DESCRIBED BY KIMCHE. OTHERWISE, HE SAID, THE PAPER WOULD BE WORTHLESS SINCE IT WOULD HAVE NO BINDING EFFECT.

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12. I SAID MUCH WOULD DEPEND ON THE NATURE OF DE FACTO ARRANGEMENTS, AND ASKED IF KHARMA HAD OUTLINED A PLAN. KIMCHE SAID IT WAS NOT ALL THAT CLEAR. HE WAS ALSO NOT SURE ON HOW MUCH BACKING KHARMA HAD. KIMCHE SAID HE HAD FOUND ONE OF KHARMA'S REMARKS DIS-QUIETING WHEN KHARMA HAD SAID THAT AT FIRST THERE WILL BE A "CERTAIN FLOW OF GOODS AND PEOPLE" WHICH COULD THEN INCREASE OVER TIME. KIMCHE VOICED ISRAEL'S DISSATISFACTION WITH ANYTHING THAT MIGHT SMELL OF A DISCRIMINATORY REGIME. DRAPER COMMENTED WE HAD MADE IT CLEAR TO KHARMA THAT ISRAEL DOES NOT LIKE SELECTIVE CATEGORIES. LEWIS ASKED IF IT WAS NOT POSSIBLE TO THINK OF RESTRICTIVE NON-DISCRIMINATORY FLOWS. IN THIS CONTEXT, KIMCHE SAID THAT KHARMA HAD VIGOROUSLY

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EXPRESSED THE CONCERN OF HIS GOVERNMENT ON THE POSSIBLE MOVEMENT OF PALESTINIANS ON THE WEST BANK OR ISRAELI-ARABS INTO LEBANON. LEWIS SAID IT WAS A FACT OF LIFE THAT BOTH PARTIES WOULD IMPOSE RESTRICTIONS.

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13. KIMCHE SAID THAT GOOD WORK HAD BEEN DONE IN DRAFTING THE PREAMBLE TO THE AGREEMENT AND ALSO IN NARROWING DIFFERENCES ON THE FINAL CLAUSES. ELI RUBENSTEIN RAISED THE ISSUE OF WHEN THE TERMINATION OF THE STATE OF WAR WOULD COME INTO EFFECT. THE LEBANESE WANTED IT TO TAKE EFFECT ON THE EVACUATION OF ALL ISRAELI FORCES FROM LEBANON. HE URGED US TO SUPPORT ISRAEL'S POSITION WHICH HAS THIS ARTICLE COME INTO EFFECT UPON THE ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THE AGREEMENT, SAYING ISRAEL'S POSITION HAD LOGIC AND PRECEDENT. I REPLIED THAT I COULD SEE THE LOGIC ON BOTH SIDES AND ADVISED THAT WE SHOULD LET THE MATTER REST FOR THE MOMENT. WE COULD COME BACK TO IT LATER. RUBENSTEIN SAID THIS WAS A VERY IMPORTANT POINT FOR ISRAEL.

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14. AT THE END OF THE MEETING, SHAMIR SAID 50 PERCENT OF THE AGREEMENT HAD ALREADY BEEN DONE. I SAID THE LAST 50 PERCENT WAS ALWAYS THE HARDEST. I HOPED THAT ONCE THE INTERNAL SITUATION WAS RESOLVED, WE COULD QUICKLY GET DOWN TO DRAFTING AN AGREED TEXT, AS I HAD DESCRIBED TO THE PRIME MINISTER ON WEDNESDAY. IT WAS IMPERATIVE, I STRESSED, TO MOVE MORE DELIBERATELY AND TO START BRIDGING THE "RED LINES" BETWEEN THE PARTIES.

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I SAID THAT KIMCHE AND DRAPER HAD DONE GOOD WORK IN IDENTIFYING PROBLEMS AND IN BRIDGING SOME GAPS, BUT IT WAS VITALLY IMPORTANT TO MOVE FASTER AND AVOID A PROTRACTED NEGOTIATION.

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15. I TOLD SHAMIR THAT I WAS GOING TO LEBANON THIS

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AFTERNOON TO HAVE FURTHER EXPLORATORY DISCUSSIONS AND TO INVIGORATE THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS. (KIMCHE SAID THAT IT WAS CLEAR THE LEBANESE SIDE WAS NOT RECEIVING FRESH INSTRUCTIONS.) I THEN HOPED WE COULD RENEW OUR DISCUSSIONS NEXT WEEK IN A MORE INTENSIVE AND ORGANIZED MANNER. SHAMIR SAID HE THOUGHT IT WAS ESSENTIAL

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FOR THE ISRAELI MINISTERIAL STEERING COMMITTEE TO MEET NEXT WEEK TO REVIEW THE NEGOTIATIONS BUT ADDED THIS WOULD DEPEND ON OTHER DEVELOPMENTS. HOWEVER, HE DID NOT EXPLICITLY MAKE THIS A PRECONDITION TO CONTINUING OUR DISCUSSIONS, AT LEAST AT THE WORKING LEVEL ON AN INFORMAL BASIS.

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16. COMMENT: AFTER GOING TO LEBANON THIS AFTERNOON, I AM NOW PLANNING TO RETURN TO ISRAEL ON ABOUT MONDAY EVENING AFTER THE TALKS IN KHALDAH. I HOPE WE WILL BE ABLE TO CONTINUE OUR DISCUSSIONS HERE ON TUESDAY AND WEDNESDAY, AT LEAST AT THE WORKING LEVEL. SHARON'S RESIGNATION FROM HIS DEFENSE PORTFOLIO THIS MORNING MAY CLEAR THE AIR SOMEWHAT, BUT IT IS STILL ENTIRELY POSSIBLE THAT THE STEERING COMMITTEE WILL NOT BE ABLE TO MEET NEXT WEEK, THOUGH THIS IS CLEARLY SHAMIR'S INTENT. END COMMENT. LEWIS

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FROM HABIB

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, MOPS, US, LE, IS, XF
SUBJECT: HABIB/DRAPER MIVI-LEBANESE
NEGOTIATIONS

1. [REDACTED]

2. LEWIS, DRAPER AND I ARE REVIEWING THE MANNER IN WHICH TO PURSUE OUR OBJECTIVES IN THE ISRAELI-LEBANESE PROBLEM IN THE LIGHT OF THE ISRAELI CABINET CRISIS FOLLOWING THE KAHAN COMMISSION REPORT. THE MEETING AT KIRYAT SHEMONA TODAY WAS USEFUL DESPITE ISRAEL'S HOLDING OFF NEGOTIATIONS ON CERTAIN BASIC SECURITY ISSUES. AS WILL BE SEEN IN THE FULL REPORT OF THE DAY'S DISCUSSION, THE ISRAELIS HAVE STATED THEY WOULD MEET AGAIN ON FEBRUARY 14 BUT MADE IT CLEAR THEY COULD NOT REALLY TALK SERIOUSLY ON CERTAIN SUBJECTS UNTIL LATER IN NEXT WEEK, AND PERHAPS NOT EVEN THEN--IMPLYING UNTIL THE CABINET CRISIS IS RESOLVED.

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3. WE ARE MEETING WITH FOREIGN MINISTER SHAMIR TOMORROW MORNING, FEBRUARY 11. UNTIL THEN WE WILL HOLD OFF GIVING OUR OPINION ON HOW BEST TO PROCEED TO ACCELERATE THE NEGOTIATIONS. AT THIS MOMENT IT IS CLEAR THAT CHANGES IN ISRAELI NEGOTIATING POSITIONS ON KEY ISSUES WILL NOT BE CONSIDERED UNTIL THE CABINET CRISIS IS RESOLVED. MEANWHILE, RELATIVELY NON-CONTROVERSIAL ISSUES CAN BE CLARIFIED, AND WE

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CAN MAKE SOME PROGRESS, BUT AN ATTEMPT TO GET
A QUICK BREAKTHROUGH ON THE ISSUES OF
SECURITY AND MUTUAL RELATIONS WILL HAVE TO WAIT.
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FROM HABIB

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, XF, IX, LE, US

SUBJECT: HABIB MISSION: MEETING WITH PRIME MINISTER
BEGIN, FEBRUARY 9

1. [REDACTED]

2. SUMMARY: AMBASSADOR HABIB, ACCOMPANIED BY
AMBASSADOR LEWIS, MET WITH BEGIN FEBRUARY 9 FOR
APPROXIMATELY 50 MINUTES, DURING WHICH HE REVIEWED
FOR BEGIN HIS WASHINGTON DISCUSSIONS AND CONVEYED
THE PRESIDENT'S SENSE OF URGENCY ABOUT THE STATE OF
THE LEBANESE NEGOTIATIONS. BEGIN READILY AGREED
WITH HABIB'S PROPOSAL THAT HABIB MAKE ANOTHER

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INTENSIVE EFFORT BILATERALLY WITH THE ISRAELI TEAM
TO TRY TO HAMMER OUT AGREEMENT TO BRIDGE THE REMAINING
GAPS, CONCENTRATING ON ISRAELI REQUIREMENTS FOR
ADEQUATE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS IN SOUTH LEBANON AND
AN ADEQUATE BUT NOT DESTABILIZING DEGREE OF NORMALIZA-
TION. HOWEVER, REFERRING TO THE CURRENT POLITICAL
CRISIS IN THE WAKE OF THE PUBLICATION OF THE COMMISSION
OF INQUIRY REPORT, BEGIN SAID THAT HE WOULD HAVE TO ASK
HABIB TO BE A LITTLE PATIENT AND TO GIVE HIM AT**UNCLASSIFIED**

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LEAST "ONE OR TWO DAYS" BEFORE ASKING HIS COLLEAGUES TO MEET WITH HABIB. HABIB MADE CLEAR THAT HE WOULD STAY HERE FOR THE TIME BEING IN ORDER TO BE READY TO MEET INTENSIVELY AS SOON AS THIS STORMY CABINET CRISIS PERMITS THE ISRAELIS TO GIVE ADEQUATE ATTENTION TO THESE NEGOTIATING ISSUES. TONIGHT'S CABINET MEETING WAS ABOUT TO CONVENE AS HABIB AND LEWIS LEFT, BUT IT MAY WELL BE SOME DAYS BEFORE THE FUTURE OF THE GOVERNMENT IS CLEAR. END SUMMARY.

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3. AMBASSADORS HABIB AND LEWIS MET WITH PRIME MINISTER BEGIN AND HIS PERSONAL ADVISER, YEHUDA AVNER, FOR APPROXIMATELY 50 MINUTES WEDNESDAY EVENING, FEBRUARY 9. THE MEETING PRECEDED A CRUCIAL CABINET MEETING CALLED TO CONSIDER THE GOVERNMENT'S FUTURE IN LIGHT OF THE KAHAN COMMISSION REPORT ON THE BEIRUT MASSACRES, AND THE ATMOSPHERE WAS POLITICALLY CHARGED. A LARGE, PRO-SHARON GUSH EMUNIM DEMONSTRATION WAS GOING ON OUTSIDE THE PRIME MINISTRY, AND VARIOUS COALITION MEMBERS WERE GATHERING TO CONFER WITH BEGIN. HE WAS EXTREMELY POLITE AND ATTENTIVE, AND SEEMED IN CHARGE OF HIMSELF AND THE SITUATION. BUT, OBVIOUSLY, BEGIN'S MAIN PREOCCUPATION WAS HOW TO DEAL WITH THESE CRUCIAL POLITICAL DECISIONS

[REDACTED]

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CONCERNING THE FUTURE OF HIS GOVERNMENT, NOT THE CURRENT STATE OF THE LEBANESE NEGOTIATIONS. NONETHELESS, HE INVITED HABIB'S REPORT ON HIS TALKS IN WASHINGTON AND RESPONDED POSITIVELY, IF VAGUELY, TO HABIB'S SUGGESTED COURSE OF ACTION.

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4. HABIB BEGAN BY CONVEYING PRESIDENT REAGAN'S GREETINGS TO PRIME MINISTER BEGIN AND CONTINUED BY DESCRIBING HIS CONSULTATIONS AND DISCUSSIONS IN WASHINGTON OVER THE PAST TEN DAYS. HE SAID HE HAD MADE A POINT OF TELLING PRESIDENT REAGAN AND SECRETARY SHULTZ WHEN HE HAD RETURNED TO WASHINGTON THAT THE TRIPARTITE NEGOTIATIONS WERE NOW FINALLY GETTING SERIOUS AND DIGGING INTO DETAIL, AND THAT HABIB, LEWIS AND DRAPER HAD ALL AGREED IT WAS IMPORTANT TO ALLOW THE TRIPARTITE NEGOTIATIONS TO CONTINUE FOR SOME WEEKS IN ORDER TO NARROW GAPS AS FAR AS POSSIBLE AND HIGH-LIGHT THE KEY DIFFERENCES WHICH MUST BE BRIDGED. HABIB SAID THAT THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY HAD ACCEPTED IN GENERAL THIS APPROACH, AFTER A THOROUGH REVIEW WITH THEIR KEY OFFICIALS. HOWEVER, THERE WAS A VERY STRONG FEELING IN WASHINGTON THAT THIS PROCESS WAS GOING ON TOO LONG AND THAT IT WAS NECESSARY TO STRIKE HARD FOR AN EARLY AGREEMENT.

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5. HABIB TOLD BEGIN THAT HE HAD MET WITH PRESIDENT REAGAN AGAIN JUST BEFORE HIS DEPARTURE; THAT THE PRESIDENT HAD APPROVED HABIB'S CONTINUING TO PURSUE THE DIPLOMATIC TRACK HE HAD LAUNCHED DURING HIS LAST VISIT, I.E., URGING BEGIN AND HIS COLLEAGUES TO WORK INTENSIVELY WITH THE U.S. FOR A MAXIMUM

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AMOUNT OF BILATERAL AGREEMENT ON THE KEY ISSUES PRIOR TO HABIB PROCEEDING AGAIN TO BEIRUT. HABIB TOLD BEGIN THAT THE PRESIDENT STILL BELIEVES IT SHOULD BE POSSIBLE FOR ISRAEL AND THE UNITED STATES TO REACH AGREEMENT ON THE FUNDAMENTAL BASIC REQUIREMENTS TO PROTECT ISRAELI SECURITY AND ON A DEGREE OF

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NORMALIZATION WHICH WILL PROTECT BOTH ISRAELI AND LEBANESE INTERESTS. THEREFORE HE HAD TOLD HABIB TO "TRY AGAIN, HARDER."

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6. HABIB THEN WENT ON TO STRESS THAT THE TRILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS HAD BEEN PROCEEDING WELL IN RECENT DAYS, THAT GOOD WORK HAD BEEN DONE AND THAT ENOUGH PROGRESS HAD BEEN MADE TO PERMIT THE U.S. TO TARGET MORE EFFECTIVELY ITS MEDIATING ROLE IN BUILDING BRIDGES OVER THE KEY OBSTACLES. HABIB SAID THAT IN
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[REDACTED]

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HIS VIEW THE PARTNERS ARE NOW IN A POSITION TO FOCUS ON TWO BASIC QUESTIONS: EXACTLY WHAT IS REQUIRED TO MEET ISRAEL'S MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS FOR SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS IN THE SOUTH, AND HOW MUCH NORMALIZATION IS POSSIBLE, OVER WHAT PERIOD OF TIME. HABIB STRESSED THAT THE U.S. DOES NOT ACCEPT THE ARGUMENT MADE IN VARIOUS OTHER QUARTERS THAT LEBANON CANNOT ACCEPT ANY NORMALIZATION AT ALL; NOR DO WE REJECT IN ANY WAY THE NEED FOR GENUINE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS TO PROTECT ISRAEL'S NORTHERN RE HABIB SAID HE THOUGHT THAT AS A RESULT OF THE PROGRESS MADE BY THE TRIPARTITE NEGDTIATORS. THERE IS NOW A GOOD OPENING TO TRY TO BRIDGE THESE KEY GAPS. HE STRESSED THAT HE WOULD LIKE TO SIT DOWN AGAIN WITH BEGIN'S PEOPLE TO SEE WHAT CAN BE ACHIEVED BETWEEN US, SUGGESTING THAT IT MIGHT EVEN BE BETTER TO DO THIS AT THE WORKING LEVEL FOR THREE OR FOUR DAYS. SUMMING UP, HABIB SAID SIMPLY THAT THE PRESIDENT HAD ASKED HIM TO COME OUT AGAIN AND TO DO EVERYTHING HUMANLY POSSIBLE TO ACCELERATE THE DIPLOMATIC PROCESS AND TO ACHIEVE EARLY AGREEMENT.

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7. BEGIN RESPONDED VAGUELY, BUT UNMISTAKABLY:
"IT IS CERTAINLY A VERY GOOD IDEA TO SIT TOGETHER AND TO TRY TO AGREE BETWEEN US. I AM PREPARED TO ASK MY COLLEAGUES TO SIT WITH YOU INTENSIVELY AS YOU SUGGEST. BUT YOU MUST UNDERSTAND THAT WE NEED REAL SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS; WE CANNOT ALLOW OUR TOWNS TO BE THREATENED IN THE NORTH AGAIN."

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8. THEN, IN SOMEWHAT OF AN EMBARRASSED FASHION, BEGIN WENT ON TO SAY THAT: "I MUST TELL YOU THIS IS A VERY SPECIAL TIME. JUST AFTER YOU LEAVE I MUST
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MEET WITH MY CABINET COLLEAGUES TO DEAL WITH THE QUESTION OF HOW WE RESPOND TO THE COMMISSION REPORT. WE ARE PREOCCUPIED WITH IT JUST NOW AND I NEED AT LEAST A DAY OR TWO BEFORE I CAN RESPOND TO YOUR SUGGESTION." THERE WAS THEN SOME FURTHER DISCUSSION OF THE FACT THAT ALL POLITICAL EYES ARE TURNED ON THE GOVERNMENT'S FUTURE, WITH BEGIN SHOWING QUIET SELF-CONFIDENCE, BUT NOT WANTING TO DESCRIBE HOW HE SAW EVENTS PLAYING OUT. HABIB REASSURED HIM THAT OF COURSE WE UNDERSTOOD THE DELICACY OF THE MOMENT AND THAT IT WOULD TAKE A LITTLE TIME, PERHAPS, TO SORT OUT THE NEGOTIATING SITUATION ON THE ISRAELI SIDE. HE SAID HE WOULD WAIT IN JERUSALEM TO HEAR FROM THE PRIME MINISTER FURTHER WHEN THIS SITUATION CLARIFIED.

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9. BEGIN THEN ASKED HABIB WHAT HE COULD TELL HIM ABOUT THE READINESS THE SYRIANS OR THE PLO TO WITHDRAW, AND WHETHER THERE WAS ANY NEWS ABOUT THE MISSING ISRAELI SOLDIERS. HABIB REPLIED THAT WE HAVE RECEIVED FLAT STATEMENTS FROM THE SYRIANS, THROUGH SAUDI CHANNELS, WHICH AMOUNT TO AN UNEQUIVOCAL ASSURANCE THAT SYRIA WILL WITHDRAW SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH ISRAEL. HOWEVER, IN THEIR CONTACTS WITH THE LEBANESE, THE SYRIANS HAVE ADDED TO THEIR STATEMENTS THE ASSERTION THAT THERE, OF COURSE, MUST BE IN ANY AGREEMENTS REACHED BETWEEN ISRAEL AND LEBANON NO THREAT TO SYRIAN SECURITY NOR ANY DEROGATION OF LEBANESE SOVEREIGNTY. BEGIN PICKED UP THIS POINT WITH THE RHETORICAL QUESTION OF HOW "TEMPORARY OBSERVATION POSTS" COULD BE A THREAT TO SYRIA? HABIB RESPONDED THAT HE WOULD PUT THE POINT DIFFERENTLY: THE SYRIANS INSIST THAT WITHDRAWAL BE TOTAL AS WELL AS SIMULTANEOUS AND THAT IF THERE IS ANY

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RESIDUAL ISRAELI MILITARY PRESENCE IN LEBANON THAT
WOULD STOP THE SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL FROM TAKING PLACE.
HOWEVER, HABIB CONTINUED, THERE MAY BE OTHER WAYS
TO DEAL ADEQUATELY WITH ISRAEL'S GENUINE SECURITY NEEDS
WITHOUT ANY RESIDUAL IDF PRESENCE, FOR EXAMPLE, THROUGH
AN ENHANCED LIAISON RELATIONSHIP. BUT, HABIB STRESSED
AGAIN, THE SYRIAN AGREEMENT FOR SIMULTANEOUS WITHDRAWAL
IS BASED ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT WITHDRAWAL WILL BE
TOTAL.

10. BEGIN THEN ASKED PLAINTIVELY: "WHO THEN WILL
PREVENT THE KATYUSHAS FROM FALLING ON US AGAIN?" HABIB
WENT THROUGH A NUMBER OF SPECIFIC POSSIBILITIES IN
THE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS FIELD, ALL DESIGNED TO
PRECLUDE ANY RESIDUAL ISRAELI MILITARY PRESENCE. BEGIN
SHOOK HIS HEAD AND SAID THAT HE WAS AFRAID IT WOULD NOT

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BE ENOUGH, STRESSING HIS GREAT CONCERN ABOUT ANY
POSSIBLE RETURN TO THE THREATS OF THE PAST,
AND EMPHASIZING THAT ISRAEL SPEAKS ONLY ABOUT "TEMPORARY
OBSERVATION POSTS." HABIB CLOSED THIS PART OF THE
CONVERSATION BY SAYING THAT WE NEED TO TALK A GREAT
DEAL MORE AT THE WORKING LEVEL TO SEE IF WE CAN COME
UP WITH SOME FORMULA WHICH BEGIN COULD ACCEPT
WHICH STILL PRECLUDES ANY RESIDUAL MILITARY PRESENCE.
BEGIN LISTENED SILENTLY, BUT DID NOT COMMENT FURTHER.

11. B THEN DESCRIBED THE TALKS BETWEEN
THE LEBANESE AND THE PLO IN TUNIS, STRESSING THAT THE
SAME LEBANESE GENERAL WHO HAD BEEN THE KEY INTERMEDIARY

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WITH THE PLO DURING THE BEIRUT EVACUATION WAS HANDLING THESE NEGOTIATIONS IN A VERY EFFICIENT FASHION. HABIB STRESSED THAT THE PLO HAS NOT REJECTED THE IDEA OF WITHDRAWING FIRST, ALTHOUGH THEY HAVE STRESSED THE NEED FOR CAREFUL COORDINATION WITH THE SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL AND A DESIRE TO MOVE OUT UNDER SYRIAN PROTECTION. WITH RESPECT TO DESTINATIONS, HABIB SAID THAT THE PLO HAS UNDERSTOOD THAT ALGERIA WOULD TAKE SOME OF THEIR COMBATANTS, OTHERS MIGHT GO TO SYRIA OR IRAQ; PRESIDENT MUBARAK HAD FLATLY REFUSED TO CONSIDER RECEIVING ANY. HABIB TOLD BEGIN THAT DURING THE MEETING BETWEEN WAZZAN AND FOREIGN MINISTER SALIM WITH ARAFAT THAT ARAFAT HAD RAISED THE ISSUE OF THE NEED FOR CONTINUING PROTECTION FOR PALESTINIAN NON-COMBATANTS AFTER THE FIGHTERS HAVE BEEN WITHDRAWN. THE LEBANESE HAD GIVEN ASSURANCES, BUT HABIB THOUGHT THAT ARAFAT MAY INSIST ON SOME INTERNATIONAL PRESENCE AT THE CAMPS TO LEND GREATER CREDIBILITY TO THESE ASSURANCES. ALL IN ALL, HABIB SAID, FROM THE REPORTS OF THE LEBANESE-PLO

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MEETINGS, HE DID NOT SEE ANY INSUPERABLE OBSTACLES. THE END OF THE CONVERSATION TOUCHED BRIEFLY ON VARIED SUBJECTS, INCLUDING BEGIN'S ABILITY TO MOBILIZE A MAJORITY IN THE CABINET WHENEVER HE HIMSELF IS CONVINCED. BEGIN OBJECTED THAT HE WAS OFTEN HIMSELF IN THE MINORITY, BUT HE DID FINALLY ADMIT: "WE ARE A TEAM, IF SOMETIMES A LEAKING TEAM."
(THIS SALLY PRODUCED CONSIDERABLE LAUGHTER, INCLUDING SOME FROM BEGIN HIMSELF--ONE OF THE FIRST TIMES HE HAS BEEN SEEN TO INDULGE IN GENUINE LAUGHTER SINCE HIS WIFE'S DEATH.) HABIB AND BEGIN ALSO TOUCHED ON THE VALUE OF INTERNATIONAL FORCES IN GENERAL, WITH BEGIN STRESSING UNIFIL'S PAST INADEQUACIES AND HABIB STRESSING THE VALUE OF UNIFIL AND THD WORK DONE BY THE FRENCH AND ITALIAN MNF FORCES IN BEIRUT.

--
12. HABIB SUMMED UP BY SAYING THAT HE HAD COME WITH A PROPOSAL TO PROCEED URGENTLY, "TOGETHER." HE BELIEVES THAT THE GAPS IN THE POSITIONS ARE NOW CLEAR ENOUGH TO BE MORE READILY BRIDGED AND HE IS DETERMINED TO MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO BRIDGE THEM. BEGIN RESPONDED THAT THERE ARE UNDENIABLE DIFFERENCES OF OPINION WHICH SHOULD NOT BE COVERED UP. HE AGAIN ENDORSED THE PROCESS OF TALKING INTENSELY BETWEEN US, BUT STRESSED AS WE WERE LEAVING AGAIN HOW IMPORTANT THE SECURITY QUESTION WAS TO HIM AND THAT HE SAW NO ALTERNATIVE TO SOME RESIDUAL IDF ROLE IN SOUTH LEBANON FOR A LIMITED PERIOD OF TIME.

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13. COMMENT: THIS IS AS MUCH AS WE COULD ACHIEVE WITH BEGIN TOTALLY PREOCCUPIED WITH THE CRISIS IN HIS GOVERNMENT AND UNSURE WHO HIS DEFENSE MINISTER WILL BE TOMORROW OR MONDAY. HOWEVER, BEGIN WAS

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OBVIOUSLY RELIEVED THAT WE WERE ANXIOUS TO CONTINUE TRYING TO REACH AN UNDERSTANDING ON THE GAPS IN KEY AREAS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. WE CERTAINLY HAVE ENOUGH OPENING TO PROCEED AS SOON AS THE POLITICAL CLOUDS CLEAR ONLY SLIGHTLY. END COMMENT.
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TAGS: PREL, LE, IS, US, SY
SUBJECT: DRAPER MISSION: SYRIAN RESPONSE

PAGE 02 STATE 036454

REF: DAMASCUS 843

1.

2. AMBASSADOR'S TNFORMAL OBSERVATIONS TO GLAIEL WERE ON
TARGET. SUBJECT TO APPROVAL OF AMBASSADOR HABIB, EMBASSY
MAY PROVIDE MFA FOLLOWING USG RESPONSE TO SARG AS
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--IN REFERENCE TO THE VIEWPOINT OF THE SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC, AS PRESENTED FEBRUARY 2, 1983, REGARDING THE USG'S VIEW OF THE LEBANESE-ISRAELI NEGOTIATING AGENDA, THE USG NOTES THAT THE SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC AND UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT SHARE THE GOAL OF AN INDEPENDENT, SOVEREIGN AND UNIFIED LEBANON. IT IS FOR THIS SHARED GOAL THAT THE UNITED STATES CONTINUES TO URGE A SPEEDY CONCLUSION TO THE LEBANESE-ISRAELI NEGOTIATIONS NECESSARY TO EFFECT THE WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAELI FORCES FROM LEBANON.

--THE UNITED STATES UNDERSTANDS THE GOVERNMENT OF SYRIA IS PREPARED TO WITHDRAW ITS FORCES ON THE BASIS OF DIRECT

NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN SYRIA AND THE GOVERNMENT OF LEBANON, AS HAS BEEN STATED PREVIOUSLY AND REPEATEDLY IN MEETINGS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND SYRIA OVER THE LAST SIX MONTHS. INDEED, AS WE HAVE STATED ON NUMEROUS OCCASIONS, WE SUPPORT FULLY THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES FROM LEBANON AS THE BEST MEANS TO RESTORE STABILITY TO LEBANON.

--THE UNITED STATES REITERATES ITS POSITION REGARDING PEACE TREATIES: THE UNITED STATES FAVORS A PEACE TREATY

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BETWEEN ISRAEL AND EACH OF HER NEIGHBORS. HOWEVER, A PEACE TREATY ACHIEVED BY FORCE, THREAT OF FORCE OR AS A PRECONDITION FOR ANYTHING ELSE, DOES NOT PRODUCE REAL PEACE. PEACE TREATIES CANNOT HAVE TRUE MEANING OR LASTING EFFECT WITHOUT THE FULL AND VOLUNTARY AGREEMENT OF ALL PARTIES TO THE TREATY. THEREFORE, THE UNITED STATES DOES NOT FAVOR AN "IMPOSED" PEACE TREATY.

--THE UNITED STATES NOTES THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF LEBANON SEEKS FROM ITS NEGOTIATIONS WITH ISRAEL SUITABLE ARRANGEMENTS WHICH WILL FORESTALL AND PREVENT ANY REASON FOR FUTURE MILITARY INTERVENTION FROM WHATEVER QUARTER, AND THAT LEBANON SEEKS ASSURANCES OF NON-INTERFERENCE IN LEBANESE INTERNAL AFFAIRS.

--THE UNITED STATES SUPPORTS THE GOVERNMENT OF LEBANON IN ITS DETERMINATION TO RESTORE TO LEBANON FULL INDEPENDENCE FREE OF THE PRESENCE, DOMINATION OR UNDUE INFLUENCE OF OUTSIDE FORCES. DAM

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JERUSALEM FOR HABIB

FROM DRAPER

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, MOPS, MARR, LE, US, IS, XF

SUBJECT: DRAPER MISSION: MUTUAL RELATIONS AND SECURITY

SUBCOMMITTEE MEETINGS, FEBRUARY 8

PAGE 02 BEIRUT 01456 01 OF 03 091030Z

1. [REDACTED]

2. SUMMARY: IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE ANNOUNCEMENT CONCERNING THE REPORT OF THE COMMISSION OF INQUIRY, VERY LITTLE WAS ACCOMPLISHED FEBRUARY 8. THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON MUTUAL RELATIONS DID PUT THE FINISHING TOUCHES ON AN AGREED TEXT ON THE LIAISON OFFICES; AND THE ISRAELIS PRESENTED THREE NEW DRAFT

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TEXTS ("COORDINATION OF FLIGHTS OVER THE SECURITY ZONE"; "CIVIL GUARD IN THE SECURITY ZONE"; "THE LOCAL FORCES") IN THE SECURITY SUBCOMMITTEE. THE NEXT MEETING IS SCHEDULED FOR THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 10 IN KIRYAT SHEMONA. END SUMMARY.

3. THE MUTUAL RELATIONS AND SECURITY SUBCOMMITTEES MET BEGINNING AT 1030 FEBRUARY 8, IN KHALDAH. BY THEN, THE RESULTS OF THE COMMISSION OF INQUIRY WERE KNOWN, AND BOTH DELEGATIONS WERE DISTRACTED FROM THE SUBSTANTIVE NEGOTIATIONS. AS A RESULT, THE SUBCOMMITTEES EACH MET FOR ABOUT ONE AND A HALF HOURS AND THE ISRAELI DELEGATION DEPARTED EARLY.

4. MUTUAL RELATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE. THE DELEGATIONS PUT THE FINISHING TOUCHES ON THE LAST PARAGRAPH CONCERNING LIAISON, WHICH NOW READS: "ALL MATTERS RELATING TO THESE LIAISON OFFICES AND THEIR STAFFS ARE THE OBJECT OF AN ARRANGEMENT, PROVIDED FOR IN ANNEX ---." (OTHER PARAGRAPHS OF THIS ARTICLE CONTAINED IN BEIRUT 1445.)

5. THEREAFTER, THERE WAS A BRIEF DISCUSSION OF PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES IN WHICH THE LEBANESE

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CONFIRMED THAT, IN THEIR VIEW, THE ISRAELI LIAISON OFFICE AND STAFF SHOULD FUNCTION ON THE BASIS OF CONSULAR IMMUNITIES. THE ISRAELIS OBJECTED STRONGLY TO THIS APPROACH, ALTHOUGH THEY AGREED TO RECEIVE AND STUDY THE LEBANESE DRAFT. KIMCHE ALSO EXPRESSED SURPRISE THAT THE LEBANESE WANTED TO HAVE A DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES IN AN ANNEX TO THE AGREEMENT, SAYING HE THOUGHT THE LEBANESE WOULD HAVE PREFERRED AN ABBREVIATED TEXT FOR COSMETIC REASONS.

6. KIMCHE ASKED KHARMA IF HE HAD ANY NEW INSTRUCTIONS CONCERNING THE MOVEMENT OF GOODS. KHARMA SAID THAT HE DID NOT, ALTHOUGH HE HOPED TO BE IN A POSITION TO PUT FORWARD A DRAFT TEXT SOON AFTER DISCUSSION WITH HIS GOVERNMENT. KHARMA DID CONFIRM THAT LEBANON ACCEPTED ISRAEL'S SUGGESTION FOR AN INFORMAL, UNOFFICIAL MEETING OF EXPERTS TO DISCUSS POLICE MATTERS (NARCOTICS, SMUGGLING AND CRIME) AND SAID HE THOUGHT THE LEBANESE EXPERTS WOULD BE READY IN ABOUT TEN DAYS. KIMCHE ASKED FOR AN EARLIER TIMETABLE ON THIS MEETING, AS WELL AS FOR THE OTHER MEETINGS OF EXPERTS.

7. KIMCHE ASKED KHARMA IF HE HAD ANY INSTRUCTIONS CONCERNING THE MOVEMENT OF PERSONS, RE-EMPHASIZING

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ISRAEL'S OPPOSITION TO ANY PROPOSAL WHICH WOULD CATEGORIZE THE TYPES OF PERSONS (E.G., PILGRIMS) WHO WOULD BE ENTITLED TO CROSS THE BORDER. KIMCHE SAID ISRAEL WANTED MOVEMENT TO OCCUR ON THE BASIS OF THE PRINCIPLE THAT ISRAELIS COULD TRAVEL TO LEBANON WITHOUT DISTINCTION (ALTHOUGH SUBJECT TO VISA AND OTHER REQUIREMENTS). KHARMA SAID THAT HE DID NOT HAVE ANY

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INSTRUCTIONS ON THE SUBJECT. KIMCHE URGED KHARMA TO TAKE THE MATTER UP WITH HIS GOVERNMENT, SAYING THAT THE MOVEMENT OF PERSONS WAS EVEN MORE IMPORTANT TO ISRAEL THAN THE MOVEMENT OF GOODS.

8. SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS/WITHDRAWALS SUBCOMMITTEE. BR. GEN. EINAN, WHO HEADED THE ISRAELI DELEGATION IN THE ABSENCE OF GEN. TAMIR, BEGAN THIS MORNING'S

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SESSION BY PRESENTING A CONCEPT PAPER ON THE COORDINATION OF FLIGHTS OVER THE SECURITY ZONE. THE PAPER INCLUDED THE FOLLOWING POINTS:

-- THREE HOURS NOTICE WILL BE GIVEN TO THE ISRAELIS FOR ALL LEBANESE CIVIL OR MILITARY FLIGHTS OVER THE SECURITY ZONE.

-- INFORMATION REGARDING EACH FLIGHT WILL BE TRANSMITTED TO ISRAELI AIR DEFENSE BY A LEBANESE AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL CENTER THROUGH A TELEX WHICH WILL LINK THE TWO. A DIRECT TELEPHONE LINK WILL ALSO BE ESTABLISHED BETWEEN THE TWO CENTERS.

-- NO FLIGHTS WILL BE MADE WITHIN FIVE MILES OF THE ISRAELI BORDER.

EINAN EMPHASIZED THAT THE ISRAELIS WOULD NOT APPROVE OR DISAPPROVE OF FLIGHTS --- THEY SIMPLY WANTED TO KNOW WHEN AND WHERE THE FLIGHTS WERE TO OCCUR. HE ADDED THAT THE THREE-HOUR LIMIT WOULD, OF COURSE, BE FLEXIBLE. IN AN EMERGENCY, NOTIFICATION JUST PRIOR TO OR EVEN DURING THE FLIGHT WOULD BE SUFFICIENT.

9. GEN. HAMDAN HAD NO ARGUMENT WITH THE PRINCIPLE OF PRIOR NOTIFICATION, ONLY WITH THE MECHANISM BY WHICH IT IS TO BE ACCOMPLISHED. HE SAID THE GOL OPPOSED THE ESTABLISHMENT OF DIRECT COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN LEBANESE AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLERS AND ISRAELI CONTROLLERS. HE PROPOSED THAT ALL NOTIFICATION BE GIVEN IN THE MILITARY COMMISSION, AND THAT, IF NECESSARY, ADDITIONAL OFFICERS BE ADDED TO THE COMMISSION TO ACCOMPLISH THIS TASK. HAMDAN ALSO SAID

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THAT HE OPPOSED THE RESTRICTION AGAINST FLIGHTS WITHIN FIVE MILES OF THE BORDER. THE GOL WILL GIVE PRIOR NOTIFICATION, HE SAID, BUT WILL FLY TO ANY POINT ON LEBANESE TERRITORY ONCE THAT NOTIFICATION HAS BEEN GIVEN. GEN. COOLEY QUESTIONED EINAN ON THE NEED FOR PRIOR NOTIFICATION SINCE IT MAKES LITTLE MILITARY SENSE, GIVEN ISRAELI EARLY WARNING CAPABILITIES. EINAN RESPONDED WITH FAMILIAR ARGUMENTS ON THE NEED FOR ISRAEL TO BE ABSOLUTELY CERTAIN OF WHETHER FLIGHTS APPROACHING HER TERRITORY WERE FRIENDLY OR HOSTILE. ISRAEL, HE SAID, COULD NOT AFFORD TO BE UNCERTAIN.

10. EINAN HAD NO STRONG OBJECTION TO THE IDEA OF NOTIFICATION THROUGH THE MILITARY COMMISSION, BUT SAID THAT THIS MIGHT REQUIRE NOTIFICATION 24 HOURS IN ADVANCE, INSTEAD OF THREE HOURS. HAMDAN REPLIED THAT THIS MUCH NOTICE WAS NOT NECESSARY: WITH THE PROPER RELAY BETWEEN THE MILITARY COMMISSION AND ISRAELI CONTROLLERS, THE NOTIFICATION COULD BE ACCOMPLISHED WITHOUT DELAY. EINAN WAS NOT INSISTENT REGARDING THE FIVE-MILE NO-ENTRY ZONE. THE LEBANESE, HE SAID, SHOULD UNDERSTAND THAT THIS IS A VERY SENSITIVE AREA FOR ISRAEL.

11. EINAN THEN TURNED TO THE QUESTION OF THE STATUS

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OF LOCAL FORCES AND CIVIL GUARDS IN THE SECURITY ZONE.
HE OFFERED THE FOLLOWING DRAFT LANGUAGE:

"THE LOCAL ARMED FORCES PRESENT IN THE SECURITY REGION
AT THE TIME OF ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THE AGREEMENT,
SHALL BE ENLISTED TO THE LEBANESE ARMY AND SERVE IN
THE UNITS OF THE LEBANESE ARMY STATIONED IN THE
SECURITY REGION. THE LOCAL CIVIL GUARD FUNCTIONING

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IN THE SECURITY REGION AT THE TIME OF ENFRY INTO
FORCE OF THE AGREEMENT, SHALL BE INTEGRATED INTO
SOME KIND OF A NATIONAL MILITARY STRUCTURE THAT WILL
BE ONE OF THE ELEMENTS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE SECURITY
OF THE REGION."

AN ACCOMPANYING EXPLANATORY DOCUMENT OUTLINED THE
STRUCTURE AND ROLE OF THE CIVIL GUARD BEING ESTABLISHED
BY ISRAEL IN THE SOUTH SO THAT ALL PARTIES WOULD
CLEARLY UNDERSTAND WHAT THE ISRAELIS MEAN BY CIVIL
GUARD.

12. HAMDAN'S RESPONSE WAS SIMPLE AND CLEAR: THE

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LEBANESE APPRECIATED THE ISRAELI SUGGESTIONS, BUT IT WOULD BE ENTIRELY UP TO THE LEBANESE TO DECIDE WHAT WOULD BE DONE WITH THE HADDAD BRIGADE AND THE CIVIL GUARD. HE DID PROMISE THAT THE HADDAD FORCES WOULD BE INTEGRATED INTO THE NATIONAL MILITARY STRUCTURE, BUT HE WOULD MAKE NO PROMISE REGARDING THEIR ULTIMATE DISPOSITION OR STRUCTURE. HE SAID MUCH THE SAME REGARDING THE CIVIL GUARD: THE MATTER IS A LEBANESE AFFAIR. LEBANON WILL PROMISE TO SECURE ISRAEL'S NORTHERN BORDER, BUT IT WILL NOT PROMISE EXACTLY HOW IT WILL DO IT. HAMDAN SUGGESTED THAT A LARGE NUMBER OF HADDAD'S MEN AND THE CIVIL GUARDS WERE COMMON CRIMINALS WHO COULD NOT BE DEPENDED UPON. GEN. COOLEY COMMENTED THAT THE U.S. WOULD NOT LIKE TO SEE THE LEBANESE ABILITY TO SECURE THE SOUTHERN ZONE HINDERED BY A REQUIREMENT TO USE FORCES WHICH MAY INCLUDE A SUBSTANTIAL CRIMINAL ELEMENT. HE STRESSED THE NEED FOR THE GOL TO EXERT COMPLETE AUTHORITY IN THE AREA; THE ISRAELI PROPOSAL MIGHT CREATE A PROBLEM OF DUAL LOYALTY AMONG THE FORCES IN THE ZONE.

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EINAN DEFENDED THE USEFULNESS OF THESE FORCES, AND THE QUESTION WAS LEFT OPEN AS THE DAY'S SESSION ENDED. IT WAS AGREED THAT THE LEBANESE WOULD TRY TO HAVE DETAILED COUNTER-PROPOSALS READY FOR THE THURSDAY SESSION IN KIRYAT SHEMONA. DILLON

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FROM DRAPER

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: SHUM, SREF, PINT, PINS, LE, IS, XF

SUBJECT: HABIB/DRAPER MISSION: PHALANGE AND THE
MIYAH-MIYAH REFUGEE CAMP

REFS: STATE 37970, BEIRUT 1524

1.

2. RECOGNIZING THAT DCM FLATEN HAD ALREADY TAKEN
UP THE MATTER WITH THE FOREIGN MINISTRY, I NONETHELESS
SEIZED THE OPPORTUNITY TODAY, FEBRUARY 10, TO ALERT

PAGE 02

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MFA DIRECTOR GENERAL DAVID KIMCHE DURING THE
ISRAEL-LEBANON NEGOTIATIONS TO THE POTENTIAL PROBLEM
OF PHALANGE PERSONNEL IN THE CAMP AT MIYAH-MIYAH.
KIMCHE SAID HE WAS AWARE OF REPORTS OF INTIMIDATION
OF PALESTINIANS IN SOUTHERN LEBANON, BUT HE HAD
NO SPECIFIC INFORMATION ON THE MIYAH-MIYAH CAMP.
HE CALLED OVER GENERAL MENAHEM EINAN AND ASKED
HIM TO LOOK INTO THE PROBLEM IMMEDIATELY.
KIMCHE AGREED COMPLETELY THAT ALL STEPS HAD TO BE

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TAKEN TO FORESTALL ANY INVOLVEMENT OF THE PHALANGE
IN PALESTINIAN CAMPS. (PARTICULARLY NOW, HE
ADDED, WHILE THE INQUIRY COMMISSION'S REPORT IS SO
VIVID.)

3. THIS CONVERSATION TOOK PLACE AT 1045 A.M. LOCAL
IN KIRYAT SHMONA.
LEWIS

[REDACTED]

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JERUSALEM PASS HABIB

FROM DRAPER

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, MOPS, MARR, LE, US, IS, XF

SUBJECT: DRAPER MISSION: MEETING OF THE SECURITY
ARRANGEMENTS/WITHDRAWALS SUBCOMMITTEE AT KHALDAH,

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FEBRUARY 7

1. [REDACTED]

2. SUMMARY: THE MEETING OF THE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS/
WITHDRAWALS SUBCOMMITTEE AT KHALDAH ON FEBRUARY 7
CENTERED ON A SEARCH FOR FLEXIBILITY IN POSITIONS ON
THE TEN ISSUES SUMMARIZED AT NATANYA ON FEBRUARY 3.
IT WAS AGREED THAT THREE OF THESE ISSUES -- UNIFIL,**UNCLASSIFIED**

UNTSO, AND THE "ANTI-TERRORIST" STATIONS -- WERE TOO CONTENTIOUS FOR THE SUBCOMMITTEE TO HANDLE, AND THEY WERE THEREFORE AT THIS TIME SET ASIDE TO BE ADDRESSED BY HIGHER AUTHORITIES. THERE WERE INDICATIONS OF FLEXIBILITY BY THE ISRAELIS ON THE REMAINING SEVEN ISSUES -- MILITARY COMMISSION, INTELLIGENCE EXCHANGE, ISRAELI AERIAL SURVEILLANCE, ISRAELI NAVAL PATROLS, FOREIGN FORCES, ANTI-AIRCRAFT MISSILES, AND ELECTRONIC MEASURES -- THOUGH THE ISRAELI SIDE INDICATED THE DEGREE OF ITS FLEXIBILITY WOULD HINGE ON CHANGES IN THE LEBANESE POSITIONS ON THE THREE KEY ISSUES. THE ISRAELIS TABLED "CONCEPT PAPERS" TO GUIDE DISCUSSION ON THE MILITARY COMMISSION, ANTI-AIRCRAFT MISSILES, AND ELECTRONIC MEASURES. THE LEBANESE PRESENTED ALTERNATIVE WORDING ON FOREIGN FORCES IN RESPONSE TO THE ISRAELI FORMULATION READ AT NATANYA ON FEBRUARY 3. RENEWED DISCUSSION OF THE NORTHERN LIMIT OF THE 45 KM ZONE FOLLOWED, WITH NEITHER SIDE EVIDENCING FLEXIBILITY ON THIS ISSUE. THE SESSION ENDED WITH CLEAR DISAGREEMENT OVER THE NORTHERN LIMIT. ISRAEL ADAMANTLY REQUIRES 45 KM; LEBANON IS WILLING TO ACCEDE ONLY TO THE AWWALI RIVER LINE. ISRAEL HAS DEFERRED FURTHER DISCUSSION ON FORCES AND WEAPONS WITHIN THE SECURITY ZONE UNTIL AGREEMENT IS REACHED ON

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THE SIZE OF THE ZONE. DISCUSSIONS WILL RESUME FEBRUARY 8 IN KHALDAH. END SUMMARY.

3. GENERAL HAMDAN OPENED THE SESSION BY SUGGESTING THAT THREE ISSUES WHICH WERE DISCUSSED ON FEBRUARY 3 AT NATANYA -- UNIFIL, UNTSO, AND THE "ANTI-TERRORIST" STATIONS -- BE SET ASIDE, COMMENTING THAT HE DID NOT HAVE THE AUTHORITY TO BUDGE ON THESE ISSUES. HE PROPOSED WE REVIEW THE REMAINING SEVEN ISSUES TO SEE IF ANY CHANGE IN POSITIONS HAD OCCURRED AND THEN ADDRESS THE MECHANISM OF THE ISRAELI WITHDRAWALS FROM LEBANON. GEN. TAMIR AGREED, AND GEN. HAMDAN PROCEEDED, FOLLOWING THE SAME ORDER AS FEBRUARY 3.

A. MILITARY COMMISSION: THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN LEBANON'S DESIRE FOR A TRIPARTITE COMMISSION AND ISRAEL'S FOR A BIPARTITE COMMISSION WAS REVIEWED WITHOUT RESOLUTION. THE LEBANESE AGREED TO HAVE JOINT SUPERVISORY TEAMS UNDER THE COMMISSION. BOTH SIDES ENVISION THE MILITARY COMMISSION WORKING UNDER THE OVERALL LIAISON COMMITTEE, AS WAS DISCUSSED IN THE MUTUAL RELATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE SESSIONS. THE ISRAELIS PRESENTED A PAPER TO GUIDE DRAFTING OF THE TEXT ON THE MILITARY COMMISSION, AND THE LEBANESE STATED THEY WOULD HAVE TO STUDY IT. GEN. HAMDAN STATED THEY WOULD

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LIKE TO INCLUDE THE INTELLIGENCE EXCHANGE EFFORT
(ANOTHER ISSUE AGREED TO IN PRINCIPLE FEBRUARY 3)
WITHIN THIS COMMISSION.
B. AERIAL SURVEILLANCE: THE TWO SIDES APPEAR TO BE

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VERY CLOSE TO AGREEMENT ON THIS ISSUE, BUT HAVE NOT YET DETERMINED HOW TO ADDRESS IT IN WRITING. THE LEBANESE ARE QUITE LEERY OF A SECRET SIDE LETTER IN WHICH THEY WOULD AGREE NOT TO CONSIDER OVERFLIGHTS A MATERIAL VIOLATION OF THE AGREEMENT. THEY WOULD PREFER TO AGREE VERBALLY THAT THEY WOULD NOT COMPLAIN ABOUT SUCH OVERFLIGHTS. THEY PUSHED FOR ADVANCE NOTIFICATION OF FLIGHTS OR AGREEMENT ON FLIGHTS WITHIN

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AGREED PARAMETERS OF ALTITUDE, TIME, AND PATTERN. THE ISRAELIS FLATLY REJECTED THIS PROPOSAL AS A THREAT TO THE SECURITY OF THEIR PLANES/PILOTS. DISCUSSION ENDED WITH AN ISRAELI SUGGESTION TO REFER THE QUESTION OF HOW TO WRITE A TEXT TO AN INFORMAL MEETING OF PERHAPS ONE REPRESENTATIVE FROM EACH SIDE. (SUCH A MEETING DID NOT TAKE PLACE FEBRUARY 7, HOWEVER.)

C. NAVAL PATROLS: IN A CLEAR CHANGE OF POSITION, GEN. EINAN PROPOSED (AS HIS OWN CONCEPT, HE SAID) THAT ISRAEL "ALLOW" LEBANON TO PATROL ITS OWN TERRITORIAL WATERS. IF AN ISRAELI VESSEL OUTSIDE THE TERRITORIAL WATER OFF LEBANON TRACKED A SUSPECTED TERRORIST/INFILTRATOR, IT WOULD NOTIFY THE LEBANESE NAVY AND WORK WITH IT TO APPREHEND THE TARGET. COL. ROHAYEM REVIEWED STEPS LEBANON PLANS TO TAKE TO SECURE ITS COAST, INCLUDING FORBIDDEN WATERS, INCREASED PATROLS, INTELLIGENCE NETS, COASTAL AND SEABORNE RADARS, AND COMMENTED THAT COORDINATION BETWEEN NAVIES POSED NO REAL PROBLEMS. GEN. COOLEY COMMENTED THAT THIS IS AN EXCELLENT AREA FOR CLOSE COORDINATION AND COOPERATION BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES TO KEEP WERRORISTS/INFILTRATORS FROM USING LEBANON'S WATERS.

D. FOREIGN FORCES: THERE IS ALMOST COMPLETE AGREEMENT ON THIS ISSUE AS WELL, THOUGH THE LEBANESE OFFERED AN ALTERNATIVE TO THE WORDING PROPOSED BY ISRAEL ON FEBRUARY 3. LEBANON'S SUGGESTION: "LEBANON WILL NOT AUTHORIZE ANY FOREIGN TROOPS IN A MANNER THAT MAY CONSTITUTE A THREAT AGAINST ISRAEL (SIC)." ISRAEL SAID THIS WORDING WAS TOO VAGUE, SINCE IT CREATED A SUBJECTIVE, NOT OBJECTIVE, TEST ON WHAT CONSTITUTES A THREAT. BOTH SIDES AGREED TO SEEK

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WORDING THAT WILL PROHIBIT INTRODUCTION OF FOREIGN COMBAT FORCES OR PREPOSITIONED EQUIPMENT WITHOUT PRECLUDING LEBANON FROM OBTAINING REQUIRED TRAINING ASSISTANCE.

E. ANTI-AIRCRAFT MISSILES: ISRAEL PRESENTED A "CONCEPT PAPER" FOR DISCUSSION. TEXT OF THE PAPER FOLLOWS:

"SURFACE-TO-AIR MISSILES AND ANTI-AIRCRAFT ARTILLERY."

"1. IN THE SECURITY REGION THERE WILL BE NO SURFACE-TO-AIR MISSILES OR ROCKET LAUNCHERS OF ANY TYPE, AND NO RADAR-GUIDED ANTI-AIRCRAFT GUN OF A CALIBRE LARGER THAN 20MM, AND PROVIDED THAT THE NUMBER OF THOSE ANTI-AIRCRAFT GUNS PERMITTED IN THE REGION SHALL NOT EXCEED 12 (COMMENT: CHANGED DURING THE SESSION FROM 6) PIECES FOR EACH BRIGADE."

"2. IN THE AREA NORTH OF THE SECURITY REGION, THERE WILL BE NO SURFACE-TO-AIR MISSILES OF ANY TYPE, EXCLUDING PERSONAL MISSILES." THE LEBANESE REACTED NEGATIVELY, AS EXPECTED, TO SUCH NEGATIVE WORDING AND TO THE EXCLUSION OF SURFACE-TO-AIR, EXCEPT SHOULDER-FIRED MAN-PORTABLE ("PERSONAL"), MISSILES FROM ALL OF LEBANON. GEN. HAMDAN RESTATED HIS PREVIOUS POSITION THAT, SINCE LEBANON IS NOT PLANNING TO BUY ANY AIR DEFENSE MISSILES IN THE NEXT THREE

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YEARS, THERE IS NO NEED TO INCLUDE THIS LIMITATION
IN THE AGREEMENT. AS A COMPROMISE, GEN. HAMDAN
SUGGESTED ADDING A THREE-YEAR PERIOD TO THE SECOND
PARAGRAPH AND LIMITING ONLY HIGH ALTITUDE AIR
DEFENSE MISSILES. GEN. EINAN COULD NOT AGREE ON
ACCEPTING A LIMIT ON HIGH ALTITUDE MISSI
LES BUT
APPEARED FAVORABLE TO THE TIME LIMIT. THE LEBANESE
AGREED TO BRING THE LIST OF EQUIPMENT ORGANIC TO AN LAF

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BRIGADE FOR DISCUSSION ON FEBRUARY 8.

F. ELECTRONIC MEASURES: AGAIN, ISRAEL PRESENTED A
"CONCEPT PAPER" TO GUIDE DISCUSSION OF THIS ISSUE.
THE TEXT FOLLOWS:

"NO ELECTRONIC WARFARE INSTALLATIONS OR EQUIPMENT OR
ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE INSTALLATIONS OR EQUIPMENT OF
ANY TYPE, AND NO RADAR OF ANY TYPE EXCLUDING RADAR
CAPABLE OF DETECTING PERSONS AT A RANGE NOT EXCEEDING
10 KM AND VEHICLES AT A RANGE NOT EXCEEDING 20 KM,
SHALL BE MAINTAINED OR ESTABLISHED IN, INTRODUCED INTO,
STOCKED IN OR TRANSPORTED THROUGH THE SECURITY REGION.

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SUCH RADARS THAT ARE PERMITTED IN THE REGION SHALL NOT BE MAINTAINED OR ESTABLISHED IN, INTRODUCED INTO, STOCKED IN OR TRANSPORTED THROUGH A STRIP EXTENDING 10 KM FROM THE LEBANESE-ISRAELI BOUNDARY." GEN. HAMDAN REJECTED THE NEGATIVE TONE OF THE PAPER, PREFERRING TO LIST THE ITEMS PERMITTED, WHICH HE SAID THE LEBANESE WOULD BE PREPARED TO PRESENT ON FEBRUARY 8. IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION ABOUT COASTAL RADARS, GEN. EINAN RESPONDED THAT THEY WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE, "JUST DON'T MENTION THEM." GEN. HAMDAN CONTINUED HIS TACK, STATING THAT HE DOES NOT WANT TO EXCLUDE THE POSSIBILITY OF INTRODUCING INTO THE SECURITY REGION, AT SOME UNSPECIFIED FUTURE TIME, AN ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE DEVICE WHICH WOULD SIGNIFICANTLY ENHANCE THE ACCOMPLISHMENT OF THE ANTI-TERRORIST MISSION. HE SUGGESTED A GENERAL CLAUSE THAT WOULD PERMIT THE MILITARY COMMISSION TO RULE ON THE INTRODUCTION OF ADDITIONAL EQUIPMENT. THE ISRAELIS DID NOT SPECIFICALLY REPLY TO THIS SUGGESTION.

4. IN A SURPRISE MOVE, GEN. HAMDAN FOLLOWED THE

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RATHER POSITIVE DISCUSSION OF THESE ISSUES BY REOPENING THE ISSUE OF THE NORTHERN LIMIT OF THE SECURITY ZONE. HE NOTED THAT LEBANON COULD NOT AGREE TO ISRAEL'S DEMAND FOR A 45 KM ZONE AND REITERATED THE LEBANESE PROPOSAL THAT THE AWWALI RIVER LINE BE THE NORTHERN BOUNDARY. HE ALSO RESTATED LEBANON'S DESIRE TO HAVE THREE BRIGADES IN THE SECURITY ZONE, WITH FLEXIBILITY TO BRING IN ADDITIONAL FORCES FOR TRAINING OR OPERATIONAL NECESSITY. THIS ALLOWED GEN. TAMIR TO REPEAT HIS MONOLOGUE THAT A SECURITY ZONE OF LESS THAN 45 KM WAS UNACCEPTABLE TO ISRAEL. HE CONTINUED THAT IT WOULD NOT BE WORTHWHILE TO GO INTO DETAILS ON FORCE RESTRICTIONS AND WEAPONS LIMITATIONS IN PORTIONS OF THE ZONE IF THERE IS NO AGREEMENT ON THE SIZE OF THE ZONE. HE INDICATED THAT ISRAEL MIGHT BE EXTREMELY FLEXIBLE ON THE FORCES ALLOWED NORTH OF THE AWWALI RIVER AND SOMEWHAT FLEXIBLE ON THOSE ALLOWED SOUTH OF THE AWWALI IF LEBANON COULD AGREE ON 45 KM. GEN. HAMDAN SAID THE AWWALI RIVER LINE WAS THE FIRM POSITION OF HIS GOVERNMENT AND THAT HE HAD HOPED TO CONVINCE GEN. TAMIR. GEN. EINAN JOINED TAMIR IN EMPHASIZING THAT THE EARLIER ISRAELI FLEXIBILITY ON OTHER ISSUES WAS AND IS DEPENDENT ON CHANGES IN LEBANESE POSITIONS.

5. COMMENT: THE SESSION, THOUGH IT ENDED IN CLEAR DISAGREEMENT OVER THE 45 KM ISSUE, WAS GOING WELL UNTIL HAMDAN REOPENED THIS THORNY PROBLEM. WHILE SPECIFIC AGREEMENT WAS NOT REACHED, ESPECIALLY ON THE

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MORE DIFFICULT ISSUES, THERE WERE POSITIVE INDICATIONS
OF FLEXIBILITY ON THE ISRAELI SIDE. DILLON

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USINFO FOR P/PPN, VOA NEWS/CA, NEA, P/RC, R/P, P/FW

AMCONSUL JERUSALEM FOR AMBASSADORS HABIB AND DRAPER

E.O. 12356:N/A

SUBJECT: ISRAEL-LEBANON-U.S. NEGOTIATIONS

1. FOLLOWING IS A JOINT COMMUNIQUE READ BY U.S. EMBASSY
PRESS ATTACHE/IO ARTHUR BERGER AT THE END OF TALKS,
KIRYAT SHEMONA, FEBRUARY 10, 1983:
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TODAY, FOLLOWING A MEETING OF THE PLENARY, THE SUB-
COMMITTEES ON MUTUAL RELATIONS, MILITARY ISSUES,
AND THE TERMINATION OF THE STATE OF WAR, MET.

THE DELEGATIONS WORKED INTENSIVELY AND CONSTRUCTIVELY
TO INCREASE UNDERSTANDING AND AGREEMENT. THEY
EXAMINED DRAFT TEXTS ON SEVERAL OF THE ISSUES, AND
DIFFERENCES IN THE TEXTS WERE NARROWED.

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AMONG THE SUBJECTS DISCUSSED WERE MATTERS PERTAINING TO
MUTUAL RELATIONS, THE TEXT OF THE PREAMBLE TO THE
AGREEMENT, SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS, AND A PROGRAM OF
FUTURE WITHDRAWALS.

THE NEXT PLENARY WILL BE HELD ON MONDAY, FEBRUARY 14
IN KHALDE.

THANK YOU.
END TEXT.
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*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a
*** Current Classification *** UNCLASSIFIED

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JERUSALEM PASS HABIB

FROM DRAPER

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, MOPS, MARR, LE, US, IS, XF

SUBJECT: DRAPER MISSION: SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE

-- TERMINATION OF THE STATE OF WAR, FEB. 7

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REF: BEIRUT 1135 ✓

1. [REDACTED]

2. SUMMARY: LEBANESE PRESENTED THEIR COUNTERPROPOSALS
TO ISRAELI SUGGESTIONS CONCERNING A PREAMBLE, MUTUAL
RECOGNITION, ABROGATION OF PRIOR INCONSISTENT UNDER-
TAKINGS, PREVENTION OF TERRORISM AND TERRORIST
ORGANIZATIONS, STATIONING OF FOREIGN FORCES, ANDPage 1
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ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THE AGREEMENT. THE LEBANESE AND ISRAELIS AGREE ON THE SUBSTANCE OF MOST OF THESE ISSUES, BUT THERE IS A SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCE IN DRAFTING ON SEVERAL ITEMS, DERIVING FROM DIFFERING PERSPECTIVES ON HOW MUCH "POLITICAL" LANGUAGE TO INCLUDE IN THE TEXT. THE TWO DELEGATIONS HAVE AGREED THAT EACH WILL PREPARE NEW DRAFT TEXTS, DRAWING ON THEIR RESPECTIVE COMMENTS. END SUMMARY.

3. THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE TERMINATION OF THE STATE OF WAR MET FEB. 7 TO RECEIVE THE LEBANESE COUNTER-PROPOSALS ON THIS SUBJECT. PARTICIPANTS WERE FATTAL, RUBINSTEIN, AND KRECZKO.

4. WITHOUT ACCEPTING THE PRECISE WORDING OF THE ISRAELI DRAFT (REFTEL, PARA 5), FATTAL ACCEPTED THAT NEITHER ISRAEL NOR LEBANON WILL ALLOW IN ITS TERRITORY THE STATIONING OF FORCES FROM COUNTRIES WHICH DO NOT HAVE DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH THE OTHER OR FROM EGYPT. (FATTAL TOLD RUBINSTEIN THAT HE HOPED ISRAEL WOULD HAVE MORE FAITH IN LEBANON AFTER THIS AGREEMENT THAN IT HAD IN EGYPT AFTER A PEACE TREATY). WITHOUT BEING ASKED, FATTAL SAID IT WAS HIS "PERSONAL VIEW" THAT IT WAS INCONSISTENT FOR LEBANON TO TERMINATE THE STATE OF WAR

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WITH ISRAEL AND TO REMAIN A MEMBER OF A DEFENSE PACT WITH NATIONS WHICH CONSIDERED THEMSELVES AT WAR WITH ISRAEL. FATTAL SAID HE PERSONALLY BELIEVED THAT LEBANON WOULD WITHDRAW FROM THE ARAB DEFENSE PACT. (COMMENT: THIS IS THE FIRST TIME WE HAVE HEARD THE LEBANESE EXPRESS THIS POSITION.)

5. CONCERNING A GENERAL COMMITMENT TO PREVENT TERRORIST ACTS AND TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS (REFTEL, PARA 6), FATTAL HAD ONLY MINOR COMMENTS ON THE FIRST TWO SENTENCES OF THE ISRAELI PROPOSAL, WHICH READ:

"THE TERRITORY OF EACH PARTY WILL NEVER BE USED AS A BASE FOR HOSTILE OR TERRORIST ACTIVITY AGAINST THE OTHER PARTY, ITS TERRITORY AND PEOPLE ANYWHERE. TO THIS END, THE PARTIES RECIPROCALLY UNDERTAKE TO PROHIBIT AND TO PREVENT THE EXISTENCE, ORGANIZATION, SETTING UP, OR FUNCTIONING WITHIN THEIR RESPECTIVE TERRITORY, OF ANY GROUP, ORGANIZATION, ARMED BANDS, MERCENARIES OR INDIVIDUALS, OR OF ANY RELATED BASE, OFFICE OR INFRASTRUCTURE, AIMED AT THREATENING OR ENDANGERING THE SECURITY OF THE OTHER PARTY OR THE WELFARE AND SAFETY OF ITS POPULATION."

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WITH RESPECT TO THIRD SENTENCE OF THE ISRAELI PROPOSAL, WHICH PROVIDES FOR THE ABROGATION OF THE CAIRO AND MELKART ACCORDS, FATTAL SUGGESTED THAT ALL PRIOR INCONSISTENT UNDERTAKINGS BE HANDLED IN A SINGLE PARAGRAPH (SEE PARA 8, BELOW). FATTAL DID NOT OBJECT TO THE ISRAELI-PROPOSED LANGUAGE FOR THE PREVENTION OF ACTS OF BELLIGERENCY AND SUBVERSION (REFTEL, PARA 6) OR FOR THE PROSECUTION OF INDIVIDUALS WHO VIOLATE

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THE AGREEMENT (REFTEL, PARA 6). RUBINSTEIN AGAIN BROUGHT UP THE IDEA OF AN EXTRADITION AGREEMENT, BUT FATTAL SAID THE CONCLUSION OF SUCH AN AGREEMENT SHOULD BE LEFT FOR A LATER STAGE IN ISRAEL/LEBANON RELATIONS.

6. REGARDING THE ISRAELI PROPOSALS FOR MUTUAL RECOGNITION, GOOD NEIGHBORLY RELATIONS, AND THE NON-USE OF FORCE (REFTEL, PARAS 7 AND 9), FATTAL PROPOSED THE FOLLOWING LANGUAGE:

"THE TWO PARTIES AGREE, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE UN CHARTER, TO SETTLE THEIR DISPUTES THROUGH PEACEFUL MEANS AND IN SUCH A MANNER AS NOT TO ENDANGER INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY AND JUSTICE, AND TO REFRAIN IN THEIR MUTUAL RELATIONS FROM THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE IN ANY MANNER INCOMPATIBLE WITH THE AIMS OF THE UNITED NATIONS.

"EACH PARTY UNDERTAKES NOT TO VIOLATE THE EXISTING INTERNATIONAL FRONTIER BETWEEN THE TWO STATES AND TO RESPECT THE SOVEREIGNTY, TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY AND POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE OF THE OTHER.

RUBINSTEIN'S MAIN DIFFICULTY WITH THE LEBANESE PROPOSAL WAS ITS FAILURE TO PROVIDE FOR EXPLICIT RECOGNITION OF ISRAEL. FATTAL RESPONDED THAT AN UNDERTAKING TO RESPECT THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY, SOVEREIGNTY AND POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE OF ISRAEL CONSTITUTED EXPLICIT RECOGNITION.

7. LEBANON COUNTERPROPOSED THE FOLLOWING PREAMBLE (ISRAELI TEXT, REFTEL, PARA 8):

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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"LEBANON AND ISRAEL,

"REAFFIRMING THEIR FAITH IN THE AIMS AND PRINCIPLES OF THE UN CHARTER AND THEIR DESIRE TO LIVE IN PEACE WITH ALL PEOPLE AND ALL GOVERNMENTS,

"BEARING IN MIND THE IMPORTANCE OF THE MAINTENANCE AND STRENGTHENING OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE BASED ON LIBERTY, EQUALITY, JUSTICE AND RESPECT FOR FUNDAMENTAL HUMAN RIGHTS,

"HAVE AGREED TO DECLARE THE END OF THE STATE OF WAR BETWEEN THEM AND, TO THIS END, HAVE CONCLUDED THIS AGREEMENT:

RUBINSTEIN ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE ISRAELI PREAMBLE OPENED PAST ARGUMENTS ABOUT WHETHER RELATIONS SHOULD BE CHARACTERIZED AS "GOOD NEIGHBORLY" OR "PEACEFUL", BUT HE COUNTERED THAT THE LEBANESE DRAFT FAILED TO INDICATE THE BILATERAL CHARACTER OF THE AGREEMENT. BOTH DELEGATIONS SAID THEY WOULD PREPARE NEW DRAFTS.

8. REGARDING PRIOR INCONSISTENT UNDERTAKINGS (REFTEL, PARA 10), FATTAL OFFERED THE FOLLOWING COUNTERPROPOSAL:

"ANY PROVISION OF ANY CONVENTION, LEGISLATION, OR REGULATION WHICH DOES NOT CONFORM TO THE PRESENT AGREEMENT WILL BE CONSIDERED NULL."

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FATTAL SAID THAT THE INCLUSION OF SUCH A BROAD PROVISION
MADE UNNECESSARY THE NUMEROUS REFERENCES TO INCONSISTENT
UNDERTAKINGS OR LEGISLATION IN ISRAEL'S DRAFTS.
RUBINSTEIN SAID THAT IN CERTAIN CASES (E.G., ECONOMIC
BOYCOTT AND CAIRO AND MELKART ACCORDS), REPETITION
WAS DESIRABLE FROM A POLITICAL POINT OF VIEW. (FATTAL
ASKED IF RUBINSTEIN WAS INTERESTED IN DRAFTING
VICTORIES OR SUBSTANCE.) WHEN RUBINSTEIN POINTED OUT

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THAT FATTAL'S DRAFT DID NOT PROHIBIT LEBANON FROM
ENTERING INTO FUTURE INCONSISTENT UNDERTAKINGS, FATTAL
AGREED TO CONSIDER ADDING TO HIS DRAFT THE FOLLOWING
SENTENCE FROM THE ISRAELI DRAFT: "THE PARTIES
UNDERTAKE NOT TO ENTER INTO ANY OBLIGATION IN CONFLICT
WITH THIS AGREEMENT."

9. AS CONCERNS TECHNICAL PROVISIONS FOR BRINGING
THE AGREEMENT INTO FORCE, (ISRAELI TEXT, REFTEL PARA 11),
FATTAL PROPOSED THE FOLLOWING TEXT:

"THIS AGREEMENT WILL BE RATIFIED BY THE TWO PARTIES
ACCORDING TO THEIR CONSTITUTIONAL PROCEDURES AND
WILL ENTER INTO FORCE ON THE EXCHANGE OF THE

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INSTRUMENTS OF RATIFICATION
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"ALL THE ANNEXES OF THIS AGREEMENT WILL BE CONSIDERED AS AN INTEGRAL PART OF THIS AGREEMENT.

"THIS AGREEMENT WILL BE COMMUNICATED TO THE SECRETARIAT OF THE UNITED NATIONS FOR REGISTRATION IN CONFORMITY WITH THE PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE 102 OF THE UN CHARTER.

"DONE AT (BLANK) ON (BLANK) IN ARABIC, HEBREW, ENGLISH AND FRENCH, EACH TEXT BEING EQUALLY AUTHENTIC. IN CASE OF DIVERGENCE OF INTERPRETATION, THE ENGLISH AND FRENCH TEXTS WILL EQUALLY PREVAIL.

RUBINSTEIN INDICATED THAT ISRAEL DID NOT OBJECT TO THE ADDITION OF A FRENCH TEXT, BUT HE QUESTIONED THE WISDOM OF HAVING TWO PREVAILING TEXTS. FATTAL SAID HE SAW NO ALTERNATIVE SINCE FRENCH WAS THE OFFICIAL DIPLOMATIC LANGUAGE OF LEBANON.

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10. FINALLY, THE DELEGATIONS DISCUSSED AGAIN THE TIMING OF THE ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THE TERMINATION OF THE STATE OF WAR. FATTAL PROPOSED, "THE TERMINATION OF THE STATE OF WAR WILL TAKE EFFECT WHEN THE EVACUATION OF LEBANESE TERRITORY BY THE ISRAELI FORCES HAS BEEN COMPLETED." RUBINSTEIN REPEATED THE ISRAELI POSITION THAT THE TERMINATION OF STATE OF WAR SHOULD ENTER INTO FORCE UPON SIGNATURE OF THE AGREEMENT. FATTAL SAID THAT GOL WOULD INSIST THAT IT NOT BE EFFECTIVE UNTIL ISRAEL HAD COMPLETED ITS WITHDRAWAL.

11. FATTAL AND RUBINSTEIN SAID THAT THERE WAS A SIGNIFICANT AMOUNT OF SUBSTANTIVE AGREEMENT ON THE ISSUES DISCUSSED. EACH UNDERTOOK TO PREPARE REVISED TEXTS, BEARING IN MIND THE RESPECTIVE COMMENTS.
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JERUSALEM PASS HABIB

FROM DRAPER

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, MOPS, MARR, LE, US IS, XF

SUBJECT: DRAPER MISSION: SEVENTH MEETING OF SUB-

-- COMMITTEE ON MUTUAL RELATIONS, KHALDAH, FEB. 7

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1. [REDACTED]

2. SUMMARY: THE SUBCOMMITTEE SPENT MOST OF ITS SESSION REACHING AGREED AD REFERENDUM TEXTS ON HOSTILE PROPAGANDA AND LIAISON. THERE WAS A GENERAL DISCUSSION ON CORE ISSUE OF THE MOVEMENT OF GOODS AND PEOPLE. AMBASSADOR KHARMA INDICATED, HOWEVER, HE NEEDED MORE TIME TO CONSULT AND

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BUILD A GOVERNMENT CONSENSUS BEFORE HE WOULD BE ABLE TO SUBMIT A FURTHER DRAFT ON THIS SUBJECT. KHARMA ALSO SAID HE WAS IN THE PROCESS OF ORGANIZING FOR "INFORMAL MEETINGS OF EXPERTS" TO EXCHANGE VIEWS. KIMCHE PRESSED FOR THE MEETINGS TO BEGIN NEXT WEEK. OVERALL, THE TONE OF THE MEETING WAS CONSTRUCTIVE AND BUSINESSLIKE, THOUGH THE MOST DIFFICULT ISSUE ON THE AGENDA WAS BASICALLY SKIRTED. END SUMMARY.

HOSTILE PROPAGANDA

3. MOST OF THE DISCUSSION FOCUSED ON THE ISSUE OF THE CANCELLATION OF LAWS INCOMPATIBLE WITH THIS ARTICLE. KHARMA OUTLINED THREE OPTIONS: (A) KEEP LANGUAGE TO THIS EFFECT WITHIN THE ARTICLE ON HOSTILE PROPAGANDA AS HAD BEEN PREVIOUSLY DISCUSSED; (B) DRAFT A GENERAL PROVISOR WHICH WOULD DECLARE LAWS AND REGULATIONS INCOMPATIBLE WITH THE AGREEMENT (AS A WHOLE) "NULL AND VOID"; OR (C) MAKE NO REFERENCE TO CANCELLATION PER SE SINCE ONCE THE AGREEMENT IS RATIFIED, ALL LAWS AND REGULATIONS INCOMPATIBLE WITH IT WILL BE AUTOMATICALLY SUPERCEDED. KIMCHE

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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IMMEDIATELY REPLIED THAT HE PREFERRED THE SECOND OPTION. WITH THIS UNDERSTANDING, THE FOLLOWING AD REFERENDUM TEXT WAS AGREED TO. BEGIN TEXT:

IN A SPIRIT CONSISTENT WITH THE TERMINATION OF THE STATE OF WAR, AND WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THEIR RESPECTIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, THE PARTIES WILL ABSTAIN FROM ANY FORM OF HOSTILE PROPAGANDA AND INCITEMENT AGAINST EACH OTHER.

ALL LAWS AND REGULATIONS INCOMPATIBLE WITH THIS AGREEMENT WILL BE NULL AND VOID. END TEXT.

LIAISON

4. THE ISSUE OF HOW THE U.S. ROLE WOULD BE DESCRIBED IN THE "SPECIAL LIAISON COMMITTEE" WAS EXTENSIVELY REVIEWED. DRAPER PERSUADED KHARMA TO DROP HIS DEMAND THAT IT BE CALLED A "TRIPARTITE COMMITTEE." ALSO, AT DRAPER'S URGING, KHARMA ACCEPTED AN ISRAELI COMPROMISE FORMULA WHICH WOULD ACKNOWLEDGE AMERICAN PARTICIPATION IN THE UMBRELLA "SPECIAL LIAISON COMMITTEE," BUT AVOIDED MAKING THE U.S. AN EXACT CO-EQUAL AND ON THE SAME BILATERAL LEVEL AS LEBANON AND ISRAEL. A GREAT DEAL OF GIVE AND TAKE WAS

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MADE IN FORMULATING COMPROMISE LANGUAGE ON THE
REMAINDER OF THIS ARTICLE. KHARMA WAS PARTICULARLY
INSISTENT ON LINKING THE ISRAELI LIAISON OFFICE
TO THE "SPECIAL LIAISON COMMITTEE" AND DRAPER
SUGGESTED LANGUAGE TO BRIDGE THE GAP WHICH WAS
ACCEPTED. IN THIS CONTEXT, KIMCHE REPEATED THAT,
ASIDE FROM THE IMMUNITIES ISSUE, ISRAEL WANTED I*S
OFFICE LOCATED IN THE "BEIRUT AREA." DRAPER SAID

NOTE: THIS TEL RECATEGORIZED TO EXDIS PER S/S-O MR. BARON

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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HE THOUGHT THIS WAS REASONABLE, THOUGH KHARMA CONTINUED TO MAINTAIN THAT SECURITY WAS AN IMPORTANT FACTOR. THE EXPERTS DID NOT MEET ON IMMUNITIES TODAY. HOWEVER, AT LUNCH, LEBANESE INFORMED THE ISRAELIS THAT THEY NOW BELIEVE THE PROPER MODEL FOR IMMUNITIES IS THE VIENNA CONSULAR CONVENTION, NOT THE SPECIAL MISSIONS CONVENTIONS AS THEY HAD SAID PREVIOUSLY. THIS MAY COMPLICATE WHAT HAD APPEARED TO BE QUICK AGREEMENT ON IMMUNITIES, SINCE

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THE SPECIAL MISSIONS CONVENTION GRANT IMMUNITIES WHICH ARE SUBSTANTIALLY THE SAME AS DIPLOMATIC PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES.

5. FOLLOWING THE AGREED AD REFERENDUM TEXT. BEGIN TEXT:

-- UPON THE ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THIS AGREEMENT, A SPECIAL LIAISON COMMITTEE WILL BE ESTABLISHED, IN WHICH THE U.S. WILL BE A PARTICIPANT. THIS COMMITTEE WILL BE ENTRUSTED WITH THE IMPLEMENTATION OF ALL AREAS COVERED BY THIS AGREEMENT.

-- THE SPECIAL LIAISON COMMITTEE WILL ALSO ADDRESS ITSELF ON A CONTINUING BASIS TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE MUTUAL RELATIONS BETWEEN LEBANON AND ISRAEL, IN A MANNER THAT WILL REFLECT THE SPIRIT OF THIS AGREEMENT.

-- THE PRESENT MILITARY LIAISON COMMITTEE WILL BECOME A SUBCOMMITTEE OF THIS SPECIAL LIAISON COMMITTEE.

-- OTHER SUBCOMMITTEES MAY BE ESTABLISHED AS THE NEED ARISES.

-- THE SPECIAL LIAISON COMMITTEE WILL MEET IN LEBANON AND ISRAEL RESPECTIVELY.

-- EACH PARTY MAY, IF IT SO DESIRES, MAINTAIN A LIAISON OFFICE ON THE TERRITORY OF THE OTHER PARTY, UNLESS THERE IS AN AGREED CHANGE OF STATUS, "IN ORDER TO CARRY OUT THE WORK OF THE SLC AND TO ASSIST IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS AGREEMENT."

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-- ALL MATTERS RELATING TO THESE LIAISON OFFICES AND THEIR STAFF WILL BE SUBJECT TO....(FORMAT OF AGREEMENT ON IMMUNITIES WILL DETERMINE HOW IT WILL BE DESCRIBED IN THIS ARTICLE OR WHETHER IT WOULD BE IN AN ANNEX OR SIDE LETTER).

MOVEMENT OF GOODS AND PEOPLE

6. KHARMA SAID HE HOPED TO HAVE SOMETHING ON THIS SUBJECT BY THE THURSDAY MEETING, SAYING THIS SUBJECT FIRST REQUIRED CAREFUL CONSULTATION WITH HIS GOVERNMENT TO DEVELOP CONSENSUS ON THE PRINCIPLE. (COMMENT: KHARMA IS OUT IN FRONT OF SOME OF HIS POLITICAL LEADERS IN HIS THINKING ON THIS ISSUE. END COMMENT.) KIMCHE EMPHASIZED HE NEEDED A "CONCRETE

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PROPOSAL" FROM THE LEBANESE SIDE SINCE THE PRESENT DRAFTING EXERCISE WAS BASED ON KHARMA'S ORIGINAL SUGGESTIONS. KHARMA SAID HE UNDERSTOOD AND ALSO INDICATE HE HAD A VERY CLEAR IDEA OF WHAT KIMCHE WANTED TO BE CONTAINED IN THE LANGUAGE OF THE AGREEMENT ON THIS SUBJECT, BASED ON EARLIER DISCUSSIONS. KHARMA DUCKED A QUESTION FROM KIMCHE ON HOW HE ENVISAGED THE INTERIM ARRANGEMENTS MIGHT COME INTO EFFECT.

MEETINGS OF EXPERTS

7. KHARMA SAID HE WAS ORGANIZING FOR INFORMAL MEETINGS OF EXPERTS, SAYING A NUCLEUS OF ECONOMIC EXPERTS WAS BEING FORMED AND ALSO HOPED A SIMILIAR GROUP OF COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY EXPERTS WOULD BE ESTABLISHED THIS WEEK. KHARMA MADE IT CLEAR THAT HE DID NOT SEE THESE MEETINGS

NOTE: RECATEGORIZED TO EXDIS PER MR BARON S/S-O

[REDACTED]

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AS HAVING ANY OFFICIAL LINK TO THE RESPECTIVE
DELEGATIONS. THEY WOULD BE MEETING INFORMALLY
AND ONLY TO ENGAGE IN EXPLORATORY TALKS FOR
AN EXCHANGE OF VIEWS AND INFORMATION. KHARMA
DID NOT RESURFACE HIS PROPOSAL FOR PUTTING

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LEBANESE CUSTOMS OFFICIALS CLOSE TO THE BORDER.

8. KIMCHE REPLIED THAT HE HOPED THE PARTIES
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

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COULD AGREE THE NEXT DAY, FEB. 8, ON A SCHEDULE FOR MEETINGS TO BEGIN NEXT WEEK. HE SUGGESTED THAT THE MEETINGS IN ISRAEL SHOULD TAKE PLACE IN NATANYAH AND FOR PRACTICAL REASONS AND FOR THOSE OF "COVER," THOUGHT THE LEBANESE EXPERTS SHOULD COME WITH THE OFFICIAL DELEGATION. KHARMA AGREED. THE ISRAELI SIDE ALSO PROVIDED INFORMATION MATERIALS ON COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY, CUSTOMS, AND DRUGS TO THE LEBANESE AND PROMISED MORE IN OTHER FIELDS. KHARMA SAID HE WOULD RECIPROCATE. HE EXPRESSED PARTICULAR INTEREST IN THE AREA OF COOPERATION ON DRUG SMUGGLING. DILLON

NOTE: RECATEGORIZED TO EXDIS PER MR BARON S/S-O

[REDACTED]

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JERUSALEM PASS HABIB

FROM DRAPER

CORRECTED COPY TEXT (ADD PARA 3)

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, MOPS, MARR, LE, US, IS, XF

SUBJECT: DRAPER MISSION: PLENARY SESSION AND SUB-

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-- COMMITTEE MEETINGS IN KHALDAH, FEB. 7

1. [REDACTED]

2. THE ISRAELI, LEBANESE, AND U.S. DELEGATIONS MET
IN KHALDAH TODAY, FEBRUARY 7, FOR A TWENTY-MINUTE
PLENARY SESSION BEFORE BREAKING UP TO WORK IN THREE
SUBCOMMITTEES. AMBASSADOR FATTAL OPENED THE PLENARY
WITH A STATEMENT ON THE FACTIONAL FIGHTING IN ALAYH

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FOIA NUMBER: 33BEIRUT01415

CHANNEL: n/a

HE DECLARED HIS ASTONISHMENT THAT HEAVY FIGHTING AND LOSS OF LIFE COULD TAKE PLACE IN AN AREA UNDER IDF CONTROL, URGED ISRAEL TO FULFILL ITS OBLIGATIONS TO PROTECT THE CIVILIAN POPULATION UNDER THE GENEVA AND HAGUE CONVENTIONS, AND EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT THE ISRAELI DELEGATION COULD REASSURE THE LEBANESE DELEGATION ON THIS SCORE. KIMCHE, IN HIS RESPONSE, EXPRESSED HIS AND ISRAEL'S SORROW FOR THE LOSS OF LIFE. HE MADE IT CLEAR, HOWEVER, THAT ISRAEL DOES NOT CONSIDER ITSELF AN "OCCUPYING FORCE" IN THE LEGAL SENSE. (RUBENSTEIN SAID LATER THAT ISRAEL DOES APPLY THE PROVISIONS OF THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS AS A MATTER OF POLICY.) AFFIRMING THAT ISRAEL WANTED TO PULL ITS FORCES OUT OF THE ALAYH AREA AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, KIMCHE URGED THE LEBANESE TO TAKE UP ISRAEL'S OFFER OF A PARTIAL WITHDRAWAL (ONCE CERTAIN CONDITIONS HAD BEEN MET). HE DID GO ON TO SAY THAT ISRAEL WOULD TRY TO PREVENT FURTHER LOSS OF LIFE. WITHOUT SPECIFYING WHAT HE MEANT, HE DECLARED THAT, IF ISRAEL HAD NOT TAKEN CERTAIN STEPS IN THE AREA IN RECENT WEEKS, THE LOSS OF LIFE WOULD HAVE BEEN MUCH GREATER.

3. KIMCHE THEN URGED THE LEBANESE TO SPEED UP THE NEGOTIATIONS. HE WARNED THAT, IF DELAY CONTINUES, THE

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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CONSEQUENCES COULD BE SERIOUS: POSITIONS COULD FREEZE, OUTSIDE PRESSURE COULD INCREASE IN INTENSITY, AND INTERNAL DEVELOPMENTS MIGHT HINDER PROGRESS. HE SUGGESTED THAT A DRAFTING COMMITTEE BE ESTABLISHED TODAY TO DELINEATE AREAS OF AGREEMENT AND DISAGREEMENT BY USE OF SPECIFIC LANGUAGE, BRACKETED WHERE NECESSARY. FATTAL POINTED OUT THAT AT LEAST ONE OF THE SUBCOMMITTEES (TERMINATION OF THE STATE OF WAR) HAD ALREADY REACHED THE DRAFTING STAGE. WITHOUT SPECIFICALLY ADDRESSING KIMCHE'S PROPOSAL THAT A DRAFTING COMMITTEE BE CREATED, FATTAL DID REFLECT A GENERAL CONSENSUS THAT, WHEREEVER POSSIBLE, THE SUBCOMMITTEES SHOULD MOVE TO DRAFTING. DRAPER EXPRESSED EXPLICIT US SUPPORT FOR MOVING AHEAD ON DRAFTING WHEREVER POSSIBLE.

4. KIMCHE THEN BROUGHT UP THE SUBJECT OF RECENT PRESS REPORTS WHICH DESCRIBED ISRAELI PROPOSALS AS DESIGNED TO "LIMIT THE SOVEREIGNTY" OF LEBANON. HE EMPHASIZED THAT ANY AGREEMENT SIGNED BY THE LEBANESE WILL, NECESSARILY, HAVE THE SUPPORT OF THE FULL GOVERNMENT, AND THAT THERE IS A CLEAR HISTORY OF AGREEMENTS WHICH ESTABLISH SPECIAL SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS IN THE TERRITORY OF A SOVEREIGN COUNTRY. HE CITED THE ROLE OF U.S. FORCES IN JAPAN AFTER THE WAR AS A CASE IN POINT.

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IN RESPONSE, FATTAL POINTED OUT THAT, FROM A LEGAL POINT OF VIEW, ANY AGREEMENT LIMITS SOVEREIGNTY TO A CERTAIN EXTENT; THE POINT OF THE PRESS REPORTS, HE SUGGESTED, WAS THAT SOME ISRAELI PROPOSALS -- I.E., THE ESTABLISHMENT OF "EARLY WARNING STATIONS" -- ARE NOT ACCEPTABLE TO THE GOL.

5. FOLLOWING SUBCOMMITTEE MEETINGS BEFORE AND AFTER LUNCH, THE PLENARY CONVENED BRIEFLY TO APPROVE A FINAL PRESS STATEMENT (SEPTTEL) AND TO SCHEDULE THE NEXT SUBCOMMITTEE MEETINGS FOR

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TUESDAY, FEB. 8, AT 1000 IN KHALDAH.

6. FOLLOWING IS A SUMMARY OF THE WORK OF EACH OF THE THREE SUBCOMMITTEES. A DETAILED REPORT OF EACH IS BEING SENT SEPTTEL.

7. SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS: THE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS/ WITHDRAWALS SUBCOMMITTEE SPENT THE DAY SEARCHING FOR FLEXIBILITY IN POSITIONS ON SEVEN OF THE TEN ISSUES DISCUSSED ON FEB. 3 AT NATANYAH: MILITARY COMMISSION, INCLUDING INTELLIGENCE EXCHANGE; ISRAELI AERIAL SURVEILLANCE; NAVAL PATROLS; FOREIGN FORCES; ANTI AIRCRAFT MISSILES; AND ELECTRONIC MEASURES. THE TWO SIDES AGREED TO REFER THREE ISSUES TO THEIR GOVERNMENTS FOR FURTHER DISCUSSION: UNIFIL, UNTSO,

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WOULD HINGE ON LEBANESE CHANGES OF POSITION. THE ISRAELI
SIDE PROVIDED "CONCEPT PAPERS" TO GUIDE DISCUSSION
ON THE MILITARY COMMISSION, SURFACE-TO-AIR MISSILES
AND ANTI-AIRCRAFT ARTILLERY, AND ELECTRONIC MEASURES.
THE LEBANESE PRESENTED ALTERNATIVE WORDING ON FOREIGN
FORCES IN RESPONSE TO THAT READ BY ISRAEL ON FEB. 3
AT NATANYAH. THE SESSION ENDED WITH CLEAR DISAGREE-
MENT OVER THE NORTHERN LIMIT OF THE SECURITY ZONE.
ISRAEL ADAMANTLY REQUIRES 45 KM.; LEBANON IS WILLING
TO ACCEDE ONLY TO THE AWALI RIVER LINE. FURTHER

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
DISCUSSION ON FORCES AND WEAPONS WITHIN THE ZONE HAS BEEN DEFERRED BY THE ISRAELIS UNTIL AGREEMENT IS REACHED ON THE SIZE OF THE ZONE.

8. MUTUAL RELATIONS: THE MUTUAL RELATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE SPENT MOST OF ITS SESSION IN REACHING AGREED AD REFERENDUM TEXTS ON HOSTILE PROPAGANDA AND LIAISON. THERE WAS A GENERAL DISCUSSION ON CORE ISSUE OF THE MOVEMENT OF GOODS AND PEOPLE. AMBASSADOR KHARMA INDICATED, HOWEVER, HE NEEDED MORE TIME TO CONSULT AND BUILD A GOVERNMENT CONSENSUS BEFORE HE WOULD BE ABLE TO SUBMIT A FURTHER DRAFT ON THIS SUBJECT. KHARMA ALSO SAID HE WAS IN THE PROCESS OF ORGANIZING FOR "INFORMAL MEETINGS OF EXPERTS" TO EXCHANGE VIEWS. KIMCHE PRESSED FOR THE MEETINGS TO BEGIN NEXT WEEK. OVERALL, THE TONE OF THE MEETING WAS CONSTRUCTIVE AND BUSINESSLIKE, THOUGH THE MOST DIFFICULT ISSUE ON THE AGENDA WAS BASICALLY SKIRTED.

9. TERMINATION OF THE STATE OF WAR: LEBANESE PRESENTED THEIR COUNTERPROPOSALS TO ISRAELI SUGGESTIONS CONCERNING PREAMBLE, MUTUAL RECOGNITION, ABROGATION OF PRIOR INCONSISTENT UNDERTAKINGS, PREVENTION OF TERRORISM AND TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS, STATIONING OF FOREIGN FORCES, AND ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THE AGREEMENT. LEBANESE AND ISRAELIS AGREE ON THE SUBSTANCE OF MOST OF THESE ISSUES, BUT THERE IS A SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCE IN DRAFTING ON SEVERAL ITEMS, DERIVING PRIMARILY FROM DIFFERING PERSPECTIVES ON HOW MUCH "POLITICAL" LANGUAGE TO INCLUDE IN THE TEXT. THE TWO DELEGATIONS HAVE AGREED THAT EACH WILL PREPARE NEW DRAFT TEXTS, DRAWING ON THEIR RESPECTIVE COMMENTS. DILLON



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PARIS OR ROME FOR AMBASSADOR HABIB

FROM DRAPER

E.O 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, MOPS, MARR, LE, US, IS, XF

SUBJECT: DRAPER MISSION: SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS

1. [REDACTED]
2. THE FOLLOWING REFLECTS AN EFFORT TO PUT ON PAPER
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

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SOME OF THE THINKING OF OUR TEAM ON A BRIDGING
FORMULA FOR SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS. WE MAY REPEAT
MAY USE IT AS A BASIS FOR EXPLORATORY TALKS WITH
THE ISRAELI AND LEBANESE DELEGATIONS THIS WEEK.

-- SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS --

1. SECURITY ZONE. A SECURITY ZONE WILL
BE ORGANIZED IN THE AREA BETWEEN THE ISRAEL-LEBANON

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BORDER MEASURED FROM METULLA NORTH TO A LINE MARKED BY THE ROAD BETWEEN DAMUR AND KAFR NABRAKH-JABAL BARUK-KIFRAYYA-JUBB JANNIN-KAMED AL LAWZ-'AYN 'ARAB-TO THE SYRIAN BORDER. THIS SECURITY ZONE IS DIVIDED INTO THREE SECTORS (SEE MAP A) DESIGNATED SECTOR A, SECTOR B, AND SECTOR C. WITHIN EACH SECTOR IN THE TOTAL SECURITY ZONE CERTAIN LIMITATIONS AND RESTRICTIONS AS OUTLINED BELOW WILL APPLY.

-- A. SECTOR A. EXTENDING APPROXIMATELY 15-18 KILOMETERS FROM THE ISRAEL-LEBANON BORDER, BEGINNING AT THE MOUTH OF THE LITANI RIVER, SECTOR A WILL BE COMPLETELY FREE OF ALL WEAPONS, ARMED ELEMENTS, OR MILITIAS OTHER THAN LEBANESE ARMED FORCES, POLICE, AND FORCES ORGANIZED FOR INTERNAL SECURITY, EXCEPT FOR ONE UN BATTALION TO BE STATIONED IN TYRE (SUR) FOR A PERIOD OF EIGHTEEN (18) MONTHS. THIS SECTOR WILL HAVE A SPECIAL LEBANESE ARMED FORCES COMMANDER WHO WILL REPORT DIRECTLY TO THE COMMANDER OF THE LEBANESE ARMED FORCES.

-- (1) EXTRAORDINARY POPULATION CONTROL MEASURES, IN ADDITION TO MARTIAL LAW, WILL BE ENFORCED. THESE MEASURES WILL INCLUDE, BUT NOT BE LIMITED TO, SPECIAL IDENTIFICATION CARDS,

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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TRAVEL PERMITS, AND RESIDENCE CONTROLS. NON-RESIDENTS WILL BE PERMITTED TO ENTER OR RESIDE IN SECTOR A ONLY WITH SPECIAL APPROVAL BY THE SECTOR COMMANDER. NO UNAUTHORIZED WEAPONS WILL BE PERMITTED IN THIS SECTOR.

-- (2) FORCE RESTRICTIONS AND WEAPONS LIMITATIONS. ONE BRIGADE OF LEBANESE ARMED FORCES WILL BE DEPLOYED IN SECTOR A. THIS BRIGADE WILL BE FORMED FROM AND WILL INCORPORATE THE EXISTING LOCAL FORCE UNITS/MILITIAS FROM SECTOR A AND SECTOR B. THE BRIGADE WILL BE AUTHORIZED TO CARRY THE WEAPONS AND EQUIPMENT ORGANIC TO A STANDARD LEBANESE ARMED FORCES BRIGADE AND WILL CONSIST OF THREE INFANTRY/MECHANIZED INFANTRY BATTALIONS; JH FANK BATTALION, AND ONE ARTILLERY BATTALION OF UP TO 24 TUBES, PLUS STANDARD LOGISTICS AND ADMINISTRATIVE SUPPORT.

-- B. SECTOR B. BETWEEN SECTOR A AND A LINE MARKED BY THE AWALI RIVER-JAZZIN-MASHGHARAH-KAFR MISHKI-RASHAYYA-SYRIAN BORDER, FORCES IN SECTOR B WILL PREVENT INTRODUCTION INTO OR MOVEMENT THROUGH LEBANON OF ANY ARMED ELEMENTS, INFILTRATORS, OR MILITARY EQUIPMENT DESTINED FOR SECTOR A OR FOR USE IN AN ATTACK ON THE TERRITORY OF ISRAEL FROM ANY PLACE IN THE SECTOR. (MARTIAL LAW WILL APPLY

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IN THOSE AREAS OF THE SECTOR AS DESIGNATED BY
THE GOVERNMENT OF LEBANON.)

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-- (1) FORCE RESTRICTIONS AND WEAPONS LIMITATION. ONE STANDARD LEBANESE ARMED FORCES BRIGADE WITH ITS ORGANIC WEAPONS AND EQUIPMENT WILL BE STATIONED IN SECTOR B. UP TO A SECOND STANDARD BRIGADE MAY BE INTRODUCED INTO OR STATIONED IN SECTOR B FOR TRAINING OR OPERATIONAL MISSIONS. NO RESTRICTIONS APPLY TO TRAINING OF

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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COMBAT SUPPORT/COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT UNITS. ADDITIONAL OPERATIONAL UNITS MAY BE DEPLOYED FOR TRAINING OR OPERATIONAL MISSIONS AFTER COORDINATION WITH THE MILITARY COMMISSION.

-- (2) ONE BATTALION OF UN FORCES ORGANIZED FOR THE MISSION WITH NECESSARY LOGISTICS SUPPORT WILL BE STATIONED AT TYRE (SUR), WITH ANOTHER BATTALION AT SIDON (SAYDA), FOR A PERIOD NOT TO EXCEED 18 MONTHS. THE MISSION OF THESE BATTALIONS IS TO SUPPORT THE GOVERNMENT OF LEBANON IN PROVIDING SECURITY FOR THE ESTABLISHED, RECOGNIZED PALESTINIAN REFUGEE CAMPS (SEE ANNEX I). THESE UN FORCES WILL BE RESTRICTED TO THE MISSION DESCRIBED ABOVE.

-- C. SECTOR C. BETWEEN SECTOR B AND THE NORTHERN LIMIT OF THE SECURITY ZONE, THE GOVERNMENT OF LEBANON WILL UNDERTAKE EXTRAORDINARY PROCEDURES TO REMOVE ALL HEAVY WEAPONS AND ARMORED VEHICLES NOT BELONGING TO THE LEBANESE ARMED FORCES. INTERNATIONAL FORCES MAY ASSIST THE GOVERNMENT OF LEBANON IN THIS SECTOR IF REQUESTED BY THE GOVERNMENT OF LEBANON. UPWARDS OF THREE INTERNATIONAL FORCE BATTALIONS COULD BE USED HERE EXCLUSIVE OF THOSE CURRENTLY IN BEIRUT. THROUGHOUT THIS SECTOR, AND ESPECIALLY ALONG THE SOUTHERN EDGE, EMPHASIS WILL BE PLACED ON INTERDICTING MAIN INFILTRATION ROUTES AND ON DENYING PROBABLE LOCATIONS FOR DEPLOYMENT OR STORAGE OF HEAVY WEAPONS AND ARMORED VEHICLES TO UNAUTHORIZED FORCES OR PERSONS TO PRECLUDE THEIR INTRODUCTION INTO OR INFILTRATION THROUGH THIS SECTOR. NO FORCE

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[REDACTED]

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RESTRICTIONS OR WEAPONS LIMITATIONS OTHER THAN THOSE NOTED BELOW ARE IMPOSED ON THE LEBANESE ARMED FORCES IN THIS SECTOR.

-- 2. GENERAL SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS. THE FOLLOWING RESTRICTIONS WILL APPLY EQUALLY THROUGHOUT THE SECURITY ZONE EXCEPT AS NOTED.

-- A. LEBANESE POLICE AND INTERNAL SECURITY FORCES MAY BE STATIONED IN THE SECURITY ZONE WITHOUT RESTRICTION AS TO THEIR NUMBERS, HOWEVER, THEY WILL BE ARMED ONLY WITH PERSONAL AND CREW SERVED WEAPONS. ARMORED SCOUT OR COMMANDO CARS ARE NOT PROHIBITED.

-- B. NO FORTIFICATIONS OR MINEFIELDS DIRECTED AGAINST ISRAEL, OR THAT MIGHT BE DIRECTED AGAINST: A' SHALL BE ESTABLISHED.

-- C. NO SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE, ARTILLERY PIECE, ROCKET LAUNCHER, OR RADAR-GUIDED AIR DEFENSE OR COASTAL DEFENSE GUN OF ANY TYPE NOT SPECIFIED IN ANNEX 2 WILL BE STATIONED, STOCKED, INTRODUCED INTO, OR TRANSPORTED THROUGH THE SECURITY ZONE.

-- D. NO INTERNATIONAL FORCES OTHER THAN THOSE SPECIFIED IN PARAGRAPHS 1A AND 1B(2) ABOVE MAY BE STATIONED WITHIN SECTORS A AND B. INTERNATIONAL FORCES MAY BE DEPLOYED IN SECTOR C AT THE REQUEST OF THE GOVERNMENT OF LEBANON FOR A PERIOD NOT TO EXCEED 18 MONTHS FOR THE PURPOSE OF ASSISTING THE GOVERNMENT OF LEBANON TO REESTABLISH

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TS SOVEREIGNTY THROUGHOUT THE AREA.

-- E. ONLY THOSE AIR DEFENSE MISSILES
ORGANIC TO A STANDARD LEBANESE ARMED FORCES
BRIGADE (ANNEX 2) MAY BE STATIONED IN OR INTRO-
DUCED INTO THE SECURITY ZONE. NO MOBILE AIR
DEFENSE MISSILE SYSTEM, OTHER THAN SHOULDER-FIRED

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MAN-PORTABLE SYSTEMS, WILL BE DEPLOYED ANYWHERE
IN LEBANON FOR A PERIOD OF FIVE YEARS FOLLOWING
THE CONCLUSION OF THIS AGREEMENT.

-- F. ISR
AELI RECONNAISSANCE OVERFLIGHTS
AND NAVAL PATROLS MAY CONTINUE UNTIL THE WITHDRAWAL
OF ISRAELI FORCES FROM LEBANON IS COMPLETED. THERE-
AFTER, OVERFLIGHTS OVER THE SECURITY ZONE WILL
BE CONDUCTED ONLY IN ACCORDANCE WITH PREARRANGED
TIMES AND FLIGHT PATTERNS IN COORDINATION WITH
THE GOVERNMENT OF LEBANON. INTELLIGENCE FROM
THESE FLIGHTS WILL BE SHARED WITH THE GOVERNMENT
OF LEBANON. ENTRY OF ISRAELI NAVAL PATROLS

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INTO LEBANON'S TERRITORIAL WATERS IS PROHIBITED.

G. THE PARTIES AGREE TO EXCHANGE COMPLETE INTELLIGENCE ON TERRORIST OR SUSPECTED TERRORIST ACTIVITY WITHIN THE SECURITY ZONE. THE EXCHANGE WILL INCLUDE INFORMATION ON THE MOVEMENT, ORGANIZATION, AND OPERATIONS OF ANY ESTABLISHED OR POTENTIAL TERRORIST ORGANIZATION, WITH SPECIAL EMPHASIS ON THE REFUGEE CAMPS AND OTHER AREAS OF REFUGEE CONCENTRATIONS.

-- H. ONLY THOSE ELECTRONIC MEASURES NEEDED TO ACCOMPLISH THE INTERNAL SECURITY MISSION MAY BE STATIONED IN OR INTRODUCED INTO SECTORS A AND B. LEBANON MAY ESTABLISH ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE AND WARNING STATIONS WITHIN SECTOR C TO ASSIST IN THE ANTI-INFILTRATION MISSION

-- 3. MILITARY COMMISSION. A MILITARY COMMISSION, ESTABLISHED WITHIN THE OVERALL LIAISON COMMITTEE TO SUPERVISE THE AGREEMENT, WILL SUPERVISE
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THE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS AND WILL ENSURE THAT VIOLATIONS OF THE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS ARE RECTIFIED IMMEDIATELY.

-- A. THE MILITARY COMMISSION WILL ALSO ORGANIZE JOINT SUPERVISORY TEAMS COMPOSED OF AN EQUAL NUMBER OF REPRESENTATIVES OF EACH PARTY TO OBSERVE COMPLIANCE WITH THE TERMS OF THE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS AND TO INVESTIGATE COMPLAINTS OR SUSPECTED VIOLATIONS.

-- B. THE MILITARY COMMISSION WILL CONDUCT THE EXCHANGE OF INTELLIGENCE AS NOTED IN PARAGRAPH 2H ABOVE.

-- C. THERE WILL BE DIRECT TELEPHONIC LINKS BETWEEN THE OFFICERS OF THE COMMISSION IN ISRAEL AND LEBANON. MEETINGS OF THE COMMISSION WILL BE HELD REGULARLY, AT LEAST ONCE A MONTH, OR AT THE REQUEST OF ANY PARTY.

ANNEX I

- .- PROVIDING SECURITY FOR THE REFUGEE CAMPS AT SIDON
- .- AND TYRE

1. TWO SPECIALLY TAILORED BATTALIONS OF WITH NECESSARY L
IN SECTORS A AND B TO SUPPORT T
FORCES IN PROVIDING SECURITY FOR THE REFUGEE CAMPS

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OF RASHIDIYAH, BURJ AL SHAMALI, AND AL BUSS. THE
SECOND BATTALION WILL BE STATIONED IN SIDON FOR THE

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AME PURPOSE IN THE AREA OF THE 'AYN AL HILWAH

AND MIAH MIAH REFUGEE CAMPS.

2. THE UN UNITS WILL OPERATE WITH LEBANESE ARMED FORCES UNITS. THE TWO LEBANESE ARMED FORCES BATTALIONS CURRENTLY NEAR SIDON ARE CAPABLE OF WORKING WITH UN FORCES IN SECURING THE REFUGEE

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CAMPS BOTH AGAINST THE INFILTRATION OF WEAPONS AND THE SUBSEQUENT RESURGENCE OF ORGANIZED MILITARY ACTIVITY AND FROM THE THREAT OF EXTERNAL ATTACKS ON CAMP RESIDENTS BY ELEMENTS HOSTILE TO THEIR PRESENCE. THE LEBANESE ARMED FORCES UNITS WILL ROTATE COMPANIES OF THESE BATTALIONS THROUGH THEIR OWN TRAINING PROGRAM AT THE SAME TIME AS THEY WORK WITH THE UN FORCES.

3. THE UN FORCES WILL REMAIN DEPLOYED UNTIL THE GOVERNMENT OF LEBANON IS FULLY CAPABLE OF PROVIDING THIS SECURITY BY ITSELF, OR FOR A PERIOD NOT TO EXCEED 18 MONTHS. BY THEN SUFFICIENT LEBANESE ARMED FORCES UNITS SHOULD BE TRAINED AND EQUIPPED AND THE POPULATION OF THE CAMPS CONVINCED THAT THE LEBANESE ARMED FORCES CAN PROTECT THEM SO THAT THE UN FORCES CAN WITHDRAW FROM THE AREA OF THE CAMPS.

4. THE GOVERNMENT OF LEBANON IS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE SECURITY OF THE RESIDENTS OF THE CAMPS. THE UN FORCE WILL SUPPORT AND ASSIST THE FORCES OF THE GOVERNMENT OF LEBANON WITH THIS MISSION IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE FOLLOWING GUIDELINES:

-- A. THE FORCE WILL BE ARMED ONLY WITH DEFENSIVE LIGHT INDIVIDUAL AND CREW SERVED WEAPONS. IT WILL NOT APPLY FORCE EXCEPT IN SELF DEFENSE OR TO ASSIST THE LEBANESE ARMED FORCES IN DEFENDING THE INHABITANTS OF THE CAMPS FROM IMMINENT DANGER.

LEBANON FORCES ARE PROVIDING ADEQUATE SECURITY.

-- C. IN THE EVENT OF RECEIPT OF EVIDENCE OF

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INFILTRATION OF ARMS INTO THE CAMP(S) OR A RESURGENCE OF MILITARY ORGANIZATION WITHIN THE CAMP(S), THE FORCE WILL REPORT TO AND COORDINATE APPROPRIATE RESPONSES WITH THE FORCES OF THE

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GOVERNMENT OF LEBANON. REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UN FORCE COULD ACCOMPANY GOVERNMENT OF LEBANON FORCES CONDUCTING SEARCH OPERATIONS WITHIN THE CAMP(S) TO ENSURE PROPER RESPECT FOR THE RIGHTS OF THE INHABITANTS.

-- D. IF A NON-GOVERNMENTAL ARMED ELEMENT ATTEMPTS TO ENTER THE CAMP(S), THE UN FORCE IS AUTHORIZED TO RESPOND WITH FORCE, IN CONJUNCTION WITH GOVERNMENT OF LEBANON FORCES, TO DETER OR HALT SUCH ACTIVITY. DILLON

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TUNIS FOR ROSS

FROM DRAPER

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, MOPS, MARR, LE, US, IS, XF

SUBJECT: DRAPER MISSION: FOURTH MEETING OF SUBCOMMITTEE

-- ON MUTUAL RELATIONS, NETANYA, FEB. 1

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REF: A) BEIRUT 861, B) TEL AVIV 1406, C) TEL AVIV 1539,
-- D) JERUSALEM 194V

1. [REDACTED]

2. SUMMARY. PRIMARY FOCUS IN MUTUAL RELATIONS
SUBCOMMITTEE REMAINS THE MOVEMENT OF PERSONS AND
GOODS. LEBANESE REITERATED THAT THIS ISSUE SHOULD BEPage - 1
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DISCUSSED SIX MONTHS AFTER WITHDRAWAL, BUT SUGGESTED THAT SOME MOVEMENT MIGHT OCCUR IN THE INTERIM IN ACCORDANCE WITH "AGREED INTERIM ARRANGEMENTS". LEBANESE ARE AMBIGUOUS AS TO WHETHER THESE INTERIM ARRANGEMENTS WOULD BE CONCLUDED BEFORE OR AFTER ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL. ISRAEL CONTINUES TO PRESS FOR IMPLEMENTABLE AGREEMENTS ON THE MOVEMENT OF GOODS AND PERSONS BEFORE WITHDRAWAL, AND HAS SUGGESTED THAT TECHNICAL EXPERTS ON CUSTOMS AND ECONOMICS, POLICE, AND AVIATION BEGIN MEETING THURSDAY IN KIRYAT SHMONHILE MAINTAINING ISRAEL'S OFFICIAL POSITION, KIMCHE APPEARS INTERESTED IN LEBANESE REFERENCE TO "AGREED INTERIM ARRANGEMENTS", PROVIDED THESE ARRANGEMENTS ARE SUBSTANTIAL.

3. SUBCOMMITTEE NARROWED, BUT DID NOT RESOLVE, THE DIFFERENCES CONCERNING LIAISON OFFICES. KEY DIFFERENCES REMAIN THE RELATION OF THE ISRAELI LIAISON OFFICE TO THE COMMITTEE FOR FUTURE DISCUSSIONS, AND WHETHER THE COMMITTEE WILL INCLUDE THE UNITED STATES. ISRAEL ALSO CONTINUES TO PUT FORWARD MORE OF ITS DRAFT AGREEMENT, WITH A PRESENTATION TODAY OF THE ANNEX PROVISIONS ON TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND MAIL AND THE ANNULMENT OF LEBANESE RESERVATIONS CONCERNING

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ISRAEL TO MULTILATERAL CONVENTIONS TO WHICH LEBANON IS A PARTY. END SUMMARY.

4. SUBCOMMITTEE ON MUTUAL RELATIONS HELD ITS FOURTH MEETING IN NETANYA, FEBRUARY 1. PARTICIPANTS WERE KIMCHE, RUBENSTEIN AND STAFF (ISRAEL); KHARMA AND AMIN (LEBANON); AND DRAPER, HARE AND KRECZKO (U.S.). MAIN TOPICS OF DISCUSSION WERE LIAISON AND MOVEMENT OF GOODS AND PERSONS.

LIAISON

5. AT THE OUTSET, KIMCHE SAID HE WAS PREPARED TO ACCEPT KHARMA'S DRAFT ON LIAISON AS THE BASIS FOR DISCUSSION, THOUGH HE HAD SOME SPECIFIC PRELIMINARY COMMENTS ON ITS LANGUAGE (REF C). HE ARGUED THAT THE FOURTH PARAGRAPH DESCRIBING THE FUNCTIONS OF THE MILITARY LIAISON SYSTEM WOULD BE DISCUSSED AND DESCRIBED BY THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS. A SIMPLE REFERENCE TO THAT DESCRIPTION SHOULD THEREFORE SUFFICE FOR THIS ARTICLE. KHARMA AGREED. HE ALSO SUGGESTED THAT IN THE FIFTH PARAGRAPH THE WORD "RESPECTIVELY" SHOULD BE SUBSTITUTED FOR THE PHRASE "AS NEED ARISES" TO INDICATE THAT THE COMMITTEE WOULD MEET IN BOTH COUNTRIES. KHARMA ALSO ACCEPTED THIS POINT AD REFERENDUM.

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6. KIMCHE PREDICTABLY OBJECTED TO DESCRIBING THE LIAISON OFFICE AS "TEMPORARY," UNLESS IT WERE ADDED "UNTIL DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS ARE ESSHED." OTHERWISE, HE SAID IT WOULD BE VIRTUALLY IMPOSSIBLE TO SELL THE DRAFT TEXT TO HIS POLITICAL LEVEL, ADDING THE REMOVAL OF THE WORD WAS A SINE QUA NON. KHARMA SUGGESTED HE WOULD DRAFT LANGUAGE TYING THE LIAISON OFFICE TO THE LIFE OF THE TRIPARTITE COMMITTEE. KIMCHE SUGGESTED THAT SUCH AN INDIRECT

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EXDIS -- SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MILITARY ADDRESSEES

LINK WOULD BE ESTABLISHED IF KHARMA ACCEPTED ISRAEL'S PROPOSED ADDITION THAT "THE COMMITTEE WILL MEET IN THESE LIAISON OFFICES, OR ELSEWHERE, AS DESIRED BY THE PARTIES." KHARMA SAID A STRONGER ORGANIC LINK BETWEEN THE LIAISON OFFICES AND THE TRIPARTITE COMMITTEE WAS REQUIRED. KIMCHE REPLIED IF THE LINK WAS STRONG, THIS WOULD POSE PROBLEMS FOR ISRAEL BECAUSE IT WOULD SUGGEST

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THAT THE LIAISON OFFICE DID NOT HAVE A LIFE OF ITS OWN. FINALLY, KIMCHE SAID HE WOULD ALSO HAVE SOME SUGGESTED LANGUAGE CHANGES ON PARAGRAPH TWO OF THE LEBANESE DRAFT AT THE NEXT MEETING, IN ORDER TO ACCENTUATE THAT THE LIAISON COMMITTEE WOULD HANDLE BILATERAL, CIVILIAN MATTERS AS WELL AS MILITARY ISSUES. (NOTE: ISSUE OF WHETHER LIAISON COMMITTEE WILL BE BILATERAL OR TRIPARTITE REMAINS UNRESOLVED.) MOVEMENT OF GOODS AND PEOPLE

7. KHARMA REPEATED THE LEBANESE PROPOSAL THAT ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE MOVEMENT OF GOODS AND PERSONS BE DISCUSSED SIX MONTHS FOLLOWING IS WITHDRAWAL AND CONSOLIDATION OF GOL AUTHORITY AT THE BORDER. HE ARGUED THAT LEBANON WOULD NOT NEGOTIATE THESE ARRANGEMENTS WHILE ISRAEL CONTROLLED THE BORDER. KIMCHE MADE IT ABUNDANTLY CLEAR THAT THE "MOVEMENT OF GOODS OF PERSONS" WAS THE CENTERPIECE OF THE AGREEMENT ON MUTUAL RELATIONS AND THAT WITHOUT IT, THERE WOULD BE NO AGREEMENT AND NO WITHDRAWAL. RUBENSTEIN AND KIMCHE ALSO PRESSED THE THEME THAT UNLESS THE AGREEMENT CONTAINED CLEAR PRINCIPLES AND DID SOMETHING ABOUT THE ECONOMIC BOYCOTT, IT WOULD BE A NON-STARTER SINCE THERE WOULD BE NO UNDERLYING VALIDITY TO WHATEVER AGREEMENTS WERE REACHED.

8. KHARMA WAS PRESSED HARD ON WHAT WOULD HAPPEN AT THE BORDERS ON DAY ONE FOLLOWING ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL. HE SAID THIS WOULD DEPEND ON AGREED INTERIM ARRANGEMENTS. HE WAS NOT CLEAR IF THESE ARRANGEMENTS WOULD BE CONCLUDED BEFORE OR AFTER THE DEPARTURE OF THE ISRAELI FORCES FROM LEBANON. WITHOUT COMMITTING HIMSELF TO

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KHARMA'S SCENARIO, KIMCHE DESCRIBED HOW HE THOUGHT THE PROCESS COULD EVOLVE DRAWING ON KHARMA'S APPROACH. FIRST, EXPERTS COULD CONVENE IMMEDIATELY, --KIMCHE SUGGESTED AT THE THURSDAY MEETING IN KIRYAT SHMONA, -- TO DRAW UP AN INTERIM AGREEMENT, WHICH COULD POSSIBLY BE CONTAINED IN A SEPARATE LETTER. THIS INTERIM AGREEMENT WOULD INCLUDE AS MUCH SUBSTANTIVE MATERIAL CONCERNING MOVEMENT OF GOODS AND PEOPLE AS POSSIBLE (E.G., LISTS OF ITEMS AND TARIFF CHARGES, NUMBER OF BORDER CROSSINGS). THE EXPERTS WOULD THEN RECONVENE IN SIX MONTHS TO DRAW UP THE FINAL AGREEMENT. KIMCHE ASKED IF KHARMA FORSAW A CLEAR STATEMENT ON THE MOVEMENT OF GOODS AND PEOPLE IN THE AGREEMENT ITSELF. KHARMA REPLIED IT WAS PART OF HIS THINKING THAT LEBANON WOULD COMMIT ITSELF IN THE AGREEMENT TO REACH A SUBSEQUENT AGREEMENT ON THE MOVEMENT OF GOODS AND PERSONS.

9. WHEN PRESSED ON THE EXACT PARAMETERS OF WHAT MIGHT BE CONTAINED IN INTERIM AGREEMENT, KHARMA GAVE NO CLEAR INDICATION, SAYING SIMPLY THAT THIS WOULD DEPEND ON THE DECISIONS OF THE TWO GOVERNMENTS. IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION ON THE MOVEMENT OF PERSONS, KHARMA SAID HE DID NOT HAVE ANY SPECIFIC IDEAS ON THIS SUBJECT. (IN A SEPARATE SIDE CONVERSATION, KHARMA TOLD DRAPER HE HAD NO INSTRUCTIONS ON THIS POINT.) KIMCHE AND RUBENSTEIN SAID THERE SHOULD BE NO MISUNDERSTANDING OF THE ISRAELI POSITION ON THESE POINTS. THE ISRAELIS WANTED TO HAVE A NON-DISCRIMINATORY REGIME ACROSS THE BORDER, BOTH AS IT PERTAINED TO THE MOVEMENT OF GOODS AND PEOPLE. THEY SET ASIDE AS A NON-STARTER CERTAIN SUGGESTIONS THEY HAD HEARD (A NOT TOO VEILED ALLUSION TO AMBASSADOR HABIB'S NON-PAPER) THAT ONLY

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EXDIS -- SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MILITARY ADDRESSEES

CERTAIN CATEGORIES OF PEOPLE OR COMMUNITIES, SUCH AS PILGRIMS, THE SICK, OR DAY LABORERS, COULD CROSS THE BORDER. FROM THE ISRAELI PERSPECTIVE, ANY LEBANESE OR ISRAELI CITIZEN CARRYING A PROPER PASSPORT AND VISA OUGHT TO BE ABLE TO TRAVEL BETWEEN LEBANON AND ISRAEL.

10. IN CONCLUDING THE DISCUSSION ON THIS POINT, IT WAS AGREED THAT AMBASSADOR KHARMA WOULD TRY HIS HAND

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IN DRAFTING A NEW TEXT. KHARMA ALSO SAID HE WOULD CONSULT WITH HIS GOVERNMENT ON THE ISRAELI PROPOSAL TO HAVE ECONOMIC EXPERTS MEET AT KIRYAT SHMONA ON THURSDAY. (AS MIGHT BE EXPECTED, KHARMA IS UNENTHUSIASTIC ABOUT THE ISRAELI PROPOSAL THAT EXPERTS BEGIN DISCUSSIONS NOW ON ARRANGMENTS FOR THE MOVEMENT OF PERSONS AND GOODS, AND WE DOUBT HIS GOVERNMENT WILL ACCEPT IT.)
OTHER ITEMS ON MUTUAL RELATIONS

11. AFTER THIS DISCUSSION, THE ISRAELI SIDE BEGAN TO RAISE OTHER SUBJECTS ON THE MUTUAL RELATIONS AGENDA. KIMCHE FIRST PROPOSED THAT FOUR AREAS OF COOPERATION

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BETWEEN POLICE FORCES SHOULD BE ADDRESSED, NAMELY IN THE FIELDS OF DRUGS, SMUGGLING (INCLUDING ARMS), CRIME AND BORDER CONTROL. HE URGED THAT MEETINGS OF EXPERTS BE CONVENED WITHOUT DELAY IN A COMPLETELY INFORMAL ENVIRONMENT, ADDING THIS WOULD BE IN THE INTEREST OF BOTH GOVERNMENTS. KHARMA SAID HE WOULD DISCUSS THIS REQUEST WITH HIS GOVERNMENT.

12. IN THE AFTERNOON SESSION, KIMCHE READ THE LANGUAGE FROM PARAGRAPHS 5 AND 6 OF THE ISRAELI DRAFT ANNEX (REF D) CONCERNING COMMUNICATIONS AND MAIL, NOTING THIS AREA CONSTITUTED A VITAL PART OF ANY DISCUSSION OF MUTUAL RELATIONS. RUBINSTEIN NOTED THAT LEBANON HAD EXPRESSED RESERVATIONS WITH RESPECT TO ISRAEL IN VARIOUS INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS TO WHICH IT WAS SIGNATORY. AS LEBANON AND ISRAEL ENTERED A "NEW ERA," RUBINSTEIN ARGUED IT WAS ONLY LOGICAL FOR THESE RESERVATIONS TO BE DROPPED AND SUGGESTED THAT THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS

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EXPERTS SHOULD ALSO MEET ON THIS SUBJECT IN ORDER TO REACH AS MUCH SUBSTANTIVE AGREEMENT AS POSSIBLE BEFORE ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL. AGAIN, AMBASSADOR KHARMA AGREED TO SUBMIT THE ISRAELI PROPOSAL TO HIS GOVERNMENT. (KHARMA ADDED THAT IT MIGHT BE ALSO USEFUL TO ADDRESS "AT SOME POINT" THE ISSUES OF THE SAFETY OF AIR LANES AND THE RESCUE OF DISTRESSED PEOPLE AT SEA.)

13. AT ONE POINT IN THE DISCUSSION, KIMCHE EVEN SUGGESTED AN UNOFFICIAL MEETING OF BANKING EXPERTS, SAYING THIS WAS AN AREA IN WHICH ISRAEL MIGHT PROFITABLY LEARN FROM LEBANON'S EXPERTISE. KHARMA THANKED KIMCHE FOR HIS COMPLIMENT AND PROCEEDED TO PRESENT AN EXTENDED ANALYSIS OF THE REASONS FOR LEBANON'S BANKING SUCCESS.

14. FINALLY, KIMCHE READ THE LANGUAGE OF PARAGRAPH IV OF ISRAEL'S DRAFT GENERAL AGREEMENT CONCERNING MULTINATIONAL CONVENTIONS, INCLUDING AVIATION AGREEMENTS (REF D). KIMCHE AND RUBINSTEIN ARGUED THAT LEBANON SHOULD WITHDRAW ITS STANDARD ARAB RESERVATION TO ILLEGAL CONVENTIONS WHICH RENDER THOSE CONVENTIONS INAPPLICABLE TO ISRAEL. REFERRING TO AVIATION AGREEMENTS, RUBINSTEIN SUGGESTED THAT ISRAELI AND LEBANESE TECHNICAL EXPERTS MEET IMMEDIATELY TO RESOLVE LANDING RIGHTS, AIR CLEARANCES, AND

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OTHER TECHNICAL QUESTIONS RELATED TO AVIATION.
AGAIN, KHARMA UNDERTOOK TO REFER THE PROPOSAL
TO HIS GOVERNMENT.

15. COMMENT: THE TONE OF THE MEETING CONTINUED TO BE
FRIENDLY AND BASICALLY POSITIVE. HOWEVER, KHARMA,
EVEN WHILE CONTINUOUSLY QUALIFYING HIS REMARKS AS

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EXDIS -- SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MILITARY ADDRESSEES

"PERSONAL AND INFORMAL," MAY BE GIVING THE IMPRESSION
OF GREATER LEBANESE LATITUDE THAN ACTUALLY EXISTS
BY HIS REFERENCES TO "INTERIM ARRANGEMENTS". HOW FAR
HE MAY BE STRAYING WILL BECOME CLEARER IN OUR NEXT
MEETINGS. END COMMENT. LEWIS

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ERRORS= N/A

CONCEPTS= COMMITTEE, MEETING, RELATIONS ESTABLISHMENT, DIPLOMATIC PRIVILEGE

TAGS= PREL, MOPS, MARR, LE, US, IS, XF, (DRAPER, MORRIS)

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FROM DRAPER

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, MOPS, MARR, LE, US, IS, XF

SUBJECT: DRAPER MISSION: THIRD SUBCOMMITTEE SESSION

— ON MUTUAL RELATIONS, JANUARY 31

REF: A) BEIRUT 861, B) TEL AVIV 1406

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1. [REDACTED]
2. SUMMARY: ON LIAISON, AMBASSADOR KHARMA PRESENTED A LEBANESE COUNTERDRAFT WHICH THE ISRAELIS SAID THEY WOULD STUDY. THE ISRAELIS REITERATED THEIR POSITION FOR A SEPARATE LIAISON OFFICE IN THE "BEIRUT AREA" AND THE NECESSITY FOR IMMUNITIES FOR STAFF AND VISITING OFFICIALS. IT WAS AGREED EXPERTS WOULD ALSO DISCUSS THE IMMUNITIES ISSUE THIS WEEK. BOTH SIDES WENT OVER FAMILIAR GROUND IN DESCRIBING THEIR RESPECTIVE POSITIONS ON THE "MOVEMENT OF GOODS AND PEOPLE." AMBASSADOR KHARMA INTRODUCED THE CONCEPT OF "AD HOC INTERIM" ARRANGEMENTS TO POSSIBLY COVER THE PERIOD UNTIL THE TRIPARTITE COMMITTEE CONVENED AFTER SIX MONTHS TO DISCUSS THIS SUBJECT. IN RESPONSE TO AN ISRAELI INQUIRY, KHARMA SAID HE DID NOT SEE SUCH INTERIM ARRANGEMENTS COMING INTO EFFECT UNTIL ABOUT THIRTY DAYS AFTER THE ISRAELI DEPARTURE. THE TENOR OF THE DISCUSSION IN THIS WORKING GROUP CONTINUED TO BE BASICALLY CONSTRUCTIVE, DESPITE THE CHASM BETWEEN THE PARTIES ON THE "GOODS AND PEOPLE" ISSUE. END SUMMARY
3. AMBASSADOR KHARMA HEADED THE LEBANESE SIDE, ASSISTED BY AMBASSADOR AMINE AND A NEWLY APPOINTED

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ECONOMIC ADVISOR, DR. NASIR, A PROFESSOR AND PRIVATE CONSULTANT, DAVID KIMCHE, ELI RUBINSTEIN, ALAN BAKER AND OTHERS REPRESENTED ISRAEL. AMB. DRAPER, HARE, AND KRECZKO MADE UP THE AMERICAN TEAM.

HOSTILE PROPAGANDA

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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4. THIS ISSUE WAS BRIEFLY DISCUSSED. KHARMA SAID THAT LEBANON WAS REVIEWING ITS VARIOUS REGIONAL UNDERTAKINGS WHICH COULD BEAR ON THIS SUBJECT, AND MIGHT COME UP WITH ANOTHER FORMULATION ON THE CANCELLATION OF LAWS AND REGULATIONS INCOMPATIBLE WITH THIS ARTICLE (REF B, PARA 6). KIMCHE SAID HE WOULD HAVE NO PROBLEM AS LONG AS THIS SUBJECT WAS TAKEN CARE OF ONE WAY OR THE OTHER.
LIAISON

5. AMBASSADOR KHARMA INTRODUCED A LEBANESE COUNTER-DRAFT TO THE ISRAELI PROPOSAL SUBMITTED AT THE LAST MEETING IN KIRYAT SHEMONA (REF B, PARA 5).

TEXT OF LEBANESE DRAFT: QUOTE:


LIAISON

— UPON THE ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THIS AGREEMENT, A TRIPARTITE LIAISON COMMITTEE WILL BE ESTABLISHED AND WILL BE ENTRUSTED WITH THE IMPLEMENTATION OF ALL THE AREAS COVERED BY THIS AGREEMENT.

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— THE TRIPARTITE LIAISON COMMITTEE WILL ADDRESS
ITSELF, AND ON A CONTINUING BASIS, TO THE
DEVELOPMENT OF THE MUTUAL RELATIONS OF THE PARTIES
IN THE LIGHT OF THEIR RESPECTIVE INTERESTS AND IN
A MANNER THAT WILL REFLECT AND SERVE THE PROMOTION



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OLIAISON

OF REGIONAL PEACE AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY IN
THE MIDDLE EAST.

-- THE PRESENT MILITARY LIAISON COMMITTEE WILL BECOME
AN INTEGRAL PART OF THIS TRIPARTITE LIAISON COM-
MITTEE.

-- THE MILITARY LIAISON COMMITTEE WILL CONTINUE ITS



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CURRENT ACTIVITIES AND WILL BE ENTRUSTED WITH
ADDITIONAL AND SPECIFIC MILITARY TASKS DEFINED BY
THIS AGREEMENT OR BY ITS ANNEXES: SUPERVISION OF
WITHDRAWALS - SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS - OTHER QUES-
TIONS RELEVANT TO SECURITY AND INFORMATION ON
MATTERS THAT MAY CONSTITUTE A THREAT TO THE SECURITY
OF ONE OF THE PARTIES.

-- THE TRIPARTITE LIAISON COMMITTEE WILL MEET IN
LEBANON OR ISRAEL, AS NEED ARISES.

-- EACH PARTY MAY, IF IT SO DESIRES, MAINTAIN A

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TEMPORARY LIAISON OFFICE, ON THE TERRITORY OF THE OTHER PARTY.

-- ALL PROBLEMS RELATING TO THESE TEMPORARY LIAISON OFFICES AND THEIR STAFF WILL BE THE OBJECT OF A SEPARATE ARRANGEMENT TO BE AGREED UPON AMONG THE PARTIES AT A LATER STAGE. END QUOTE

6. KIMCHE REPLIED HE WAS INTERESTED IN SUBSTANCE AND REITERATED THE ISRAELI POSITION THAT A) THERE SHOULD BE A SEPARATE ISRAELI LIAISON OFFICE, B) THE OFFICE SHOULD BE LOCATED IN THE BEIRUT AREA, AND C) THE OFFICIALS AND STAFF SHOULD HAVE SOME FORM OF IMMUNITY. KHARMA SAID LEBANON WAS CONCERNED ABOUT SECURITY FOR THE OFFICE. ON IMMUNITIES, HE GAVE AN ELABORATE DESCRIPTION OF THE COMPLEXITIES OF THE ISSUE, DRAWING ON HIS OWN INVOLVEMENT IN DRAFTING VARIOUS HEADQUARTERS AGREEMENTS. IN THE END, IT WAS AGREED THAT EXPERTS WOULD MEET TO DISCUSS THE IMMUNITIES ISSUE THIS WEEK. KIMCHE COMMENTED THAT IF THE LEBANESE WANTED TO PUT

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IMMUNITIES IN A SEPARATE LETTER, THIS WOULD NOT BE A PROBLEM. DRAPER CONCURRED THAT THIS MIGHT BE ONE WAY TO HANDLE THE ISSUE, IF IT PROVED TO BE TOO TROUBLESOME.

7. WITH RESPECT TO KHARMA'S DRAFT, KIMCHE ALSO TOOK EXCEPTION TO THE USE OF THE WORD "TEMPORARY" TO DESCRIBE THE ISRAELI LIAISON OFFICE, ADDING THAT IF THIS PHRASEOLOGY WERE USED, ISRAEL WOULD INSIST ON INSERTING "UNTIL DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WERE ESTABLISHED." KHARMA REPLIED THIS ADDITION WOULD BE UNACCEPTABLE TO HIS GOVERNMENT BUT PROMISED TO REFLECT ON THIS POINT FURTHER, POSSIBLY BY TYING THE LIFE OF THE LIAISON OFFICE TO THE DURATION OF

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THE TRIPARTITE COMMISSION. KIMCHE ALSO POINTED
OUT THAT THE DESCRIPTION OF THE MILITARY

LIAISON SYSTEM MIGHT HAVE TO BE MODIFIED
AND HANDLED IN A DIFFERENT WAY IN LIGHT OF THE
WORK OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS,
WHICH WAS ALSO ADDRESSING THIS ISSUE.
MOVEMENT OF GOODS AND PEOPLE

8. KHARMA REVIEWED FAMILIAR LEBANESE POSITIONS,
NAMELY LEBANON'S ECONOMIC DEPENDENCE ON THE ARAB

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WORLD AND THAT LEBANON COULD NOT NEGOTIATE WHILE ISRAELI FORCES CONTINUED TO OCCUPY LEBANESE SOIL. HOWEVER, HE EMPHASIZED THAT LEBANON WAS PREPARED TO DISCUSS ECONOMIC ISSUES IN GOOD FAITH IN ORDER TO ARRIVE AT RATIONAL, BALANCED, MUTUALLY PROFITABLE RELATIONSHIPS. HE SAID THIS MUST BE LOOKED AT OVER THE LONG TERM, IF THESE CONCEPTS WERE TO BE TRANSLATED INTO PRACTICAL TERMS.

9. KIMCHE HAMMERED ON THE THEME OF CANCELLING THE ECONOMIC BOYCOTT, IF ANYTHING CONCRETE WAS TO EMERGE FROM THESE DISCUSSIONS. HE SUGGESTED THAT WHAT WAS REQUIRED WAS TO DISCUSS ALL OF THE SPECIFIC POINTS ON THE ECONOMIC AGENDA AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, EVEN BEFORE AN OVERALL AGREEMENT WAS REACHED. HE URGED THAT EXPERTS SIT DOWN IMMEDIATELY, EVEN DURING THE PRESENT WEEK, TO BEGIN DISCUSSION OF THE ISSUES. KHARMA REPEATED HIS POSITION THAT DISCUSSIONS SHOULD BEGIN SIX MONTHS AFTER ISRAEL'S DEPARTURE, THOUGH HE ADDED SOME AD HOC INTERIM ARRANGEMENTS COULD BE MADE. KIMCHE ASKED SPECIFICALLY WHAT KHARA ENVISAGED WOULD BE IN PLACE ON THE DAY AFTER EVACUATION. KHARMA REPLIED THAT HE DID NOT EXPECT TO SEE ANYTHING IN PLACE WITH RESPECT TO GOODS AND PEOPLE UNTIL POSSIBLY THIRTY DAYS AFTER THE DEPARTURE OF THE ISRAELI FORCES. KHARMA STRESSED THAT THE SIX MONTH TIME FRAME WAS HIS MOST IMPORTANT POINT. IT WOULD BE USELESS FOR LEBANON TO BECOME ENGAGED IN ADVANCE, EXPECT POSSIBLY IN FASHIONING AD HOC INTERIM ARRANGEMENTS. LEWIS

SUSPECTED DUPLICATE.....

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LOCATOR= TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM

ERRORS= N/A

CONCEPTS= TERMINATION, WAR, COMMITTEE, TROOP DEPLOYMENT, RECOGNITION, ANTITERRORIST

TAGS= PREL, PBTS, MOPS, MARR, LE, US, IS, SY, XF, PLO, (DRAPER, MORRIS)

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IM/IPS/CR/IR

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4. RUBINSTEIN, FATTAL AND KRECZKO MET JANUARY 31 IN SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERMINATION OF STATE OF WAR TO HEAR ISRAELI PROPOSALS ON "RELATED" ISSUES.

5. FIRST RELATED ISSUE RELATES TO THE STATIONING ON LEBANESE TERRITORY OF HOSTILE, FOREIGN FORCES. RUBINSTEIN PROPOSED THE FOLLOWING TEXT: "SUBJECT TO THE AGREED SECURITY PROVISIONS, EACH PARTY WILL PREVENT ENTRY INTO, DEPLOYMENT IN OR PASSAGE THROUGH ITS TERRITORY BY FOREIGN MILITARY FORCES FROM ANY STATE

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WHICH DOES NOT MAINTAIN DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH BOTH PARTIES, OR FROM A STATE PARTY TO A REGIONAL MILITARY PACT OTHER MEMBERS OF WHICH DO NOT MAINTAIN DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH BOTH PARTIES." FATTAL SAID THAT HE BELIEVED THIS ISSUE SHOULD BE ADDRESSED IN THE MILITARY COMMITTEE, AND RUBINSTEIN AGREED. (NOTE THAT ISRAELI FORMULA, WHICH IS DESIGNED TO EXCLUDE EGYPT, WOULD ALSO APPEAR TO EXCLUDE NATO MEMBERS.)

6. SECOND RELATED ISSUE IS A GENERAL COMMITMENT TO PREVENT TERRORIST ACTS AND TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS, AND TO ABROGATE PRIOR INCONSISTENT AGREEMENTS, SUCH AS THE CAIRO AND MELKART ACCORDS. RUBINSTEIN PROPOSED THE FOLLOWING TEXT: "THE TERRITORY OF EACH PARTY WILL NEVER BE USED AS A BASE FOR HOSTILE OR TERRORIST ACTIVITY AGAINST THE OTHER PARTY, ITS TERRITORY AND PEOPLE ANYWHERE. TO THIS END THE PARTIES RECIPROCALLY UNDERTAKE TO PROHIBIT AND TO PREVENT THE EXISTENCE, ORGANIZATION, SETTING UP OR FUNCTIONING WITHIN THEIR RESPECTIVE TERRITORY, OF ANY GROUP, ORGANIZATION, ARMED BANDS, MERCENARIES OR INDIVIDUALS, OR OF ANY RELATED BASE, OFFICE OR INFRASTRUCTURE, AIMED AT THREATENING OR ENDANGERING THE SECURITY OF THE OTHER PARTY OR THE WELFARE AND SAFETY OF ITS POPULATION. TO THIS END, ALL AGREEMENTS, ACCORDS AND ARRANGEMENTS ENABLING THE PRESENCE AND FUNCTIONING ON THEIR RESPECTIVE

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TERRITORIES OF SUCH ELEMENTS HOSTILE TO THE OTHER
PARTY ARE NULL AND VOID.

"EACH PARTY UNDERTAKES TO REFRAIN FROM INSTIGATING,,
PLANNING, ORGANIZING OR PARTICIPATING IN THREATS OR
ACTS OF BELLIGERENCY, TERRORISM, SUBVERSION, INCITEMENT,

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HOSTILITY OR VIOLENCE, AGAINST THE PEOPLE AND PROPERTY
OF THE OTHER PARTY, AND TO ENSURE THAT SUCH THREATS
AND ACTS DO NOT ORIGINATE FROM AND ARE NOT INSTIGATED,
PLANNED OR ORGANIZED IN ITS TERRITORY.

" EACH PARTY UNDERTAKES TO ENSURE THAT PREVENTATIVE
ACTION AND DUE PROCEEDINGS WILL BE TAKEN AGAINST
PERSONS OR ORGANIZATIONS PERPETRATING ACTS IN VIOLATION
OF THIS PARAGRAPH."

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RUBINSTEIN ALSO SUGGESTED THE POSSIBILITY OF AN
EXTRADITION AGREEMENT TO IMPLETENT THE LAST PARAGRAPH
OF THE PROPOSAL. FATTAL SAID THAT THE GENERAL CONCEPT
OF RUBINSTEIN'S PROPOSAL WAS ACCEPTABLE, ALTHOUGH HE
WOULD WANT TO REVIEW THE LANGUAGE CAREFULLY, AND..
HE HAD RESERVATIONS REGARDING EXTRADITION. HE MENTIONED
THE POSSIBILITY OF DRAWING LANGUAGE FROM THE UN
DECLARATION ON FRIENDLY RELATIONS AMONG STATES, WHICH
ISRAEL AND LEBANON BOTH ACCEPTED. (SUBSEQUENTLY, FATTAL
INFORMED US PRIVATELY THAT LEBANON WILL PROPOSE

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ADDITIONAL PROVISIONS DRAWN FROM THIS DECLARATION CONCERNING NON-INTERFERENCE IN INTERNAL AFFAIRS).

7. THIRD RELATED ISSUE CONCERNS GENERAL PRINCIPLES TO GUIDE FUTURE RELATIONS, DRAWN FROM THE UN CHARTER (AND THE EGYPTIAN PEACE TREATY). RUBINSTEIN PROPOSED THE FOLLOWING TEXT: "THE PARTIES AFFIRM THAT IN THEIR MUTUAL RELATIONS THEY WILL BE GUIDED BY THE PRINCIPLES OF THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER AND THE PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW GOVERNING PEACEFUL RELATIONS AMONG STATES, IN PARTICULAR:

- A) THEY RECOGNIZE AND WILL RESPECT EACH OTHER'S
- SOVEREIGNTY, TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY AND POLITICAL
- INDEPENDENCE;

- B) THEY RECOGNIZE AND WILL RESPECT EACH OTHER'S
- RIGHT TO LIVE IN PEACE WITHIN SECURE AND
- RECOGNIZED BOUNDARIES;

- C) THEY WILL REFRAIN FROM THREAT AND AVOID THE
- USE OF FORCE, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, AGAINST

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- EACH OTHER AND WILL SETTLE ALL DISPUTES BETWEEN
- THEM BY PEACEFUL MEANS."

FATTAL DID NOT COMMENT.

8. FOURTH RELATED ISSUE IS THE PREAMBLE. FATTAL LAID DOWN A MARKER THAT A PREAMBLE IS NOT NECESSARY, BUT RUBINSTEIN REJOINED THAT THEY HELP SET THE TONE OF A DOCUMENT AND ARE USUAL IN A DOCUMENT "OF THIS CHARACTER." RUBINSTEIN PROPOSED THE FOLLOWING TEXT:

"THE GOVERNMENT OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL AND THE GOVERNMENT OF LEBANON:

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WITH A VIEW TO CONSOLIDATING PEACEFUL RELATIONS BETWEEN
ISRAEL AND LEBANON AND BETWEEN THEIR PEOPLES;

HAVING AGREED TO RECOGNIZE EACH OTHER'S SOVEREIGNTY AND
INDEPENDENCE WITHIN SECURE AND RECOGNIZED BOUNDARIES;

DESIRING TO ACHIEVE LASTING SECURITY FOR BOTH
COUNTRIES AND THEIR PEOPLES AND TO AVOID THREATS,
HOSTILITY AND SUFFERING BETWEEN THEM AND THEIR PEOPLES;

DESIRING TO ATTAIN NORMAL GOOD-NEIGHBOURLY RELATIONS
BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES AND THEIR PEOPLES;

9. FIFTH RELATED ISSUE IS EXPRESS MUTUAL RECOGNITION

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AND CONFIRMATION OF THE BOUNDARY. RUBINSTEIM PROPOSED
THE FOLLOWING TEXT:

" THE PARTIES AFFIRM THEIR MUTUAL RECOGNITION OF
EACH OTHER AND CONSIDER THE BOUNDARY BETWEEN THEM
INVIOABLE.

THE PARTIES AGREE TO CONSOLIDATE BETWEEN THEM AND THEIR
PEOPLES NORMAL GOOD-NEIGHBOURLY RELATIONS AND MUTUAL
UNDERSTANDING."

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FATTAL DID NOT COMMENT, PENDING EXAMINATION OF THE TEXT.

10. SIXTH RELATED ISSUE RELATES TO POSSIBLE INCONSISTENT UNDERTAKINGS BY LEBANON. IN THIS REGARD, RUBINSTEIN QUESTIONED WHETHER LEBANON IS A MEMBER OF THE ARAB DEFENSE PACT (IT IS), BUT HE DID NOT PURSUE THE ISSUE. HE PROPOSED THE FOLLOWING TEXT:

"THE PARTIES UNDERTAKE TO FULFILL IN GOOD FAITH THEIR OBLIGATIONS UNDER THIS AGREEMENT.

"THE PARTIES UNDERTAKE NOT TO ENTER INTO ANY OBLIGATION IN CONFLICT WITH THIS AGREEMENT AND TO ABROGATE, AS APPROPRIATE, ANY SUCH EXISTING OBLIGATION.

" SUBJECT TO ARTICLE 103 OF THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER, IN THE EVENT OF A CONFLICT BETWEEN THE OBLIGATIONS OF THE PARTIES UNDER THIS AGREEMENT AND ANY OF THEIR OTHER OBLIGATIONS, THE OBLIGATIONS UNDER THIS AGREEMENT WILL PREVAIL."

FATTAL SAID THAT THE ISSUE OF INCONSISTENT UNDERTAKINGS AND LEGISLATION HAD COME UP SEVERAL TIMES, AND HE THOUGHT IT WAS MOST PRACTICAL TO DEAL WITH IT ONCE, IN ONE PLACE.

11. FINAL RELATED ISSUE CONCERNS TECHNICAL PROVISIONS FOR ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THE AGREEMENT. RUBINSTEIN PROPOSED THE FOLLOWING TEXT:

"1. THIS AGREEMENT SUPERSEDES ALL PREVIOUS AGREEMENTS BETWEEN ISRAEL AND LEBANON.

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"2. THIS AGREEMENT WILL BE PRESENTED FOR RATIFICATION TO THE RESPECTIVE GOVERNMENTS, AND THE INSTRUMENTS OF RATIFICATION WILL BE EXCHANGED BY THE PARTIES WITHIN TEN DAYS OF ITS SIGNING, AND IT WILL ENTER INTO FORCE UPON EXCHANGE OF INSTRUMENTS OF RATIFICATION BY BOTH GOVERNMENTS.

"3. ALL ANNEXES ATTACHED TO THIS AGREEMENT SHALL BE REGARDED AS AN INTEGRAL PART HEREOF.

"4. THIS AGREEMENT SHALL BE COMMUNICATED TO THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS FOR REGISTRATION IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE 102 OF THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS.

"DONE AT THIS IN TRIPPLICATE IN HEBREAN, ARABIC AND ENGLISH, EACH TEXT BEING EQUALLY AUTHENTIC. IN CASE OF DIVERGENCE OF INTERPRETATION, THE ENGLISH TEXT SHALL PREVAIL."

FATTAL AGREED THAT SOME SUCH TECHNICAL PROVISIONS WOULD BE NEEDED, RESERVING HIS POSITION ON THE LANGUAGE (AND ALSO ON ENGLISH AS THE CONTROLLING TEXT).

12. COMMENT: AFTER THE MEETING, FATTAL TOLD US PRIVATELY THAT THE MOST DIFFICULT OF THE ISRAELI PROPOSALS WILL BE THAT FOR EXPLICIT RECOGNITION.

13. NOTE THAT IN ONE COMMITTEE OR ANOTHER, ISRAELIS

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HAVE NOW TABLED NEARLY ALL OF THE DRAFT TREATY WHICH
THEY PRESENTED TO HABIB ON JANUARY 18, WITH THE

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EXCEPTION OF THE SECURITY PROVISIONS AND THE ANNEXES.
END COMMENT. DILLON

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BEIRUT FOR AMBASSADOR DRAPER

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, MOPS, MARR, LE, US, IS, XF

SUBJECT: DRAPER MISSION: SECOND SUBCOMMITTEE SESSION
ON MUTUAL RELATIONS, JANUARY 27

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REF: BEIRUT 861

1. BEGIN SUMMARY: AT THE JANUARY 27 SESSION IN
KIRYAT SHEMONA, THE WORKING GROUP ON MUTUAL RELATIONS DISCUSSED
IN DETAIL "LIAISON" AND "HOSTILE PROPAGANDA" ISSUES. AN AGREED
AD REFERENDUM TEXT ON HOSTILE PROPAGANDA WAS REACHED AND DIFFERENCES
WERE NARROWED ON LIAISON ARRANGEMENTS. AMBASSADOR KHARMA ALSO PLACED
ON THE TABLE A LEBANESE COUNTER PROPOSAL ON THE "MOVEMENT OF GOODS
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PEOPLE," AFTER LACONICALLY DESCRIBING THE GAP BETWEEN THE LEBANESE AND ISRAELI POSITIONS AS "HUGE" ON THIS POINT. TIME DID NOT PERMIT FURTHER DISCUSSION OF THIS CONTENTIOUS ISSUE. OVERALL, THE TONE OF THE DECISION WAS CONSTRUCTIVE IN THIS WORKING GROUP. END SUMMARY.

2. LIAISON

THE DISCUSSION FOCUSED ON THE ISRAELI DESIRE TO HAVE A SEPARATE LIAISON OFFICE IN THE BEIRUT AREA. KIMCHE SAID THE U.S. AND LEBANON COULD HAVE BUILDINGS IN THE SAME AREA AS THE ISRAELI LIAISON OFFICE BUT DID NOT WANT TO HAVE ALL PARTIES HOUSED IN THE SAME BUILDING. KHARMA COUNTERED THAT LEBANON THOUGHT IT WOULD BE BETTER FOR SECURITY REASONS TO HAVE ALL DELEGATIONS IN ONE BUILDING BUT IF ISRAEL INSISTED ON A SEPARATE OFFICE, WHICH HE SAID COULD BE IN THE "VICINITY OF BEIRUT," HE WOULD "REFLECT POSITIVELY" ON THE MATTER IN HIS CONSULTATIONS WITH HIS GOVERNMENT. DRAPER SAID WE WERE OPEN-MINDED ON THIS QUESTION AND NOTED THE U.S. WOULD PROBABLY NOT NEED SEPARATE OFFICES APART FROM ITS EMBASSY IN BEIRUT.

1. BEGIN SUMMARY: AT THE JANUARY 27 SESSION IN KIRYAT SHEMONA, THE WORKING GROUP ON MUTUAL RELATIONS DISCUSSED IN DETAIL "LIAISON" AND "HOSTILE PROPAGANDA"

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ISSUES. AN AGREED AD REFERENDUM TEXT ON HOSTILE PROPAGANDA WAS REACHED AND DIFFERENCES WERE NARROWED ON LIAISON ARRANGEMENTS. AMBASSADOR KHARMA ALSO PLACED ON THE TABLE A LEBANESE COUNTER PROPOSAL ON THE "MOVEMENT OF GOODS AND PEOPLE," AFTER LACONICALLY DESCRIBING THE GAP BETWEEN THE LEBANESE AND ISRAELI POSITIONS AS "HUGE" ON THIS POINT. TIME DID NOT PERMIT FURTHER DISCUSSION OF THIS CONTENTIOUS ISSUE. OVERALL, THE TONE OF THE DECISION WAS CONSTRUCTIVE IN THIS WORKING GROUP. END SUMMARY.

3. SECOND, THE ISSUE OF IMMUNITIES FOR STAFF AND VISITING OFFICIALS WAS ADDRESSED. KHARMA SAID HIS GOVERNMENT REJECTED THE ISRAELI FORMULATION WHICH DESCRIBED IMMUNITIES AND PRIVILEGES AS BEING EQUIVALENT TO THOSE ENJOYED BY DIPLOMATIC PERSONNEL. HOWEVER, HE SAID HE UNDERSTOOD THE ISRAELI RATIONALE FOR WANTING IMMUNITIES AND INDICATED HIS GOVERNMENT WAS EXPLORING VARIOUS POSSIBILITIES, INCLUDING THOSE PROVIDED IN THE 1969 CONVENTION FOR NON-DIPLOMATIC STAFF. KIMCHE SAID HE UNDERSTOOD KHARMA'S POINT ON DIPLOMATIC EQUIVALENCY AND EXPRESSED SATISFACTION THAT THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT WAS LOOKING AT THE IMMUNITIES ISSUE POSITIVELY.

4. THIRD, THERE WAS A LENGTHY DISCUSSION OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE "JOINT COMMITTEE," WHICH

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THE LEBANESE ALWAYS REFERRED TO AS THE "TRIPARTITE COMMITTEE," AND THE MILITARY LIAISON SYSTEM. DRAWING ON THE LEBANESE DRAFT LANGUAGE PRESENTED AT THE JANUARY 24 MEETING (REFTEL), KHARMA ARGUED THAT IT WAS ONLY LOGICAL TO VIEW THE COMMITTEE AS HAVING BROAD SUPERVISORY RESPONSIBILITIES FOR ALL AREAS COVERED IN THE AGREEMENT, INCLUDING THOSE PERTAINING TO SECURITY AND MILITARY MATTERS. HE, THEREFORE, WANTED TO HAVE THE MILITARY LIAISON SYSTEM EXPLICITLY LINKED TO THE TRIPARTITE COMMITTEE. KIMCHE ARGUED THAT THE MILITARY LIAISON SYSTEM WOULD FOCUS PRINCIPALLY ON THE SOUTH

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AND THAT SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS WERE IN REALITY A SEPARATE ACTIVITY. MOREOVER, HE ADDED THAT IF ONE WERE TO ACCEPT KHARMA'S POINT ON LINKAGE, WHICH IN HIS VIEW GAVE UNDUE WEIGHT TO THE MILITARY-SECURITY

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RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE COMMITTEE, IT WOULD BE NECESSARY TO BALANCE THE LANGUAGE OF THE TEXT BY IDENTIFYING EXPLICITLY THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC MANDATE OF THE COMMITTEE. KIMCHE ASSUMED, HOWEVER, THAT THIS WOULD POSE DIFFICULTIES FOR THE LEBANESE SIDE. AFTER FURTHER DISCUSSION, KIMCHE PRESENTED A COMPROMISE TEXT ON LIAISON ARRANGEMENTS INCORPORATING POINTS FROM BOTH SIDES, WHICH HE HOPED KHARMA WOULD STUDY AND USE AS THE BASIS FOR DISCUSSION AT THE NEXT MEETING. KHARMA DECLINED TO MAKE ANY PRIOR COMMITMENT, SAYING HE WISHED TO FIRST REVIEW AND REFLECT ON THE VARIOUS

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TEXTS WHICH HAD BEEN SUBMITTED. HE NOTED, HOWEVER, THAT THERE SEEMED TO BE SUBSTANTIAL AGREEMENT ON THE SUBSTANCE OF LIAISON ARRANGEMENTS BETWEEN THE DELEGATIONS.

5. TEXT OF ISRAELI DRAFT:

QUOTE: THE PARTIES WILL RESPECTIVELY MAINTAIN A LIAISON REPRESENTATION IN EACH OTHER'S COUNTRY TO ASSIST IN THE DEVELOPMENT AND FACILITATION OF THEIR MUTUAL RELATIONS. THE STAFF AND RELATED PERSONNEL ON OFFICIAL DUTY IN THE HOST COUNTRY WILL BE ACCORDED THOSE ACCEPTED PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES WHICH WILL ENABLE THE DUE FULFILLMENT OF THEIR TASKS.

THE PRESENT MILITARY LIAISON COMMITTEE WILL BECOME AN INTEGRAL PART OF A JOINT COMMITTEE THAT WILL BE ESTABLISHED IN ORDER TO SUPERVISE THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS AGREEMENT. THE COMMITTEE WILL MAINTAIN CONTINUOUS CONTACTS AND DISCUSSIONS AND WILL DEAL WITH ALL MATTERS ARISING BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES. END QUOTE.

6. HOSTILE PROPAGANDA

AGREEMENT WAS REACHED RATHER QUICKLY ON AN AD REFERENDUM TEXT ON THIS ITEM. KHARMA'S PRINCIPAL OBJECTION WAS TO THE SWEEPING NATURE OF THAT PART OF THE ISRAELI FORMULATION WHICH HAD SAID LAWS AND REGULATIONS INCOMPATIBLE WITH THE SPIRIT OF THE AGREEMENT WILL BE CANCELLED. KHARMA ARGUED THE

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ISRAELI POSITION AS DESCRIBED WOULD IN EFFECT APPLY TO ALL PARTS OF THE AGREEMENT, AND NOT JUST THIS ITEM, AND WAS, THEREFORE, MUCH TOO COMPREHENSIVE. KIMCHE REPLIED THAT HE UNDERSTOOD KHARMA'S POSITION ON THE NEED FOR MORE RESTRICTIVE LANGUAGE AND THE FOLLOWING COMPROMISE AD REFERENDUM LANGUAGE WAS AGREED TO:

QUOTE: IN A SPIRIT CONSISTENT WITH THE TERMINATION OF THE STATE OF WAR, THE PARTIES WILL ABSTAIN FROM HOSTILE PROPAGANDA AND INCITEMENT AGAINST EACH OTHER WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THEIR CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, AND WILL CANCEL LAWS AND REGULATIONS INCOMPATIBLE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THIS ARTICLE. END QUOTE.

7. MOVEMENT OF GOODS AND PEOPLE

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KHARMA OPENED DISCUSSION ON THIS AGENDA ITEM BY SAYING THERE WAS A "HUGE GAP" IN THE RESPECTIVE POSITIONS OF THE TWO PARTIES. HE SAID THIS WAS AN ISSUE OF GREAT DELICACY AND REFERRED TO THE FRAGILITY OF LEBANON'S ECONOMY WHICH HE DESCRIBED AS VERY MUCH INTERTWINED WITH THE ARAB WORLD. HE SPECIFICALLY NOTED THAT 60-70 PERCENT OF LEBANON'S TRADE AND SERVICES WAS WITH ARAB STATES, WHICH PLACED A GREAT CONSTRAINT ON LEBANON. HE ALSO ARGUED THAT LEBANON HAD GREAT DIFFICULTY IN DOING ANYTHING IN THIS SPHERE AS LONG AS ISRAELI TROOPS WERE IN LEBANON AND CURRENT ISRAELI PRACTICE CAUSED GREAT DAMAGE TO LEBANON'S ECONOMY. IN HIS VIEW, IT WAS NECESSARY TO PUT THIS SUBJECT IN A DIFFERENT TIME FRAME FROM THAT SUGGESTED BY ISRAEL WHICH CALLED

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AMEMBASSY TUNIS PRIORITY
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN PRIORITY

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SECTION 03 OF 03 TEL AVIV 01406

EXDIS

FOR INSTANT ACTION ON ALL FRONTS. AFTER HEARING KHARMA'S COUNTER PROPOSAL, KIMCHE OBSERVED THAT KHARMA'S DESCRIPTION OF A "HUGE GAP" WAS AN UNDER-STATEMENT. TIME DID NOT HOWEVER PERMIT FURTHER DISCUSSION.

--

8. TEXT OF THE LEBANESE COUNTER DRAFT:

QUOTE: SIX MONTHS AFTER THE COMPLETE EVACUATION OF ALL ISRAELI FORCES FROM LEBANON AND THE EFFECTIVE

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CONSOLIDATION OF THE LEBANESE AUTHORITY ALONG THE LEBANESE SIDE OF THE INTERNATIONALLY RECOGNIZED BOUNDARY BETWEEN LEBANON AND ISRAEL, AND IN LIGHT OF THE NEWLY ESTABLISHED TERMINATION OF THE STATE OF WAR, THE PARTIES SHALL INITIATE WITHIN THE TRIPARTITE COMMITTEE, THE EXPLORATION OF POSSIBLE FUTURE RELATIONS PERTAINING TO THE MOVEMENT OF GOODS, PRODUCTS AND PERSONS ON THE BASIS OF THE COLLECTION AND EXCHANGE OF ALL PERTINENT DATA DURING THE INTERIM PERIOD. UNQUOTE.

--

LEWIS

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PAGE 01
ACTION SS-25

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AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY JIDDA PRIORITY

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Date: 11/4/97

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SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 00786

DECAPTIONED

FROM DRAPER

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, MOPS, LE, US, IS, XF

SUBJECT: HABIB/DRAPER MISSION: LATEST LEBANESE

-- WORKING PAPER

1. [REDACTED]
2. IN A MEETING BETWEEN AMBASSADORS HABIB, DRAPER AND DILLON AND LEBANESE WORKING TEAM JANUARY 21 (SEPTTEL), FONMIN SALEM PROVIDED AMB. HABIB WITH A NEW PAPER, WHICH HE SAID WOULD PROBABLY GUIDE THE POSITIONS OF THE LEBANESE NEGOTIATING TEAM. AS WITH HIS PREVIOUS PAPER, SALEM SAID THAT HIS DRAFT WAS "UNOFFICIAL," IN THAT IT HAD NOT YET BEEN APPROVED BY THE PRIME MINISTER OF PRESIDENT.

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WE EXPECT THAT THE THRUST OF THIS PAPER -- OR A SIMILAR ONE -- WILL BE FOLLOWED BY THE LEBANESE DELEGATION OVER THE NEXT SESSION OR TWO.

3. TEXT FOLLOWS:
GUIDELINES FOR DISCUSSION

I. INTRODUCTION

-- 1. RELATIONS BETWEEN LEBANON AND ISRAEL HAVE BEEN GOVERNED SINCE MARCH 23, 1949, BY THE ISRAELI-LEBANESE GENERAL ARMISTICE AGREEMENT. THE AGREEMENT GUARANTEED "THE RIGHT OF EACH PARTY TO ITS SECURITY AND FREEDOM FROM FEAR OF ATTACK BY THE ARMED FORCES OF THE OTHER..." THE EXECUTION OF THE AGREEMENT WAS SUPERVISED BY A MIXED ARMISTICE COMMISSION OF FIVE HEADED BY THE U.N. CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE TRUCE SUPERVISION ORGANIZATION (UNTSO).

-- THE AGREEMENT WAS TO BE IN FORCE UNTIL A "PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT BETWEEN THE PARTIES IS ACHIEVED." THE PARTIES "MAY, BY MUTUAL CONSENT, REVISE THE AGREEMENT OR SUSPEND ITS APPLICATION, OTHER THAN ARTICLE I AND III, AT ANY TIME."

-- THE AGREEMENT WAS COMMUNICATED TO THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE U.N. FOR TRANSMISSION TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND TO THE U.N. CONCILIATION COMMISSION ON PALESTINE. THE AGREEMENT SUCCEEDED IN THAT IT PREVENTED, FOR A LONG TIME, AGGRESSIVE ACTION BY THE ARMED FORCES OF EITHER PARTY. LEBANON ADHERED STRICTLY TO ITS OBLIGATIONS; AND INSPITE OF THE ARAB-ISRAELI WARS OF 1956, 1967, AND 1973, LEBANON

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AND ISRAEL WERE NOT INVOLVED IN HOSTILITIES.

2. CONFLICTS

-- THE 1967 WAR AND THE SUBSEQUENT DEFEAT OF EGYPT, SYRIA AND JORDAN INTENSIFIED ARAB FRUSTRATION AND STRENGTHENED THE PALESTINIAN RESISTANCE MOVEMENT. UNDER THE LEADERSHIP OF FATAH, -J MENT WAGED A WAR OF ATTRITION AGAINST ISRAEL. IT SOUGHT A BASE IN JORDAN AND FELL IN CONFLICT WITH THE JORDANIAN GOVERNMENT; IT THEN SOUGHT A BASE IN LEBANON AND SUCCEEDED IN GETTING STRONGHOLDS IN THE COUNTRY INSPITE OF GOVERNMENT OPPOSITION. THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT ACCEPTED, UNDER PRESSURE, ARRANGEMENTS WITH THE PALESTINE RESISTANCE MOVEMENT, WHICH LED TO INCREASED CONFLICT BETWEEN PALESTINIANS (IN LEBANON) AND ISRAELIS ACROSS THE FRONTIER.

3. INVASION

-- THE ISRAELI INVASION OF LEBANON IN MARCH 1978 WAS AIMED AT THE PALESTINIAN FIGHTERS IN LEBANON, AND NOT AGAINST LEBANON PER SE. THE U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL

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CHANNEL: n/a

RESOLUTION 425 (MARCH 19, 1978) CALLED FOR "STRICT RESPECT FOR THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY, SOVEREIGNTY AND POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE OF LEBANON WITHIN ITS INTERNATIONALLY RECOGNIZED BOUNDARIES"; AND CALLED

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USELO RIYADH IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY
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AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY JIDDA PRIORITY

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EXDIS

FROM DRAPER

UPON ISRAEL "IMMEDIATELY TO CEASE ITS MILITARY ACTION AGAINST LEBANESE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY AND WITHDRAW FORTHWITH ITS FORCES FROM ALL LEBANESE TERRITORY." RESOLUTION 425 ESTABLISHED UNIFIL FOR THE "PURPOSE OF CONFIRMING THE WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAELI

FORCES, RESTORING INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY AND ASSISTING THE GOVERNMENT OF LEBANON IN ENSURING THE RETURN OF ITS EFFECTIVE AUTHORITY IN THE AREA..."

-- BETWEEN 1978 AND 1982 THE SECURITY COUNCIL PASSED A NUMBER OF RESOLUTIONS CALLING ON ISRAEL TO CEASE ITS MILITARY ACTION AGAINST LEBANESE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY. IN THE WAKE OF THE ISRAELI INVASION OF LEBANON IN JUNE 1982, THE SECURITY COUNCIL

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PASSED RESOLUTION 508 CALLING UPON "ALL PARTIES TO THE CONFLICT TO CEASE IMMEDIATELY AND SIMULTANEOUSLY ALL MILITARY ACTIVITIES WITHIN LEBANON AND ACROSS THE LEBANESE-ISRAELI BORDER..." AND RESOLUTION 509 CALLING ON ISRAEL TO "WITHDRAW ALL ITS MILITARY FORCES FORTHWITH AND UNCONDITIONALLY TO THE INTERNATIONALLY RECOGNIZED BOUNDARIES OF LEBANON."

CONCLUSION

-- SINCE 1949 THEREFORE ISRAEL HAD NO PROBLEM WITH LEBANON TO NECESSITATE MILITARY ACTION AGAINST IT. IT HAD SUCH A PROBLEM WITH THE PLO. THE PROBLEM THEREFORE WILL CEASE WITH THE DEPARTURE OF THE PLO. LEBANON AND THE PLO HAVE AGREED THAT LEBANON WILL NOT BE AGAIN A BASE FOR THE PLO.

-- THE BRUNT OF THE NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN ISRAEL AND LEBANON, THROUGH THE TRIPARTITE COMMITTEE, IS TO ENSURE THE COMPLETE DEPARTURE OF THE PLO AND TO EXAMINE SECURITY CONDITIONS IN A MANNER THAT NEITHER LEBANON NOR ISRAEL WILL CONSTITUTE A THREAT TO EACH OTHER.

-- SUCH NEGOTIATIONS WILL ALSO DEAL WITH RELATED SUBJECTS SUCH AS THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE SYRIANS, WITHDRAWAL OF THE ISRAELI FORCES, SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS, AND SUCH ARRANGEMENTS AS DEEMED FEASIBLE BY THE PARTIES (LEBANON, ISRAEL, AND U.S.) TO REFLECT THE "TERMINATION OF THE STATE OF WAR STATUS" WHICH REPLACES THE "ARMISTICE AGREEMENT STATUS."

II. PROPOSED PROTOCOL

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-- 1. ALL DISCUSSIONS ON THE POINTS ABOVE, ARE TO BE CONDUCTED BY A TRIPARTITE COMMITTEE CONSISTING OF DELEGATIONS FROM LEBANON, ISRAEL AND THE U.S. THE DELEGATIONS WILL BE WORKING UNDER INSTRUCTIONS FROM THEIR GOVERNMENTS, AND THE PROTOCOL, RECOMMENDED BY THE COMMITTEE, SHALL BE SUBMITTED TO THE COMPETENT CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITIES FOR APPROVAL. THE PROTOCOL WILL BE WITNESSED BY THE U.S. THE COMMITTEE WILL MEET IN A PLACE OR PLACES AGREED UPON BY ALL PARTIES CONCERNED.

-- 2. THE TRIPARTITE COMMITTEE WILL CONTINUE TO MEET AFTER THE CONCLUSION OF THE PROTOCOL TO SUPERVISE ITS IMPLEMENTATION.

-- 3. THE PROTOCOL WILL CONSIST OF THE FOLLOWING ELEMENTS:

- A) SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS:

- CI) MEASURES WILL BE TAKEN FOR THE PREVENTION OF ALL ACTS OF HOSTILITY FROM THE TERRITORY OF EITHER SIDE. LEBANON UNDERTAKES NOT TO BECOME A PLATFORM OF ANY ARMED ACTIVITY OF ANY SORT, MILITARY OR PARAMILITARY, AGAINST ISRAEL. SIMILARLY ISRAEL UNDERTAKES NOT TO USE LEBANESE TERRITORY FOR MILITARY OR PARAMILITARY ACTIVITIES AGAINST LEBANON OR OTHER COUNTRIES, AND NOT TO INTERFERE IN LEBANESE AFFAIRS.

- (II) LEBANON'S SECURITY (INTERNAL AND FRONTIER RELATIONS) IS THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE LEBANESE MILITARY AND SECURITY FORCES, WHICH MAY BE ASSISTED FOR A TEMPORARY PERIOD, AND AS LEBANON SEES FIT, BY MNF AND UNIFIL, AND UNTSO. ALL MILITIAS WILL BE DISSOLVED OR INTEGRATED INTO THE LEBANESE MILITARY

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FROM DRAPER

AND SECURITY FORCES AS LEBANON DEEMS FIT.

III. OBSERVATION POSTS, MANNED BY LEBANON AND, IF NECESSARY, BY OBSERVERS FROM NEUTRAL COUNTRIES, MAY BE ESTABLISHED IN PARTS OF THE COUNTRY, TO ENSURE THAT NO HOSTILE ELEMENTS MAY INFILTRATE FROM LEBANON TO ITS NEIGHBORS AND VICE VERSA.

IV. SECURITY ZONES, DEMILITARIZED ZONES, ETC. MAY BE EXAMINED ON RECIPROCAL BASIS.

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V. SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS WILL BE SUPERVISED, FOR A TEMPORARY PERIOD, BY THE TRIPARTITE COMMITTEE.

- B) WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAELI FORCES

- (I) WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAELI FORCES WILL TAKE PLACE WITHIN 20 DAYS AFTER A SPECIFIED DATE. LEBANON WILL MAKE SEPARATE ARRANGEMENTS WITH THE SYRIANS AND THE PLO FOR THEIR WITHDRAWAL AT OR BEFORE THAT DATE.

- (II) THE U.S., AS A FULL PARTNER IN THE NEGOTIATIONS, WILL HELP LEBANON, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, IN ITS DISCUSSIONS WITH ISRAEL, SYRIA AND THE PLO, TO AFFECT THE IMMEDIATE AND COMPLETE WITHDRAWAL OF THEIR FORCES FROM LEBANON.

- (III) LEBANON WILL LEND ALL ITS EFFORTS TO ENSURE THAT ISRAELI PRISONERS, MISSING PERSONNEL AND THE BODIES OF ISRAELIS IN THE HANDS OF THE SYRIANS AND THE PLO ARE RETURNED. SIMILARLY, ISRAEL WILL RETURN ALL LEBANESE WHO ARE DETAINED BY ISRAELI AUTHORITIES.

- C) FRAMEWORK OF MUTUAL RELATIONS

- (I) LEBANON AND ISRAEL DECLARE THE ENDING OF THE STATE OF WAR BETWEEN THEM.

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- (II) HOSTILE PROPAGANDA BETWEEN LEBANON
AND ISRAEL WILL CEASE.

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- (III) MUTUAL UNIMPEDED ACCESS TO PLACES OF
RELIGIOUS SIGNIFICANCE WILL BE PROVIDED.

- (IV) THE PARTIES COMMIT THEMSELVES TO
FURTHERING A SPIRIT OF MUTUAL TOLERANCE.

- (V) THE PARTIES AFFIRM THEIR COMMITMENT
TO OBSERVE HUMAN RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS FOR
ALL.

- (VI) THE TRIPARTITE COMMITTEE WILL CONTINUE
TO DISCUSS, AFTER THE SIGNING OF THE PROTOCOL, WAYS
AND MEANS TO PROMOTE RELATIONS BETWEEN LEBANON AND
ISRAEL IN A MANNER CONSISTENT WITH THE TERMINATION
OF THE STATE OF WAR.
GUARANTEES

AS THE VICTIM OF REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL CONFLICTS,
LEBANON NEEDS GUARANTEES THAT ITS TERRITORY WILL NOT
BE USED BY ITS NEIGHBORS, BY REGIONAL AND FOREIGN
POWERS, AS A BASE FOR HOSTILE ACTIVITY AGAINST IT
OR AGAINST OTHERS. SUCH GUARANTEES MAY INVOLVE
REGIONAL COMMITMENTS, SUPERPOWER COMMITMENTS, OR
UNITED NATIONS COMMITMENTS.

21 JANUARY 1983. END TEXT. DILLON

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AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY JIDDA PRIORITY

USELO RIYADH PRIORITY

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BEIRUT 00875

DECAPTIONED

FROM DRAPER

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, US, LE, IS, XF

SUBJECT: DRAPER MISSION: VENUE FOR WORKING GROUPS

REF: TEL AVIV 1139

1.

2. LAST NIGHT, JANUARY 24, I BRIEFED FOREIGN MINISTER SALEM ON WHAT HAD EMERGED FROM PHIL HABIB'S TRIPS TO CAIRO, RIYADH, AND ON HIS LAST STOP IN JERUSALEM. I OF COURSE SEIZED THE OCCASION TO PRESS HARD FOR A QUICK LEBANESE AGREEMENT TO HAVE WORKING GROUPS MEET AT NATANYAH. DESPITE SALEM'S UNDERSTANDING WITH ME AS LONG AGO AS SATURDAY NIGHT THAT A

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NATANYAH VENUE WAS 75 PERCENT IN THE BAG, ON THIS OCCASION HE SAID THAT UNEXPECTED OPPOSITION HAD DEVELOPED, AND HE COULD NOT OVERCOME IT. I MADE IT CLEAR THAT I THOUGHT THE LEBANESE POSITION WAS INCOMPREHENSIBLE, AND STRESSED THAT DELAYS IN THE MEETINGS OF WORKING GROUPS WERE AGAINST LEBANESE INTERESTS AND OUR OWN.

3. FINALLY, SALEM SAID HE THOUGHT THAT A COMPROMISE

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CHANNEL: n/a

IDE WOULD BE VENTILATED AT A WEDNESDAY EVENING STRATEGY SESSION, AND THAT WAZZAN WOULD BE PERSUADED TO ACCEPT CAESAREA.

4. ACTION REQUESTED: PLEASE GET IN TOUCH WITH DAVID KIMCHE TO CONVEY THE FOLLOWING POINTS FROM ME:

-- IN MY OPINION, A VENUE OTHER THAN KIRYAT SHEMONA FOR BOTH REPEAT BOTH PLENARY AND WORKING GROUP MEETINGS WOULD BE DESIRABLE, BECAUSE OF WEATHER CONDITIONS AS WELL AS THE DBILITY OF CUTTING DOWN TRAVEL TIME FOR THE ISRAELI DELEGATION.

-- PART OF THE REASON FOR THE LEBANESE INABILITY TO COME TO AN AGREEMENT STEMS FROM THE CONFLICTIING INFORMATION GIVEN BY ME TO THE LEBANESE ON ISRAEL'S BEHALF (I.E., PUSHING FOR NATANYAH) AND THAT PROVIDED BY THE ISRAELIS DIRECTLY TO LEBANESE LIAISON REPRESENTATIVES.

-- I HAVE REASON TO BELIEVE THE LEBANESE MIGHT ACCEPT CAESAREA AS A MEETING PLACE FOR WORKING GROUPS. IF ISRAEL COULD AGREE, I WOULD SUGGEST

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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PUSHING FOR PLENARY MEETINGS THERE AS WELL; MEANWHILE WE MIGHT TRY TO BALANCE THE NUMBER OF MEETINGS IN ISRAEL WITH A FEW MORE THAN NOW PLANNED IN LEBANON, IF SATISFACTORY ARRANGEMENTS CAN BE MADE FOR OVERNIGHT STAYS. DILLON

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S/S-O:WAGARLAND

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TO AMEMBASSY ALGIERS IMMEDIATE

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AMEMBASSY TUNIS PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY BEIRUT PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY

AMCONSUL JERUSALEM PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY

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Date: 11/6/97

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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, US, LE, IS, AG

SUBJECT: ALGERIAN AMBASSADOR'S CALL ON AMBASSADOR PHILIP HABIB

1

2. ALGERIAN AMBASSADOR YAKER CALLED ON AMBASSADOR PHILIP HABIB FOR AN HOUR'S RUN-DOWN ON MID EAST DEVELOPMENTS, JAN 26, BEFORE RETURNING TO ALGIERS FOR CONSULTATIONS. AMBASSADOR HABIB GAVE HIM FULL RUNDOWN, COVERING BOTH LEBANESE WITHDRAWAL TALKS AND PEACE PROCESS.

3. ON LEBANON, HABIB STRESSED COMPROMISES WHICH GEMAYEL

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STATE 024721

COMPELLED BY CIRCUMSTANCES TO ATTEMPT, TO CLEAR NATIONAL TERRITORY OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES. -HABIB SOUGHT SUPPORT OF "RESPONSIBLE ARAB NATIONS" FOR GEMAYEL'S EFFORTS, POINTING OUT THAT LATTER INTENDED PROTECT LEBANON'S SOVEREIGNTY, PRESERVE RENASCENT INTERNAL CONSENSUS AND MAINTAIN VIABLE TIES TO ARAB COMMUNITY WHILE NEGOTIATING WITH ISRAEL, SYRIANS AND PLO. YAKER WONDERED WHETHER GEMAYEL COULD SUCCEED, GIVEN EXIGENCIES OF HIS ISRAELI INTERLOCUTORS AND ASSERTED THAT ALGIERS BELIEVED HIM TO BE IN VERY

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TENUOUS SITUATION. HE URGED US DO MORE TO HASTEN DEPARTURE OF ISRAELIS FROM LEBANON. HABIB EMPHASIZED KEY ROLE WHICH ALGIERS COULD PLAY GIVEN ITS INFLUENCE AND PRESIDENT CHADLI'S PRESTIGE THROUGHOUT THE ARAB WORLD. IN REVIEWING GROUND ALREADY COVERED, HABIB STRESSED IMPORTANCE OF EARLIER ALGERIAN CONTRIBUTIONS, NOTABLY HOSPITALITY EXTENDED TO HUNDREDS OF PLO FIGHTERS IN FIRST BEIRUT EVACUATION AND ALGIERS SUPPORT, VIA FEZ PEACE PLAN, TO UNSC RESO 242.

4. ON PEACE PROCESS HABIB PROVIDED YAKER WITH STRAIGHT-FORWARD UPDATE ON PRIVILEGED BASIS. HE STRESSED IMPORTANCE OF ARAB SUPPORT TO KING HUSSEIN AS LATTER SEEKS CONCURRENCE OF PALESTINIANS AND OTHERS TO ENGAGE. HE URGED YAKER HAVE GOA ADVISE PLO IN PREPARATION FOR UPCOMING ALGIERS PALESTINIAN NATIONAL COUNCIL MEETING, THAT IT SHOULD SEIZE OPPORTUNITY, WHICH MAY NOT RECUR FOR SOME TIME IF MISSED, TO COME TO GRIPS WITH CENTRAL ISSUE IN REGION BY HELPING HUSSEIN FORM JORDANIAN-PALESTINIAN (NON-PLO) DELEGATION FOR NEGOTIATING WITH ISRAEL. POSSIBILITY OF MEANINGFUL NEGOTIATIONS ABOUT PALESTINIAN RIGHTS WITH PARTICIPATION OF PALESTINIANS NOW EXISTS. INSISTENCE ON PLO PARTICIPATION QUA PLO WOULD MAKE TALKS IMPOSSIBLE.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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YAKER STRESSED ENORMITY OF CONCESSIONS WE ARE ASKING JORDANIANS, PLO, ARABS TO MAKE. BEGIN GOVERNMENT IS REFUSING TO AGREE TO SETTLEMENT FREEZE, PALESTINIAN STATE OPTION, RECOGNITION OF PLO. IDF REMAINS IN LEBANON AND IS SEEKING TO IMPOSE "NORMALIZATION" ON LEBANESE-ISRAELI RELATIONS AS PRICE FOR PARTIAL WITHDRAWAL AT RISK OF DESTROYING GEMAYEL. HOW CAN JORDAN/PALESTINIANS SIT DOWN WITH ISRAELI REPRESENTATIVES IN THIS CONTEXT? ARABS IN EFFECT ARE BEING ASKED TO IGNORE ISRAELI INVASION, ADVANTAGES WHICH ISRAEL IS TRYING TO DRAW THEREFROM AND ISRAEL'S MANIFEST UNWILLINGNESS GO ALONG WITH KEY ELEMENTS OF PRESIDENT'S SEPTEMBER 1 INITIATIVE. HABIB RESPONDED THAT ALL PARTIES IN EFFECT COMMITTED TO WITHDRAWAL FROM LEBANON AND NOW ENGAGED IN SERIOUS NEGOTIATION OF WITHDRAWAL ISSUES. WE WILL KEEP AFTER THEM UNTIL WITHDRAWAL ACHIEVED. BEGIN GOVERNMENT'S POSITIONS COULD BE EXPECTED TO EVOLVE WHEN CONFRONTED BY ARAB INTERLOCUTORS PREPARED TO -NEGOTIATE WITH ISRAEL IN CAMP DAVID FRAMEWORK TO WHICH GOI HAS SUBSCRIBED. THE ESSENTIAL POINT IS THAT MILITARY APPROACH TO CENTRAL ISSUE HAS FAILED BUT POLITICAL OPPORTUNITY DEAL WITH NUB OF PROBLEM NOW WAITING TO BE GRASPED. PRESIDENT REAGAN REMAINS COMMITTED TO US SEPTEMBER 1 POSITIONS NOTWITHSTANDING ISRAEL'S UNWILLINGNESS THUS FAR TO AGREE. ALGERIA, AS KEY PLAYER AMONG RESPONSIBLE ARAB STATES

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SHOULD USE ITS INFLUENCE TO SEE PALESTINIAN ISSUE DEALT
WITH EQUITABLY, BY PUTTING PALESTINIANS IN POSITION
WITH JORDANIANS TO NEGOTIATE THEIR FUTURE AND THEIR
ASPIRATIONS NOT WITH THE US BUT WITH ISRAEL. SHULTZ

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INFO AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE

AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE

WHITEHOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY JIDDA PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY

USELO RIYADH PRIORITY

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SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY

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SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIRUT 00861

DECAPTIONED

EXCLUSIVE FOR MILITARY ADDRESSEES

FROM DRAPER

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, MOPS, MARR, LE, US, IS, SY, PLO, XF

SUBJECT: DRAPER MISSION: FIRST SUBCOMMITTEE SESSION

-- ON MUTUAL RELATIONS, JANUARY 24

1. [REDACTED]
2. SUBCOMMITTEE ON MUTUAL RELATIONS HELD ITS

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FIRST SESSION, JANUARY 24. KHARMA AND AMIN PARTICIPATED FOR LEBANON; KIMCHE, RUBINSTEIN, AND LEOR FOR ISRAEL; AND DRAPER, HARE AND KRECZKO FOR UNITED STATES. SESSION LASTED ONE HOUR AND ADDRESSED "REPRESENTATION" AND "HOSTILE PROPAGANDA," WITHOUT RESOLVING EITHER.

3. KHARMA BEGAN BY SAYING THAT EARLIER ISRAELI PROPOSAL FOR CREATION OF AN ISRAELI LIAISON

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OFFICE IN BEIRUT WITH DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITIES EXCEEDED CURRENT LEBANESE LIMITS. HE COUNTER-PROPOSED THE FOLLOWING TEXT:

-- "THE PROTOCOL SHOULD ESTABLISH A TRIPARTITE COMMITTEE WHICH WILL BE ENTRUSTED WITH THE SUPERVISION AND THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE VARIOUS AREAS OF THE AGREEMENT.

-- "IT WILL ALSO DISCUSS ON A CONSISTENT AND CONTINUING BASIS DEVELOPMENT OF RELATIONS IN THE LIGHT OF THE INTERESTS OF THE PARTIES CONCERNED AND IN A MANNER THAT WILL REFLECT AND SERVE THE PROMOTION OF REGIONAL PEACE AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

-- "THE PRESENT MILITARY LIAISON COMMITTEE WILL CONTINUE ITS FUNCTIONS AND WILL BECOME AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE TRIPARTITE COMMITTEE WITH SPECIFIC MILITARY TASKS DEFINED BY THE PROTOCOL AND ITS EVENTUAL ANNEXES. IT WILL BE ENTRUSTED IN PARTICULAR WITH THE SUPERVISION OF WITHDRAWALS AND SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS.

-- "IN THE FUTURE, ALL MILITARY AFFAIRS OF
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

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MUTUAL INTEREST WILL BE DISCUSSED ON A REGULAR BASIS, PARTICULARLY QUESTIONS RELEVANT TO SECURITY AND INFORMATION ON MATTERS THAT MAY CONSTITUTE A THREAT TO EITHER PARTY'S SECURITY.

-- "THE TRIPARTITE COMMITTEE WILL MEET IN BOTH COUNTRIES AND MAY HAVE AN OFFICE IN A PLACE AGREED IN LEBANON, WHERE STAFF MEMEBERS OF ALL PARTIES CAN MAINTAIN ADEQUATE FACILITIES."

4. THE PRIMARY DIFFERENCE BETWEEN LEBANESE AND ISRAELI APPROACH IS WHETHER ISRAEL WILL HAVE A SEPARATE OFFICE IN BEIRUT WHICH HAS GENERAL RESPONSIBILITIES, OR WHETHER THE ISRAELI PRESENCE WILL BE STRICTLY TIED TO STAFF SUPPORT FOR A TRIPARTITE COMMITTEE CREATED TO OVERSEE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AGREEMENT. (KIMCHE ATTEMPTED TO MOVE KHARMA FROM HIS POSITION BY READING THE RELEVANT PROVISION OF THE "WORKING PAPER" AND NOTING IT HAD BEEN ACCEPTED BY LEBANESE AUTHORITIES. KHARMA SAID HE WAS UNDER INSTRUCTIONS TO IGNORE THE PAPER.)

5. HOSTILE PROPAGANDA. KHARMA SAID THAT ISRAEL'S JANUARY 20 PROPOSAL WAS UNACCEPTABLE, AND SUGGESTED TWO COUNTERPROPOSALS:

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(I) "THE PARTIES WILL ABSTAIN FROM HOSTILE PROPAGANDA
AND INCITEMENT AGAINST EACH OTHER IN A SPIRIT
CONSISTENT WITH THE TERMINATION OF THE STATE OF WAR.
NOTHING WILL BE REQUIRED BY EITHER PARTY THAT IS
INCONSISTENT WITH THEIR CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

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EXDIS--SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MILITARY ADDRESSEES

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AND THE LAWS OF THEIR COUNTRY."

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(II) "IN A SPIRIT CONSISTENT WITH THE TERMINATION OF THE STATE OF WAR, THE PARTIES WILL ABSTAIN FROM HOSTILE PROPAGANDA AND INCITEMENT AGAINST EACH OTHER, WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THEIR CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND PERTINENT LEGISLATION."

6. SUBSTANTIVE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN ISRAELI AND LEBANESE FORMULAS IS WHETHER AGREEMENT SHOULD

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EXPRESSLY PROVIDE THAT DOMESTIC LEGISLATION WHICH IS INCONSISTENT WITH THE AGREEMENT WILL BE REPEALED. IN FACT, THIS ISSUE HAS LITTLE TO DO WITH HOSTILE PROPAGANDA PROBLEM, AS BECAME APPARENT WHEN KIMCHE SAID ISRAEL WOULD INSIST ON AN EXPLICIT PROVISION IN ORDER TO ASSURE ITSELF OF LEBANESE TERMINATION OF THE ARAB ECONOMIC BOYCOTT. DILLON

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BEIRUT FOR AMBASSADOR DRAPER

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, US, LE, IS, XF

SUBJECT: DRAPER MISSION: VENUE FOR WORKING GROUPS

REF: HARE/ROSS TELCON, JANUARY 24

1. [REDACTED]

2. POLCOUNS HARE CONVEYED TO DAVID KIMCHE AT 2130 HOURS LOCAL, JANUARY 24, LEBANESE POSITION THAT THEY WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO MEET AT NETANYA FOR WORKING GROUP MEETINGS AND HAD DECIDED THEY WOULD LIKE TO TAKE UP ISRAELI PROPOSALS ON VENUE FOR THE WORKING GROUPS AT THE THURSDAY MEETING IN KIRYAT SHEMONA (REF TELCON). HARE ADDED THAT IF ISRAEL WOULD AGREE TO NAHARIYA, IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE

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TO HAVE A MEETING ON WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 26, THOUGH THIS WAS NOT CERTAIN.

3. KIMCHE IMMEDIATELY ASKED WHY LEBANON COULD NOT ACCEPT NETANYA AS A VENUE, WHICH HE NOTED WAS A TOWN TOTALLY DEVOID OF POLITICAL SIGNIFICANCE. HARE DID NOT OFFER ANY SPECIFIC INTERPRETATION OF LEBANESE MOTIVATIONS. KIMCHE DESCRIBED THE LEBANESE POSITION VARIOUSLY AS "RIDICULOUS," "INCOMPREHENSIBLE," AND

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"INSULTING." HE SAID HE WOULD PERSONALLY RECOMMEND TO HIS MINISTERS THAT ISRAEL STAND FAST ON NETANYA, THOUGH HE SAID THAT HIS MINISTERS MIGHT POSSIBLY NOT AGREE WITH HIS VIEW. HE ALSO WARNED THAT IF THE IMPASSE CONTINUED ISRAEL MIGHT GO "PUBLIC" TO DESCRIBE WHY THE TALKS WERE NOT MOVING AHEAD MORE RAPIDLY, WHICH WAS A GOAL, HE ASSUMED, THAT WE SHARED. HE ADDED THAT AMBASSADOR FATTAL WAS PERSONALLY EMBARRASSED BY HIS GOVERNMENT'S POSITION ON THIS ISSUE.

4. KIMCHE ASKED IF AMBASSADOR DRAPER WAS MAKING ANY INTERVENTION WITH THE LEBANESE AUTHORITIES. HARE RESPONDED THAT DRAPER'S REMARKS IN THE PLENARY SESSION TODAY DEMONSTRATED OUR VIEW ON THE NECESSITY OF MOVING AHEAD QUICKLY, SUBJECT OF COURSE TO THE AGREEMENT OF BOTH PARTIES. HARE ASKED KIMCHE IF ISRAEL HAD NOT IN FACT PROPOSED NAHARIYA AS A POSSIBLE VENUE IN THE FIRST INSTANCE. KIMCHE BRUSHED THIS ASIDE, SAYING THAT NAHARIYA HAD BEEN OFFERED AS ONE POSSIBLE LOCATION IN THE PAST, BUT ITS FACILITIES WERE LIMITED DURING THE WINTER SEASON. HE WAS MORE OBVIOUSLY ANNOYED BY LEBANESE RELUCTANCE TO ACCEPT NETANYA AFTER THEIR EARLIER TURNDOWN OF HERZILYIA PETUAH.

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5. COMMENT: IN OUR JUDGEMENT, THE LEBANESE ARE BEING OVERLY DIFFICULT IN AGREEING TO A SITE FOR WORKING GROUP DISCUSSIONS. THE ISRAELIS WILL MOST CERTAINLY, AS KIMCHE INDICATED, TRUMPET LEBANESE RECALCITRANCE AS THE PRIMARY REASON FOR THE SLOWDOWN IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. WE BELIEVE THE LEBANESE SHOULD BE ADVISED FIRMLY THAT THIS IS NOT IN THEIR INTEREST, NOR IN THE INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES. END COMMENT. LEWIS

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EXCLUDED FROM DISSEMINATION FOR MILITARY ADDRESSEES
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FROM DRAPER

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, PBTS, MOPS, MARR, LE, US, IS, SY, PLO, XF
SUBJECT: DRAPER MISSION: JANUARY 24 NEGOTIATING
-- ROUND

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1.

2. SUMMARY: THE NINTH ROUND OF LEBANESE-ISRAELI-US
NEGOTIATIONS DEVOTED ITS PLENARY SESSION TO A
COMPREHENSIVE STATEMENT OF THE LEBANESE POSITION
ON EACH AGENDA ITEM, AN ISRAELI RESPONSE, AND
FURTHER DISCUSSION OF SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS AND
WITHDRAWALS. THE SUBCOMMITTEES FORMED AT THE
LAST PLENARY HELD THEIR FIRST SESSIONS (SEPTELS).

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LEBANON PROPOSED A TRIPARTITE PROTOCOL AGREEMENT, A TRIPARTITE LIAISON COMMISSION, SECURITY MEASURES UNDER THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE LEBANESE ARMY AND INTERNAL SECURITY FORCES WITH UNIFIL AND MNF ASSISTANCE FOR A LIMITED TIME, SEPARATE AGREEMENTS WITH SYRIA AND THE PALESTINIANS FOR SIMULTANEOUS OR PRIOR WITHDRAWALS, ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL WITHIN 20 DAYS OF A PREDETERMINED DATE, AN END TO THE STATE OF WAR AND TO HOSTILE PROPAGANDA, THE SELECTIVE PASSAGE OF PERSONS ACROSS THE BORDER, AND CONTINUING DISCUSSIONS ON WAYS OF DEVELOPING RELATIONS FURTHER. IT AVOIDED ANY MENTION OF POSSIBLE TRADE. ISRAEL RESPONDED WITH A MEASURED ATTACK ON WHAT IT CALLED THE "ARAB DICTAT" THAT HAD PRODUCED THE LEBANESE POSITION AND DESCRIBED THE CONSEQUENCES OF SURRENDERING TO THIS "DICTAT" IN GRAPHIC TERMS. IT REJECTED ANY "HALF-MEASURES" ON ITS SECURITY CONCERNS, STRESSING THAT "NO FORCE IN THE WORLD CAN IMPOSE THIS." IT ATTACKED UNIFIL AND THE MNF FOR HAVING DEMONSTRATED THEIR INEFFECTIVENESS IN COMBATTING TERRORISM. (A MYSTERIOUS EXPLOSION NEAR THE MEETING PLACE WAS RAPIDLY ASCRIBED BY THE ISRAELIS TO FIRE FROM THE HAYY AS-SULLAM ADJACENT TO USMC LINES.) IT JUSTIFIED ITS SECURITY

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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DEMANDS AS BEING NECESSITATED BY THE ABSENCE OF A PEACE TREATY, THE INABILITY OF THE LEBANESE ARMY TO SHOULDER THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR SECURITY FOR THE NEXT THREE YEARS, AND CONCERN ABOUT SYRIAN DESIGNS. IT MAINTAINED ITS REJECTION OF ANY INTERNATIONAL FORCES, INCLUDING OBSERVERS, IN THE SECURITY ZONE ("NO FORCE IN THE WORLD CAN CHANGE OUR MINDS"), AND MADE IT CLEAR THIS REJECTION APPLIED TO ANY UNIFIL ROLE IN PROTECTING PALESTINIAN CAMPS. COMMENT: THE LEBANESE CAME TO THE MEETING WITH A TOUGH POSITION OF PRINCIPLE BUT FEW SUGGESTIONS FOR PRACTICAL ARRANGEMENTS THAT MIGHT SATISFY AT LEAST SOME OF THE ISRAELI CONCERNS AND DEMANDS. THESE MAY BEGIN TO EMERGE IN THE SUBCOMMITTEE MEETINGS. FOR THE MOMENT, BOTH LEBANESE AND ISRAELIS ARE LIKELY TO STICK TO TOUGH POSITIONS WHILE THEY TRY TO INFLUENCE AND READ THE SIGNALS FROM WASHINGTON. END SUMMARY.

3. THE NINTH ROUND OF LEBANESE-ISRAELI-US NEGOTIATIONS TOOK PLACE IN KHALDAH, LEBANON, JANUARY 24. AMBASSADOR DRAPER, ROSS, KRECKO, HARE, COLLINS AND GREENE WERE AT THE TABLE FOR THE US.

4. OUTLINE OF SESSION

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IN TWO AND ONE-HALF HOURS OF PLENARY, THE LEBANESE PRESENTED A COMPREHENSIVE STATEMENT OF POSITION, INCLUDING A NUMBER OF CONCRETE PROPOSALS ON EACH AGENDA ITEM, AND THE ISRAELIS RESPONDED. SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS AND WITHDRAWALS WERE THEN DISCUSSED

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AT MORE LENGTH. SUBCOMMITTEE MEETINGS WERE
SCHEDULED FOR WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 26 OR -- IF THE
ISSUE OF VENUE WAS SETTLED THIS EVENING --
TUESDAY, JANUARY 25. THE SUBCOMMITTEES ON
MUTUAL RELATIONS, POSSIBLE GUARANTEES, SECURITY
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

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ARRANGEMENTS, AND WITHDRAWALS MET (THE LATTER TWO
IN JOINT SESSION) FOR ONE HOUR (SEPTELS).

5. LEBANESE STATEMENT

FATTAL OPENED THE PLENARY BY READING A COMPREHENSIVE
STATEMENT OF POSITION (THE SUBHEADS ARE OURS):

-- INTRODUCTION: WHEN ISRAEL'S MILITARY FORCES
INVADED LEBANON, THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY
WAS CONCERNED, BUT NO ONE COULD IMAGINE THE
COURSE EVENTS WOULD TAKE. THE UNSC ADOPTED
RESOLUTION 508 STATING ITS CONCERN FOR THE
VIOLATION OF LEBANON'S SOVEREIGNTY, TERRITORIAL
INTEGRITY, AND INDEPENDENCE. IT FOLLOWED THIS
UP WITH RESOLUTION 509 DEMANDING IN AN IMPERATIVE
AND LEGALLY COMPULSORY MANNER THAT ISRAEL WITHDRAW
ITS FORCES FORTHWITH AND UNCONDITIONALLY. IGNORING
THESE RESOLUTIONS, ISRAEL SAID IT WANTED TO ASSURE
THE SECURITY OF ITS NORTHERN BORDER AND PUT AN
END TO THE ACTIVITIES OF THE PALESTINIANS IN
SOUTHERN LEBANON. THESE DEMANDS SEEMED
LEGITIMATE, SINCE LEBANON AT THE TIME WAS
INCAPABLE OF MAINTAINING ORDER OR SECURITY FOR
WELL KNOWN AND PAINFUL REASONS. ISRAEL AND
LEBANON HAD LIVED IN PEACE FROM 1949 TO 1967,
BUT ISRAEL DENOUNCED THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT
IN 1967. THE INTERNAL SITUATION IN LEBANON
BEGAN TO DETERIORATE UNDER PRESSURE FROM ALL
SIDES. THIS LED TO THE CAIRO ACCORDS OF 1969,
WHICH WERE IMPOSED ON LEBANON BY THE DICTAT OF
NEARBY GOVERNMENTS AND THE PRESSURE OF A PEOPLE
WHICH HAD BEEN EXPELLED FROM ITS COUNTRY, TAKEN
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

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REFUGE IN LEBANON, AND THEN TRAMPLED THE SACRED RULES OF HOSPITALITY.

..THE KEY ISSUE: THE QUESTION LEBANON POSES AT THIS POINT IN THE NEGOTIATIONS IS WHY DOES ISRAEL SEEK TO IMPOSE A DICTAT AS DANGEROUS AS THE FIRST ONE? THE ISRAELI PROPOSALS ON SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS AND MUTUAL RELATIONS AS PRESENTED AT KIRYAT SHEMONA ARE UNACCEPTABLE IN THEIR PRESENT FORM. THEIR EXTREME CHARACTER WOULD PUT LEBANON AT WAR WITH THE ENTIRE ARAB WORLD. AS AN EXAMPLE, THE WATCH POSTS ISRAEL SEEKS ARE LIKE PISTOLS AIMED AT THE HEART OF THE ARAB WORLD. LEBANON CANNOT ACCEPT SUCH A GRAVE VIOLATION OF ITS SOVEREIGNTY, NOT LEAST OF ALL BECAUSE IT WOULD REPRESENT A PERMANENT THREAT TO SYRIA. REGARDING MUTUAL RELATIONS, LEBANON CANNOT OPEN ITS BORDERS AS WIDELY AS ISRAEL WANTS WITHOUT SUBJECTING ITSELF TO THE WRATH OF THE ARAB STATES, WITH TRAGIC CONSEQUENCES FOR ITS ECONOMY, WHICH IS HIGHLY DEPENDENT ON ITS SURROUNDINGS. WHAT ISRAEL IS ASKING IS NOTHING SHORT OF A REVISION OF LEBANON'S NATIONAL IMPERATIVES. THIS WOULD LEAD TO THE COUNTRY'S ANNIHILATION. THIS CANNOT BE WHAT ISRAEL WANTS, SINCE IT HAS CONSISTENTLY CALLED FOR A STRONG AND INDEPENDENT LEBANON. ISRAEL'S PEACE CONDITIONS RESEMBLE THOSE THE VICTOR IMPOSES ON THE VANQUISHED.

-- THE BASIS OF LEBANESE-ISRAELI RELATIONS: A DESIRE FOR NORMAL RELATIONS BETWEEN NEIGHBORS IS NATURAL, BUT WHEN THE PRICE IS RUINOUS, IT IS NATURAL THAT THE PARTY THAT HAS TO PAY THE PRICE WILL FIND IT DIFFICULT TO ACCEPT. LEBANON WOULD HAVE LIKED TO

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EXDIS--SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MILITARY ADDRESSEES

BE ABLE TO SAY IT WOULD APPLY THE UN DECLARATION
ON PRINC
IPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW CONCERNING
FRIENDLY RELATIONS AND COOPERATION AMONG STATES,
TO WHICH IT ADHERES, TO ITS RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL.
BUT THE UN CHARTER IS NOT A SUPERMARKET, WHERE
ONE CAN PICK AND CHOOSE. ISRAEL CANNOT, FOR
EXAMPLE, REJECT IMPERATIVE UNSC RELATIONS WHILE

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INVOKING MORE GENERAL UN PRINCIPLES. LEBANON
WOULD HAVE LIKED TO HEAR ISRAEL SAY ALL IT
WANTED IN RETURN FOR ITS WITHDRAWAL WAS FULL
APPLICATION OF THE UN DECLARATION ON FRIENDLY
RELATIONS, BUT IT KNOWS THIS TO BE A DREAM.
THEREFORE LEBANON HAS A NUMBER OF PROPOSALS:

.. A TRIPARTITE PROTOCOL AND COMMISSION: LEBANON
PROPOSES THE SIGNATURE OF A PROTOCOL BY THE
THREE PARTIES TO THE NEGOTIATIONS. THE IMPLE-
MENTATION OF THIS PROTOCOL WILL BE SUPERVISED
BY A TRIPARTITE LIAISON COMMISSION.

-- SECURITY MEASURES: LEBANON PROPOSES SECURITY
MEASURES TO PREVENT ANY HOSTILE ACT FROM THE
TERRITORY OF EITHER COUNTRY. (A) LEBANON WILL
UNDERTAKE THAT ITS TERRITORY WILL NOT BE USED
AS A PLATFORM FOR MILITARY OR PARA-MILITARY
ACTIVITIES OF ANY KIND AGAINST ISRAEL. (B)
IN PARALLEL, ISRAEL WILL NOT USE LEBANESE TERRI-
TORY FOR ACTIVITIES AGAINST LEBANON AND
UNDERTAKES NOT TO INTERFERE IN LEBANON'S INTERNAL
AFFAIRS. (C) THE SECURITY OF LEBANON'S BORDERS
WILL BE THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE LEBANESE
ARMY AND INTERNAL SECURITY FORCES, ASSISTED FOR
A CERTAIN PERIOD BY UNIFIL AND THE MNF. (D) ALL
LEBANESE MILITIAS WILL BE DISSOLVED AND INTE-
GRATED INTO THE LEBANESE ARMY AND SECURITY FORCES.
(E) WATCH POSTS RUN BY LEBANESE OR, IF NECESSARY,

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BY THIRD COUNTRY OBSERVERS AGREED BY LEBANON AND ISRAEL, WILL BE SET UP AT VARIOUS POINTS IN LEBANON TO PREVENT ANY HOSTILE INFILTRATION FROM LEBANON TO ITS NEIGHBORS AND VICE VERSA.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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(F) DEMILITARIZED SECURITY ZONES WILL BE SET UP BY COMMON ACCORD ON THE BASIS OF RECIPROCITY.
(G) ALL OF THE ABOVE MEASURES WILL BE SUPERVISED BY THE TRIPARTITE COMMITTEE.
-- EVACUATION: (A) WITHDRAWAL WILL OCCUR WITHIN 20 DAYS OF A PREDETERMINED DATE. (B) LEBANON WILL REACH SEPARATE AGREEMENTS WITH SYRIA AND THE PALESTINIANS FOR SIMULTANEOUS OR PRIOR WITHDRAWALS. (C) LEBANON WILL SPARE NO EFFORT TO OBTAIN THE RELEASE OF ISRAELI POWS, MIAS, AND KIAS. (D) IN EXCHANGE, ISRAEL WILL RELEASE THE LEBANESE PRISONERS IT HOLDS. (E) THE US, AS A FULL PARTNER IN THE NEGOTIATIONS, WILL HELP LEBANON ACHIEVE THE EVACUATION OF ALL NON-LEBANESE FORCES.

-- MUTUAL RELATIONS: (A) THE TWO PARTIES WILL PROCLAIM AN END TO THE STATE OF WAR. (B) THE TWO PARTIES WILL END ALL HOSTILE PROPAGANDA. (C) THE TWO PARTIES WILL ENCOURAGE A SPIRIT OF MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING AND RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AMONG THEIR PEOPLE. (D) THE PASSAGE OF PERSONS WILL OCCUR ON A SELECTIVE BASIS. (E) ONCE THE PROTOCOL IS SIGNED, THE EVACUATION ACCOMPLISHED, AND AN END TO THE STATE OF WAR PROCLAIMED, THE TRIPARTITE COMMISSION WILL WORK ON WAYS OF DEVELOPING LEBANESE-ISRAELI RELATIONS.

-- POSSIBLE GUARANTEES: AS LEBANON IS THE MAIN VICTIM OF THE CONFLICTS OF THE REGION, IT WILL WANT GUARANTEES THAT ITS NEIGHBORS WILL NOT USE ITS TERRITORY FOR HOSTILE ACTS AGAINST

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EXDIS--SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MILITARY ADDRESSEES

OTHER STATES. THESE WILL REQUIRE COMMITMENTS
FROM OTHER STATES, AS WELL AS FROM INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATIONS.

-- CLOSING: IN THE PREVAILING INTERNATIONAL
SITUATION, LEBANON, WILL ALL THE GOOD WILL
IN THE WORLD, CAN PROMISE NOTHING MORE.

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6. ISRAELI RESPONSE.

KIMCHE TOOK THE FLOOR TO RESPOND TO THE "GIST

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AND TONE" OF FATTAL'S STATEMENT:

-- THE LEBANESE STATEMENT IS A DECLARATION THAT COMES AT THE INSTIGATION AND UNDER THE PRESSURE OF THE ARAB COUNTRIES. IT CANNOT EXPRESS THE WILL AND DESIRE OF THE LEBANESE PEOPLE, CHRISTIAN AND MUSLIM, BUT IS AN ARAB DICTAT. THIS ARAB PRESSURE AGAINST WHAT THE NEGOTIATIONS ARE TRYING TO ACHIEVE IS ONE MORE INDICATION THAT THE ARABS DO NOT WANT PEACE. IF THEY WANTED PEACE, THEY WOULD NOT CONSIDER THE PEACEFUL MOVEMENT OF GOODS AND PEOPLE TO BE TREASON, THE DEVELOPMENT OF NORMAL RELATIONS A BETRAYAL, AND THE PRESENT TALKS AS SOMETHING TO BE CASTIGATED.

-- LEBANON IS IN DANGER OF SURRENDERING TO A DICTAT MORE DANGEROUS THAN THAT OF 1969. TO SURRENDER WOULD MEAN A SLIDE BACK INTO THE PREVIOUS PERIOD OF INSTABILITY, VIOLENCE, TERRORISM, AND WEAKNESS. ISRAEL IS NOT TRYING TO IMPOSE A DICTAT. IT WANTS PEACE. IT IS NOT TALKING AS THE VICTOR TO THE VANQUISHED. IT IS ASKING TO LIVE IN PEACE WITH A PEOPLE FOR WHOM IT FEELS NO ENMITY. IS THIS A CRIME?

-- ISRAEL SHALL NOT GO BACK TO THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT. IT SHALL NOT AGREE TO HALF-MEASURES THAT WILL ENDANGER ITS OWN SECURITY. "NO FORCE IN THE WORLD CAN IMPOSE THIS." ISRAEL PAID A

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HEAVY PRICE THIS PAST YEAR TO ENSURE THE WELL-BEING OF ITS PEOPLE. ISRAEL IS TALKING ABOUT ITS OWN SECURITY AND CANNOT COMPROMISE. IT CANNOT ALLOW ARAB LEADERS TO SAOTAGE THE WISHES OF THE LEBANESE AND ISRAELI PEOPLES TO LIVE IN PEACE AND SECURITY BY IMPOSING A DAMASCUS DICTAT OR A RIYADH DICTAT.

-- ON THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS, WHERE WAS THE SECURITY COUNCIL WHEN THE SYRIANS BOMBED LEBANON'S CITIES AND TOWNS? DEEDS ARE SOMETIMES MORE IMPORTANT THAN WORDS, AND ISRAEL'S WERE MEANT TO FREE ISRAEL AND LEBANON FROM THE THREAT OF THE PLO. ISRAEL CAPTURED 500 ARTILLERY PIECES IN SOUTHERN LEBANON. THE ENTIRE BRITISH ARMY ONLY HAS 760.

-- ON UNIFIL AND THE MNF AND THEIR POSSIBLE USE IN PREVENTING SUCH THREATS, ISRAEL HAS HAD UNIFIL AT ITS DOORS FOR SOME TIME, BUT THE PLO

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FLOURISHED IN ITS ZONE. IT PREVENTED NOTHING.
AS FOR THE MNF, IN THE LAST THREE WEEKS, TERRORISTS
HAVE INFILTRATED THROUGH ITS LINES TO ATTACK
ISRAELI CONVOYS ON THE OLD SIDON ROAD AND THEN
TAKEN REFUGE BEHIND THESE LINES. THE MNF IS
NOT AN ALTERNATIVE TO THE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS
ISRAEL WANTS. TODAY, A 120MM SHELL WAS FIRED
AT THE LEBANON BEACH HOTEL. WHERE DID IT COME
FROM? SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS CANNOT BE SUFFICIENT
IN THE ABSENCE OF THE FRIENDLY, COOPERATIVE, GOOD
NEIGHBORLY RELATIONS ISRAEL SEEKS.

7. LEBANESE VIEWS ON SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS.

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KIMCHE ASKED FOR A FULLER EXPOSITION OF LEBANESE VIEWS ON THE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS. FATTAL ASKED COLONEL RUHAYYIM TO RESPOND. SETTING ASIDE "EASY" ASPECTS SUCH AS FORBIDDING THE USE OF LEBANESE TERRITORY FOR ACTIVITIES AGAINST ISRAEL, RUHAYYIM REVIEWED SIX POINTS:

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-- THE SECURITY ZONE: ISRAEL DEFINES IT AS 45-50 KILOMETERS. LEBANON HAS NOT YET UNDERSTOOD WHY. WHY NOT MAKE IT 100 KMS. OR 15 KMS.? THIS IS SOMETHING THAT WILL HAVE TO BE DISCUSSED IN THE SUBCOMMITTEE.

-- INFILTRATION AND DETECTION STATIONS: LEBANON WISHES TO LEARN THE PURPOSE, EQUIPMENT, AND LOCATION OF SUCH STATIONS BEFORE DISCUSSING THEM FURTHER WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF RESPECT FOR LEBANESE SOVEREIGNTY AND THE NEED TO AVOID AFFRONTS TO OTHER NEIGHBORING STATES.

-- DE FACTO FORCES: THE DE FACTO FORCES (I.E., LOCAL MILITIAS) ARE MADE UP OF LEBANESE CITIZENS. THEIR STATUS IS A PURELY LEBANESE MATTER WHICH THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT WILL DEAL WITH.

-- LIMITATIONS ON ARMAMENTS AND WEAPONS: THIS IS EASY TO DISCUSS, SINCE LEBANON AND ISRAEL HAD SUCH LIMITATIONS IN THEIR PREVIOUS RELATIONS (I.E., THE ARMISTICE).

-- SUPERVISORY LIAISON COMMITTEE: SUCH A COMMITTEE IS NORMAL WHENEVER THERE ARE ARRANGEMENTS THAT NEED SUPERVISION. IN THIS CASE, IT WILL BE TRIPARTITE.

-- STATIONING OF ARAB OR OTHER FORCES: ONCE LEBANON AND ISRAEL DECLARE AN END TO THE STATE OF WAR, IT WILL NEVER ENTER LEBANON'S MIND TO STATION SUCH FORCES ON ITS TERRITORY AGAINST

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ISRAEL. IF LEBANON EVER HAD TO SEEK RECOURSE TO A THIRD COUNTRY, IT WOULD BE FOR INTERNAL SECURITY ONLY, AND THIS WOULD BENEFIT LEBANON'S NEIGHBORS. IT WOULD NOT BE DIRECTED AGAINST ISRAEL. (TAMIR IMMEDIATELY INTERJECTED THAT THE ARAB DETERRENT FORCE HAD CERTAINLY BEEN OF NO BENEFIT.)

8. ISRAELI VIEWS ON WITHDRAWALS AND SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS.

TAMIR, AT KIMCHE'S REQUEST, REPEATED FAMILIAR ISRAELI CONDITIONS FOR PARTIAL AND FULL WITHDRAWAL, AS WELL AS PAST ISRAELI POSITIONS ON SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS. HE PREFACED HIS REMARKS ON THE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS WITH A DESCRIPTION OF THE MAIN FACTORS THAT INFLUENCED ISRAELI THINKING:

-- THE AGREEMENT TO BE SIGNED IS NOT A PEACE AGREEMENT, AND WHAT ISRAEL IS TALKING ABOUT IS SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS IN THE ABSENCE OF PEACE. IF LEBANON AND ISRAEL REACH PEACE, THE PICTURE WILL CHANGE COMPLETELY.

-- A PERIOD OF TIME IS NEEDED TO REORGANIZE THE LEBANESE ARMY TO THE POINT WHERE IT CAN PREVENT TERRORISM AGAINST ISRAEL AND LEBANON. ISRAEL ESTIMATES THIS PERIOD AS THREE YEARS. ISRAEL CAN EITHER WITHDRAW AFTER THIS PERIOD OR WITHDRAW RAPIDLY (AS IT SEEKS) ON THE BASIS OF CERTAIN SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS, INCLUDING THE PRESENCE OF SOME ISRAELIS WITH LEBANESE AGREEMENT, WHICH WOULD NOT VIOLATE LEBANESE

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EXDIS--SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MILITARY ADDRESSEES

SOVEREIGNTY.

-- ISRAEL DOES NOT FAVOR BEGINNING THE PROCESS OF
INTEGRATING LOCAL MILITIAS INTO THE LEBANESE
ARMY WITH THE TWO MILITIAS FRIENDLY TO ISRAEL.
WHY NOT START WITH THE RADICAL MILITIAS IN THE
NORTH? (ASKED BY DRAPER TO CLARIFY THIS, TAMIR

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SAID ISRAEL IS FOR THE INIEGRATION OF ALL
MILITIAS EXCEPT THOSE THAT ARE ANTI-LEBANESE
INTO THE LEBANESE ARMY. THE LOCAL FORCES IN
THE SOUTH SHOULD BE INTEGRATED INTO THE LEBANESE
ARMY FORCES RESPONSIBLE FOR SECURITY IN THE SOUTH.
THE REST OF THE COUNTRY IS NOT ISRAEL'S PROBLEM.
HOWEVER, IN THE SOUTH, ISRAEL WILL BE VERY
CAREFUL ABOUT THE KIND OF INTEGRATION THAT

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WILL OCCUR. IT HAD HEARD ABOUT CERTAIN OPTIONS THAT DID NOT EXACTLY CONSTITUTE INTEGRATION.)

-- INTERNATIONAL FORCES ARE NOT ORGANIZED FOR OR CAPABLE OF FIGHTING TERRORISM. THIS IS A JOB FOR POLICE AND INTERNAL SECURITY FORCES, AS THE MFO IN THE SINAI RECOGNIZED IN REFUSING TO ACCEPT RESPONSIBILITY FOR ANTI-TERRORISM. ISRAEL HAS HAD EXPERIENCE WITH THE MNF AND UNIFIL. IT IS NOT AGAINST THEM, BUT THEY ARE NOT CAPABLE OF DEALING WITH TERRORISM. THEREFORE, TAMIR SAID, ISRAEL WILL EXCLUDE THEM, AND "NO FORCE IN THE WORLD CAN CHANGE OUR MINDS. NO INTERNATIONAL FORCES, NO MNF, NO UN OBSERVERS WILL BE IN THE ZONE." (WE BELIEVE THIS IS THE FIRST TIME ISRAEL HAS EXPLICITLY REJECTED OBSERVERS.) HE MADE IT PLAIN THAT THIS EXCLUSION APPLIED TO ANY UNIFIL ROLE IN PROTECTING PALESTINIAN REFUGEE CAMPS IN THE SOUTH. THESE, HE SAID, WERE A LEBANESE RESPONSIBILITY, AND TO PUT THEM UNDER UNIFIL PROTECTION WOULD BE TANTAMOUNT TO A NEW CAIRO ACCORD. CLARIFYING AT FAIHAL'S REQUEST, KIMCHE ADDED THAT ISRAEL DID NOT OPPOSE STATIONING UNIFIL ANYWHERE IN LEBANON, ONLY IN THE SOUTH, WHERE IT MIGHT

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HAMPER SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS. ELSEWHERE IN THE COUNTRY, THERE WOULD BE PROBLEMS UNTIL THE LEBANESE ARMY COULD ASSUME FULL RESPONSIBILITIES. IMPLYING THERE COULD BE A ROLE FOR UNIFIL IN OTHER AREAS, HE SAID THERE MIGHT BE INFILTRATION ACROSS THE EASTERN BORDER, FOR INSTANCE. EXPANDING ON TAMIR'S REMARKS ON PROTECTION OF THE PALESTINIAN CAMPS, KIMCHE SAID THAT ANY INTERNATIONAL FORCE GUARDING THE CAMPS WOULD BECOME A SCREEN BEHIND WHICH THE PLO WOULD REBUILD ITS STATE WITHIN A STATE AND ORGANIZE HOSTILE ACTIVITY. THE LEBANESE ARMY WOULD BE UNABLE TO ACT IN THE PRESENCE OF INTERNATIONAL FORCES.

-- IT IS HARD, TAMIR SAID, TO JUDGE WHAT THE BEHAVIOR OF SYRIA WILL BE OVER THE NEXT FEW YEARS. ITS CLOSE COOPERATION WITH THE SOVIETS, ITS ROLE IN THE ARAB WORLD, THE NATURE OF ITS RADICAL, DICTATORIAL REGIME, AND ITS FRAGMENTATION ALL MEANT THAT SYRIA REMAINS A DANGER TO ISRAEL. LEBANON MAY SEE A NEW SYRIAN INVASION OR NEW DEMANDS, AND ISRAEL HAS TO TAKE THIS INTO ACCOUNT IN FRAMING ITS PROPOSALS ON SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS.

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9. ISRAELI PROBE ON MOVEMENT OF PERSONS AND GOODS.

RUBINSTEIN ASKED THE LEBANESE TO ELABORATE ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF MUTUAL RELATIONS. WHILE THEY HAD MENTIONED THE SELECTIVE ACCESS OF PERSONS, THEY HAD SAID NOTHING ABOUT THE MOVEMENT OF GOODS AND PRODUCTS. HOW, HE ASKED, DID THE LEBANESE SEE THE SITUATION ON THE BORDER THE MORNING AFTER THE AGREEMENT WAS RATIFIED? WHAT

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ABOUT MERCHANTS AND TOURISTS? FATTAL RESPONDED THAT THESE WERE QUESTIONS TO BE DISCUSSED IN THE SUBCOMMITTEE. HE COULD SAY, HOWEVER, THAT IT WOULD BE HARD TO ENVISAGE THE TOTAL OPENING OF THE BORDER AT THE PRESENT TIME. RUBINSTEIN RUEFULLY REMARKED THAT "THEN, A LOT OF WORK NEEDS TO BE DONE IN THE NEGOTIATIONS." FATTAL

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REPLIED LACONICALLY THAT "I HAVE NO DOUBT THAT THAT."

10. WORKING METHODS.

-- THE PLENARY AGREED TO HAVE ONE HOUR OF WORK IN SUBCOMMITTEES (SEPTTEL) BEFORE THE END OF THE DAY TO SHOW SOME PROGRESS.

-- IT ALSO AGREED THAT THE NEXT MEETING OF THE SUBCOMMITTEES WOULD BE HELD ON TUESDAY OR WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 25 OR 26 AT A SITE IN ISRAEL. (ISRAEL HAD WITHDRAWN A PREVIOUS OFFER OF NAHARIYYA AND PROPOSED NATANYA INSTEAD. THE LEBANESE SAID THEY WOULD HAVE A DECISION LATER IN THE DAY. SUBSEQUENTLY, THEY ASKED US TO INFORM THE ISRAELIS THEY COULD NOT ACCEPT NATAYNA AND WOULD EXPECT TO MEET AGAIN ON THURSDAY, JAN. 27 IN KIRYAT SHEMONA. THE POSSIBILITY OF WEDNESDAY SUBCOMMITTEE MEETINGS IS STILL OPEN, HOWEVER. THE ISRAELIS MAY FIND AN ACCEPTABLE COUNTERPROPOSAL.)

-- FINALLY, THE PLENARY AGREED TO A PRESS STATEMENT (SEPTTEL).

11. COMMENT: THE LEBANESE CAME TO THE JAN. 24 MEETING ARMED WITH A RELATIVELY WELL ARTICULATED, TOUGH POSITION OF PRINCIPLE TO PRESENT IN THE FACE OF THE INITIAL ISRAELI POSITION. THEY DID NOT, HOWEVER, HAVE MUCH TO SAY ABOUT PRACTICAL ARRANGEMENTS THAT MIGHT SATISFY AT LEAST SOME OF THE ISRAELI SECURITY CONCERNS AND NORMALIZATION DEMANDS. THESE MAY BEGIN TO EMERGE IN THE

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GIVE AND TAKE OF SUBCOMMITTEE MEETINGS ONCE THE LATEST FLAP OVER VENUE IS SETTLED. THE LEBANESE ARE LIKELY TO STICK TO A GENERALLY TOUGH POSITION FOR THE TIME BEING, AT LEAST UNTIL THEY GET SOME SENSE OF THE DIRECTION AMB. HABIB'S LATEST CONSULTATIONS WILL TAKE. THE ISRAELIS, MEANWHILE, SHOW NO SIGNS OF YIELDING ON ANY FRONT. WHILE KIMCHE RESPONDED MORE IN SORROW THAN IN ANGER TO FATTAL'S OPENING STATEMENT, TAMIR, NOW BACK FROM ZAIRE, WAS QUICK TO RESPOND IN STENTORIAN TONES REGARDING SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS AND WITHDRAWALS. IN SIDE DISCUSSIONS, MEMBERS OF THE ISRAELI DELEGATION HAVE TOLD US THEY BELIEVE LEBANON'S NEW TOUGHNESS IS DUE TO THE SIGNALS COMING FROM SAUDI ARABIA AND SYRIA. WHILE THEY DISCOUNT THE SIGNIFICANCE OF SAUDI AND SYRIAN POSITIONS ON THE KEY ISSUES, THEY THEN URGE US TO WORK ON THE SAUDIS IN PARTICULAR TO SOFTEN THEM. DILLON


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SUBJECT: NORMALIZATION

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1. [REDACTED]

2. IN THE COURSE OF AMBASSADOR HABIB'S JANUARY 22 MEETING WITH PRESIDENT MUBARAK, THE AMBASSADOR RAISED THE NORMALIZATION ISSUE AND MUBARAK ASKED WHETHER THE ISRAELIS HAD SAID ANYTHING TO HABIB ABOUT THAT SUBJECT DURING HIS MOST RECENT VISIT TO JERUSALEM. HABIB REPLIED THAT THE ISRAELIS HAD NOT SO MUCH AS MENTIONED THE SUBJECT TO HIM, EVEN THOUGH THEY KNEW HE WAS DUE TO VISIT CAIRO SHORTLY. AS MUBARAK SHOWED SIGNS OF READING THIS TO MEAN THAT THE GOI'S CONCERN OVER NORMALIZATION ISSUES WAS PERHAPS BEING OUTWEIGHED BY ITS PREOCCUPATION WITH OTHER TOPICS (E.G., LEBANON), I TOOK THE OPPORTUNITY TO NOTE THAT ISRAELI OFFICIALS HAVE LATELY BEEN ESPECIALLY OUTSPOKEN ABOUT THE STATE OF EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI RELATIONS IN THEIR CONTACTS WITH EMBASSY TEL AVIV -- EXPRESSING

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INTENSE UNHAPPINESS WITH THE GOE'S PERFORMANCE ON A WIDE RANGE OF NORMALIZATION ISSUES.

3. THIS ELICITED A LIVELY RESPONSE FROM MUBARAK, WHO LAUNCHED INTO A VEHEMENT DEFENSE OF THE GOE'S BEHAVIOR TOWARD ISRAEL IN THE LIGHT OF THE LEBANON CRISIS. "DO YOU REALIZE THE MOOD OF PUBLIC OPINION HERE?" HE ASKED. "DON'T YOU SEE HOW STUPID IT WOULD HAVE BEEN FOR ME TO PRETEND THAT NOTHING HAD HAPPENED (IN LEBANON)

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AND TO ALLOW MYSELF TO AGREE TO PROCEED WITH NORMALIZATION? EVEN SO, DESPITE GREAT PRESSURES ON ME TO DO SO, I REFUSED TO GO SO FAR AS TO EXPEL THE ISRAELI AMBASSADOR." IN RESPONSE TO HABIB'S REJOINDER THAT THE ISRAELIS NEVERTHELESS REMAIN VERY UPSET OSAMA EL-BAZ REMARKED SARCASTICALLY, "YES -- THEY EXPECT US TO KISS THEM." MUBARAK CONTINUED: "WE SIGNED THE PEACE TREATY AND WE WILL STICK TO IT. WE'LL TRADE WITH THE ISRAELIS AT OUR CONVENIENCE, BUT WE WILL NOT BE PRESSURED INTO ACCORDING THEM SPECIAL TREATMENT." HABIB OBSERVED THAT, REGARDLESS OF THE COMPLAINTS BEING DIRECTED BY EACH SIDE AGAINST THE OTHER, IT IS IMPORTANT TO REMEMBER -- THAT A CONTINUING DIALOGUE BETWEEN CAIRO AND JERUSALEM IS THE ONLY WAY OF RESOLVING THEM. AFTER ALL, HE NOTED, IT WAS EGYPT WHICH HAD ORIGINATED THIS METHODOLOGY OF DEALING WITH THE ISRAELIS. MUBARAK ACKNOWLEDGED THIS POINT AND THE IMPORTANCE OF CONTINUING TO TALK, BUT ADDED GLOOMILY: "I FEAR THEY WILL ONLY DRAG THINGS OUT."

4. I VENTURED TO SUGGEST THAT ONE USEFUL STEP TOWARD IMPROVING EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI RELATIONS WOULD BE THE REACTIVATION OF MILITARY LIAISON SYSTEM MEETINGS ON A REGULAR MONTHLY BASIS. KAMAL HASSAN ALI

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SAID THE GOE HAD TRIED TO DO THIS IN CONNECTION WITH THE LAST LIAISON SYSTEM MEETING IN OCTOBER, BUT THAT SUBSEQUENT MEETINGS HAD BEEN BLOCKED BY AN "AGENDA DISPUTE." THE EGYPTIANS HAD PROPOSED THEIR AGENDA AND INVITED THE ISRAELIS TO DO SO AS WELL. THE GOE WAS STILL WAITING ON ISRAEL. (COMMENT: WE UNDERSTAND FROM MFO SOURCES THAT BRIG. DOV SION AND ADMIRAL MOHSEN HAMDY ARE TRYING TO SCHEDULE ANOTHER LIAISON SYSTEM MEETING FOR FEBRUARY 9 OR 10 AT EL-GORAH. HAMDY, WHO HAS JUST EMERGED FROM HOSPITAL AFTER A FEW WEEKS OF TREATMENT AN - "O A HEART AILMENT REPORTEDLY WAS TOUCHED "O RECEIVE A GET-WELL MESSA E FROM SION THAT READ: "PLEASE GET WELL. I NEED YOU." END COMMENT.) PRECHT

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JERUSALEM FOR AMBASSADORS HABIB AND DRAPER FROM ROSS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: SCOM, PREL, PINT, MOPS, LE, IS, SY, PLO, US
SUBJECT: DRAPER MISSION: LEBANESE TOUGHEN PUBLIC STANCE

1. THE LEBANESE STEERING COMMITTEE FOR THE
NEGOTIATIONS TOLD AMBASSADOR HABIB JANUARY 21 THAT IT
WOULD TAKE ACTION TO REFLECT THE LEBANESE POSITION
MORE FIRMLY IN COMING NEGOTIATING SESSIONS AND IN THE
MEDIA. A GLANCE AT THE JANUARY 23 PRESS SHOWS THAT
OFFICIAL LEBANESE SPOKESMEN AND SYMPATHETIC POLITICAL

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FIGURES HAVE INDEED BEEN MOBILIZED FOR THIS PURPOSE.

2. (U) MANY PAPERS REPRODUCE A NEWS ANALYSIS
PUBLISHED BY THE "CENTRAL NEWS AGENCY" OUTLINING THE
LEBANESE POSITION AS COMMUNICATED TO AMBASSADOR HABIB.
ACCORDING TO "SOURCES CLOSE TO THE REGIME" CITED BY THE
NEWS AGENCY, THE LEBANESE POSITION MAY BE SUMMARIZED
AS FOLLOWS:

-- LEBANON IS MORE THAN EVER DETERMINED TO OBTAIN THE

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COMPLETE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES FROM ITS TERRITORY IN ACCORDANCE WITH A COMPREHENSIVE PLAN AND TIMETABLE TO BE AGREED UPON.

-- GEBANON CONTINUES TO REJECT THE NORMALIZATION OF ITS RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL, BUT AGREES TO DISCUSS THE FRAMEWORK OF FUTURE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES.

-- LEBANON AGREES TO DISCUSS THE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS THAT ISRAEL DEMANDS, BUT UNDER INTERNATIONAL AUSPICES AND IN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT, ESPECIALLY AS REGARDS THE PRESENCE OF ARMAMENTS IN THE SOUTH.

-- LEBANON REJECTS THE ISRAELI DEMAND ON ESTABLISHING EARLY WARNING STATIONS, AS WELL A THE ESTABLISHMENT OF MILITARY POINTS BY ANY FOREIGN ARMED FORCE ANYWHERE IN LEBANON, BECAUSE THESE WOULD ENTAIL A SERIES OF MEASURES AND ARRANGEMENTS, INCLUDING LIAISON AMONG THESE POINTS AND ACROSS THE BORDER.

-- LEBANON REMAINS ATTACHED TO AMERICAN PARTICIPATION IN THE NEGOTIATIONS AND TO THE PRESENCE OF INTERNATIONAL AND MULTINATIONAL FORCES IN THE SOUTH.

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3. (U) "OFFICIAL SOURCES" QUOTED IN LEADING INDEPENDENT ARABIC DAILY "AN-NAHAR" INDICATE THAT "LEBANON WAS CAREFUL TO GIVE HABIB ITS CLEAR AND FRANK POSITION ON ALL THE ISRAELI DEMANDS, AS WELL AS ITS OWN DEMAND, I.E., ACHIEVEMENT OF THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES FROM ITS TERRITORY, POINTING OUT THAT THERE ARE RED LINES THAT CANNOT BE CROSSED BECAUSE OF THEIR CONNECTION WITH CLEAR LEBANESE CONSTANTS."

4. (U) THE THEME OF "RED LINES" IS ALSO PLAYED UP IN A STATEMENT GIVEN TO THE PRESS BY FORMER PRIME MINISTER SALAM FOLLOWING HIS JANUARY 22 MEETING WITH AMBASSADOR DRAPER: "I EMPHASIZED TO AMB. DRAPER THAT ALL LEBANESE WANT PEACE AND ARE WORKING SERIOUSLY FOR IT. THEY WANT TO REACH IT BY PEACEFUL MEANS, NOT THROUGH THE CANNON. I EXPLAINED TO HIM IN DETAIL THE RED LINES THAT LEBANON CANNOT CROSS UNDER ANY CIRCUMSTANCES. ISRAEL MUST REALIZE THIS, AND THE UNITED STATES MUST TAKE IT INTO CONSIDERATION."

5. (U) PRIME MINISTER WAZZAN IS QUOTED IN THE PRESS AS WELL: "WE REGRET THAT WE HAVE NOT SEEN SUFFICIENT PROGRESS IN THE ISRAELI POSITIONS. WE HAVE FACED AND WILL FACE THIS (SITUATION) WITH A FIRMNESS AS STRONG AS

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OUR RIGHT TO INDEPENDENCE AND SOVEREIGNTY, AS WELL AS WITH A REFUSAL TO SUBMIT TO ANY DEMAND OR CONDITION THAT CONTRADICTS THIS OR HARMS OUR LEBANESE, REGIONAL ARAB, AND OTHER INTERESTS....(NEGOTIATIONS WITH SYRIA AND THE PALESTINIANS) ARE TAKING PLACE AS WELL ON MORE THAN ONE LEVEL. WE HAVE REACHED A POINT WHERE WE FEEL CONFIDENT OF POSITIVE RESULTS AT THE APPROPRIATE TIME."

6. (U) THE SUNNI MUFTI OF THE REPUBLIC, SHAYKH HASAN KHALID, IS QUOTED IN AN INTERVIEW WITH AL-ITTIHAD OF [REDACTED]

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ABU DHABI AS SAYING THAT "GEBANON'S INTEREST IS TO BE FOUND IN THE ABSENCE OF NORMALIZATION BETWEEN IT AND ISRAEL....WE ARE ATTACHED TO THE ARMISTICE ACCORD OF 1949."

7. (U) IN A COMMUNIQUE FOLLOWING A MEETING OF ITS LEADERSHIP, THE SHI'ITE MOVEMENT "AMAL" WARNS AGAINST PARTIAL WITHDRAWALS: "WE CALL ON THE LEBANESE NEGOTIATORS AND THE AMERICAN PARTNER TO REJECT PARTIAL WITHDRAWALS OR EVEN ANY STUDY OR HINT OF A PARTIAL SOLUTION."

8. [REDACTED] COMMENT: THE "CENTRAL NEWS AGENCY" IS VERY CLOSE TO MODERATE PHALANGE OPINION AND TO THE PALACE, AND AMBASSADOR TUENI IS BACKGROUNDING ITS PRESIDENTIAL CORRESPONDENT ALMOST DAILY. THEREFORE, ITS FORMULATION OF THE LEBANESE POSITION GOING INTO ROUND NINE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS MAY BE PRESUMED TO BE ACCURATE.

9. [REDACTED] FYI: SALAM DID IN FACT RAISE THREE "RED LINES" WITH DRAPER, BUT ONLY IN GENERAL TERMS -- FREE MOVEMENT OF GOODS AND PEOPLE, LIAISON "AS DEFINED BY THE ISRAELIS", AND EARLY WARNING STATIONS. ACCORDING TO SALAM, SYRIA IS THE KEY PARTY IN DEFINING THESE RED LINES IN DETAIL, SINCE IT IS IN A POSITION TO RALLY ARAB OPINION, INCLUDING SAUDI ARABIA, OO ITS POINT OF VIEW. WHILE THE LEBANESE MUSLIM COMMUNITY HAS, IN SALAM'S VIEW, SHOWN GREAT COURAGE (FOR INSTANCE, IN ACCEPTING THE NECESSITY FOR THE LEBANESE AND ISRAELIS TO SIT DOWN TOGETHER), IT CANNOT GO VERY FAR BEYOND THE "RED LINES" LAID DOWN BY THE ARAB WORLD. DILLON UNQUOTE SHULTZ

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AMCONSUL JERUSALEM PRIORITY

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SECTION 01 OF 05 CAIRO 02064

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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, MILI, LE, US, IS, EG, XF

SUBJECT: HABIB MISSION: BRIEFING OF PRESIDENT
- MUBARAK - JANUARY 22

1. [REDACTED]

2. SUMMARY: AMBASSADOR HABIB, IN MEETING WITH PRESIDENT MUBARAK DURING A BRIEF VISIT HERE ON JANUARY 22, ELICITED A CLEAR GOE ENDORSEMENT OF OUR VIEW THAT THE LEBANESE CANNOT EXPECT TO AVOID SOME "LIMITED" CONCESSIONS TO THE ISRAELIS IF THEY HOPE TO ENSURE THE IDF'S WITHDRAWAL. THE EGYPTIANS AGREED THAT BOTH THE ISRAELIS AND THE SAUDIS ARE PUSHING MAXIMAL POSITIONS IN THIS FIRST STAGE OF NEGOTIATIONS. THEY ALSO AGREED ON THE

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NEED TO MAKE PROGRESS AS RAPIDLY AS POSSIBLE. MUBARAK URGED HABIB TO SPEAK FRANKLY WITH KING FAHD ON THESE POINTS, AND HABIB UNDERTOOK TO PROVIDE MUBARAK FEEDBACK ON HIS TALKS IN RIYADH. THE EGYPTIANS INDICATED THEIR READINESS TO ASSIST, TO THE DEGREE THEY ENJOY ACCESS TO AND INFLUENCE WITH OTHER ARABS, OUR EFFORTS TO PERSUADE THE SAUDIS OF THE NEED FOR LEBANESE FLEXIBILITY ON CONCESSIONS AS THE NEGOTIATIONS PROCEED. END SUMMARY.

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3. AMBASSADOR HABIB MET FOR OVER AN HOUR WITH PRESIDENT MUBARAK ON SATURDAY, JANUARY 22, TO BRIEF HIM ON THE STATUS OF THE LEBANON NEGOTIATIONS. IN ATTENDANCE WERE DEPRIMIN AND FORMIN KAMAL HASSAN ALI, MFA FIRST UNDERSECRETARY AND PRESIDENTIAL ADVISOR OSAMA EL-BAZ, CHARGE AND POL COUNSELOR CAROLAN.

4. HABIB PORTRAYED TO THE EGYPTIANS IN CONSIDERABLE DETAIL THE CURRENT STATE OF PLAY IN THE NEGOTIATIONS -- GIVING A RUNDOWN ON THE DEMANDS PUT FORWARD BY THE ISRAELIS WITH REGARD TO WITHDRAWAL, SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS AND "MUTUAL RELATIONS," AS WELL AS THE TENTATIVE POSITIONS SO FAR ADVANCED BY THE LEBANESE. HE SAID HE HAD PARTIALLY ACHIEVED WHAT PRESIDENT REAGAN HAD SENT HIM BACK TO THE AREA TO DO -- I.E., HE HAD HELPED ACCELERATE THE PACE OF THE INITIAL, AGENDA-SETTING STAGE OF THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS. IN ADDITION, HOWEVER, THE PRESIDENT HAD PARTICULARLY INSTRUCTED HIM TO SEEK TO MOVE THE NEGOTIATIONS ON SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES ALONG QUICKLY, BRIDGING GAPS IN THE POSITIONS OF THE PARTIES WHEREVER NECESSARY. IN THIS RESPECT, SAID HABIB, HE HAD SO FAR ACHIEVED NO PROGRESS WHATSOEVER.

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THE ISRAELIS, FOR THEIR PART, INSIST ON ARRANGEMENTS WITH THE LEBANESE THAT AMOUNT VIRTUALLY TO A COMPREHENSIVE PEACE TREATY -- MINUS ONLY THE FORMAL TITLE AND PROVISIONS FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF DIPLOMATIC AND CULTURAL RELATIONS. THE LEBANESE SEEM PREPARED TO GO A LONG WAY TOWARD MEETING MANY OF ISRAEL'S REQUIREMENTS, BUT THEY ARE TERRIBLY FRIGHTENED BY THE POTENTIALLY DISASTROUS POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC COMPLICATIONS WHICH ACCEPTANCE OF ISRAEL'S DEMANDS IN THE NORMALIZATION FIELD WOULD CREATE IN THEIR RELATIONS WITH SYRIA AND OTHER ARAB STATES. THE GOL'S FEARS IN THIS REGARD HAVE BEEN REINFORCED BY THE STRONG ADMONITIONS PRESIDENT GEMAYEL HAS BEEN RECEIVING FROM THE ARABS AGAINST AGREEING TO ANY NORMALIZATION STEPS AT ALL.

5. HABIB NOTED THAT SOME LEBANESE LEADERS, FACED WITH ISRAELI POSITIONS THAT GO FAR BEYOND WHAT THE GOL THINKS IT CAN ACCEPT, SEEM DISPOSED TO BELIEVE THE USG SHOULD DO THEIR NEGOTIATING FOR THEM. THIS NOTION IS WRONG. THE GOL ITSELF MUST COME TO GRIPS WITH THE NEED TO GIVE SOME CONCESSIONS (PARTICULARLY WITH REGARD TO NORMALIZATION) TO THE ISRAELIS IN RETURN FOR IDF WITHDRAWAL. SO FAR, HOWEVER, THE LEBANESE APPEAR UNWILLING TO DETERMINE AND ARTICULATE FOR THEMSELVES

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WHAT THE LIMITS OF THOSE CONCESSIONS SHOULD BE.
THE FIRST TRULY SUBSTANTIVE NEGOTIATING SESSION
WILL TAKE PLACE ON JANUARY 24, AND HABIB HOPED

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EXDIS

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THIS WILL HELP SPUR THE GOL INTO EXAMINING MORE
ACUTELY "WHAT THE TRAFFIC WILL BEAR" IN TERMS OF ARAB

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REACTION. HE THOUGHT IT SHOULD NOT PROVE IMPOSSIBLE FOR THE LEBANESE, WITH OUR HELP AND THAT OF FRIENDS SUCH AS EGYPT, TO CONVINCE OTHER MODERATE AND SENSIBLE ARABS THAT THE GOL MUST CONCEDE SOMETHING IN ORDER TO OBTAIN ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL.

6. EL-BAZ SAID THE GOL HAS TOLD CAIRO THAT THE USG IS TAKING A "BACKSEAT" IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. (THE GOE HAD REPLIED THAT A LOW-KEY U.S. APPROACH IS "IN THE NATURE OF NEGOTIATIONS OF THIS KIND IN THEIR EARLY

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STAGES.") EL-BAZ THEN SUGGESTED THAT THE LEBANESE MAY REALLY WANT THE USG TO DO THEIR NEGOTIATING FOR THEM. HABIB THOUGHT THIS IS NOT ENTIRELY TRUE RIGHT NOW, ALTHOUGH THE GOL WOULD PROBABLY NOT BE UNHAPPY TO SEE MATTERS EVOLVE IN THAT DIRECTION AS TIME GOES ON. HE TENDED TO SYMPATHIZE WITH PRIMIN WAZZAN'S WORRIES ABOUT ARAB REACTION, WHICH HAD PROMPTED HIM TO PLEAD WITH HABIB TO "DO IT LIKE YOU DID LAST SUMMER . . . JUST TELL US WHAT WE HAVE TO ACCEPT." HABIB DID NOT RULE OUT THE POSSIBILITY OF THE USG ACTING ON THE GOL'S BEHALF AT SOME POINT. HE EMPHASIZED, HOWEVER, THAT THERE MUST FIRST BE A CERTAIN AMOUNT OF BILATERAL GIVE-AND-TAKE IN THE NEGOTIATIONS -- IF ONLY TO LEND AN AURA OF BILATERALISM TO THE PROCESS, A CONCEPT THE ISRAELIS (ESPECIALLY SHARON) REGARD AS IMPORTANT.

7. UP TO NOW, SAID HABIB, ISRAEL'S DEMANDS IN ALL THREE SUBSTANTIVE AREAS HAVE BEEN SO SWEEPING AS TO LEAVE THE LEBANESE ALMOST PARALYZED BY THEIR FEARS OF ARAB REACTION. HE HAD MADE CLEAR TO THE ISRAELIS THE POINTS ON WHICH WE BELIEVE THEIR DEMANDS ARE UNREALISTIC OR GO TOO FAR (E.G., EARLY WARNING STATIONS AND OTHER MANIFESTATIONS OF A RESIDUAL IDF PRESENCE ON LEBANESE SOIL, THE RETENTION OF A ROLE FOR HADDAD'S FORCES IN THE SOUTH, "MOST-FAVORED-NATION" TREATMENT WITH REGARD TO ALL KINDS OF ECONOMIC AND HUMAN INTERCOURSE, ETC.). HE HAD SINCE OBTAINED GEMAYEL'S OWN, SIMILAR REACTION TO THESE ISRAELI DEMANDS AND WOULD CONFIRM THEM TO THE GOI LEADERSHIP IN THE NEXT DAY OR TWO BEFORE RETURNING TO WASHINGTON TO CONSULT WITH THE PRESIDENT AND SECRETARY SHULTZ.

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8. HABIB NOTED THAT DESPITE HIS EFFORTS TO PORTRAY TO THE ISRAELIS THE VERY THIN LINE THAT GEMAYEL MUST WALK IN THE NEGOTIATIONS, THEY ARE NOT AT ALL SYMPATHETIC TO THE GOL'S PREDICAMENT VIS-A-VIS THE OTHER ARABS. IN HABIB'S VIEW, THE GOI IS NOT LIKELY TO BUDGE MUCH FROM THE EXTREME POSITIONS IT HAS TAKEN. THE CURRENT PROSPECT, THEREFORE, IS THAT (A) THE PARTIES WILL REMAIN VERY FAR APART ON VARIOUS KEY ISSUES, (B) THE NEGOTIATIONS COULD DRAG ON FOR MONTHS, (C) THE ISRAELIS AND SYRIANS COULD CONSOLIDATE THEIR GRIP ON THE PARTS OF LEBANON THEY NOW OCCUPY, (D) THE PROSPECT OF WITHDRAWAL BY ALL FOREIGN FORCES FROM LEBANON WOULD RECEDE, (E) THE DANGEROUS POTENTIAL FOR INCIDENTS AND MILITARY ESCALATION BETWEEN ISRAEL AND SYRIA WOULD PERSIST, AND, MOST DISTRESSING OF ALL, (F) THE REAGAN INITIATIVE AND OUR HOPES FOR EARLY RESUMPTION OF THE OVERALL MIDEAST PEACE PROCESS WOULD STAGNATE. MUBARAK INTERJECTED THAT THE ISRAELIS WOULD ALSO PROCEED TO ENSURE, THROUGH CONTINUED SETTLEMENT ACTIVITIES ON THE WEST BANK, THAT THERE WOULD BE NOTHING LEFT FOR THE PARTIES TO NEGOTIATE IN ANY FUTURE PEACE PROCESS. HABIB REPLIED THAT FOR ALL THESE REASONS WE CANNOT AFFORD PROTRACTED NEGOTIATIONS OVER LEBANON. HE SAID PRESIDENT REAGAN IS WELL AWARE OF THIS AND REMAINS DETERMINED TO ACCELERATE THE PACE OF A NEGOTIATED WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES FROM LEBANON. MUBARAK COULD EXPECT TO HEAR THESE VIEWS DIRECTLY FROM PRESIDENT REAGAN NEXT WEEK IN WASHINGTON.

9. MUBARAK OBSERVED THAT IT WOULD CLEARLY BE HELPFUL IF MODERATE ARAB GOVERNMENTS COULD. SOMEHOW

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EXDIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, MILI, LE, US, IS, EG, XF
SUBJECT: HABIB MISSION: BRIEFING OF PRESIDENT

REASSURE THE GOL THAT THEY RECOGNIZE THE NEED FOR
"LIMITED" CONCESSIONS TO ISRAEL ON THE NORMALIZATION
FRONT. HE REGRETTED THAT NONE OF THEM APPARENTLY FEEL
"FREE" TO DO SO. HABIB SAID GEMAYEL AIMS TO ESTABLISH
AN INTEGRAL, INDEPENDENT LEBANON THAT WILL BE LINKED TO
BOTH THE ARAB WORLD AND THE WEST, BUT HE NEEDS
TO MAKE A DEAL TO RID LEBANON OF THE SYRIAN AND ISRAELI
PRESENCE BEFORE HE CAN ACCOMPLISH THIS. THE ARABS
SHOULD RECOGNIZE THAT GEMAYEL'S AMBITION MUST BE
SUPPORTED, NOT FRUSTRATED BY MAXIMALIST PRESSURES, AND
THAT, IF GEMAYEL AND WE FAIL, LEBANON MAY END UP
BEING EFFECTIVELY PARTITIONED BETWEEN SYRIA AND ISRAEL.

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MUBARAK INDICATED THAT EGYPT SHARES THESE VIEWS
AND IS WORKING "TO THE LIMITS OF OUR ABILITIES" TO
SUPPORT THE GOL. HE ADDED THAT THE GOE CERTAINLY
SUBSCRIBES TO THE NOTION THAT THE LEBANESE
MUST MAKE "LIMITED, NOT SWEEPING" CONCESSIONS ON
NORMALIZATION TO THE ISRAELIS IN ORDER TO PRODUCE
THEIR WITHDRAWAL. EL-BAZ ECHOED THIS VIEW,
STATING FLATLY THAT "THERE HAS TO BE A QUID PRO QUO
FOR WITHDRAWAL." KAMAL HASSAN ALI AGREED, BUT SAID
THE GOE DEFINES "LIMITED" CONCESSIONS AS THOSE
"NOT AFFECTING LAND OR LEBANON'S SOVEREIGNTY."
TO HABIB'S SUGGESTION THAT THE EGYPTIANS WOULD DO WELL
TO CONVEY SUCH VIEWS TO THE GOL DIRECTLY, EL-BAZ

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RESPONDED THAT HE AND BOUTROS GHALI HAD DONE THIS IN THE COURSE OF THEIR VISIT TO BEIRUT LAST MONTH. GEMAYEL'S ANSWER, HE RECALLED, HAD BEEN TO THE EFFECT THAT "LEBANON IS NOT EGYPT" -- I.E., THAT THE GOL WAS TOO WEAK TO BRAVE ARAB REACTION TO CONCESSIONS TO ISRAEL AS EGYPT HAD DONE. EL-BAZ ADDED THAT HE AND GHALI HAD ALSO EXPRESSED TO GEMAYEL THE GOL'S READINESS TO SHARE ITS POLITICAL AND PRACTICAL EXPERTISE IN DEALING WITH THE ISRAELIS WITH REGARD TO "DIFFERENT FORMULAS, ASPECTS, DOSES AND STAGES" RELATING TO NORMALIZATION AND SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS. THE GOL HAD NOT TAKEN THE EGYPTIANS UP ON THIS OFFER TO DATE, HE SAID, "BUT WE KNEW IT WOULD BE HARD FOR AMIN TO CONSULT WITH US WHILE NEGOTIATIONS ARE IN PROGRESS." MUBARAK AND EL-BAZ OPINED THAT THE TASK OF HELPING THE GOL DEFINE THE "REASONABLE LIMITS" OF CONCESSIONS OUGHT IN THE FIRST INSTANCE TO FALL TO THE USG. HABIB SAID HE IS PREPARED TO PERFORM THIS ROLE AT THE PROPER TIME (NOT RIGHT NOW) AND THAT HE

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ALREADY HAS BEEN GIVING SOME THOUGHT TO WHAT IT MIGHT ENTAIL.

10. MUBARAK URGED HABIB TO SPEAK FRANKLY TO THE SAUDIS ABOUT THE ESSENTIAL NEED FOR GOL CONCESSIONS TO ISRAEL ON MATTERS NOT INVOLVING LEBANESE SOVEREIGNTY OR THE GOL'S CONTROL OF ITS OWN TERRITORY. IN RESPONSE TO HABIB'S QUERY AS TO WHETHER, IN EGYPT'S OPINION, KING FAHD RECOGNIZES THIS NEED, MUBARAK SAID HE BELIEVES THIS IS SO. HE COULD NOT BE SURE, HOWEVER, WHAT POSITION THE KING WOULD ADOPT IN TALKING TO HABIB. HABIB NOTED THAT FAHD HAS INVARIABLY PROVED "SOLID" AND HELPFUL TO US IN THE PAST WITH REGARD TO THE SITUATION IN LEBANON. HE COULD NOT UNDERSTAND WHY THE SAUDIS REPORTEDLY HAVE BEGUN URGING GEMAYEL TO ADOPT SUCH AN UNYIELDING POSITION ON NORMALIZATION QUESTIONS. EL-BAZ SUGGESTED THAT NEWS REPORTS OF EXAGGERATED, MAXIMALIST DEMANDS BEING LEVIED ON THE GOL BY ISRAEL MAY HAVE PROMPTED THE SAUDIS TO REACT IN KIND. HABIB SAID HE EXPECTED TO GAIN A CLEARER APPRECIATION OF SAUDI ATTITUDES IN THE COURSE OF HIS FORTHCOMING MEETING WITH KING FAHD IN RIYADH. HE UNDERTOOK TO REPORT FURTHER TO MUBARAK ON THIS SUBJECT AND TO MAKE SUGGESTIONS IF EGYPT COULD PLAY A USEFUL ROLE WITH THE SAUDIS. MUBARAK SAID HE WOULD BE SENDING A SPECIAL MESSENGER TO KING FAHD WHEN HE RETURNS FROM WASHINGTON. IN THE MEANTIME, HABIB WAS GLAD TO KNOW THAT THE EGYPTIANS HAVE AN UNDERSTANDING OF THE INTENSE, CONFLICTING

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PRESSURES THAT ARE BEING BROUGHT TO BEAR ON GEMAYEL FROM
VARIOUS DIRECTIONS, AS WELL AS A CLEAR APPRECIATION
OF GEMAYEL'S NEED TO MAKE SOME CONCESSIONS TO

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EXDIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, MILI, LE, US, IS, EG, XF
SUBJECT: HABIB MISSION: BRIEFING OF PRESIDENT

THE ISRAELIS SO THAT PROGRESS CAN BE MADE TOWARD
THE REMOVAL OF FOREIGN FORCES FROM LEBANON.

11. THE DISCUSSION WAS PUNCTUATED AT ONE POINT BY AN
EXCHANGE OF DIVERGENT VIEWS ON THE SYRIAN ROLE.
HABIB APPEARED DUBIOUS OF MUBARAK'S ASSERTION THAT

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.SECRET, DIRECT ISRAELI-SYRIAN CONTACTS HAVE PRODUCED AGREEMENT BY THE TWO SIDES TO WORK IN CONCERT TO FRUSTRATE EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE WITHDRAWAL BY FOREIGN FORCES FROM LEBANON. THE PRESIDENT ADAMANTLY ASSERTED SUCH CONTACTS OCCURRED "IN EUROPE AND ELSEWHERE" IN RECENT MONTHS. MUBARAK POINTED OUT THAT ISRAEL

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AND SYRIA HAVE A VESTED INTEREST IN PROLONGING THEIR PRESENCE IN LEBANON IN ORDER TO BLOCK OR DELAY THE REAGAN INITIATIVE AND DEPRIVE THE USG OF CREDIBILITY IN MODERATE ARAB EYES. HABIB SAID IT WAS POSSIBLE THAT A DEGREE OF COINCIDENCE OR PARALLELISM MAY EXIST WITH REGARD TO THE TACTICS BEING EMPLOYED BY THE ISRAELIS AND THE SYRIANS, PERHAPS FORTIFIED BY A TACIT AWARENESS OF EACH OTHER'S DESIGNS. HE STRONGLY DOUBTED, HOWEVER, THAT THERE HAVE BEEN ANY DIRECT CONSULTATIONS ON STRATEGY BETWEEN THEM. MUBARAK REMAINED VISIBLY UNPERSUADED, OFFERING TO WAGER THAT TIME AND EVENTS WOULD PROVE HIM RIGHT.

12. HABIB TOOK OCCASION TO CONFIRM HIS IMPRESSION THAT THE GOE'S DECISION TO RETAIN THE PRESENCE OF UNTSO OBSERVERS ON EGYPTIAN TERRITORY HAD BEEN A UNILATERAL ONE. KAMAL HASSAN ALI INDICATED THIS WAS THE CASE, NOTING THIS HAD BEEN DONE SOLELY WITH THE AGREEMENT OF THE UN SECRETARY-GENERAL AND HAD NOT INVOLVED THE UNSC IN ANY WAY. HABIB AND THE EGYPTIAN LEADERS AGREED THAT THIS EGYPTIAN-UNTSO PRECEDENT MIGHT PROVE TO BE INSTRUCTIVE FOR THE LEBANESE.

13. HABIB OBSERVED PARENTHETICALLY THAT HIS CURRENT PREOCCUPATION WITH THE LEBANON NEGOTIATIONS HAS FORCED HIM TO BE OUT OF TOUCH WITH THE ONGOING CONSULTATIONS BETWEEN ARAFAT AND KING HUSSEIN. THIS SUBJECT WOULD BE COVERED IN WASHINGTON. HE GATHERED THAT THE EXCHANGES APPEARED TO BE HEADING GENERALLY IN A POSITIVE DIRECTION AND THAT ARAFAT ANTICIPATES USING NEXT MONTH'S PNC SESSIONS AT ALGIERS TO OBTAIN ENDORSEMENT OF HIS DECISION

[REDACTED]

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TO COME TO AN "ARRANGEMENT" WITH THE GOJ. MUBARAK SAID HIS IMPRESSION IS THAT KING HUSSEIN'S MOOD IS UPBEAT AND THAT "HE IS DOING HIS BEST." HE NOTED, HOWEVER, THAT THE SYRIANS CONTINUE TO

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PRESSURE ARAFAT THROUGH VARIOUS RADICAL FACTIONS IN THE PLO. HE TENDED TO AGREE WITH HABIB'S GUESS THAT ARAFAT AND HUSSEIN WILL EVENTUALLY ARRIVE AT AN "ARRANGEMENT," BUT THE QUESTION IN EGYPT'S MIND IS "WHEN?" HABIB CONCURRED THAT THE TIME-FACTOR IS VITALLY IMPORTANT, BUT HE WONDERED IF ARAFAT REALLY UNDERSTANDS THIS YET. MUBARAK REPLIED BY OBSERVING THAT PALESTINIAN NOTABLES IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES (E.G., HIKMAT AL-MASRI) CERTAINLY UNDERSTAND IT, BUT THAT PALESTINIANS-IN-EXILE CANNOT ALWAYS BE COUNTED ON TO LOOK BEYOND THEIR "FALSE WORLD."

14. HABIB NOTED ALSO THAT HE SEES NO USEFUL PURPOSE IN VISITING DAMASCUS AGAIN UNTIL HE HAS A BETTER VIEW OF THE POSSIBILITIES OF MOVEMENT IN THE LEBANESE-ISRAELI NEGOTIATIONS. ASKED ABOUT PROSPECTS FOR THE DEPARTURE OF THE ESTIMATED 8,000 - 12,000 PLO FIGHTERS STILL LOCATED IN NORTH AND NORTHEAST LEBANON, HE SAID ARAFAT HAS WRITTEN TO GEMAYEL PROFESSING HIS DESIRE TO COOPERATE WITH THE GOL IN THIS AND OTHER RESPECTS. HABIB BELIEVED THE PLO CHAIRMAN IS WELL AWARE THAT HIS PEOPLE'S INTEREST WILL BE BEST SERVED BY "GETTING THEM OUT OF THERE." AT THIS POINT IN THE CONVERSATION, HABIB'S HALF-FACETIOUS SUGGESTION TO MUBARAK THAT EGYPT MIGHT BE INCLINED TO GIVE HAVEN TO "A FEW -- MAYBE 4,000" PLO EFFECTIVES NEXT TIME AROUND BROUGHT A PREDICTABLE,

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VIGOROUS AND UNMISTAKABLY NEGATIVE REACTION FROM
THE PRESIDENT.

15. RIYADH PLEASE PASS TO AMBASSADOR HABIB.
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EXCLUSIVE FOR MILITARY ADDRESSEES

JIDDA/RIYADH PASS AMBASSADOR HABIB

FROM DRAPER

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, PBTS, MOPS, MARR, LE, IS, SY, PLO, US

SUBJECT: DRAPER MISSION: JANUARY 20 NEGOTIATING ROUND

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1. SUMMARY. AT THE EIGHTH ROUND OF LEBANESE-ISRAELI-US NEGOTIATIONS, THE CONCEPTS OF LIAISON, CESSATION OF HOSTILE PROPAGANDA, THE MOVEMENT OF PERSONS AND GOODS, SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS, AND WITHDRAWALS WERE DISCUSSED AND FOUR NEW SUBCOMMITTEES WERE CREATED. THE ISRAELIS DREW ON THEIR DRAFT AGREEMENT TO STATE THEIR PROPOSALS ON ALL THE ABOVE SUBJECTS EXCEPT SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS AND WITHDRAWALS, WHERE THEY FELL BACK ON THE DECEMBER 14

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"WORKING PAPER". MAJOR DIFFERENCES IN THE ISRAELI AND LEBANESE POSITIONS BEGAN TO SURFACE, ESPECIALLY ON SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS AND MUTUAL RELATIONS, BUT ON UNEQUAL TERMS. THE LEBANESE CONTINUED TO REACT VERY SOFTLY TO ISRAELI PROPOSALS, USUALLY STATING THEY WOULD REFER THEM TO THEIR GOVERNMENT BEFORE COMMENTING IN DETAIL. THIS, AS WELL AS THE UNDISCIPLINED STATEMENTS OF SOME MEMBERS OF THE LEBANESE DELEGATION, LED THE ISRAELIS TO BELIEVE THAT SOME OF THEIR PROPOSALS MIGHT BE ACCEPTABLE IN SOME FORM. THE LEBANESE STEERING COMMITTEE INTENDS TO TAKE CORRECTIVE ACTION. FURTHER DISCUSSION IS TO TAKE PLACE AT THE NEXT PLENARY, TO BE HELD JANUARY 24 IN KHALDAH, AND AT WORKING GROUP MEETINGS SCHEDULED FOR JANUARY 24 IN KHALDAH IF TIME PERMITS AND FOR JANUARY 25 AND 26 AT A SITE IN ISRAEL. END SUMMARY.

3. THE EIGHTH ROUND OF LEBANESE-ISRAELI-US NEGOTIATIONS TOOK PLACE IN KIRYAT SHEMONA JANUARY 20. AMBASSADOR DRAPER, ROSS, HARE, COLLINS, AND GREENE WERE AT THE TABLE FOR THE US.

4. GOALS OF SESSION.

IN TWO HOURS OF PLENARY AND ONE HOUR AT HEADS OF
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

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DELEGATION LEVEL, THE GROUP DISCUSSED IN GREATER DETAIL THE CONCEPTS OF LIAISON, CESSATION OF HOSTILE PROPAGANDA, THE MOVEMENT OF PERSONS AND GOODS, SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS, AND WITHDRAWALS. IT ALSO SET UP FOUR MORE SUB-COMMITTEES. THE ISRAELIS BEGAN TO WORK FROM THEIR DRAFT AGREEMENT (JERUSALEM 00194 - NOTAL) ON ALL THE ABOVE ISSUES EXCEPT SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS AND WITHDRAWALS, FOR WHICH THEY CONTINUED TO RELY ON THE DECEMBER 14 "WORKING PAPER" (82 BEIRUT 09473 - NOTAL).

5. LIAISON.

-- KIMCHE PRESENTED THE ISRAELI IDEAS ON LIAISON, WHICH HE CALLED "LIAISON REPRESENTATION" OR A "LIAISON OFFICE", BY READING SECTION V.1 AND V.2 OF THE ISRAELI DRAFT AGREEMENT. IN HIS INTRODUCTION, HE SAID SOME FORM OF ISRAELI REPRESENTATION WAS NEEDED IN LEBANON "AS PART OF A NEW, CONSTRUCTIVE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ISRAEL AND LEBANON" TO CONDUCT AN ONGOING DIALOGUE, DEEPEN THE RELATIONSHIP, SUPERVISE DECISIONS ALREADY TAKEN, AND SERVE AS A MEETING PLACE FOR THE PROPOSED JOINT COMMITTEE.

-- FATTAL LIMITED HIS RESPONSE TO STATING THAT HE HAD A VERY RESERVED ATTITUDE ON KIMCHE'S PROPOSED TEXT BECAUSE

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OF THE SIGNIFICANT LEGAL CONSEQUENCES IT HAD, BUT WOULD
SUBMIT IT TO HIS GOVERNMENT FOR STUDY. SPECIFICALLY,
HE FELT THE TEXT IMPLIED DE JURE RECOGNITION BECAUSE
IT MENTIONED FUTURE DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS AND ACCORDED
ISRAELI REPRESENTATIVES DIPLOMATIC PRIVILEGES. HE AGREED

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THAT A LIAISON COMMITTEE SHOULD EXIST, BUT SAID LEBANON HAD NOT STUDIED THE MODALITIES IN DETAIL. HE WAS NOT SURE, FOR INSTANCE, IF LEBANON WOULD WANT TO MAINTAIN ANY LIAISON PRESENCE IN ISRAEL. A COMMITTEE IN LEBANON WAS, HOWEVER, QUITE POSSIBLE, BUT IT WOULD BE HARD TO ACCEPT THE ISRAELI DEFINITION. FURTHERMORE, LEBANON ASSUMED THE US WOULD BE THE THIRD PARTY IN THE COMMITTEE, SINCE IT WOULD SIGN ANY FINAL AGREEMENT AND ITS

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PRESENCE WOULD BE USEFUL. THE ROLE OF THE COMMITTEE SHOULD EVOLVE AS RELATIONS EVOLVED, AND THERE WAS NO GED FOR A STRICT DEFINITION OF ITS RESPONSIBILITIES AT THE START. SPECIFYING HE WAS DOING SO WITHOUT ACCEPTING THE ISRAELI DEFINITION, FATTAL SUGGESTED

SENDING THE ISSUE TO THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON MUTUAL RELATIONS FOR FURTHER DISCUSSION.

-- KIMCHE AND RUBENSTEIN STRESSED IN VARIOUS INTERVENTIONS THAT RECOGNITION OF ISRAEL WOULD BE A FACT (RUBENSTEIN CITED THE SOVIET-JAPANESE TREATY OF 1956 AS AN EXAMPLE OF SUCH RECOGNITION IN THE ABSENCE OF A TREATY OF PEACE). AS FOR IMMUNITIES, MANY NON-DIPLOMATS WERE, FOR PRAGMATIC REASONS, ACCORDED APPROPRIATE IMMUNITIES. THE ESSENCE OF THE ISRAELI FORMULA, RESTATED BY KIMCHE, WAS THAT ISRAEL NEEDED AN OFFICE IN THE BEIRUT AREA. LEBANON COULD, IF IT WANTED, HAVE ONE IN ISRAEL, PREFERABLY IN THE JERUSALEM AREA. THE JOINT COMMITTEE WOULD MEET ON THESE PREMISES. OBSERVING THAT THE DISTANCE BETWEEN THE LEBANESE AND ISRAELI POSITIONS ON THIS ISSUE DID NOT SEEM SO GREAT, KIMCHE FINALLY AGREED TO LEAVE FURTHER DISCUSSION TO THE SUBCOMMITTEE.

-- DRAPER STATED THAT SOME FORM OF INSTITUTIONALIZED EXCHANGE WAS CALLED FOR AS ONE ELEMENT OF THE PACKAGE BEING NEGOTIATED AND THE US HOPED THE LEBANESE AND ISRAELIS COULD COME TO AN UNDERSTANDING. THE COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES SHOULD BE GOOD, SINCE THE NECESSITY FOR SUCH COMMUNICATIONS HAD BEEN WELL DEMONSTRATED OVER THE PAST SEVERAL MONTHS. SOME FORM OF IMMUNITY FROM LOCAL LAWS FOR OFFICIAL VISITORS AND LIAISON PERSONNEL CONDUCTING OFFICIAL

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BUSINESS COULD BE WORKED OUT.

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6. CESSATION OF HOSTILE PROPAGANDA.

-- KIMCHE PRESENTED THE ISRAELI IDEAS ON THE CESSATION OF HOSTILE PROPAGANDA BY READING SECTION IV.5 OF THE ISRAELI DRAFT AGREEMENT.

-- AMBASSADOR KHARMA, RESPONDING FOR LEBANON, STATED THAT THE CESSATION OF HOSTILE PROPAGANDA AND INCITEMENT BY OFFICIAL GOVERNMENT MEDIA WAS AGREEABLE, BUT THAT LEBANON DID HAVE A CONSTITUTIONALLY SANCTIONED FREE PRESS. KIMCHE CONFIRMED THAT WHAT THE ISRAELIS HAD IN MIND COVERED ONLY GOVERNMENT CONTROLLED MEDIA.

-- DRAPER EXPRESSED US SUPPORT FOR THE CESSATION OF OFFICIALLY SPONSORED HOSTILE PROPAGANDA AND INCITEMENT, POINTING OUT THAT BOTH LEBANON AND ISRAEL HAD A COMMON INTEREST IN DOING SO.

-- ADDRESSING THAT PART OF THE ISRAELI PROPOSAL THAT CALLED FOR "CANCELLATION OF LAWS AND REGULATIONS (ON MEDIA) INCOMPATIBLE WITH THE SPIRIT OF THIS AGREEMENT," FAIIAL SIAD IT WOULD BE USEFUL IF THE ISRAELIS COULD PROVIDE THE LEBANESE WITH A LIST OF LEBANESE LAWS THEY FOUND INCOMPATIBLE. IN ANY CASE, IF THE FINAL AGREEMENT WERE RATIFIED BY THE PARLIAMENT, IT WOULD ACQUIRE FORCE OF LAW AND AUTOMATICALLY CANCEL INCOMPATIBLE LEGISLATION.

-- IT WAS AGREED THAT, IN VIEW OF THE UNDERSTANDING REACHED ON THIS ISSUE, FURTHER DISCUSSION WOULD BE LEFT TO THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON MUTUAL RELATIONS.

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7. MOVEMENT OF GOODS AND PEOPLE.

-- KIMCHE READ SECTIONS IV
.1 AND IV.2A AND PARAPHRASED
SECTIONS IV.2B AND IV.3 OF THE ISRAELI DRAFT AGREEMENT
TO PRESENT THE ISRAELI IDEAS ON THIS ISSUE AND
SUGGESTED THAT THE DETAILS BE DISCUSSED IN THE SUB-
COMMITTEE ON MUTUAL RELATIONS AND FORMALIZED IN AN

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ANNEX TO THE AGREEMENT.

-- FATTAL REPLIED THAT, SINCE THIS ISSUE WAS THE
MOST SENSITIVE IN THE PRESENT NEGOTIATIONS, HE WOULD
HAVE NO IMMEDIATE COMMENT, BUT WOULD SIMPLY REFER THE
ISRAELI PROPOSAL TO HIS GOVERNMENT.

8. SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS.

-- BRIG. GEN. GILBOA INTRODUCED THE ISRAELI IDEAS
ON SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS WITH SEVERAL CONCEPTUAL
REMARKS: (A) ISRAEL DID NOT WANT A RETURN TO THE SITUA-
TION THAT PREVAILED IN LEBANON BEFORE THE WAR, WHEN

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LEBANON WAS OCCUPIED BY PLO AND SYRIAN FORCES; (B) ISRAEL WOULD LIKE A NEW SECURITY RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ITSELF AND LEBANON; (C) TO FACILITATE THAT RELATIONSHIP, CERTAIN SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS WERE NEEDED. THE MAJOR STRESS WOULD BE ON DIRECT, EXCLUSIVE ARRANGEMENTS BETWEEN THE IDF AND LAF. GILBOA THEN READ ITEMS 4.A THROUGH 4.G OF THE SECTION ON "SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS" IN THE DECEMBER 14 "WORKING PAPER", WHICH CALLED FOR A SECURITY ZONE, IDF-MANNED EARLY WARNING STATIONS FOR AN AGREED PERIOD (GILBOA ADDED "OR WATCH POSTS" TO THE DECEMBER 14 FORMULATION), THE PRESENCE OF ONLY LEBANESE ARMY AND POLICE FORCES IN THE SECURITY ZONE (GILBOA EXPLICITLY EXCLUDED THE PRESENCE OF ANY INTERNATIONAL FORCES), INTEGRATION OF "LOCAL FORCES" IN THE SOUTH INTO THE LEBANESE MILITARY "AS ONE OF THE ELEMENTS RESPONSIBLE FOR SECURITY IN THE REGION" (KIMCHE HAD NOT MENTIONED THE "LOCAL FORCES" IN HIS PRESENTATION JANUARY 17, SO THIS WAS A NEW ELEMENT), ISRAELI RECONNAISSANCE FLIGHTS AND NAVAL PATROLS FOR AN AGREED PERIOD,

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LIMITATIONS ON SOME KINDS OF HEAVY WEAPONS AND FORTIFICATIONS, A JOINT ISRAELI-LEBANESE COMMITTEE TO OVERSEE THE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS, AND AGREEMENT NOT TO ALLOW ANY ARAB FORCES OR FORCES FROM COUNTRIES WITHOUT DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH LEBANON AND ISRAEL INTO EITHER OF THE TWO COUNTRIES.

-- COL. RUHAYYIM RESPONDED FOR LEBANON. LEBANON TOO, HE SAID, WANTED TO AVOID THE SITUATION THAT HAD EXISTED BEFORE THE WAR, BUT IT WANTED THE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS TO BE NEGOTIATED WITH ISRAEL TO FALL WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF LEBANESE FREEDOM AND SOVEREIGNTY AND THE TOTAL WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES. IN ADDITION, LEBANON HAD OTHER NEIGHBORS, AND IT DID NOT WANT ITS SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS WITH ISRAEL TO AFFECT ITS RELATIONS WITH THE ARAB COUNTRIES, ESPECIALLY SYRIA. ANY SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS MUST BE FOR THE PURPOSE OF SECURING SOUTHERN LEBANON; IF THEY AFFECTED THE SECURITY OF OTHER COUNTRIES, THEY WOULD BE HARD TO ACCEPT. FOR ONE THING, SYRIA MIGHT REQUEST A 45 KM SECURITY ZONE AS WELL; ANYTHING GRANTED TO ISRAEL IN DEROGATION OF LEBANESE SOVEREIGNTY WOULD HAVE TO BE GRANTED TO SYRIA AS WELL. BEYOND THAT, ISRAEL WAS SAYING IT WANTED ONLY LEBANESE ARMY AND POLICE FORCES RESPONSIBLE FOR SECURITY IN THE SOUTH. ISRAELI EARLY WARNING STATIONS, RECONNAISSANCE FLIGHTS, AND NAVAL PATROLS WOULD COMPROMISE THAT RESPONSIBILITY. THIS REQUIRED FURTHER STUDY AND DISCUSSION IN THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS.

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-- GILBOA COUNTERED BY SAYING THERE WAS NO DANGER OF PLO INFILTRATION INTO SYRIA FROM LEBANON, AND THE TWO SITUATIONS COULD NOT BE COMPARED. FATTAL REMINDED HIM THAT SINCE 1975 SYRIA HAD BEEN PRESSING LEBANON FOR A SECURITY ACCORD, IF NOT A MILITARY AGREEMENT, AND LEBANON HAD CONSISTENTLY REFUSED. THE DISCUSSION WAS LEFT THERE.

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9. PROGRAM OF COMPLETE WITHDRAWALS.

-- GILBOA PRESENTED ISRAEL'S WELL KNOWN CONDITIONS
FOR WITHDRAWAL AS SET FORTH IN ITEMS 5.A THROUGH 5.D
OF THE SECTION ON "WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAELI FORCES" IN
THE DECEMBER 14 "WORKING PAPER": COMPLETE PRIOR
DEPARTURE OF PLO FORCES AND OFFICES; RETURN OF ALL
ISRAELI POWS, MIAS, AND KIAS IN SYRIAN AND PLO HANDS;

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SIMULTANEOUS ISRAELI AND SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL AND
AGREEMENT ON SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS AND MUTUAL RELATIONS.

-- BRIG. GEN. HAMDAN, RESPONDING FOR LEBANON, EXPRESSED

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HIS PLEASURE THAT ISRAEL ADMITTED THE PRINCIPLE OF COMPLETE WITHDRAWALS, BUT VOICED HIS FEAR THAT THE CONDITIONS GILBOA HAD SET FORTH WERE BEYOND LEBANON'S CAPABILITIES. ISRAEL WAS ASKING FOR A COMPLETE PLO WITHDRAWAL FROM AREAS NOT UNDER LEBANESE CONTROL. THE POWS, MIAS, AND KIAS WERE NOT IN LEBANESE HANDS. LEBANON WOULD STUDY THE ISRAELI CONDITIONS AND RESPOND IN THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON WITHDRAWALS.

-- KIMCHE REBUTTED THAT, IF ISRAEL WITHDREW BEFORE THE PLO, THE LATTER WOULD NOT LEAVE LEBANON, JUST AS IT WOULD NOT HAVE LEFT WEST BEIRUT. ISRAEL WANTED TO LEAVE LEBANON SURE THAT IT WOULD REMAIN FREE AND NOT AGAIN BECOME A BASE FOR AGGRESSION.

-- FATTAL CLOSED THE DISCUSSION BY REITERATING LEBANON'S CLEAR POSITION: ALL FOREIGN FORCES MUST LEAVE, AS PRESIDENT REAGAN HAD SAID. LEBANON HAD BEGUN PARALLEL NEGOTIATIONS WITH SYRIA AND THE PLO ON THIS ISSUE.
10. METHODS OF WORK.

-- KIMCHE PROPOSED THE CREATION OF ADDITIONAL SUBCOMMITTEES -- IN ADDITION TO THAT ALREADY ESTABLISHED ON TERMINATION OF THE STATE OF WAR -- TO DEAL WITH THE FRAMEWORK OF MUTUAL RELATIONS, SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS, THE PROGRAM OF COMPLETE WITHDRAWALS, AND (IF THE LEBANESE WISHED) POSSIBLE GUARANTEES. HE PROPOSED THAT THESE SUBCOMMITTEES BEGIN WORK ON TUESDAY AND WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 25 AND 26, IN HERZLIYYA,
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

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ISRAEL. FURTHERMORE, IF THE PLENARY TO BE HELD ON MONDAY, JANUARY 24 IN KHALDAH COMPLETED ITS DISCUSSION OF AGENDA ITEMS, THEN THE SUBCOMMITTEES COULD IN FACT BEGIN WORK ON THAT DATE.

-- FATTAL AND DRAPER ACCEPTED THESE PROPOSALS. (THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT SUBSEQUENTLY VETOED HERZLIYYA, AND ISRAEL HAS PROPOSED NATHANYA AS AN ALTERNATIVE.)

-- IT WAS ALSO AGREED THAT SHORT PLENARIES WOULD BE HELD EVERY DAY THAT SUBCOMMITTEES MET.

-- IN THE HEADS OF DELEGATION MEETING, THE AGENDA ITEMS TO BE DISCUSSED IN THE DAY'S PLENARY WERE AGREED, WITH LEBANON INSISTING ON A DISCUSSION OF WITHDRAWALS AND SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS. THERE WAS ALSO AN INCONCLUSIVE DISCUSSION OF THE TONE OF PRESS STATEMENTS, WITH ISRAEL SEEKING TO EXPRESS PROGRESS WHEREVER POSSIBLE AND LEBANON TAKING A MORE CAUTIOUS VIEW. (IN SUBSEQUENT REVIEW, AMBASSADORS HABIB

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AND DRAPER AGREED THAT THE US SHOULD WORK TO HAVE ANY AGREED PRESS STATEMENTS AVOID UNWARRANTED OPTIMISM.)

11. COMMENT: THE MAJOR DIFFERENCES ARE BEGINNING TO SURFACE, BUT ON UNEQUAL TERMS. THE LEBANESE DELEGATION CONTINUED TO REACT VERY SOFTLY TO THE ISRAELI PROPOSALS, USUALLY STATING IT WOULD REFER THEM TO ITS GOVERNMENT BEFORE COMMENTING FURTHER. THIS ENCOURAGED THE ISRAELIS TO BELIEVE THAT THESE PROPOSALS MIGHT BE ACCEPTABLE IN SOME FORM. BEYOND THAT, INDIVIDUAL MEMBERS OF THE LEBANESE DELEGATION ENGAGED IN UNDISCIPLINED SIDE CONVERSATIONS THAT ALSO HELPED CONVINCE THE ISRAELI DELEGATION THAT ITS PROPOSALS WERE NOT UNREASONABLE. (IT IS CLEAR FROM THE MEETINGS THAT HABIB AND DRAPER HAD WITH PRESIDENT GEMAYEL AND THE LEBANESE STEERING COMMITTEE THAT THE LEBANESE

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POSITION IS MUCH HARDER THAN THE ISRAELIS HAVE LED
THEMSELVES TO BELIEVE. THE COMMITTEE INTENDS TO REMEDY
THE SITUATION BY INSTRUCTING THE LEBANESE DELEGATION
TO RESPOND TO THE ISRAELIS IN FIRMER TERMS AT FUTURE
MEETINGS.) DILLON

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FROM DRAPER

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, MOPS, LE, US, IS, XF

SUBJECT: HABIB/DRAPER MISSION: LEBANESE REACTION TO

-- ISRAELI POSITIONS, JANUARY 21

1. [REDACTED]
2. SUMMARY: IN A PRIVATE MEETING WITH PRESIDENT GEMAYEL, AND SUBSEQUENTLY WITH PRIME MINISTER WAZZAN, FONMIN SALEM AND THE LEBANESE WORKING TEAM ON JANUARY 21, WE PRESSED FOR, AND RECEIVED, UNAMBIGUOUS LEBANESE RESPONSES TO EACH OF THE MAJOR POINTS IN THE ISRAELI POSITION. THE LEBANESE FLATLY AND FIRMLY REJECT ANY RESIDUAL ISRAELI OR SYRIAN MILITARY PRESENCE IN LEBANON AFTER WITHDRAWAL, INCLUDING IN [REDACTED]

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THE MANNING OF EARLY WARNING STATIONS AND IN JOINT PATROLS. THEY ARE CONVINCED THAT ANY IDF PRESENCE WILL UNDERMINE THE AUTHORITY OF THE GOL AND WILL PRECLUDE SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL. THE LEBANESE ALSO STATED FIRMLY THAT THEY WANT EITHER UNIFIL OR THE MNF, OR BOTH, TO ASSIST THE LAF IN SOUTHERN LEBANON OR ANYWHERE IN LEBANON.

3. WITH THE EXCEPTION OF NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR WADIA HADDAD, THE LEBANESE ARE NOT INTERESTED IN

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AN INITIAL PULLBACK OR DISENGAGEMENT, AT LEAST AS THE ISRAELIS DESCRIBE IT. THEY BELIEVE THAT IT WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE TO SECURE PRIOR, COMPLETE PLO WITHDRAWAL IN EXCHANGE FOR ONLY A RELATIVELY MINOR ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL. THEY SUSPECT THAT THE SUBSEQUENT NEGOTIATIONS WITH ISRAEL CONCERNING SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS AND NORMALIZATION WOULD BE PROTRACTED ONCE ALL OF THE PLO HAD LEFT AND THE SYRIANS HAD PULLED BACK FROM THE METN, ZAHLE, AND SHTAURAH.

4. THE LEBANESE POSITION ON NORMALIZATION APPEARS FIRMER THAN PREVIOUSLY WAS THE CASE. THEY ABSOLUTELY WILL NOT ACCEPT THE CONCEPT OF OPEN BORDERS, FREE MOVEMENT, OR TERMINATION OF THE ECONOMIC BOYCOTT, BECAUSE THEY ARE COMPLETELY CONVINCED THAT THE PLO AND SYRIA WOULD NOT WITHDRAW AND THAT THERE WOULD BE ARAB ECONOMIC RETALIATION. THEY ARE PREPARED FOR LIMITED MOVEMENT OF PILGRIMS AND FOR MEDICAL VISITS. THEY MIGHT ACCEPT THE MOVEMENT OF ADDITIONAL CATEGORIES OF PERSONS DE FACTO, PROVIDED THERE IS SOME KIND OF "UN COVER" (WHETHER UNTSO OR UNIFIL) AT THE BORDER. SALEM AND WAZZAN SAID THEY WERE NOT PREPARED TO ACCEPT ANY TRADE WITH ISRAEL, EVEN ON A DE FACTO BASIS. THE LEBANESE CONTINUE TO ACCEPT

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THE NOTION OF A COMMITTEE TO MEET IN LEBANON AFTER WITHDRAWAL TO DISCUSS NORMALIZATION ISSUES. END SUMMARY.

5. HABIB MET PRIVATELY WITH PRESIDENT GEMAYEL FOR ONE AND A HALF HOURS AT 6 P.M., JANUARY 21. THEREAFTER, DRAPER, DILLON, ROSS AND KRECKZO JOINED HABIB FOR A TWO HOUR MEETING WITH GEMAYEL, PM WAZZAN, FONMIN SALEM, COUNSELORS TUENI AND HADDAD, AND THE FULL LEBANESE NEGOTIATING TEAM.

6. PRIVATE MEETING WITH GEMAYEL. HABIB BRIEFED GEMAYEL ON HIS MEETINGS IN ISRAEL. HABIB DESCRIBED THE ISRAELI POSITION CONCERNING THE FORM AND SUBSTANCE OF AN EVENTUAL ISRAEL/LEBANON AGREEMENT. GEMAYEL SAID THE ISRAELI PROPOSAL WOULD RESULT IN TOTAL LEBANESE ISOLATION FROM THE ARAB WORLD AND CONTINUED SYRIAN OCCUPATION, WITH AN ISRAELI PROTECTORATE ESTABLISHED IN SOUTHERN LEBANON. GEMAYEL EXPRESSED ASTONISHMENT THAT ISRAEL COULD BE SO INDIFFERENT TO THE LIMITS ON LEBANON. HE REITERATED A MESSAGE WHICH WE HAVE CONVEYED TO THE ISRAELIS PREVIOUSLY -- THAT HE IS WILLING TO GO A LONG WAY IN DEVELOPING A RELATIONSHIP WITH ISRAEL, BUT THERE ARE LIMITS ON WHAT HE CAN DO IMMEDIATELY. HE MADE A LONG AND IMPASSIONED STATEMENT. "ARE THERE NO LIMITS," HE

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ASKED. HE SAID THAT HE WOULD GO WHERE THEY WERE
DRIVING HIM, BUT ONLY IF THE US WOULD PROTECT

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EXDIS

FROM DRAPER

LEBANON (FROM THE ARAB WORLD).

7. GEMAYEL PROVIDED HABIB WITH A SPECIFIC RESPONSE
TO EACH OF THE MAJOR POINTS IN THE ISRAELI PRESENTA-
TION. GEMAYEL THEN ASKED WHETHER HABIB HAD PRESENTED

A TEXT IN ISRAEL. HABIB SAID THAT HE HAD, AND DESCRIBED ITS CONTENTS IN SOME DETAIL. HABIB DECLINED GEMAYEL'S REPEATED REQUESTS FOR A COPY OF THE US DRAFT.

8. MEANWHILE, DRAPER HAD HAD SOME TALKS WITH TUENI AND HADDAD, WHO CONFIRMED THAT THEY WERE TREATING THE SAUDI WARNINGS AGAINST NORMALIZATION WITH GREAT SERIOUSNESS. FOLLOWING THEIR PRIVATE SESSION, HABIB AND GEMAYEL MET WITH THEIR RESPECTIVE TEAMS

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(PARA 5, ABOVE) TO REVIEW AGAIN THE LEBANESE RESPONSE TO KEY ISRAELI POSITIONS. FOLLOWING IS SUMMARY OF VIEWS OF GEMAYEL AND HIS WORKING TEAM, WHICH WERE CONSISTENT IN ALL SIGNIFICANT REGARDS: -- A. GENERAL SALEM RESPONDED TO HABIB'S DESCRIPTION OF THE ISRAELI POSITION BY SAYING THAT IT WOULD MAKE LEBANON INTO A PROTECTORATE. HE TERMED THE PROPOSALS "RIDICULOUS" AND SAID THAT THEY WOULD DESTROY THE COUNTRY BY PROVOKING INTERNAL CONFLICT AND ARAB OSTRACISM. HE SAID THE PROPOSED SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS WERE EVEN MORE INSULTING THAN THE LEBANESE HAD EXPECTED.

-- B. RESIDUAL IDF PRESENCE IN SOUTHERN LEBANON. LEBANESE FLATLY REJECT ANY RESIDUAL IDF OR SYRIAN PRESENCE IN LEBANON, WHETHER FOR EARLY WARNING STATIONS OR FOR JOINT PATROLS. THEY WERE DISMAYED TO HEAR THE ISRAELIS WANT A COMPANY AT EACH OF THREE STATIONS, BUT THE SIZE OF THE ISRAELI PRESENCE IS NOT THE ISSUE. THE PRESIDENT, PM, AND FONMIN WERE ALL EQUALLY CLEAR. RESIDUAL IDF PRESENCE WILL UNCERCUT RESTORATION OF GOL AUTHORITY AND WILL PRECLUDE SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL. LEBANESE TAKE THIS POSITION EVEN WITH RESPECT TO A RESIDUAL IDF PRESENCE FOR "AN AGREED PERIOD OF TIME."

(NOTE: ABOVE DOES NOT APPLY TO ISRAELI AIR RECONNAISSANCE IN WHICH LEBANESE APPEARED PREPARED TO ACQUIESCE, AT LEAST DE FACTO.)

-- C. EARLY WARNING STATIONS. THEIR TECHNICAL EXPERTS HAVE CONCLUDED THAT THE MOUNT BARUK STATION IS DIRECTED AT SYRIA, AND NOT DESIGNED TO DETECT MOVEMENT WITHIN LEBANON, AS ISRAEL MAINTAINS. THEY ARE WILLING TO ACCEPT THE JUDGMENT OF A US TEAM

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OF EXPERTS ON THIS QUESTION, IF ISRAEL WOULD ALLOW SUCH A TEAM TO VISIT THE INSTALLATION. GEMAYEL AND SALEM BOTH SAID THAT THEY WOULD ACCEPT EARLY WARNING STATIONS IF ISRAEL INSISTS UPON THEM, PROVIDED THEY ARE MANNED BY UNIFIL OR THE LEBANESE OR AN ACCEPTABLE THIRD PARTY, AND PROVIDED THEY ARE NOT DIRECTED AT SYRIA. SALEM IS AGAINST ANY STATION AT MOUNT BARUK, BUT WOULD OKAY NON-ISRAELI MANNED "OBSERVATION POSTS" ELSEWHERE AIMED AT DETECTING INFILTRATORS.

-- D. PARTIAL WITHDRAWAL. WHILE LEBANESE WOULD HAVE TO WELCOME "ANY" WITHDRAWAL OF FOREIGN FORCES, THEY (INCLUDING GEMAYEL) ARE CONVINCED THAT THE ISRAELI IDEA OF A PARTIAL PULLBACK WITH THE CONDITIONS THEY WANT, IS COMPLETELY UNWORKABLE. SALEM AND WAZZAN SAID THAT THERE WAS NO WAY THAT THE PLO WOULD COMPLETELY WITHDRAW IN EXCHANGE FOR THE SLIGHT CHANGE IN IDF DISPOSITIONS WHICH ISRAEL WAS SUGGESTING. HAMDAN POINTED OUT THAT THE ISRAELI POSITION AS REGARDS THE REQUISITE PARALLEL SYRIAN PULLBACK WAS COMPLETELY UNREALISTIC FROM THE SYRIAN MILITARY STANDPOINT, SINCE THEY WOULD HAVE TO GIVE UP SHTAURAH, A KEY CROSSROADS. GEMAYEL AND OTHERS POINTED OUT THAT ONCE THE PLO HAD DEPARTED AND SYRIANS HAD DISENGAGED, THERE WOULD BE LITTLE PRESSURE ON ISRAEL TO NEGOTIATE THE NORMALIZATION AND SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS WITH ANY SENSE OF URGENCY. (PRESIDENTIAL COUNSELOR WADIA HADDAD, HOWEVER, THOUGHT THAT PARTIAL WITHDRAWAL MIGHT HAVE SOME MERIT, IF THE ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL WAS MORE EXTENSIVE, E.G., DOWN TO THE AWALI RIVER AT SIDON.)

-- E. HADDAD'S FORCES. SALEM CONFIRMED THAT

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FROM DRAPER

LEBANON HAD AGREED THAT THE LOCAL MILITIA IN THE SOUTH WILL BE REINTEGRATED INTO THE LAF OR POLICE OR SOME OTHER NATIONAL MILITARY STRUCTURE, SUCH AS A BORDER GUARD. SALEM HAS DIFFICULTY, HOWEVER, WITH PROPOSAL THAT AN ISRAEL/LEBANON AGREEMENT WILL STIPULATE THAT THESE FORCES MUST REMAIN IN THE SOUTH, SINCE HE SEES THIS AS A DEROGATION OF LEBANESE CONTROL OF ITS OWN ARMY AND THEREFORE OF ITS SOVEREIGNTY.

-- F. UNIFIL AND THE MNF. GEMAYEL SAID, AND HIS TEAM REINFORCED THE POINT, THAT LEBANON DEFINITELY WANTS TO RETAIN UNIFIL AND THE MNF, BOTH TO ASSIST THE LAF AS IT DEVELOPS AND TO INDICATE BROAD INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT FOR LEBANON'S EFFORTS.

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THE LEBANESE ACCEPT THAT LAF CAPABILITIES IN THE SOUTH WILL BE LIMITED INITIALLY, AND THIS REINFORCES THEIR INSISTENCE ON UNIFIL OR ON THE MNF IN THE SOUTH. (TUENI SAID THAT GOL WILL NOT ARGUE WITH ISRAEL ABOUT PAST EFFECTIVENESS OF UNIFIL, BUT WILL BE PREPARED TO DISCUSS WAYS OF REMOVING PAST OBSTACLES TO UNIFIL EFFECTIVENESS.)

-- G. CONDITIONS FOR WITHDRAWAL. LEBANESE WOULD UNDER IDEAL CIRCUMSTANCES LIKE TO GO ALONG WITH ISRAEL'S POSITION THAT PLO SHOULD LEAVE FIRST, BUT HAVE DOUBTS THAT THIS COULD BE DONE. THEY ACCEPT THAT BODIES AND PRISONERS SHOULD BE RETURNED BEFORE ISRAELI MOVES AND THAT SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL SHOULD

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BE SIMULTANEOUS WITH ISRAEL. THEY CONTINUE TO BELIEVE THAT THEY HAVE FAIRLY GOOD ASSURANCES FROM SYRIA AND THE PLO CONCERNING THEIR RESPECTIVE WITHDRAWALS.

-- H. NORMALIZATION. THE LEBANESE POSITION IS THAT THE FUTURE DEVELOPMENT OF ISRAEL/LEBANON RELATIONS SHOULD BE DISCUSSED IN A TRIPARTITE COMMITTEE (ISRAEL LEBANON-US) FOLLOWING ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL. THEY ACCEPT THAT THE COMMITTEE WILL MEET IN BEIRUT, BUT REMAIN DIVIDED ON WHETHER ISRAEL CAN MAINTAIN A STAFF IN BEIRUT TO SUPPORT THE WORK OF THE COMMITTEE. LEBANESE FLATLY REJECT THE PRINCIPLES OF "OPEN BORDERS," "FREE MOVEMENT OF PERSONS AND GOODS," AND "TERMINATION OF THE ECONOMIC BOYCOTT." WAZZAN AND SALEM SAID THAT SAUDIS AND SYRIANS HAD BEEN FIRM ON THIS. THEY ARE NOT WILLING TO RISK ARAB ECONOMIC RETALIATION OR ANOTHER INTERNAL WAR, "TO TEST" THESE CONCEPTS. LEBANESE WILL NOT ACCEPT THESE TERMS EVEN AS PRINCIPLES FOR INCLUSION IN AN AGREEMENT NOW, WITH IMPLEMENTATION TO BE

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WORKED OUT LATER (LET ALONE THE ISRAELI POSITION, WHICH INCORPORATES THESE PRINCIPLES AND IMMEDIATE IMPLEMENTATION). REFERRING TO SAUDI AND SYRIAN PRESSURES, WAZZAN SAID THAT LEBANON WAS AGAINST ALL FORMS OF NORMALIZATION AND THAT THIS WAS A "RED LINE" FOR LEBANON. THE FARTHEST THAT SALEM WOULD GO WAS TO SAY THAT LEBANON COULD ACCEPT THE MOVEMENT OF SOME CATEGORIES OF PERSONS, SUCH AS PILGRIMS, AS WELL AS FOR HUMANITARIAN AND MEDICAL REASONS. WITH A UN PRESENCE AT THE BORDER (UNIFIL OR UNTSO) SALEM SAID LEBANON MIGHT ACCEPT A BROADER CATEGORY OF MOVEMENT DE FACTO REPEAT DE FACTO, SUCH AS THE MOVEMENT OF AGRICULTURAL WORKERS. IN RESPONSE TO HABIB'S DIRECT QUESTION, SALEM SAID THAT IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT FOR LEBANON TO AGREE TO "ANY" TRADE WITH ISRAEL, EVEN DE FACTO. WAZZAN WAS FIRMER.

-- I. TERMINATION OF THE STATE OF WAR. SALEM AND TUENI CONFIRMED, WITH WAZZAN PRESENT, THAT LEBANON WILL AGREE THAT THERE IS NO STATE OF WAR BETWEEN ISRAEL AND LEBANON. THEY CONSIDER THIS A MAJOR UNDERTAKING BY LEBANON, AND ARE SECOND-GUESSING THEMSELVES ABOUT WHETHER THEY SHOULD HAVE CONCEDED IT SO EARLY IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. THEY ALSO CONSIDER THAT THIS DECLARATION, PLUS A WILLINGNESS TO CONTINUE POLITICAL DISCUSSIONS ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF RELATIONS AFTER WITHDRAWAL, SHOULD BE SEEN BY ISRAEL AS SIGNIFICANT FIRST STEPS IN NORMALIZATION. LEBANESE CONFIRMED THAT THEY ARE WILLING TO TERMINATE HOSTILE PROPAGANDA.

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-- J. US GUARANTEES. COUNSELOR TUENI EXPLAINED
THAT LEBANON WILL SEEK BOTH LEGAL AND POLITICAL
GUARANTEES FOR WHATEVER AGREEMENT IS CONCLUDED

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FROM DRAPER

WITH ISRAEL. TUENI SAID THE LEGAL GUARANTEES
WILL BE SIMILAR TO THOSE PROVIDED BY THE US AT
CAMP DAVID (I.E., J L WITNESS TO THE AGREE-
MENT, AND PERHAPS SIDE ASSURANCES CONCERNING US
EFFORTS TO PROMOTE COMPLIANCE WITH THE AGREEMENT).
THE POLITICAL GUARANTEES WILL BE MANIFESTED BY
THE CONTINUING PRESENCE OF THE MNF, AT LEAST FOR
A TEMPORARY TIME PERIOD, AND OF UNIFIL.

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-- K. OTHER ISSUES. THERE WAS SOME HARDENING OF THE LEBANESE POSITION ON OTHER ISSUES, ALTHOUGH THIS MAY REPRESENT NEGOTIATING TACTICS, ESPECIALLY SINCE ISRAEL BEGAN TO REVEAL AT THE LAST KIRYAT SHEMONA SESSION EXACTLY HOW FAR-REACHING ITS POSITION IS. FOR EXAMPLE, TUENI NOW SAYS THE SECURITY REGION

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SHOULD EXTEND TO THE LITANI AT MOST, IN ORDER TO DISCOURAGE SYRIAN REQUESTS FOR A 45 KM. ZONE, "WHICH WOULD MAKE ALL OF LEBANON INTO A SECURITY ZONE." LEBANESE ALSO QUESTIONED ISRAELI POSITION THAT THERE BE NO NEW FORTIFICATIONS IN THE SECURITY ZONE, SINCE FORTIFICATIONS ARE DEFENSIVE.

9. TUENI, SALEM AND WAZZAN ALL FLOATED THE IDEA THAT LEBANON SHOULD DISCONTINUE ITS PARTICIPATION IN THE KIRYAT SHEMONA/KHALDAH TALKS. THEY WERE CLEARLY DISAPPOINTED AT THE PACE OF THE TALKS AND THE REVELATION OF THE TRUE EXTENT OF THE ISRAELI POSITION HAS HEIGHTENED THEIR FRUSTRATION. DRAPER STRONGLY URGED THEM TO CONTINUE THEIR PARTICIPATION, AND TO REACT TO ISRAELI PROPOSALS BY PUTTING ON THE RECORD IN UNAMBIGUOUS TERMS THE LEBANESE POSITION. DRAPER SAID THAT THE ISRAELIS WERE CONCLUDING FROM THE LEBANESE NEGOTIATING POSTURE THAT LEBANON ACCEPTED MUCH OF WHAT ISRAEL WAS PROPOSING. FATTAL ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THIS WAS A PROBLEM, BUT SAID HE HAD BEEN WITHOUT INSTRUCTIONS ON NORMALIZATION AT THE LAST SESSION. HE NOW HAS CLEAR INSTRUCTIONS, AND HE SAYS HE WILL PUT THEM CLEARLY ON THE RECORD.

10. COMMENT: THE LEBANESE HAVE OBVIOUSLY BEEN SHOCKED INTO SERIOUS PREPARATION OF A CLEAR LEBANESE POSITION BY WHAT THEY HEARD AT THE LAST SESSION AT KIRYAT SHEMONA, WHERE KIMCHE BEGAN PUTTING FORWARD SECTIONS OF THE ISRAELI DRAFT (AND KIMCHE HAS ONLY REVEALED A SMALL PART OF THE ISRAELI DRAFT). LEBANESE COMMENTS CONFIRM THAT MUCH OF THE ISRAELI APPROACH HAS NO CHANCE OF ACCEPTANCE IN LEBANON. JUDGING FROM REMARKS

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JANUARY 21, PARTICULARLY CONCERNING MOVEMENT OF PERSONS AND GOODS, LEBANESE WOULD EVEN FIND DIFFICULT PARTS OF THE DRAFT WHICH HABIB PRESENTED IN ISRAEL. DILLON

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DECAPTIONED

FROM HABIB

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, MILI, SY, LE, US, IS, XF

SUBJECT: HABIB/DRAPER MISSION: MEETING WITH SHARON

- AND SHAMIR, JANUARY 21

1. [REDACTED]

2. SUMMARY. WE DISCUSSED FULLY WITH DEFMIN SHARON AND FONMIN SHAMIR ON JAN. 21 THE FULL RANGE OF SECURITY ISSUES. BLUNT LANGUAGE WAS EXCHANGED. SHAROE EARLY WARNING STATIONS, ### EACH MANNED BY AN IDF COMPANY (250 MEN). SHARON REJECTS UNIFIL. HE ALSO ELABORATED ON SHAMIR'S REFERENCE TO A "COOPERATIVE RELATIONSHIP" BETWEEN THE IDF AND THE LAF IN SOUTH

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LEBANON. ISRAELI CONVOYS WOULD MOVE BETWEEN ISRAEL AND THE WARNING STATIONS, IN VIEW OF THE "OPEN BORDERS." THERE WOULD BE JOINT IDF/LAF PATROLS. FREQUENCY OF PATROLS WOULD BE ###

DEFINED IN THE

KIRYAT SHEMONA-KN WAS NOT INTERESTED

IN TALKING ABOUT ALTERNATIVE WAYS OF PROVIDING SOUTHERN LEBANON, SAYING ISRAEL WOULD DEFINE

ITS OWN SECURITY NEEDS. SHAMIR ASKED WHETHER WE HAD

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SUBSTITUTE SUGGESTIONS FOR THE EARLY WARNING STATIONS,
WHICH COULD BE A POSSIBLE OPENING LATER.

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3. I TOLD SHARON THAT THE U.S. POSITION HAD NOT
CHANGED. PRESIDENT REAGAN HAD CALLED FOR THE TOTAL
WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES AS SOON AS POSSIBLE,
IN #### ARRANGEMENTS WHICH WOULD
PREVENT FUTURE THREATS TO ISRAELI SECURITY. SHARON'S
SUGGESTED SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS--INVOLVING A CONTINUED
IDF PRESENCE IN LEBANON--WERE INCONSISTENT WITH WHAT
WE THOUGHT WAS OUR SHARED OBJECTIVE OF "TOTAL WITHDRAWAL."
AND, I SAID, SHARON'S SUGGESTION THAT THERE COULD BE A
PARALLEL RESIDUAL SYRIAN PRESENCE IN THE BEKAA WAS
INCONSISTENT WITH WHAT WE THOUGHT WAS OUR SHARED
OBJECTIVE OF THE RESTORATION OF LEBANESE SOVEREIGNTY
THROUGHOUT LEBANON. I SAID THAT THE UNITED STATES
WAS NOT PREPARED FOR A PROTRACTED NEGOTIATION FROM
THE STANDPOINT OF ITS REGIONAL INTERESTS AND ITS
RELATIONS WITH STATES IN THE AREA. I TOLD SHARON THAT
HIS APPROACH RISKED A NEGATIVE IMPACT ON U.S./ISRAEL
RELATIONS. "AT STAKE IS OUR RELATIONSHIP." I ADDED
THAT THE U.S. WOULD CONTINUE TO VOICE ITS POLICY IN
ALL EFFECTIVE WAYS. ## REFERENCE
TO "EFFECTIVE" MEANS, AND SAID ISRAEL WOULD NOT RESPOND

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TO PRESSURE. I SAID THAT THE ONLY CURRENT PRESSURE
WAS ON LEBANON, AND REMINDED SHARON THAT WE WERE TRYING
TO COME TO AGREEMENT WITH ISRAEL BILATERALLY IN ORDER
TO PREVENT DIFFERENCES IN OUR APPROACH.

--

4. SIGNIFICANTLY, SHARON ALSO STRESSED THAT DECISIONS
SHOULD ONLY BE MADE IN THE PUBLIC NEGOTIATIONS. I
REMINDED HIM THAT PRIME MINISTER BEGIN HAD AGREED TO A
"PARALLEL PROCESS" IN ORDER TO EXPEDITE THE TALKS. END
SUMMARY.

--

5. I MET WITH FOREIGN MINISTER SHAMIR AND DEFENSE
MINISTER SHARON, AND AIDES, FOR TWO HOURS MORNING OF
JANUARY 21 TO DISCUSS PRINCIPALLY THE ISRAELI POSITIONS
ON SECURITY ISSUES ON SHARON'S RETURN FROM ZAIRE.
I WAS ACCOMPANIED BY AMBASSADORS DRAPER AND LEWIS, KRECKO,
AND HARE.

--

6. SHAMIR OPENED THE MEETING BY ASKING KIMCHE TO
REVIEW YESTERDAY'S (JANUARY 20) TALKS IN KIRYAT SHEMONA.
AFTER DESCRIBING THE EXCHANGE ON LIAISON, HOSTILE
PROPAGANDA, MOVEMENT OF GOODS AND PEOPLE, SECURITY
ARRANGEMENTS, AND WITHDRAWAL, KIMCHE SUMMED UP HIS
IMPRESSION BY SAYING THAT THE LEBANESE WERE BASICALLY
STALLING, POSSIBLY WAITING UNTIL I WENT TO BEIRUT THIS

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WEEKEND. HE HAD BEEN TOLD BY THE LEBANESE DELEGATION THAT THEY DID NOT HAVE ANY INSTRUCTIONS. IN REVIEWING THE WORK PROGRAM FOR NOTED THAT THE LEBANESE HAD PROBLEMS IN MEETING AT HERZILYA AS HAD BEEN AGREED AT KIRYAT SHEMONA, THOUGH WE DID NOT KNOW THE PRECISE REASONS WHY THEY HAD TAKEN THIS POSITION. KIMCHE SAID THE LEBANESE HAD IN FACT PRESSED FOR A

NOTE BY OC/T: # GARBLES THROUGHOUT TEXT. CORRECTION TO FOLLOW.

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AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE
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USELO RIYADH IMMEDIATE

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EXDIS

CHANGE IN VENUE. IT WAS AGREED THAT DRAPER WOULD PURSUE THIS POINT FURTHER WHEN HE GOES TO BEIRUT TODAY.

7. TURNING TO THE SECURITY ISSUES, SHARON STATED HE HAD ALREADY CLEARLY DESCRIBED ISRAEL'S POSITION LAST SUNDAY. BUT HE WAS READY TO ANSWER QUESTIONS AND

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CLARIFY THE ISRAELI POSITION IF I WISHED. (SHARON DID NOT PROVIDE THE SECURITY ANNEX. IN RESPONSE TO OUR INQUIRIES AFTER THE MEETING, HIS AIDES SAID THE PAPER WAS NOT YET FULLY PREPARED. IT IS CLEAR, HOWEVER, THAT SHARON HAS TAKEN THE DELIBERATE DECISION NOT TO REVEAL ALL OF HIS CARDS TO US PRIOR TO A DISCUSSION OF THESE ISSUES IN THE OPEN TALKS.) CONTINUING, SHARON BRIEFLY REVIEWED ISRAEL'S OPPOSITION TO INTERNATIONAL FORCES IN THE SOUTHERN SECURITY ZONE (INCLUDING UN OBSERVERS ON THE GROUND THAT A STATE OF WAR WOULD HAVE

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BEEN TERMINATED), AND THE ISRAELI REQUIREMENT FOR EARLY WARNING STATIONS.

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8. I ASKED SHARON TO DEFINE MORE PRECISELY THE LEVEL OF STAFFING, FUNCTION, AND RESUPPLY ISSUES RELATING TO THE STATIONS. SHARON DID NOT WANT TO BE DRAWN INTO DETAILS BUT DID SAY THAT EACH OF THE THREE STATIONS WOULD HAVE ABOUT ONE COMPANY (250 MEN) AND THAT RESUPPLY WOULD BE MADE ALONG WELL-KNOWN ROAD ROUTES OVER THE "OPEN BORDER." AS HE HAD BEFORE, HE REITERATED THAT THE STATIONS WERE NEEDED TO COUNTER ANY RENEWED EFFORT TO REBUILD THE TERRORIST INFRASTRUCTURE AND TO INTERDICT (#)

WRECTED AGAINST ANY ARAB COUNTRY. IN RESPONSE TO MY QUESTION, SHARON DID NOT SEE ANY OTHER POSSIBLE SUBSTITUTE ARRANGEMENT (I.E., AERIAL RECONNAISSANCE, LEBANESE OBSERVATION POSTS, EXCHANGE OF INTELLIGENCE) WHICH COULD MEET THE REQUIREMENT OF HAVING ISRAELI-MANNED EARLY WARNING STATIONS IN THE SOUTH. I TOOK THIS OCCASION TO MAKE IT CLEAR THAT I HAD NEVER MENTIONED THE POSSIBILITY OF HAVING AMERICAN-MANNED WARNING STATIONS, AS HAD BEEN SUGGESTED IN SEVERAL MEDIA REPORTS. SHARON SAID HE UNDERSTOOD.

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9. I THEN PRESSED FOR MORE INFORMATION ON WHAT TYPE OF COOPERATIVE ARRANGEMENTS ISRAEL ENVISAGES BETWEEN LEBANON AND ISRAEL IN THE SECURITY ZONE. SHARON WAS RELUCTANT TO BE SPECIFIC, SAYING THAT ARRANGEMENTS WOULD BE WORKED OUT IN THE WORKING GROUP SET UP FOR THIS PURPOSE. HOWEVER, HE DID AGREE THAT THE ISRAELI CONCEPT INCLUDED PROVISION FOR JOINT PATROLS.

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10. I ASKED WHAT ISRAEL'S POSITION WOULD BE IF SYRIA DEMANDED SIMILAR FACILITIES FROM THE LEBANESE, ESPECIALLY SINCE IT WAS NOW CLEAR THAT ISRAEL WAS NOT TALKING ABOUT COMPLETE WITHDRAWAL. SHARON INITIALLY SAID THE ISRAELI AND SYRIAN POSITIONS SHOULD NOT BE COMPARED. HE NOTED THAT ISRAEL HAD NEVER ACTED AS A BASE FOR TERRORIST ACTIVITIES AGAINST LEBANON OR SYRIA, WHILE ISRAEL HAD BEEN A VICTIM TO TERRORISM FOR THE LAST 100 YEARS. FURTHERMORE, ISRAEL WAS NOT TALKING ABOUT A PERMANENT ISRAELI PRESENCE IN LEBANON. THE LENGTH OF TIME WOULD DEPEND ON NEGOTIATIONS AND AGREEMENT BETWEEN ISRAEL AND LEBANON, ADDING THAT ISRAEL WOULD BE PREPARED TO REMOVE THE EARLY WARNING STATIONS WHEN ISRAEL "WAS CONVINCED THAT THE LEBANESE SECURITY SERVICES WERE WELL ORGANIZED AND ANOTHER STATE-WITHIN-A-STATE COULD NOT BE RECONSTITUTED." AFTER PRESSING FURTHER ON MY PART, SHARON FINALLY SAID HE PERSONALLY FELT THAT IF THE SYRIANS DEMANDED THREE COMPANIES IN LEBANON AS A QUID PRO QUO FROM THE LEBANESE, ISRAEL WOULD ACQUIESCE. HE STATED THAT EVEN UNDER THOSE CIRCUMSTANCES, IT WAS MORE IMPORTANT FOR ISRAEL TO HAVE EARLY WARNING STATIONS TO PROTECT ITS SECURITY INTERESTS. THIS WOULD OF COURSE BE ON THE UNDERSTANDING THAT SYRIA WOULD ONLY RETAIN SUCH FACILITIES AS LONG AS ISRAEL ALSO KEPT ITS STATIONS IN LEBANON.

11. I ASKED WHAT WOULD HAPPEN IF LEBANON DID NOT AGREE TO A CONTINUING ISRAELI AND SYRIAN PRESENCE IN LEBANON. SHARON REPLIED THAT ISRAEL HAD LIBERATED LEBANON FROM THE TERRORISTS AND THEY WOULD NECESSARILY HAVE TO PAY A PRICE, EVEN IF THEY DID NOT LIKE THE CONCEPT OF EARLY WARNING STATIONS. HE COMPARED THE SITUATION TO THE VARIOUS ZONES WHICH HAD BEEN AGREED TO IN THE SINAI WITH THE EGYPTIANS. THE EGYPTIANS, HE ARGUED, DID NOT

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LIKE THIS CONCEPT BUT FINALLY HAD TO ACCEPT ITS REALITY.

12. WE HAD A BRIEF DISCUSSION ON A PARTIAL WITHDRAWAL. THE ISRAELIS REVIEWED THEIR FAMILIAR CONDITIONS FOR A PARTIAL PULLBACK. ISRAEL WILL NOT MOVE BACK ONE YARD UNLESS ITS CONDITIONS WERE SATISFIED. AS OPPOSED TO A MUTUAL PULLBACK, SHARON INDICATED THAT ISRAEL DID NOT ENVISAGE A CLASSIC "SEPARATION OF FORCES," SINCE ISRAEL IN THE BEKAA WAS ALREADY POSITIONED AT OR BELOW THE 45 KM SECURITY ZONE, AND COULD NOT PULL BACK FURTHER IN THAT AREA. I SAID THAT THERE WERE PROBLEMS WITH ANY PARTIAL WITHDRAWAL FORMULA UNLESS IT WAS CLEARLY LINKED TO THE FRAMEWORK OF A COMPLETE WITHDRAWAL SCHEDULE. OTHERWISE, IT COULD LEAD TO A SITUATION WHEREBY THERE WOULD BE A CONTINUING SYRIAN OCCUPATION IN THE BEKAA AND ISRAELI OCCUPATION IN THE SOUTH.

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13. I THEN REVIEWED THE BASIC AMERICAN POSITION. WE WANTED THE EARLY DEPARTURE OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES FROM LEBANON. AT THE SAME TIME, WE HAVE ALWAYS MADE CLEAR THE IMPORTANCE WE ATTACH TO ASSURING THAT ISRAEL'S SECURITY INTERESTS WERE PROTECTED, WHILE ALSO PROVIDING FOR A FULLY INTEGRAL AND SOVEREIGN LEBANON. WE BELIEVED THESE CONCEPTS COULD BE SUCCESSFULLY COMBINED AND QUICK PROGRESS MADE.

14. WE WERE NOT, I STRESSED, PREPARED TO ACCEPT A PROTRACTED PROCESS OF NEGOTIATIONS. WHAT WAS AT STAKE WAS THE RELATIONSHIP OF OUR OBJECTIVES TO THOSE OF ISRAEL IN LEBANON. GOING FURTHER, I ADDED BLUNTLY THAT WHAT WAS AT STAKE WAS OUR OWN RELATIONSHIP. I SAID LEBANESE VIEWS WERE ALSO IMPORTANT. ISRAEL WOULD SEE FOR ITSELF WHAT THE LEBANESE POSITIONS WERE IN THE WORKING GROUPS. IN THE MEANTIME, I SUGGESTED ISRAEL MIGHT SERIOUSLY RECONSIDER ITS SECURITY CONCEPTS, ESPECIALLY AS THEY RELATED TO THE CONTINUING ISRAELI PRESENCE IN SOUTHERN LEBANON AND THE OPEN-ENDED NATURE OF ISRAELI-LEBANESE COOPERATION AND SUPERVISION.

15. SHAMIR SAID HE UNDERSTOOD OUR OPPOSITION TO EARLY WARNING STATIONS. HE ASKED IF WE HAD ANY SUBSTITUTE PROPOSALS. I SAID I WANTED TO KNOW MORE FULLY THE LEBANESE POSITION BUT NOTED ISRAEL HAD ALREADY REJECTED LEBANON'S VIEW OF COMBINING LEBANESE AND INTERNATIONAL FORCES IN THE SECURITY ZONE. FURTHERMORE, I NOTED THE

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CIRCUMSTANCES IN LEBANON HAD CHANGED GIVEN THE REDUCED NATURE OF THE THREAT AND NEW LEBANESE MOTIVATION AND CAPABILITY. THIS ALLOWED ONE TO HAVE SOME DEGREE OF CONFIDENCE THAT AN AGREEMENT COULD BE REACHED SHORT

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OF KEEPING A CONTINUING ISRAELI PRESENCE AFTER FINAL WITHDRAWAL.

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16. I SAID I HAD LISTENED AND NOW MORE FULLY UNDERSTOOD THE ISRAELI POSITION. IT WAS EVIDENT WE WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO CHANGE THOSE POSITIONS AT THIS POINT. ON THE OTHER HAND, WE HAD OUR OWN VIEWS WHICH WE WOULD EXPRESS EFFECTIVELY IN TRYING TO REACH AN EFFECTIVE SOLUTION. SHARON INTERPRETED MY REMARKS AS THREATENING. I REPEATED WE WERE TRYING TO REACH AN EFFECTIVE AND LOGICAL SOLUTION. ISRAEL CAN OF COURSE REJECT OUR POSITIONS. HOWEVER, IT SHOULD BE EVIDENT THAT AS LONG AS FOREIGN FORCES REMAINED IN LEBANON, LEBANON WOULD ONLY ENJOY HALF SOVEREIGNTY. THIS WAS NOT A CONCEPT WHICH THE UNITED STATES COULD ACCEPT.

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17. SHARON ATTEMPTED TO EXPLAIN ONCE AGAIN THAT ISRAEL WAS INTERESTED IN TOTAL WITHDRAWAL. ON THE SOVEREIGNTY ISSUE, HE COMPARED THE ISRAELI EARLY WARNING STATIONS TO OUR FACILITIES IN TURKEY, JAPAN, OR PANAMA. I REPLIED THAT THESE COMPARISONS WERE IRRELEVANT. SIGNIFICANTLY, SHARON ALSO REITERATED HIS POSITION THAT REAL NEGOTIATIONS COULD ONLY BE CONDUCTED DIRECTLY WITH THE LEBANESE AND PRESSURES WOULD NOT HELP. I SAID THERE WERE ONLY PRESSURES ON THE LEBANESE AND REMINDED SHARON THAT THE PRIME MINISTER HAD AGREED TO THE PARALLEL PROCESS TO EXPEDITE THE TALKS.

--

18. I CONCLUDED BY SAYING THAT WE WOULD TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION THE VIEWS OF BOTH PARTIES, AS WELL AS OUR INTERESTS. I WOULD GO TO BEIRUT THIS AFTERNOON AND TALK TO PRESIDENT GEMAYEL AND HIS KEY ADVISERS. I THEN PLANNED TO RETURN TO JERUSALEM ON SUNDAY FOR FURTHER

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TALKS. I ALSO NOTED THAT I HAD BEEN CALLED BACK TO
WASHINGTON FOR CONSULTATIONS AND WOULD LEAVE ON MONDAY.

19. IN A MEASURED SUMMING UP, SHAMIR SAID OUR MUTUAL
CONCERN IS TO PREVENT A RETURN TO THE STATUS QUO ANTE.
CERTAIN MEASURES MUST BE TAKEN TO ENSURE THIS OBJECTIVE
IS ACHIEVED. ISRAEL IS OBLIGED NOW TO DEVELOP A NEW
SITUATION AND NEW RELATIONSHIP WITH LEBANON, WHICH
WILL ENCOMPASS SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS, ESTABLISHING
A CLIMATE OF MUTUAL CONFIDENCE, AND REALIZING TRUE
COOPERATION. ISRAEL WAS PROPOSING CERTAIN ACTIONS TO
ACCOMPLISH THOSE ENDS BUT ISRAEL SEEMED TO BE ACCUSED
OF THE CRIME OF WANTING TO HAVE PEACE. I REPLIED
THAT I COULD SUBSCRIBE TO EVERYTHING THE FOREIGN
MINISTER HAD SAID. I HAD NEVER HAD ANY DOUBT ABOUT
OUR COMMON OBJECTIVE. WHAT I DID FIND, HOWEVER, WAS

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A DIFFERENCE OF VIEW ON HOW WE WERE TO REACH THAT
OBJECTIVE.

20. COMMENT. THOUGH WE DID NOT RECEIVE ISRAEL'S

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SECURITY ANNEX, THE THRUST OF ISRAEL'S THINKING ON SECURITY ISSUES AND ITS IMPLICATIONS IS NOW CLEAR. ISRAEL FORESEES A PROTRACTED AND INTIMATE SECURITY RELATIONSHIP IN SOUTHERN LEBANON, IN WHICH THE EARLY WARNING STATIONS WILL PLAY A PART. THE THREE STATIONS WILL HAVE THREE COMPANIES AND WILL BE RESUPPLIED ACROSS AN "OPEN BORDER." THERE WILL BE JOINT PATROLS AND HADDAD'S FORCES WILL BE A SIGNIFICANT LEBANESE SECURITY ELEMENT IN THE SECURITY ZONE. IT WILL IN EFFECT BE AN ISRAELI SPHERE OF INFLUENCE, HONEYCOMBED BY AN EXTENSIVE POLITICAL AND INTELLIGENCE NETWORK. THE PRESENCE OF INTERNATIONAL FORCES WOULD OF COURSE RUN DIRECTLY COUNTER TO THIS CONCEPT, WHICH IS WHY THE ISRAELIS ARE APPLYING EVERY TYPE OF ARGUMENT AGAINST UNIFIL. END COMMENT. LEWIS

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FROM DRAPER MISSION (ROSS)

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, MOPS, MARR, LE, SY, PLO, IS, US, UR, SA

SUBJECT: HABIB/DRAPER MISSION: LATEST LEBANESE-SYRIAN
CONTACT

1. [REDACTED]

2. SUMMARY: GEMAYEL'S SPECIAL EMISSARY TO SYRIA
BRIEFED AMBASSADOR DILLON AND ROSS JANUARY 19 ON HIS
TALKS WITH ASSAD JANUARY 15.

-- ASSAD CONFIRMED THAT SYRIA WILL BE WATCHING PROGRESS

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OF LEBANESE-ISRAELI NEGOTIATIONS CLOSELY. LEBANON
SHOULD KNOW THAT IF "NORMALIZATION" OR OPEN BORDERS FOR
PERSONS AND GOODS WERE AGREED TO, THIS WOULD LEAD TO
COLLAPSE OF LEBANON AS PRESENTLY CONSTITUTED AND
IMMEDIATE CLOSURE OF SYRIAN BORDER. LATTER STEP,
ACCORDING TO ASSAD, HAD BEEN FULLY COORDINATED WITH
SAUDIS. FURTHERMORE, SYRIA WOULD VIEW ISRAELI
MAINTENANCE OF EARLY WARNING STATIONS IN LEBANON AS A
"HOSTILE ACT". PROVIDED ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL WERE AGREED,

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HOWEVER, SYRIA WOULD (IN OBEID'S WORDS) WITHDRAW "SIMULTANEOUSLY" WITH ISRAELIS.

--OBEID URGED ASSAD TO MAINTAIN HIGH-LEVEL DIALOGUE WITH US FOR GOOD OF SYRIA, LEBANON, AND ARAB WORLD. AFTER MAKING IT CLEAR THAT SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL WAS MATTER FOR SYRIA AND LEBANON TO DISCUSS DIRECTLY, ASSAD AGREED TO RECEIVE AMBASSADOR HABIB DURING HIS NEXT VISIT.

-ASSAD RESPONDED POSITIVELY TO IDEA OF REPLACING SYRIAN FORCES WITH LAF TROOPS IN AREAS WHERE NO CONFRONTATION EXISTS WITH IDF (METN AND TRIPOLI AREA). HE LINKED THIS IMPLICITLY, HOWEVER, TO INCLUSION OF PRO-SYRIAN POLITICAL FIGURES IN PROCESS OF NATIONAL RECONCILIATION.

-- ASSAD CHARACTERIZED SYRIAN-SOVIET RELATIONS AS HAVING WARMED SINCE EMERGENCE OF ANDROPOV, WHOM HE KNOWS AND LIKES. END SUMMARY.

3. JEAN OBEID ('UBAYD), PRESIDENT GEMAYEL'S SPECIAL EMISSARY TO SYRIA, BRIEFED AMBASSADOR DILLON AND ROSS JANUARY 19 ON HIS THREE HOURS OF TALKS WITH SYRIAN PRESIDENT ASSAD JANUARY 15. OBEID AND ASSAD MET ALONE FOR ONE HOUR AND WERE THEN JOINED BY SYRIAN FOREIGN MINISTER KHADDAM.

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4. BACKGROUND AND PURPOSE OF VISIT.

OBEID'S VISIT CAME ABOUT ONE WEEK AFTER THE VISITS OF PRIME MINISTER WAZZAN, LAF COMMANDER GEN. TANNUS, AND GEN. QURAYTIM TO DAMASCUS AND TWO DAYS AFTER AGREEMENT ON A LEBANESE-ISRAELI-US AGENDA FOR TALKS. FROM OBEID'S PRESENTATION, IT BECAME APPARENT THAT GEMAYEL HAD SENT HIM TO DAMASCUS TO BRIEF ASSAD ON THE CURRENT STATE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS, ELICIT HIS REACTIONS, ENCOURAGE HIM TO MAINTAIN A HIGH-LEVEL DIALOGUE WITH THE US, AND EXPLORE FURTHER THE POSSIBILITY OF HAVING LAF TROOPS REPLACE SYRIAN FORCES IN THE METN AND TRIPOLI REGIONS.

5. THE NEGOTIATIONS

-- BEFORE OBEID COULD BEGIN HIS BRIEFING, ASSAD LAUNCHED INTO A LENGTHY AND IMPASSIONED DISCOURSE ON THE NEGOTIATIONS. IT WOULD HAVE BEEN BETTER, HE SAID, HAD LEBANON PROTECTED ITS MORAL POSITION BY REFUSING TO NEGOTIATE WITH THE ISRAELIS. HAVING OPENED NEGOTIATIONS, HOWEVER, IT HAD COMMITTED A GREAT MISTAKE IN AGREEING TO THE PUBLISHED AGENDA. ASSAD WAS PARTICULARLY INCENSED BY THE AGENDA'S REFERENCE TO "THE EVACUATION OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES", SINCE TO HIM THIS EQUATED THE

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SYRIANS TO THE ISRAELIS. WHAT LEBANON NEEDED WAS A
DE GAULLE, NOT A PETAIN OR A LAVAL (THIS THEME HAD BEEN

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PLAYED WIDELY IN THAT MORNING'S SYRIAN PRESS). SYRIA
WOULD BE WATCHING THE PROGRESS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS
CLOSELY, AND LEBANON SHOULD KNOW THAT, IF NORMALIZATION
(TATBI') OR OPEN BORDERS FOR PERSONS OR GOODS WERE

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AGREED TO, THIS WOULD LEAD (A) TO THE COLLAPSE OF LEBANON AS PRESENTLY CONSTITUTED (OBEID INTERPRETED THIS TO BE A VEILED THREAT TO STIR UP TROUBLE IN LEBANON) AND (B) TO THE IMMEDIATE CLOSING OF THE SYRIAN BORDER TO ALL MOVEMENTS FROM LEBANON. FURTHERMORE, LEBANON SHOULD KNOW THAT THE DECISION TO CLOSE THE SYRIAN BORDER IN THE EVENT OF NORMALIZATION OR OPEN BORDERS WITH ISRAEL HAD BEEN TAKEN "IN FULL COORDINATION" WITH SAUDI ARABIA. IN ADDITION, LEBANON SHOULD KNOW THAT, WHILE SYRIA HAD NO PROBLEM WITH THE PRINCIPLE OF

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SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS, IT WOULD CONSIDER THE MAINTENANCE OF EARLY WARNING STATIONS BY THE ISRAELIS ANYWHERE IN LEBANON "A HOSTILE ACT" AND RESPOND ACCORDINGLY.

OBEID RESPONDED THAT, SINCE NO ARAB INITIATIVE COULD GET THE ISRAELIS OUT, LEBANON HAD NO CHOICE BUT TO NEGOTIATE TO RECOVER FULL SOVEREIGNTY OVER ALL ITS TERRITORY, AND IT WOULD APPRECIATE AT LEAST THE MORAL SUPPORT OF ITS ARAB BROTHERS AS IT DID SO. AS FOR THE ISSUE OF OPEN BORDERS, THE BORDERS WERE IN FACT NOW WIDE OPEN. LEBANON WAS TRYING TO ACHIEVE A MEASURE OF CLOSURE, AND IF THE ARABS COULD GET THE BORDERS CLOSED, LEBANON WOULD BE DELIGHTED.

-- IN THE DISCUSSION, OBEID GOT THE STRONG IMPRESSION THAT THE REDEPLOYMENT OF UNIFIL INTO OTHER AREAS OF LEBANON WOULD POSE NO INSURMOUNTABLE PROBLEMS WITH SYRIA. ON WITHDRAWALS, ASSAD CONFIRMED SYRIA'S READINESS TO WITHDRAW, IN OBEID'S WORDS, "SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH THE ISRAELIS". OBEID DID NOT RAISE THE POW ISSUE.

6. NEED FOR HIGH-LEVEL DIALOGUE WITH THE US

-- OBEID SAID HE HAD HEARD THAT ASSAD HAD REFUSED TO RECEIVE AMBASSADOR HABIB DURING HIS LAST VISIT TO SYRIA, AND HE URGED ASSAD TO CONTINUE HIS DIALOGUE WITH HIM. HABIB, HE SAID, HAD COMMUNICATED HIS HIGH REGARD FOR ASSAD TO A NUMBER OF LEBANESE LEADERS, AND LEBANON FELT THAT -- EVEN IF THE US AND SYRIA DID NOT ALWAYS SEE EYE TO EYE -- THERE WAS A GREAT ADVANTAGE FOR LEBANON, FOR SYRIA, AND FOR THE ARAB WORLD IN MAINTAINING A HIGH-LEVEL DIALOGUE WITH THE US.

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-- ASSAD RESPONDED THAT, SINCE THE TIME OF DR. KISSINGER, THE US HAD BEEN DEALING WITH SYRIA ON THE BASIS OF FULL CONCERTATION WITH ISRAEL, AND VISITS TO DAMASCUS HAD COME ONLY IN THE CONTEXT OF PRESSURES OVER SPECIFIC CRISES. THIS WAS NOT THE WAY TO WORK FOR A NORMAL RELATIONSHIP. REGARDING AMBASSADOR HABIB'S PRESENT EFFORTS, ASSAD SAID THAT SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL FROM LEBANON WAS A MATTER FOR SYRIA AND LEBANON TO DISCUSS DIRECTLY AND THAT THE US SHOULD NOT TRY TO ARROGATE TO ITSELF THE ROLE OF INTERMEDIARY BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES. AFTER A FURTHER APPEAL FROM OBEID ON THE NECESSITY AND BENEFITS OF A HIGH-LEVEL DIALOGUE, ASSAD AGREED THAT, IF REQUESTED, HE WOULD RECEIVE AMBASSADOR HABIB DURING HIS NEXT VISIT.

7. LAF REPLACEMENT OF SYRIAN TROOPS

-- TO FOLLOW UP ON EARLIER DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN LAF COMMANDER GEN. TANNUS AND HIKMAT SHIHABI (WHICH OBEID CHARACTERIZED AS PRODUCTIVE AND WARM, WITH TANNUS MAKING A VERY POSITIVE IMPRESSION ON THE SYRIANS), OBEID URGED ASSAD TO CONSIDER THE POSSIBILITY OF ARRANGING FOR LAF TROOPS TO REPLACE SYRIAN FORCES IN CERTAIN AREAS WHERE NO CONFRONTATION WITH ISRAEL EXISTED (THE METN AND THE TRIPOLI AREA). THIS WOULD PERMIT THE LAF TO ACQUIRE BADLY NEEDED FIELD EXPERIENCE, EVEN IF THERE MIGHT BE SOME INITIAL GROWING PAINS AND MISTAKES.

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-- ASSAD RESPONDED POSITIVELY TO THIS IDEA, BUT
(IMPLICITLY LINKING A SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL TO POSITIVE
DEVELOPMENTS IN THIS FIELD) HE THEN PRESSED OBEID TO
URGE GEMAYEL TO BROADEN HIS EFFORTS FOR A NATIONAL
POLITICAL RECONCILIATION TO INCLUDE SUCH FIGURES AS
IN'AM RA'D OF THE PPS AND FORMER PRESIDENT FRANJIYAH.
(COMMENT: ASSAD EVIDENTLY WANTS TO ASSURE PRO-SYRIAN
ELEMENTS IN LEBANON SOME
SHARE OF POWER BEFORE
CONSIDERING THE KIND OF PARTIAL WITHDRAWAL THE
LEBANESE ARE PROPOSING. OBEID TOLD US HE IS IN FACT
WORKING HARD TO BRING ABOUT THESE AND OTHER
RECONCILIATIONS, SINCE A STRONG "POPULAR" CONSENSUS IN
LEBANON IS POTENTIALLY ONE OF GEMAYEL'S STRONGEST
CARDS.)

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-- OBEID ALSO RAISED THE PRESENCE OF IRANIANS IN
BA'LABAKK WITH ASSAD, SAYING A SYMPATHETIC MINORITY
IN LEBANON ATTRIBUTED THEIR PRESENCE TO SYRIAN INABILITY
TO STOP THEIR ENTRY, WHILE A MAJORITY ATTRIBUTED THEIR
PRESENCE TO SYRIAN COLLUSION. WITHOUT ADDRESSING
THE POSSIBILITY OF REMOVING THE IRANIANS, ASSAD DID
SAY THAT "ORDERS HAVE BEEN GIVEN TO GET THE SITUATION
IN BA'LABAKK UNDER CONTROL."

8. SYRIAN-SOVIET RELATIONS

OBEID USED THE OCCASION TO ASK ASSAD ABOUT THE PRESENT

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STATE OF SYRIAN-SOVIET RELATIONS. ASSAD RESPONDED THAT, UNDER ANDROPOV -- WHOM HE KNEW PERSONALLY AND HAD A HIGH REGARD FOR, THE SOVIET UNION WAS SHOWING ITSELF TO BE MORE UNDERSTANDING OF SYRIA AND ITS NEEDS.

9. COMMENT: DURING THIS MEETING, OBEID SHOWED HIMSELF TO BE A CAPABLE AND SENSITIVE INTERLOCUTOR IN SPITE OF HIS DANDIFIED AIR. WHILE HE UNDOUBTEDLY TAILORED HIS BRIEFING TO HIS AUDIENCE, HE SEEMED TO HOLD NOTHING BACK, RESPONDING EASILY TO THE VARIOUS CLARIFYING QUESTIONS PUT TO HIM. HE WAS ESPECIALLY ANXIOUS THAT AMBASSADOR HABIB EXPLOIT THE TERRAIN HE HAD PREPARED WITH ASSAD AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. HE EVEN OFFERED SOME FREE ADVICE ON DEALING WITH ASSAD ON LEBANON. INSTEAD OF GOING TO HIM TO TRY TO "IMPOSE" A PACKAGE PREPARED ELSEWHERE, HE SAID, WE SHOULD STRESS THE NEED FOR SYRIA AND THE US, AS FRIENDS OF LEBANON, TO CONSULT ON WAYS TO HELP THAT COUNTRY OUT OF ITS PRESENT SITUATION. WHILE WE COULD TURN THE DISCUSSION ANY WAY WE WISHED, THE STYLE OF THE INITIAL APPROACH WAS

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EX-105
DECAPTIONED

FROM HABIB

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, MILI, SY, LE, US, IS, XF

SUBJECT: HABIB/DRAPER MISSION: MEETING WITH FONMIN

-- SHAMIR, JANUARY 20

1.

2. SUMMARY; WE USED A SMALL MEETING OVER LUNCH WITH FONMIN SHAMIR TO GO BACK OVER THE MAJOR POINTS OF CONTROVERSY: EARLY WARNING STATIONS AND UNIFIL, BUT PRIMARILY THE EXTENT OF IMMEDIATE NORMALIZATION. WHEN SHAMIR RE-CONFIRMED THE ISRAELI POSITION ON THESE ISSUES, HABIB SAID THAT HE FRANKLY DOUBTED WHETHER ISRAEL WAS SINCERELY INTERESTED IN REACHING AN UNDER-

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STANDING WITH THE UNITED STATES WHICH WAS SALEABLE IN BEIRUT, SINCE THE ISRAELI POSITIONS ON THESE KEY ISSUES WOULD, IN OUR OPINION, JEOPARDIZE ARAB ECONOMIC SUPPORT AND PREVENT SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL. AS HE HAD DONE YESTERDAY, HABIB TOLD SHAMIR BLUNTLY THAT THE ISRAELI DRAFT WAS COMPLETELY UNWORKABLE, AND HE AGAIN URGED SHAMIR TO WORK FROM OUR DRAFT, SUGGESTING CHANGES WHICH WOULD MAKE IT ACCEPTABLE.

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3. SHAMIR SAID ISRAEL WAS NOT BLIND TO THE DEFECTS OF THE OVERT NEGOTIATING CHANNEL AND WANTED TO REACH AGREEMENT WITH THE US, BUT THE SUBSTANCE OF WHAT ISRAEL HAD SUGGESTED (ALTHOUGH NOT ITS FORM) WAS AN ISRAELI MINIMUM. HABIB REITERATED THAT IF ISRAEL WERE TO AE ITS CURRENT DEMANDS, LEBANON WOULD BE OSTRACIZED IN THE ARAB WORLD AND SYRIA MIGHT NOT WITHDRAW. HABIB TWICE TOLD SHAMIR THAT IF ISRAEL MAINTAINED ITS CURRENT POSITIONS, A SITUATION MIGHT RESULT WHERE THERE WAS PRESSURE ON ISRAEL TO WITHDRAW IN EXCHANGE ONLY FOR REASONABLE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS, LEAVING NORMALIZATION COMPLETELY TO THE SIDE. HABIB SAID THAT HE WAS CONCERNED THAT THE LEBANON ISSUE RISKED BECOMING A GREAT POINT OF CONTENTION BETWEEN US, WITH VERY SERIOUS POTENTIAL IMPACT ON THE US/ISRAEL RELATIONSHIP. LEWIS STRESSED THAT THE TREND LINE IN US/ISRAEL RELATIONS HAD BEEN STEADILY DOWNWARD FOR MONTHS AND THAT THERE WAS RAPIDLY DIMINISHING CONFIDENCE IN WASHINGTON THAT THE US AND ISRAEL HAD COMMON OBJECTIVES IN LEBANON. IF THIS CONCLUSION CARRIED THE DAY, A SERIOUS CRISIS IN US/ISRAEL RELATIONS WS INEVITABLE. SHAMIR'S BASIC RESPONSE WAS THAT ISRAEL WANTED TO REACH AGREEMENT WITH THE US AND THAT ISRAEL'S

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MINIMUM WOULD BE ACCEPTED BY GEMAYEL, IF THE US STRONGLY SUPPORTED IT. END SUMMARY.

4. HABIB, LEWIS AND KRECZKO HAD A THREE-HOUR WORKING LUNCH JANUARY 20 WITH FOREIGN MINISTER SHAMIR, JOINED BY DEPUTY FONMIN BEN-MEIR, HANON BAR-ON, AND SHAMIR'S CHEF DE CABINET, YOSSI BEN AHARON.

5. HABIB SAID THAT AFTER HIS DISCUSSIONS OF THE LAST TWO DAYS, HE WAS BECOMING CONVINCED THAT ISRAEL WAS NOT INTERESTED IN WORKING WITH THE US TO OBTAIN A SHORT-CUT TO AN AGREEMENT WITH LEBANON. HABIB SAID THAT HE DID NOT WANT TO REACH THIS CONCLUSION UNTIL HE HAD DISCUSSED SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS WITH DEFMIN SHARON ON JANUARY 21, AND CONVEYED THE ISRAELI POSITION TO GEMAYEL. HOWEVER, ON THE BASIS OF THE ISRAELI DRAFT AND ON WHAT WE HD HEARD SO FAR CONCERNING BOTH NORMALIZATION AND SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS, A US/ISRAEL UNDERSTANDING DID NOT SEEM FEASIBLE. FROM WHAT WE KNEW OF LEBANON'S POSITION, ISRAEL'S PRESENTATION WOOT BE ACCEPTABLE TO GEMAYEL. ITS VARIOUS PROVISIONS FOR A RESIDUAL IDF PRESENCE IN LEBANON (EARLY WARNING STATIONS AND JOINT PATROLS) WOULD PROVIDE SYRIA AN EXCUSE NOT TO WITHDRAW; AND ITS INSISTENCE ON VIRTUALLY COMPLETE NORMALIZATION IM-

MEDIATELY RISKED ARAB ECONOMIC RETALIATION IF NOT
OSTRACISM OF LEBANON FROM THE ARAB WORLD.

6. HABIB SAID HE WOULD DISCUSS THESE MATTERS WITH
GEMAYEL, AND ALSO SEE KING FAHD IN SAUDI ARABIA.
HABIB SAID WE WOULD SUPPORT WHATEVER GEMAYEL DECIDED
WITH FAHD AND OTHERS, BUT THAT WE SERIOUSLY DOUBTED
WHETHER GEMAYEL COULD ENTERTAIN THE TYPE OF AGREEMENT
WHICH ISRAEL WAS SUGGESTING. HABIB SAID THAT GEMAYEL WOULD
BE SHDCKED IF HE SAW THE ISRAELI DRAFT; IT WENT MUCH

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TOO FAR IN SUBSTANCE AND FORM, AND WAS A PEACE TREATY IN EVERYTHING BUT NAME. HABIB REPEATED THAT THE ISRAELI DRAFT WENT FAR BEYOND THEIR STATED OBJECTIVES IN ENTERING LEBANON, AND ALSO FAR BEYOND THE PAPERS ISRAEL HAD PRESENTED US IN OCTOBER. HABIB AGAIN URGED SHAMIR TO WORK FROM THE BASIS OF THE DRAFT WHICH WE HAD PRESENTED, AND TO GIVE US SOME SUGGESTIONS ON HOW TO IMPROVE IT AND MAKE IT MORE ACCEPTABLE.

7. SHAMIR REPEATED ISRAEL'S RATIONALE FOR ITS CURRENT POSITIONS -- THE LEBANESE ARMY IS WEAK AND THEREFORE WILL NEED TO COOPERATE WITH THE IDF FOR A SPECIFIED PERIOD TO PREVENT THE RESURGENCE OF PLO TERRORISM. UNIFIL WAS NOT A SUITABLE SUBSTITUTE AND EARLY WARNING STATIONS ARE NECESSARY. SHAMIR SAID THAT LEBANON MUST CLEARLY WITHDRAW FROM THE ARAB WAR AGAINST ISRAEL,

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MILITARY AND ECONOMIC. SHAMIR SAID THAT THE ARABS WOULD NOT RETALIATE AGAINST LEBANON IF THE US STRONGLY SUPPORTED GEMAYEL. HE POINTED TO THE FACT THAT ARAFAT WAS NOW WILLING TO VISIT CAIRO AND WAS NO LONGER INSISTING THAT EGYPT RENOUNCE CAMP DAVID. IF THE PLO WAS TAKING THIS POSITION WITH RESPECT TO EGYPT, WHY SHOULD THE ARABS BE TOUGH ON LEBANON?

8. LEWIS AND HABIB WENT BACK THROUGH OUR ARGUMENTS. HABIB SAID THAT ISRAEL WAS EXAGGERATING THE PLO THREAT, AND UNDERESTIMATING THE DETERMINATION OF LEBANON TO PREVENT THE RETURN OF THE PLO. WE ALSO SAID THAT ISRAEL WAS GREATLY UNDERESTIMATING THE POTENTIAL ARAB REACTION TO WHAT ISRAEL WAS PROPOSING AND POINTED OUT THAT WE COULD NOT CONTROL THE ARAB REACTION OR PRODUCE SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL, IF ISRAEL OVERREACHED. HABIB REPEATED THAT WE DID NOT THINK SYRIA WOULD WITHDRAW IF THERE WERE ANY VESTIGES OF AN IDF PRESENCE IN LEBANON, INCLUDING JOINT PATROLS AND EARLY WARNING STATIONS. ON NORMALIZATION, KRECKO ASKED SHAMIR WHETHER THERE WAS ANYTHING THE US COULD PROVIDE ISRAEL WHICH WOULD REASSURE ISRAEL THAT THE NORMALIZATION PROCESS WOULD CONTINUE TO DEVELOP AFTER WITHDRAWAL. LEWIS POINTED OUT THAT THIS WOULD BE CONSISTENT WITH THE ISRAELI VIEW THAT THE US HAD GREAT INFLUENCE OVER WHAT LEBANON COULD DO. SHAMIR DISMISSED THE IDEA, SAYING THE ISSUE WAS NOT US INTENTIONS, BUT LEBANESE DECISIONS.

9. SHAMIR ALSO RETURNED TO HIS ARGUMENT THAT ALL ATTENTION WAS ON ISRAEL AND NOTHING WAS BEING DONE TO SECURE SYRIAN OR PLO WITHDRAWAL. HABIB TOLD SHAMIR THAT WE HAD GOOD EVIDENCE FROM A VALID INTER-

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LOCUTOR THAT SYRIA AND THE PLO WERE WILLING TO WITHDRAW. HABIB SAID THAT HE WOULD CONFIRM THIS AGAIN. HOWEVER, HE DID NOT WANT TO TRY TO NAIL THIS DOWN ANY MORE DIRECTLY WITH THE SYRIANS, OR FOR THE LEBANESE TO ASK THE PLO FOR SPECIFICS CONCERNING WITHDRAWAL, UNTIL WE AND THE LEBANESE WERE IN A POSITION TO SAY THAT ISRAEL AND LEBANON HAD REACHED AN AGREEMENT ON ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL.

10. AT THIS POINT, HABIB TOLD SHAMIR THAT ISRAEL WAS PUSHING TOO FAR TOO FAST AND THAT ISRAEL COULD WIND UP JEOPARDIZING OUR OBJECTIVES OF A STRONG LEBANON AND SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL. HABIB SAID THAT SHAMIR SHOULD UNDERSTAND THAT WE MAY SOON GET TO THE POINT WHERE PRESSURE WILL MOUNT FOR ISRAEL TO WITHDRAW IN EXCHANGE FOR SECURITY ARRANGEMENT LEAVING

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NORMLIZATION TO THE SIDE. HE ASKED SHAMIR TO RE-EXAMINE ISRAEL'S MINIMUM POSITION, BECAUSE HE WAS VERY PESSIMISTIC ABOUT LEBANON'S ABILITY TO BUY WHAT ISRAEL WAS SUGGESTING. AGAIN, SHAMIR ARGUED THAT LEBANON WAS READY FOR WHAT ISRAEL WAS SUGGESTING, IF ONLY THE US WOULD STRONGLY SUPPORT IT.

11. HABIB SAID HE WAS CONCERNED THAT THE LEBANON SITUATION WAS DEVELOPING IN A WAY WHICH WOULD LEAD TO A SERIOUS CONFRONTATION BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND ISRAEL. HABIB REPEATED HIS WARNING THAT HE WAS CONCERNED THAT ISRAEL WAS PUSHING FOR SO MUCH THAT IT WOULD DESTROY THE OPPORTUNITY TO ESTABLISH EVEN AN INITIAL RELATIONSHIP WITH LEBANON. HE REPEATED THAT THE ISSUE WAS BECOMING A PROBLEM BETWEEN US

AND THAT HE WAS WORRIED ABOUT ITS IMPACT ON THE US/ISRAEL RELATIONSHIP.

12. SHAMIR'S RESPONSE WAS THAT EVENTS IN LEBANON DEPENDED ON THE US. HE STUCK FIRMLY TO THE POINT

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THAT IF THE US SUPPORTED THE ISRAELI POSITION, IT WOULD BE ACCEPTED BY LEBANON AND THE ARABS.

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13. HABIB REITERATED THAT WE WERE MOVING IN A DIRECTION WHICH WOULD AFFECT US/ISRAEL RELATIONS. LEWIS THEN SAID THAT THE TRENDLINE IN US-ISRAELI RELATIONS HAS BEEN STEADILY DOWNWARD FOR A NUMBER OF MONTHS. NOW THERE IS RAPIDLY DIMINISHING CONFIDENCE IN WASHINGTON THAT ISRAEL AND THE US SHARED COMMON OBJECTIVES IN LEBANON. LEWIS FORESAW A SERIOUS CRISIS IN US/ISRAEL RELATIONS IF THE OPPOSITE CONCLUSION WERE REACHED IN WASHINGTON.

14. HABIB REPEATED THAT HE HAD REAL DOUBTS THAT ISRAEL WAS INTERESTED IN PURSUING THE PARALLEL NEGOTIATING

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TRACK WITH THE US. SHAMIR SAID THAT ISRAEL WAS NOT BLIND AND KNEW THE DEFECTS OF THE OVERT KIRYAT SHEMONA TALKS. ISRAEL ALSO KNEW THAT NOTHING WOULD BE ACCOMPLISHED IF THE US DID NOT SUPPORT THE

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ISRAEL/LEBANON AGREEMENT. BUT, HE SAID THAT ISRAEL HAD CERTAIN MINIMUM OBJECTIVES, AND THESE HAD BEEN PRESENTED TO US.

14. COMMENT: LEWIS AND I MADE CRYSTAL CLEAR TO SHAMIR THAT ISRAEL'S DEFINED OBJECTIVES WERE EXCESSIVE, AND WOULD NOT LEAD TO THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES. WE HAVE ALSO MADE CLEAR THAT THE ISRAELI DRAFT IS A COMPLETE NON-STARTER, AND THAT ISRAEL SHOULD WORK FROM OUR DRAFT. WE HAVE CLEARLY STATED THAT WE ARE ON A COURSE WHICH COULD LEAD TO A SEVERE CRISIS IN US/ISRAEL RELATIONS. WHILE SHAMIR MAINTAINS THAT HE IS STILL INTERESTED IN REACHING AN ACCEPTABLE UNDERSTANDING WITH THE US, NONE OF OUR BLUNT TALK HAS RESULTED IN AN INDICATION OF A SIGNIFICANT SHIFT IN THE ISRAELI POSITION ON ANY OF THE KEY ISSUES. AND, OF COURSE, WE WILL NOT KNOW THE TRUE EXTENT OF OUR PROBLEMS ON THE SECURITY SIDE UNTIL I HAVE SPOKEN WITH SHARON TOMORROW.

15. I INTEND TO MAKE THE SAME POINTS TO BEGIN TOMORROW WHICH I MADE TO SHAMIR TODAY, IN UNMISTAKABLE TERMS. HOWEVER, I WILL NOT BE IN THE STRONGEST POSITION POSSIBLE UNTIL I HAVE SEEN GEMAYEL AND FAHD PERSONALLY, AND CAN CONFIRM DIRECTLY TO THE ISRAELIS THAT GEMAYEL CANNOT GO AS FAR AS THEY ARE SUGGESTING, AND THAT THE US WILL NOT PRESS HIM TO ADOPT POSITIONS WHICH THREATEN HIS INTERNAL SUPPORT OR HIS ARAB RELATIONS. END COMMENT. GROVE

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DECAPTIONED

FROM HABIB

E.O. 12356: DECL; OADR

TAGS: PREL, MILI, SY, LE, US, IS, XF

SUBJECT: HABIB/DRAPER MISSION: SECOND MEETING WITH
-- FOREIGN MINISTER SHAMIR, JANUARY 19

REF: JERUSALEM 202✓

1. [REDACTED]

2. SUMMARY: WE HAD A TWO-HOUR SESSION WITH FONMIN SHAMIR EVENING OF 19 JAN WHICH CONFIRMED THAT ISRAEL SEEKS VIRTUALLY NORMAL RELATIONS WITH LEBANON, AT LEAST AS REGARDS THE MOVEMENT OF PEOPLE AND GOODS, EFFECTIVE IMMEDIATELY UPON RATIFICATION OF ITS AGREEMENT WITH [REDACTED]

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LEBANON (I.E, TEN DAYS AFTER SIGNATURE). WE SUGGESTED ALTERNATIVE FORMULAS CONCERNING AN EVOLUTIONARY PROCESS, BUT SHAMIR INSISTED ON CLEAR PRINCIPLES WHICH TERMINATE THE ECONOMIC BOYCOTT AND ALLOW FREE MOVEMENT OF PERSONS, AND PRIOR ARRANGEMENTS WHICH WILL MAKE SIGNIFICANT TRADE AND MOVEMENT IMPLEMENTABLE UPON RATIFICATION. SHAMIR AND KIMCHE SAID THAT LEBANON MUST MAKE A CLEAN BREAK WITH THE ARAB BOYCOTT NOW, WHILE IT HAD THE EXCUSE OF "BUYING" ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL. THEY SAID THAT IF THIS

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WERE THE U.S. POSITION, GEMAYEL WOULD BUY IT.

3. HABIB SAID THAT IT WAS OUR VIEW THAT THERE WAS NO WAY LEBANON COULD GO THAT FAR AT THIS TIME, WITHOUT SEVERE INTERNAL PROBLEMS AND A BREAK WITH THE ARAB STATES, ALTHOUGH WE WOULD PUT THE QUESTION TO GEMAYEL DIRECTLY. HABIB SAID THAT PRESIDENT REAGAN HAD STATED THE U.S. POSITION SEVERAL TIMES: ALL FOREIGN TROOPS SHOULD WITHDRAW FROM LEBANON. LEWIS ADDED THAT PRESIDENT REAGAN HAD SAID WE WOULD SUPPORT NORMALIZATION BETWEEN ISRAEL AND LEBANON, BUT ONLY TO THE EXTENT IT DID NOT JEOPARDIZE THE NATIONAL CONSENSUS OR UNDERMINE THE GOVERNMENT OF LEBANON IN ITS RELATIONS WITH THE ARAB WORLD. HABIB WARNED SHAMIR THAT A MINIMUM PACKAGE MIGHT BE WITHDRAWAL IN EXCHANGE FOR ONLY SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS, AND THAT ISRAEL MIGHT ULTIMATELY HAVE TO DO WITHOUT NORMALIZATION. SHAMIR SAID THAT ISRAEL WANTS TO WITHDRAW AND HAS THE BEST INTENTIONS, BUT IT WOULD NOT DO SO UNLESS ITS BASIC NEEDS WERE MET. HE SAID THE NATURE OF THE CIVILIAN RELATIONSHIP WAS THE KEY TO EFFECTIVE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS.

4. SHAMIR REPEATED ISRAEL'S CONCEPT OF THE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS IN THE SOUTH, AND IT IS NOT ENCOURAGING.

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(IT IS LIKELY THAT SHARON'S RE-ENTRY INTO THE DISCUSSIONS WILL BE TO UNDERSCORE THE HARD LINE.) SHAMIR SAID THAT THOSE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS MUST BE BASED ON DAILY COOPERATION BETWEEN LEBANON AND ISRAEL, ON A VERY CLOSE AND FRIENDLY BASIS, AND THAT ISRAELI EARLY WARNING STATIONS WERE A NATURAL COMPONENT OF THIS. HABIB SAID THAT IF ANY IDF PERSONNEL STAYED IN LEBANON, WE WERE SURE THAT SYRIA WOULD NOT WITHDRAW. END SUMMARY.

5. AS AGREED AT THE CONCLUSION OF OUR FIRST SESSION TODAY WITH SHAMIR (REFTEL), DRAPER AND KRECZKO MET AT 1:30 P.M. WITH RUBINSTEIN, DEVON, AND ZENGER TO SEE WHETHER IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO ACHIEVE SOME AGREED PRINCIPLES CONCERNING NORMALIZATION. IT WAS NOT. DRAPER AND KRECZKO TRIED A NUMBER OF FORMULAS AND CONCEPTS WHICH COULD PROVIDE AN INITIAL DEGREE OF NORMALIZATION AND A GOOD BASIS FOR REASSURING ISRAEL THAT THE NORMALIZATION PROCESS WOULD CONTINUE. AT ONE POINT, WE SUGGESTED A PACKAGE CONCERNING NORMALIZATION WHICH WOULD INCLUDE:

1) PRINCIPLES CONCERNING NORMALIZATION (WHICH WOULD STOP SHORT OF THE BLUNT LANGUAGE AND DETAILED REGIME ON OPEN BORDERS AND FREE MOVEMENT WHICH ISRAEL HAS BEEN SEEKING); 2) ARRANGEMENTS CONCERNING IMMEDIATE

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ELEMENTS OF NORMALIZATION (ALTHOUGH FAR LESS THAN THE ISRAELIS WERE SEEKING); 3) A MECHANISM FOR THE FUTURE DEVELOPMENT OF RELATIONS, WITH THE POSSIBILITY OF A TIMETABLE OF GOALS; AND 4) A US SIDE COMMITMENT TO ENCOURAGE LEBANON TO DEVELOP ITS RELATIONS. HOWEVER, THE ISRAELIS WERE FIRM THAT THE AGREEMENT MUST INCLUDE IN CLEAR TERMS BOTH THE PRINCIPLE OF

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OPEN BORDERS FOR GOODS AND PERSONS AND ARRANGEMENTS WHICH WILL ALLOW SIGNIFICANT ASPECTS OF TRADE AND TOURISM TO BEGIN ON THE DAY THAT THE AGREEMENT IS RATIFIED. THEY ASSERT THAT MANY LEBANESE WANT TO GO THIS FAR, AND CAN, IF THE US WILL SUPPORT LEBANON WITH THE MODERATE ARABS.

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6. AT FIVE P.M., 19 JAN, HABIB, DRAPER, LEWIS, KRECZKD, AND HARE MET WITH SHAMIR AND HIS MFA TEAM. AT THE OUT-SET, HABIB SAID HE WAS DISAPPOINTED THAT WE WERE UNABLE TO AGREE ON GENERAL PRINCIPLES IN A DRAFT AGREEMENT TO COVER THE MOVEMENT OF GOODS AND PERSONS ACROSS THE BORDER. IT OUGHT TO HAVE BEEN POSSIBLE TO FIND A REASON-ABLE BASIS TO BEGIN THE PROCESS WHICH WOULD NOT LEAD TO UNACCEPTABLE CONSEQUENCES FOR LEBANON. HABIB SAID HE HAD ASSUMED THE 10 OCT CABINET PAPER AND THE 11 OCT

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SECURITY DOCUMENTS HAD REPRESENTED BASIC ISRAELI POLICY AND THAT WE HAD TRIED IN OUR DRAFT TO PUT THE EARLIER ISRAELI PAPERS IN THEIR PROPER CONTEXT. BUT NOW ISRAEL WAS SAYING THIS WAS NOT ENOUGH. HABIB TOLD THE ISRAELIS THAT WE HAD NOT PROPOSED "INSTANT NORMALIZATION" IN OUR PAPER, IN PART BECAUSE OF WHAT WE THOUGHT THE ISRAELI PAPERS HAD INTENDED. WE HAD NOT SUSPECTED THAT SO MUCH WAS EXPECTED TO BE IN PLACE ON DAY ONE.

7. SHAMIR ARGUED THAT THE PHRASEOLOGY IN THE EARLY 10 OCT ISRAELI DOCUMENT, SPECIFICALLY THE PHRASE "NORMAL CIVILIAN ACCESS," SHOULD BE DEFINED AS AN ISRAELI EFFORT TO ACHIEVE THE RELATIONSHIP WHICH EXISTS BETWEEN CANADA AND THE U.S, OR BETWEEN LEBANON AND ITALY. HAVING ESTABLISHED THIS PRINCIPLE, IT WAS NOW NECESSARY TO NEGOTIATE THE DETAILS IN KHALDAH AND KIRYAT SHEMONA. KIMCHE EMPHASIZED THAT THE KEY POINT WAS AN "OPEN BORDER." BAR-ON ADDED THAT UNLESS WRITTEN AGREEMENTS WERE REACHED ON SPECIFICS, DE FACTO UNDER-STANDINGS WOULD BE MEANINGLESS. UNDER CURRENT LEBANESE REGULATIONS, ISRAELI GOODS COULD BE CONFISCATED AND VISAS NOT ISSUED, ETC.

8. HABIB REPLIED THAT WE WERE TRYING TO FIND A FORMULA WHICH WOULD ALLOW THE PROCESS FOR EVOLVING COMMERCIAL AND OTHER RELATIONS TO BEGIN, WHILE ALSO GIVING THE LEBANESE SUFFICIENT COVER TO JUSTIFY THEIR ACTIONS TO THE MODERATE ARABS. ISRAEL WAS, HOWEVER, SAYING THAT LEBANON MUST BE PREPARED TO MAKE A "CLEAN BREAK" WITH THE ARABS AND THE ARAB LEAGUE. SHAMIR INTERRUPTED TO SAY THIS WAS "UNAVOIDABLE." CONTINUING, HABIB SAID IT WOULD THEN BE NECESSARY TO DETERMINE DIRECTLY FROM THE LEB-ANESE WHETHER THEY WERE CAPABLE OF TAKING SUCH A DRA-

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MATIC STEP. THIS WOULD NECESSARILY MEAN, HABIB SAID, THAT HE WOULD HAVE TO MODIFY THE CONCEPT OF OUR FIRST REACHING AN AGREEMENT WITH ISRAEL AND ASSUME INSTEAD A MEDIATING ROLE. HE SAID THAT THE ISSUE OF MUTUAL RELATIONS WAS MORE DANGEROUS THAN THOSE CONCERNING SECURITY RELATIONS SINCE WE WERE TALKING ABOUT THE FUNDAMENTAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ISRAEL AND LEBANON. HABIB SAID HE THOUGHT THE LEBANESE HAD REAL RESTRICTIONS ON HOW FAR THEY COULD GO, BUT THAT HE WOULD HAVE TO EXPLAIN THE REALITIES OF THE ISRAELI POSITION TO PRESIDENT GEMAYEL AND ASCERTAIN HIS PRECISE LIMITS. WE COULD THEN TRY AGAIN TO ACHIEVE U.S.-ISRAEL CONCURRENCE ON A DRAFT AGREEMENT.

9. KIMCHE SAID A "CLEAN BREAK" WAS NECESSARY, ADDING THAT THE LEBANESE HAD EXPLAINED IT WOULD BE EASIER TO EXPLAIN LEBANESE CONCESSIONS TO THE ARABS NOW THAN IN A POST-WITHDRAWAL PERIOD. HABIB REPLIED THIS MIGHT APPEAR TO BE A LOGICAL POSITION, BUT IT DID NOT REFLECT THE POSITION OF THOSE LEBANESE WHO HAD TO DEAL WITH THE ARABS. SHAMIR SAID THE LEBANESE UNDERSTOOD THIS WAS A VERY SERIOUS MATTER FOR ISRAEL. KIMCHE ADDED IT WAS THE "SINE QUO NON." RUBENSTEIN SAID THAT IN PRIVATE TALKS WITH THE LEBANESE DELEGATES AT KHALDAH AND KIRYAT SHEMONA, THIS POINT SEEMED TO BE UNDERSTOOD.

10. KIMCHE DESCRIBED HOW HE THOUGHT THE WORK AT KHALDAH/KIRYAT SHEMONA WOULD PROCEED. HABIB SAID THIS WAS A PRESCRIPTION FOR SIX MONTHS OF NEGOTIATIONS. BOTH KIMCHE AND SHAMIR THOUGHT A REALISTIC ESTIMATE WAS TWO MONTHS.

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11. AFTER EXHAUSTING THIS PART OF THE DISCUSSION, HABIB SUGGESTED THAT WE NOW PUT THE ISSUE OF MUTUAL RELATIONS TO ONE SIDE. WE WOULD TALK TO SHARON ON FRIDAY MORNING (AFTER HIS RETURN FROM ZAIRE) ON SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS TO SEE WHERE THE PROBLEMS WERE, AND THEN PROCEED TO BEIRUT TO TALK WITH GEMAYEL.

12. LEWIS THEN ASKED SHAMIR HOW ISRAELI TOURISTS AND TRADE WOULD DISCOURAGE REINFILTRATION OF THE PLO (AN ARGUMENT MADE REPEATEDLY BY THE ISRAELIS). KIMCHE SAID THAT IT WAS A QUESTION OF GEMAYEL DECIDING WHICH WAY HE WAS GOING. IF HE DECIDED NOW TO BREAK WITH THE ARAB BOYCOTT, IT WAS MORE LIKELY HE WOULD RESIST ARAB PRESSURES TO ALLOW THE PLO CERTAIN LIBERTIES. HABIB SAID ISRAEL UNDERESTIMATED THE CONSENSUS IN

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LEBANON AGAINST A RETURN TO A SITUATION IN WHICH THE PLO THREATENED NOT ONLY ISRAEL, BUT ALSO LEBANON. AND, THE UNITED STATES WOULD STRONGLY SUPPORT REASONABLE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS WHICH WOULD PREVENT THE PLO FROM BECOMING A THREAT.

13.. SHAMIR THEN SHIFTED TO THE ISRAELI CONCEPT OF A SECURITY ZONE, WHICH HE SAID MUST BE "BASED ON DAILY COOPERATION BETWEEN LEBANON AND ISRAEL, ON A VERY CLOSE AND VERY FRIENDLY BASIS." HE SAID THAT EARLY WARNING STATIONS WERE A NATURAL COMPONENT OF THIS. HABIB SAID AGAIN FIRMLY THAT IF ANY IDF PERSONNEL REMAINED IN LEBANON, SYRIA WOULD NOT WITHDRAW.

SHAMIR SAID THAT ISRAEL COULD NOT RELY ON THE LEBANESE ARMY ALONE, OR ON INTERNATIONAL FORCES. HE SAID HE WAS NOT TALKING ABOUT A LARGE IDF PRESENCE, BUT ISRAELI-MANNED STATIONS FOR A LIMITED PERIOD OF TIME, AND A JOINT SUPERVISORY SYSTEM, WHICH MIGHT INCLUDE JOINT ISRAEL/LEBANON PATROLS.

14. HABIB SAID THAT WE WERE SURE THAT SYRIA WOULD NOT WITHDRAW UNDER THESE ADDED ARRANGEMENTS. HABIB ALSO SAID THAT ISRAEL'S DEMANDS, AS THEY HAD BEEN DESCRIBED TO US DURING THE DAY, WENT FAR BEYOND SIMPLE SECURITY NEEDS. HE WARNED SHAMIR THAT A MINIMUM PACKAGE WOULD BE A FORMULA OF WITHDRAWAL FOR SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS. IN THE END, HE STRESSED, ISRAEL MIGHT HAVE TO COME ALL THE WAY BACK TO THIS, WITHOUT ACHIEVING EVEN WHAT WE WERE SUGGESTING WITH RESPECT TO NORMALIZATION. HABIB'S WARNING CAUSED A LONG PAUSE.

15. SHAMIR'S CHEF DE CABINET, YOSHI AHARON, SAID

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THAT THE EXTENT OF NORMALIZATION DEPENDED ON THE US VIEW. HABIB SAID THAT OUR POSITION WAS THAT WE SOUGHT THE BEST POSSIBLE AGREEMENT BETWEEN ISRAEL AND LEBANON, BUT NOT AT THE EXPENSE OF A PROTRACTED NEGOTIATION AND A WEAKENED, PARTITIONED LEBANON. HABIB AGAIN SAID THAT PRESIDENT REAGAN'S POSITION WAS CLEAR: "ALL FOREIGN FORCES SHOULD WITHDRAW FROM LEBANON." LEWIS ADDED THAT THE PRESIDENT'S VIEW WAS ALSO EQUALLY CLEAR ON THE NORMALIZATION ISSUE: "WE WOULD LIKE TO SEE AS MUCH NORMALIZATION AS CAN BE ACCOMMODATED WITHOUT UNDERMINING THE GOVERNMENT OF LEBANON. WE WILL NOT FORCE LEBANON TO ACCEPT A DEGREE OF NORMALIZATION THAT UNDERMINES THE GOVERNMENT" (OR CUTS ITS RELATIONS WITH THE ARAB WORLD). HE SAID THAT ISRAEL SHOULD HAVE NO MISUNDERSTANDING ON THIS POINT.

16. HABIB SAID THAT LEBANON WAS WALKING A FINE LINE. WHILE IT CANNOT CONSTITUTE A THREAT TO ISRAEL, IT ALSO CANNOT EXIST WITHOUT GOOD RELATIONS WITH THE ARAB WORLD. IF THE ARABS BROKE ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH LEBANON, IT WOULD BE CRIPPLED FINANCIALLY. KIMCHE AND SHAMIR RESPONDED THAT THE THREAT OF ARAB ECONOMIC RETALIATION AGAINST LEBANON WAS EXAGGERATED, IN VIEW OF LEBANON'S STRONG BANKING SYSTEM. WHAT THE UNITED STATES NEEDED TO DO WAS TO SECURE SAUDI BACKING FOR LEBANON.

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17. HABIB CONCLUDED BY SAYING THAT THE LEBANESE WERE NOT DREAMING WHEN THEY CONTEMPLATED AN ADVERSE ARAB REACTION. THEY HAD ALREADY RECEIVED EXPLICIT WARNINGS FROM MODERATE COUNTRIES ON WHOM THEY DEPEND, AS THE ISRAELIS MUST BE AWARE. SHAMIR CONCLUDED BY SAYING QUIETLY BUT FIRMLY THAT ISRAEL WANTS TO PROCEED AND WITH THE BEST POSSIBLE INTENTIONS.

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IT WILL NOT MOVE, HOWEVER, IF ITS BASIC POSITIONS ARE NOT MET.

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18. COMMENT: HABIB AND LEWIS ARE HAVING LUNCH WITH SHAMIR TOMORROW, WHILE DRAPER GOES TO THE KIRYAT SHEMONA MEETING. HABIB WILL RE-EMPHASIZE THE IMPORTANCE THAT THE UNITED STATES ATTACHES TO CUTTING THROUGH THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS AND REACHING A REASONABLE AGREEMENT IMMEDIATELY. HABIB, LEWIS AND DRAPER WILL SEE SHARON AND SHAMIR AT 9 A.M. FRIDAY TO REVIEW THE FULL ISRAELI POSITION ON SECURITY MATTERS AND WILL TRY TO PUSH FURTHER FOR A REASONABLE ISRAELI-LEBANESE AGREEMENT ON THE BASIS OF WHAT WE HAVE PROPOSED SO FAR. AT THAT POINT IT WILL PROBABLY BE NECESSARY TO TOUCH BASE WITH PRESIDENT GEMAYEL TO REVIEW THE BIDDING. GROVE

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EX-111
DECAPTIONED

FROM HABIB

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, MILI, IS, LE, US, XF

SUBJECT: HABIB/DRAPER MISSION: ISRAEL-LEBANON NEGOTIA-
-- TIONS -- NEXT MOVES

1. [REDACTED]

2. CURRENT STATE OF OUR EFFORTS IS BEING REPORTED IN
CONTEXT OF TODAY'S MEETINGS WITH FONMIN SHAMIR. LEWIS
AND I WILL MEET WITH SHAMIR THURSDAY WHILE TALKS AT
KIRYAT SHEMONA TAKE PLACE.3. I AM GOING TO NEED A TURN AROUND WITH PRESIDENT
GEMAYEL AND HIS ADVISORS BEFORE MAKING A DEFINITIVE
ESTIMATE OF WHERE WE STAND. HOWEVER, IT IS CLEAR
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

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ENOUGH AT THIS STAGE THAT ISRAELI DEMANDS, ESPECIALLY
ON NORMALIZATION ISSUES BUT ALSO ON SOME SECURITY
ARRANGEMENTS, GO FAR BEYOND WHAT LEBANESE HAVE
ENVISAGED, WHAT PRINCIPAL ARAB NATIONS WILL ACCEPT,
AND WHAT WE BELIEVE ARE BASIC NEEDS TO BRING ABOUT
WITHDRAWAL OF ALL EXTERNAL FORCES FROM LEBANON.4. I THEREFORE PROPOSE TO PROCEED AS FOLLOWS IN
TERMS OF TRAVEL AND DISCUSSIONS OVER THE NEXT WEEK:

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-- FRIDAY, JANUARY 21: WE WILL MEET WITH SHAMIR AND SHARON TO TRY AND ARRIVE AT AT LEAST SOME POINTS OF AGREEMENT ON THE KEY ISSUES. SHARON IS RETURNING FROM ZAIRE ON THURSDAY AND HIS PRESENCE WILL MAKE IT POSSIBLE TO CLARIFY ISRAELI POSITION ON SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS AND WITHDRAWAL. WE WOULD THEN SEEK A MEETING WITH BEGIN TO REVIEW THE STATUS. ACCOMPANIED BY DRAPER I WOULD LEAVE FOR BEIRUT IN THE EARLY EVENING ON FRIDAY. EMBASSY BEIRUT SHOULD SEEK A MEETING WITH GEMAYEL ALONE AT 1730 HOURS TO BE FOLLOWED BY A MEETING WITH HIS PRINCIPAL ADVISORS LATER THAT NIGHT.

-- SATURDAY, JANUARY 22: TO MEET EGYPTIAN REQUEST FOR A BRIEFING ON LEBANESE SITUATION, I AM PREPARED TO GO TO CAIRO EARLY IN THE MORNING. EMBASSY CAIRO SHOULD SEEK MEETING WITH MUBARAK AT OR AROUND 1000 HOURS. FOLLOWING THIS I WOULD LEAVE FOR RIYADH HOPING THAT EMBASSY CAN ARRANGE A MEETING WITH KING FAHD LATE THAT AFTERNOON OR EVENING. MY PURPOSE WOULD BE TO CALM SAUDI OPPOSITION TO THE SORT OF AGREEMENT THAT MAY BE POSSIBLE IN THE HOPE THAT LEBANON WILL THEREBY SECURE MODERATE ARAB BACKING FOR ITS POSITIDN.

-- SUNDAY, JANUARY 23: RETURN TO ISRAEL FOR FURTHER

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DISCUSSIONS AND ATTEMPT AT ACHIEVING AN AGREED DRAFT OF AN ISRAEL-LEBANON AGREEMENT IN AS SPECIFIC TERMS AS POSSIBLE. THESE DISCUSSIONS COULD CONTINUE ON MONDAY, JANUARY 24, AS NECESSARY. IF SUCCESSFUL I WOULD GO TO LEBANON TO PRESENT IT TO GEMAYEL.

5. UNFORTUNATELY, IT IS ONLY BARELY POSSIBLE THAT WE CAN REACH THIS STAGE OF AGREEMENT WITH THE ISRAELIS. IF WE ARE NOT SUCCESSFUL, I WOULD PLAN TO LEAVE FOR WASHINGTON ON TUESDAY, JANUARY 25, TO PARTICIPATE IN MUBARAK VISIT AND USE THE OC-CASION TO REVIEW THOROUGHLY WITH THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY WHERE WE STAND ON LEBANON AND WHAT NEXT STEPS SHOULD BE. I WOULD THEN PLAN TO RETURN TO ISRAEL AND LEBANON OVER THE WEEKEND TO TRY AND RESOLVE THE REMAINING DIFFERENCES IN THE FORM OF A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE AGREEMENT. IT MAY TAKE A FEW DAYS TO FIND OUT IF THIS IS POSSIBLE OR NOT. BUT BY THE END OF THE FIRST WEEK IN FEBRUARY WE SHOULD KNOW WHETHER OUR CURRENT EFFORT TO ESCALATE THE PACE OF A SOLUTION IN LEBANON HAS SUCCEEDED OR WHETHER A DIFFERENT APPROACH MUST BE CONSIDERED.

6. MEANWHILE, NEGOTIATIONS AT KIRYAT SHEMONA AND

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KHALDAH WILL CONTINUE, HOPEFULLY ON ACCELERATED
SCHEDULE, INCLUDING WORKING GROUPS, WITH WHATEVER
CLARIFICATIONS AND AGREEMENTS THAT MAY RESULT.
DRAPER WILL BE PUSHING AHEAD IN THAT FRAMEWORK.
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DECAPTIONED

FROM HABIB

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, MILI, IS, LE, US, XF

SUBJECT: HABIB/DRAPER MISSION: MORNING MEETING WITH
-- FOREIGN MINISTER SHMIR, JANUARY 19

1. [REDACTED]

2. SUMMARY: DURING TWO HOURS OF DISCUSSIONS WEDNESDAY MORNING, WE MADE LITTLE PROGRESS IN BRIDGING THE FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPTUAL GAPS CONTAINED IN OUR RESPECTIVE DRAFTS FOR A LEBANON-ISRAEL AGREEMENT. IN THE ABSENCE OF SHARON, SECURITY ISSUES WERE ONLY TOUCHED UPON. NEVERTHELESS, THERE WAS NO GIVE BY THE ISRAELIS ON THE NECESSITY FOR EARLY WARNING STATIONS; IT ALSO BECAME

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CLEARER THAT THE ISRAELIS HAVE A VERY EXTENSIVE VIEW OF WHAT WILL BE REQUIRED IN THE WAY OF AN ISRAELI-LEBANESE SUPERVISORY SYSTEM FOR THE SOUTHERN ZONE. ON NORMALIZATION, THE ISRAELIS PLACED PARTICULAR EMPHASIS ON THE NEED FOR OPEN BORDERS AND THE TERMINATION OF THE ECONOMIC BOYCOTT. I REPEATEDLY STRESSED THE NEED TO BE PRACTICAL AND TO AVOID QUANTUM JUMPS, WHICH WOULD DESTROY WHAT WE WERE MUTUALLY TRYING TO ACHIEVE. WE AGREED THAT A SUBGROUP WOULD TRY TO DRAFT

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LANGUAGE ON MUTUAL RELATIONS THIS AFTERNOON. WE WILL THEN MEET AGAIN AT 1700 HOURS LOCAL WITH THE FOREIGN MINISTER. END SUMMARY.

3. I MET FOR MORE THAN TWO HOURS WEDNESORNING, JANUARY 19, WITH FOREIGN MINISTER SHAMIR AND HIS TEAM. I WAS ACCOMPANIED BY AMBASSADORS DRAPER AND LEWIS, KRECZKO AND HARE.

4. SHAMIR SET THE TONE FOR THE MORNING SESSION BY OFFERING SOME "PERSONAL COMMENTS" ON THE PAPER WE SUBMITTED TO THE ISRAELIS YESTERDAY AFTERNOON (JANUARY 18). HE SAID THAT ANY EVENTUAL AGREEMENT MUST BE BASED ON THE PREMISE AND CONVICTION THAT IT WILL ESTABLISH A NEW RELATIONSHIP WITH LEBANON AND THAT THE PLO WILL NEVER BE ABLE TO COME BACK TO LEBANON. HE DID NOT FIND ANYTHING IN OUR PAPER WHICH WOULD GIVE ISRAEL THIS ASSURANCE. ON SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS, HE ARGUED THAT SATISFACTORY ASSURANCES COULD NOT BE OBTAINED WITHOUT EARLY WARNING STATIONS OR A JOINT ISRAEL/LEBNON SUPERVISORY SYSTEM IN THE SECURITY ZONE. UNIFIL WOULD NOT BE USEFUL. ON BILATERAL RELATIONS, HE SAID OUR PROPOSALS WERE DEVOID OF MEANING IN THE ABSENCE OF SPECIFIC REFERENCE TO THE NORMAL MOVEMENT OF PEOPLE AND GOODS ACROSS OPEN BORDERS.

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ISRAEL, HE SAID, CANNOT ACCEPT THE CONCEPT THAT THE AGREEMENT AND LEBANON WOULD BE THE "SLAVE TO ARAB PRESSURE." IF THAT CONCEPT WERE TO TAKE HOLD, LEBANON WOULD RETURN TO THE SITUATION WHICH PREVAILED PRIOR TO JUNE, BECOMING AGAIN A VICTIM OF SYRIAN AND PLO OCCUPATION.

5. I REPLIED THAT WE SHARED THE BASIC OBJECTIVE OF NOT ALLOWING THE SITUATION IN LEBANON TO RETURN TO THE STATUS QUO ANTE. THIS WOULD NOT BE PERMITTED. HOWEVER, I HAD DIFFICULTIES IN ACCEPTING THE ISRAELI PROPOSITION TO LEAP FROM THE PRESENT SITUATION TO THE IDEAL IN ONE STEP. REFERRING BACK TO THE OCTOBER 11 ISRAELI PAPER, I EXPLAINED THAT I DID NOT SEE MUCH DIFFERENCE BETWEEN ITS PROVISIONS ON SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS AND THOSE CONTAINED IN OUR DRAFT. THE AGREEMENT WOULD LEAD TO THE WITHDRAWAL OF SYRIAN AND PLO COMBATANTS, WHICH WOULD MATERIALLY REDUCE THE THREAT TO LEBANON AND ISRAEL. IN THE INTERIM PERITER WITHDRAWAL, WE RECOGNIZED THE LIMITATIONS OF THE LEBANESE ARMED FORCES, WHICH IS WHY WE FELT IT WAS USEFUL TO RETAIN THE CONCEPT OF HAVING UNIFIL PLAY ROLE FOR A TEMPORARY PERIOD. I HOPED ISRAEL WOULD NOT AUTOMATICALLY REJECT UNIFIL, ANY MORE THAN I HAD REJECTED EARLY WARNING STATIONS. IN THIS CONTEXT, I FLOATED THE IDEA OF HAVING LEBANESE MAN THESE STATIONS. (IN

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THE ABSENCE OF SHARON, THERE WAS NO IRSRAELI RESPONSE.)
6. BEYOND THE SECURITY ARRANGMEENTS, I WAS EVEN MORE
CONCERNED ABOUT MAKING A QUANTUM LEAP IN NORMALIZATION.
I DESCRIBED THE ISRAELI DRAFT AS A COMBINATION OF A
"PEACE TREATY AND A TREATY OF FRIENDSHIP, COMMERCE,
AND NAVIGATION." I ADVISED THE ISRAELIS TO PUT THEIR
PAPER ON THE SHELF AND HOLD IT FOR LATER DISCUSSIONS,

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ARGUING THAT WHAT WAS REQUIRED NOW WAS TO SET THE
FOUNDATION TO ENSURE THERE WILL BE NO CLOSED BORDERS.
I REPEATEDLY STRESSED THE NEED TO BE PRACTICAL AND TO
AVOID CREATING A SITUATION WHICH WOULD LEAD TO
VIRTUALLY CERTAIN LEBANESE AND ARAB REJECTION, THEREBY
DESTROYING WHAT WE WERE TRYING TO ACHIEVE. AS A

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CONCRETE SUGGESTION, I THOUGHT WE OUGHT TO CONCENTRATE ON THE BASIC PRINCIPLES OF NORMALIZATION WHICH HAD BEEN INCORPORATED IN OUR PAPER, BASED LARGELY ON ISRAEL'S OCTOBER 11 PAPER.

7. YEHUDA BEN MEIR REINFORCED SHAMIR'S OPENING COMMENTS, WHICH HE THOUGHT ACCURATELY REFLECTED ATTITUDES IN THE CABINET AND THE PUBLIC AT LARGE. HE SPECIFICALLY SAID OUR DRAFT WAS DEFICIENT IN FOUR IMPORTANT ASPECTS: 1) NO EARLY WARNING STATIONS; 2) ALLOWING INTERNATIONAL FORCES,

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ESPECIALLY UNIFIL, IN THE SOUTHERN SECURITY ZONE; 3) NO TERMINATION OF THE ECONOMIC BOYCOTT, SAYING NOTHING WOULD HAPPEN IN NORMALIZATION UNLESS IT WAS TERMINATED; AND 4) NOT SPECIFICALLY PROVIDING FOR THE PRIOR WITHDRAWAL OF THE PLO.

8. KIMCHE OBSERVED THAT WITH ALL DUE RESPECT TO OUR PARALLEL EFFORT, ISRAEL HAD RECEIVED THE DEFINITE IMPRESSION FROM BOTH THE MUSLIM AND CHRISTIAN DELEGATES TO KHALDAH/KIRYAT SHEMONA TALKS THAT THE SUBSTANCE OF NORMALIN COULD BE ADDRESSED. ASIDE FROM LIAISON OFFICES, HE THOUGHT THE HEART OF NORMALIZATION WAS THE FREE MOVEMENT OF GOODS AND PERSONS ACROSS THE BORDER. HE THOUGHT THIS OBJECTIVE COULD BE ACHIEVED THROUGH DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS, SAYING THIS WAS AN HISTORIC OPPORTUNITY WHICH SHOULD NOT BE MISSED. HE ALSO ARGUED THAT TO THE EXTENT ARAB PRESSURE WERE AN OBSTACLE, THE UNITED STATES SHOULD DO ITS UTMOST TO REMOVE THAT OBSTACLE.

9. I REPLIED THAT WE WERE TALKING ABOUT A MATTER OF DEGREE. ONE HAD TO RECOGNIZE THAT THE LEBANESE FACE A REAL THREAT OF ARAB REJECTION AND WERE WALKING A FINE LINE. IT WAS NOT IN OUR MUTUAL INTEREST TO PUSH THEM TOO FAR. IT WAS ESPECIALLY IMPORTANT THAT LEBANON RECEIVE SUPPORT FROM THE MODERATE ARABS, ESPECIALLY SAUDI ARABIA, JORDAN, AND OTHERS. WE COULD ANTICIPATE THAT THE SYRIANS WOULD ALWAYS BE OPPOSED TO WHAT WAS AGREED. THE TRICK WAS TO ARRIVE AT A SITUATION WHERE SUFFICIENT PRESSURE WERE PLACED ON THE SYRIANS SO THAT THEY HAD NO ALTERNATIVE TO WITHDRAWAL. I STRESSED THAT WE WERE PREPARED TO PLAY AN ACTIVE ROLE WITH THE ARABS, BUT THERE WERE OBVIOUS LIMITS TO WHAT COULD BE

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ACCOMPLISHED.

10. BAR-ON ARGUED THAT UNLESS SPECIFIC WRITTEN AGREEMENT WERE REACHED, ISRAEL WAS BASICALLY AFRAID THAT LEBANON, BEING WEAK, WOULD INEVITABLY BOW TO ARAB PRESSURE AND THE RELATIONSHIP WOULD BE WHITTLED AWAY. DE FACTO AGREEMENTS AND UNDERSTANDINGS, UPON WHICH WE WERE RELYING, WOULD BE INADEQUATE. LEWIS ARGUED THAT IN THE LEBANESE CASE, AS OPPOSED TO THE EGYPTIN EXAMPLE, LEBANON HAD A REAL ECONOMIC INTEREST IN BUILDING A BROADER RELATIONSHIP IN THE POST-WITHDRAWAL PERIOD. AS THE ISRAELIS NOW WERE SEEING, FORMAL WRITTEN UNDERTAKINGS (WITH EGYPT) DID NOT ASSURE THAT TRADE WOULD OCCUR, WHERE THE UNDERLYING ECONOMIC INTEREST WAS WEAK. THIS FACTOR SHOULD BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN DETERMINING WHAT WACTICALLY REQUIRED TO BE PUT IN WRITING AT THIS POINT.

11. AFTER MORE THAN TWO HOURS OF DISCUSSIONS, I SAID THAT I DID NOT WANT TO WAIT AND SEE WHAT THE KHALDAH/KIRYAT SHEMONA TALKS WOULD BRING, THOUGH I SAW VALUE IN THAT PROCESS. I SUGGESTED THAT DRAPER AND KRECZKO MEET WITH THEIR ISRAELI COUNTERPARTS TO DRAFT LANGUAGE WHICH COULD BE INCORPORATED UNDER THE FRAMEWORK FOR MUTUAL RELATIONS RUBRIC IN THE AGREEMENT THIS AFTERNOON. SHAMIR AGREED TO THIS SUGGESTION. WE WILL THEN RECONVENE OUR MEETING AT 1700 HOURS LOCAL TODAY. IT IS UNDERSTOOD THAT A FULL DISCUSSION OF THE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS WILL HAVE TO AWAIT FRIDAY MORNING, WHEN SHARON WILL HAVE RETURNED TO ISRAEL AND CAN JOIN THE TALKS.

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FROM HABIB

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, MILI, IS, LE, US, XF

SUBJECT: HABIB/DRAPER MISSION: ISRAELI DRAFT AGREEMENT

1. [REDACTED]
2. WE HAVE JUST RECEIVED A COPY OF THE ISRAELI DRAFT AGREEMENT WITH LEBANON. IT IS COMPLETELY UNWORKABLE. IT IS A PEACE TREATY IN EVERYTHING BUT NAME, AND EVEN GOES BEYOND THE EGYPT/ISRAEL PEACE TREATY IN DETAILING NORMALIZATION. IN ADDITION, IT HAS MANY CHARACTERISTICS OF A TREATY OF FRIENDSHIP, COMMERCE AND NAVIGATION. IT WOULD BE REJECTED IN LEBANON AND THE MOST MODERATE ARAB STATES.
3. ASIDE FROM GOING MILES BEYOND THE STATED ISRAELI AIMS FOR THE JUNE INVASION OF LEBANON, IT ALSO IS MORE AMBITIOUS THAN THE SECRET "WORKING PAPER" AND THE ISRAELI OCTOBER 11 PROPOSAL.

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4. I INTEND TO BE QUITE BLUNT WITH THE ISRAELIS TOMORROW. I WILL TELL THEM THAT THEIR DRAFT IS UNSUITABLE AS A BASIS FOR DISCUSSION. INSTEAD, I WILL PROPOSE THAT WE USE OUR DRAFT WHICH WAS READ TO THEM ON JAN. 18 AS A WORKING TEXT. (FORWARDED SEPTTEL.)

5. NOTE THAT ISRAELI DRAFT IS INCOMPLETE. BECAUSE OF SHARON'S ABSENCE, SHAMIR WAS UNWILLING TO PROVIDE US

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WITH ANNEX I, WHICH DEALS WITH SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS AND WITHDRAWAL. WE DREAD TO CONTEMPLATE ITS CONTENTS. AGREEMENT BETWEEN ISRAEL AND LEBANON

THE GOVERNMENT OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL AND THE GOVERNMENT OF LEBANON:

WITH A VIEW TO CONSOLIDATING PEACEFUL RELATIONS BETWEEN ISRAEL AND LEBANON AND BETWEEN THEIR PEOPLES;

HAVING AGREED TO RECOGNIZE EACH OTHER'S SOVEREIGNTY AND INDEPENDENCE WITHIN SECURE AND RECOGNIZED BOUNDARIES;

DESIRING TO ATTAIN NORMAL GOOD-NEIGHBORLY RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES AND THEIR PEOPLES;

DESIRING TO ACHIEVE LASTING SECURITY FOR BOTH COUNTRIES AND THEIR PEOPLES AND TO AVOID THREATS, HOSTILITY AND SUFFERING BETWEEN THEM AND THEIR PEOPLES;

AGREE IN THE FREE EXERCISE OF THEIR SOVEREIGNTY,

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TO THE FOLLOWING:

I.

1. THE PARTIES CONFIRM THAT THE STATE OF WAR BETWEEN ISRAEL AND LEBANON HAS BEEN TERMINATED. NO STATE OF WAR EXISTS BETWEEN ISRAEL AND LEBANON.

2. THE PARTIES AFFIRM THEIR MUTUAL RECOGNITION OF EACH OTHER AND CONSIDER THE BOUNDARY BETWEEN THEM INVIOABLE.

3. THE PARTIES AGREE TO CONSOLIDATE BETWEEN THEM AND THEIR PEOPLES NORMAL GOOD-NEIGHBORLY RELATIONS AND MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING.

4. THE PARTIES AFFIRM THAT IN THEIR MUTUAL RELATIONS THEY WILL BE GUIDED BY THE PRINCIPLES OF THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER AND THE PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW GOVERNING PEACEFUL RELATIONS AMONG STATES, IN PARTICULAR:

-- A) THEY RECOGNIZE AND WILL RESPECT EACH OTHER'S SOVEREIGNTY, TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY AND POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE;

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-- B) THEY RECOGNIZE AND WILL RESPECT EACH OTHER'S
RIGHT TO LIVE IN PEACE WITHIN SECURE AND RECOGNIZED
BOUNDARIES;

-- C) THEY WILL REFRAIN FROM THREAT AND AVOID THE
USE OF FORCE, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, AGAINST

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EACH OTHER AND WILL SETTLE ALL DISPUTES BETWEEN
THEM BY PEACEFUL MEANS.

5. THE PARTIES AFFIRM THAT EACH OF THEM HAS THE
INHERENT RIGHT OF SELF-DEFENSE.

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II.

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1. SUBJECT TO THE PROVISIONS OF PARAGRAPH III AND

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ANNEX I, EACH PARTY WILL PREVENT ENTRY INTO, DEPLOYMENT IN OR PASSAGE THROUGH ITS TERRITORY BY FOREIGN MILITARY FORCES FROM ANY STATE WHICH DOES NOT MAINTAIN DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH BOTH PARTIES, OR FROM A STATE PARTY TO A REGIONAL MILITARY PACT OTHER MEMBERS OF WHICH DO NOT MAINTAIN DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH BOTH PARTIES.

2. THE TERRITORY OF EACH PARTY WILL NEVER BE USED AS A BASE FOR HOSTILE AND TERRORIST

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ACTIVITY AGAINST THE OTHER PARTY ITS TERRITORY AND PEOPLE ANYWHERE. TO THIS END THE PARTIES RECIPROCALLY UNDERTAKE TO PROHIBIT AND TO PREVENT THE EXISTENCE, ORGANIZATION, SETTING UP OR FUNCTIONING WITHIN THEIR RESPECTIVE TERRITORY, OF ANY GROUP, ORGANIZATION, ARMED BANDS, MERCENARIES OR INDIVIDUALS, OR OF ANY RELATED BASE, OFFICE OR INFRASTRUCTURE, AIMED AT THREATENING OR ENDANGERING THE SECURITY OF THE OTHER PARTY OR THE WELFARE AND SAFETY OF ITS POPULATION. TO THIS END, ALL AGREEMENTS, ACCORDS AND ARRANGEMENTS ENABLING THE PRESENCE AND FUNCTIONING ON THEIR RESPECTIVE TERRITORIES OF SUCH ELEMENTS HOSTILE TO THE OTHER PARTY ARE NULL AND VOID.

3. EACH PARTY UNDERTAKES TO REFRAIN FROM INSTIGATING, PLANNING, ORGANIZING OR PARTICIPATING IN THREATS OR ACTS OF BELLIGERENCY, TERRORISM, SUBVERSION OR INCITEMENT, HOSTILITY AND VIOLENCE, AGAINST THE PEOPLE AND PROPERTY OF THE OTHER PARTY, AND TO ENSURE THAT SUCH THREATS AND ACTS DO NOT ORIGINATE FROM AND ARE NOT INSTIGATED, PLANNED OR ORGANIZED IN ITS TERRITORY.

4. EACH PARTY UNDERTAKES TO ENSURE THAT PREVENTATIVE ACTION AND DUE PROCEEDINGS WILL BE TAKEN AGAINST PERSONS OR ORGANIZATIONS PERPETRATING ACTS IN VIOLATION OF THIS PARAGRAPH.

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III.

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1. IN ORDER TO PROVIDE MAXIMUM SECURITY TO BOTH PARTIES, AGREED SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS, AS FORMULATED IN ANNEX I ATTACHED HERETO, WILL BE ESTABLISHED AND EFFECTED, AS APPROPRIATE, UPON ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THIS AGREEMENT.

2. THE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS DETAILED IN ANNEX I INCLUDE:

- (A) GENERAL SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS;
- (B) SPECIFIC SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS TO BE EFFECTED IN A SECURITY REGION DESCRIBED IN THAT ANNEX (HEREINAFTER - THE SECURITY REGION).

IN THE SECURITY REGION THERE WILL BE ONLY LEBANESE ARMED FORCES AND LEBANESE POLICE.

3. A JOINT LEBANESE-ISRAELI SUPERVISORY SYSTEM WILL BE ESTABLISHED FOR THE SUPERVISION OF THE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS.

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IV.

1. UPON ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THIS AGREEMENT, THE BOUNDARY BETWEEN ISRAEL AND LEBANON WILL BE OPEN TO THE FREE MOVEMENT OF PEOPLE, GOODS, PRODUCTS AND SERVICES BY LAND, SEA AND AIR, THEREBY MAXIMIZING THE BENEFITS OF THE GEOGRAPHIC CONTINGUITY BETWEEN THE TWO STATES.

2A. UPON ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THIS AGREEMENT, THE NORMAL GOOD-NEIGHBORLY RELATIONSHIP CON-

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SOLIDATED BETWEEN THE PARTIES WILL INCLUDE INTER ALIA COMMERCIAL, TRANSPORT, TELECOMMUNICATIONS, TOURISTIC, AVIATION, AND OTHER RELATIONS, AND THE TERMINATION OF ALL ECONOMIC BOYCOTTS AND DISCRIMINATORY BARRIERS TO THE FREE MOVEMENT OF PEOPLE, GOODS, PRODUCTS AND SERVICES.

2B. DETAILS AS TO THE PRACTICAL IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS PARAGRAPH BY THE PARTIES IN THEIR MUTUAL RELATIONS ARE FORMULATED IN ANNEX II ATTACHED TO THIS AGREEMENT.

3. UPON ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THIS AGREEMENT, BOTH PARTIES SHALL ACCORD TO EACH OTHER MOST FAVORED NATION TREATMENT WITH THE EXCEPTION OF ANY PREFERENCES AND ADVANTAGES WHICH RESULT FROM ANY CUSTOM UNION OR FREE TRADE AREA TO WHICH EITHER OF THE PARTIES IS OR MAY BECOME A PARTY.

4. UPON ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THIS AGREEMENT, THE PARTIES UNDERTAKE TO APPLY IN THEIR MUTUAL RELATIONS

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ALL MULTILATERAL CONVENTIONS TO WHICH THEY ARE BOTH PARTIES AND WHERE NECESSARY, TO TRANSMIT AN APPROPRIATE NOTIFICATION TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND OTHER DEPOSITARIES OF SUCH CONVENTIONS. IN THIS CONTEXT, THE PARTIES RECOGNIZE AS APPLICABLE TO EACH OTHER INTER ALIA THE AVIATION AGREEMENTS TO WHICH THEY ARE BOTH PARTIES, PARTICULARLY THE CONVENTION ON INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION 1944 AND THE INTERNATIONAL AIR SERVICES TRANSIT AGREEMENT 1944.

5. THE PARTIES WILL FOSTER MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THEIR RESPECTIVE PEOPLES THROUGH, INTER ALIA, ABSTENTION FROM HOSTILE PROPAGANDA AND IN-

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CITEMENT AGAINST EACH OTHER AND THE CANCELLATION OF LAWS AND REGULATIONS INCOMPATIBLE WITH THE SPIRIT OF THIS AGREEMENT.

6. THE PARTIES AGREE TO COOPERATE WITH EACH OTHER FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE REGION AS A WHOLE, THE RAISING OF STANDARDS OF LIVING, THE ERADICATION OF DISEASE, THE PREVENTION OF POLLUTION, THE FURTHERING OF EDUCATION, CULTURE AND RELIGIOUS TOLERANCE AND THE GENERAL PROSPERITY OF THE REGION.

--

V.

1. PENDING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN THEM, THE PARTIES WILL RESPECTIVELY MAINTAIN A LIAISON REPRESENTATION IN EACH OTHER'S TERRITORY TO ASSIST IN THE DEVELOPMENT AND

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FACILITATION OF THEIR MUTUAL RELATIONS. THE STAFF OF THE REPRESENTATION WILL BE ACCORDED PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES EQUIVALENT TO THOSE GRANTED TO DIPLOMATS.

2. A JOINT COMMITTEE WILL BE ESTABLISHED AND WILL MEET REGULARLY IN ISRAEL AND LEBANON RESPECTIVELY IN ORDER TO SUPERVISE THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS AGREEMENT, TO MAINTAIN CONTINUOUS CONTACTS AND DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES, AND TO DEAL WITH ALL POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC PROBLEMS ARISING BETWEEN THEM. THE COMMITTEE WILL ALSO COORDINATE CONTACTS BETWEEN ISRAEL AND LEBANON IN THE VARIOUS BILATERAL SPHERES DETAILED IN PARAGRAPH IV OF THIS AGREEMENT AND IN ANNEX II.

--

VI.

1. THE PARTIES UNDERTAKE TO FULFILL IN GOOD FAITH THEIR OBLIGATIONS UNDER THIS AGREEMENT.

2. THE PARTIES UNDERTAKE NOT TO ENTER INTO ANY OBLIGATION IN CONFLICT WITH THIS AGREEMENT AND TO ABROGATE, AS APPROPRIATE, ANY SUCH EXISTING OBLIGATION.

3. SUBJECT TO ARTICLE 103 OF THE UNITED NATIONS

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CHANNEL: n/a

CHARTER, IN THE EVENT OF A CONFLICT BETWEEN THE
OBLIGATIONS OF THE PARTIES UNDER THIS AGREEMENT
AND ANY OF THEIR OTHER OBLIGATIONS, THE OBLIGATIONS
UNDER THIS AGREEMENT WILL PREVAIL.

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VII.

DISPUTES ARISING OUT OF THE APPLICATION OR
INTERPRETATION OF THIS AGREEMENT SHALL BE RESOLVED
BY NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE PARTIES.

VIII.

1. THIS AGREEMENT SUPERSEDES ALL PREVIOUS AGREEMENTS
BETWEEN ISRAEL AND LEBANON.

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2. THIS AGREEMENT WILL BE PRESENTED FOR RATIFICATION TO THE RESPECTIVE GOVERNMENTS, AND THE INSTRUMENTS OF RATIFICATION WILL BE EXCHANGED BY THE PARTIES WITHIN TEN DAYS OF ITS SIGNING, AND IT WILL ENTER INTO FORCE UPON EXCHANGE OF INSTRUMENTS OF RATIFICATION BY BOTH GOVERNMENTS.

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3. ALL ANNEXES ATTACHED TO THIS AGREEMENT SHALL BE REGARDED AS AN INTEGRAL PART HEREOF.

4. THIS AGREEMENT SHALL BE COMMUNICATED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS FOR REGISTRATION IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE 102 OF THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS.

DONE AT (BLANK) THIS (BLANK) IN TRIPLICATE IN HEBREW, ARABIC, AND ENGLISH, EACH TEXT BEING EQUALLY AUTHENTIC. IN CASE OF DIVERGENCE OF INTERPRETATION THE ENGLISH TEXT SHALL PREVAIL.

(SIGNED) (SIGNED)
FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF LEB.

ANNEX II

FRAMEWORK FOR MUTUAL RELATIONS

FURTHER TO THE PROVISIONS OF PARAGRAPH IV OF THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN ISRAEL AND LEBANON (HEREINAFTER THE AGREEMENT):

DESIRING TO BENEFIT FROM THE GEOGRAPHIC CONTIGUITY BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES;

WITH A VIEW TO ENABLING THE PRACTICAL IMPLEMENTATION IN THE RELEVANT SPHERES, OF MUTUAL RELATIONS, IMMEDI-

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ATELY UPON THE ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THE AGREEMENT;

THE PARTIES AGREE AS FOLLOWS:

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1. MOVEMENT OF GOODS, PRODUCTS AND PERSONS

-- UPON THE ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THE AGREEMENT, AND FURTHER TO PARAGRAPH IV THEREOF, PERSONS, VEHICLES, GOODS AND PRODUCTS WILL BE PERMITTED RECIPROCALLY TO MOVE FREELY BETWEEN AND WITHIN THE RESPECTIVE TERRITORIES OF LEBANON AND ISRAEL FOR PURPOSES OF, INTER ALIA, TRADE AND TOURISM, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE FOLLOWING PROVISIONS:

-- A. MOVEMENT OF PERSONS

---- I. MOVEMENT OF PERSONS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES WILL BE VIA INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARY TRANSIT TERMINALS.

----II. ARRANGEMENT WILL BE AGREED UPON BY THE AUTHORITIES OF BOTH PARTIES FOR THE POSSIBLE RECIPROCAL WAIVER OF VISA REQUIREMENTS FOR PERSONS HOLDING NATIONAL PASSPORTS, FOR PERIODS OF UP TO ONE MONTH, WITH THE POSSIBILITY OF EXTENSION AFTER DUE APPLICATION TO THE RELEVANT GOVERNMENT AUTHORITIES.

----III. NEITHER PARTY WILL IMPOSE DISCRIMINATORY OR OTHER RESTRICTIONS OF ANY KIND ON THE MOVEMENT OF PERSONS ACROSS THE BOUNDARY.

----IV. THE PARTIES WILL RECIPROCALLY ISSUE MULTIPLE ENTRY VISAS VALID FOR PERIODS OF NO LESS THAN ONE YEAR FOR SPECIFIC CATEGORIES OF PERSONS,

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AS WILL BE DETERMINED BY THEM.

---- V. THE POLICE AND CUSTOMS AUTHORITIES OF THE PARTIES WILL COOPERATE IN ORDER TO SUPERVISE BOUNDARY TRANSIT WITH A VIEW TO PREVENTING SMUGGLING OF NARCOTICS AND OTHER ITEMS.

-- B. MOVEMENT OF GOODS AND PRODUCTS

---- I. THE PARTIES WILL RECIPROCALLY FACILITATE THE FREE MOVEMENT OF ALL COMMERCIAL, INDUSTRIAL, AGRICULTURAL AND OTHER GOODS AND PRODUCTS AS WELL AS RELATED UTILITIES AND SERVICES, ACROSS THE BOUNDARY BETWEEN THEM.

---- II. IN THE MOVEMENT OF GOODS AND SERVICES, THE PARTIES WILL MUTUALLY APPLY MDST FAVORED NATION TREATMENT AS FORMULATED IN PARAGRAPH IV(3) OF THE AGREEMENT.

----III. THE PARTIES WILL APPLY ALL RELEVANT INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS TO WHICH THEY ARE PARTIES, CONCERNING THE MOVEMENT OF GOODS AND PRODUCTS.

----IV. THE PARTIES WILL APPLY BETWEEN THEM ALL THE NECESSARY FACILITIES AND ARRANGEMENTS CONNECTED WITH AND INVOLVED IN THE MOVEMENT OF GOODS AND

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PPRODUCTS, INCLUDING, INTER ALIA:

----- PROVISION OF RELEVANT INFORMATION, LAWS AND REGULATIONS;

----- BANKING FACILITIES AND CONTACTS;

----- CONTACT BETWEEN TRADING AND COMMERCIAL INSTITUTIONS;

----- ANTI-DUMPING ARRANGEMENTS;

----- PARTICIPATION IN TRADE FAIRS AND EXHIBITIONS;

----- PARTICIPATION IN TENDERS;

----- FACILITIES FOR TRADE ADVERTISING;

----- FACILITIES FOR CURRENCY CONVERSION.

----V. THE POLICE AND CUSTOMS AUTHORITIES OF THE PARTIES WILL COOPERATE IN TRANSIT FORMALITIES AND IN ANTI-SMUGGLING ACTIVITIES.

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-----IV. THE PARTIES WILL MUTUALLY COOPERATE IN THE USE OF BONDED WAREHOUSING AND IN FACILITATING TRANSIT OF GOODS AND PRODUCTS.

-----VII. THE PARTIES WILL MUTUALLY COMPLY WITH QUARANTINE, PHYTOSANITARY, VETERINARY AND HEALTH REGULATIONS, WITH RESPECT TO THE MOVEMENT OF AGRICULTURAL OR BIOLOGICAL GOODS AND PRODUCTS.

-----VIII. REPRESENTATIVES OF THE PARTIES WILL MAINTAIN PERIODIC CONTACTS IN ORDER TO ENSURE THE SMOOTH FLOW OF TRADE, AND TO DEAL WITH ANY PROBLEM WHICH MAY ARISE.

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2. LAND TRANSPORTATION

A) THE INTERNATIONAL BONDARY TRANSIT TERMINALS WILL BE LOCATED AT (BLANK).

B) THE PARTIES WILL ENSURE DUE PROVISION AND MAINTENANCE OF TRANSPORT FACILITIES AND SERVICES INCLUDING ROADS, RAILWAYS, AUTOBUS AND OTHER PUBLIC TRANSPORT SERVICES.

C) EACH PARTY WILL ENABLE THE FREE MOVEMENT OF VEHICLES INTO AND WITHIN ITS TERRITORY WITHOUT IMPOSITION OF DISCRIMINATORY RESTRICIIONS.

D) THE PROVISIONS OF THIS ANNEX WILL APPLY TO PUBLIC, PRIVATE AND COMMERCIAL VEHICLES, INCLUDING TAXIS, BUSES, RENTED VEHICLES AND TOURISM VEHICLES.

E) THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE PARTIES WILL MEET IN ORDER TO FORMULATE PROVISIONS REGARDING MUTUAL RECOGNITION OF VEHICLE LICENSES AND INSURANCE.

G) A REGULAR PUBLIC TRANSPORT SERVICE WILL BE INSTITUTED BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES.

3. MARITIME TRANSPORTATION

UPON ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THE AGREEMENT EACH PARTY SHALL GRANT AND AFFORD TO VESSELS, CARGOES AND PASSENGERS OF THE OTHER, AS WELL AS TO VESSELS AND

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CARGOES DESTINED FOR OR COMING FROM THE OTHER, WITHIN ITS PORTS AND TERRITORIAL WATERS, THE SAME FACILITIES AND CONDITIONS WHICH ARE GENERALLY APPLICABLE TO VESSELS, PASSENGERS AND CARGO OF OTHER NATIONS, IN ACCORDANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL LAW AND COMITY OF NATIONS.

THE SAID FACILITIES AND CONDITIONS INCLUDE, INTER ALIA, FREE ACCESS TO PORTS AND THE USE OF PORT FACILITIES FOR ENTRY AND DEPARTURE OF VESSELS, FOR LOADING AND UNLOADING OF CARGOES AND FOR EMBARKATION AND LANDING OF PASSENGERS AND OF CREWS.

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4. AIR TRANSPORTATION

A) AS FORMULATED IN PARAGRAPH IV OF THE AGREEMENT, THE PARTIES RECOGNIZE AS APPLICABLE TO EACH OTHER THE RIGHTS, PRIVILEGES AND OBLIGATIONS PROVIDED FOR BY

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THE AVIATION AGREEMENTS TO WHICH THEY ARE BOTH

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PARTY, PARTICULARLY BY THE CONVENTION ON INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION 1944 ("THE CHICAGO CONVENTION") AND THE INTERNATIONAL AIR SERVICES TRANSIT AGREEMENT 1944.

ANY DECLARATIONS OF NATIONAL EMERGENCY BY A PARTY UNDER ARTICLE 89 OF THE CHICAGO CONVENTION WILL NOT BE APPLIED TO THE OTHER PARTY ON A DISCRIMINATORY BASIS.

B) UPON ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THE AGREEMENT, EACH PARTY WILL RECIPROCALLY GRANT TO THE DESIGNATED AIRLINES OF THE OTHER RIGHTS TO FLY OVER ITS TERRITORY, TO LAND IN ITS TERRITORY FOR NON-TRAFFIC PURPOSES AND TO LAND THEREIN IN ORDER TO TAKE ON OR TO DISCHARGE PASSENGERS, MAIL AND CARGO ON A COMMERCIAL BASIS, AND OTHER RIGHTS, AS WILL BE MUTUALLY DETERMINED BY REPRESENTATIVES OF THE CIVIL AVIATION AUTHORITIES OF THE PARTIES.

C) REPRESENTATIVES OF THE PARTIES AND OF THEIR CIVIL AVIATION AUTHORITIES WILL MEET WITHIN (BLANK) MONTHS OF THE ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THE AGREEMENT IN ORDER TO REVIEW THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ABOVE PROVISIONS AND TO COMMENCE NEGOTIATIONS WITH A VIEW TO CONCLUDING AN AIR TRANSPORT AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES, WHICH WILL INCLUDE, INTER ALIA, THE PROVISIONS FORMULATED ABOVE.

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5. POSTAL AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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A) UPON ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THE AGREEMENT NORMAL AND DIRECT POSTAL, TELEPHONE, TELEX, DATA FACSIMILE, WIRELESS AND CABLE COMMUNICATIONS AND TELEVISION RELAY SERVICES BY CABLE, RADIO LAND SATELLITE SHALL BE ESTABLISHED BETWEEN THE TWO PARTIES IN ACCORDANCE WITH ALL RELEVANT INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS AND REGULATIONS.

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B) THE PARTIES WILL ACTIVATE BETWEEN THEM REDUCED
RATES FOR LOCAL BORDER TRAFFIC.

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6. OTHER SPHERES OF MUTUAL RELATIONS

WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO THE PROVISIONS OF THIS ANNEX,
THE PARTIES MAY ENTER INTO NEGOTIATIONS WITH A VIEW
TO CONCLUDING SPECIFIC AGREEMENTS ON MATTERS RELATED
TO THE SUBJECTS DEALT WITH IN THIS ANNEX, AS WELL
AS OTHER MATTERS WHICH MAY ENHANCE THE RELATIONS
BETWEEN THE PARTIES.

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7. CONTACTS

APPROPRIATE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE PARTIES WILL
MAINTAIN CONTACTS, WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE
JOINT COMMITTEE SET UP IN ACCORDANCE WITH PARAGRAPH V
OF THE AGREEMENT, IN ORDER TO ENSURE THE PROPER

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IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RESPECTIVE PROVISIONS OF THIS
ANNEX.

END TEXTS.

6. NOTE: IN THE ISRAELI DRAFT OF ANNEX II,
PART TWO (LAND TRANSPORTATION) SKIPS FROM
E TO G. GROVE

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*** Current Handling Restrictions *** EXDIS
*** Current Classification ***

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

☒ RELEASE☐ EXCISE☐ DENY☒ DECLASSIFY☐ DECLASSIFY

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EO Citations

Date: 11/1/97

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DECAPTIONED

FROM HABIB

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, MILI, IS, LE, US, XF

SUBJ: HABIB/DRAPER MISSION: TEXT OF U.S. PRESENTATION

REF: JERUSALEM 191✓

1. [REDACTED]

2. FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF THE U.S. DRAFT AGREEMENT WHICH HABIB READ REPEAT READ TO FONMIN SHAMIR AND ISRAELI WORKING TEAM, 18 JAN (REFTEL). AS HABIB EXPLAINED, ITEMS WITHIN PARENTHESES ARE OPTIONAL, ARE MEANT FOR DISCUSSION, AND MIGHT OR MIGHT NOT BE INCLUDED IN FINAL AGREEMENT. ALSO, WE DID NOT INCLUDE ANNEX ON WITHDRAWAL SCHEDULE. ALTHOUGH SHAMIR PROPOSED THAT IT NOT BE TABLED UNTIL THEY WERE READY WITH THEIR DRAFT, THE ENTIRE TEXT WAS READ AT THE MEETING AND A SINGLE COPY WAS GIVEN TO BAR-ON AFTERWARD TO MAKE SURE THE ISRAELIS HAD THE CORRECT WORDING FOR THE RECORD.

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3. TEXT FOLLOWS:

TITLE: AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL AND THE
GOVERNMENT OF LEBANON

GENERAL

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1. (ISRAEL AND LEBANON CONFIRM THAT THE STATE OF WAR BETWEEN THEM HAS BEEN TERMINATED.) A STATE OF WAR DOES NOT EXIST BETWEEN ISRAEL AND LEBANON. THIS AGREEMENT SUPERCEDES PRIOR AGREEMENTS BETWEEN THEM. IT ESTABLISHES SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS AS SPECIFIED HEREUNDER; DETERMINES A FRAMEWORK OF MUTUAL RELATIONS BETWEEN ISRAEL AND LEBANON; AND PROVIDES FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAELI FORCES FROM LEBANON IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE ATTACHED SCHEDULE.

SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS

2. ISRAEL AND LEBANON AGREE THAT NO HOSTILE ACTIVITIES WILL BE CONDUCTED FROM THE TERRITORY OF ONE AGAINST THE OTHER. TO THAT END, EACH WILL PROHIBIT THE ENTRY, OR STATIONING IN ITS TERRITORY, OF ARMED INDIVIDUALS OR MILITARY EQUIPMENT WHICH ARE TO CARRY OUT TERRORIST OR MILITARY ACTS AGAINST THE OTHER.

- ISRAEL AND LEBANON EACH WILL PREVENT THE UNAUTHORIZED ENTRY FROM ITS TERRITORY INTO THE TERRITORY OF THE OTHER OF ARMED INDIVIDUALS OR MILITARY EQUIPMENT.

- HIGH ALTITUDE ISRAELI RECONNAISSANCE FLIGHTS OVER
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LEBANON SHALL NOT BE CONSIDERED TO (BE HOSTILE MILITARY ACTIONS WITHIN THE TERMS OF THIS AGREEMENT) (CONSTITUTE A MATERIAL BREACH OF THIS AGREEMENT). THE RECONNAISSANCE WILL BE CARRIED ON FOR A PERIOD OF TIME AGREED UPON BY ISRAEL AND LEBANON.

- NEITHER ISRAEL NOR LEBANON WILL PERMIT THE STATIONING ON ITS TERRITORY OF EXTERNAL FORCES WHICH ARE HOSTILE TO THE OTHER. EACH WILL NOTIFY THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE OF THE PROPOSED ENTRY OF EXTERNAL FORCES INTO ITS TERRITORY. (IN THE EVENT OF A DISAGREEMENT BETWEEN ISRAEL AND LEBANON AS TO WHETHER A PARTICULAR FORCE IS HOSTILE, THE TWO SHALL ACCEPT THE JUDGMENT OF THE UNITED STATES.)

- A SECURITY REGION WILL BE CREATED IN THE AREA DEFINED ON THE ATTACHED MAP (APPROXIMATELY A 45 KM LINE FROM THE ISRAELI BORDER), CONCURRENTLY WITH THE WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAELI FORCES. THE GOVERNMENT OF LEBANON WILL EXERCISE ITS SOVEREIGN AUTHORITY FULLY THROUGHOUT THE REGION, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE FOLLOWING PRINCIPAL POINTS:

A. IN THE SECURITY REGION, THE ONLY ARMED FORCES PRESENT WILL BE THE LEBANESE ARMY, THE LEBANESE POLICE, OR OTHER AUTHORIZED ELEMENTS OF THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT, AND IN-

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INTERNATIONAL FORCES REQUESTED BY THE GOVERNMENT OF LEBANON WHICH ARE NOT HOSTILE TO ISRAEL. THE GOVERNMENT OF LEBANON WILL REQUEST THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL TO AUTHORIZE UNIFIL TO ASSIST THE LEBANESE ARMED FORCES (IN PROTECTING THE PALESTINIAN REFUGEE CAMPS THROUGHOUT LEBANON) (IN PREVENTING THE INFILTRATION INTO THE SECURITY

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REGION OF UNAUTHORIZED ARMED ELEMENTS, (CONCENTRATING PRIMARILY IN THE NORTHERNMOST 10 KMS OF THE SECURITY REGION)) (IN MAINTENANCE OF SECURITY, AND IN ENSURING THE RESTORATION OF THE AUTHORITY OF THE GOVERNMENT OF LEBANON, THROUGHOUT LEBANON, IN SUCH MANNER AS MAY BE AGREED).

B. THE GOVERNMENT OF LEBANON WILL BE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF ARRANGEMENTS WITHIN THE SECURITY REGION. PERSONNEL OF THE LOCAL FORCES IN THE SECURITY REGION WILL BE OFFERED INTEGRATION OR REINTEGRATION INTO

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SOME KIND OF NATIONAL MILITARY OR POLICE STRUCTURE, AND WILL BE UNDER THE CONTROL AND AUTHORITY OF THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT. TO THE MAXIMUM DEGREE, PERSONNEL SO INTEGRATED WILL BE STATIONED WITH LEBANESE UNITS IN THE SECURITY REGION.

C. EARLY WARNING STATIONS MAY BE MAINTAINED BY ISRAEL ONLY DURING THE PERIOD IN WHICH WITHDRAWAL OF EXTERNAL FORCES IS TAKING PLACE TO ENSURE THAT NO UNAUTHORIZED ELEMENTS ENTER THE SECURITY REGION AND TO MONITOR THE

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WITHDRAWAL OF EXTERNAL FORCES. SURVEILLANCE WILL BE CONDUCTED IN A MANNER ACCEPTABLE TO BOTH ISRAEL AND LEBANON.

D. WITHIN THE SECURITY REGION, THERE WILL BE NO SURFACE-TO-AIR OR SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILES, NO ROCKETS, AND NO NEW MILITARY FORTIFICATIONS.

E. A JOINT MILITARY ISRAELI-LEBANESE SUPERVISORY SYSTEM IS HEREBY ESTABLISHED FOR THE SUPERVISION OF THESE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS AND TO COORDINATE THE WITHDRAWAL PROVISIONS OF THIS AGREEMENT. IT WILL MEET CONTINUOUSLY IN BEIRUT DURING THE WITHDRAWAL PERIOD. FOLLOWING THE COMPLETION OF WITHDRAWAL, AN ISRAELI MILITARY LIAISON OFFICE WILL BE ESTABLISHED AT (IN ISRAEL); A LEBANESE MILITARY LIAISON OFFICE SHALL BE ESTABLISHED (IN LEBANON).

- THERE SHALL BE DIRECT TELEPHONIC LINKS BETWEEN THE OFFICES. MEETINGS OF THE LIAISON OFFICES WILL BE HELD AT LEAST ONCE A MONTH, OR AT THE REQUEST OF EITHER PARTY AND WILL ALTERNATE BETWEEN THE LIAISON OFFICES. THE FIRST MEETING WILL BE HELD AT THE ISRAELI LIAISON OFFICE, NO LATER THAN TWO WEEKS FOLLOWING THE COMPLETION OF THE WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAELI FORCES.

F. VIOLATIONS OF ANY OF THE ABOVE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS WILL BE RECTIFIED IMMEDIATELY. (IN THE EVENT OF AN ALLEGED VIOLATION, THE UNITED STATES WILL CONSULT WITH THE PARTIES, AS APPROPRIATE, TO DETERMINE COMPLIANCE WITH THIS AGREEMENT.)

FRAMEWORK OF MUTUAL RELATIONS

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3. THE BILATERAL RELATIONS BETWEEN ISRAEL AND LEBANON WILL BE BASED ON THE FOLLOWING:

A. THE TWO OFFICIAL DELEGATIONS OF THE COMMITTEE WHICH NEGOTIATED THIS AGREEMENT WILL CONTINUE TO MEET IN A SPECIAL COMMITTEE (HEREAFTER "THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE") AFTER THE WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAELI FORCES, IN ORDER TO SUPERVISE THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS AGREEMENT AND TO MAINTAIN CONTINUOUS DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES. THE UNITED STATES WILL BE INVITED TO PARTICIPATE IN THE WORK OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE.

B. PEOPLE AND GOODS WILL MOVE ACROSS THE BORDER BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THEIR RESPECTIVE REGULATIONS AND NATIONAL LEGISLATION. ACCESS ACROSS THE BORDER SHALL ONLY BE PERMITTED THROUGH ENTRY POINTS DESIGNATED BY EACH COUNTRY. (IT IS UNDERSTOOD THAT UNTSO WILL CONTINUE TO EXERCISE ITS RESPONSIBILITIES WITHIN ITS CURRENT AREA OF OPERATIONS.)

C. IN ORDER TO SUPPORT THE WORK OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE, ISRAEL AND LEBANON WILL BE ABLE TO MAINTAIN A STAFF IN THE TERRITORY OF THE OTHER. THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE WILL MEET IN THE BEIRUT AREA, OR SUCH OTHER LOCATIONS AS IT MAY DECIDE. OFFICIALS OF ONE COUNTRY AUTHORIZED TO ENTER THE OTHER WILL BE EXTENDED IMMUNITY FROM LOCAL LAWS FOR OFFICIAL ACTS.

D. ISRAEL AND LEBANON WILL REFRAIN FROM ANY INTERFERENCE IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF THE OTHER. BEARING IN MIND THE FREE PRESS IN EACH COUNTRY, ISRAEL AND LEBANON WILL REFRAIN FROM PROMOTING HOSTILE PROPAGANDA AGAINST THE

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OTHER.

E. THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE WILL DISCUSS ON A CONTINUING BASIS THE DEVELOPMENT OF SOCIAL, ECONOMIC, AND HUMANITARIAN RELATIONS WITH A VIEW TO THE ACHIEVEMENT OF PEACEFUL RELATIONS.

- (AS A FIRST PRIORITY, THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE WILL ESTABLISH ARRANGEMENTS TO IMPLEMENT THE FOLLOWING UNDERTAKINGS:

- --DESIGNATION OF POINTS OF ACCESS A
T THE BORDER.

- --INDIVIDUALS SHALL BE ABLE TO CROSS THE BORDER FOR PURPOSES OF RELIGIOUS PILGRIMAGES, FOR FAMILY VISITATIONS, FOR MEDICAL PURPOSES, FOR THE WORK OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE AND THE MILITARY LIAISON COMMITTEE, AND AS MAY BE OTHERWISE AGREED.

- --MAIL AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS WILL BE PERMITTED TO MOVE BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES, IN ACCORDANCE WITH

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RELEVANT INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS.

- --DAY LABORERS WILL BE ABLE TO TRANSIT THE BORDER, SUBJECT TO APPLICABLE NATIONAL LABOR REGULATIONS.

- --NECESSARY AND APPROPRIATE PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES WILL BE EXTENDED TO GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS PERMITTED TO VISIT OR BE STATIONED IN THE TERRITORY OF THE OTHER.)

WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAELI FORCES

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4. ALL ISRAELI FORCES WILL WITHDRAW FROM LEBANON WITHIN (BLANK) DAYS, BEGINNING ON A DATE TO BE AGREED. THIS IS CONSISTENT WITH THE OBJECTIVE OF THE GOVERNMENT OF LEBANON THAT ALL EXTERNAL FORCES WITHDRAW FROM LEBANON. (IT IS UNDERSTOOD THAT THE AGREED DATE WILL BE THE EARLIEST PRACTICABLE DATE AFTER LEBANON HAS SECURED AGREEMENT TO A SCHEDULE OF WITHDRAWALS OF ALL EXTERNAL FORCES AND OF ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE RETURN OF ALL ISRAELI NATIONALS WHO HAVE BEEN TAKEN INTO CUSTODY, AND THE REMAINS, OR FULL AND DETAILED INFORMATION ABOUT THE LOCATION OF THE REMAINS, OF ALL ISRAELI SOLDIERS WHO HAVE FALLEN.)

- THE ISRAELI FORCES WILL BE WITHDRAWN IN ACCORDANCE WITH A SCHEDULE WHICH WILL PROVIDE FOR AN ORDERLY WITHDRAWAL, AND WILL ALLOW THE GOVERNMENT OF LEBANON TO REASSERT ITS AUTHORITY AS THE ISRAELI FORCES WITHDRAW. THE LAF AND THE IDF WILL MAINTAIN CONTINUOUS LIAISON DURING THE WITHDRAWAL AND WILL EXCHANGE ALL NECESSARY INFORMATION, THROUGH THE MILITARY LIAISON COMMITTEE.

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ENTRY INTO FORCE

5. THIS AGREEMENT WILL ENTER INTO FORCE UPON SIGNATURE AND DETERMINATION OF THE AGREED DATE REFERRED TO IN PARAGRAPH FOUR. NOTWITHSTANDING THIS PROVISION, THE PROVISIONS IN PARAGRAPH 1 CONCERNING THE STATE OF WAR SHALL NOT ENTER INTO FORCE UNTIL COMPLETION OF THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL ISRAELI FORCES.

- THIS AGREEMENT SHALL BE REGISTERED WITH THE UNITED NATIONS' SECRETARY-GENERAL, IN ACCORDANCE WITH ARTICLE 102 OF THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS.

- DISPUTES REGARDING THE INTERPRETATION OR APPLICATION OF THIS AGREEMENT SHALL BE RESOLVED THROUGH NEGOTIATIONS, OR SUCH OTHER PEACEFUL MEANS AS THE PARTIES DETERMINE.

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FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL

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FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF
LEBANON

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FROM HABIB/DRAPER

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, US, IS, LE, PLO, XF

SUBJECT: HABIB/DRAPER MISSION: PRESENTATION OF US
-- IDEAS TO ISRAELIS, JANUARY 18

1. [REDACTED]

2. SUMMARY: AT OUR JANUARY 18 SUBSTANTIVE SESSION
WITH FONMIN SHAMIR AND HIS WORKING TEAM, HABIB
PRESENTED ORALLY A US DRAFT AGREEMENT. (IN VIEW
OF THE NUMBER OF PEOPLE PRESENT AND THE PAST
EXPERIENCE WITH LEAKS, WE DID NOT DISTRIBUTE
COPIES.) SHAMIR ASKED TO DEFER THE DISCUSSIONS

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OF SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS IN VIEW OF SHARON'S
ABSENCE, AND WE THEREFORE CONCENTRATED ON "MUTUAL
RELATIONS." THE ISRAELIS THEN READ SECTIONS OF
THEIR DRAFT PROPOSAL, WHICH COMBINES EXTREMELY
BLUNT GENERAL PRINCIPLES ("OPEN BORDERS," "FREE
MOVEMENT," AND "TERMINATION OF ALL BOYCOTTS") WITH
A LENGTHY, DETAILED ANNEX WHICH DEALS WITH ALMOST
EVERY CONCEIVABLE ASPECT OF NORMALIZATION. HABIB
EXPLAINED CLEARLY TO THE ISRAELIS WHY THIS APPROACH**UNCLASSIFIED**

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WENT TOO FAR. THE LEBANESE COULD NOT ACCEPT IT. OUR MAIN PROBLEMS WITH THE APPROACH CONCERNED DEGREE AND TIMING. WE HAD TO USE A PRAGMATIC APPROACH, AND WORK FOR A DEVELOPING RELATIONSHIP. THE US, HABIB STRESSED, COULD NOT WAIT FOR THE ISRAELIS TO TRY FOR SUCH AN APPROACH SINCE FAILURE WAS SURE. THE ISRAELIS BELIEVE THAT THEY MUST ACHIEVE EVERYTHING NOW, NOT LATER. THEY ARE SUSPICIOUS OF THE ARGUMENT THAT THE DEVELOPMENT OF RELATIONS CAN EVOLVE FURTHER AFTER ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL.

3. THE ISRAELIS WILL PROVIDE A COPY OF THEIR DRAFT AGREEMENT TO US THIS EVENING, AND WE WILL MEET AGAIN TOMORROW MORNING. END SUMMARY.

5. HABIB, JOINED BY LEWIS, DRAPER, KRECKO, AND HARE, MET FOR TWO HOURS WITH FONMIN SHAMIR AND HIS ADVISERS THE MORNING OF JANUARY 18. SHARON WAS ABSENT BECAUSE OF HIS TRIP TO ZAIRE, BUT A NUMBER OF MILITARY WERE PRESENT. SHAMIR WAS JOINED BY BEN MEIR, KIMCHE, BAR-ON, AND RUBINSTEIN, AMONG OTHERS.

6. THE MEETING BEGAN WITH A SUMMARY BY KIMCHE, RUBINSTEIN, AND DRAPER OF THE MEETING OF THE PREVIOUS DAY AT KHALDAH. KIMCHE'S SUMMARY WAS UPBEAT, AS

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HE EMPHASIZED THE PROGRESS MADE CONCERNING THE TERMINATION OF THE STATE OF WAR. KIMCHE SAID THE MAIN PROBLEM, AS DESCRIBED BY LEBANESE NEGOTIATOR FATTAL, WAS FEAR OF SYRIAN REACTION AND ULTIMATE REFUSAL TO WITHDRAW. ACCORDING TO KIMCHE, FATTAL ALSO EMPHASIZED THE NECESSITY OF SAUDI "PASSIVE ENDORSEMENT" OF LEBANON'S DECISIONS.

7. THIS LED US INTO A SOMEWHAT CONFLICTING ANALYSIS OF THE POTENTIAL ARAB REACTION AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT. HABIB SAID THE LEBANESE CONCERNS WERE REAL, AND POINTED OUT THAT SAUDI ARABIA MAY ALREADY HAVE TAKEN SPECIFIC STEPS TO LIMIT IMPORTS OF LEBANESE GOODS, BECAUSE OF THE POSSIBILITY ISRAELI GOODS WERE COMMINGLED. MOREOVER, LEBANON WAS LOOKING TO SAUDI ARABIA FOR GENEROUS RECONSTRUCTION ASSISTANCE, AND IT COULD NOT AFFORD TO JEOPARDIZE THIS. DRAPER REPORTED THAT HE HAD MET WITH GEMAYEL THE NIGHT BEFORE, AND THAT GEMAYEL WAS VERY NERVOUS BECAUSE OF THE WARNINGS THAT HE HAD BEEN GETTING FROM THE SAUDIS AND SYRIANS. (DRAPER SAID THAT GEMAYEL HAD NOT HAD THE SAME PROBLEM WITH THE EGYPTIANS AND HABIB WENT ON TO REJECT ISRAELI SUGGESTIONS THAT THE EGYPTIANS WERE BEING NEGATIVE BY CITING HIS OWN TALKS WITH GHORBAL, AMONG OTHER EXAMPLES.)

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8. HABIB CONCLUDED FROM THE ARAB WARNINGS THAT ISRAEL WOULD HAVE TO SETTLE FOR LESS THAN ITS MAXIMUM WISHES, OR ELSE RUN THE RISK OF AN AGREEMENT WHICH DID NOT PRODUCE SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL AND WAS THEREFORE MEANINGLESS. THE ISRAELI CONCLUSION IS THAT THE UNITED STATES MUST DO MORE TO BRING THE ARABS AROUND. HABIB AND LEWIS DESCRIBED THE EFFORTS WE WERE MAKING, BUT SAID THERE WERE LIMITS TO WHAT WE CAN

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ACCOMPLISH.

10. THE ISRAELIS MADE RELATIVELY FEW SUGGESTIONS, BUT SHAMIR ASKED RUBINSTEIN TO READ THE ISRAELI PROPOSALS ON NORMALIZATION. THE ISRAELI APPROACH IS TO INCLUDE

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IN THE AGREEMENT ITSELF SEVERAL GENERAL PRINCIPLES, SUCH AS OPEN BORDERS, FREE MOVEMENT OF PERSONS AND GOODS, AND TERMINATION OF ECONOMIC BOYCOTTS. IT WOULD ALSO STIPULATE THE NECESSITY OF COMMERCIAL, TRANSPORTATION, AND OTHER AGREEMENTS; PROVIDE FOR RECIPROCAL MOST-FAVORED NATION TREATMENT; REQUIRE LEBANON TO REMOVE ALL RESERVATIONS RELATING TO ISRAEL FROM ITS ACCESSIONS TO MULTILATERAL CONVENTIONS; AND CALL FOR COOPERATION FOR REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN A NUMBER OF SPHERES. IN ADDITION,

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THE ISRAELIS PROPOSE A FOUR PAGE ANNEX WHICH ELABORATES ON ALL OF THE ABOVE UNDERTAKINGS, INCLUDING SPECIFIC PROVISIONS REGARDING PORTS, MARITIME RELATIONS, POLLUTION CONTROL, VETERINARY REGULATIONS, ETC. (HABIB ASKED WHAT HAPPENED TO THE "KITCHEN SINK.")

11. HABIB SAID THE RUBINSTEIN PRESENTATION WOULD NOT WORK. IT WENT TOO FAR TOO SOON. WHEN BEN MEIR SAID ISRAEL COULD NOT ACCEPT LESS NORMALIZATION THAN CURRENTLY EXISTS, HABIB SAID THAT ISRAEL COULD NOT USE AS ITS MEASURING STICK A SITUATION WHICH WAS IMPOSED ON LEBANON BY VIRTUE OF ISRAEL'S CONTROL OF BOTH SIDES OF THE BORDER. LEWIS POINTED OUT THAT THE ISRAELI PRESENTATION WENT FAR BEYOND THE SECRET ISRAELI-LEBANESE "WORKING PAPER," WHICH HAD CALLED FOR AGREEMENTS IN THE VARIOUS FIELDS OF NORMALIZATION TO BE NEGOTIATED AFTER WITHDRAWAL. HABIB SAID THAT ISRAELI'S INSISTENCE ON SUCH AN AGREEMENT WOULD EITHER LEAD TO A LEBANON WHICH WAS SUBJECTED TO A TOTAL ARAB BOYCOTT, WHICH THE ISRAELIS DO NOT WANT, OR A SITUATION IN WHICH SYRIA WOULD NOT WITHDRAW. THE BASIC ISRAELI RESPONSE WAS THAT IT MUST ACHIEVE THE SUBSTANCE OF NORMALIZATION WHILE LEBANON CAN JUSTIFY IT TO THE ARABS ON THE NEED TO GET ISRAEL TO WITHDRAW. AFTER WITHDRAWAL, THEY BELIEVE THE ARABS WILL PRESSURE LEBANON TO REVERSE, OR AT LEAST STOP, THE NORMALIZATION PROCESS.

12. AFTER THESE EXCHANGES, SHAMIR SAID THAT HE WOULD PROVIDE US A COPY OF THE ISRAELI DRAFT AGREEMENT AND WE AGREED TO MEET AGAIN AT 9 A.M.

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WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 19.

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13. AFTER THE MEETING, WE HAD LUNCH WITH KIMCHE AND BAR-ON. HABIB TOLD KIMCHE FLATLY THAT THE RUBINSTEIN PRESENTATION WAS A NON-STARTER. KIMCHE SAID THAT EVERYONE HAS "THEIR NEGOTIATING GAMBITS." KIMCHE SAID, HOWEVER, THAT THE BASIC QUESTION COULD NOT BE AVOIDED: ON THE DAY FOLLOWING ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL, WOULD ISRAELIS BE ABLE TO GO TO LEBANON (SUBJECT TO VISA REQUIREMENTS, ETC.) AND WOULD LEBANESE BUSINESSMEN BE ABLE TO DEAL WITH ISRAELIS, WITHOUT FEAR OF PROSECUTION. HABIB SAID THAT THE ANSWER WAS "SOME, BUT NOT ALL, AT LEAST INITIALLY" AS REGARDS THE MOVEMENT OF BOTH PERSONS AND GOODS. KRECZKO EXPLAINED THAT OUR DRAFT HAD IN FACT TERMINATED THE BDYCOTT OF ISRAEL BY PROVIDING FOR THE MOVEMENT OF SOME GOODS AND PERSONS ACROSS THE BORDER. OUR APPROACH WAS A COMBINATION OF THE LEBANESE APPROACH, WHICH WOULD LEAVE EVERYTHING TO NEGOTIATION AFTER WITHDRAWAL, AND THE ISRAELI APPROACH, WHICH WOULD NAIL EVERYTHING DOWN IN ADVANCE. WE WERE SUGGESTING A FRAMEWORK FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF MUTUAL RELATIONS, AND SOME IMMEDIATE UNDERTAKINGS CONCERNING ELEMENTS OF NORMALIZATION.

14. LEWIS AND HABIB ALSO USED THE LUNCH TO PUT TO KIMCHE AND BAR-ON IN EVEN BLUNTER TERMS THAN HAD BEEN USED PREVIOUSLY THE NEED FOR PROMPT MOVEMENT. HABIB SAID FIRMLY THAT WASHINGTON WAS NOT PREPARED FOR NEGOTIATIONS OVER SEVERAL MONTHS, SO THAT ISRAEL COULD GET POSSIBLY ONE PERCENT MORE THAN WHAT WE COULD PRODUCE IMMEDIATELY. HABIB ALSO SAID IT WAS IN ISRAEL'S INTEREST TO GET THE LEBANON ISSUE BEHIND US, AND MOVE ON TO THE IMPORTANT ISSUE OF THE BROADER PEACE PROCESS.

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15. COMMENT: THE ISRAELI APPROACH ON "MUTUAL RELATIONS" IS A NON-STARTER. EVEN IF WE COULD CONVINCE THEM TO DROP THE ENTIRE ANNEX, AS HABIB SUGGESTED, THEIR GENERAL PRINCIPLES ARE SO FAR-REACHING THAT THEY WOULD ALMOST INEVITABLY PROMPT A HOSTILE ARAB REACTION, AND PERHAPS ALLOW SYRIA TO REFRAIN FROM WITHDRAWING. TOMORROW'S SESSION, IN VIEW OF SHARON'S CONTINUED ABSENCE, WILL BE DEVOTED PRIMARILY TO MUTUAL RELATIONS. WE WILL TRY TO ASCERTAIN ISRAELI FLEXIBILITY, AND WHETHER THE ISRAELI PRESENTATION WAS A "NEGOTIATING GAMBIT" OR A SERIOUS PROPOSAL. THERE IS A MAJOR GAP BETWEEN WHAT THE ISRAELIS CURRENTLY HAVE DEFINED AS THEIR MINIMUM NEEDS AND WHAT WE BELIEVE THE TRAFFIC CAN BEAR IN BEIRUT. END COMMENT.

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NOTE: ACCORDING TO DRAFTER THERE IS NO REPEAT NO NUMBERED PARAGRAPH FOUR AND TEXT IS COMPLETE AS SENT.

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EXERCISE SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MILITARY ADDRESSEES

JERUSALEM FOR AMBASSADORS HABIB AND DRAPER

FROM DRAPER MISSION (ROSS)

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, PBTS, MOPS, MARR, LE, IS, US

SUBJECT: DRAPER MISSION: JANUARY 17 DISCUSSION OF END
TO STATE OF WAR

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REF: JERUSALEM 00140 ✓

1. [REDACTED]
2. SUMMARY: IN EXTENSIVE DISCUSSION OF FORMULA ON
TERMINATION OF STATE OF WAR IN PLENARY AND WORKING GROUP
MEETINGS JANUARY 17, LEBANESE AND ISRAELIS STUCK
GENERALLY TO PREVIOUS POSITIONS (REFTEL). ISRAELIS WERE
WILLING TO CONCEDE THAT, IF LEBANESE WOULD ADDRESS

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FORMULA THEY HAD PROPOSED AT KIRYAT SHEMONA, QUESTION OF TIMING FOR ITS ENTRY INTO FORCE COULD BE LEFT IN ABEYANCE. ALTHOUGH THEY HINTED BROADLY FORMULA GAVE THEM NO PROBLEMS, LEBANESE WOULD NOT ADDRESS IT UNLESS IT WAS FORMALLY LINKED TO TOTAL EVACUATION OF LEBANESE TERRITORY. FATTAL PROPOSED EXCHANGE OF LETTERS OF INTENT AS WAY OF DOING THIS. IDEA PROVED TO BE NON-STARTER IN ITS PRESENT FORM, SINCE, TO DEMONSTRATE THEY WERE GETTING SOMETHING IN RETURN, LEBANESE WANTED EXCHANGE OF LETTERS TO BE ACCOMPANIED BY PARTIAL ISRAELI PULLBACK AND RESUMPTION OF LEBANESE CONTROL OF ITS BORDER POSTS. AT END OF DISCUSSION, DRAPER FORMULATED HIS UNDERSTANDING OF LEBANESE POSITION FOR REPORTING PURPOSES AS FOLLOWS: LEBANESE DELEGATION IS NOT NEGATIVE TO (ISRAELI) FORMULA FOR POSSIBLE INCLUSION IN EVENTUAL BROAD AGREEMENT WHOSE OTHER PROVISIONS HAVE BEEN MUTUALLY ACCEPTED BY BOTH PARTIES. NEITHER KIMCHE NOR FATTAL TOOK EXCEPTION TO THIS FORMULATION.

3. WORKING GROUP ALSO DISCUSSED APPLICABILITY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, INCLUDING UN CHARTER, TO FUTURE RELATIONS BETWEEN LEBANON AND ISRAEL. FATTAL BERATED ISRAELIS FOR BEING SELECTIVE IN THEIR APPROACH TO AGREEMENTS SPONSORED BY UN.

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4. FINALLY, WORKING GROUP ENGAGED IN INCONCLUSIVE DISCUSSION OF SHAPE OF EVENTUAL AGREEMENT. FATTAL, STATING LEBANESE HAD NOT GIVEN MATTER MUCH THOUGHT, WOULD NOT RULE OUT POSSIBILITY OF SEVERAL AGREEMENTS, USE OF RELATIVELY LESS FORMAL FORMS SUCH AS "ARRANGEMENTS", "MEMORANDA OF UNDERSTANDING", AND "ENTENTES", RECOURSE TO EXCHANGES OF LETTERS AND SIDE UNDERSTANDINGS, AND INCLUSION OF US AS FORMAL PARTY TO ANY AGREEMENT... HE DID CONFIRM THAT, WHATEVER FORM OR FORMS WERE CHOSEN, THESE WOULD HAVE LEGAL FORCE OF INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS. END SUMMARY.

5. TERMINATION OF STATE OF WAR IN PLENARY.

-- THE JANUARY 17 PLENARY IN KHALDAH BEGAN ITS PROCEEDINGS BY RESUMING THE DISCUSSION OF TERMINATION OF THE STATE OF WAR BEGUN AT THE JANUARY 13 SESSION IN KIRYAT SHEMONA (OTHER ASPECTS OF THE JANUARY 17 PLENARY ARE REPORTED SEPTEL).

-- KIMCHE ASKED FATTAL'S OPINION OF THE "SIMPLE, DIRECT, FORMULA" ISRAEL HAD PROPOSED. HE REPEATED THAT (A) ISRAEL RECOGNIZED THAT THE AGREEMENT OF WHICH THIS FORMULA WOULD BE A PART WOULD BE A PACKAGE DEAL,

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INCLUDING ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL, (B) ALL ITEMS WOULD COME INTO FORCE UPON SIGNATURE OR RATIFICATION OF THE AGREEMENT, AND (C) THIS AGREEMENT WOULD SUPERSEDE ALL PREVIOUS AGREEMENTS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES (I.E., THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT).

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-- FATTAL IMMEDIATELY REITERATED THE LEBANESE POSITION. LEBANON HAD "NO OBJECTION OF PRINCIPLE TO SUCH A DECLARATION", BUT COULD NOT ENVISAGE ITS COMING INTO FORCE BEFORE THE LAST ISRAELI SOLDIER HAD LEFT LEBANON. TO DO OTHERWISE, FATTAL SAID, WOULD OPEN THE WAY TO ACCUSATIONS THAT LEBANON HAD SOLD OUT ITS SOVEREIGNTY.

--COUNTERATTACKING, KIMCHE AND RUBENSTEIN ASKED

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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WHY THERE SHOULD BE A PROBLEM WITH SUCH A STATEMENT. BOTH URGED THAT FATTAL SHOULD WORK TO REACH AGREEMENT ON A FORMULA; THE QUESTION OF ITS ENTRY INTO FORCE COULD BE LEFT IN ABEYANCE AND SETTLED IN THE PACKAGE DEAL.

-- INTRODUCING A NEW IDEA, FATTAL SAID THAT, WHILE LEBANON ACCEPTED INCLUSION OF A DECLARATION ENDING THE STATE OF WAR IN THE PACKAGE DEAL, IT WOULD BE NECESSARY EITHER TO LEAVE THE PRECISE FORMULATION OF THE STATEMENT FOR LATER OR TO LINK IT FORMALLY TO THE TOTAL EVACUATION OF LEBANESE TERRITORY, PERHAPS BY AN EXCHANGE OF LETTERS OF INTENT (HE RAISED THIS PROPOSAL IN MORE DETAIL IN THE WORKING GROUP).

-- KIMCHE AGAIN PRESSED FATTAL TO FINALIZE A FORMULA, ARGUING THAT THE WHOLE AGREEMENT WAS TANTAMOUNT TO A LETTER OF INTENT UNTIL IT WAS SIGNED, AND PROPOSED FORMATION OF A DRAFTING COMMITTEE TO WORK OUT A FORMULA THAT WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO ALL BUT KEPT PENDING UNTIL OTHERWISE DECIDED.

-- FATTAL SAID HE HAD NO OBJECTION TO THE FORMATION OF THIS AND OTHER WORKING GROUPS. KIMCHE DESIGNATED ELY RUBENSTEIN, LT. COL. (FNU) ZINGER, AND MR. (FNU) BAKER AS THE ISRAELI MEMBERS. THESE LATER MET WITH FATTAL FOR LEBANON AND DRAPER AND ROSS FOR THE US.

6. TERMINATION OF STATE OF WAR IN WORKING GROUP

-- FATTAL OPENED BY EXPLAINING HIS PROPOSAL FOR AN EXCHANGE OF LETTERS OF INTENT IN MORE DETAIL. LEBANON WAS PREPARED TO EXCHANGE LETTERS OF INTENT TO CONSIDER

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THE STATE OF WAR AS TERMINATED IF ISRAEL WOULD AGREE TO A PARTIAL PULLBACK AND LEBANESE CONTROL OF ITS BORDER POSTS. THESE CONDITIONS WERE NECESSARY BECAUSE THE IMPACT OF THE EXCHANGE OF LETTERS (WHICH WOULD INEVITABLY LEAK) WOULD BE DISASTROUS FOR LEBANON'S POSITION IN THE ARAB WORLD UNLESS IT COULD SHOW IT HAD RECEIVED SOMETHING IN RETURN. ALREADY, THE MERE INCLUSION OF TERMINATION OF THE STATE OF WAR ON THE AGENDA HAD BROUGHT SIGNIFICANT LEBANESE AND ARAB CRITICISM. THIS EXCHANGE OF LETTERS WOULD BE A STEP FORWARD WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO THE FINAL AGREEMENT, AND AN AGREED FORMULA ON TERMINATION OF THE STATE OF WAR WOULD ALSO APPEAR IN THIS AGREEMENT.

-- IN ENSUING DISCUSSION, FATTAL'S PROPOSAL WAS DEMONSTRATED TO BE A NON-STARTER FOR THE PRESENT. RUBENSTEIN INTERPRETED LEBANESE CONTROL OF THEIR BORDER POINTS AS ENTAILING COOPERATION WITH THE ISRAELIS ON PRACTICAL BORDER ARRANGEMENTS, WHILE FATTAL WANTED ANY SUCH DISCUSSION TO OCCUR AT THE APPROPRIATE TIME IN THE APPROPRIATE WORKING GROUP. FURTHERMORE, AS DRAPER POSITED WITHOUT OBJECTION FROM RUBENSTEIN OR FATTAL, A PARTIAL ISRAELI PULLBACK WOULD HAVE TO BE ACCOMPANIED BY A PARTIAL SYRIAN PULLBACK AND THE RETURN OF ISRAELI POWS, MIAS, AND KIAS.

-- FATTAL FINALLY SAID HE WOULD NOT INSIST ON HIS IDEA, BUT IT DID REMAIN A PROPOSAL TO GET OUT OF THE PRESENT

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EXDIS - SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MILITARY ADDRESSEES

PROBLEM ON TERMINATION OF THE STATE OF WAR.

-- DRAPER TOLD THE ISRAELIS THAT THE VISION OF A TOTALLY
UNCONTROLLED BORDER THAT EXISTED IN LEBANON WAS CAUSING
THE LEBANESE LEADERSHIP POLITICAL PROBLEMS AND THAT
PERHAPS SOMETHING COULD BE DONE TO
EXPLORE WAYS OF
IMPROVING THE COSMETICS OF THE SITUATION WITH OR WITHOUT
AN EXCHANGE OF LETTERS. RUBENSTEIN AND ZINGER SAID

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THEY WOULD BE HAPPY TO HAVE ANY LEBANESE IDEAS ON
DESIRABLE CONTROLS. RUBENSTEIN ASKED FOR STATISTICS ON
THE DAMAGE CAUSED BY DUMPING, AND FATTAL PROMISED TO
PROVIDE THEM "IN A FEW DAYS."

-- RUBENSTEIN KEPT COMING BACK TO THE ISRAELI FORMULA
AND TRYING TO GET FATTAL TO ADDRESS IT. FATTAL
REPEATEDLY SLID OFF, AFFIRMING THAT AGREEMENT ON A
FORMULA WOULD TAKE "ONLY ONE MINUTE" ONCE THE REST OF
THE AGREEMENT WAS IN PLACE. FINALLY, HE ADMITTED THAT
THE ISRAELI FORMULA WAS "VIABLE" AND "DOESN'T DISTURB
ME IN ANY WAY," BUT HE REPEATED HE COULD NOT ADHERE TO
IT IMMEDIATELY. RUBENSTEIN EXPRESSED PLEASURE AT THE

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POSITIVE TONE OF FATTAL'S REACTION.

-- AT THE END OF THE DISCUSSION, DRAPER SUMMARIZED THE LEBANESE POSITION FOR REPORTING PURPOSES AS FOLLOWS: THE LEBANESE DELEGATION IS NOT NEGATIVE TO THE (ISRAELI) FORMULA FOR POSSIBLE INCLUSION IN AN EVENTUAL BROAD AGREEMENT WHOSE OTHER PROVISIONS HAVE BEEN MUTUALLY ACCEPTED BY BOTH PARTIES. (NEITHER KIMCHE NOR FATTAL, TO WHOM DRAPER SHOWED THE FORMULATION, TOOK EXCEPTION TO IT.)

7. INTERNATIONAL LAW AND LEBANESE-ISRAELI RELATIONS

--RUBENSTEIN RAISED THE APPLICABILITY OF GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND STATED HIS ASSUMPTION THAT, WITH THE END OF THE STATE OF WAR, THE FRAMEWORK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW THAT WOULD GOVERN BILATERAL RELATIONS WOULD BE THAT OF THE UN CHARTER AND ASSOCIATED DECLARATIONS, SUCH AS THAT ON PEACEFUL RELATIONS.

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-- FATTAL USED HIS REPLY TO BERATE THE ISRAELIS FOR BEING SELECTIVE IN THEIR APPROACH TO THE UN. WHAT ABOUT UNSC RESOLUTIONS 508 AND 509 AND THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT GUARANTEED BY THE UNSC? AFTER A LENGTHY, SOMETIMES ARCANE, DISCUSSION OF THE UN SYSTEM AND THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT, HE FINALLY AGREED THAT LEBANON WISHED TO REMAIN WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE UN CHARTER AND CALLED ON ISRAEL TO DO THE SAME.

8. SHAPE OF FINAL AGREEMENT

-- IN RESPONSE TO RUBENSTEIN'S INITIATION OF A DISCUSSION OF THE SHAPE OF THE FINAL AGREEMENT, FATTAL PROFESSED THAT LEBANON HAD NOT THOUGHT MUCH ABOUT IT. THE AGREEMENT MIGHT BE ONE OR MORE, IT MIGHT TAKE THE RELATIVELY LESS FORMAL SHAPE OF AN EXCHANGE OF LETTERS, AN "ARRANGEMENT", "MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING", OR "ENTENTE". DRAPER ADDED, AND FATTAL TOOK THE POINT, THAT CERTAIN SENSITIVE ISSUES MIGHT BEST BE TREATED IN SIDE UNDERSTANDINGS.

-- FATTAL DID SAY THE ONLY POINT ON WHICH HE COULD BE CLEAR AT THIS STAGE WAS THAT LEBANON BELIEVED THE US WOULD BE A PARTY TO ANY AGREEMENT ON AN EQUAL FOOTING. DRAPER REPLIED THAT THE US EXPECTED AT LEAST TO WITNESS ANY AGREEMENT. BEYOND THAT, WE WERE COMPLETELY OPEN

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EXDIS - SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MILITARY ADDRESSEES

MINDED SUBJECT TO OUR CONSTITUTIONAL PROCEDURES.
RUBENSTEIN, IMPLYING ANYTHING MORE WOULD CAUSE

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PROBLEMS, SAID ISRAEL WOULD NOT OBJECT TO A US ROLE AS "WITNESS".

-- EXPANDING ON ISRAEL'S THOUGHTS ABOUT AN AGREEMENT, RUBENSTEIN OUTLINED THE FORM IT SHOULD TAKE: (A) THE TITLE WOULD BE SIMPLY "AGREEMENT BETWEEN ISRAEL AND

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LEBANON"; (B) THERE WOULD BE A SHORT PREAMBLE; (C) THE MAIN PROVISIONS OF THE PACKAGE -- TERMINATION OF THE STATE OF WAR, SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS, WITHDRAWALS, AND MUTUAL RELATIONS -- WOULD BE SPELLED OUT IN A NUMBER OF ARTICLES; (D) THERE WOULD BE SOME NECESSARY LEGAL ADDITIONS; (E) THERE WOULD BE TWO ANNEXES, ONE A DETAILED SECURITY AND WITHDRAWAL ANNEX, AND ONE A DETAILED MUTUAL RELATIONS ANNEX. FATTAL ASKED ARCHLY WHETHER RUBENSTEIN HAD PREPARED A DRAFT OF SUCH A "TREATY". RUBENSTEIN SAID SOMETHING EXISTED AT HIS LEVEL, BUT IT DID NOT HAVE MINISTERIAL APPROVAL AND COULD THEREFORE BE CHANGED. FATTAL REITERATED A PREFERENCE FOR SIMPLICITY, SINCE ANYTHING THAT LOOKED LIKE A PEACE TREATY WOULD RAISE DIFFICULTIES WITH THE ARAB WORLD. DRAPER EXPRESSED US SUPPORT FOR A SIGNED AGREEMENT SUPPLEMENTED WITH SIDE UNDERSTANDINGS WHERE NECESSARY.

9. REPORT TO PLENARY

--RETURNING TO THE PLENARY, FATTAL AND RUBENSTEIN AGAIN OUTLINED THEIR RESPECTIVE POSITIONS ON TERMINATION OF STATE OF WAR. RUBENSTEIN PROPOSED THE ISSUE BE DISCUSSED FURTHER AT COMING MEETINGS...

-- RUBENSTEIN AND FATTAL ALSO TOOK NOTE OF THE DISCUSSION ON THE SHAPE OF AN AGREEMENT, AND FATTAL CONFIRMED THAT, WHATEVER FORM OR FORMS IT HAD, IT WOULD HAVE THE LEGAL FORCE OF AN INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT. DILLON

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SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MILITARY ADDRESSEES

JERUSALEM FOR AMBASSADORS HABIB AND DRAPER

FROM DRAPER MISSION (ROSS)

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, PBTS, MOPS, MARR, UNIFIL, LE, IS, SY, PLO, US

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SUBJECT: DRAPER MISSION: JANUARY 17 PLENARY SESSION AT
KHALDAH

1. [REDACTED]
2. SUMMARY: IN TWO AND ONE-HALF HOURS OF PLENARY SESSION
AT KHALDAH JANUARY 17, LEBANESE, ISRAELI, AND U.S.
DELEGATIONS:

-- COMPLETED PRESENTATION AND DISCUSSION OF "GENERAL

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PRINCIPLES" RELATIVE TO AGENDA ITEM ON "TERMINATION OF STATE OF WAR (SEPTTEL);

-- PRESENTED OPENING POSITIONS ON ALL OTHER ITEMS ON AGENDA, WITH ISRAELIS GENERALLY READING FROM DECEMBER 14 "WORKING PAPER" AND LEBANESE RESPONDING TO SOME BUT NOT ALL POINTS; IN PARTICULAR, LEBANESE DID NOT MAKE A FIRM PRESENTATION ON "NORMALIZATION" AND TOOK NO POSITION ON EARLY WARNING STATIONS; LEBANESE DID STATE THEY HAD PROMISES ON SYRIAN AND PLO WITHDRAWAL;

-- HEARD LEBANESE PROPOSAL TO CREATE FIVE WORKING GROUPS, BUT ACTIVATED ONLY ONE (TO DISCUSS "TERMINATION OF STATE OF WAR" IN MORE DETAIL); ISRAELIS PREFER TO AWAIT COMPLETION OF PLENARY DISCUSSION OF OTHER AGENDA ITEMS BEFORE ACTIVATING MORE WORKING GROUPS;

-- AGREED THAT "INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS" OF WORKING GROUP ON "FRAMEWORK OF MUTUAL RELATIONS" COULD BEGIN IN NEAR FUTURE, GIVEN "COMPLEXITY" OF ISSUE AND NEED TO BRING "GENERAL PRINCIPLES" OF ISRAELIS AND LEBANESE CLOSER TOGETHER;

-- AGREED TO MEET JANUARY 20 IN KIRYAT SHEMONA TO CONTINUE

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PRESENTATION AND DISCUSSION OF "GENERAL PRINCIPLES" RELATIVE TO BALANCE OF AGENDA ITEMS AND DECIDE ON ACCELERATED SCHEDULE FOR DELIBERATIONS OF WORKING GROUPS.

3. WORKING GROUP ON "TERMINATION OF STATE OF WAR" HELD FIRST MEETING (SEPTTEL). ATMOSPHERE OF VARIOUS PLENARY AND WORKING GROUP SESSIONS WAS BUSINESSLIKE, WITH BOTH SIDES PRESENTING THEIR POSITIONS IN FIRM, SOMETIMES BLUNT, TERMS. PERSONAL RELATIONS AMONG DELEGATES CONTINUE TO BE VERY CORDIAL. END SUMMARY.

4. THE SEVENTH LEBANESE-ISRAELI-US NEGOTIATING ROUND TOOK PLACE AT KHALDAH JANUARY 17. TWO AND ONE-HALF HOURS WERE SPENT IN PLENARY, AND AN ADDITIONAL ONE AND ONE-HALF HOURS WERE DEVOTED TO THE FIRST MEETING OF THE WORKING GROUP ON "TERMINATION OF THE STATE OF WAR" (SEPTTEL).

5. GOALS OF PLENARY.

THE DELEGATIONS SET THEIR GOALS FOR THE PLENARY AS (A) A CONTINUATION OF THE DISCUSSION ON TERMINATION OF THE STATE OF WAR, (B) EXAMINATION OF THE "GENERAL PRINCIPLES" RELATIVE TO THE OTHER ITEMS ON THE AGENDA, AND (C) FURTHER DISCUSSION OF THE WORKING METHODS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. SEPTTEL SUMMARIZES THE DISCUSSION OF

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TERMINATION OF THE STATE OF WAR IN BOTH THE PLENARY
AND WORKING GROUP.

6. DISCUSSION OF OTHER AGENDA ITEMS.

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SUBJECT: LEBANESE AMBASSADORS TO U.S., UN AND OTHER POSTS

FATTAL OPENED DISCUSSION OF OTHER AGENDA ITEMS WITH THE OBSERVATION THAT HE WANTED TO HEAR THE ISRAELI POSITIONS FIRST, SINCE LEBANON WAS MAKING DEMANDS ON ONLY ONE ITEM-- THE "PROGRAM OF COMPLETE WITHDRAWALS"--WHILE ISRAEL WAS MAKING DEMANDS ON THE REST. (IN LATER DISCUSSION, IT BECAME CLEAR LEBANON WAS ALSO DEMANDING THE "POSSIBLE

[REDACTED]

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GUARANTEES".) REFERRING SLYLY TO THE DECEMBER 14 "WORKING PAPER" (WHOSE EXISTENCE HAS NEVER BEEN FORMALLY ADMITTED IN THE PLENARY), FATTAL ASKED KIMCHE IF HE HAD A "WORKING DOCUMENT" TO SUBMIT. KIMCHE SAID HE WOULD BE HAPPY TO READ OUT THE ISRAELI POINT OF VIEW ON THE VARIOUS ITEMS.

7. SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS: ISRAELI POSITION.

-- KIMCHE READ THE ISRAELI POSITION ON SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS WORD FOR WORD FROM THE DECEMBER 14 "WORKING PAPER", WITH TWO EXPANSIONS AND TWO OMISSIONS. THESE WERE AS FOLLOWS:

-- KIMCHE JUSTIFIED THE NEED FOR EARLY WARNING INSTALLATIONS BY SAYING THAT THEY WOULD BE NECESSARY FOR THE INTERIM PERIOD IN WHICH THE LEBANESE ARMED FORCES WOULD BE REBUILDING THEMSELVES TO A LEVEL WHERE THEY COULD IN FACT GUARANTEE SECURITY IN THE SOUTH.

-- KIMCHE JUSTIFIED EXCLUSIVE RELIANCE ON THE LEBANESE ARMED FORCES IN THE SECURITY ZONE BY ARGUING THAT ISRAEL "HAD NOT HAD A GOOD EXPERIENCE WITH INTERNATIONAL FORCES"--THEY HAD NOT PREVENTED TERRORIST ACTS. (HE MENTIONED AGAIN THE RECENT DISCOVERY OF KATYUSHAS AIMED AT KIRYAT SHEMONA.)

-- KIMCHE AVOIDED DEFINING THE DEPTH OF THE "SECURITY ZONE." LATER, WHEN FATTAL ASKED THE ISRAELIS TO DEFEND A 45 KM DEFINITION, KIMCHE AND BRIG. GEN. SAGIE BOTH SPOKE EXCLUSIVELY OF 45 KMS. THE DECEMBER 14 WORKING PAPER SPEAKS OF 45-50 KMS.

-- KIMCHE DROPPED ENTIRELY THAT SECTION OF THE DECEMBER

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14 WORKING PAPER THAT ADDRESSED THE FUTURE OF THE "LOCAL FORCES" IN THE SOUTH.

8. SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS: LEBANESE REACTION AND DISCUSSION.

-- FATTAL SAID HE COULD RESPOND IN ONLY A VERY GENERAL WAY AND THEN SINGLED OUT THREE AREAS FOR REACTION:

(A) INTERNATIONAL FORCES. FATTAL STRESSED THAT THE ISRAELI AND LEBANESE POSITIONS WERE IN CONFLICT, SINCE LEBANON DID NOT INTEND TO DISPENSE WITH UNIFIL. IT WOULD SEEK TO GIVE ITS FORCES A STRONGER MANDATE AND PERHAPS A NEW DEPLOYMENT PATTERN. IT SAW NO REASON WHY THEIR PRESENCE IN THE SOUTH SHOULD DISTURB ISRAEL. SIMILARLY, LEBANON SAW NO REASON WHY THE MNF SHOULD BOTHER ISRAEL, SINCE IT WAS MADE UP OF NATIONS FRIENDLY TO BOTH COUNTRIES. KIMCHE REPLIED THAT ISRAEL HAD NO OBJECTION TO THE PRESENCE OF UNIFIL IN LEBANON, ONLY TO ITS PRESENCE IN THE SECURITY ZONE...IT MIGHT, FOR INSTANCE, BE POSSIBLE TO USE UNIFIL ON THE NORTHERN AND EASTERN BORDERS. FATTAL URGED KIMCHE NOT TO MAKE A DEFINITIVE JUDGMENT, SINCE, WITH THE DEPARTURE OF THE PALESTINIANS, UNIFIL'S SITUATION HAD CHANGED. LEBANON SAW ITS FORCES AS PLAYING AN IMPORTANT PSYCHOLOGICAL ROLE (IN THE SOUTH), ENCOURAGING THE RETURN OF THE POPULATION THAT HAD FLED. SAGIE REBUTTED THAT ISRAEL COULD HAVE RECONSIDERED ITS POSITION HAD UNIFIL NOT FAILED TO INTERDICT THE PLO IN THE PAST. NEITHER KIMCHE NOR SAGIE RESPONDED ON MNF DEPLOYMENT IN THE SECURITY ZONE.

(B) RECONNAISSANCE FLIGHTS AND NAVAL PATROLS. FATTAL DESCRIBED THESE AS DILUTING LEBANESE SOVEREIGNTY, BUT CONCEDED THAT LEBANON COULD ACCEPT THEM FOR A LIMITED PERIOD TO BE DEFINED.

(C) DEFINITION OF SECURITY ZONE. FATTAL ASKED THE

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ISRAELIS TO JUSTIFY A 45 KM DEFINITION OF THE SECURITY ZONE. (KIMCHE HAD MENTIONED NO SPECIFIC DISTANCE*) KIMCHE SAID IT HAS BEEN DEFINED IN ACCORDANCE WITH

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SUBJECT: LEBANESE AMBASSADORS TO U.S., UN AND OTHER POSTS

RTILLERY RANGE (SAGIE SPECIFIED THE 43 KM RANGE OF A
180 MM ARTILLERY PIECE) AND MIGHT VARY SLIGHTLY
DEPENDING
ON TERRAIN FEATURES. FATTAL NOTED THAT THIS
DEFINITION WOULD HAVE TO BE REVIEWED BY THE MILITARY
SPECIALISTS, SINCE, IF SYRIA ASKED FOR AS MUCH, ALL OF
LEBANON WOULD BECOME A SECURITY ZONE. THE LEBANESE

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WOULD THEN BE UNABLE TO ASSURE THEIR OWN DEFENSE AND
SECURITY.

9. FRAMEWORK FOR MUTUAL RELATIONS: ISRAELI POSITION

-- KIMCHE READ THE ISRAELI POSITION ON "NORMALIZATION"
FROM THE DECEMBER 14 WORKING PAPER (WITHOUT THE
DECLARATION OF NEUTRALITY). IN DOING SO, HOWEVER, HE
WAS CAREFUL TO AVOID USE OF THE TERMS "NORMALIZATION"
OR "OPEN BORDERS," AND HE INDICATED THAT LIAISON OFFICES
COULD EXIST IN BOTH COUNTRIES. ON THE OTHER POINTS,
INCLUDING "TERMINATION OF ALL ECONOMIC BOYCOTT", THE
LANGUAGE WAS IDENTICAL. HE STRESSED THAT WHAT ISRAEL IS
SEEKING IS "A SITUATION IN WHICH PEOPLE AND GOODS MOVE
IN BOTH DIRECTIONS IN ACCORDANCE WITH INTERNATIONALLY
ACCEPTED PRACTICES," I.E., PASSPORTS, VISAS, CUSTOMS,
ETC.

10. FRAMEWORK FOR MUTUAL RELATIONS: LEBANESE REACTION
AND DISCUSSION

-- FATTAL RATHER SURPRISINGLY RESTRICTED HIS REPLY TO
ONLY ONE POINT -- THE PASSAGE OF GOODS. HE COMPLAINED
THAT ISRAEL HAD OPENED LEBANON'S BORDERS WIDE TO ISRAELI
GOODS AND THAT, AS A NEGOTIATOR, HE FOUND HIMSELF
HUMILIATED TO HAVE TO NEGOTIATE UNDER THE PRESSURE OF
DECISIONS ALREADY TAKEN. ISRAELI GOODS, AS WELL AS
GOODS IN TRANSIT THROUGH HAIFA, WERE HAVING A HEAVY
EFFECT ON THE LEBANESE ECONOMY. NO LEBANESE GOODS WERE

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GOING TO ISRAEL. FATTAL RATHER GINGERLY APPEALED FOR AN(UNSPECIFIED) "GOOD WILL GESTURE" BY ISRAEL ON THIS POINT, SO "I COULD NEGOTIATE WITHOUT THE THREAT OF THIS PRESSURE."

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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-- LEAPING INTO THE BREACH FATTAL HAD OPENED, KIMCHE SAID THE PROBLEMS FATTAL HAD DESCRIBED HIGHLIGHTED THE NEED TO "REGULARIZE AND REGULATE" THE SITUATION. HE INVITED THE LEBANESE TO SIT DOWN TO A DISCUSSION OF THE "SIMPLE CUSTOMS MEASURES" THAT WOULD REMOVE THE PRESSURE THEY SAID THEY WERE FEELING. TO SHOW ITS GOOD FAITH, ISRAEL HAD TAKEN UNILATERAL MEASURES ON APPLES AND OLIVE OIL AS SOON AS IT HAD LEARNED THAT ITS EXPORTS WERE UPSETTING THE LEBANESE MARKET FOR THOSE GOODS. ON THE TRANSIT TRADE, KIMCHE SAID LEBANESE MERCHANTS WERE TAKING ADVANTAGE OF THE ABSENCE OF REGULATION, AND THE SOONER ISRAEL AND LEBANON ESTABLISHED CONTROLS THE HEALTHIER THE SITUATION WOULD BE. CONCERNING LEBANESE EXPORTS TO ISRAEL, KIMCHE HAD MFA BEIRUT LIAISON OFFICER YITZHAK LEOR DESCRIBE THE TRADE IN SCRAP METAL AND USED TIRES FOR RECAPPING THAT HAD ALREADY DEVELOPED; IN LEOR'S WORDS, "WHATEVER IS COMPETITIVE IS ALREADY BEING BOUGHT." TO THE DISCOMFIT OF THE LEBANESE, LEOR ALSO SAID THERE WAS A GROWING TRADE IN LEBANESE GOODS PROCESSED IN ISRAEL AND RETURNED TO LEBANON.

-- WITHOUT ADDRESSING THE OTHER ASPECTS OF KIMCHE'S PRESENTATION ON THE FRAMEWORK OF MUTUAL RELATIONS, FATTAL PROPOSED TO MOVE ON. KIMCHE WAS DELIGHTED TO DO SO, OBSERVING THAT "IF YOU HAVE NO OTHER REMARKS ON MUTUAL RELATIONS, THAT'S A GOOD SIGN." FATTAL OBSERVED DRYLY THAT "WHEN OBJECTING, ONE HAS TO BE CAREFUL WITH THE DOSE. MORE OBJECTIONS WILL COME LATER."

11. PROGRAM OF COMPLETE WITHDRAWALS: ISRAELI POSITION

-- AS HE HAD ON THE OTHER ITEMS, KIMCHE READ THE LANGUAGE OF THE DECEMBER 14 WORKING PAPER ON THIS POINT. HE DID ADD ONE IDEA: IF THE PLO COMPLETED ITS DEPARTURE, IF ISRAELI POWS, MIAS, AND KIAS WERE RETURNED, AND IF

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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SYRIA WAS PREPARED TO WITHDRAW FROM THE MATN, THEN ISRAEL WOULD BE PREPARED TO WITHDRAW IMMEDIATELY TO THE 45 KM SECURITY ZONE. DRAPER ASKED KIMCHE TO CLARIFY

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HETHER HE MEANT THE 45 KM LINE OR THE "DAMUR LINE".
KIMCHE AND SAGIE CONFIRMED THEY MEANT THE "DAMUR LINE,"
AND SAGIE CONCEDED THAT ITS EXACT DEMARCATION COULD BE
DISCUSSED.

12. PROGRAM OF COMPLETE WITHDRAWALS: LEBANESE REACTION

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AND DISCUSSION

-- FATTAL RESPONDED TO KIMCHE WITH AN APPEAL TO "ALL
DELEGATIONS" TO HELP LEBANON RESOLVE ITS DILEMMA ON
WITHDRAWALS: "UNLESS LEBANON NEGOTIATES WITH ISRAEL,
ISRAEL DOES NOT LEAVE, AND SYRIA AND THE PLO REMAIN AS
WELL. IF LEBANON NEGOTIATES WITH ISRAEL, SYRIA SAYS
IT WON'T LEAVE IF ANY CONCESSIONS ARE MADE. ISRAEL AND
THE PLO THEN REMAIN IN LEBANON, TOO." LOOKING AT DRAPER,
FATTAL REPEATED HIS APPEAL.

-- DRAPER CONFIRMED THAT THE US POSITION REMAINED THAT
ALL FOREIGN FORCES MUST LEAVE, BUT THAT THE COMPLEXITIES
OF THE NECESSARY NEGOTIATION WERE CLEAR. THE US WOULD,
FOR ITS PART, DO WHAT IT COULD TO MARSHALL OUTSIDE
SUPPORT FOR A CONCURRENT SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL. NO SINGLE
PARTY SHOULD HAVE A VETO ON THE PROCESS. THE ARAB STATES
MUST RECOGNIZE THAT SYRIA AND THE PLO MUST WITHDRAW
TO GET THE ISRAELIS OUT. THERE SHOULD BE NO RELUCTANCE
IN THE ARAB WORLD TO PERMIT THE NECESSARY NEGOTIATIONS.

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-- KIMCHE, CHOOSING TO INTERPRET FATTAL'S APPEAL AS FOCUSED ON SYRIA, EXPRESSED HIS PLEASURE AT FATTAL'S RECOGNITION THAT SYRIA WAS THE REAL PROBLEM. HE WENT ON TO COMPLAIN THAT NOT ENOUGH PRESSURE HAD BEEN PUT ON SYRIA AND THE PLO TO GET OUT. ONCE AGREEMENT WAS REACHED ON A PROGRAM OF ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL, THE ARAB STATES AND THE US MUST PUT PRESSURE ON SYRIA AND THE PLO TO WITHDRAW.

-- FATTAL REJOINED THAT THERE HAD BEEN NEGOTIATIONS WITH SYRIA AND THE PLO. THEY HAD NOT BEEN INTENSIVE, BECAUSE THE SYRIANS HAD ALREADY PROMISED TO LEAVE "WHEN THE

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EVACUATION BEGINS" AND THE PALESTINIANS HAD SAID THEY WOULD LEAVE "AT LEBANON'S FIRST REQUEST." WHILE THE LEBANESE WERE NOT NAIVE AND RECOGNIZED THAT THE TRUE VALUE OF THESE PROMISES WAS YET TO BE SEEN, THEY KNEW THE OFFICIAL SYRIAN AND PALESTINIAN MEDIA TO BE SPEAKING IN A VOICE DIFFERENT FROM THE LEADERSHIP.

-- KIMCHE COMPLAINED IN CLOSING THAT NO ONE HAD PUT THE PPALESTINIAN "PROMISE" TO THE TEST. GLANCING AT THE US DELEGATION, HE CONTINUED THAT ISRAEL HAD INSTEAD BEEN MADE TO FEEL ALL THE PRESSURE AND OUTRAGE ALONE.

13. POSSIBLE GUARANTEES

IN RESPONSE TO A REQUEST FROM KIMCHE, FATTAL EXPLAINED LEBANON'S INTEREST IN GUARANTEES. HE SAID THAT AS THE WEAKEST PARTY IT FOUND GUARANTEES ATTRACTIVE. THE PRESENCE OF UNIFIL AND THE MNF WAS ONE FORM OF GUARANTEE, BUT THERE WERE OTHERS -- SUCH AS COMMITMENTS BY FRIENDLY COUNTRIES -- THAT NEED NOT BE GONE INTO AT THIS STAGE. POSSIBLE GUARANTEES WOULD DEPEND ON THE STRUCTURE OF THE FINAL AGREEMENT AND THE ATMOSPHERICS AND SITUATION AT THE TIME.

14. WORKING METHODS

-- ONCE THE GENERAL DISCUSSION OF THE AGENDA ITEMS WAS COMPLETED, FATTAL TURNED TO THE WORKING METHODS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. KIMCHE HAVING AT AN EARLIER STAGE IN THE DAY AGREED THAT WORKING GROUPS COULD WORK ON DAYS OTHER THAN MONDAYS AND THURSDAYS AND MEET IN PLACES OTHER THAN KIRYAT SHEMONA AND KHALDAH, FATTAL PROPOSED THE CREATION OF FIVE WORKING GROUPS AND NAMED THE LEBANESE PARTICIPANTS: END TO STATE OF WAR (FATTAL), SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS (COL. RUHAYYIM), FRAMEWORK OF MUTUAL RELATIONS (AMB. KHARMA), PROGRAM OF COMPLETE WITHDRAWALS

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BRIG. GEN. HAMDAN AND COL. QA'QUR), POSSIBLE GUARANTEES
(ANTOINE BARUD).

-- KIMCHE REPLIED THAT ISRAEL CONTINUED TO FEEL THAT
AGREEMENT ON PRINCIPLES GOVERNING THE VARIOUS ITEMS
SHOULD BE REACHED BEFORE THEY WERE PUT TO THE VARIOUS

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WORKING GROUPS. THIS COULD BE DONE IMMEDIATELY FOR
THE TERMINATION OF THE STATE OF WAR (THIS WAS DONE;
SEE SEPTTEL). IN ANY CASE, ISRAEL WELCOMED SPEEDING UP
THE PACE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS AND WOULD BE PREPARED TO
MEET IN PLENARY OR WORKING GROUPS AT ANY PLACE AND ON
ANY DAY EXCEPT SATURDAY. IT ACCEPTED FATTAL'S LIST OF
WORKING GROUPS. OTHERS COULD BE ADDED IF NEEDED.

-- DRAPER ARGUED FOR FLEXIBILITY IN DECIDING WHEN A
GIVEN ITEM PASSED TO A WORKING GROUP. THERE MIGHT BE
ADVANTAGES IN MOVING AN ITEM TO A WORKING GROUP EITHER

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BECAUSE THERE WAS FUNDAMENTAL DISAGREEMENT IN THE PLENARY OR BECAUSE MORE DETAILED INFORMATION WAS NEEDED.

PRAGMATISM WAS REQUIRED.

-- AMBASSADOR KHARMA SUGGESTED THAT THE WORKING GROUP ON MUTUAL RELATIONS MEET IN INFORMAL, PRELIMINARY CONSULTATIONS TO TRY TO COME TO GRIPS WITH THE COMPLEXITY OF THE ISSUES, NARROW THE GAP IN THE POSITIONS OF THE TWO SIDES, AND MAKE A PROPOSAL ON PRINCIPLES FOR JOINT SUBMISSION TO THE TWO GOVERNMENTS. IF THIS PROPOSAL WAS ACCEPTED, THE WORKING GROUP WOULD THEN PROCEED INTO DETAILS. KIMCHE SAID HE HAD NO OBJECTION TO THIS "CONSTRUCTIVE PROPOSAL" AND OFFERED TO ENTER INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS AT ANY TIME.

-- IT WAS FINALLY AGREED THAT FURTHER PRACTICAL STEPS TO SPEED THINGS UP WOULD BE EXAMINED AT THE COMING PLENARY MEETING.

15. REPORT OF FIRST WORKING GROUP

-- THE PLENARY HEARD A SHORT REPORT ON THE FIRST MEETING OF THE WORKING GROUP ON THE TERMINATION OF THE STATE

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OF WAR (SEPTTEL).

16. PRESS STATEMENT

-- THE DELEGATIONS AGREED TO AN ISRAELI PROPOSAL FOR A PRESS STATEMENT (SEPTTEL).

17. COMMENT: THE JANUARY 17 MEETING PERMITTED BOTH SIDES TO STAKE THEIR INITIAL POSITIONS OUT FOR THE RECORD. THE ISRAELIS WERE MORE THOROUGH, DRAWING ON THE DECEMBER 14 WORKING PAPER IN ALMOST EVERY CASE. THE LEBANESE WERE VERY SELECTIVE IN THEIR RESPONSES, APPEARING IN SOME CASES TO ACQUIESCE IN ISRAELI POSITIONS. FATTAL DID, HOWEVER, RESERVE HIS RIGHT TO EXPRESS MORE OBJECTIONS. ALTHOUGH THE PROCEEDINGS HIGHLIGHTED THE EXPECTED DIFFERENCES ON INTERNATIONAL FORCES IN THE SOUTH, THE LEBANESE FAILED TO STAKE OUT A TOUGH POSITION ON "NORMALIZATION" AND STAKED OUT NO POSITION ON EARLY WARNING INSTALLATIONS. THEY APPEAR TO BE DODGING THE REALLY DIFFICULT ISSUES, HOPING AGAIN FOR FATHER CHRISTMAS TO DELIVER A GIFT.

18. THE ATMOSPHERICS WERE GOOD. THE VARIOUS PLENARY AND WORKING GROUP SESSIONS WERE CONDUCTED IN A BUSINESS-LIKE MANNER, WITH BOTH SIDES PRESENTING THEIR POSITIONS IN GENERALLY FIRM AND SOMETIMES BLUNT TERMS. THE

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PERSONAL RELATIONS AMONG THE DELEGATES OF THE THREE
COUNTRIES CONTINUE TO BE VERY CORDIAL. DILLON

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**EXCISE
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FROM HABIB

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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, MOPS, SY, LE, US, IS, XF

SUBJECT: HABIB/DRAPER MISSION: INITIAL PARALLEL

-- DISCUSSIONS WITH SHARON AND SHAMIR, JAN. 16

1.

2. SUMMARY: DURING A TWO AND A HALF HOUR MEETING
JANUARY 16, WE BEGAN OUR INTENSIVE EFFORTS IN ISRAEL
TO REACH AN EARLY ISRAEL/LEBANON AGREEMENT. SHARON
INITIALLY TRIED TO RE-INTERPRET OUR APPROACH, IN
ORDER TO MAINTAIN THE DIRECT ISRAEL/LEBANON NEGOTIATIONS

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AS THE PRIMARY VEHICLE FOR ADDRESSING SUBSTANTIVE
ISSUES. HOWEVER, SHAMIR HELPFULLY PUT THE CONCEPT
BACK ON BRACK.3. WE THEN REVIEWED THE MAIN SUBJECTS ON THE
AGENDA, DURING WHICH SHARON DREW EXTENSIVELY FROM
THE SECRET IIRAEI-LEBANESE "WORKING PAPER" TO DESCRIBE
ISRAEL'S SUBSTANTIVE POSITIONS. MY PURPOSE WAS TO
POSE QUESTIONS AND PUT DOWN CERTAIN MARKERS ON**UNCLASSIFIED**

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CONTENTIOUS ISSUES. DURING THE DISCUSSION, SHARON DESCRIBED IN GREATER DETAIL ISRAEL'S POSITION CONCERNING THE EARLY WARNING STATIONS. WHILE HE DENIES THAT THEY ARE AIMED AT ANY ARAB COUNTRY, INCLUDING SYRIA, HE CLAIMS THEY ARE NECESSARY TO OBSERVE AND INTERDICT INFILTRATION INTO SOUTHERN LEBANON. THE STATIONS WOULD BE MANNED BY ISRAELI SOLDIERS. AT THE END OF OUR GENERAL REVIEW, I SAID THAT THE MAJOR STICKING POINTS WERE LIKELY TO BE (1) THE EARLY WARNING STATIONS; (2) THE DEGREE OF INITIAL NORMALIZATION; (3) THE REQUIREMENT OF COMPLETE PLO WITHDRAWAL BEFORE ANY ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL; AND (4) THE ISSUE OF INTERNATIONAL FORCES (UNIFIL OR MNF) IN SOUTHERN LEBANON.

4. WE AGREED TO RESUME OUR MEETINGS EITHER MONDAY EVENING (WHEN THE ISRAELI NEGOTIATING TEAM RETURNS FROM KHALDAH), OR, MORE PROBABLY, ON TUESDAY. NO NEW GROUND WAS BROKEN IN OUR MEETING, BUT IT DID SERVE TO CLARIFY POSITIONS AND SET THE STAGE FOR OUR NEXT ROUND. END SUMMARY.

5. I MET WITH FONMIN SHAMIR AND DEFMIN SHARON FOR TWO AND A HALF HOURS EVENING SUNDAY, JANUARY 16, TO BEGIN OUR INTENSIVE EFFORTS FOR REACHING AN

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EARLY ISRAELI-LEBANESE AGREEMENT. CONTRARY TO OUR EARLIER UNDERSTANDING OF SMALL NEGOTIATING TEAMS, THE TWO MINISTERS WERE ACCOMPANIED BY A BATTERY OF AIDES, INCLUDING ALL THE MILITARY PARTICIPANTS IN THE KHALDAH/KIRYAT SHEMONA TALKS. AMBASSADORS LEWIS AND DRAPER, AND KRECZKO AND HARE ACCOMPANIED ME. (DESPITE AN UNDERSTANDING REACHED AT THE CONCLUSION TO PROVIDE ONLY GENERAL PRESS GUIDANCE OF THE MEETING, THE NEWS WHICH IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWED OUR MEETING (BY ONE HALF HOUR) REPORTED THAT I WAS ATTEMPTING TO REACH AGREEMENT WITH ISRAEL ON PRINCIPLES FOR AN AGREEMENT, WHICH I WOULD THEN "PERSUADE" THE LEBANESE TO ACCEPT. I LATER VIGOROUSLY BERATED HANON BAR-ON FOR THIS BREACH OF OUR UNDERSTANDING.)

6. AT THE OUTSET OF OUR DISCUSSION, SHAMIR OUTLINED HIS UNDERSTANDING OF THE AGREEMENT WHICH I HAD REACHED WITH PM BEGIN ON THURSDAY. HE SAID OUR PURPOSE WAS TO DISCUSS ALL ISSUES IN ORDER TO REACH AGREEMENT AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. MEANWHILE, THE KHALDAH/KIRYAT SHEMONA NEGOTIATIONS WOULD CONTINUE AND WOULD NOT BE DISTURBED BY THIS PARALLEL TRACK. I SAID THIS WAS AN ACCURATE REFLECTION OF MY UNDERSTANDING WITH BEGIN. I REVIEWED IN SOME DETAIL THE REASONS WHY PRESIDENT REAGAN THOUGHT IT WAS IMPERATIVE TO ACCELERATE THE NEGOTIATIONS AND REACH AGREEMENT "IN A MATTER OF DAYS, NOT WEEKS,"

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AS WOULD BE THE CASE IF NEGOTIATIONS CONTINUED THROUGH THE OVERT CHANNEL ONLY. I STRESSED THAT THE US AND ISRAEL SHOULD BE ABLE TO COME QUICKLY TO AN UNDERSTANDING IN THIS PARALLEL TRACK, AND THAT THEREAFTER I WOULD TRY TO OBTAIN LEBANESE AGREEMENT. I SAID THAT GEMAYEL HAD ENDORSED THIS APPROACH, ALTHOUGH HE HAD DECIDED NOT TO SHARE THIS INFORMATION AND HIS APPROVAL OF THE APPROACH WITH HIS COLLEAGUES.

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7. AT THIS POINT, SHARON GAVE HIS OWN INTERPRETATION OF WHAT BEGIN HAD ACCEPTED, PREFACING HIS COMMENTS BY SAYING THAT THE OVERT CHANNEL HAD PRODUCED "IMPRESSIVE RESULTS" AND THAT THE PACE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS COMPARED FAVORABLY WITH OTHER (E.G. VIETNAM) TALKS. HE STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF DIRECT ISRAEL/LEBANON TALKS. HE

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SAID OUR TALKS MIGHT "CLARIFY" POSITIONS, BUT SHOULD NOT BE SEEN AS A SUBSTITUTE FOR THE OVERT TALKS, WHERE MATTERS OF SUBSTANCE MUST BE RESOLVED.

8. I REPLIED EMPHATICALLY TO SHARRN'S INTERPRETATTN OF MY TASK, SAYING THAT OUR CONCEPT WAS TO ACCELERATE DISCUSSIONS ON A PARALLEL TRACK IN ORDER TO REACH AN AGREEMENT WHICH COULD THEN BE HANDED TO THE OVERT TALKS FOR ENDORSEMENT. WHILE WE HAD NO OBJECTION TO THESE OVERT TALKS, WE BELIEVED THIS INTENSIVE APPROACH WOULD BE MORE EFFICIENT AND FASTER. I ALSO

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POINTEDLY REMINDED SHARON THAT IT HAD TAKEN 3 OR 4 MONTHS, NOT JUST SIX MEETINGS, TO PRODUCE AN AGENDA. GIVEN SOME OF THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE TWO PARTIES, IT WAS ALSO CLEAR THAT CERTAIN BRIDGING CONCEPTS WOULD BE REQUIRED IN ORDER TO FACILITATE AN EARLY AGREEMENT AND THIS APPROACH AFFORDED THE BEST POSSIBILITY FOR QUICKLY CLOSING THESE GAPS. I EXPLAINED THAT IT WAS ON THIS BASIS THAT I HAD DISCUSSED THE CONCEPT WITH GEMAYEL, AND SECURED HIS APPROVAL.

9. SHAMIR THEN SAID HE WISHED TO CLARIFY THE BASIS FOR OUR TALKS, STATING THAT ISRAEL DOES NOT WANT TO PROLONG THE NEGOTIATIONS AND THAT IT WAS IN OUR COMMON INTEREST TO MOVE FORWARD. HE UNDERSTOOD FROM THE PRIME MINISTER THAT OUR TALKS WERE INTENDED TO INTENSIFY THE PACE, THOUGH, AS SHARON HAD STATED, THEY WOULD NOT REPLACE THE DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS. WITH SHAMIR'S HELPFUL DECLARATION, SHARON HAD NO FURTHER COMMENT AND WE PRECEDED TO REVIEW SPECIFIC ISSUES. EXCEPT FOR THE TERMINATION OF WAR ISSUE, SHARON DOMINATED THE EXCHANGE. IN PRESENTING ISRAELI VIEWS, SHARON RELIED HEAVILY ON THE "WORKING PAPER," AND READ LENGTHY EXCERPTS FROM IT.

10. TERMINATION OF THE STATE OF WAR. RUBINSTEIN PRESENTED ISRAEL'S PROPOSED FORMULA ON THIS ISSUE. (ISRAEL AND LEBANON CONFIRM THAT THE STATE OF WAR HAS BEEN TERMINATED. NO STATE OF WAR EXISTS BETWEEN THEM.) HE EXPLAINED THAT THIS DECLARATION SHOULD BECOME EFFECTIVE WITH SIGNATURE OR RATIFICATION OF THE AGREEMENT, AND SUGGESTED THAT THIS ISRAEL/ LEBANON AGREEMENT SHOULD "SUPERCEDE" PRIOR AGREEMENTS BETWEEN ISRAEL AND LEBANON. I FLOATED THE LEBANESE IDEA THAT THE DECLARATION OF THE TERMINATION OF THE WAR SHOULD ONLY BE EFFECTIVE AT THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE

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LAST ISRAELI TROOPS. SHARON INTERRUPTED RUBINSTEIN'S RESPONSE TO SAY THAT SINCE ISRAEL HAD ENTERED LEBANON TO LIBERATE IT FROM THE "TERRORISTS" THE PRESENCE OF ITS TROOPS WAS IRRELEVANT.

11. SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS. WHILE SHARON READ THE ENTIRE SECTION OF THE "WORKING PAPER" DEALING WITH SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS, OUR DISCUSSIONS FOCUSED ON THE QUESTIONS OF EARLY WARNING STATIONS AND AN INTERNATIONAL PRESENCE IN THE SOUTH.

12. SHARON EXPLAINED THAT ISRAEL SOUGHT THREE EARLY WARNING STATIONS, AT JABAL BARUK, NORTHEAST OF SIDON, AND NEAR NABATIYA. THESE WERE NECESSARY FOR "A PERIOD OF TIME" BECAUSE OF THE LAF'S LIMITED CAPABILITIES. (SHARON WOULD NOT SPECIFY A TIME, SAYING THIS WOULD NEED TO BE NEGOTIATED.) I PRESSED SHARON ON THE PURPOSE OF THE STATIONS. HE CLAIMED THAT THEY WERE NOT AIMED AT ANY ARAB COUNTRY, INCLUDING SYRIA, AND SAID THEY WERE DESIGNED TO DETECT EFFORTS TO USE LEBANESE TERRITORY FOR ATTACKS AGAINST ISRAEL. HE SAID THAT THE STATIONS WOULD BE ISRAELI-MANNED, AND WOULD CONSIST NOT ONLY OF ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT BUT ALSO ISRAELI SOLDIERS WITH BINOCULARS, ETC., WHO MIGHT EVEN DO SOME PATROLLING.

13. I CAUTIONED SHARON AGAINST ASSUMING THESE STATIONS SHOULD BE ISRAELI-MANNED. I SAID WE HAD ASSUMED THAT ISRAEL, LIKE US, WAS INTERESTED IN THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES. A RESIDUAL ISRAELI PRESENCE WAS NOT ONLY INCNSISTENT WITH THIS, BUT WOULD ALSO MAKE IT DIFFICULT TO SECURE

SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL. I SAID THAT WE NEEDED TO

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CONSIDER ALTERNATIVES. SHARON SAID THE ALTERNATIVE WAS A TWO-YEAR (OR MORE) ISRAELI PHASED WITHDRAWAL, SO THAT THE LAF COULD DEVELOP ITS CAPABILITIES AS ISRAEL WITHDRAWS.

14. I SUGGESTED THAT THE LAF MIGHT BE ASSISTED IN THE SOUTH BY UNIFIL OR POSSIBLY THE MNF. SHARON SAID THAT UNIFIL WAS UNACCEPTABLE, BECAUSE IT HAD COOPERATED WITH THE TERRORISTS. I REMINDED SHARON THAT ISRAEL HAD ORIGINALLY SUGGESTED AN MNF IN THE SOUTH, AND HE SOMEWHAT LAMELY RESPONDED THAT IN VIEW OF PLO RE-INFILTRATION OF BEIRUT BEHIND THE "BARRIER OF THE MNF," ISRAEL WAS NO LONGER INTERESTED IN AN MNF PRESENCE.

15. WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAELI FORCES. SHARON READ OUT THE FAMILIAR ISRAELI CONDITIONS FOR ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL. I SAID COMPLETE PLO WITHDRAWAL BEFORE ANY

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ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL MIGHT NOT BE ACHIEVABLE. I PRESSED SHARON TO SPECIFY A DURATION FOR ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL, BUT THE MOST HE WOULD SAY WAS THAT IT WOULD BE "AS SHORT AS POSSIBLE," ONCE AN AGREEMENT WAS REACHED.

16. NORMALIZATION. TO THE OBVIOUS DISCOMFORT OF THE FOREIGN MINISTRY OFFICIALS, SHARON EVEN CARRIED THE DISCUSSION CONCERNING NORMALIZATION. AGAIN, SHARON READ FROM THE WORKING PAPER. I PLACED EMPHASIS ON A MECHANISM FOR THE CONTINUING DISCUSSION OF BILATERAL RELATIONS AFTER WITHDRAWAL, AND THE ISRAELIS DID NOT OBJECT. THEY ALSO DID NOT OBJECT WHEN I POINTED OUT THAT WORDS LIKE "OPEN BORDERS" AND "TERMINATION OF THE

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ECONOMIC BOYCOTT" WERE CODE WORDS IN THE ARAB WORLD. SHARON ACKNOWLEDGED THAT EVEN IN NEGOTIATION OF THE WORKING PAPER, THE LEBANESE HAD DIFFICULTIES WITH "TERMINATION OF THE ECONOMIC BOYCOTT." AND, SHAMIR AGREED THAT THE PHRASE "OPEN BORDERS" WAS NOT ESSENTIAL, IF ISRAEL'S SUBSTANTIVE REQUIREMENTS WERE MET.

17. I ALSO RAISED THE ISSUE OF THE "FOOTNOTE" IN THE WORKING PAPER, WHICH REFERS TO INTERNATIONAL OBSERVERS AT THE BORDER, EMPHASIZING THAT THE LEBANESE FELT VERY STRONGLY ABOUT THIS. SHARON AND BEN-MEIR ARGUED THAT THIS WAS INCONSISTENT WITH A TERMINATION OF THE STATE OF WAR. WE POINTED OUT THAT UNTSO CONTINUES TO OPERATE IN EGYPT AFTER THE PEACE TREATY. THE ISRAELI RESPONSE -- THAT EGYPT ALLOWS UNTSO TO OPERATE WITHOUT ISRAELI CONSENT -- MAY PROVIDE, I BELIEVE, THE SOLUTION TO THIS PROBLEM IN THE LEBANON CONTEXT AS WELL.

18. I CONCLUDED OUR SUBSTANTIVE TALKS BY SAYING THAT THERE WAS SUBSTANTIAL AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE ISRAELI AND LEBANESE POSITIONS ON MOST ISSUES. HOWEVER,

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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THERE WERE SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCES ON FOUR ISSUES: (1) ISRAELI-MANNED EARLY WARNING STATIONS; (2) THE IMMEDIATE STEPS IN NORMALIZATION; (3) THE REQUIREMENT OF TOTAL PLO WITHDRAWAL BEFORE ANY ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL; AND (4) AN INTERNATIONAL PRESENCE IN THE SECURITY ZONE. SHAMIR SAID HE WAS ENCOURAGED IF THESE WERE THE ONLY MAJOR DIFFERENCES.

19. COMMENT: WE HEARD VERY LITTLE NEW FROM THE ISRAELIS THIS EVENING. HOWEVER, I BELIEVE WE HAVE CONVINCED THE ISRAELIS OF OUR SERIOUSNESS ABOUT AN INTENSIVE DIALOGUE ON THE ISSUES, AND WE HAVE LAID DOWN THE NECESSARY MARKERS ON THE MAJOR PROBLEM AREAS. WE AGREED TO RESUME OUR DISCUSSIONS EITHER MONDAY EVENING OR TUESDAY, WITH THE UNDERSTANDING THAT WE WOULD MEET ALL DAY ON TUESDAY. THE DELIBERATE INFORMING OF THE PRESS OF THE CONCEPT ON WHICH WE ARE PROCEEDING WAS UNDOUBTEDLY SHARON'S DOING. I BELIEVE HE DOES NOT LIKE THE IDEA, AND WISHES TO MAKE IT LESS THE FOCUS OF EFFORTS. SHARON IS LEAVING FOR ZAIRE FOR A FEW DAYS BUT IS LEAVING A MILITARY TEAM TO STICK TO HIS LINE IN THE MEETINGS. GROVE

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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

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TAGS: PREL, LE, IS, US
SUBJECT: DRAPER MISSION: SUPPORTING THE LEBANESE
POSITION ON AGENDA

REF: (A) TEL AVIV 567 (NOTAL), (B) TEL AVIV 536^M (NOTAL)

1. _____
2. ACTION ADDRESSEES--AND INFO ADDRESSEES AT POSTS'
DTSCRETION--SHOULD BRIEF HOST GOVERNMENTS ON

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LEBANESE-ISRAELI AGREEMENT 04 AGENDA FOR THEIR NEGOTIATIONS ALONG LINE OF FOLLOWING TALKING POINTS. THE PRESENTATIONS MUST BE UPBAT, EMPHASIZING THE POSITIVE. THIS IS NOT RPT NOT A DEFENSE OF U.S. AND LEBANESE ACTIONS, BUT AN EXPLANATION. THE MAJOR POINTS TO GET ACROSS ARE THAT WE ARE IN THE PROCESS OF ACCOMPLISHING VERY IMPORTANT GOALS WHICH SHOULD BE UNDERSTOOD AND APPRECIATED. ABOVE ALL, THE LEBANESE SHOULD BE SUPPORTED IN ALL OF THEIR EFFORTS TO MAKE THEIR COUNTRY WHOLE AND HEALTHY AGAIN.

-- THE USG REMAINS DETERMINED TO SEEK THE WITHDRAWAL FROM

LFBOF ALL EXTERNAL FORCES, AN ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OF THE RESTORATION OF FULL GOL AUTHORITY THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY. WE ARE ENCOURAGED BY THE SUCCESS IN ACHIEVING AN AGREED AGENDA FOR THE LEBANESE-ISRAELI TALKS. IT IS A VITAL FIRST STEP IN NEGOTIATIONS WHICH MUST MOVE QUICKLY FORWARD.

-- THE UNITED STATES, THROUGH THE DIRECT, CONTINUAL PARTICIPATION OF AMB. DRAPER AND THE RELATED EFFORTS OF AMB. HABIB, WILL SEEK TO EXPEDITE THESE ISRAELI-LEBANESE NEGOTIATIONS.

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-- THE AGENDA PROPOSALS FINALLY ACCEPTED WERE ESSENTIALLY A U.S. COMPROMISE CONCEPT. ALL AGREED TO DISCUSS THE AGENDA OPEN MINDEDLY WITHOUT COMMITMENT TO THE OUTCOME OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. WE EXPECT AND WILL PUSH FOR RAPID PROGRESS.

-- RECOGNIZING THE INTERRELATIONSHIP OF THE VARIOUS AGENDA ITEMS IS IMPORTANT. THE ONLY WAY IN WHICH ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL CAN BE ACHIEVED AND LEBANESE AUTHORITY RESTORED FULLY THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY WILL BE THROUGH A PACKAGE DEAL IN WHICH SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS, WITHDRAWAL OF SYRIAN AND PLO FORCES AS WELL AS ISRAELI, AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A NEW RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ISRAEL AND LEBANON WILL ALL BE INDISPENSABLE ELEMENTS.

-- THE AGENDA ITEM ON THE TERMINATION OF THE STATE OF WAR REFLECTS THE TRADITIONAL LEBANESE POSITION THAT THE STATE OF WAR AS EFFECTIVELY TERMINATED BY THE 1949 ARMISTICE AGREEMENT.

-- DEVELOPMENT OF A NEW RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ISRAEL AND LEBANON IS LOGICAL AND WOULD FLOW FROM THE TERMINATION OF THE STATE OF WAR. LEBANON SEEKS FROM THE NEGOTIATIONS SUITABLE ARRANGEMENTS WHICH WILL FORESTALL AND PREVENT ANY REASON FOR FUTURE MILITARY INTERVENTION FROM WHATEVER QUARTER. LEBANON WILL ALSO SEEK ASSURANCES OF

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NON-INTERFERENCE IN LEBANESE INTERNAL AFFAIRS.

-- THE LEBANESE ARE DETERMINED TO RESTORE THEIR COUNTRY TO FULL INDEPENDENCE FREE OF THE PRESENCE, DOMINATION OR UNDUE INFLUENCE OF OUTSIDE FORCES. THEY DESERVE THE RIGHT OF ALL FRIENDLY GOVERNMENTS.

3. TEXT OF AGREED AGENDA PROVIDED REF B. CABLE BEING REPEATED AS NECESSARY.
SHULTZ

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FOR AMBASSADOR DRAPER FROM THE SECRETARY

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PEPR, LE, IS
SUBJECT: ISRAELI-LEBANESE NEGOTIATIONS

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KEN DAM JOINS ME IN CONGRATULATING YOU FOR THE SUCCESSFUL
OUTCOME OF YOUR EFFORTS TO OBTAIN AN AGREEMENT FROM THE
GOVERNMENTS OF ISRAEL AND LEBANON ON AN AGENDA FOR THEIR
NEGOTIATIONS. WE KNOW IT HAS BEEN AN UPHILL BATTLE AND
ARE PROUD OF THE ROLE YOU PLAYED, ALONG WITH ALAN KRECKO,
CHRIS ROSS AND THE OTHER COMMITTED MEMBERS OF YOUR HARD-
WORKING TEAM. WE FULLY EXPECT THAT YOUR EFFORTS,
COMPLEMENTING THOSE OF PHIL HABIB, WILL WIN FOR THE CAUSE
OF PEACE THE AGREEMENT WE SEEK FOR THE WITHDRAWAL FROM
LEBANON OF FOREIGN FORCES.

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AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY JIDDA PRIORITY

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E.O. 12356: DECAPTIONED

FROM HABIB AND DRAPER

E.O. 12356: DECL: LOADR

TAGS: PREL, MOPS, SY, LE, US, IS, XP, PLO

SUBJECT: HABIB/DRAPER MISSION: LEBANESE VIEWS ON
- SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES

1. [REDACTED]

2. SUMMARY: HAVING SECURED PRESIDENT GEMAYEL'S
APPROVAL TO OUR CONCEPT CONCERNING ACCELERATION
OF THE NEGOTIATIONS, HABIB, DRAPER AND DILLON SPENT
MORE THAN AN HOUR WITH HIM JANUARY 14 AND AN HOUR
JANUARY 15 WITH HIS WORKING TEAM DISCUSSING THE
PRIMARY SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES WHICH WILL NEED TO BE

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RESOLVED IN AN ISRAEL/LEBANON AGREEMENT. SOME OF
THEIR IDEAS REMAIN ILL-FORMED, BUT THEIR BASIC MESSAGE
WAS CLEAR: LEBANON WILL GLADLY CONCLUDE AN AGREE-
MENT WHICH TERMINATES THE STATE OF WAR AND WHICH
PROVIDES ISRAEL WITH REASONABLE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS;
ALTHOUGH GEMAYEL PRIVATELY WOULD BE WILLING TO GO
FAR, THE CONSENSUS OF HIS ADVISERS IS THAT ANY
SIGNIFICANT MOVEMENT ON NORMALIZATION WILL HAVE TO
BE "FORCED" ON LEBANON AND WOULD RUN A SERIOUS RISK

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OF AFFECTING ITS INTERNAL CONSENSUS AND RELATIONS WITH ARAB STATES. SOME LEBANESE APPARENTLY BELIEVE THAT THEY HAVE A SYRIAN COMMITMENT TO SIMULTANEOUS WITHDRAWAL (GEMAYEL IS LESS SANGUINE) WHICH THEY BELIEVE WOULD BE JEOPARDIZED BY AN AGREEMENT WITH ISRAEL WHICH GOES VERY FAR IN THE FIELD OF NORMALIZATION. THE LEBANESE WILL BE LOOKING TO THE UNITED STATES TO SUPPORT LEBANON'S REFUSAL TO GO BEYOND WHAT IT CAN TOLERATE FOR INTERNAL OR EXTERNAL REASONS. END SUMMARY.

3. AS REPORTED SEPTTEL, GEMAYEL HAS AGREED TO OUR CONCEPT FOR ACCELERATING THE PACE OF NEGOTIATIONS. FOLLOWING HIS ACCEPTANCE, HABIB, DRAPER AND DILLON WENT OVER ON THE EVENING OF JANUARY 14 THE PRIMARY SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES WHICH WILL NEED TO BE RESOLVED IF AN EARLY ISRAEL/LEBANON AGREEMENT IS TO BE REACHED. WITH KRECZKO AND ROSS JOINING US, WE ALSO WENT OVER THE SAME SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES SEPARATELY ON JANUARY 15 WITH THE LEBANESE WORKING TEAM RESPONSIBLE FOR NEGOTIATIONS (FONMIN SALEM, PRESIDENTIAL ADVISERS GHASSAN TUENI AND WADIA HADDAD, FATTAL, HAMDAN, AND OTHERS).



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4. HABIB DID NOT EXPLAIN TO THE LEBANESE WORKING GROUP OUR NEW CONCEPT FOR ACCELERATING THE NEGOTIATIONS. ONLY GEMAYEL KNOWS OF THIS, AND WE WILL LEAVE IT TO HIM TO DECIDE HOW WIDELY TO DISSEMINATE IT WITHIN HIS OWN GOVERNMENT. THEREFORE, HABIB PRECEDED HIS SUBSTANTIVE EXCHANGE WITH THE LEBANESE WORKING TEAM WITH SOME GENERAL INTRODUCTORY REMARKS IN WHICH HE STRESSED THE NEED TO ACCELERATE THE PACE OF THE TALKS. HE CONGRATULATED THEM ON THE ACHIEVEMENT OF AN AGENDA WHICH PROTECTED THEIR INTERESTS, BUT MADE IT CLEAR THAT WE COULD NOT CONTINUE TO DEVOTE WEEKS TO SEMANTICS. IN PREPARATION FOR AN ACTIVE US ROLE IN BRIDGING SUBSTANTIVE DIFFERENCES, HE SAID, WE WOULD LIKE TO REVIEW AGAIN WITH THE LEBANESE THEIR POSITIONS ON EACH OF THE SIGNIFICANT ISSUES IN THE NEGOTIATIONS.

5. WHAT THE LEBANESE HAVE IN MIND FOR MONDAY AT KHALDAH IS TO TRY TO BREAK LOOSE THE NEGOTIATING LOGJAM BY PUTTING FORWARD IMMEDIATELY THEIR WILLINGNESS TO DECLARE THAT THERE IS NO STATE OF WAR BETWEEN ISRAEL AND LEBANON. THEY WILL PROPOSE THAT LEBANON PROVIDE ISRAEL WITH A "LETTER OF INTENT," IN WHICH LEBANON WILL COMMIT ITSELF TO A DECLARATION ON THE NON-EXISTENCE OF A STATE OF WAR WHEN THE

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LAST ISRAELI TROOP WITHDRAWS. IN EXCHANGE, LEBANON
WILL ASK ISRAEL FOR TWO IMMEDIATE GOOD WILL GESTURES:
-- A PULL-BACK TO DAMOUR AREA (ACCOMPANIED BY A
SIMULTANEOUS SYRIAN PULL-BACK); AND,

-- ENTRY BY GOL OFFICIALS TO THE ISRAEL/LEBANON
BORDER AREA, SO THAT THERE CAN BE SOME REGULATION
OF BORDER MOVEMENT. (LEBANON WOULD SELL THIS
LARGELY COSMETIC MOVE TO THE ARAB STATES AS A
"CLOSING" OF THE PRESENTLY "OPEN AND UNCONTROLLED"

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

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AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY JIDDA PRIORITY
USELO RIYADH PRIORITY
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BORDER. HAVING ESTABLISHED THEIR PRESENCE AT THE
BORDER WITH GOODS CONTINUING TO MOVE ACROSS,
LEBANESE HOPE THE ISSUE OF MOVEMENT OF PERSONS
AND GOODS WILL NOT NEED TO BE TREATED IN AN
ISRAEL/LEBANON AGREEMENT.)

(COMMENT: WHILE AN INTERESTING CONCEPT, WE ARE
CONCERNED THAT ISRAEL WILL NOT BEGIN ITS WITH-
DRAWALS UNTIL THERE IS A PACKAGE AGREEMENT COVERING
ALL ISSUES ON THE AGENDA, AND THE PLO HAS STARTED
WITHDRAWING AND THE POW/MIA ISSUE IS RESOLVED.
END COMMENT.)

6. BEYOND THIS, FOLLOWING IS AN ITEM-BY-ITEM ACCOUNT
OF THE LEBANESE POSITION AS IT STANDS NOW.

7. SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS.

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-- A. DEFINITION OF THE SECURITY ZONE. LEBANON WILL ACCEPT THE CREATION OF A SECURITY ZONE WHICH EXTENDS ROUGHLY 45 KMS. FROM ISRAEL'S BORDER. LEBANON ACCEPTS THAT THERE WILL BE LIMITATIONS ON THE WEAPONS WHICH THE LAF CAN MAINTAIN IN THE SECURITY REGION, AND THAT THERE WILL NOT BE FORCES HOSTILE TO ISRAEL IN THE REGION.

-- B. EARLY WARNING STATIONS. LEBANON WILL NOT AGREE TO ISRAELI-MANNED STATIONS AFTER ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL. LEBANON WOULD PREFER NOT TO HAVE EARLY WARNING STATIONS ESTABLISHED AT ALL. HOWEVER, IT WILL AGREE TO THEIR MAINTENANCE FOR AN AGREED TIME PERIOD AFTER ISRAEL'S WITHDRAWAL, PROVIDED REPEAT PROVIDED THEY ARE MANNED BY A THIRD PARTY ACCEPTABLE TO BOTH LEBANON AND ISRAEL AND PROVIDED THEY ARE DESIGNED SOLELY FOR THE DETECTION OF INFILTRATION (NOT AIMED AT SYRIA). THE LEBANESE ARE CONVINCED THAT THE SYRIANS WOULD NOT ACCEPT ISRAELI-MANNED EWS.

-- C. UNIFIL. WHATEVER WAS SAID IN THE SECRET "WORKING PAPER," UNIFIL IS A VITAL PART OF THE LEBANESE THINKING ON HOW TO MEET THEIR SECURITY REQUIREMENTS. LEBANON'S PREFERENCE IS FOR UNIFIL TO BE AVAILABLE FOR USE THROUGHOUT THE SECURITY REGION, BUT IT IS OPEN TO OTHER SUGGESTIONS. HOWEVER, THE LEBANESE BELIEVE IT UNLIKELY THAT THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL WOULD AGREE TO REMOVE UNIFIL COMPLETELY FROM THE SOUTH. THEY ARE NOT ATTRACTED TO THE IDEA OF STATIONING UNIFIL EXCLUSIVELY ALONG THE NORTHERN PERIMETER OF THE SECURITY REGION. (THE LEBANESE ALSO WANT TO CONSIDER THE MNF FOR THE SECURITY

[REDACTED]

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ZONE.)

-- D. LOCAL MILITIA. LEBANON INTENDS TO REINTEGRATE ALL OF THE LOCAL SOUTHERN MILITIA INTO THE LAF, THE POLICE, OR A BORDER GUARD. ACCORDING TO GENERAL HAMDAN, THERE HAVE ALREADY BEEN DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN TANNUS AND HADDAD CONCERNING THIS.

E. AERIAL RECONNAISSANCE. FONMIN SALEM SAID THAT LEBANON CAN ACCEPT ISRAELI OVERFLIGHTS ONLY UNTIL ISRAEL COMPLETES ITS WITHDRAWAL FROM LEBANON. HE, AND GEMAYEL, RECOGNIZE THAT ISRAELI OVERFLIGHTS WILL CONTINUE THEREAFTER, BUT THEY DO NOT WANT TO BE SEEN AS ACCEPTING SUCH FLIGHTS, AT LEAST IN WRITING. (GEMAYEL IS, HOWEVER, BASICALLY MORE FLEXIBLE ON THIS POINT.)

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F. RESIDUAL PLO PRESENCE. WHILE LEBANON COMPLETELY ENDORSES ISRAELI DEMANDS CONCERNING WITHDRAWAL OF ALL PLO COMBATANTS (ALTHOUGH NOT NECESSARILY BEFORE ANY OTHER STEPS TAKE PLACE), IT BELIEVES THAT SOME RESIDUAL PLO POLITICAL PRESENCE WILL BE NECESSITATED BY BOTH POLITICAL AND PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS (SOCIAL AND HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE FOR THE CAMPS). THE LEBANESE ARE THINKING OF DEFINING THE PLO PRESENCE IN THE SAME WAY THE EGYPTIANS DEFINE ITS PRESENCE IN CAIRO.

8. WITHDRAWAL.

-- A. DURATION. HABIB ASKED GEMAYEL POINT BLANK WHETHER LEBANON WANTED A GRADUAL ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL, AS WAS BEING CLAIMED BY SOME SOURCES. GEMAYEL EMPHATICALLY SAID NO, AND SAID HE WOULD WELCOME

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WITHDRAWAL TOMORROW, IF THAT COULD BE ACHIEVED. THE LEBANESE MILITARY BELIEVE THAT, FROM A LOGISTICS ANGLE, BOTH SYRIA AND ISRAEL COULD WITHDRAW WITHIN FIVE DAYS, ALTHOUGH THE LEBANESE WOULD CLEARLY BE SATISFIED WITH A 30-DAY WITHDRAWAL PERIOD. REGARDLESS OF DURATION, THE LEBANESE HAVE IN MIND TWO-OR-MORE STAGES IN A WITHDRAWAL (FOLLOWING AN INITIAL "GOOD WILL" DISENGAGEMENT). THE HALF-WAY POINT FOR ISRAEL WOULD BE THE ZAHRANI OR LITANI RIVER. FOR SYRIA, IT WOULD INCLUDE WITHDRAWAL FROM TRIPOLI, ZAHLA, MOUNT LEBANON AND SHTURA.

-- B. PLO. THE LEBANESE BELIEVE THAT THEY HAVE RECEIVED FROM ARAFAT A COMMITMENT TO WITHDRAW FROM LEBANON AND EVEN TO BEGIN WITHDRAWING FIRST. HOWEVER, THEY ARE AWARE THAT SUCH COMMITMENTS ARE GIVEN IN

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"A CERTAIN CONTEXT" AND THAT THEY WILL NEED TO REAFFIRM THE COMMITMENT WHEN THEY ARE MORE CERTAIN ABOUT ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL. THEY ARE PREPARING TO SEND TWO EMISSARIES BACK TO TUNIS TO RESOLVE THE TECHNICAL ISSUES RELATED TO PLO WITHDRAWAL. THE LEBANESE SAID THAT IT WAS IMPERATIVE THAT THERE BE AN AMERICAN AVAILABLE IN TUNIS FOR CONSULTATIONS, AND WE CONFIRMED THAT CHRIS ROSS WOULD JOIN AMBASSADOR CUTLER THERE IN PROVIDING WHATEVER ASSISTANCE THEY COULD.

-- C. SYRIA. THE LEBANESE WORKING TEAM WAS ALSO CONVINCED THAT LEBANON HAS A SYRIAN COMMITMENT TO SIMULTANEOUS WITHDRAWAL, PROVIDED LEBANON DOES NOT GO TOO FAR IN ITS AGREEMENT WITH ISRAEL. GEMAYEL IS LESS CERTAIN. HE IS WELL AWARE THAT THE SYRIANS CAN BE THE SPOILERS EVEN IF HE SECURES ISRAEL'S AGREEMENT TO A REASONABLE PACKAGE. GEMAYEL IS PLANNING A TRIP TO DAMASCUS SOON TO NAIL THE MATTER DOWN, BUT WILL WAIT UNTIL HE HEARS FROM HABIB OR DRAPER ON MONDAY ON HOW WE ARE DOING WITH THE ISRAELIS BEFORE GOING, SO THAT HE DOES NOT ARRIVE "EMPTY-HANDED." HE ALSO IS THINKING OF LATER VISITS TO SAUDI ARABIA, JORDAN, AND ALGERIA.

9. NORMALIZATION. THE LEBANESE, PARTICULARLY SALEM, WERE QUITE BLUNT ABOUT THE DIFFICULTY THAT THIS ISSUE PRESENTS. SALEM SAID THAT LEBANON "WILL GLADLY TERMINATE THE STATE OF WAR AND GLADLY AGREE

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ON SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS, BUT EVERY ASPECT OF
NORMALIZATION WILL HAVE TO BE FORCED UPON US"
(IMPLYING BY THE US IF NECESSARY). HE SAID THAT
THE COMPARISON WHICH THE ISRAELIS LIKE TO DRAW

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TO EGYPT IS UNFOUNDED, SINCE LEBANON IS WEAK AND
HAS A CHRISTIAN LEADER WITH WHOM THE ARAB HEADS
OF STATE WILL BE "MERCILESS." HE SAID THAT
LEBANON HAD "NOTHING TO OFFER" IN THE FIELD OF
NORMALIZATION, BUT WOULD WAIT TO SEE WHAT
ISRAEL WANTED AND WHAT THE US POSITION WOULD BE.
LEBANON, SALEM EMPHASIZED, EXPECTS THE UNITED
STATES TO SUPPORT IT IF IT CONCLUDES THAT IT
CANNOT GO BEYOND A CERTAIN POINT. HE REFERRED TO
STATEMENTS BY PRESIDENT REAGAN AND SECRETARY
SHULTZ WHICH PLEDGED SUPPORT FOR LEBANON WHENEVER
ITS INTERNAL CONSENSUS OR ARAB RELATIONS WERE
THREATENED.

10. WITH RESPECT TO THE SPECIFIC NORMALIZATION
ITEMS, WE HAVE ALSO BEEN TOLD THE FOLLOWING:

-- A. TERMINATION OF THE STATE OF WAR. ACCEPTED
BY THE LEBANESE, BUT IT CAN ONLY BE EFFECTIVE AFTER
THE LAST ISRAELI SOLDIER HAS LEFT LEBANON. (THIS
HAS BEEN FATTAL'S CONSISTENT POSITION IN THE
OVERT NEGOTIATIONS.)

-- B. MOVEMENT OF PERSONS. LEBANESE CAN "ENTERTAIN"
STRICTLY HUMANITARIAN MOVEMENT OF PERSONS ACROSS
THE BORDER, SUCH AS MOVEMENT BY RELIGIOUS PILGRIMS.
ISRAELI TOURISM IS "OUT OF THE QUESTION" IF ONLY BY
VIRTUE OF THE PHYSICAL DANGER "TOURISTS" WOULD BE
IN.

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-- C. LIAISON. THE LEBANESE ACCEPT THE NEED FOR CONTINUING DISCUSSIONS FOLLOWING ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL, BUT WANT THIS DONE THROUGH A "TRIPARTITE COMMITTEE" (ISRAEL, LEBANON, US). LEBANON WILL NOT ESTABLISH AN OFFICE IN ISRAEL. IT CAN AGREE THAT ISRAEL WILL HAVE A STAFF IN LEBANON TO SUPPORT THE WORK OF THE TRIPARTITE COMMITTEE, BUT DOES NOT WANT TO SEE AN ISRAELI LIAISON OFFICE, PER SE. AS RELATIONS DEVELOP, LEBANON COULD ACCEPT A DISCONTINUATION OF THE US PRESENCE IN THE TRIPARTITE COMMITTEE.

-- D. MOVEMENT OF GOODS. SALEM SAID THAT THIS IS THE MOST SENSITIVE ISSUE, MORE SO EVEN THAN THE MOVEMENT OF PERSONS. TUENI SAID THAT SAUDI ARABIA HAD ALREADY RESTRICTED THE IMPORTATION OF SOME LEBANESE GOODS, FOR FEAR THEY ARE REALLY ISRAELI-

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MADE GOODS WHICH HAVE BEEN BROUGHT INTO LEBANON. HE ALSO SAID THAT SAUDI ARABIA HAS BEGUN PUTTING LIMITS ON COLLECTIVE VISA REQUESTS FOR LEBANESE WORKERS, AS A WARNING.

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CHANNEL: n/a

-- E. BORDER ARRANGEMENTS. THE LEBANESE ARE STILL PLAYING WITH THE IDEA THAT THE UN MIGHT SOMEHOW TAKE OVER RESPONSIBILITY FOR THEIR BORDER; THIS, THEY FEEL, WOULD ENABLE THEM TO BE MORE FORTHCOMING REGARDING CROSS-BORDER MOVEMENT OF GOODS AND PERSONS ON A DE FACTO BASIS, OR EVEN A DE JURE BASIS IN SOME AS YET UNDEFINED CASES. WE POINTED OUT THAT THIS POSITION WAS UNREALISTIC AND THAT EVEN IF THE UN IS PRESENT AT THE BORDER, IT WILL MERELY OBSERVE. ACTUAL DECISIONS CONCERNING WHAT GOODS AND PEOPLE CROSS THE BORDER WILL STILL HAVE TO BE MADE BY LEBANON.

11, COMMENT: WHILE WE DID NOT LEARN ANYTHING NEW CONCERNING THE SUBSTANTIVE LEBANESE POSITIONS FROM THESE DISCUSSIONS, THEY WILL ENABLE HABIB TO PUT FORWARD CLEARLY TO ISRAEL THE CURRENT LEBANESE POSITION. IT IS CLEARER THAN EVER THAT (1) NORMALIZATION, (2) AN INTERNATIONAL PRESENCE IN THE SECURITY ZONE, AND (3) EW STATIONS WILL BE THE MAJOR STICKING POINTS. END COMMENT. GROVE

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E.O. 12356: OADR
TAGS: MARR, LE, IS
SUBJECT: DRAPER MISSION: LAF FORCES ATTACHED TO
UNIFIL

REF: BEIRUT 394 ✓

1. [REDACTED]

2. SINCE LEBANESE HAVE APPARENTLY EXHAUSTED BILATERAL
MEANS OF RESOLVING MATTER OF LAF FORCES ATTACHED TO
UNIFIL, WE AGREE WE SHOULD APPROACH ISRAELIS. SUBJECT
TO VIEWS OF AMBASSADOR HABIB, EMBASSY TEL AVIV IS
REQUESTED TO SEEK CLARIFICATION OF ISRAELI POSITION
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

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FROM MFA. WE SUGGEST THAT EMBASSY MAKE FOLLOWING
POINTS:-- LEBANESE CONCERN OVER THIS MATTER, AS EXPRESSED TO
US IN BEIRUT, IS CLEARLY STRONG. THE ISSUE APPEARS TO
BE UNDERMINING THE POSITIVE ATMOSPHERE THAT ISRAEL HAS
TRIED TO FOSTER WITH LEBANESE MILITARY AND CIVILIAN
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-- THE PRESENCE OF LAF PERSONNEL IN UNIFIL'S AREA HELPS

TO PRESERVE A MEANS FOR EXPANDING LEBANESE AUTHORITY THROUGHOUT LEBANON. THIS PRESENCE HASTENS THE DAY WHEN LEBANESE FORCES CAN ASSUME SECURITY ROLE WITHOUT OUTSIDE ASSISTANCE. IT WOULD SEEM TO BE PARTICULARLY IN ISRAEL'S INTEREST TO PROMOTE THAT RESULT. IF THE LEBANESE CHARGES OF IDF HINDRANCE ARE TRUE, WE DO NOT UNDERSTAND WHY THE EFFICIENT ASSIGNMENT AND ROTATION OF LAF PERSONNEL ARE BEING IMPEDED IN THIS M.

-- FINALLY, THIS ACTION APPEARS TO BE CONTRARY TO WHAT WE ALL ARE TRYING TO ACHIEVE IN THE LEBANESE-ISRAELI NEGOTIATING FORUM.

-- WE HOPE THIS PROBLEM CAN BE RESOLVED AMICABLY THROUGH THE LAF-IDF LIAISON COMMITTEE. SHULTZ

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DECAPTIONED

FROM DRAPER

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS; PINT, PINS, MOPS, MILI, SY, LE, US, IS, XF

SUBJECT: DRAPER MISSION: TERMINATION OF STATE OF WAR

REF: TEL AVIV 536^m

1. [REDACTED]

2. SUMMARY: ISRAEL AND LEBANON BEGAN THEIR SUBSTANTIVE NEGOTIATIONS JANUARY 13, WITH AN EXAMINATION OF THE AGENDA ITEM "TERMINATION OF THE STATE OF WAR". BOTH DELEGATIONS SUPPORT AN OUTCOME WHICH CONCLUDES THAT

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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THERE IS NO STATE OF WAR BETWEEN ISRAEL AND LEBANON, AND THEREFORE THIS AGENDA ITEM SHOULD NOT PROVE OVERLY DIFFICULT. THE MAIN PROBLEMS WILL BE (1) DRAFTING, BECAUSE OF DIFFERING VIEWS AS TO WHETHER THERE CURRENTLY IS A STATE OF WAR; AND (2) ENTRY INTO FORCE, BECAUSE

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LEBANON BELIEVES THAT THE NON-EXISTENCE OF A STATE OF WAR SHOULD ONLY BE DECLARED WHEN THE LAST ISRAELI TROOP IS WITHDRAWN, WHILE ISRAEL BELIEVES IT SHOULD BECOME EFFECTIVE UPON SIGNATURE OF AN ISRAEL/LEBANON AGREEMENT WHICH PROVIDES FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAELI FORCES.
END SUMMARY.

3. AS INDICATED REFTTEL, ISRAEL AND LEBANON AGREED ON AN AGENDA FOR SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSIONS AT THE JANUARY 13 SESSION IN KIRYAT SHEMONA. THEY ALSO AGREED TO BEGIN THEIR SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSIONS WITH AN EXAMINATION OF THE AGENDA ITEM "TERMINATION OF THE STATE OF WAR".

4. DISCUSSION CENTERED INITIALLY ON THE LEGAL QUESTION OF WHETHER THERE CURRENTLY IS A STATE OF WAR BETWEEN ISRAEL AND LEBANON. LEBANON'S LEGAL POSITION IS THAT THE 1949 ARMISTICE AGREEMENT TERMINATED THE STATE OF WAR BETWEEN THEM, AND THAT THIS TERMINATION WAS PERMANENT. IN SUPPORT, FATTAL ARGUED THAT UNLIKE TRADITIONAL ARMISTICE ACCORDS, WHICH ONLY SUSPENDED HOSTILITIES, THIS ARMISTICE AGREEMENT HAD BEEN IMPOSED BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL AS A PERMANENT END TO BELLIGERENCY. HE POINTED OUT THAT THE SECURITY COUNCIL HAD EXPLICITLY REJECTED EGYPT'S ARGUMENT IN THE EARLY 1950'S THAT THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT HAD ONLY SUSPENDED HOSTILITIES. HE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE ARMISTICE PROVISIONS HAD BEEN BREACHED SEVERAL TIMES, BY BOTH SIDES, BUT SAID THIS

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DID NOT RENDER THEM VOID. HE POINTED OUT THAT THE SECURITY COUNCIL HAD REAFFIRMED THE VALIDITY OF THE ARMISTICE REGIME SINCE THE 1967 AND 1973 WARS. AND, HE QUOTED VARIOUS ISRAELI OFFICIALS TO SUPPORT HIS POSITION.

5. RUBINSTEIN EXPLAINED THE ISRAELI POSITION THAT THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENTS ARE NO LONGER VALID. HE ALSO REFERRED TO THE EGYPTIAN POSITION IN THE 1950'S, AND NOTED THAT IT HAD BEEN SUPPORTED BY LEBANON AT THAT TIME. HE QUOTED LEBANESE OFFICIALS TO SUPPORT HIS POSITION, INCLUDING A CABLE FROM THE GOL TO THE GOI IN 1967, IN WHICH THE GOL DECLINED TO ATTEND A MEETING OF THE ILMAC "BECAUSE OF THE STATE OF WAR" BETWEEN THEM. HE SAID THAT LEBANON'S SUPPORT FOR EGYPT IN 1967 AND ITS ACCESSION TO THE CAIRO ACCORDS ABROGATED THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENTS AND RENDERED THEM VOID. RUBINSTEIN SAID

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THE ISRAEL/LEBANON AGREEMENT SHOULD REMOVE ANY AMBIGUITY CONCERNING THE EFFECT OF THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT.

6. AFTER THIS EXCHANGE OF LEGAL POSITIONS FOR THE RECORD, THE DELEGATIONS DECIDED TO PUT THE LEGAL DEBATE TO THE SIDE. (KIMCHE NOTED THAT IT HAD BEEN REFRESHING TO HEAR ONE OF ISRAEL'S NEIGHBORS ARGUE THAT IT WAS NOT AT WAR WITH ISRAEL.) BOTH WANTED TO BE ABLE TO CONCLUDE THAT THE STATE OF WAR DID NOT EXIST, AND THE QUESTION WAS HOW TO ACCOMPLISH THIS. THIS INVOLVES TWO ISSUES: THE TIME OF ANY DECLARATION CONCERNING THE STATE OF WAR; AND THE FORMULA FOR EXPRESSING IT.

7. WITH RESPECT TO THE TIMING OF ANY DECLARATION,

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EXDIS

ISRAEL'S POSITION IS THAT WHATEVER FORMULA IS AGREED, IT SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN ISRAEL AND LEBANON AND BECOME EFFECTIVE AT SIGNATURE. FATTAL SAID THAT LEBANON COULD NOT ACCEPT THAT IT WOULD MAKE SUCH A DECLARATION WHILE ISRAELI TROOPS WERE IN LEBANON. RUBENSTEIN POINTED OUT THAT THE STATE OF WAR HAD BEEN TERMINATED BETWEEN EGYPT AND ISRAEL AT THE SIGNATURE OF THE EGYPT/ISRAEL TREATY, EVEN THOUGH ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM THE SINAI WAS NOT COMPLETED FOR ANOTHER YEAR. FATTAL WAS NOT PERSUADED BY THIS PRECEDENT. (COMMENT: FATTAL CHOSE HIS WORDS CAREFULLY, AND DID NOT CONCEDE THAT ANY FORMULA CONCERNING THE STATE OF WAR SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN THE ISRAEL/LEBANON AGREEMENT, EVEN IF THAT PARTICULAR PART OF THE AGREEMENT DID NOT BECOME EFFECTIVE UNTIL THE COMPLETION OF ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL.

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FATTAL MAY HAVE IN MIND A UNILATERAL DECLARATION CONCERNING THE STATE OF WAR, AN OPTION WHICH WE HAVE HEARD HIM DESCRIBE TO GEMAYEL. END COMMENT.)

8. WITH RESPECT TO DRAFTING, WHAT WILL BE NEEDED IS A FORMULA WHICH AFFIRMS THAT A STATE OF WAR DOES NOT EXIST, BUT WHICH DOES NOT PREJUDICE THE POSITION OF EITHER PARTY AS TO WHEN THE STATE OF WAR WAS TERMINATED. AT THE END OF THE SESSION, RUBINSTEIN SUGGESTED THE FOLLOWING: "THE PARTIES CONFIRM THAT THE STATE OF WAR BETWEEN ISRAEL AND LEBANON HAS BEEN TERMINATED. NO STATE OF WAR EXISTS BETWEEN ISRAEL AND LEBANON." (COMMENT: RUBINSTEIN'S SUGGESTION IS CONSTRUCTIVE, AND REFLECTS SOME OF THE CONVERSATIONS WHICH WE HAVE HAD WITH HIM. THE WORD "CONFIRM" AND THE PHRASE "HAS BEEN TERMINATED" WERE PURPOSELY CHOSEN TO LEAVE OPEN THE QUESTION OF WHEN THE WAR ENDED. END COMMENT.) THE LEBANESE WILL RESPOND TO THIS FORMULA AT OUR NEXT SESSION.

9. OUR FIRST SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSION WAS A GOOD ONE. AS EXPECTED, BOTH DELEGATIONS FOUND IT NECESSARY TO PUT THEIR LEGAL POSITIONS ON THE RECORD, BUT

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THEY AGREED IN ADVANCE TO RESIST A LENGTHY LEGAL DEBATE
(FOR WHICH BOTH WERE OBVIOUSLY WELL-PREPARED). THE
PROBLEM AREAS IN THIS AGENDA ITEM ARE NOW CLEARLY IDENTIFIED,
AND THEY DO NOT APPEAR TO BE MAJOR. GROVE

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TEL AVIV 00567

DECAPTIONED

FROM DRAPER

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, LE, IS, US, XF
SUBJECT: DRAPER MISSION: SUPPORTING THE LEBANESE
POSITION ON THE AGENDA

1. [REDACTED]

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2. IT WILL BE IMPORTANT--NOW THAT THE ISRAELIS
AND LEBANESE HAVE AGREED TO AN AGENDA (TEXT BY
SEPTTEL)--TO BE PREPARED TO COUNTERACT ARAB WORLD
CRITICISM OF THE LEBANESE STANCE. THE DEPARTMENT
MAY WANT TO REFINE GUIDANCE FOR APPROPRIATE POSTS,
BUT I BELIEVE THAT IT SHOULD INCORPORATE THE
FOLLOWING MAJOR POINTS:

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--THERE IS NO NEED FOR THE LEBANESE TO FEEL DEFENSIVE. THEY HAVE ENTERED INTO FACE-TO-FACE, DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE ISRAELIS WITH AN ATTITUDE THAT ALL ISSUES CAN BE DISCUSSED, INCLUDING EVEN A PEACE TREATY WITH ISRAEL, BUT THEY WILL NOT NECESSARILY AGREE TO THEM. THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS IS NOW UNDER WAY FULLY AND THE OUTCOME IS NOT PRE-DETERMINED, AS WAS MADE CLEAR IN THE CLARIFICATION OF THE AGENDA STATEMENT. ALL AGREED TO DISCUSS THE AGENDA OPEN MINDEDLY "WITHOUT COMMITMENT TO THE OUTCOME OF THE NEGOTIATIONS."

--THE AGENDA PROPOSALS FINALLY ACCEPTED WERE ESSENTIALLY A U.S. COMPROMISE CONCEPT.

--RECOGNIZING THE INTERRELATIONSHIP OF THE VARIOUS AGENDA ITEMS IS IMPORTANT. THE ONLY WAY IN WHICH ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL CAN BE ACHIEVED, AND LEBANESE AUTHORITY RESTORED FULLY THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY, WILL BE THROUGH A PACKAGE DEAL IN WHICH SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS, WITHDRAWAL AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A NEW STATUS QUO IN THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ISRAEL AND LEBANON WILL BE INDISPENSABLE ELEMENTS.

[REDACTED]

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--THE AGENDA ITEM ON THE TERMINATION OF THE STATE OF WAR SHOULD NOT BE CONTROVERSIAL. LEBANON HAS TRADITIONALLY TAKEN THE POSITION THAT THE STATE OF WAR WAS EFFECTIVELY TERMINATED BY THE 1949 ARMISTICE AGREEMENT. WHAT IS LIKELY TO BE PRODUCED IS SOME KIND OF REAFFIRMATION OF THE FACT A STATE OF WAR BETWEEN THESE TWO COUNTRIES HAS NOT EXISTED.

--DEVELOPMENT OF A NEW STATUS QUO IN THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ISRAEL AND LEBANON IS TOTALLY UNDERSTANDABLE. LEBANON SEEKS FROM THE NEGOTIATIONS SUITABLE ARRANGEMENTS WHICH WILL FORESTALL AND PREVENT ANY REASON FOR FUTURE MILITARY INTERVENTION. LEBANON WILL ALSO SEEK IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS-- AND IN THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A NEW STATUS QUO-- ASSURANCES OF NON-INTERFERENCE IN LEBANESE INTERNAL AFFAIRS.

--OUTSIDE OBSERVERS SHOULD NOT NITPICK NOR CRITICIZE WHAT THE LEBANESE HAVE BEEN DOING. THE LEBANESE ARE DETERMINED TO RESTORE THEIR COUNTRY TO FULL INDEPENDENCE FREE OF THE PRESENCE, DOMINATION OR UNDUE INFLUENCE OF OUTSIDE FORCES.

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JERUSALEM/TEL AVIV FOR AMB. DRAPER FROM ROSS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, MOPS, MARR, LE, IS

SUBJECT: DRAPER MISSION: APPROACH ON LAF FORCES WITH
UNIFIL

1.

2. PRESIDENTIAL COUNSELOR WADI' HADDAD CALLED ROSS JANUARY 12 TO ASK THE US TO APPROACH ISRAEL ON THE SITUATION OF LAF TROOPS ATTACHED TO UNIFIL IN SOUTH LEBANON. WHILE IN THE PAST THE LEBANESE HAD, THROUGH THE LAF/IDF LIAISON COMMITTEE, BEEN ABLE TO DEAL WITH REPEATED ISRAELI EFFORTS TO HAMPER THE MOVEMENTS OF LAF TROOPS ATTACHED TO UNIFIL, THE ISRAELIS HAD, ACCORDING TO HADDAD, ESCALATED THE MATTER TO A QUESTION OF PRINCIPLE IN THE COURSE OF THE JANUARY 11 LAF-IDF MEETING. FOR THE FIRST TIME, THE ISRAELIS STATED THEY WOULD ACCEPT NO CHANGE IN THE LAF TROOPS ATTACHED TO UNIFIL. THEY WOULD PERMIT NO COLLECTIVE

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ROTATION OF TROOPS OR ANY RETURN OF TROOPS ON LEAVE. IN SHORT, THEY WOULD PERMIT NO LEBANESE TROOPS NOT REPEAT NOT ALREADY ON STATION WITH UNIFIL TO ENTER OR RETURN TO SOUTH LEBANON. LEBANESE ATTEMPTS TO DEAL WITH THIS POSITION THROUGH THE LAF-IDF COMMITTEE HAD PROVED FRUITLESS, SO UNIFIL COMMANDER CALLAGHAN HAD BEEN INFORMED AND WE WERE BEING ASKED TO TAKE THE MATTER UP WITH THE ISRAELIS. ROSS UNDERTOOK TO INFORM WASHINGTON AND AMB. DRAPER AND RECOMMEND AN APPROPRIATE

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APPRO A.

3. COMMENT: THERE IS A LONG HISTORY OF ISRAELI HARRASSMENT OF LAF TROOPS ATTACHED TO UNIFIL, BUT THIS IS THE FIRST TIME THE ISRAELIS HAVE INDICATED OPENLY THEY INTEND TO PREVENT ANY CHANGE IN LAF PERSONNEL. THIS POSITION IS INCONSISTENT WITH THE GENERALLY FRIENDLY RELATIONS THE ISRAELIS HAVE TRIED TO FOSTER WITH THE LAF AND CONTRIBUTES NOTHING TO THE CREATION OF A POSITIVE ATMOSPHERE FOR LEBANESE-ISRAELI NEGOTIATIONS. SINCE THE LEBANESE FEEL THEY HAVE EXHAUSTED BILATERAL REMEDIES, IT APPEARS APPROPRIATE TO APPROACH THE ISRAELIS AS HADDAD HAS REQUESTED. DILLON

NOTE BY OC/T: APPARENT OMISSION AT END OF PARA 2. CORRECTION WILL FOLLOW.

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EX-16 - SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MILITARY ADDRESSEES

FROM DRAPER MISSION (ROSS)

E.O. 12356: DECL; OADR

TAGS: PREL, MOPS, LE, IS, US

SUBJECT: DRAPER MISSION: AGREEMENT REACHED ON AGENDA
- FOR NEGOTIATIONS

1. ([REDACTED])

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2. SUMMARY: THE ISRAELI, LEBANESE, AND US DELEGATIONS AGREED JANUARY 13 ON AN AGENDA FOR THEIR DISCUSSIONS. AGREEMENT WAS REACHED AFTER ISRAEL ACCEPTED THE "MINOR" LEBANESE ALTERATIONS TO THE TEXT WORKED OUT AT THE LAST ROUND IN KHALDAH JANUARY 10 ON THE BASIS OF A PROPOSAL BY AMB. DRAPER. ISRAEL CONDITIONED ITS ACCEPTANCE ON LEBANESE ACCEPTANCE OF "MINOR" ISRAELI ALTERATIONS

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FO THE KHALDEH TEXT. NONE OF THESE POSED ANY DIFFICULTY EXCEPT ISRAEL'S INSISTENCE THAT THE WORDS "OR COMMITMENT" BE DELETED FROM THE PROPOSED "DISCLAIMER" ("ALL AGREE TO ADDRESS ALL THE ITEMS OPEN-MINDEDLY, WITHOUT PREJUDICE OR COMMITMENT TO THE FINAL OUTCOME OF THE NEGOTIATIONS"). BEGIN'S INSISTENCE THAT THESE WORDS BE REMOVED AND WAZZAN'S INSISTENCE THAT THEY STAY, AS EXPRESSED THROUGH THEIR RESPECTIVE STEERING COMMITTEES, CAUSED AN INITIAL IMPASSE. WORKING ON BOTH THE LEBANESE AND ISRAELI DELEGATIONS, AYB. DRAPER PROMOTED FIRST A LEBANESE COUNTERPROPOSAL SUBSTITUTING "WITHOUT COMMITMENT TO" FOR "WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO" (WHICH THE ISRAELIS PREFERRED) AND THEN ISRAELI ACCEPTANCE OF THE LEBANESE COUNTERPROPOSAL. AFTER AGREEMENT HAD BEEN REACHED ON THE AGENDA, BOTH THE ISRAELI AND LEBANESE DELEGATIONS THANKED DRAPER FOR HIS EFFORTS DURING THE FIRST SIX ROUNDS AND THEN PROCEEDED TO DISCUSSION OF THE FIRST ITEM ON THE AGENDA (TERMINATION OF THE STATE OF WAR). AFTER ISRAELI AND LEBANESE POSITIONS ON THIS ITEM HAD BEEN ESTABLISHED (SEPTTEL), FATTAL ASKED FOR A PRELIMINARY DISCUSSION OF THE PROCEDURES TO BE FOLLOWED FOR FUTURE SESSIONS. AFTER EXAMINATION OF VARIOUS ASPECTS

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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OF THESE PROCEDURES, IT WAS AGREED THAT DELEGATIONS WOULD MAKE CONCRETE PROPOSALS ON THE METHODS AND PACE TO BE FOLLOWED FOR FUTURE DISCUSSIONS AT THE JAN. 17 PLENARY TO BE HELD IN KHALDAH. EMPHASIZING THE NEED FOR RAPID PROGRESS, DRAPER ATTEMPTED TO HAVE THIS PLENARY MOVED UP TO JAN. 16, BUT FATTAL CITED TRANSPORTATION REQUIREMENTS AND THE NEED FOR TIME TO REFLECT AND CONSULT POLITICAL LEVELS AS GOVERNING THE PACE TO BE SET. WE WILL WORK ON WITH THE LEBANESE BETWEEN NOW AND JAN. 17 TO ENCOURAGE THEM TO PRESENT PROPOSALS ON METHOD AND PACE THAT ACCELERATE THE DELIBERATIONS SIGNIFICANTLY. END SUMMARY.

3. TWO AND ONE-HALF HOURS INTO THE SIXTH NEGOTIATING LROUND, HELD AT KIRYAT SHEMONA JANUARY 13, THE ISRAELI, LEBANESE AND US DELEGATIONS REACHED AGREEMENT ON AN AGENDA FOR THEIR DISCUSSIONS. THE TEXT AS AGREED IS PROVIDED BELOW. ADDRESSEES WHO RECEIVED THE TRANSCRIPT OF THE AGENDA AS READ TO THE PRESS BY ISRAELI MFA DIRECTOR-GENERAL KIMCHE WILL NOTE A FEW INSIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCES. THE PRESENT TEXT GOVERNS.

4. BEGIN TEXT:

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IT HAS BEEN AGREED BY THE PARTIES TO THE CONFERENCE

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TO ADDRESS CONCURRENTLY -- IN THE LIGHT OF THEIR
LINTERRELATIONSHIP -- ALL THE FOLLOWING AGENDA ITEMS:

-- TERMINATION OF THE STATE OF WAR.

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USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE
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EXDIS - SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MILITARY ADDRESSEES

-- SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS.
-- FRAMEWORK FOR MUTUAL RELATIONS, INCLUDING SUCH
ISSUES AS: LIAISON; ENDING OF HOSTILE PROPAGANDA;
THE MOVEMENT OF GOODS, PRODUCTS AND PERSONS;
COMMUNICATIONS, ETC.
-- PROGRAM OF COMPLETE WITHDRAWALS; CONDITIONS FOR
ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL, WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF THE
EVACUATION OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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-- POSSIBLE GUARANTEES.

NOTE: THE AGENDA HAS INCORPORATED THE SUBJECTS
PROPOSED BY THE DELEGATIONS OF ISRAEL AND LEBANON.
ALL AGREE TO ADDRESS THE ITEMS ON THE AGENDA OPEN-
MINDEDLY, WITHOUT COMMITMENT TO THE OUTCOME OF THE
NEGOTIATIONS. EACH DELEGATION MAY RAISE SUBJECTS
ADDITIONAL TO THOSE ON THE AGENDA. END TEXT.

5. AGREEMENT WAS REACHED IN THE FOLLOWING STAGES:

-- AT THE OPENING OF THE PLENARY SESSION, DRAPER,
WITH FATTAL'S CONCURRENCE, PRESENTED THE LEBANESE
AMENDMENTS TO THE AGENDA PROPOSAL CONSIDERED AT
THE FIFTH SESSION AT KHALDAH JANUARY 10 (BEIRUT
00300). FATTAL TRIED TO ADD AN ADDITIONAL AMENDMENT --
SUBSTITUTION OF "NON-LEBANESE FORCES" FOR "FOREIGN
FORCES" IN THE FOURTH AGENDA ITEM. AFTER KIMCHE
EXPRESSED ISRAEL'S CONCERN THAT "NON-LEBANESE FORCES"
MIGHT NOT COVER PLO FIGHTERS WITH LEBANESE NATION-
ALITY, FATTAL AGREED HE WOULD NOT INSIST ON THE
CHANGE.

-- AFTER NOTING LEBANON'S ACCEPTANCE OF THE KHALDAH
PROPOSAL WITH "MINOR ALTERATIONS," TO USE THE WORDS
OF THE LEBANESE, KIMCHE ANNOUNCED THAT, IN A SPIRIT
OF COOPERATION, ISRAEL WOULD AGREE TO THE PROPOSAL,
INCLUDING THE LEBANESE ALTERATIONS, PROVIDED THE
LEBANESE ACCEPTED A NUMBER OF "MINOR" ISRAELI
ALTERATIONS: (A) THE WORD "ALL" SHOULD BE ADDED
BEFORE "THE FOLLOWING AGENDA ITEMS" IN THE FIRST
SENTENCE OF THE AGENDA. (B) THE PHRASE
"IN THE LIGHT OF THEIR INTERRELATIONSHIP" IN THE

[REDACTED]

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FIRST SENTENCE SHOULD BE MOVED, PERHAPS TO THE END OF THE SENTENCE, TO AVOID THE APPARENT REFERENCE OF "THEIR" TO "THE PARTIES" AS ADDED BY THE LEBANESE. (C) WHILE THE BRACKETS AROUND THE FIFTH AGENDA ITEM -- "FUTURE GUARANTEES" -- COULD BE REMOVED AS AN ISRAELI GESTURE TOWARD THE LEBANESE, THE LANGUAGE IN THE OTHER BRACKETED PHRASE -- "WITHOUT PREJUDICE OR COMMITMENT TO THE FINAL OUTCOME OF THE NEGOTIATIONS" -- MUST BE CHANGED. KIMCHE SUGGESTED THAT THE AFFECTED SENTENCE READ AS FOLLOWS: "ALL AGREE TO ADDRESS THE ITEMS ON THE AGENDA OPEN MINDEDLY, WITHOUT PREJUDICE AS TO THE OUTCOME OF THE NEGOTIATIONS."

-- FATTAL IMMEDIATELY REPLIED THAT HE COULD ACCEPT ALL THE ISRAELI CHANGES EXCEPT THE DELETION OF THE WORDS "OR COMMITMENT" (SEE C ABOVE). IN SPITE OF KIMCHE'S URGINGS, WHICH STRESSED THAT ISRAEL HAD ACCEPTED INCLUSION OF THE AFFECTED SENTENCE "ONLY WITH VERY GREAT DIFFICULTY" AND THAT THE WORDS "OR COMMITMENT" MERELY STRENGTHENED "WITHOUT PREJUDICE" AND DID NOT ADD A NEW IDEA, FATTAL STOOD FAST ON THIS POINT, STATING HE HAD AN "IMPERATIVE MANDATE" NOT TO TOUCH THIS SENTENCE (HE MEANT SPECIFICALLY THE WORD "COMMITMENT"). INDEED, HE SAID, HE COULD NOT EVEN GO BACK TO HIS GOVERNMENT ON IT. AT THIS POINT, DRAPER SUGGESTED A SHORT HEADS OF DELEGATION MEETING.

-- IN THE "SHORT" HEADS OF DELEGATION MEETING, WHICH LASTED TWO HOURS WITH MANY INTERRUPTIONS FOR TELEPHONE CALLS TO JERUSALEM AND BEIRUT, AN INITIAL IMPASSE QUICKLY DEVELOPED. KIMCHE INSISTED THAT PRIME MINISTER BEGIN HIMSELF HAD INSISTED AT THE JANUARY 12 MEETING OF THE ISRAELI

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EXDIS - SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MILITARY ADDRESSEES

STEERING COMMITTEE THAT THE WORDS "OR COMMITMENT"
BE DELETED IN EXCHANGE FOR ALL THE LEBANESE CHANGES
THE ISRAELIS
WERE ACCEPTING. FATTAL EQUALLY
ADAMANTLY INSISTED THAT PRIME MINISTER WAZZAN HAD
REITERATED THE IMPERATIVE MANDATE NOT TO DELETE
"OR COMMITMENT" AT THE JANUARY 12 MEETING OF THE
LEBANESE STEERING COMMITTEE. DRAPER, FOR HIS
PART, ARGUING THAT THE REDUNDANCY BETWEEN "WITHOUT



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PREJUDICE TO" AND "WITHOUT COMMITMENT TO" MADE IT
IMMATERIAL WHETHER THE WORD WAS INCLUDED OR REMOVED,
URGED FATTAL TO TRANSMIT TO HIS GOVERNMENT THE
STRONG VIEW OF THE US DELEGATION THAT "WITHOUT
PREJUDICE TO" FULLY PROTECTED THE LEBANESE POSITION.
THIS BEING THE CASE, THE US RECOMMENDED MOVING
AHEAD RAPIDLY. TO REINFORCE HIS POINT, DRAPER
CALLED AMB. DILLON AND ASKED HIM TO WEIGH IN WITH
THE LEBANESE IN BEIRUT AS WELL. FATTAL EVENTUALLY
CAME BACK WITH A COUNTERPROPOSAL BY WHICH THE
LEBANESE WOULD ACCEPT DELETION OF "WITHOUT PREJUDICE
TO" IN FAVOR OF "WITHOUT COMMITMENT TO." DRAPER
HAD MEANWHILE ASCERTAINED FROM DILLON AND FATTAL

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THAT THE WORD "COMMITMENT" WAS WAZZAN'S RED LINE AND HAD RELAYED THIS TO KIMCHE, URGING HIM STRONGLY TO SEEK BEGIN'S APPROVAL FOR THE LEBANESE COUNTER-PROPOSAL. THROUGH FOREIGN MINISTER SHAMIR, KIMCHE WAS FINALLY ABLE TO REACH BEGIN AFTER HIS MEETING WITH AMB. HABIB BROKE UP AND PUT THE LEBANESE COUNTERPROPOSAL TO HIM, ALONG WITH ONE OR TWO OTHER ALTERNATIVE WORDINGS THAT HAD EMERGED FROM A MARATHON HUNT FOR NEW PHRASES AND SYNONYMS THAT THE HEADS OF DELEGATION AND THEIR ADVISERS HAD ENGAGED IN.

-- KIMCHE RESUMED THE PLENARY TO CONVEY THE ISRAELI RESPONSE TO THE LEBANESE COUNTERPROPOSAL. "TO DISPLAY OUR POSITIVE AND FRIENDLY ATTITUDE TOWARD LEBANON," KIMCHE ANNOUNCED, "WE HAVE AGREED TO THE SUBSTITUTION OF THE WORD "COMMITMENT" FOR "PREJUDICE." FATTAL EXPRESSED HIS THANKS AND HIS CONVICTION THAT THE DISCUSSIONS COULD NOW GO FORWARD.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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6. BEFORE READING THE AGREED AGENDA AS PRESENTED ABOVE, KIMCHE SAID HE WISHED TO RECORD HIS THANKS AND PRAISE TO AMB. DRAPER FOR "HIS CONSTRUCTIVE CONTRIBUTION TO THESE OPENING ROUNDS AND FOR THE WAY HE HAS HELPED US REACH AGREEMENT ON AN AGENDA." FATTAL ASSOCIATED HIMSELF WITH KIMCHE'S REMARKS, ADDING THAT "HIS IMAGINATION AND INGENUITY BROUGHT US HERE."

7. AT KIMCHE'S SUGGESTION, THE PLENARY BEGAN A DISCUSSION OF THE FIRST AGENDA ITEM -- TERMINATION OF THE STATE OF WAR -- BEFORE BREAKING FOR LUNCH, THUS PERMITTING THE DESIGNATED SPOKESMAN, AVI PANZER, TO ANNOUNCE TO THE PRESS BOTH AGREEMENT ON AN AGENDA AND THE BEGINNING OF SUBSTANTIVE DELIBERATIONS. THE DETAILS OF THESE DELIBERATIONS ARE BEING REPORTED IN A SEPTTEL FROM JERUSALEM.

8. AFTER FATTAL EOR THE LEBANESE AND KIMCHE AND ELI RUBENSTEIN FOR THE ISRAELIS HAD EXPRESSED THEIR POSITIONS ON THE TERMINATION OF THE STATE OF WAR AND RELATED POINTS, FATTAL ASKED THAT THE PLENARY TURN TO AN EXAMINATION OF THE PROCEDURES TO BE USED FOR THE SUBSTANTIVE TALKS. AFTER DISCUSSING HOW AGENDA ITEMS WOULD BE HANDLED, THE FORMATION OF WORKING GROUPS, THE POSSIBILITY OF HOLDING MEETINGS OVER TWO OR MORE DAYS, AND STEPPING UP THE PACE OF MEETINGS, THE PLENARY AGREED THAT

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THE DELEGATIONS SHOULD PREPARE CONCRETE PROPOSALS
FOR THE METHODS AND PACE TO BE APPLIED IN FUTURE
DISCUSSIONS FOR PRESENTATION AT THE NEXT PLENARY
JANUARY 17 IN KHALDAH. DRAPER ARGUED FOR INTENSIFYING
THE DELIBERATIONS IMMEDIATELY BY MOVING THE NEXT

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EXDIS - SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MILITARY ADDRESSEES

LENARY UP TO SUNDAY, BUT FATTAL ARGUED THAT THE
CADENCE OF MEETINGS HAD TO BE GOVERNED BY TRAVEL

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REQUIREMENTS AND THE NEED TO REFLECT AND CONSULT WITH THE POLITICAL LEVEL. (WE WILL BE WORKING WITH THE LEBANESE BETWEEN NOW AND THE NEXT PLENARY TO ENCOURAGE THEM TO PRESENT PROPOSALS THAT SPEED THE PACE UP SIGNIFICANTLY.)

9. COMMENT: WHILE AGREEMENT ON THE AGENDA IS

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A REFRESHING ACHIEVEMENT AFTER SIX ROUNDS, IT REMAINS TO BE SEEN HOW MUCH WE WILL BE ABLE TO ACCELERATE THE SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSIONS. GIVEN THE RELATIONSHIP OF THIS ISSUE TO AMB. HABIB'S CONCURRENT AND UPCOMING DISCUSSIONS IN JERUSALEM AND BEIRUT, WE DEFER TO AMBS. HABIB AND DRAPER FOR FURTHER REFLECTIONS. DILLON

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STATEMENT OF STATE

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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, EG, IS, LE, US
SUBJECT: GHORBAL MEETING WITH HABIB

1. [REDACTED]
2. IN RESPONSE TO A REQUEST, AMBASSADOR HABIB MET WITH EGYPTIAN AMBASSADOR GHORBAL FRIDAY, JAN. 7. ALSO ATTENDING WERE EGYPTIAN DCM ELZOEBY AND NEA/EGY BRILL.
3. FOLLOWING OPENING PLEASANTRIES, GHORBAL ASKED HABIB WHAT THE U.S. WAS DOING TO MOVE THE LEBANON NEGOTIATIONS FORWARD. HABIB REPLIED THT HE WOULD BE RETURNING TO THE REGION EARLY THE WEEK OF JANUARY 10 TO MEET WITH ISRAELI

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AND LEBANESE OFFICIALS. IN THESE MEETINGS, HE WOULD SEEK COMMON GROUND ON THE THREE ELEMENTS OF A SETTLEMENT--WITHDRAWAL, SECURITY, AND FUTURE RELATIONS. ON THIS LATTER POINT, HABIB NOTED THAT THERE WAS A GROWING IMPRESSION THAT BOUTROS GHALI AND OSAMA EL-BAZ HAD USED THEIR VISIT TO BEIRUT TO TELL THE LEBANESE NOT TO REACH A DEAL WITH THE ISRAELIS. HABIB INDICATED HE WAS CONCERNED ABOUT THIS BECAUSE HE HAD ASKED BOUTROS FOR HELP PRIOR TO THIS TRIP. HABIB SAID IF HE WAS TO

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SUCCEED, HE NEEDED NOT ONLY EGYPT'S HELP, BUT THE HELP OF ALL THE MODERATE ARABS.- IN THIS REGARD, LEBANON'S FRIENDS SHOULD NOT BE TELLING IT NOT TO DISCUSS ANYTHING BUT WITHDRAWAL ISSUES. THE LEBANESE WILL NOT GO BEYOND WHAT THEY BELIEVE IS SUSTAINABLE WITHIN THEIR POLITICAL CONSENSUS. HABIB SAID HE WOULD KEEP MUBARAK INFORMED OF HIS PROGRESS AND WOULD VISIT CAIRO IF CONDITIONS PERMITTED. IN ANY EVENT, HE SAID HE WOULD BE IN WASHINGTON FOR MUBARAK'S VISIT.

4. GHORBAL RESPONDED THAT THERE WAS NO TRUTH TO ANY SUGGESTION THE EGYPTIANS WERE BEING UNHELPFUL WITH THE LEBANESE. HE NOTED THOUGH THAT LIKE THE U.S., THE EGYPTIANS HAD ADVISED THE LEBANESE AGAINST AGREEING TO NEGOTIATIONS IN JERUSALEM. GHORBAL THEN CHARGED THE U.S. WAS SUCCUMBING TO ISRAELI PRESSURE ON LEBANON (A THEME THAT DOMINATED THE REST OF THE CONVERSATION) AND NOTED THAT EGYPT IS AN ALUMNUS OF NEGOTIATIONS WITH ISRAEL AND RECOGNIZED THE SIGNS. GHORBAL CONTINUED BY CHARACTERIZING RECENT U.S. PUBLIC STATEMENTS ON LEBANON AS BEING WEAKER THAN EARLIER ONES, SINGLING OUT THE PRESIDENT'S RESPONSE TO A QUESTION ON LEBANON AT HIS LAST NEWS CONFERENCE.

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5. HABIB REJECTED GHORBAL'S COMMENTS, NOTING THE STRONG SENSE OF URGENCY AT THE HIGHEST LEVELS OF THE USG TO GET PROGRESS IN LEBANON. HE SAID HE WAS BEING SENT BACK TO THE REGION PRECISELY BECAUSE OF OUR CONCERNS OVER PROBLEMS THAT WERE DEVELOPING IN THE NEGOTIATIONS, WHICH HE AGREED RESEMBLED PROBLEMS IN EARLIER EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI NEGOTIATIONS. HABIB SAID THE U.S. POSITION HAD ALWAYS BEEN THAT WE WOULD SUPPORT WHATEVER THE LEBANESE BELIEVED WAS POSSIBLE. GHORBAL INTERJECTED THAT THE U.S. HAD SAID BEFORE IT DID NOT THINK A PEACE TREATY OR NORMALIZATION ISSUES SHOULD BE LINKED WITH WITHDRAWAL NEGOTIATIONS, BUT NOW THERE WAS MUCH TALK FROM THE U.S. OF NORMALIZATION. HABIB REPLIED WE HAVE ALWAYS BELIEVED THAT ISSUES RELATED TO FUTURE RELATIONS WOULD BE INVOLVED IN THE WITHDRAWAL NEGOTIATIONS, BUT THAT THE LEBANESE CAN ONLY BE EXPECTED TO GO AS FAR AS THEIR CONSENSUS WILL LET THEM. WE ARE NOT GOING TO LET ANYONE FORCE OUT A PRIME MINISTER OVER THESE ISSUES.

6. REGAINING THE INITIATIVE, GHORBAL SAID EGYPT IS NOT ARGUING WITH THE U.S. OVER LEBANON, IT IS TRYING TO TELL THE U.S. SOMETHING. WE SHARE THE SAME GOALS IN LEBANON AND FOR THE PEACE PROCESS. THE PROBLEM IS THERE IS A PERCEPTION IN THE REGION THAT THE U.S. IS WEAKENING ON

LEBANON BECAUSE OF ISRAELI PRESSURE, THIS IN A SITUATION

WHERE ISRAEL HAS TO WITHDRAW EVENTUALLY. THIS HAS VERY BAD IMPLICATIONS FOR THE PEACE PROCESS. WHAT GHORBAL ASKED ARE THE JORDANIANS, THE PALESTINIANS, AND THE SAUDIS TO THINK ABOUT YOUR WILLINGNESS AND ABILITY TO MOVE THE ISRAELIS ON THE DIFFICULT ISSUES INVOLVED IN THE PEACE PROCESS IF YOU SUCCUMB TO THEM NOW. HABIB REPLIED THAT HE UNDERSTOOD WHAT GHORBAL WAS SAYING, BUT THAT THE PERCEPTION, IF IT EXISTED, WOULD BE PROVEN WRONG.

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7. THE MEETING CLOSED ON EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI RELATIONS. GHORBAL COMPLAINED ABOUT COMMENTS ISRAELI PRESIDENT NAVON MADE ABOUT EGYPTIAN ADHERENCE TO THE PEACE TREATY AT THE NATIONAL PRESS CLUB JAN. 6. CHARACTERIZING THESE COMMENTS AS THE ISRAELI PARTY LINE, GHORBAL SAID NEVERTHELESS THE ISRAELIS SHOULD NOT CRITICIZE EGYPT FROM WASHINGTON, AND THE U.S. SHOULD NOT LET THEM DO SO. HABIB NOTED THE ISRAELIS ARE CONCERNED THAT THE ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF THE PAST MAY BE ERODED BY PRESENT TRENDS, WHICH WILL INCREASE THE DIFFICULTY OF BUILDING FOR THE FUTURE. HE SAID THE EGYPTIANS AND ISRAELIS MUST BEGIN TO TALK ABOUT TABA AND NORMALIZATION ISSUES, BUT HE RECOGNIZED THE EGYPTIAN POSITION THAT SOME VISIBLE SIGN OF PROGRESS ON LEBANON IS REQUIRED FIRST. HABIB ALSO RAISED ISRAELI SENSITIVITY OVER THE TREATMENT OF ISRAEL IN THE CAIRO PRESS, NOTING THAT NAVON HAD SAID THAT WHILE HE UNDERSTOOD AND ACCEPTED CRITICISM OF POLICY, THE EGYPTIAN PRESS WAS SLIPPING BACK INTO OLD HABITS WITH CARTOONS AND ARTICLES THAT WERE ANTI-JEWISH. GHORBAL RESPONDED WITH SOME HEAT, ASKING IF IT WAS POSSIBLE TO LEGISLATE HUMAN FEELINGS AND NOTING THAT THE EGYPTIAN PRESS WAS NO HARDER ON THE BEGIN GOVERNMENT THAN THE U.S. AND ISRAELI PRESS.

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JERUSALEM FOR AMBASSADORS HABIB AND DRAPER

9302566

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: MARR, MOPS, ICRC, PLO, IS, SY

SUBJECT: ISRAELI POWS AND MIAS: REQUEST FOR UPDATE

REFS: A) TEL AVIV 07843) DAMASCUS 09942) STATE 4381

1. [REDACTED]

2. AMBASSADOR HABIB WILL BE ARRIVING IN ISRAEL SHORTLY, AND HAS AN APPOINTMENT TO SEE PRIME MINISTER BEGIN THURSDAY, JANUARY 13. AS HAS BEEN THE CASE IN VIRTUALLY ALL OF THEIR MEETINGS SINCE THE WAR IN LEBANON BEGAN, WE EXPECT THAT THE POW/MIA ISSUE WILL BE HIGH ON THE PRIME MINISTER'S AGENDA. HE WILL EXPECT TO HAVE A PROGRESS REPORT FROM AMBASSADOR HABIB ON U.S. EFFORTS SINCE THEIR LAST MEETING. PLEASE PROVIDE WHATEVER INFORMATION IS AVAILABLE WHICH CAN BE PROVIDED TO PRIME MINISTER BEGIN. FLATEN

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FROM DRAPER

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PINT, PINS, MOPS, MILI, SY, LE, US, IS, XF
SUBJECT: DRAPER MISSION: WAZZAN'S COMMENTS ON NORMAL-
- IZATION AND US CREDIBILITY, JANUARY 4

1. [REDACTED] (TEXT)

2. SUMMARY: I MET WITH PRIME MINISTER WAZZAN ON JAN. 4
TO REVIEW THE US POSITION AND TO TRY TO PERSUADE HIM
TO ALLOW THE LEBANESE DELEGATION MORE FLEXIBILITY RE-
GARDING THE AGENDA. WAZZAN ULTIMATELY ACCEDED TO A
FORMULA WHICH I CAN DISCUSS WITH THE ISRAELIS. HOWEVER,
HE WAS ANGRY AND -- AS HE HAS DONE ONLY A FEW TIMES SINCE
I HAVE KNOWN HIM -- HE LOST HIS TEMPER. HE USED THE
MEETING TO STRESS THAT HE WAS NOT PREPARED TO GO VERY

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FAR IN THE FIELD OF NORMALIZATION AS A CONDITION TO
ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL AND TO REITERATE THAT, ON THE BASIS
OF PAST US STATEMENTS, LEBANON EXPECTS THE UNITED
STATES TO BRING ISRAEL TO ACCEPT LEBANON'S LIMITATIONS
ON AN URGENT BASIS. END SUMMARY.

3. ACCOMPANIED BY ROSS AND KRECZKO, I MET WITH LEBANESE
PRIME MINISTER SHAFIQ WAZZAN ON THE AFTERNOON OF JAN. 4
TO REVIEW THE US POSITION ON NEGOTIATIONS AND TO URGE HIM
TO ALLOW THE LEBANESE DELEGATION MORE FLEXIBILITY CON-

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CERNING THE AGENDA. FOREIGN MINISTER SALEM, WHO WAS WITH WAZZAN, HHFDNSF WED THE MEETING AT MY BEHEST AND THAT OF GEMAYEL, BUT WAZZAN DOUBTLESSLY INTENDS TO PLAY IT AS HAVING SUMMONED ME FOR A LECTURE.

4. WAZZAN MADE NO EFFORT TO CONC8L.HIS FRUSTRATION WILH ISRAEL AND THE UNITED STATES. HE BEGAN BY SAYING THAT HE BELIEVED THE NEGOTIJ IONS WERE AT AN IMPASSE BECAUSE OF ISRAEL'S DEMANDS CONCERNING NORMALIZATION. HE STRESSED HEATEDLY THAT HE COULD NOT ACCEPT "NORMALIZATION" OR "TYPES OF NORMALIZATION," "IN FULL OR IN PART." HE SPOKE WITH GREAT PASSION AND LOST CONTROL OF HIS TEMPER AT TIMES..

5. WAZZAN SAID THAT ISRAEL HAD SET OUT TO ACHIEVE PEACE FOR GALILEE AND HAD DONE SO. " LEBANON WAS READY TO DISCUSS SECURNTY ARRANGEMENTS WITH ISRAEL TO PREVENT FUTURE ISRAELI INCURSIONS, EVEN THOUGH THIS RISKED SIMILAR DEMANDS FROM SYRIA. BUT LEBANON WAS NOT EGYPT. FOR ISRAEL TO PRESS FOR MORE THAN SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS WAS A VIOLATION OF ISRAEL'S PROCLAIMED OBJECTIVES. LEBANON'S INITIAL CONTACTS WITH THE PLO AND SYRIA HAD BEEN POSITIVE, AND NEITHER HAD SOUGHT PRECONDITIONS FOR WITHDRAWAL.

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[REDACTED]

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6. WAZZAN SAID THAT MANY QUESTIONS WERE BEING RAISED ABOUT US CREDIBILITY, AND WHETHER IT HAD BECOME A PARTNER OF ISRAEL'S AIMS. SOME MUSLIMS WERE EVEN PRESSING HIM TO AUTHORIZE THE RE-ARMAMENT OF MUSLIM MILITIAS, IN MIEW OF THE ACTIONS OF THE SO-CALLED "LEBANESE FORCES" AND THE ABSENCE OF MOVEMENT ON THE WITHDRAWAL OF FOREIGN FORCES. HE SAID HE HAD REFUSED. HE RECOUNTED STATEMENTS BY AMB. HABIB AND SECRETARY SHULTZ CALLING FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAELI FORCES WITHOUT CONDITIONS, AS WELL AS THE "NINE POINTS" AND US SUPPORT FOR SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 509. HE ASKED ME TO CONVEY TO PRESIDENT REAGAN, SECRETARY SHULTZ AND PHIL HABIB HIS POSITION -- AS PRIME MINISTER AND HEAD OF THE ISLAMIC COUNCIL -- THAT INTENSE PRESSURE SHOULD BE PUT ON ISRAEL NOW TO MODIFY ITS DEMANDS CONCERNING NORMALIZATION. HE STRESSED THAT HE WAS GRATEFUL FOR THE US ROLE TO DATE, BUT SAID THAT TIME WAS PRESSING FOR PROGRESS.

7. WAZZAN SAID THAT HIS PERSONAL VIEW WAS THAT THE BORDERS COULD BE OPENED WITH ISRAEL ONLY IF THERE WAS A UN UMBRELLA. HE SAID THAT THIS WAS THE MAXIMUM LEBANON COULD DO, UNTIL THERE WAS FURTHER PROGRESS IN THE BROADER PEACE PROCESS.

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8. I REVIEWED THE AMERICAN POSITION FOR WAZZAN. I SAID FROM THE PRESIDENT ON DOWN WE HAD MADE CLEAR THAT WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES WAS OUR HIGHEST PRIORITY, ACCOMPANIED BY REASONABLE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS IN THE CASE OF ISRAEL.

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HOWEVER, WE WOULD ALSO SUPPORT A SITUATION BETWEEN LEBANON AND ISRAEL WHICH WOULD FORESTALL ANY POSSIBLE FUTURE EXCUSE FOR A REPEAT OF ISRAEL'S INVASION OF LEBANON FOR OR FOR INTERFERENCE IN LEBANON'S INTERNAL AFFAIRS. WE WERE NOT TALKING ABOUT NORMALIZATION AS SUCH, BUT ABOUT PRACTICAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR A FUTURE RELATIONSHIP THAT

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WOULD BE IN LEBANON'S AS WELL AS ISRAEL'S INTERESTS. THIS WOULD NOT BE DISHONORABLE. I STRESSED THAT MANY LEBANESE WERE APPARENTLY READY FOR A CAREFULLY-DEFINED RELATIONSHIP WITH ISRAEL. I SAID WE WOULD SUPPORT SUCH A RELATIONSHIP, PROVIDED IT DID NOT COME AT THE EXPENSE OF LEBANON'S INTERNAL UNITY OR EXTERNAL ARAB TIES. I ALSO SAID THAT IF LEBANON DEFINED ITS RELATIONSHIP WITH ISRAEL CAREFULLY IN A WAY THAT BROUGHT ABOUT WITHDRAWAL AND A STABILIZED SITUATION IN LEBANON, IT WOULD

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HAVE THE SUPPORT OF NOT ONLY THE UNITED STATES, BUT ALSO THE WEST AND THE MODERATE ARAB STATES. I URGED WAZZAN NOT TO PASS UP THE OPPORTUNITY TO CREATE CONDITIONS WHICH WOULD FACILITATE ISRAEL'S PROMPT WITHDRAWAL.

9. WAZZAN REPEATED THAT HE IS READY FOR SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS AND MORE (HE GAVE EXAMPLES OF THE TERMINATION OF BELLIGERENCY, THE CESSATION OF HOSTILE PROPAGANDA, AND A CONTINUING DISCUSSION ON FUTURE RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL AFTER WITHDRAWAL). HOWEVER, NORMALIZATION AS SUCH MUST WAIT UNTIL OTHERS ARE READY TO JOIN LEBANON IN MOVING FORWARD WITH ISRAEL. WAZZAN ALSO MADE CLEAR AT LEAST IMPLICITLY THAT HE WILL BE WILLING TO MAKE MORE "CONCESSIONS" IF THE UNITED STATES INSISTS UPON THEM. HOWEVER, HE SAID HE WOULD PREFER CONTINUED OCCUPATION TO THE ACCEPTANCE OF CONCESSIONS IMPOSED BY ISRAEL.

10. WAZZAN AND I THEN DISCUSSED THE SUGGESTION WHICH I HAD PUT TO SALEM THE NIGHT BEFORE FOR RESOLVING THE AGENDA ISSUE. IN EXCHANGE FOR A RELATIVELY SIMPLE THREE-POINT AGENDA (SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS, WITHDRAWAL, MUTUAL RELATIONS) LEBANON WOULD AGREE TO INFORM ISRAEL IN WRITING THAT ALL OF THE ITEMS ON ISRAEL'S PROPOSED AGENDA WERE SUBSUMED UNDER THESE THREE ITEMS AND WOULD BE ADDRESSED. WAZZAN AND SALEM AGREED, PROVIDED THERE IS A PARALLEL LETTER FROM ISRAEL CONCERNING LEBANON'S PROPOSED AGENDA. THIS WILL NOT BE MUCH TO WORK WITH IN ISRAEL, BUT IT IS AS FAR AS WAZZAN WAS WILLING TO GO.

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11. I HAD MET WITH SALEM THE EVENING OF JANUARY 3, TO GO OVER HOW I SHOULD APPROACH WAZZAN. IN THE COURSE OF OUR DISCUSSIONS, SALEM HAD ALSO COMPLAINED ABOUT AN INCONSISTENCY IN US STATEMENTS. HE SAID THAT SHULTZ AND HABIB HAD NOT PLACED ANY EMPHASIS ON NORMALIZATION, AND THAT HE WAS SURPRISED TO FIND THE US NOW IN EFFECT SUPPORTING ISRAEL'S EFFORTS TO REACH AGREEMENT ON CERTAIN NORMALIZATION MATTERS IN ADVANCE OF WITHDRAWAL. I USED THE POINTS I MADE LATER TO WAZZAN. WITH BOTH, I STRESSED THAT THEY MUST NOT REPEAT THE MISTAKES MADE AFTER THE 1967 WAR. TO END OCCUPATION, THEY HAD TO NEGOTIATE PRACTICAL ARRANGEMENTS. THEY DID NOT HAVE TO CHARACTERIZE THEM AS "NORMALIZATION." DILLON

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EXDIS

FROM DRAPER: FOR AMB LEWIS OPENING OF BUSINESS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: XF, LE, IS, US, PEPR, PBOR, PLO

SUBJECT: DRAPER MISSION: NEW ISRAELI PRE-CONDITION FOR
STARTING TALKS

REF: DRAPER-HABIB TELECON

1. [REDACTED]

2. SUMMARY: THE ISRAELIS HAVE SET A NEW PRE-CONDITION
FOR OPENING TALKS -- A SIGNED AGREEMENT REGARDING THE

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WORKING PAPER -- WHICH THE LEBANESE CANNOT ACCEPT. THE
LEBANESE HAVE A COUNTER-PROPOSAL WHICH THEY ARE TRYING
OUT ON MOSSAD REP "MANDY" TONIGHT. END SUMMARY.

3. JOINED BY KRECZKO, I HAVE JUST COMPLETED FIVE HOURS
OF TALKS TONIGHT, DEC. 22-23, WITH GEMAYEL'S SECRET EMIS-
SARY, AND COUNSELOR HADDAD, AS WELL AS WITH GEMAYEL HIM-
SELF. THE ISRAELIS HAVE PRESENTED ANOTHER CONDITION TO
THE OPENING OF NEGOTIATIONS. DURING THE VISIT OF THE

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EMISSARY TO ISRAEL YESTERDAY TO ARRANGE THE DATE AND VENUE OF THE TALKS, SHARON INSISTED AS A PRECONDITION THAT THE EMISSARY OR ANY OTHER LEBANESE SIGN A DOCUMENT LABELED "AGREEMENT" WHICH SPECIFIES THAT "ISRAEL AND LEBANON AGREE THAT THE WORKING PAPER OF DEC. 14 DETERMINES THE BASIC ELEMENTS AND GUIDELINES FOR THE NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE LEBANESE AND ISRAELI DELEGATIONS, WITH THE AIM OF REACHING AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE TWO STATES ON SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS, NORMALIZATION AND WITHDRAWAL." THE ISRAELI PRESENTATION WAS COMBINED WITH A NOT-TOO-VEILED THREAT THAT ISRAEL COULD NOT PREDICT WHAT WOULD HAPPEN NEXT, IN THE SHUF, AND WITH THE DRUZE AND SHI'A, IF THE AGREEMENT WERE NOT SIGNED ALLOWING NEGOTIATIONS TO PROCEED. THE ISRAELIS WERE ALSO CLEARLY TRYING TO KEEP THE U.S. COMPLETELY OUT OF THE ACT.

4. AFTER A LOT OF GIVE-AND-TAKE WITH MAROUN AND HADDAD, WE WENT TO SEE GEMAYEL WITH A NUMBER OF OPTIONS. GEMAYEL ASKED WHAT THE U.S. WOULD DO IF HE DID SUCH-AND-SUCH. I SAID WE WOULD SUPPORT WHATEVER HE DECIDED, INCLUDING AUTHORIZING FATTAL OR SOMEONE TO SIGN THE ISRAELI-PROPOSED AGREEMENT. GEMAYEL DID NOT LIKE THE CONCEPT OF HAVING ANYONE SIGN SUCH AN "AGREEMENT" FOR BOTH CONSTITUTIONAL AND INTERNAL POLITICAL REASONS. ALSO, HE DIS-

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TRUSTS THE ISRAELIS AND SUSPECTS THEY WOULD LEAK THE FACT. ON THE OTHER HAND, HE IS DESPERATE TO GET NEGOTIATIONS STARTED. I SAID THAT I CONSIDERED THE ISRAELI CONDITION BOTH UNNECESSARY AND UNREASONABLE. IT WOULD BIND LEBANON MUCH TOO TIGHTLY TO A WORKING PAPER WHICH WAS NOT TOTALLY ACCEPTABLE TO LEBANON. I INDICATED I WAS ALSO TROUBLED BY SHARON'S VIEW THAT EACH PAGE OF THE WORKING PAPER WOULD BECOME 50 PAGES IN THE FINAL AGREEMENT, THAT ONLY TWO NEGOTIATING SESSIONS A WEEK WERE CONTEMPLATED, AND THAT NEGOTIATIONS MIGHT TAKE MONTHS.

5. AFTER IT WAS FULLY CLEAR THAT GEMAYEL, MAROUN, AND HADDAD WERE AGAINST THE AGREEMENT, I REITERATED WHAT I HAD SAID EARLIER: IT WOULD BE BEST TO SUGGEST TO ISRAEL A COUNTER-PROPOSAL RATHER THAN GIVING THE ISRAELIS A FLAT TURNDOWN. I SUGGESTED A VOLUNTEERED LEBANESE STATEMENT TO THE ISRAELIS OFFERING TO NEGOTIATE IN GOOD FAITH ALONG THE LINES AND IN THE SPIRIT OF THE DEC. 14 WORKING PAPER...."

6. HADDAD CAME UP WITH A VARIATION OF THIS APPROACH, WHICH WAS ACCEPTED BY GEMAYEL, IN PART BECAUSE IT GETS THE U.S. BACK INTO THE ACT. THIS APPROACH WILL ENTAIL A "PRELIMINARY" (AND SECRET IF POSSIBLE) MEETING BETWEEN FATTAL AND KIMCHE, WITH ME PRESENT, DURING WHICH FATTAL

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WOULD SIGN A LETTER TO KIMCHE PROMISING GOOD FAITH NEGOTIATIONS ALONG THE LINES OF THE APPROACH DESCRIBED IN PARA 5 ABOVE.

7. MAROUN WILL GET IN TOUCH TONIGHT WITH MOSSAD REPRESENTATIVE "MANDY" OO SOUND HIM OUT ON THIS COUNTER-OFFER, AND SHOW HIM THE TEXT OF THE PROPOSED MESSAGE.

8. IF SOMETHING LIKE THIS IS POSSIBLE, GEMAYEL WILL GO OVER WITH PM WAZZAN TOMORROW MORNING WHAT MAY HAVE TO BE DONE AND SEEK HIS ACQUIESCENCE. THIS WILL BE VERY

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DIFFICULT FOR HIM, GEMAYEL MADE CLEAR. ME ALSO SAID THAT HE HAS ONLY A FEW MONTHS TO MAKE PROGRESS ON WITHDRAWALS. HE SAID HE HAD MUSLIM SUPPORT AS PRESIDENT BECAUSE HE WAS A MEMBER OF THE PHALANGE AND COULD BE EXPECTED TO SOLVE SOME PROBLEMS. IF HE COULD NOT SOLVE THIS ONE, HE MIGHT HAVE TO THINK OF RESIGNING.

9. COMMENT: IT IS EXTREMELY DIFFICULT TO DEAL WITH THIS SITUATION WHEN THE ISRAELIS ARE PRIVATELY MAKING A NEW CONDITION WITH THE LEBANESE WHILE MEANWHILE IMPLYING TO US THAT THERE IS NOTHING MORE TO SETTLE FROM THE VENUE QUESTION. THE COMPLICATION IS COMPOUNDED BY THE FACT THAT I CANNOT SAY ANYTHING ABOUT THE SECRET TALKS OTHER THAN TO GEMAYEL, HADDAD, AND OF COURSE MAROUN, WHILE SALEM AND TUENI ARE PASSING INFORMATION OR MESSAGES TO ME ON THE BASIS OF AN INCOMPLETE UNDERSTANDING OF WHAT HAS BEEN GOING ON. IN SUM, HOWEVER, I CONSIDER THE PRESENT LEBANESE COUNTER-OFFER MORE THAN REASONABLE. IT GIVES THE ISRAELIS A SIGNATURE ON SOMETHING. END COMMENT. DILLON

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9302566

FROM DRAPER: FOR AMB LEWIS OPENING OF BUSINESS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: XF, LE, IS, US, PEPR, PBOR, PLO

SUBJECT: DRAPER MISSION: NEW ISRAELI PRE-CONDITION FOR
STARTING TALKS

REF: DRAPER-HABIB TELECON

1. ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: THE ISRAELIS HAVE SET A NEW PRE-CONDITION
FOR OPENING TALKS -- A SIGNED AGREEMENT REGARDING THE
WORKING PAPER -- WHICH THE LEBANESE CANNOT ACCEPT. THE
LEBANESE HAVE A COUNTER-PROPOSAL WHICH THEY ARE TRYING
OUT ON MOSSAD REP "MANDY" TONIGHT. END SUMMARY.3. JOINED BY KRECZKO, I HAVE JUST COMPLETED FIVE HOURS
OF TALKS TONIGHT, DEC. 22-23, WITH GEMAYEL'S SECRET EMIS-
SARY, AND COUNSELOR HADDAD, AS WELL AS WITH GEMAYEL HIM-
SELF. THE ISRAELIS HAVE PRESENTED ANOTHER CONDITION TO
THE OPENING OF NEGOTIATIONS. DURING THE VISIT OF THE
EMISSARY TO ISRAEL YESTERDAY TO ARRANGE THE DATE AND

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VENUE OF THE TALKS, SHARON INSISTED AS A PRECONDITION
THAT THE EMISSARY OR ANY OTHER LEBANESE SIGN A DOCUMENT
LABELED "AGREEMENT" WHICH SPECIFIES THAT "ISRAEL AND
LEBANON AGREE THAT THE WORKING PAPER OF DEC. 14 DETER-
MINES THE BASIC ELEMENTS AND GUIDELINES FOR THE NEGOTI-
ATIONS BETWEEN THE LEBANESE AND ISRAELI DELEGATIONS,
WITH THE AIM OF REACHING AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE TWO STATES
ON SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS, NORMALIZATION AND WITHDRAWAL."
THE ISRAELI PRESENTATION WAS COMBINED WITH A NOT-TOO-VEILED**UNCLASSIFIED**

THREAT THAT ISRAEL COULD NOT PREDICT WHAT WOULD HAPPEN NEXT, IN THE SHUF, AND WITH THE DRUZE AND SHI'A, IF THE AGREEMENT WERE NOT SIGNED ALLOWING NEGOTIATIONS TO PROCEED. THE ISRAELIS WERE ALSO CLEARLY TRYING TO KEEP THE U.S. COMPLETELY OUT OF THE ACT.

4. AFTER A LOT OF GIVE-AND-TAKE WITH MAROUN AND HADDAD, WE WENT TO SEE GEMAYEL WITH A NUMBER OF OPTIONS. GEMAYEL ASKED WHAT THE U.S. WOULD DO IF HE DID SUCH-AND-SUCH. I SAID WE WOULD SUPPORT WHATEVER HE DECIDED, INCLUDING AUTHORIZING FATTAL OR SOMEONE TO SIGN THE ISRAELI-PROPOSED AGREEMENT. GEMAYEL DID NOT LIKE THE CONCEPT OF HAVING ANYONE SIGN SUCH AN "AGREEMENT" FOR BOTH CONSTITUTIONAL AND INTERNAL POLITICAL REASONS. ALSO, HE DISTRUSTS THE ISRAELIS AND SUSPECTS THEY WOULD LEAK THE FACT. ON THE OTHER HAND, HE IS DESPERATE TO GET NEGOTIATIONS STARTED. I SAID THAT I CONSIDERED THE ISRAELI CONDITION BOTH UNNECESSARY AND UNREASONABLE. IT WOULD BIND LEBANON MUCH TOO TIGHTLY TO A WORKING PAPER WHICH WAS NOT TOTALLY ACCEPTABLE TO LEBANON. I INDICATED I WAS ALSO TROUBLED BY SHARON'S VIEW THAT EACH PAGE OF THE WORKING PAPER WOULD BECOME 50 PAGES IN THE FINAL AGREEMENT, THAT ONLY TWO NEGOTIATING SESSIONS A WEEK WERE CONTEMPLATED, AND THAT NEGOTIATIONS MIGHT TAKE

[REDACTED]

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MONTHS.

5. AFTER IT WAS FULLY CLEAR THAT GEMAYEL, MAROUN, AND HADDAD WERE AGAINST THE AGREEMENT, I REITERATED WHAT I HAD SAID EARLIER: IT WOULD BE BEST TO SUGGEST TO ISRAEL A COUNTER-PROPOSAL RATHER THAN GIVING THE ISRAELIS A FLAT TURNDOWN. I SUGGESTED A VOLUNTEERED LEBANESE STATEMENT TO THE ISRAELIS OFFERING TO NEGOTIATE IN GOOD FAITH ALONG THE LINES AND IN THE SPIRIT OF THE DEC. 14 WORKING PAPER...."

6. HADDAD CAME UP WITH A VARIATION OF THIS APPROACH, WHICH WAS ACCEPTED BY GEMAYEL, IN PART BECAUSE IT GETS THE U.S. BACK INTO THE ACT. THIS APPROACH WILL ENTAIL A "PRELIMINARY" (AND SECRET IF POSSIBLE) MEETING BETWEEN FATTAL AND KIMCHE, WITH ME PRESENT, DURING WHICH FATTAL WOULD SIGN A LETTER TO KIMCHE PROMISING GOOD FAITH NEGOTIATIONS ALONG THE LINES OF THE APPROACH DESCRIBED IN PARA 5 ABOVE.

7. MAROUN WILL GET IN TOUCH TONIGHT WITH MOSSAD REPRESENTATIVE "MANDY" TO SOUND HIM OUT ON THIS COUNTER-OFFER, AND SHOW HIM THE TEXT OF THE PROPOSED MESSAGE.

8. IF SOMETHING LIKE THIS IS POSSIBLE, GEMAYEL WILL GO OVER WITH PM WAZZAN TOMORROW MORNING WHAT MAY HAVE TO

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BE DONE AND SEEK HIS ACQUIESCENCE. THIS WILL BE VERY DIFFICULT FOR HIM, GEMAYEL MADE CLEAR. HE ALSO SAID THAT HE HAS ONLY A FEW MONTHS TO MAKE PROGRESS ON WITHDRAWALS. HE SAID HE HAD MUSLIM SUPPORT AS PRESIDENT BECAUSE HE WAS A MEMBER OF THE PHALANGE AND COULD BE

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EXDIS

FROM DRAPER

EXPECTED TO SOLVE SOME PROBLEMS. IF HE COULD NOT SOLVE THIS ONE, HE MIGHT HAVE TO THINK OF RESIGNING.

9. COMMENT: IT IS EXTREMELY DIFFICULT TO DEAL WITH THIS SITUATION WHEN THE ISRAELIS ARE PRIVATELY MAKING A NEW CONDITION WITH THE LEBANESE WHILE MEANWHILE IMPLYING TO US THAT THERE IS NOTHING MORE TO SETTLE FROM THE VENUE QUESTION. THE COMPLICATION IS COMPOUNDED BY THE FACT THAT I CANNOT SAY ANYTHING ABOUT THE SECRET TALKS OTHER THAN TO GEMAYEL, HADDAD, AND OF COURSE MAROUN, WHILE SALEM AND TUENI ARE PASSING INFORMATION OR

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MESSAGES TO ME ON THE BASIS OF AN INCOMPLETE UNDER-
STANDING OF WHAT HAS BEEN GOING ON. IN SUM, HOWEVER,
I CONSIDER THE PRESENT LEBANESE COUNTER-OFFER MORE
THAN REASONABLE. IT GIVES THE ISRAELIS A SIGNATURE ON
SOMETHING. END COMMENT.
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NEA/AFN:PSEPASTIAN
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S/S-O:GUSREY

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DECAPTIONED

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PEPR, LE, EG, MO
SUBJECT: HABIB MISSION: MESSAGES TO MUBARAK & HASSAN
ON LEBANON

1. [REDACTED]
2. PLEASE DELIVER FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT MUBARAK
AND KING HASSAN FROM AMBASSADOR HABIB:

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BEGIN TEXT: DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:/YOUR MAJESTY:

I HAVE JUST RETURNED TO WASHINGTON TO REPORT TO PRESIDENT
REAGAN ON THE LATEST ROUND OF DTSCUSSIONS I HAVE HAD ON
THE LEBANON ISSUE IN ISRAEL AND LEBANON. AS I UNDERTOOK
TO DO WHEN WE LAST MET, I WANTED TO PROVIDE YOU A BRTEF
PERSONAL REVIEW OF MY TALKS. -

OUR IMMEDIATE GOAL IS TO BRING ISRAELI NEGOTIATORS TO THE

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TABLE WITH LEBANESE COUNTERPARTS FOR SERIOUS, SUBSTANTIVE TALKS ON THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES FROM LEBANON. WE SEEK THESE NEGOTIATIONS AT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE TIME. AS YOU ARE AWARE, AS A RESULT OF RECENT DISCUSSIONS, ISRAELIS NO LONGER INSISTING UPON HOLDING TALKS IN JERUSALEM, AND WE ARE ASSISTING THE TWO SIDES IN

REACHING AGREEMENT ON A VENUE FOR TALKS, EITHER ALTERNATING BETWEEN STATES IN ISRAEL AND LEBANON OR IN A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE THIRD COUNTRY. THE UNITED STATES WILL BE PRESENT DURING THE COMING MEETINGS, AND WE WILL WORK TO ENCOURAGE THEIR EARLY AND FAVORABLE CONCLUSION.

WE BELIEVE THERE IS A BASIS FOR A RAPID AND WORKABLE SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM WHICH WOULD INCLUDE THE FOLLOWING ELEMENTS: (1) THE TOTAL WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAELI FORCES FROM LEBANON IN THE LIGHT OF THE DEPARTURE OF SYRIAN AND PALESTINIAN FORCES; (2) PRACTICAL SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS BETWEEN LEBANON AND ISRAEL TO ASSURE THAT THE SITUATION IN SOUTHERN LEBANON DOES NOT OFFER ANY CAUSE FOR HOSTILITIES TO REOCCUR; AND (3) MEASURES GOVERNING RELATIONS BETWEEN ISRAEL AND LEBANON WHICH WOULD ENCOURAGE PEACEABLE RELATIONS BUT WHICH WOULD NOT BE A FULL PEACE TREATY. THE LEBANESE POSITION IS THAT ISSUES

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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INVOLVING SECURITY AND RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL REMAIN OPEN TO NEGOTIATION.

I APPRECIATE THE TIME YOU GRACIOUSLY PROVIDED FOR OUR MEETING LAST MONTH. WITH YOUR PERMISSION, I WILL FROM TIME TO TIME KEEP YOU INFORMED OF WHERE THINGS STAND IN OUR EFFORTS IN LEBANON. WITH HIGHEST REGARD,

SINCERELY, PHILIP HABIB. END TEXT. DAM

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9302566

FROM AMBASSADOR LEWIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: SHUM, LE, IS, SY, PLO, ICRC
SUBJECT: HABIB/DRAPER MISSION: PALESTINIAN PRISONERS
- IN ISRAELI CUSTODY
REF: A) STATE 351482 B) JERUSALEM3885 (NOTAL)

1. [REDACTED]

2. HABIB, DRAPER AND I DISCUSSED PRISONER ISSUE IN LIGHT
OF REF A WITH THE ISRAELIS ON
DECEMBER 19. IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT HABIB HAD ALREADY
TOUCHED ON THE ISSUE IN HIS LAST MEETING WITH BEGIN
DECEMBER 16 (REF B, PARA 8). WE AGREED THAT ISSUE SHOULD
BE RAISED AGAIN NOW WITH GOI DURING CURRENT ROUND OF HABIB/
DRAPER TALKS.3. ACCORDINGLY, DURING LUNCHEON WITH KIMCHE AND BAR-ON
OF MFA ON DECEMBER 19, HABIB PROBED QUESTION OF STATUS OF
THE PALESTINIAN PRISONERS HELD BY THE ISRAELIS, BOTH IN
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

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THE ANEAR CAMP AS WELL AS THOSE SPECIAL PRISONERS HELD IN
ISRAEL. LEWIS STRESSED ISRAEL'S OBLIGATIONS TO PROVIDE
HUMANITARIAN TREATMENT UNDER FOURTH GENEVA CONVENTION AND
ASKED WHETHER ICRC WAS BEING ALLOWED TO VISIT ANY DETAIN-
EES HELD IN ISRAEL AS WELL AS THOSE IN ANSAR.4. DRAPER TOLD KIMCHE THAT HE HAD PRESSED GEMAYEL TO FIND
OUT FROM THE PALESTINIANS - AND EVEN THE SYRIANS - WHAT
THEY MIGHT WANT FROM THE ISRAELIS IN RETURN FOR THE PRIS-**UNCLASSIFIED**

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ONERS AND BODIES THEY HELD. DRAPER SAID HE HAD TOLD GEMAYEL THAT THE ISRAELIS MIGHT WELL BE PREPARED TO GIVE UP SOME OF THEIR PALESTINIAN AND SYRIAN PRISONERS IN EXCHANGE FOR THE RETURN OF THE ISRAELIS HELD BY THE PALESTINIANS AND THE SYRIANS. IN ANY EVENT, DRAPER CONTINUED, HE HAD TOLD GEMAYEL THAT THE LEBANESE WOULD HAVE A REAL INTEREST IN WHAT HAPPENED TO THOSE PRISONERS RELEASED BY THE ISRAELIS. DRAPER TOLD KIMCHE THAT GEMAYEL HAD MADE CLEAR THAT HE WOULD NOT WANT HUNDREDS OF PALESTINIAN PRISONERS SHOWING UP IN BEIRUT AND HE DID WANT TO SEE THAT THEY WENT ELSEWHERE IN THE WORLD.

5. IN RESPONSE TO OUR QUESTIONS, KIMCHE AND BAR-ON BOTH SAID THAT THEY WERE CERTAIN THAT THE ICRC IS ALLOWED TO VISIT THE DETAINEES HELD IN ISRAEL PROPER. ALTHOUGH THEY WERE NOT POWS IN ISRAEL'S VIEW, ISRAEL OBSERVED THE FOURTH GENEVA CONVENTION AND ALLOWED THE ICRC ACCESS TO THEM JUST AS IS THE CASE WITH OTHER PALESTINIANS TAKEN INTO CUSTODY ON THE WEST BANK FOR SECURITY OFFENSES. THEY DID NOT GIVE ANY INDICATION HOW MANY PALESTINIANS TAKEN IN LEBANON MAY NOW BE IN CUSTODY IN ISRAEL. (WE WILL TRY TO PROBE THIS POINT FURTHER AT THE NEXT OPPORTUNITY.)

6. WE DISCUSSED WITH KIMCHE AND BAR-ON PRIME MINISTER BEGIN'S EARLIER EXPRESSIONS OF INTEREST IN OFFERING RELEASE

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OF ALL THE PRISONERS TO OBTAIN THE RELEASE OF THE SYRIAN JEWISH COMMUNITY. HABIB REMINDED KIMCHE HE HAD RAISED THIS PROPOSAL WITH ASSAD AT BEGIN'S REQUEST AND HAD GOTTEN NOWHERE. KIMCHE ADVISED HABIB TO RAISE THE MATTER AGAIN WITH THE PRIME MINISTER AND TO TELL HIM THAT THERE WAS NO HOPE AS FAR AS ASSAD WAS CONCERNED.

7. HABIB THEN DID RAISE THE ISSUE WITH BEGIN IN PRIVATE LATER ON DECEMBER 19 IN GENERAL TERMS, NOT MAKING ANY DISTINCTION BETWEEN THOSE PRISONERS IN ANSAR AND THOSE HELD IN ISRAEL PROPER. HABIB TOLD BEGIN THAT HE SAW NO CHANCE OF MAKING HEADWAY ON THE SYRIAN JEWRY QUESTION IN THIS WAY. BEGIN LISTENED BUT WAS NOT READY TO REPLY IN SPECIFIC TERMS. LEWIS

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FOIA Exemptions

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DEGAPTIONED

FROM HABIB

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PEPR, PINT, PINS, SY, MOPS, MILI, IS, LE, US, XF

SUBJECT: HABIB/DRAPER MISSION: MEETING WITH BEGIN ON

- ISRAELI CABINET DECISION, DEC. 19

REF: TEL AVIV 18683N

1. [REDACTED]

2. SUMMARY: WE MET WITH BEGIN AND SHARON AFTER THE CABINET MEETING AT WHICH IT WAS DECIDED: (A) TO OPEN NEGOTIATIONS WITH LEBANON ON THE BASIS OF THE ISRAELI-LEBANESE "WORKING PAPER"; AND (B) TO ANNUL ISRAEL'S EARLIER DECISION TO INSIST ON MEETING IN JERUSALEM. THE ISRAELIS ARE READY TO BEGIN NEGOTIATIONS "SHORTLY," BUT WERE NOT PREPARED TO SET A DATE TODAY OR TO DECIDE ON A MEETING PLACE. THERE IS A DIFFERENCE OF OPINION WHETHER TO MEET IN EUROPE (GENEVA) OR IN LEBANON.

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TIATIONS "SHORTLY," BUT WERE NOT PREPARED TO SET A DATE TODAY OR TO DECIDE ON A MEETING PLACE. THERE IS A DIFFERENCE OF OPINION WHETHER TO MEET IN EUROPE (GENEVA) OR IN LEBANON.

3. SHARON REPEATED HIS INSISTENCE THAT THE WORKING PAPER IS A "FULLY AGREED DOCUMENT," AND SAID THEY WILL RESIST ANY ATTEMPT TO AMEND THE BASIC POINTS IN THE PAPER. OTHER ISRAELIS RECOGNIZE THAT THE

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PAPER IS NOT TOTALLY SET IN CONCRETE

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4. I MET ALONE WITH BEGIN FOLLOWING THE MORE GENERAL MEETING THIS EVENING TO PRESS FOR AN EXPLICIT DATE TO BEGIN NEGOTIATIONS AND TO SUGGEST THAT THE NEGOTIATIONS BE HELD IN THE LEBANESE-ISRAELI AREA RATHER THAN IN EUROPE. BEGIN WOULD NOT BE PINNED DOWN, ALTHOUGH IT REMAINS CLEAR HE WANTS TO REACH EARLY DECISIONS. END SUMMARY.

5. I MET WITH PRIME MINISTER BEGIN, DEFMIN SHARON, AND THEIR COLLEAGUES FOR ABOUT 30 MINUTES AT THE PRIME MINISTRY LATE AFTERNOON DECEMBER 19 TO REVIEW THE CABINET DECISION ON STARTING THE ISRAELI-LEBANESE NEGOTIATIONS. I WAS ACCOMPANIED BY AMBASSADORS DRAPER AND LEWIS AND STAFF. (WE HAD ALREADY DISCUSSED WITH KIMCHE THE CABINET DECISION - REFTTEL.) BEGIN OPENED THE MEETING BY SAYING THAT THE FIRST POSITIVE DECISION AT THE CABINET MEETING EARLIER IN THE DAY HAD BEEN TO CONFIRM THE WORKING PAPER IN ACCORDANCE WITH WHICH NEGOTIATIONS WILL TAKE PLACE. HE SAID ISRAEL WOULD APPOINT ITS DELEGATION "VERY SOON", BUT COULD NOT DO SO DURING THE CABINET MEETING ITSELF. SPEAKING QUIETLY, HE

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SAID THAT THE CABINET HAD MADE A VERY SINCERE AND DIFFICULT DECISION REGARDING A REVISION OF ITS EARLIER DECISION INSISTING ON MEETINGS IN THE CAPITALS. HE SAID THE FURTHER QUESTION OF DECIDING THE LOCATION FOR THE TALKS WOULD BE REACHED IN CONSULTATION WITH THE LEBANESE. HE CONCLUDED HIS VERY SHORT SUMMARY STATEMENT BY SAYING THAT THESE DECISIONS PROVIDED THE BASIS TO START NEGOTIATIONS ON THEIR OWN MERITS.

6. I REPLIED THAT THIS WAS A STEP FORWARD AND WOULD SO REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, ADDING THAT THE UNITED STATES WANTS THE NEGOTIATIONS TO COME TO A GOOD AND SUCCESSFUL FRUITION. I WOULD ANXIOUSLY WAIT TO HEAR FROM THE PRIME MINISTER OF ISRAEL'S FURTHER DECISIONS (OR PROPOSALS) CONCERNING DATES AND THE LOCATIONS FOR THE NEGOTIATIONS. I STRESSED THAT WE BELIEVE VERY STRONGLY IN THE DESIRABILITY OF MOVING AHEAD QUICKLY AND THAT ISRAEL COULD BE ASSURED THAT WE WOULD MAKE A CONSTRUCTIVE CONTRIBUTION. I STATED THAT AMBASSADOR DRAPER WILL GO TO BEIRUT TOMORROW MORNING AND GIVE PRESIDENT GEMAYEL AN ACCOUNT OF OUR DISCUSSIONS IN JERUSALEM. I WOULD RETURN WHEN THE LEBANESE-ISRAELI MEETINGS WERE SCHEDULED. I SAID THAT WE WERE AT THE THRESHOLD AND I LIKED THE PROSPECT OF PASSING THROUGH THIS PARTICULAR DOOR. DRAPER NOTED THAT, ACCORDING

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TO A RADIO ISRAEL REPORT TODAY, THE LEBANESE FOREIGN MINISTER HAD WELCOMED THE POSITIVE DECISION TAKEN BY THE CABINET TODAY WHICH ALSO REFLECTED THEIR CONSTRUCTIVE APPROACH TO THESE TALKS. BEGIN SEEMED PLEASED.

7. BEGIN SAID HE WANTED ME TO KNOW THAT REACHING THESE DECISIONS HAD NOT BEEN SIMPLE OR EASY. I REPLIED THAT I KNEW VERY WELL THAT CHANGING A CABINET DECISION WAS NOT AN EASY PROCESS, BUT THAT I THOUGHT THE DECISION

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FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 3962
INFO WHITEHOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
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AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE
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WAS WISE AND IN OUR COMMON INTEREST.

8. SHARON REFERRED TO THE CABINET DISCUSSION ON THE WORKING PAPER. HE SAID THAT IT WOULD BE IMPORTANT FOR DRAPER TO "CLARIFY" OR TO MAKE CLEAR TO GEMAYEL THE

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ISRAELI POSITION WITH RESPECT TO THE PAPER. AS HE HAD IN THE MORNING MEETING, SHARON STATED THAT ISRAEL LOOKED AT THIS AS AN "AGREED PAPER" AND THAT, IF THE LEBANESE WISHED TO CHANGE THEIR POSITIONS FOR ANY REASON, THEN ISRAEL WOULD FEEL FREE ALSO TO CHANGE ITS POSITIONS OR TO BRING NEW IDEAS TO THE NEGOTIATIONS. HE STRESSED THAT THE WORKING PAPER WAS A PRODUCT OF CONCESSIONS FROM BOTH SIDES. HE THOUGHT IT WOULD BE GOOD FOR US TO ADVISE PRESIDENT GEMAYEL NOT TO CHANGE THE WORKING PAPER AT THIS STAGE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. I

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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SAID THAT I BELIEVED THE PAPER ALLOWED FOR SOME FURTHER DISCUSSION AND CLARIFICATION AND THAT NO ONE SHOULD BE SURPRISED IF THE LEBANESE WANTED TO DO SO.

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9. SHARON EMPHASIZED ONCE AGAIN THAT ISRAEL DID NOT WANT TO SPRING ANY SURPRISES AND THEREFORE IT WOULD BE VERY GOOD IF WE WERE TO ADVISE THE LEBANESE NOT TO MAKE ANY CHANGES. IN THIS CONTEXT, HE EMPHASIZED THE ISRAELI POSITION THAT "ALL PLO TERRORISTS" MUST BE EVACUATED FIRST BEFORE ANY ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL OR DISENGAGEMENT, ARGUING THIS WAS IN THE COMMON INTEREST OF LEBANON, THE UNITED STATES, AND ISRAEL. HE ADDED THAT ISRAEL WOULD STAY IN CONTACT WITH THE LEBANESE TO DECIDE ON THE DATE AND PLACE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. I SAID IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT ISRAEL KEEP US CLOSELY INFORMED (OF THEIR PRIVATE TALKS WITH THE LEBANESE).

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10. CONTINUING ON THE THEME OF SURPRISES, SHARON EXPLAINED THAT THE ISRAELIS HAD BEEN INFORMED THAT PRESIDENT GEMAYEL HAD INTENDED TO TELL AMBASSADOR DRAPER AND ME ABOUT THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE WORKING PAPER. I SMILED AND SAID WE MIGHT POSSIBLY HAVE A PROBLEM WITH LANGUAGE, SINCE GEMAYEL HAD TOLD ME THAT HE HAD THOUGHT THAT THE ISRAELIS HAD INFORMED US ABOUT THE WORKING PAPER SOME TIME PREVIOUSLY. ON THIS NOTE, WE DROPPED FURTHER DISCUSSION ON THIS POINT.

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11. DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER BEN MEIR SAID THAT ISRAEL WANTED TO BEGIN AND COMPLETE THE NEGOTIATIONS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AND BELIEVED TODAY'S CABINET DECISION HAD PAVED THE WAY FOR THAT OUTCOME. ISRAEL WAS NOT, HE STRESSED, PRESENTING ANY OBSTACLES TO AN EARLY

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BEGINNING OF THE TALKS. IN THIS CONTEXT, HE EMPHASIZED SHARON'S POINT ABOUT THE IMPORTANCE OF ENSURING THAT THE LEBANESE STUCK STRICTLY TO THE WORKING PAPER WHICH HAD BEEN DEVELOPED. I REPLIED THAT THE SUBSTANTIAL WORK WHICH HAD BEEN DONE DURING THE COURSE OF THE SECRET TALKS WAS ONE REASON WE BELIEVED WE COULD MOVE QUICKLY TOWARDS AN AGREEMENT.

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12. AFTER THIS MEETING, I MET ALONE WITH BEGIN TO PIN DOWN A DATE FOR THE OPENING OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. I SUGGESTED A START BEFORE CHRISTMAS IN ORDER TO ENCOURAGE HIM TO PICK A DATE IMMEDIATELY THEREAFTER. HE DID NOT REACT. DESPITE MY PERSISTENCE, BEGIN REFUSED TO GET PINNED DOWN, SAYING THAT THIS HAD TO BE WORKED OUT IN CONSULTATIONS WITH THE LEBANESE AND THAT ISRAEL STILL HAD TO DECIDE ON THE COMPOSITION OF ITS OWN DELEGATION, AS WELL AS VENUE. HOWEVER, HE SAID THAT HE DID NOT BELIEVE THAT IT WOULD TAKE LONG TO WORK OUT THESE ISSUES AND THAT NEGOTIATIONS WOULD BE ABLE TO BEGIN SOON. I SAID THAT IT WOULD BE ESPECIALLY HELPFUL IF HE COULD LET ME KNOW THROUGH SAM LEWIS A SPECIFIC DATE BEFORE I MET WITH THE PRESIDENT ON MONDAY, DECEMBER 20. (AFTER MY MEETING WITH BEGIN, I URGED DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER BEN-MEIR AND KIMCHE TO PERSUADE BEGIN TO DETERMINE A STARTING DATE BEFORE MY MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT.)

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13. AT KIMCHE'S AND BAR-ON'S URGINGS, I ALSO USED THE SEPARATE MEETING TO ENCOURAGE BEGIN TO CHOOSE A VENUE IN THE REGION, AS OPPOSED TO EUROPE. THEY FORESEE PROBLEMS. I SAID THAT THIS WOULD BE MORE EFFICIENT AND FACILITATE OUR SHARED GOAL OF SPEEDY NEGOTIATIONS. BEGIN WAS ALSO NON-COMMITTAL ON THIS POINT. (I DID NOT ADDRESS THE ISSUE WHICH LIES BEHIND THE VENUE QUESTION, THE RELATION OF THE FORMAL AND OVERT NEGOTIATIONS TO THE SECRET ISRAEL/LEBANON

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CHANNEL.)

14. COMMENT: PRIOR TO MY MEETING WITH PRIME MINISTER BEGIN, WE HAD HAD LUNCH WITH DAVID KIMCHE, WHO HAD BEEN PRESENT DURING THE CABINET DELIBERATIONS. KIMCHE EMPHASIZED THE ROLE WHICH BEGIN PERSONALLY HAD PLAYED IN GETTING THE CABINET TO APPROVE NEGOTIATIONS AND TO CHANGE THEIR POSITION ON VENUE. HE SAID THAT BEGIN LED OFF THE CABINET SESSION WITH A STRONG STATEMENT THAT IT WAS IN THE HIGHEST INTEREST OF ISRAEL TO BEGIN THE NEGOTIATIONS QUICKLY, TO PROCEED WITH THEM QUICKLY, AND TO COMPLETE THEM QUICKLY. HE SAID THAT BEGIN HAD TAKEN THE LEAD IN CONVINCING THE CABINET TO CHANGE ITS POSITION THAT TALKS MUST BE HELD IN JERUSALEM.

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15. FROM OUR OTHER DISCUSSIONS TODAY, IT APPEARS CLEAR THAT THE REAL REASON FOR NOT PROPOSING A DATE AND VENUE, AND FOR NOT YET SELECTING THE ISRAELI DELEGATION, LIES IN THE FACT THAT SHARON IN PARTICULAR MAY PREFER TO HAVE A TWIN NEGOTIATING TRACK WITH THE LEBANESE. IN OTHER WORDS, HE MAY WANT TO MONITOR SECRET NEGOTIATIONS THROUGH THE LEBANESE INTERMEDIARY WHILE ALLOWING THE OVERT, OFFICIAL TALKS TO BE CONDUCTED AS A VIRTUAL "RUBBER STAMP." IN THAT CASE, IT COULD TURN OUT THAT THE OVERT TALKS WOULD BE HELD IN A EUROPEAN CITY, SUCH AS GENEVA, HEADED ON THE ISRAELI SIDE BY AN AMBASSADOR, WHILE THE "REAL NEGOTIATIONS" ARE CONDUCTED SECRETLY IN EITHER LEBANON OR IN ISRAEL. IF THE LEBANESE AND ISRAELIS AGREE BETWEEN THEMSELVES ON A TWO-TRACK NEGOTIATING ARRANGEMENT, IT STILL WILL BE SAFER AND MORE CONVENIENT IF BOTH SETS OF NEGOTIATIONS ARE CONDUCTED IN THE LEBANON/ISRAEL AREA; AND DRAPER AND I WILL DO WHAT WE CAN TO ENSURE THAT THIS IS HOW IT TURNS OUT. IN SUM, THE ISRAELI OFFICIALS HAVE LEFT US WITH A CLEAR IMPRESSION THAT SERIOUS NEGOTIATIONS WILL PROBABLY BEGIN AFTER CHRISTMAS AND BEFORE THE NEW YEAR. END COMMENT. GROVE

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E.O. 12356: N/A

TAGS: PEPR, IS, LE, US

SUBJECT: PRESIDENT'S REMARKS ON LEBANON TO WASHINGTON POST

FOLLOWING IS VERBATIM TEXT OF PRESIDENT'S REMARKS ON
LEBANON DECEMBER 16 TO WASHINGTON POST.

BEGIN TEXT:

Q: ON SEPTEMBER 1ST, YOU CALLED FOR WITHDRAWAL OF ALL
FOREIGN FORCES IN LEBANON. WHAT ARE YOU PREPARED TO DO
TO BRING THIS ABOUT?

THE PRESIDENT: WE HAVE AMBASSADOR HABIB AND AMBASSADOR

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DRAPER OVER THERE RIGHT NOW. THEY'LL BE BACK IN A FEW
DAYS. THEY'RE MEETING WITH THEM WEEKLY. THE TIME IS NOW
FOR ACTION. WE MADE A PROPOSAL IN SEPTEMBER, A COMPLETE
PROPOSAL LEADING TOWARD A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF ALL THE
PROBLEMS IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

BUT IT BEGINS WITH RECOGNIZING THE SOVEREIGNTY OF LEBANON
AFTER ALL THESE SEVERAL YEARS OF DIVISION AND, YOU MIGHT
SAY, WAR LORDS WITH THEIR OWN MILITIAS AT ODDS WITH EACH

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OTHER IN LEBANON. THE GOVERNMENT OF LEBANON SHOULD BE SOVEREIGN OVER ITS OWN TERRITORY AND WE THINK THE TIME HAS

COME NOW FOR THE FOREIGN FORCES THAT ARE IN THERE -- SYRIA, ISRAEL, AND THE REMNANT OF THE PLO THAT IS IN THERE TO GET OUT AND THAT'S WHY THE MULTI-NATIONAL FORCE WAS SENT TO, IN A SENSE, HELP GIVE SOME STABILITY WHILE THE NEW LEBANESE GOVERNMENT ESTABLISHED ITSELF. FOR THOSE COUNTRIES TO DELAY IN GETTING OUT NOW PLACES THEM IN A POSITION OF BEING OCCUPYING ARMIES BECAUSE IT WAS ONE THING TO BE IN BY INVITATION OF LEBANON, IT WAS ANOTHER THING TO CROSS A BORDER BECAUSE THAT BORDER HAD BEEN VIOLATED AND OTHER FORCES WERE ATTACKING ISRAELI TARGETS BUT NOW THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT HAS ENOUGH CONFIDENCE IN ITSELF, IT HAS ASKED THEM TO LEAVE. AND TO NOT LEAVE IS, AS I SAY -- THEY MAKE THEMSELVES OCCUPYING FORCES.

Q. TO WITHDRAW SIMULTANEOUSLY OR WITH THE PLO FIRST AS MR. BEGIN WANTS?

THE PRESIDENT: THESE ARE THE DETAILS TO BE WORKED OUT OVER THERE AND WHAT HABIB IS TRYING TO WORK OUT WITH THEM. AND THEN WE CAN GET ON WITH THE MAJOR BUSINESS

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OF NEGOTIATIONS TO BRING ABOUT PEACE AND ELIMINATE THE DIFFERENCES THAT HAVE KEPT THE MIDDLE EAST IN TURMOIL ALL THIS TIME.

END TEXT. DAM

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FROM HADIB

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PEPR, PINT, PINS, HOPS, HILL, SY, LE, US, IS, XF

SUBJECT: HADIB/DRAPER MISSION: MEETING WITH PRIME
MINISTER BEGIN, 8:30 A.M., DEC. 19

1. ENTIRE TEXT

2. SUMMARY: AT OUR MEETING WITH BEGIN, SHARON AND
THEIR COLLEAGUES DEC. 19 PRIOR TO THE CABINET SESSION,
I REPEATEDLY URGED THAT ISRAEL AGREE TO INITIATE
NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE LEBANESE WITHIN A FEW DAYS, AND
TO COMPLETE THE NEGOTIATIONS WITHIN ONE WEEK. I SAID
THAT GENAYEL AGREED THAT THE "WORKING PAPER" HAS A
POSITIVE AGENDA FOR NEGOTIATIONS AND WAS READY TO
BEGIN IMMEDIATELY. I ALSO REPORTED THAT I HAD BEEN
IN COMMUNICATION WITH PRESIDENT REAGAN, WHO FIRMLY
BELIEVED THAT IT WAS ESSENTIAL THAT THE TALKS BEGIN
QUICKLY AND COME TO A RAPID CONCLUSION. WHILE GENAYEL
HAD QUESTIONS CONCERNING SEVERAL ASPECTS OF THE

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WORKING PAPER, HE HAD A POSITIVE ATTITUDE AND HE WERE

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CONFIDENT THAT NEGOTIATIONS DID NOT NEED TO BE PROTRACTED.

3. AS EXPECTED, BEGIN AND SHARON SAID THAT THEY WERE SURPRISED TO LEARN THAT GENAYEL ONLY CONSIDERED THE WORKING PAPER A BASIS FOR NEGOTIATIONS, AND NOT AN AGREED TEXT. THEY BOTH CAUTIONED THAT ISRAEL HAD MADE CONCESSIONS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS OF THE TEXT, AND THAT IF LEBANON BACKED OFF ITS SUBSTANCE, ISRAEL WOULD ALSO SEEK CHANGES. NEITHER TOOK ISSUE WITH MY ARGUMENT FOR THE URGENT INITIATION OF NEGOTIATIONS, BUT BOTH MADE CLEAR THAT WHILE THEY FAVORED THE RAPID CONCLUSION OF NEGOTIATIONS, THIS WOULD DEPEND AS WELL ON THE LEBANESE POSITION.

4. AFTER OUR GROUP MEETING, I MET WITH BEGIN TO URGE IN STRONG TERMS ONCE AGAIN THE NEED FOR NEGOTIATIONS TO BEGIN WITHIN A FEW DAYS AND TO CONCLUDE WITHIN A WEEK. I REFERRED TO MY COMMUNICATIONS WITH PRESIDENT REAGAN AND LEFT NO DOUBT ABOUT THE PRESIDENT'S POSITION THAT HE MUST HAVE A CLEAR AGREEMENT WITHOUT DELAY THAT LEADS TO THE RAPID WITHDRAWAL OF FOREIGN FORCES FROM LEBANON. THE ISSUE IS NOW BEFORE THE ISRAELI CABINET. HE WILL MEET AGAIN WITH THE PRIME MINISTER AND HIS COLLEAGUES AT 1730 LOCAL TODAY, TO REVIEW THE CABINET DECISION AND TO DISCUSS NEXT STEPS. END SUMMARY.

5. I MET WITH BEGIN FOR ONE HOUR MORNING OF DEC. 19, IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE ISRAELI CABINET MEETING. BEGIN WAS JOINED BY DEFIN SHARON, ACTING FOREIGN MINISTER NISSIN, DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER BEN-HEIR, AND A NUMBER OF HIGH LEVEL OFFICIALS FROM THE PRIME MINISTER'S

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OFFICE, THE MOO, AND THE MFA. AMBASSADORS LEVIE AND DRAPER, AND POLCOUNSELOR HARE AND KRECZKO JOINED ME.

6. BEGIN ASKED FOR A REPORT ON MY DISCUSSIONS IN LEBANON. I SAID THAT I HAD RETURNED WITH A POSITIVE VIEW. MY CONVERSATIONS WITH PRESIDENT GENAYEL HAD MADE CLEAR THERE WAS A REAL BASIS FOR NEGOTIATIONS IN THE CONTEXT OF THE WORKING PAPER WHICH THE SECRET ISRAELI/LEBANESE TALKS HAD PRODUCED. WE WERE PREPARED ALSO TO PARTICIPATE IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. I SAID THAT THERE WERE STILL

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POINTS WHICH REQUIRED CLARIFICATION, DISCUSSION AND NEGOTIATIONS. I NOTED THAT THE ISRAELI PRESS WAS CHARACTERIZING THE WORKING PAPER AS A "POSITIVE AGENDA" OF NEGOTIATIONS, AND I SAID THAT GENAYEL AGREED THAT THE WORKING PAPER AGENDA WAS SATISFACTORY FOR NEGOTIATIONS. I SAID THAT THE SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES HAD BEEN CLEARLY STATED, AS HAD THE GENERAL DIRECTION WE WERE MOVING, WITHOUT SPECIFYING THE EXACT OUTCOME. GENAYEL HAD AGREED THAT THE KEY ISSUES WERE WITHDRAWAL, SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS AND NORMALIZATION, AS NOTED EARLY IN THE PAPER, AND WAS IN ACCORD WITH THE APPROACH OF THE WORKING PAPER.

7. I SAID THAT THE LEBANESE WOULD OF COURSE RAISE POINTS GOING BEYOND WHAT HAD BEEN NOTED IN THE FOOTNOTE ON OBSERVERS AT THE BORDER, BUT THAT THIS SHOULD NOT BE AN OBSTACLE. THEY WOULD WANT TO CLARIFY VARIOUS MATTERS (SHARON LATER PICKED UP THIS COMMENT).

8. I REPORTED THAT GENAYEL HAD, HOWEVER, BEEN SET BACK BY THE EXTENSIVE DISCLOSURE OF THE SECRET TALKS AND THE SUBSTANCE OF THE WORKING PAPER IN THE ISRAELI PRESS. GENAYEL HAD NOT SHARED THE DOCUMENT WITH HIS CABINET AND THE PRESS ACCOUNTS HAD NOT ONLY PUT HIM IN AN EMBARRASSING POSITION BUT ALSO COULD LIMIT HIS

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FLEXIBILITY. THE INITIAL REACTION IN BEIRUT TO THESE PRESS STORIES WAS THAT THEY COULD BE LIVED WITH, BUT AS MORE AND MORE CAME OUT THIS BECAME A PROBLEM. HE HAD NOT TOLD NAZZAN WHAT HAD GONE ON, AND HE HAD ASKED THAT I SPEAK DIRECTLY WITH NAZZAN TO IMPRESS HIM ON THE NEED FOR A REALISTIC AND FLEXIBLE APPROACH TO NEGOTIATIONS WITH ISRAEL. NEVERTHELESS, GENAYEL REMAINED READY FOR THE IMMEDIATE INITIATION OF NEGOTIATIONS.

9. I TOLD BEGIN THAT I HAD BEEN IN COMMUNICATION WITH PRESIDENT REAGAN. HE SHARED GENAYEL'S INTEREST IN BEGINNING AND ENDING THE NEGOTIATIONS AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE. HE ALSO WANTED TO BRING ABOUT WITHDRAWALS QUICKLY, BUT HE REALIZED THAT THIS DEPENDED AS WELL ON THE SYRIANS AND THE PLO. GENAYEL THROUGH ODAYO HAD STARTED ACCELERATED NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE SYRIANS AND WAS ENCOURAGED; IT WAS IMPORTANT TO KEEP ANY ONUS THAT DEVELOPS ON THE SYRIANS BY MOVING QUICKLY ON THE ISRAEL/LEBANON NEGOTIATIONS. HE WOULD PUSH LEBANON TO ACCELERATE TALKS WITH

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THE PLO ALSO.

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10. I CONCLUDED WITH A SPECIFIC PROPOSAL. I REFERRED TO SHARON'S COMMENT ON DEC. 16 THAT IT APPEARED POSSIBLE TO BEGIN NEGOTIATIONS WITHIN A FEW DAYS. I SAID THAT HE AND GENAYEL HAD AGREED THIS WAS NOT ONLY POSSIBLE BUT ESSENTIAL. I SAID THAT I HOPED BEGIN AND HIS COLLEAGUES WOULD COME OUT OF THEIR CABINET MEETING WITH A CLEAR INDICATION THAT THEY ARE READY TO BEGIN THE NEGOTIATIONS IN A FEW DAYS AND TO COMPLETE THE NEGOTIATIONS RAPIDLY. I SAID THAT ONE WEEK SHOULD BE ENOUGH TO PRODUCE A SOUND DOCUMENT. I NOTED ALSO THAT I EXPECTED VENUE WOULD NO LONGER BE A STICKING POINT (KNOWING THAT THE ISRAELIS APPARENTLY HAD GIVEN UP THEIR INSISTENCE ON JERUSALEM).

11. BEGIN SAID THAT IT TOOK TWO TO PRODUCE A DOCUMENT. I REJOINED THAT WHILE CLARIFICATIONS AND DISCUSSIONS ON THE SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES REMAINED NECESSARY, I WAS CONFIDENT THAT BEGIN WOULD FIND THAT LEBANON WOULD NEGOTIATE IN GOOD FAITH AND WITH A POSITIVE ATTITUDE. I SAID THAT MUCH GOOD WORK HAD ALREADY BEEN DONE ON SUBSTANCE THROUGH THE SECRET TALKS, AND PRESUMED THAT EACH SIDE KNEW THE SUBSTANTIVE POSITIONS AND DIFFICULTIES OF THE OTHER. WE WERE NOW AT AN IMPORTANT THRESHOLD. I REITERATED THAT I HOPED THE ISRAELI CABINET WOULD GIVE A CLEAR AND POSITIVE INDICATION TODAY ON THE DIRECTION AND TIMING OF NEGOTIATIONS AND ON THE BASIS OF THE LEBANESE AND U.S. ASSESSMENT THAT URGENT ACTION WAS ESSENTIAL.

12. BEGIN SAID THAT HE DETECTED SOME SHIFT IN THE LEBANESE POSITION. WHEREAS HE UNDERSTOOD THAT THE WORKING PAPER

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HAD BEEN AGREED, NOW I WAS SAYING THAT IT WAS A "BASIS" FOR NEGOTIATIONS. I TOLD BEGIN THAT I HAD CHOSEN THIS WORD DELIBERATELY, BECAUSE, AS DEFINED SHARON HAD RECOGNIZED, THERE WERE ISSUES REQUIRING CLARIFICATION IN THE WORKING PAPER BEYOND THAT NOTED IN THE FOOTNOTE. GENAYEL DOES NOT VIEW THE WORKING PAPER AS NECESSARILY REPRESENTING THE FINAL DOCUMENT, BUT HE DOES ACCEPT THAT ALL OF THE ISSUES IN THE PAPER REQUIRE DISCUSSION AND, IN MY VIEW, HAS A POSITIVE ATTITUDE TOWARD THEM. I ALSO POINTED OUT AGAIN THAT GENAYEL HAD SHARED THE SECRET NEGOTIATING PROCESS ONLY WITH TWO OR THREE

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COLLEAGUES BUT NOT WITH HIS CABINET. THIS MADE IT MORE DIFFICULT FOR HIM TO ACKNOWLEDGE THAT ELEMENTS WERE "AGREED", PARTICULARLY IN LIGHT OF THE ISRAELI PRESS STORIES. I SAID THAT THE IMPORTANT THING WAS THAT GENAYEL MADE CLEAR HE IS READY TO BEGIN NEGOTIATIONS.

13. AT THIS POINT SHARON INTERVENED, SAYING THAT THE WORKING PAPER WAS AN "AGREED PAPER" WHICH HAD BEEN DEVELOPED AFTER TWO MONTHS OF NEGOTIATIONS AND AFTER PASSING THROUGH FIVE DRAFTS. THE CONTENTS HAD BEEN DISCUSSED WITH THE PRIME MINISTER AND FOREIGN MINISTER. WHERE POINTS OF DIFFERENCE HAD ARISEN, SUCH AS WITH RESPECT TO THE PRESENCE OF UN OBSERVERS, THIS HAD BEEN CLEARLY IDENTIFIED IN A FOOTNOTE TO THE DOCUMENT. IT WAS ALSO UNDERSTOOD THAT SOME OTHER ISSUES WOULD NEED FURTHER CLARIFICATION, SUCH AS THE TIME PERIOD IN WHICH AIR AND SEA RECONNAISSANCE MISSIONS WOULD BE AUTHORIZED. IF THE LEBANESE WERE NOT, HOWEVER, SAYING THAT THEY WOULD SEEK CLARIFICATION OF GUIDELINE ISSUES ALREADY AGREED TO, ISRAEL WOULD ALSO HAVE TO RESERVE ITS POSITION ON VARIOUS POINTS. SHARON EMPHASIZED THAT THE NEGOTIATIONS HAD BEEN HARD, REQUIRING CONCESSIONS FROM BOTH

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SIDES TO REACH THIS PACKAGE AGREEMENT. IF THE WORKING PAPER HAS NO LONGER AGREED TO, AS HAS BEEN THE CASE AT LEAST UNTIL FRIDAY MORNING, ISRAEL'S POSITION WOULD NECESSARILY BECOME HARDER IF THE LEBANESE SOUGHT TO HARDEN THEIR POSITIONS. ON THE QUESTION OF PUBLICITY, AND THE PROBLEMS WHICH THIS HAS ALLEGED TO HAVE CAUSED, SHARON RATHER LAMELY ATTEMPTED TO EXPLAIN THAT THE ISRAELIS HAD FORWARDED THE LEBANESE THAT THEY WOULD HAVE TO BRING THE PAPER TO THE ATTENTION OF THEIR GOVERNMENT. I REPLIED THAT PRESIDENT GENAYEL ALSO NEEDED TO BRING THE MATTER TO HIS GOVERNMENT, BUT IN HIS OWN WAY AND NOT THROUGH NEWSPAPER ACCOUNTS. SHARON QUICKLY DROPPED THE SUBJECT.

14. SHARON RAISED THE NEED FOR FULL PLO WITHDRAWAL, EXPLAINING THAT THERE SHOULD BE NO MISUNDERSTANDING. IF THE PLO IS NOT COMPLETELY EVACUATED FROM LEBANON, THE IDF WOULD NOT MOVE "ONE YARD." HE CITED THE RELEVANT SECTION OF THE WORKING PAPER, IF THE LEBANESE WERE NOW SAYING THIS SHOULD BE SUBJECT TO NEGOTIATIONS, IT WOULD COMPLETELY CHANGE THE CONTEXT OF THE NEGOTIA-

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TIONS. I REPLIED THAT I WAS NOT IN A POSITION TO NEGOTIATE FOR THE LEBANESE BUT EMPHASIZED ONCE AGAIN

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THAT THE LEBANESE ATTITUDE WAS POSITIVE. THE LEBANESE WERE NOT TRYING TO OBFUSCATE THE ISSUES OR CREATE COMPLICATIONS. AMBASSADOR LEVIS TOOK THE POINT SOMEWHAT FURTHER, SAYING THAT THE LEBANESE WANTED STRONGLY TO GET ALL THE PLO OUT OF LEBANON AT THE BEGINNING. THEY SHARED THE ISRAELI DESIRE IN THIS RESPECT. I ADDED THAT THE ONLY ISSUE WAS THAT PRESIDENT GENAYEL DID NOT KNOW WHAT HE WOULD ACTUALLY BE ABLE TO ACCOMPLISH IN NEGOTIATING AN EARLY PLO WITHDRAWAL.

15. SHARON THEN SUGGESTED THAT ONE POSSIBLE WAY TO OVERCOME THE PROBLEM REGARDING THE WORKING PAPER WAS TO HAVE IT SIGNED BY BOTH SIDES (BEFORE PROCEEDING WITH NEGOTIATIONS). THIS WOULD AVOID PUTTING ISRAEL IN A DIFFICULT POSITION. I QUICKLY INTERVENED TO SAY THAT ISRAEL SHOULD NOT ADD TO THE PROBLEMS AT THIS POINT. THE IMPERATIVE WAS TO GET THE NEGOTIATIONS STARTED. SHARON SAID THE WORKING PAPER MUST BE UNDERSTOOD AS THE GUIDELINES FOR THE NEGOTIATIONS, STRESSING THAT ISRAEL MUST BE CAREFUL NOT TO START THE NEGOTIATIONS OVER FROM THE BEGINNING. I REPLIED THAT THERE WAS NO WAY THE NEGOTIATIONS WOULD START ON THIS BASIS, AFTER THE NEGOTIATIONS OF THE PAST TWO MONTHS. I AGAIN STRESSED THIS WAS THE MOMENT FOR DECISION, ELABORATING THAT WE NOW WERE ON THE THRESHOLD AND IT WAS TIME TO CUT THE FINAL KNOT.

16. IN CONCLUDING THIS PART OF THE MEETING, I WARNED MY ISRAELI INTERLOCUTORS THAT IF THE PROSPECT OF REACHING AN AGREEMENT WERE NOW TO RECEDE, THOSE WHO WISHED TO DAMAGE THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS WOULD SEIZE

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THE OPPORTUNITY TO BRECK HAVOC. HE COULD NOT ALLOW THIS TO HAPPEN. IT WAS FOR THIS REASON THAT HE MUST PURSUE THE NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE GREATEST URGENCY.

17. AS HE BROKE UP, I THEN MET ALONE WITH BEGIN. I GAVE HIM GENAYEL'S PERSONAL ASSURANCES THAT HE WANTED TO GO AS FAR AS POSSIBLE IN THE RELATIONSHIP WITH ISRAEL BUT THAT HE COULD NOT DO EVERYTHING AT ONCE. HE HAD PROBLEMS IN MAINTAINING HIS NATIONAL CONSENSUS. TO TAKE ONE EXAMPLE, AMIN HAD SAID TO ME THAT HE NEEDED AN INTERNATIONAL OBSERVER ARRANGEMENT ON THE

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BORDER AS A COVER TO PERMIT THE LEBANESE TO MAKE NECESSARY DECISIONS THERE. I BORE DOWN HARDEST, HOWEVER, ON PRESIDENT REAGAN'S DETERMINATION THAT THERE BE THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE PROGRESS. IT WAS ESSENTIAL THAT ISRAEL AGREE TO START NEGOTIATIONS WITHIN A FEW DAYS AND AGREE TO TRY TO COMPLETE THEM WITHIN A WEEK; THERE MUST ALSO BE MUTUALLY SATISFACTORY VENUES. I NOTED THAT I HAD HAD AN EXCHANGE OF LETTERS WITH THE PRESIDENT WITHIN THE LAST 24 HOURS REAFFIRMING THE PRESIDENT'S STRONG VIEWS ON THE NEED FOR NO FURTHER DELAY. BEGIN WAS LEFT IN NO DOUBT THAT HE MUST HAVE AGREEMENT WITHOUT DELAY THAT WILL LEAD TO THE RAPID WITHDRAWAL OF FOREIGN FORCES FROM LEBANON. 18. MEANWHILE AMBASSADORS LEWIS AND DRAPER WERE TALKING TO MERIDON AND TANIR. BOTH ISRAELIS INDIVIDUALLY EXPLAINED THAT GENAYEL HAD BEEN READY A WEEK AGO TO "INITIAL" THE WORKING PAPER AND THAT THE LEBANESE HAD WANTED THE ISRAELIS TO DO LIKEWISE. BEGIN, HOWEVER, HAD DECIDED THAT THIS WAS NOT APPROPRIATE, AT LEAST FOR ISRAEL, IN LIGHT OF THE FACT THAT THE ISRAELI CABINET HAD NOT AGREED TO THE PAPER. BEGIN WITH ME

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ALONE GAVE ME THE SAME ACCOUNT. ONCE AGAIN, THIS
SHOWS HOW MUCH OF A STICKLER BEGIN IS ABOUT OBSERVING
THE REQUIREMENTS AND NICETIES OF CABINET RULE.

19. TANIR TOLD DRAPER THAT HE WAS FAIRLY CONFIDENT
THAT THE CABINET WOULD OPT FOR VENUES IN LEBANON AND
ISRAEL RATHER THAN EUROPE. THE ISRAELIS HAD ALREADY
CONCEDED THAT JERUSALEN WOULD NOT BE A STICKING POINT.
TANIR THOUGHT THE ISRAELI VENUE COULD BE A PLACE LIKE
NAHARIYYAH. TANIR WENT ON TO SAY THAT ANOTHER
REASON FOR VENUES IN THE REGION WAS THAT THE ISRAELI
HEAD OF DELEGATION WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO MOVE "ONE
INCH" BEYOND THE WORKING PAPER WITHOUT REFERRING THE
ISSUE TO JERUSALEN AND PROBABLY THE CABINET AS WELL.
HE WOULD NEED GUIDANCE AND INSTRUCTIONS VIRTUALLY
EVERY DAY.

20. TANIR ALSO CLARIFIED WHAT SHARON HAD SAID ABOUT
THE OTHER "CONCESSIONS" GIVEN THE LEBANESE. THESE
RELATE TO THE CONCEPT THAT ISRAELI ELECTRONIC WATCH
STATIONS AND OTHER SURVEILLANCE AND SECURITY REQUIRE-

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NENTS WOULD BE CARRIED OUT FOR LIMITED AND SPECIFIED
PERIODS OF TIME ONLY, IN CONTRAST TO THE POSITION IN

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21. AMBASSADOR LEWIS ALSO TOLD DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER BEN NEIR THAT IT WAS IMPERATIVE FOR THE CABINET TO AGREE ON A DATE AND VENUE FOR THE NEGOTIATIONS. BEN NEIR FULLY UNDERSTOOD THE GRAVITY OF THE SITUATION AND, AFTER CONFERRING WITH JUSTICE MINISTER NISSIN, SAID THAT HE HAD NISSIN ON BOARD. GROVE

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NEA:WKIRBY
NEA/P:THOMAN
S/S-O: RWERDMAN
D:NWALKER
S/S:CHILL

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Date: 11/6/97

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INFO AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE

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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: SHUM, LE, IS
SUBJECT: PALESTINIAN PRISONERS

1. [REDACTED]

2. FREELANCE JOURNALIST MILTON VIORST IS WORKING ON WASHINGTON POST ARTICLE FOR SUNDAY PAPER DISCUSSING PALESTINIAN PRISONER SITUATION IN LEBANON/ISRAEL. IN HIS DISCUSSIONS WITH DEPT. OFFICIALS, VIORST HAS RAISED USG UNDERTAKINGS IN THIS REGARD, AS SPECIFIED IN HABIB-WAZZAN LETTER OF AUGUST 18. (VIORST HAS OBTAINED COPY OF [REDACTED])

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LETTER, APPARENTLY THROUGH SOURCES IN TUNIS.)

3. THE USG RETAINS ITS STRONG INTEREST AND CONCERN FOR THE FATE AND TREATMENT OF LEBANESE AND PALESTINIAN PRISONERS. IT APPEARS TO US THAT NOW WOULD BE A GOOD

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TIME TO CONSIDER RAISING THE SUBJECT OF THE STATUS OF PERSONS CAPTURED IN LEBANON BUT INTERNED IN ISRAEL. WE NOTE THAT AMBASSADOR DRAPER HAS MADE PRELIMINARY SUGGESTIONS TO AMBASSADOR TUENI ON THE PRISONER ISSUE IN CONTEXT OF GOL-PLO DISCUSSIONS. WE WOULD APPRECIATE HIS VIEWS AND THOSE OF AMBASSADORS HABIB AND LEWIS ON POSSIBILITY THAT WE RAISE THIS ISSUE NOW WITH GOI.

4. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF AUGUST 18 HABIB-WAZZAN LETTER:

QUOTE: DEAR MR. PRIME MINISTER:

IN CONNECTION WITH OUR RECENT CONVERSATIONS, I WISH TO ASSURE YOU THAT THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT HAS HELD, AND WILL CONTINUE TO HOLD, AN INTEREST AND CONCERN FOR THE FATE OF AND THE TREATMENT OF LEBANESE AND PALESTINIAN PRISONERS BEING HELD BY ISRAELI FORCES IN CONNECTION WITH THEIR OPERATIONS IN LEBANON, AND FOR FULL RESPECT FOR ALL APPLICABLE INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS.

THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT WILL CONTINUE TO DISCUSS WITH THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL THE CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH SUCH PERSONS ARE DETAINED, REFLECTING THE VIEW OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT THAT THEY SHOULD BE ACCORDED THE MOST REASONABLE, HUMANE AND ORDERLY TREATMENT POSSIBLE UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES. THEY SHOULD BE DEALT WITH IN A MANNER CONSISTENT WITH INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS AND SHOULD BE TREATED IN A WAY WHICH RESPECTS HUMANITARIAN

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CONSIDERATIONS.

RESPECTFULLY, PHILIP C. HABIB. END QUOTE. DAM

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FOLLOWING REPEAT SENT ACTION BEIRUT TEL AVIV INFO DAMASCUS
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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: SHUM, LE, IS

SUBJECT: PALESTINIAN PRISONERS

1. [REDACTED]

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LETTER, APPARENTLY THROUGH SOURCES IN TUNIS.)

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CONNECTION WITH THEIR OPERATIONS IN LEBANON, AND FOR FULL
RESPECT FOR ALL APPLICABLE INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS.

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RESPECTFULLY, PHILIP C. HABIB. END QUOTE. DAM
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E.O. 12065: RDS-1,3 7/10/02 (PAGANELLI, ROBERT P.) OR-M
 TAGS: PEPR, MILI, MOPS, IS, LE, SA, SY, US
 SUBJ: HABIB MISSION: JULY 10 MEETING BETWEEN DEPUTY
 ASST SECY DRAPER AND SYRIAN FONHIN KHADDAM

REF: DAMASCUS 4931

1. ~~ENTIRE TEXT~~

2. SUMMARY REPORT OF TWO AND ONE-HALF HOUR MEETING
 JULY 10 BETWEEN DAS DRAPER AND FONHIN. KHADDAM AS WELL AS
 RECOMMENDED COURSES OF ACTION ARE CONTAINED REPTEL. WHAT
 FOLLOWS IS FULLER ACCOUNT OF THE DRAPER-KHADDAM MEETING.

3. DRAPER, ACCOMPANIED BY AMBASSADOR, DCM RUGH AND POLOFF
 ABINGTON, MET AT 0830 LOCAL WITH KHADDAM, DEPUTY FONHIN

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KHADDAM'S TRANSLATOR ABU FARES. AFTER INITIAL EXCHANGE OF PLEASANTRIES, DRAPER STATED THAT HABIB HAD SENT HIM TO DAMASCUS TO BRING THE SYRIANS UP TO DATE ON HABIB'S EFFORTS. HE OUTLINED FOR KHADDAM STATUS OF NEGOTIATIONS AND WHAT HABIB HAD BEEN TRYING TO ACHIEVE IN HIS DISCUSSIONS IN BEIRUT. FIRST AND FOREMOST, HABIB WAS ATTEMPTING TO PREVENT AN ISRAELI INVASION AND OCCUPATION OF WEST BEIRUT, A MOVE WHICH WOULD RESULT IN TREMENDOUS CIVILIAN CASUALTIES AND WHICH WOULD BE A CATASTROPHE FOR THE LONG-RANGE FUTURE OF LEBANON. TO THIS END, HABIB HAS BEEN SEEKING A POLITICAL SOLUTION WHICH WOULD PRESERVE PLO HONOR WHILE ALLOWING FOR THEIR DEPARTURE FROM BEIRUT, AN INITIAL STEP WHICH WOULD SET THE STAGE FOR ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM LEBANON. HABIB HAD EXPENDED MAJOR EFFORTS TO STABILIZE THE CEASEFIRE AND MAKE IT A CEASEFIRE-IN-PLACE. DESPITE PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENTS TO THE CONTRARY, THERE WAS NO QUESTION THAT THE PLO LEADERSHIP AND FIGHTERS ARE PREPARED TO LEAVE BEIRUT. THE MODALITIES OF HOW THIS WOULD BE ACCOMPLISHED WAS THE FOCAL POINT OF HABIB'S NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE GOL AND THROUGHT IT WITH THE PLO.

4. AT THE SUGGESTION AND REQUEST OF THE PLO, HABIB HAD PROPOSED TO PRESIDENT REAGAN AND RECEIVED A COMMITMENT FROM HIM TO PUT U.S. MILITARY FORCES IN LEBANON IN CONJUNCTION WITH OTHER TROOPS TO OVERSEE AND SAFEGUARD THE ORDERLY EVACUATION OF WEST BEIRUT BY THE PLO, AND ASSURE SECURITY OF THOSE WHO REMAINED BEHIND. DRAPER STRESSED THAT THIS WAS A MAJOR POLICY DECISION BY THE PRESIDENT. ONCE THE WEST BEIRUT PROBLEM HAD BEEN SOLVED, THIS WOULD SET THE STAGE INITIALLY FOR ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM BEIRUT AND ULTIMATELY FROM ALL OF LEBANON. SIMULTANEOUS WITH THESE EFFORTS, WE WERE ALSO DOING EVERYTHING WE COULD

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TO CONTRIBUTE TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A STRONG LEBANESE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT.

5. REFERRING TO THE SYRIAN COMMUNIQUE OF JULY 9 ON NOT ACCEPTING PLO COMBATANTS IN SYRIA, DRAPER SAID THAT HABIB'S EFFORTS OF THE PAST WEEK HAD BEEN BASED ON INFORMATION CONVEYED TO US BY THE SAUDIS TO THE EFFECT THAT THE SARG WAS PREPARED TO RECEIVE THE PLO LEADERSHIP AND COMBATANTS. IN VIEW OF YESTERDAY'S SYRIAN STATEMENT, IT WAS IMPERATIVE THAT WE UNDERSTOOD FULLY THE SYRIAN POSITION IN ORDER TO

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KNOW EXACTLY WHERE MATTERS STOOD.

6. KHADDAM DECLINED TO ADDRESS INITIALLY YESTERDAY'S COMMUNIQUE, PREFERRING INSTEAD TO FOCUS ON THE DETAILS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS, WHERE MATTERS STOOD, WITH WHOM HABIB HAD CONTACT, WHAT THE ISRAELI POSITION WAS ON VARIOUS POINTS, ETC. DRAPER REPEATED THAT THIS WAS WHY HABIB HAD ASKED HIM TO COME TO DAMASCUS--TO PUT THE SARG FULLY IN THE PICTURE. HE SAID THAT HABIB WAS TALKING PRINCIPALLY WITH THE GOL POLITICAL LEADERSHIP, VARIOUS SUNNI AND CHRISTIAN PERSONALITIES, AS WELL AS INFLUENTIAL LEBANESE PARLIAMENTARIANS. IN RESPONSE TO KHADDAM'S QUESTION, DRAPER SAID HABIB WAS NOT IN DIRECT CONTACT WITH PALESTINIAN LEADERS. PRIME MINISTER NAZZAN WAS THE PRINCIPAL CHANNEL TO THE PLO BUT OTHER TRADITIONAL SUNNI LEADERS SUCH AS SAAB SALAM WERE ALSO INVOLVED.

7. DRAPER DESCRIBED IN SOME DETAIL FOR KHADDAM THE TREMENDOUS DIFFICULTIES THAT HABIB HAD ENCOUNTERED IN CONDUCTING NEGOTIATIONS IN BEIRUT, MENTIONING SPECIFICALLY THE CONTINUED FIGHTING BETWEEN THE ISRAELIS AND THE PLO.

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THE EVER-TIGHTENING ISRAELI DJFI OF SEEING KEY PERSONALITIES UNDER THESE CONDITIONS. HE NOTED, FOR EXAMPLE, THAT HABIB HAD NOT BEEN ABLE TO SEE HAZZAN FOR MORE THAN FOUR OR FIVE DAYS BECAUSE OF THESE CONDITIONS, HAVING MET WITH HIM ONLY YESTERDAY. DRAPER ALSO MENTIONED, AS AN EXAMPLE OF THE GREAT OBSTACLES IN CONDUCTING THESE NEGOTIATIONS, THE VERY DIFFICULT TALKS HE HAD HELD JULY 9 WITH THE IDF ON REOPENING THE GALERIE SIMA'N CROSSING POINT SO THAT HAZZAN COULD GET TO BAABDA IN ORDER TO CONTINUE THE NEGOTIATIONS.

8. DRAPER SAID THAT IF THERE WAS ONE KEY SENTIMENT IN LEBANON WHICH HAD EMERGED OVER THE PAST MONTH, IT WAS THAT THE LEBANESE BELIEVED THEY HAD SUFFERED ENOUGH FROM THE WAR AND THE ENORMOUS DESTRUCTION THAT HAD TAKEN PLACE. THERE SEEMED TO BE A LEBANESE CONSENSUS THAT ALTHOUGH THEY CONTINUED TO SUPPORT THE PALESTINIANS IN TERMS OF RESTORING THEIR LEGITIMATE RIGHTS, LEBANON HAD SUFFERED

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ENOUGH FOR THE PALESTINIAN CAUSE. THE PLO AS AN ORGANIZATION COULD NOT REMAIN POLITICALLY OR MILITARILY IN BEIRUT

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OR IN LEBANON AS A WHOLE. THE USG AGREED FULLY WITH THIS SENTIMENT. DRAPER STRESSED REPEATEDLY THROUGHOUT THE CONVERSATION THE ENORMOUS LOSS OF LIFE WHICH WOULD RESULT IN WEST BEIRUT IF A POLITICAL SOLUTION WERE NOT ACHIEVED AND THE IDF IMPOSED A MILITARY SOLUTION INSTEAD, AND REPEATEDLY EMPHASIZED HABIB'S DEEP CONCERN TO PREVENT THIS TRAGEDY FROM OCCURRING.

9. IN TERMS OF THE PLO LEAVING WEST BEIRUT, DRAPER SAID THAT THE UNITED STATES HAD OFFERED ASSURANCES THAT THE LEADERSHIP AND FIGHTERS WOULD BE ABLE TO LEAVE IN SAFETY. WE HAD BEEN IN TOUCH WITH THE ICRC ABOUT CHARTERING PRIVATE VESSELS SHOULD THE PLO DECIDE TO LEAVE BY SEA. IN ADDITION, AND SHOULD THE PLO REQUEST IT, SHIPS FROM THE SIXTH FLEET WOULD PROVIDE AN ESCORT FOR THE VESSELS CARRYING THE PLO. IF THE PLO DECIDED TO LEAVE BEIRUT BY LAND FOR SYRIA, WE WOULD OBTAIN ASSURANCES FROM THE IDF FOR THE SAFETY OF THE EVACUEES. DRAPER NOTED THAT SOME PALESTINIANS AND LEBANESE WERE CONCERNED THAT ONCE THE PLO FIGHTERS LEFT, THEY WOULD BE DEFENSELESS AND WOULD BE ATTACKED BY OTHER LEBANESE PARTIES. THE U.S. HAD OFFERED ITS PARTICIPATION IN A MULTINATIONAL FORCE WITH THE PRIMARY PURPOSE OF SETTING UP ARRANGEMENTS WHEREBY THE PALESTINIANS IN LEBANON WOULD FEEL CONFIDENT THAT THEY WOULD NOT BE ATTACKED. WHILE U.S. PARTICIPATION WOULD BE FOR A LIMITED PERIOD (NOT MORE THAN 30 DAYS), THIS WOULD ALLOW TIME TO SET UP MORE PERMANENT SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS. DRAPER SAID THAT THIS WAS BASICALLY WHERE MATTERS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS NOW STOOD.

10. KHADDAM TURNED TO THE ISRAELI ASPECT OF THE

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LEBANESE PROBLEM AND ASKED HOW HE PROPOSED TO DEAL WITH THAT. DRAPER SAID THAT THE U.S. VIEWPOINT WAS CLEAR AND UNEQUIVOCABLE: THERE HAD TO BE COMPLETE ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM LEBANON. HE DESCRIBED IN SOME DETAIL FOR KHADDAM THE DIFFICULTIES HABIB HAD ENCOUNTERED IN DEALING WITH THE ISRAELIS. HABIB'S CONSTANT THEME IN HIS DISCUSSIONS WITH ISRAELI OFFICIALS WAS THE NECESSITY TO SOLVE THE WEST BEIRUT PROBLEM BY POLITICAL AND NOT MILITARY MEANS AND IN THE LONGER RUN TO STRENGTHEN THE GOL AND END THE PRESENCE OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES IN LEBANON--PALESTINIAN, ISRAELI AND SYRIAN. DRAPER

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EMPHASIZED ISRAELI IMPATIENCE AND SUSPICION VIS-A-VIS THE PLO AND THE GOL AND SAID THAT ISRAEL WAS SKEPTICAL THAT A POLITICAL SOLUTION COULD BE ACHIEVED.

11. KHADDAM REPEATEDLY TRIED TO PIN DRAPER DOWN ON WHAT THE UNITED STATES WOULD DO IF ISRAEL PROVED INTRANSIGENT IN TERMS OF WITHDRAWING FROM BEIRUT INITIALLY AND THEN FROM LEBANON AS A WHOLE. DRAPER STRESSED THAT THE KEY TO STARTING THE PROCESS OF ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL WAS RESOLVING THE WEST BEIRUT PROBLEM AND GETTING THE PLO OUT OF THE CITY. AS PART OF THIS PROCESS, THERE WOULD BE ADJUSTMENTS IN ISRAELI LINES AROUND BEIRUT AND A CERTAIN AMOUNT OF DISENGAGEMENT. AT A LATER STAGE, THERE WOULD BE DISENGAGEMENT IN AREAS WHERE SYRIAN AND ISRAELI FORCES WERE IN CONTACT.

12. WITH THE REMOVAL OF THE PLO FROM BEIRUT, THERE WOULD BE NO JUSTIFICATION FOR ISRAEL TO STAY IN THE AREA. THE PLO WITHDRAWAL, ACCOMPANIED BY SOME ISRAELI DISENGAGEMENT,

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WOULD BE AN IMPORTANT PSYCHOLOGICAL BREAKTHROUGH WHICH WOULD START THE PROCESS MOVING TOWARD TOTAL ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM LEBANON. DRAPER EMPHASIZED, HOWEVER, THAT THERE WERE MANY DIFFICULTIES AND POINTS OF DISAGREEMENT BETWEEN GOI AND THE USG AND THAT GOI HAD SOME DEEP RESERVATIONS AND STRONG OBJECTIONS TO SOME ELEMENTS OF THE SOLUTION FOR WEST BEIRUT THAT WAS UNDER DISCUSSION. FOR EXAMPLE, THE QUESTION OF A PLO OFFICE IN BEIRUT TO HANDLE HUMANITARIAN REQUIREMENTS WAS SOMETHING WHICH WE CONSIDERED TO BE PRAGMATIC. YET THE GOI STRONGLY DISAGREED WITH THIS. DRAPER SAID THAT WE WERE NOT BASING OUR POLICY IN LEBANON ON WHAT ISRAEL WANTED BUT ON WHAT WOULD ENSURE A STABLE AND SECURE LEBANON AND PREVENT FUTURE ISRAELI MILITARY ACTIONS AGAINST LEBANON.

13. THERE WERE ALSO POINTS OF DISAGREEMENT WITH THE PLO. SOME SUNNI LEADERS AND THE PLO, FOR EXAMPLE, WANTED THE MNF DEPLOYED THE DAY BEFORE OR THE SAME DAY THE PLO

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BEGAN TO EVACUATE BEIRUT. THE USG COULD NOT ACCEPT THIS. U.S. FORCES WOULD ONLY BE DEPLOYED AFTER THE EVACUATION

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WAS WELL UNDERWAY, AFTER THREE OR FOUR DAYS. THE U.S. FORCES COULD NOT BE THE "MEAT IN THE SANDWICH" BETWEEN ISRAELI AND PLO FORCES.

14. KHADDAM ASKED FOR A CLEARER DEFINITION OF ISRAELI GOALS IN LEBANON. IF THE PLO WITHDREW FROM BEIRUT AND LEBANON AS A WHOLE, WHAT WOULD THE SITUATION THEN BE. DRAPER RESPONDED THAT UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, LEBANON WOULD CONDUCT ITS OWN AFFAIRS WITHIN ITS BOUNDARIES AND THERE WOULD BE NO JUSTIFICATION FOR ISRAELI MILITARY INTERVENTION IN THE COUNTRY. OVER THE LONGER TERM, THE SOME 400,000 PALESTINIANS IN LEBANON MUST ACCEPT AND LIVE UNDER THE AUTHORITY OF THE GOL, NOT AS A STATE WITHIN A STATE WITH EXTRATERRITORIAL RIGHTS.

15. THE AMBASSADOR INTERJECTED THAT WHAT ISRAEL HAS STATED THAT IT WANTS IN LEBANON IS A COUNTRY WHICH OFFERS NO TERRORIST THREAT TO ISRAEL. THE UNITED STATES WAS IN GENERAL AGREEMENT WITH THIS POSITION. FROM THIS BASIC ISRAELI REQUIREMENT, HABIB HAD BEEN NEGOTIATING OVER THE PAST THREE WEEKS ALONG THE LINES DESCRIBED BY DRAPER IN ORDER TO FULFILL THIS OBJECTIVE THROUGH POLITICAL MEANS, WHILE EXERTING MAJOR EFFORTS TO PREVENT ISRAEL FROM DECIDING THAT THE POLITICAL PROCESS WAS IMPOSSIBLE AND THE JOB HAD TO BE FINISHED MILITARILY. A CONSENSUS HAD BEEN DEVELOPED, INCLUDING BY THE GOL, THAT THE PLO MILITARY AND POLITICAL PRESENCE MUST LEAVE LEBANON. THIS WAS ALSO OUR VIEWPOINT AND IT WOULD FIT THE ISRAELI REQUIREMENT FOR THE SECURITY OF ITS NORTHERN BORDER WITH LEBANON.

16. THE AMBASSADOR CONTINUED THAT HE AGREED THE LEBANESE

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COULD NOT RUN THEIR OWN AFFAIRS SO LONG AS ISRAEL CONTINUED TO OCCUPY HALF THE COUNTRY. THE SAME WAS TRUE WITH REGARD TO THE PLO AND SYRIAN MILITARY PRESENCE IN LEBANON. THAT WAS WHY THE CORE OF OUR POLICY WAS THE NECESSITY OF WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES FROM LEBANON. AS A PRACTICAL MANNER, THE BASIC SYRIAN REQUIREMENT WAS ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL. WE SHARED THAT GOAL BUT WE HAD TO COME TO AN AGREEMENT ON HOW TO ACHIEVE IT. THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FORCES IS A PART OF THE PROCESS. WE DID NOT WANT ANY FOREIGN FORCES IN LEBANON TO INTERFERE IN LEBANESE AFFAIRS AND IN THE LEBANESE POLITICAL PROCESS.

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17. KHADDAM OBJECTED TO THE IMPLIED EQUATING OF THE SYRIAN AND ISRAELI PRESENCE IN LEBANON. DRAPER RESPONDED THAT HE WERE NOT EQUATING THE TWO, BUT AS A PRACTICAL MATTER ALL FOREIGN FORCES HAD TO BE WITHDRAWN IN ORDER TO SOLVE THE LEBANESE CRISIS.

18. KHADDAM THEN TURNED TO THE CONCEPT OF A STRONG CENTRAL LEBANESE GOVPPSO THAT ISRAEL HAD MADE IT CLEAR THAT IT WOULD NOT WITHDRAW BEFORE BASHIR GENAYYAL HAD BEEN ELECTED PRESIDENT. HE EXPRESSED FEARS THAT THE CONFESSIOAL BALANCE IN LEBANON WOULD BE UPSET BY SUCH A DEVELOPHMENT AND THAT THE PALESTINIANS AND THE MUSLIN COMMUNITIES WOULD SUFFER AT THE HANDS OF A BASHIR-LED GOVERNMENT. THIS COULD INCLUDE EXPELLING THE PALESTINIANS AS WELL AS SOME MUSLIMS FROM LEBANON OR MASSACRES OF PALESTINIANS AND MUSLIMS IN ORDER TO CREATE A CHRISTIAN MAJORITY IN LEBANON. DRAPER SAID THAT THE U.S. WOULD NEVER TOLERATE THIS SITUATION. LEBANON HAD TRADITIONALLY LOOKED TO THE

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SECTION 04 OF 06 DAMASCUS 04934

U.S. FOR SUPPORT AND FRIENDSHIP. A LEBANESE GOVERNMENT WHICH FOLLOWED THIS COURSE OF ACTION COULD EXPECT NO SUPPORT FROM THE WEST AND THE U.S. WOULD DO EVERYTHING IT COULD TO PREVENT THIS FROM HAPPENING. U.S. AGREEMENT TO PARTICIPATE IN AN MNF WAS A FIRST STEP TO SETTING UP ADEQUATE ARRANGEMENTS TO ENSURE THAT ALL LEBANESE AND THE PALESTINIAN COMMUNITY FELT SECURE.

19. AFTER THIS LONG GIVE AND TAKE, KHADDAM FINALLY TURNED TO THE SUBJECT OF ASSAD'S JULY 4-5 DISCUSSIONS IN TAIF WITH KING FAHD. KHADDAM SAID THAT HE HAD BEEN PRESENT DURING THE TALKS THERE. FAHD HAD REVIEWED FOR ASSAD WHAT THE SAUDIS UNDERSTOOD TO BE AGREED UPON BY THE GOL, PLO, U.S. AND ISRAEL. THIS HAD BEEN CONVEYED TO THE SAUDIS BY PRIME MINISTER WAZZAN. FAHD HAD POSED TWO QUESTIONS TO ASSAD: WHAT WAS THE SYRIAN REACTION TO WHAT HAD BEEN AGREED UPON AND WOULD SYRIA RECEIVE THE PLO.

20. IN RESPONSE ASSAD HAD TOLD FAHD THAT SYRIA HAD NO

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OBJECTION TO WHATEVER THE PLO AGREED UPON IN SOLVING THE LEBANESE PROBLEM. ON THE SECOND QUESTION, ASSAD SAID THAT SYRIA WOULD RECEIVE THE PLO AND ITS LEADERSHIP. THE SYRIAN UNDERSTANDING OF THE AGREEMENT WITH FAHD WAS THAT SYRIA WOULD ALLOW SANCTUARY FOR THE "PLO LEADERSHIP AND ITS OFFICES". SYRIA HAD NOT UNDERSTOOD FROM THE DISCUSSIONS IN TAIF THAT THERE HAD BEEN AGREEMENT TO ALSO RECEIVE PLO COMBATANTS. STATEMENTS TO THIS EFFECT IN THE PRESS OVER THE PAST FEW DAYS HAD LED THE SARG TO ISSUE ITS CLARIFYING STATEMENT OF YESTERDAY.

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SYRIA WOULD RECEIVE THE PLO AND ITS LEADERSHIP. THE SYRIAN UNDERSTANDING OF THE AGREEMENT WITH FAHD WAS THAT SYRIA WOULD ALLOW SANCTUARY FOR THE "PLO LEADERSHIP AND ITS OFFICES". SYRIA HAD NOT UNDERSTOOD FROM THE DISCUSSIONS IN TAIF THAT THERE HAD BEEN AGREEMENT TO ALSO RECEIVE PLO COMBATANTS. STATEMENTS TO THIS EFFECT IN THE PRESS OVER THE PAST FEW DAYS HAD LED THE SARG TO ISSUE ITS CLARIFYING STATEMENT OF YESTERDAY.

21. KHADDAM CONTINUED THAT AS THE STATEMENT HAD MADE CLEAR, SYRIA WAS A HOMELAND FOR THE PALESTINIANS AND THE ARABS IN GENERAL BUT NOT IN THE PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES. THE PALESTINIAN FIGHTERS HAD THE RIGHT TO STAY WHERE THEY WERE. DISCUSSIONS IN TAIF HAD ONLY BEEN ABOUT THE PLO LEADERSHIP AND THEIR "OFFICES" AND WHETHER SYRIA WOULD RECEIVE THEM.

22. DRAPER RESPONDED THAT HE HAD BEEN PROCEEDING THIS WEEK WITH THE UNDERSTANDING, AS CONVEYED TO US BY SAUDI ARABIA, THAT SYRIA WAS READY TO RECEIVE THE PLO COMBATANTS AS WELL AS THE LEADERSHIP. BOTH DRAPER AND THE AMBASSADOR PROBED KHADDAM FOR SIGNS OF FLEXIBILITY IN THE SYRIAN POSITION. DRAPER ASKED WHAT THE SYRIAN POSITION WOULD BE TO RECEIVING THE FIGHTERS FROM BEIRUT AS AN INITIAL STAGE. THIS WAS CRITICAL IN ORDER TO PREVENT A CATASTROPHE FROM OCCURRING IN WEST BEIRUT. KHADDAM RESPONDED THAT IT WAS QUITE CLEAR, FROM DRAPER'S PRESENTATION AND REMARKS, THAT WHAT THE USG HAD IN MIND WAS THE TRANSFER OF ALL PALESTINIAN FIGHTERS IN LEBANON TO SYRIA. HE SAID THAT THERE WERE MORE THAN 25 THOUSAND PALESTINIAN COMBATANTS THROUGHOUT LEBANON.

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23. DRAPER SAID THAT HE BELIEVED THE NUMBER TO BE MUCH SMALLER THAN THAT AND THAT OUR BEST ESTIMATE OF PLO COMBATANTS OUTSIDE BEIRUT WAS SOME 3-5 THOUSAND. KHADDAM RESPONDED THAT THESE FIGHTERS WERE IN AREAS CONTROLLED BY SYRIA WHICH HAD A MUCH BETTER IDEA OF THE NUMBERS THAN DID THE US. KHADDAM THEN PRESSED FOR A CLEAR PICTURE OF WHAT WE BELIEVED WOULD TAKE PLACE FOLLOWING WITHDRAWAL OF THE PLO FROM BEIRUT.

24. DRAPER RESPONDED THAT THERE HAD TO BE A SECOND STAGE, FOLLOWING EVACUATION FROM BEIRUT, WHEREBY ALL PLO

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COMBATANTS LEFT LEBANON. THIS WAS NECESSARY SO THAT A STRONG AND CENTRAL LEBANESE GOVERNMENT COULD BE FORMED AND SO THAT ISRAEL WOULD HAVE NO EXCUSE TO RETALIATE FOR TERRORIST ACTS IN THE FUTURE AGAINST LEBANON. DRAPER SAID SOME PALESTINIANS WOULD BE WILLING TO LAY DOWN THEIR ARMS AND RETURN TO NORMAL CIVILIAN LIFE AND THE GOL WOULD PROBABLY AGREE TO THIS. KHADDAM ASKED WHY THIS COULD NOT BE ANNOUNCED PUBLICLY. DRAPER RESPONDED THAT THIS WAS UP TO GOL.

25. KHADDAM EXPRESSED DISSATISFACTION WITH THE LACK OF PRECISION IN DRAPER'S ANSWER AND SAID THAT HE WOULD BE PRESSING PRESIDENT REAGAN FOR MORE PRECISE DETAILS ON THESE MATTERS WHEN HE AND PRINCE SAUD VISITED WASHINGTON. WHAT THE U.S. WAS BASICALLY TRYING TO DO WAS TRANSFER THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM FROM ONE GEOGRAPHIC LOCATION TO ANOTHER. THE LARGER DIMENSIONS OF THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM NEEDED TO BE ADDRESSED.

26. DRAPER SAID THAT THIS ISSUE SHOULD INDEED BE TAKEN

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SECTION 05 OF 06 DAMASCUS 04934
EXDIS

UP DURING KHADDAM'S VISIT TO WASHINGTON, NOTING THAT THE
USG HAD PUBLICLY WELCOMED KHADDAM'S AND SAUD'S TRIP.
IN THE MEANTIME, HABIB WAS TRYING TO COPE WITH THE
IMMEDIATE PROBLEM OF PREVENTING THE IMMINENT DESTRUCTION
OF WEST BEIRUT BY THE ISRAELI MILITARY. THIS WOULD
DESTROY ANY CHANCE OF LEBANESE NATIONAL CONSENSUS. THIS
WAS WHY THE PROBLEM OF WEST BEIRUT HAD TO BE ADDRESSED
IMMEDIATELY AND RESOLVED SO THAT LARGER ISSUES COULD BE
DEALT WITH AT A LATER STAGE. THE AMBASSADOR STATED THAT
SYRIA COULD MAKE AN IMMEDIATE AND IMPORTANT CONTRIBUTION
TO THE PROBLEM OF BEIRUT BY AGREEING TO ACCEPT PLO
COMBATANTS. THIS WOULD MEASURABLY STRENGTHEN KHADDAM'S
HAND WHEN HE WENT TO WASHINGTON.

27. DRAPER ASKED FOR KHADDAM'S REACTION TO RECEIVING
THE FIGHTERS FROM BEIRUT AS A TEMPORARY MEASURE. KHADDAM
RESPONDED BY REFERRING BACK TO HIS EARLIER STATEMENT OF
TRANSFERRING THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM FROM ONE GEOGRAPHIC
LOCATION TO ANOTHER AND INDICATED NO FLEXIBILITY. KHADDAM

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RETURNED TO THE QUESTION OF SYRIAN FEARS OVER THE FUTURE
OF THE PALESTINIANS IN LEBANON. HE SAID SYRIA EXPECTED

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THAT THERE WOULD BE LARGE-SCALE MASSACRES OF PALESTINIANS AND MUSLIMS IN LEBANON AT THE HANDS OF THE PHALANGE. HE EXPRESSED GREAT SKEPTICISM THAT THE UNITED STATES COULD DO ANYTHING TO PREVENT THIS DESPITE DRAPER'S REPEATED STATEMENTS THAT THE USG WOULD NEVER TOLERATE SUCH A SITUATION. DRAPER SAID THAT U.S. PARTICIPATION IN AN MNF WOULD PROVIDE BOTH SYMBOLIC AND ACTUAL PROTECTION FOR THE PALESTINIAN COMMUNITY WHEN PLO COMBATANTS DEPARTED BEIRUT.

28. THE AMBASSADOR SAID HE FULLY UNDERSTOOD SYRIAN APPREHENSION REGARDING CONFESSIONAL STRIFE IN LEBANON. WHAT WE NEEDED WAS SYRIAN COOPERATION IN HELPING TO SETTLE THE WEST BEIRUT PROBLEM WHICH WOULD ENABLE US TO HAVE INFLUENCE ON THE LARGER ISSUE. IF THE WEST BEIRUT PROBLEM WERE NOT RESOLVED, THEN WHAT SYRIA FEARED MIGHT TAKE PLACE.

29. THE AMBASSADOR THEN REFERRED TO THE SYRIAN STATEMENT OF NOT ACCEPTING PLO COMBATANTS, NOTING THAT THE STATEMENT SAID THAT THE PLO HAD NOT APPROACHED THE SARG OFFICIALLY ON THIS QUESTION. HE ASKED KHADDAM IF HE COULD CONCLUDE THAT A PLO APPROACH ALONG THESE LINES WOULD LEAD TO SYRIAN RECONSIDERATION ON THIS POINT. KHADDAM SAID THAT HE COULD NOT GIVE A CLEAR ANSWER ON THIS. THE SYRIAN UNDERSTANDING WAS THAT IT WOULD ONLY RECEIVE THE PLO LEADERSHIP AND OFFICIALS. IF THE PLO APPROACHED THE SARG ON RECEIVING THE COMBATANTS, THAT WOULD PROBABLY CONTINUE TO BE THE SYRIAN RESPONSE. THE AMBASSADOR NOTED THAT FAROUQ QADDOUMI HAD MADE A STATEMENT IN LONDON JULY 9 THAT THE PLO WAS PREPARED TO MOVE TO SYRIA AND CITED THIS AS AN EXAMPLE OF THE CONSENSUS AMONG THE PLO THAT IT HAD TO LEAVE BEIRUT. (KHADDAM SAID THAT HE HEARD THIS MORNING

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THAT QADDOUMI'S STATEMENT HAD BEEN DENIED.) WE APPRECIATED SYRIA'S OFFER TO RECEIVE THE PLO LEADERSHIP AND HEADQUARTERS WHICH WAS AN IMPORTANT CONTRIBUTION TO WHAT WE WERE TRYING TO ACHIEVE. THE AMBASSADOR URGED THAT SYRIA GIVE FAVORABLE CONSIDERATION TO ALSO RECEIVING PLO COMBATANTS. DRAPER SECONDED THIS AND ASKED THAT THE SARG FORMALLY CONSIDER THIS IN LIGHT OF OUR DISCUSSIONS.

30. KHADDAM SAID THAT HE WOULD RELAY RESULTS OF OUR DISCUSSIONS TO ASSAD AND IF THERE WERE ANY NEW ELEMENTS,

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THEN HE WOULD CONVEY ASSAD'S REACTION TO US. HE STATED, HOWEVER, THAT HE CONTINUED TO SEE THE PROBLEM AS PREVIOUSLY STATED. ACCEPTANCE OF PLO COMBATANTS WOULD MEAN ACCEPTING THE PRINCIPLE OF SUSPENDING THE PALESTINIANS' RIGHT TO RESOLVE THEIR PROBLEM AND WOULD ALSO MEAN COMPENSATING ISRAEL FOR ITS AGGRESSION. SYRIA WELCOMED THE PLO LEADERSHIP BUT THOUSANDS OF FIGHTERS WERE SOMETHING ELSE.

31. DRAPER THEN RAISED PROBLEM OF KIDNAPPING OF THE GREEK CATHOLIC BISHOP OF ZAHLEH, STATING THAT THIS HAD BEEN RAISED BY LEBANESE OFFICIALS WITH HABIB. HE REQUESTED THAT KHADDAM INSTRUCT THE APPROPRIATE SYRIAN AUTHORITIES TO INVESTIGATE THE MATTER. KHADDAM SAID THAT SYRIA WAS ALREADY INVESTIGATING THE INCIDENT AND WAS EXERTING EFFORTS TO OBTAIN THE BISHOP'S RELEASE. HE SAID THAT SYRIA CONDEMNED IN THE STRONGEST POSSIBLE TERMS "DIRTY" ACTIONS SUCH AS THIS.

32. DRAPER THEN TURNED TO ISSUE OF POWS. HE REFERRED TO

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EXDIS

AN EARLIER COMMENT BY KHADDAM ON WHAT WOULD HAPPEN TO THE PALESTINIANS HELD BY ISRAEL AND SAID THAT HE COULD NOT GIVE A DEFINITIVE ANSWER TO KHADDAM. DURING HIS LAST VISIT TO ISRAEL, HOWEVER, THE GOI HAD EXPRESSED DEEP CONCERN ABOUT THE FUTURE OF ISRAELI PRISONERS HELD BY SYRIA AND HAD RAISED THE POSSIBILITY OF AN EXCHANGE OF ALL SYRIAN POWS HELD BY ISRAEL FOR THE RETURN OF ANY ISRAELI PRISONERS OR BODIES HELD BY SYRIA. THE AMBASSADOR RECALLED PREVIOUS DISCUSSIONS WITH DEPUTY FOMMIN QADDOUR ON THIS SUBJECT AND URGED THAT THE ICRC BE ALLOWED TO HAVE ACCESS TO ISRAELI PRISONERS HELD BY SYRIA. KHADDAM SAID THAT HE HAD NO INFORMATION ON THIS ISSUE BUT THAT HE WOULD DISCUSS IT WITH APPROPRIATE AUTHORITIES.

33. THIS CABLE NOT CLEARED BY DRAPER BEFORE HIS DEPARTURE. PAGANELLI

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E.O. 12065: GDS - 7/9/88
TAGS: MILI, LE, IS, PEPR, PINT, ASEC
SUBJECT: SITREP NO. 76 LEBANON WORKING GROUP: SITUATION
AS OF 0600 EDT, JULY 9, 1982

1. MILITARY SITUATION: GENERALLY, THE CEASEFIRE IS HOLDING. THE MOST SERIOUS EXCEPTION WAS SOME 30 MINUTES OF SHELLING OF THE GALERIE SIMAAN ROAD AREA, NEAR A CHECKPOINT NOW CONTROLLED BY THE LAF. THE SOURCE OF THE SHELLING WAS AN AREA OCCUPIED BY THE PARTI POPULAIRE SYRIEN. A DEPLOYMENT OF LAF TROOPS, COMPLETE WITH FLAG, NOW MANS THE GALERIE SIMAAN CHECKPOINT AND LINES THE ROAD LEADING TO THE PRESIDENTIAL PALACE. LATE IN THE MORNING, THERE WAS AN EXCHANGE OF FIRE IN SOUTHWEST BEIRUT, IN THE AIRPORT AREA. DURING THE NIGHT, THERE WAS AN EXCHANGE OF FIRE WITH THE SYRIANS IN THE CENTRAL REGION OF LEBANON.

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2. DIPLOMATIC SITUATION: DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY MORRIS DRAPER SUCCESSFULLY NEGOTIATED THE IDF TURN-OVER OF THE GALERIE SIMAAN CHECKPOINT TO THE LAF. IDF TROOPS AND THEIR TWO VEHICLES HAVE BEEN MOVED OUT OF SIGHT OF THE CHECKPOINT AND CARS ARE NOW BEING ALLOWED TO CROSS. BECAUSE THE CHECKPOINT BETWEEN WEST BEIRUT AND THE ROAD TO BA'ABDA IS NOW IN LAF HANDS, THE EMBASSY EXPECTS PRIME MINISTER AL WAZZAN AND LEFTIST LEADER WALID JUMBLATT TO

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COME SEE AMBASSADOR HABIB SOMETIME TODAY.

DAS DRAPER WILL TRAVEL TO DAMASCUS THIS AFTERNOON TO CONFER WITH SYRIAN LEADERS. HE PLANS TO RETURN TO BEIRUT SATURDAY MORNING.

ACCORDING TO A BROADCAST FROM TEL AVIV RADIO EARLY THIS MORNING, BEGIN SAID HE IS OPTIMISTIC ABOUT THE CHANCES TO EVACUATE THE PLO FROM BEIRUT BY PEACEFUL MEANS AND ADDED THAT ISRAEL DID NOT PRESENT ANY ULTIMATUM CONCERNING A DEADLINE FOR NEGOTIATIONS.

THE FOREIGN MINISTERS OF SYRIA AND SAUDI ARABIA, ON BEHALF OF THE ARAB LEAGUE, HAVE REQUESTED DISCUSSIONS OF THE LEBANON SITUATION WITH THE SECRETARY OF STATE IN WASHINGTON. THE DEPARTMENT AGREED TO HOLD SUCH A MEETING AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, AFTER THE SECRETARY DESIGNATE'S CONFIRMATION.
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E.O. 12065 GDS 7/05/88 (PEALE, SAM)
TAGS: MILI, PEPR, PINT, ASEC, LE, IS
SUBJECT: SITREP NO. 69 LEBANON WORKING GROUP: SITUATION
AS OF 1700 EDT JULY 5, 1982

1. ~~ENTIRE TEXT~~

2. MILITARY SITUATION: A CEASEFIRE WAS ARRANGED BY
AMBASSADOR HABIB FOR 1600 LOCAL TIME AND SUCCESSFULLY
WENT INTO EFFECT BY 1630, ACCORDING TO BOTH LOCAL AND
ISRAELI RADIO, PUTTING AN END TO THE HEAVIEST FIGHTING IN
10 DAYS. ISRAELI FORCES HAD MOVED FURTHER INTO THE AREA
OF PLO POSITIONS SOUTH OF BEIRUT AND BEIRUT INTERNATIONAL
AIRPORT, SHELLING PLO CAMPS IN THE SOUTHERN SUBURBS.
ISRAELI TANKS WERE REPORTED ON BOTH RUNWAYS OF THE

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AIRPORT. THE AIRPORT ITSELF APPEARED TO HAVE ESCAPED
SERIOUS DAMAGE. THE PRESIDENT PALACE WAS HIT BY
ARTILLERY FIRE OF UNKNOWN ORIGIN, WOUNDING FOREIGN
MINISTER BUTROS' DRIVER. A REUTERS REPORT THAT PRESIDENT

SARKIS HAD BEEN WOUNDED WAS WITHDRAWN AS INCORRECT.

3. LEBANESE PHALANGE MILITIA ARE HELPING TO MAINTAIN THE
BLOCKADE OF WEST BEIRUT. TODAY THEY TURNED BACK A RED

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CROSS CONVOY AT THE PORT ENTRY. BEIRUT RADIO REPORTED THAT TELEPHONE SERVICE WAS CUT OFF THIS AFTERNOON BY THE ISRAELIS.

4. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS: HABIB CONTINUES HIS INTENSIVE DISCUSSIONS WITH LEBANESE LEADERS IN BEIRUT, INCLUDING PRESIDENT SARKIS. PRIME MINISTER WAZZAN HAS MADE AN APPEAL FOR THE WORLD "TO WAKE UP TO THE REALITIES OF THIS CRIMINAL SIEGE".

5. ISRAELI NEWSPAPERS REPORT THAT ALTHOUGH THE CABINET HAS SET NO PUBLIC DEADLINE FOR THE PLO TO LEAVE LEBANON, IT WAS ONLY A MATTER OF DAYS BEFORE ISRAEL WOULD CONSIDER OTHER OPTIONS.

6. SYRIAN PRESIDENT ASSAD HELD A SECOND ROUND OF TALKS WITH KING FAHD IN TAIF. AFTER THE MEETING ASSAD REPORTEDLY LEFT SAUDI ARABIA. AN ARAB COUNCIL DELEGATION INCLUDING PLO REPRESENTATIVE QADDOUMI AND REPRESENTATIVES OF KUWAIT AND MOROCCO MET WITH SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTER GROMYKO IN MOSCOW. DISCUSSIONS WERE DESCRIBED BY TASS AS "BUSINESSLIKE AND FRIENDLY".

7. PRESS REPORTS THAT EGYPTIAN PRESIDENT HOSNI MUBARAK

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SAID EGYPT'S PEACE WITH ISRAEL WILL CONTINUE WHATEVER THE OUTCOME OF THE LEBANON WAR. IRAQ INVITED EGYPT TO THE NON-ALIGNED NATIONS SUMMIT AND SAID THE INVITATION WAS ACCEPTED.
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FROM HABIB

E.O. 12065: RDS-1,3 6/30/92 (HABIB, PHILIP)

TAGS/ XF, LE, IS, SY, SA, PLO, UNSC, MOPS, PINT

SUBJECT: HABIB MISSION: TALKS WITH BOUTROS AND SALAM: STEPPING UP
PRESSURES

REF: TEL AVIV 9897

1. [REDACTED] ENTIRE TEXT)

2. DRAWING ON THE CONCLUSIONS IN REFTTEL, I STRESSED IN
STRONG TERMS THIS AFTERNOON AND EVENING TO BOUTROS AND
FORMER PRIMIN SALAM THE FACT THAT THE ISRAELIS ARE BECOMING
EXTREMELY IMPATIENT. THERE WAS A GROWING SENSE OF URGENCY
IN ISRAEL. THERE WAS A LIMIT TO HOW LONG BARGAINING COULD
BE CONTINUED. HARD DECISIONS WOULD HAVE TO BE MADE. I BELIEVE THAT
BOUTROS IN PARTICULAR WAS IMPRESSED, BUT
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

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I ADVISED BOTH MEN TO GET THE WORD AROUND TO WHERE
IT WOULD DO THE MOST GOOD.3. BOUTROS VERY MUCH HOPES THAT WE WILL BE SUCCESSFUL
IN SECURING AN UNDERSTANDING ALONG THE LINES OF THE
NINE POINTS, ADJUSTED AS NECESSARY, AND THAT WE WILL KEEP THE
WAZZAN GOVERNMENT TOGETHER. HE IS DEEPLY WORRIED, HOWEVER,
PARTICULARLY ABOUT THE PROSPECTS THAT DIFFERENCES BETWEEN
MUSLIMS AND CHRISTIANS WILL BE SHARPENED. HE WANTS THE
PLO OUT OF THE COUNTRY, BUT HE ALSO WANTS LEBANON

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PRESERVED AS A PLURALISTIC SOCIETY. HE SAID HE DID NOT WANT TO LIVE IN A CHRISTIAN LEBANON SURROUNDED BY MUSLIM RESENTMENT. I TRIED TO BUCK HIM UP, SAYING THAT WE HAD AN OPPORTUNITY TO DEVELOP A POLITICAL SOLUTION WHICH WOULD FORESTALL AN ATTACK ON WEST BEIRUT AND ALSO PRESERVE A FOUNDATION FOR FUTURE MUSLIM- CHRISTIAN CO-OPERATION. BUT THE LEBANESE LEADERSHIP HAD TO MOVE, AND RAPIDLY.

4. NEW SUBJECT: FUTURE SC ACTIONS ON THE BASIS OF MY DISCUSSIONS WTH BOUTROS OVER THE PAST TWO DAYS, I FEEL IT IS VERY IMPORTANT TO STAY IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH LEBANESE UN PERMREP TUEINI. HE IS, OF COURSE, SYMPATHETIC TO OUR BASIC OBJECTIVES AND WANTS TO BE COOPERATIVE. HE MAY FROM TIME TO TIME BE TEMPTED TO UNDERTAKE PREMPTIVE ACTIONS, BECAUSE OF THE PRESSURES BEING APPLIED TO HIM BY ARAB AND PLO REPRESENTATIVES IN NEW YORK. HE WILL BE ABLE TO RESIST THESE PRESSURES AND MAINTAIN AN EVEN COURSE IN MY OPINION IF HE SENSES HE IS PRIVY TO OUR THINKING/THAT IS WHI I BELIEVE HE SHOULD RECEIVE THE OCCASIONAL TELEPHONE CALL FROM HIS FRIENDS IN WASHINGTON AS WELL AS FROM HIS COLLEAGUES IN THE UN MISSION IN NEW YORK.

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DAMASCUS JERUSALEM JIDDA RIYADH TEL AVIV WHITE HOUSE DTD 02
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QUOTE

BEIRUT 4415

EXDIS

FROM HABIB

E.O. 12065: RDS-1,3 7/2/02 (HABIB, PHILIP)

TAGS: MOPS, PINT, XF, LE, IS, SA, SY, PLO, UNSC

SUBJ: HABIB MISSION: MEETING WITH GOL LEADERS, JULY 2

1. (S-ENTIRE TEXT)

2. SUMMARY: PRIME MINISTER WAZZAN TOLD ME TODAY, FRIDAY,
JULY 2, THAT THE PLO HAS BASICALLY ACCEPTED THE SUBSTANCE
OF OUR CLARIFIED NINE POINTS, BUT WITH IMPLEMENTATION
CONDITIONAL ON THE PRESENCE IN BEIRUT OF AN INTERNATIONAL
FORCE. I TOLD HIM THAT I WOULD CONSULT WITH WASHINGTON
ABOUT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE CREATION OF SUCH A FORCE (TO
STAY HERE FOR A LIMITED PERIOD). I STRONGLY URGED THAT

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A GOL COMMISSION FIX AND DETERMINE DATES, STAGES, H-HOURS

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AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES AGREED UPON. THE GOL MUST NOW TAKE ON ITS FULL RESPONSIBILITY. WAZZAN WAS SOMEWHAT HESITANT IN ALL HIS STATEMENTS.

I FEEL WE MUST MOVE QUICKLY IN ORDER TO ENSURE THAT THE GOL STAYS FIRM AND THAT THE PLO WILL STICK TO ITS CONDITIONAL "DECISION IN PRINCIPLE". END SUMMARY.

3. ACCOMPANIED BY DILLON, DRAPER AND BARRETT, I CALLED ON PRESIDENT SARKIS JULY 2 AT 1235. HE WAS ATTENDED BY PRIMIN WAZZAN, FONMIN BUYRUS, JOHNNY ABDO AND AIDE KHALIL HADDAD.

4. WE BEGAN THE MEETING WITH A DISCUSSION OF THE CONFERENCE AT TAIF. SARKIS AND BUTRUS THOUGHT THAT THE RESULTS WERE GENERALLY DISCOURAGING--THE ARAB LEAGUE WAS WITH LEBANON IN PRINCIPLE BUT WOULD DO NOTHING. THE COMMUNIQUE ISSUED WOULD HAVE BEEN SUITABLE FOR A PERIOD PRIOR TO THE ISRAELI INVASION BUT WAS INAPPROPRIATE NOW. SARKIS NOTED THAT THE SAUDIS HAD A FAVORABLE POSITION TOWARD LEBANON BUT THE REST OF THE LEAGUE WAS NEGATIVE.

5. I SAID THAT, WHILE I WAS DISAPPOINTED, WE SHOULD INTERPRET THE RESULTS OF THE TAIF CONFERENCE POSITIVELY, AS SUPPORT FOR GOL EFFORTS TO BEING AN END TO THE PRESENT SITUATION AND TO CONTINUE TO WORK TOWARD THAT GOAL. IF THE TAIF MEETING WERE LESS THAN POSITIVE, THE GOL'S RESPONSIBILITY REMAINED AND THEY SHOULD ACT POSITIVELY AND URGENTLY.

6. WAZZAN THEN SAID THAT HE HAD MET WITH ARAFAT, HANI AL-HASSAN, ABU IYAD, AND NAIF HAWATHAH LAST NIGHT BUT THAT THE MEETING HAD ENDED PREMATURELY BECAUSE OF ISRAELI OVERFLIGHTS AND FLARE DROPPING, WHICH THE PLO THOUGHT

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NIGHT PRESAGE AN AIR RAID. WAZZAN SAID THE GATHERING HAD THEREFORE NOT BEEN ABLE TO FINISH ITS WORK BUT HAD GOTTEN SOME THINGS DONE. THE MAIN QUESTION RAISED BY THE PLO AT THIS MEETING WAS GUARANTEES FOR THE PALESTINIANS WHO REMAINED IN LEBANON AFTER A SETTLEMENT. THEY JUSTIFIED THEIR DEMANDS FOR GUARANTEES ON THE BASIS OF WHAT HAD HAPPENED RECENTLY IN THE LEBANESE MOUNTAINS BETWEEN PHALANGE AND DRUZE MILITIAS. WAZZAN SAID THAT HE HAD REPLIED TO THE PLO LEADERS THAT HE COULD GIVE THE PALESTINIANS ONLY THE SAME LEVEL OF

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[REDACTED]

GUARANTEES AS HE COULD TO THE LEBANESE, AND THAT HE WOULD CONTINUE TO ASK FOR AN INTERNATIONAL FORCE TO OPERATE WITH THE LAF. WAZZAN ALSO SAID THAT ABU IYAD HAD ASKED THAT I BE INFORMED THAT ALTHOUGH HE, ABU IYAD, WOULD ABIDE BY THE DECISION OF THE PLO, HE PERSONALLY HAD NOT AGREED WITH IT AND DOES NOT HAVE CONFIDENCE IN ME (HABIB).

7. I TOLD WAZZAN TO TELL ABU IYAD THAT MY CONFIDENCE IN HIM IS ALSO LIMITED BUT THAT I HAVE CERTAIN OBJECTIVES WHICH REQUIRED THE COOPERATION OF MANY PEOPLE. I TOLD WAZZAN THAT HE COULD AGAIN ASSURE THE PLO LEADERS THAT THE USG WOULD NOT BE PARTY TO BAD TREATMENT OF CHILDREN, WOMEN AND UNARMED MEN. WAZZAN REPLIED THAT THERE IS LITTLE CONFIDENCE IN THE LAF'S ABILITY TO TAKE UP ITS RESPONSIBILITIES. I RESPONDED THAT, IF THE PLO FEARS THE PHALANGE FORCES, THEY SHOULD TALK DIRECTLY TO BASHIR GEMAYEL. WAZZAN COULD NOT TELL ME WHETHER THERE HAD BEEN SUCH DISCUSSIONS. I TOLD WAZZAN THAT WASHINGTON HAD ALREADY BEEN INFORMED OF THE PLO AND GOL INTEREST IN AN INTERNATIONAL PRESENCE TO OVERSEE THE DISARMAMENT AND DEPARTURE OF THE PLO RIGHT FROM THE START.

8. I THEN ASKED WAZZAN WHETHER SPECIFIC DATES AND MODALITIES HAD BEEN DISCUSSED WITH THE PLO. WAZZAN SAID, NO, THAT HE

[REDACTED]

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THOUGHT IT WAS TIME FOR THE GOL TO CREATE A COMMISSION TO DISCUSS THE MODALITIES WITH THE PLO. HE, WAZZAN, HAD TOO MUCH TO DO TO GO INTO DETAILS. I SAID HE SHOULD FORM IT IMMEDIATELY. WHEN I ASKED HIM ON WHAT DATE THE PLO DEPARTURE COULD START, SARKIS INTERVENED TO SAY, "WHEN THE INTERNATIONAL FORCE IS THERE."

9. WAZZAN WAS VAGUE IN REPLYING TO MY FURTHER QUESTIONS CONCERNING THE SUBJECTS AGREED UPON BY THE PLO AT LAST NIGHT'S MEETING. HE DID NOT THINK THEY HAD REJECTED ANY OF THE CLARIFIED NINE POINTS. THERE HAD BEEN NO DISCUSSION OF WHERE THE PLO LEADERS WOULD GO, BUT HE THOUGHT SOME WANTED TO GO TO DAMASCUS AND OTHERS ELSEWHERE. WHEN I ASKED WAZZAN WHETHER THERE WOULD BE ANOTHER MEETING HE WOULD HAVE WITH THE PLO, HE REPEATED THAT IT WAS TIME FOR A GOL COMMISSION TO TAKE OVER.

[REDACTED]

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10. WE THEN TURNED TO THE SUBJECT OF THE DISPOSITION OF PLO ARMS. WAZZAN SAID THAT THE GOL WAS AWAITING A U S SIGNAL ON THIS SCORE. I REPLIED THAT WE THOUGHT IT BETTER FOR THE PLO TO GIVE UP ITS HEAVY WEAPONS TO THE GOL (LAF2 UNDER THE SURVEILLANCE OF AN INTERNATIONAL BODY. I SAID I UNDERSTOOD WAZZAN'S PREFERENCE FOR THE PLO FIGHTERS TO TAKE THEIR HEAVY WEAPONS WITH THEM. THIS THEORETICALLY MIGHT BE ALLOWED AS A LAST MINUTE FALLBACK POSITION, BUT I EMPHASIZED THAT IT PROBABLY WAS NOT WORKABLE, THAT I WASN'T MAKING ANY MORE CONCESSIONS AT THIS TIME, AND 5*-5 8 COULDN'T STICK AROUND FOR JUST THE SAKE OF BARGAINING. IF I WAS ABLE TO OBTAIN THE BASIC CONDITIONS FOR A SETTLEMENT DESIRED BY THE PLO AND GOL, I DID NOT WANT TO BE FACED WITH NEW DEMANDS AS A CONSEQUENCE. I SAID THERE WAS A GREAT DEAL OF PRESSURE ON ME AND THERE WERE EVEN SOME WHO HOPED THAT I WOULD NOT SUCCEED.

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11. WAZZAN THEN EXPLAINED AT LENGTH THAT I MUST UNDERSTAND THE PEOPLE HE WAS DEALING WITH. THEY ARE NOT A GOVERNMENT, THEY ARE JUST A GROUP AND DECISIONS ARE DIFFICULT FOR THEM TO MAKE. WAZZAN SAID HE UNDERSTOOD MY IMPATIENCE AND THAT HE HAD BECOME IMPATIENT TOO BUT HE THOUGHT WE WERE NEARLY AT A CONCLUDING POINT. IN REPLY TO MY QUESTION OF EXACTLY WHO WAS ABOARD FOR THE PLO AGREEMENT, SPECIFICALLY GEORGE HABBASH, HE REPLIED THAT NO HABBASH REPRESENTATIVE HAD BEEN AT THE MEETING BUT THAT ARAFAT HAD ASSURED HIM THE PLO WAS AGREED; THERE WERE SOME AGAINST THE DECISION BUT THE MAJORITY HAD CARRIED THE DAY AND THOSE OPPOSED WOULD ABIDE BY THE DECISION. HOWEVER, THIS WAS CONDITIONAL ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN INTERNATIONAL FORCE AND NO AGREEMENT COULD BE ANNOUNCED PENDING THAT DEVELOPMENT. IF THERE WERE TO BE A LEAKED ANNOUNCEMENT THAT PLO HAD AGREED TO LEAVE, THEY WOULD DENY IT.

12. I TOLD WAZZAN I TOOK HIS POINT BUT THAT IF WE GOT AN INTERNATIONAL FORCE IN PLACE, WE AND THE GOL WOULD DECIDE HOW MANY PEOPLE WERE NECESSARY AND FROM WHERE THEY SHOULD COME. I DIDN'T WANT TO HAVE ANY PROBLEMS WITH THIS FROM THE PLO AND I DID NOT WANT FURTHER CONDITIONS IMPOSED. I TOLD HIM I WOULD CONSULT WASHINGTON AND TRY FOR A COMMITMENT ON AN INTERNATIONAL FORCE IN TWO OR THREE DAYS,

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[REDACTED]

BUT IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT. WAZZAN SAID HE WOULD USE THOSE TWO OR THREE DAYS TO GET THE GOL COMMISSION STARTED ON MODALITIES OF IMPLEMENTATION.

13. I ASKED SARKIS IF HE WAS GOING TO CONVENE THE NSC. HE SAID HE WOULD IF IT WERE POSSIBLE BUT THAT HE DID NOT THINK WALID JUMBLATT WOULD COME. I SAID THE NSC WOULD BE USEFUL IN GIVING NATIONAL ENDORSEMENT TO A GOL-PLO AGREEMENT AND THAT WALID MIGHT BE PREVAILED UPON TO SHOW UP. I TURNED BACK TO WAZZAN TO ASK HIM WHETHER THE TOKEN "SYMBOLIC" PLO FORCE REMAINING IN LEBANON WAS STILL AN IMPORTANT ISSUE.

[REDACTED]

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HE SAID IT WAS, FOR BOTH THE PALESTINIANS AND LEBANON'S "ARAB BROTHERS." I AGAIN SUGGESTED THE NUMBER OF 300, IN BARRACKS IN NON-URBAN AREAS, UNDER FULL GOL AUTHORITY, WITH MEN COMING FROM OTHER THAN THE BEIRUT AREA, AND HE INDICATED AGREEMENT. WAZZAN ALSO SAID HE THOUGHT HIS COLLEAGUES OF THE MUSLIM COMMUNITY WERE STILL WITH HIM BUT HE WOULD USE THE NEXT TWO DAYS TO NAIL DOWN THEIR AGREEMENT.

14. WE THEN TOOK UP THE SUBJECT OF THE INTERNATIONAL FORCE AGAIN AND DISCUSSED THE POSSIBILITY THAT FRENCH FORCES MIGHT BE WITHDRAWN FROM UNIFIL COMMAND IN ORDER TO MAKE UP THE FORCE. WAZZAN THOUGHT AT LEAST 2000 MEN WOULD BE NEEDED. I PROPOSED 1000 AND ABDO SAID 1600 (TWO BATTALIONS) WERE NEEDED. I BELIEVE 1600 MEN WOULD BE SATISFACTORY.

15. SARKIS THEN RAISED THE SUBJECT OF THE DEPARTURE OF THE SYRIANS AND THE PALESTINIAN LIBERATION ARMY (PLA). I SUGGESTED THAT IF HE TOLD THEM TO LEAVE BEIRUT THEY WOULD GO, AND THAT I HAD HEARD THAT EVERYBODY IN TAIF WAS AGREED TO THIS (EXCEPT POSSIBLY KHADDAM). JOHNNY ABDO INTERJECTED THAT HE WOULD PREFER TO HEAR ANY SYRIAN AGREEMENT FROM PRESIDENT ASSAD. SARKIS REMINDED US THAT HE HAD INFORMED PRESIDENT ASSAD OF THE POSSIBILITY THAT HE MIGHT REQUEST SUCH A STEP AND HAD RECEIVED THE REPLY THAT HE, SARKIS, MIGHT NO LONGER BE CONSIDERED A FREE AGENT, AS HIS COUNTRY AND EVEN THE AREA OF HIS PRESIDENCY WERE UNDER FOREIGN OCCUPATION. I TOLD HIM THAT I HAD HEARD THAT THE ADF TROOPS IN BEIRUT WANTED TO LEAVE AND JOHNNY ABDO SAID HE THOUGHT THEY WOULD GO WHENEVER THE PLO LEFT, IF A LEGAL COVER COULD BE GIVEN TO THEIR DEPARTURE.

16. WE THEN DISCUSSED DEVELOPMENTS IN THE REST OF LEBANON

[REDACTED]

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AND I ASSURED THE GOL LEADERS PRESENT THAT THERE WAS NO

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POSSIBILITY THAT WE WOULD CONCUR IN GIVING AWAY PART OF THE BEQ'A TO SYRIA, WHICH WAS A CURRENT RUMOR. WE WOULD CONTINUE TO UPHOLD THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF LEBANON, AND POINT NINE OF THE U S PROPOSALS SPECIFIES THAT ALL FOREIGN ARMED FORCES WOULD EVENTUALLY LEAVE LEBANON. SARKIS AND WAZZAN BOTH MADE THE POINT THAT THE SYRIANS COULD NOT LEAVE BEFORE THE ISRAELIS DID, AND I AGREED THEY HOULD ALL LEAVE TOGETHER, AS A GENERAL PRINCIPLE UNDER POINT NINE.

17. I THEN SAID THAT WE BOTH HAD TO GO OUR SEPACATE WAYS AND DO THE SERIOUS JOBS THAT WERE AT HAND AND THAT TIME WAS PRESSING. ANSWERING A QUESTION FROM BOUTROS TO DRAPER, I SAID THAT DRAPER'S IMPRESSION FROM HIS TRIP TO ISRAEL YESTERDAY WAS THAT "IF WE DON'T HURRY, I (HABIB) HAD BETTER LEAVE."

DILLON

UNQUOTE STOESSEL.

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FOR AMBASSADOR HABIB

FOLLOWING REPEAT SENT ACTION SECSTATE FROM USINFO DTV 282221Z
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NEA -- PUBLIC AFFAIRS ADVISER CHRISTOPHER ROSS EXT 25150.
WF-114 (6/28/82)

U.S. WANTS 'ARMED ENCLAVES' IN LEBANON ELIMINATED (850)
BY ALEXANDER SULLIVAN AND ED SCHERR
USICA STAFF CORRESPONDENTS

WASHINGTON -- THE UNITED STATES WANT "ARMED ENCLAVES"
INSIDE LEBANON TO BE ELIMINATED, THE WHITE HOUSE SAID JUNE
28.

DISCUSSING U.S. HOPES FOR STRENGTHENING THE CENTRAL
GOVERNMENT OF LEBANON, DEPUTY PRESS SECRETARY LARRY SPEAKES
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SAID THE WHITE HOUSE HOPES ARMED ELEMENTS IN THE COUNTRY
WILL COME UNDER THE AUTHORITY AND CONTROL OF THE LEBANESE
CENTRAL GOVERNMENT.

"ARMED ENCLAVES," HE ADDED, "WHICH ARE INCOMPATIBLE
WITH STABILITY AND RECONCILIATION, MUST DISAPPEAR. THIS
APPLIES TO THE PALESTINIANS AS WELL AS OTHERS"

ASKED IF THAT INCLUDED ENCLAVES MANNED BY CHRISTIAN
MILITIAMEN, SPEAKES SAID IT DID, BUT HE ADDED THAT HE DID
NOT WISH TO SINGLE OUT SPECIFIC FACTIONS, OF WHICH SOME 43

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ARE REPORTED TO OPERATE IN LEBANON. HE SAID HE MEANT THAT "ALL" ARMED ENCLAVES SHOULD BE ELIMINATED IN FAVOR OF CONTROL BY THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT.

SPEAKES SAIDS PRESIDENT REAGAN HAS DIRECTED HIS SPECIAL EMISSARY, RETIRED AMBASSADOR PHILIP HABIB, "TO MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO SEE THAT A LASTING CEASEFIRE" IN LEBANON IS "PUT IN PLACE" SO THAT THE "TRAGIC SUFFERING" WILL COME TO A HALT.

SPEAKES SAID HABIB IS SEEKING TO HELP STRENGTHEN THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT IN LEBANON AND TO ENHANCE ITS "CONTROL OVER ITS SOVEREIGNTY AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY."

SUCH A GOAL, SPEAKES NOTED, "WILL NECESSARILY REQUIRE THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES" FROM LEBANON. ASKED IF HE INTENDED TO ENCOMPASS "FOREIGN FORCES," SPEAKES SAID THE WHITE HOUSE HAS NOT DIRECTLY ADDRESSED THAT QUESTION. HE ADDED, "WE HAVE INDICATED THAT ANY PALESTINIANS REMAINING SHOULD REMAIN UNDER THE CONTROL AND AUTHORITY OF THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT."

SPEAKES SAID WASHINGTON ALSO EMPHASIZES THE IMPORTANCE OF MAKING ISRAEL "SECURE FROM TERRORIST ATTACKS" AND OF MAKING "REAL PROGRESS ON PALESTINIAN AUTONOMY THROUGH THE CAMP DAVID PEACE PROCESS."

SPEAKES SAID WASHINGTON HAS ASKED THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT FOR A REPORT ON STATEMENTS BY ISRAELI OFFICERS TO

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THE EFFECT THAT CLUSTER BOMBS WERE USED AGAINST "ORGANIZED RESISTANCE" FROM SYRIAN ARMORED INFANTRY UNITS DURING THE LEBANON INVASION. THAT WOULD BE AN APPARENT VIOLATION OF ISRAELI ASSURANCES ABOUT USE OF THE WEAPON. SPEAKES SAID HE COULDN'T "PASS JUDGMENT" ON THE ISSUE "AT THIS TIME."

AT THE STATE DEPARTMENT, SPOKESMAN DEAN FISCHER TOLD AD PRESS BRIEFING JUNE 28 ZHAZ U.S. GOALS WITH RESPECT TO WEST BEIRUT "ARE THE SAME AS THE GOALS OF THE GOVERNMENT OF LEBANON."

FISCHER SAUD THESE GOALS INCLUDE: "THE DEPLOYMENT OF THE LEBANESE ARMY IN AND AROUND BEIRUT; AN END TO THE ARMED PALESTINIAN PRESENCE IN AND AROUND BEIRUT; THE WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAELI FORCES FROM THE AREA AROUND BEIRUT; AND THE REDEPLOYMENT OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES IN THE BEIRUT AREA."

HE SAID THE LEBANESE VIEWS WERE EXPRESSED IN A SERIES OF AMENDMENTS THAT LEBANON HAD SOUGHT TO ADD TO A FRENCH-SPONSORED U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION.D

THE UNITED STATES ON JUNE 26 VETOED THE FRENCH-SPONSORED RESOLUTION, WHICH CALLED FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAELI FORCESS FROM THE BEIRUT AREA.

IN EXPLAINING THE U.S. VETO, FISCHER SAID: "WE HAD HOPED THAT THE SECURITY COUNCIL WOULD ADOPT A RESOLUTION THAZ WOULD SUPPORT THE OBJECTIVE THAT IS THE BASIS OF OUR POLICY TOWARD THE LEBANON CRISIS: THE RESTORATION OF THE AUTHORITY AND SOVEREIGNTY OF THE GOVERNMENT OF LEBANON

THROUGHOUT LEBANON AND RESTORATION OF LEBANON'S TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY.

"THE RESOLUTION FAILED TO SUPPORT THIS OBJECTIVE, SINCE IT DID NOT CALL FOR DISARMING OF PALESTINIAN ELEMENTS IN BEIRUT, OPERATING IN DEFIANCE OF LEBANESE GOVERNMENT AUTHORITY. THIS WAS A FATAL DEFECT. WE THEREFORE VOTED AGAINST THE RESOLUTION," HE SAID.

QUESTIONED ABOUT THE STATES OF THE SOME 600,000 PALESTINIAN REFUGEES IN LEBANON, FISCHER SAID THAT IS A MATTER FOR THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT. THEY CAN STAY, HE SAID, IF THEY ARE SUBSERVIENT TO LEBANESE AUTHORITY AND THE

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LEBANESE WANT THEM TO STAY.

FISCHER REITERATED TO QUESTIONERS THAT HE HAS "NO INFORMATION TO SUGGEST THAT THE ISRAELIS HAVE DEPARTED FROM THEIR PREVIOUS ASSURANCES THAT THEY DO NOT INTEND TO CAPTURE OR OCCUPY WEST BEIRUT."

HE SAID THE ISRAELI CABINET HAS MADE NO DECISION TO GO INTO WEST BEIRUT.

THE SPOKESMAN DECLINED TO COMMENT ON REPORTED SAUDI ARABIAN PRESSURE ON THE UNITED STATES TO GET ISRAELI FORCES WITHDRAWN FROM AROUND WEST BEIRUT. HOWEVER, HE NOTED THAT "IN GENERAL TERMS, THE SAUDI GOVERNMENT HAS EXPRESSED ITS GREAT CONCERN ABOUT THE SITUATION IN LEBANON AND HAS URGED THE UNITED STATES TO DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO BRING THE FIGHTING TO AN END. THERE HAVE BEEN NO THREATS MADE OR ISSUED BY THE GOVERNMENT OF SAUDI ARABIA."

PPO/SULLIVAN/ES/SG/PMK/DC TMW/RTG

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FOR AMBASSADOR HABIB

FOLLOWING REPEAT DTG 281929Z JUN 82 FROM USINFO SENT
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DOHA MUSCAT MANAMA JIDDA BAGHDAD RIYADH DHAHRAN TEL AVIV
JERUSALEM

QUOTE

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(FOLLOWING FS MATERIAL NOT FOR PUBLICATION)

HERewith COMPLETE JUNE 28 CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
ARTICLE BY GEOFFREY GODSELL TITLED "WHY REAGAN AND BEGIN GOT
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IT WRONG ON LEBANON."

THE LULL IN THE FIGHTING IN LEBANON IS A DIRECT CONSEQUENCE OF MISTAKEN ASSUMPTIONS ON THE PART OF THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION IN WASHINGTON AND THE BEGIN CABINET IN JERUSALEM.

THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION WRONGLY ASSUMED IT COULD ACCEPT ISRAELI PRIME MINISTER MENACHEM BEGIN'S ASSURANCES ABOUT THE LIMITED AIMS OF THE ISRAELI INVASION OF LEBANON LAUNCHED JUNE 6. THE ISRAELI FORCES, IT WAS INITIALLY SAID, WERE CLEARING A 25-MILE WIDE BUFFER ZONE FREE OF PALESTINIAN GUERRILLAS ALONG ISRAEL'S NORTHERN BORDER. IN FACT, ISRAELI FORCES ARE NOW LAYING SIEGE TO WESTERN BEIRUT AND THREATENING TO STORM IT.

SECRETARY OF STATE ALEXANDER M. HAIG JR.'S RESIGNATION IS PART OF THE PRICE BEING PAID FOR THIS MISTAKEN ASSUMPTION. WITHIN THE REAGAN CABINET, HE HAD ARGUED FOR ACCEPTANCE AND SYMPATHETIC UNDERSTANDING OF THE ISRAELI LINE.

THE BEGIN CABINET WRONGLY ASSUMED THAT IF ISRAELI FORCES COULD PUT A NOOSE AROUND THE 6,000 FIGHTERS OF THE PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO) IN WEST BEIRUT, THE RIGHT-WING CHRISTIAN PHALANGIST MILITIA OF BASHIR GEMAYEL -- A DISCREET ALLY IN THE PAST -- WOULD BE WILLING TO MOVE IN AND PERFORM THE UNPLEASANT TASK OF FINISHING THE TRAPPED PALESTINIANS OFF.

THE PHALANGISTS' MOVE MADE IT CLEAR THEY WILL DO NOT SUCH THING -- APPARENTLY BECAUSE MR. GEMAYEL ASSUMES BEING SEEN TOO OPENLY AS ISRAEL'S MERCENARY AND PUPPET WOULD PREJUDICE HIS CHANCE OF BEING LEBANON'S NEXT PRESIDENT.

"WE WILL NOT BE INVOLVED ON A MILITARY LEVEL," A PHALANGIST SPOKESMAN TOLD A WASHINGTON POST CORRESPONDENT. "WE ARE TRYING TO PROFIT FROM THIS SITUATION ON A POLITICAL LEVEL ONLY."

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THIS HAS NOT PREVENTED THE PHALANGISTS FROM MILITARILY TAKING ADVANTAGE OF SITUATIONS RESULTING FROM ISRAELI ACTIONS -- SUCH AS MOVING INTO COMMUNITIES ON THE BEIRUT-DAMASCUS HIGHWAY CLEARED BY THE ISRAELIS OF SYRIANS AND PALESTINIANS. BUT THEY ARE REFUSING TO INITIATE MAJOR ACTION OF THEIR OWN AGAINST THE PLO.

THE GOVERNMENTS OF BOTH THE U.S. AND ISRAEL ARE WEIGHING SEPARATELY THEIR NEXT MOVES NOW THAT THEIR EARLIER CALCULATIONS HAVE PROVEN FAULTY.

THERE ARE SOME SIGNS THAT THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION IS MOVING TOWARD A TOUGHER STAND IN ITS DEALING WITH ISRAEL -- DESPITE A U.S. VETO IN ISRAEL'S BEHALF IN A UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL VOTE AT THE WEEKEND.

THE HEARST NEWSPAPER CHAIN'S JOHN WALLACH, USUALLY WELL-INFORMED ON THE MIDDLE EAST, REPORTED THAT EVEN BEFORE THE HAIG RESIGNATION PRESIDENT REAGAN HAD ASKED MR. HAIG TO WARN ISRAEL TO ACCEPT THE LATEST DEAL FOR A LEBANON CEASE-FIRE WORKED OUT BY U.S. SPECIAL ENVOY PHILIP HABIB OR FACE THE CERTAIN THREAT OF A U.S. ARMS CUTOFF.

(THE ISRAELIS DID ACCEPT A CEASE-FIRE IN THE BEIRUT AREA LATE JUNE 25 AND UNLIKE THREE EARLIER CEASE-FIRES, THIS LATEST ONE WAS STILL HOLDING JUNE 27.)

IN JERUSALEM, THE BEGIN CABINET ANNOUNCED JUNE 27 THAT IT WOULD MAINTAIN THE CEASE-FIRE, BUT WOULD OPEN FIRE IF FIRED UPON.

THE CABINET ALSO CONSIDERED PROPOSALS WORKED OUT IN BEIRUT BY MR. HABIB WHEREBY THE TRAPPED PLO MEN WOULD BE BROUGHT UNDER OUTSIDE CONTROL IN A FACE-SAVING WAY.

AFTER THE CABINET MEETING, IT WAS REPORTED THE GOVERNMENT WAS INSISTING THE PLO SURRENDER ITS ARMS TO THE LEBANESE ARMY AND THEN BE ESCORTED FROM WESTERN BEIRUT-DAMASCUS HIGHWAY, INTO SYRIA.

SYRIA'S RELATIONS WITH THE PLO HAVE ALWAYS BEEN EQUIVOCAL AT BEST, DESPITE A SMOKE SCREEN OF RHETORIC. WHETHER EITHER THE PLO OR SYRIA WOULD VOLUNTARILY ACCEPT ANY SUCH TRANSFER OF BASE AND PERSONNEL TO SYRIA IS VERY MUCH OPEN TO QUESTION.

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IT APPEARS THAT THE ANNOUNCEMENT AFTER THE ISRAELI CABINET MEETING MAY HAVE INCLUDED CONDITIONS THAT ARE EXPECTED TO BE REJECTED. AS IF TO CONFIRM THIS, ISRAELI AIRCRAFT DROPPED LEAFLETS OVER BEIRUT JUNE 27 SAYING THE WAR WITH THE PLO WAS NOT YET OVER. THE LEAFLETS ADVISED LEBANESE OF ROUTES TO LEAVE THE CITY WHILE THE CEASE-FIRE LASTED.

AS ISRAELI HARD-LINERS SEE IT, THEIR MILITARY OPERATIONS IN LEBANON PRESENT AN UNPRECEDENTED OPPORTUNITY TO DESTROY THE PLO ONCE AND FOR ALL WITH A SINGLE BLOW. THEY ARE SO CLOSE TO THIS NOW THAT THEY BELIEVE IT WOULD BE FOOLHARDY TO ALLOW THEMSELVES TO BE STOPPED IN THEIR TRACKS.

ISRAEL'S BRILLIANT BUT RUTHLESS AND SWASHBUCKLING DEFENSE MINISTER, ARIEL SHARON -- PACESETTER TILL NOW FOR THE ISRAELI OPERATIONS INSIDE LEBANON -- SAID ON ISRAELI TELEVISION JUST BEFORE THE JUNE 25 CEASE-FIRE WENT INTO EFFECT: "WE SHOULD NOT BE AFFECTED BY ANY POLITICAL PROVOCATIONS, INTERNAL OR EXTERNAL THAT EXIST AND MAY THREATEN OUR MILITARY AND POLITICAL ACHIEVEMENTS."

PRESUMABLY HE WAS REFERRING TO PRESSURE FROM THE US -- THE ONLY PRESSURE THAT REALLY COUNTS WITH THE ISRAELIS --- OR FROM THE EUROPEANS OR THE UN.

THE ISRAELIS MAY ALSO WANT TO PRESENT THE U.S. WITH A FAIT ACCOMPLI IN LEBANON BEFORE INCOMING SECRETARY OF STATE GEORGE SHULTZ TAKES OVER FROM ALEXANDER HAIG. THEY ARE WORRIED LEST MR. SHULTZ PROVE LESS SYMPATHETIC TOWARD THEM THAN WAS MR. HAIG. THEY SUSPECT MR. SHULTZ OF PRO-ARAB, AND PARTICULARLY PRO-SAUDI, SYMPATHIES BECAUSE HE IS COMING TO THE STATE DEPARTMENT FROM THE PRESIDENCY OF THE SAN FRANCISCO-BASED BECHTEL CORPORATION WHICH HAS BEEN INVOLVED IN SAUDI ARABIA.

SAUDI ARABIA AND EGYPT, SEEN BY THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION AS MODERATE ARAB ALLIES, REPORTEDLY RENEWED THEIR

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REPRESENTATIONS IN WASHINGTON AT THE WEEKEND FOR U.S. ACTION TO HALT THE ISRAELIS IN LEBANON. BOTH COUNTRIES EXPRESSED THEIR DISMAY AT THE LATEST U.S. VETO IN ISRAEL'S BEHALF IN THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL.

THE HEARST CHAIN'S JOHN WALLACH REPORTED THAT WHEN PRESIDENT REAGAN REMINDED PRIME MINISTER BEGIN OVER LUNCH JUNE 21 THAT THE U.S. MUST REMEMBER ITS MODERATE ARAB ALLIES SUCH AS SAUDI ARABIA AND JORDAN, MR. BEGIN RETORTED WITH AN ATTACK ON THE "CORRUPT, UNSTABLE DICTATORSHIP" REPRESENTED BY THE SAUDI ROYAL FAMILY.

AS FOR JORDAN MR. WALLACH SAID (ON THE PUBLIC TELEVISION PROGRAM "WASHINGTON WEEK IN REVIEW") THAT MR. BEGIN HAD BLUNTLY TOLD MR. REAGAN THAT ISRAEL WOULD SEE AS A MORTAL

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THREAT ANY HONORING BY THE U.S. OF KING HUSSEIN'S REQUEST
FOR F-16 JET FIGHTERS AND MOBILE HAWK SURFACE-TO-AIR
MISSILES.

PRESIDENT REAGAN WAS SO AFFRONTED, MR. WALLACH SAID,
THAT HE DELIBERATELY OMITTED A TOAST HE HAD INTENDED
PROPOSING TO HIS ISRAELI GUEST.
(END FS MATERIAL)
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*** Current Classification *** UNCLASSIFIED

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E.O. 12065: RDS-3, 6/28/02 (VELIOTES, NICHOLAS A.)
TAGS: PEPR, UN, US, LE, IS
SUBJECT: LEBANON: PRESS SPOKESMAN'S JUNE 28 REMARKS

1. ~~ENTIRE TEXT~~
2. WE ARE MAKING DELIBERATE EFFORT WITH THE U.S. AND OTHER MEDIA HERE TO EMPHASIZE THAT THE USG, THROUGH THE HABIB MISSION, IS SUPPORTING THE GOALS OF THE GOVERNMENT OF LEBANON, BOTH AS CONCERNS THE SPECIFIC ISSUE OF WEST BEIRUT AS WELL AS THE GENERAL LEBANESE ISSUE. THIS HAS BEEN NECESSARY BECAUSE OF THE IMPRESSION IN SOME JOURNALISTIC QUARTERS THAT THE U.S. IS SUPPORTING ISRAELI GOALS, IMPRESSIONS THAT HAVE BEEN STRENGTHENED BY THE UNLIKELY COMBINATION OF ISRAELI AND PLO MEDIA.

3. YOU SHOULD TAKE APPROPRIATE OCCASIONS TO REINFORCE

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AND CLARIFY SITUATION RE U.S. POSTURE. YOU WILL BE RECEIVING A CABLE WHICH ELABORATES ON SITUATION AND U.S. POLICY. IN MEANTIME, YOU SHOULD DRAW ON SPOKESMAN FISHER'S JUNE 28 REMARKS ABOUT U.S. SUPPORT FOR THE GENERAL OBJECTIVES OF THE GOL. THESE REMARKS ARE ALSO DESIGNED TO HELP PUT RECENT FRENCH ACTION IN SECURITY COUNCIL, AND OUR RESPONSE IN PERSPECTIVE.

4. IN ANSWER TO REQUESTS FOR "CLARIFICATION" RE LEBANESE

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RESOLUTION, YOU SHOULD NOTE THIS WAS TURNED INTO PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE FRENCH RESOLUTION WHICH, FOR REASONS UNKNOWN TO US, WERE NOT ACCEPTED, PRESUMABLY BECAUSE FRENCH BELIEVED THEY WERE IN BETTER POSITION TO KNOW WHAT IS BEST FOR LEBANON THAN THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT.

5. AFTER THE BRIEFING, WE HAVE BEEN RECEIVING NUMEROUS CALLS ASKING IF ISRAEL ALSO SUPPORTS THE GOALS OF THE GOL. WE HAVE REPLIED THAT THAT IS, OF COURSE, A QUESTION WHICH MUST BE ADDRESSED TO THE ISRAELIS. HAIG

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AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI

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AMEMBASSY ALGIERS
AMEMBASSY ANKARA
AMEMBASSY ATHENS
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMCONSUL CALCUTTA
AMEMBASSY COLOMBO
AMEMBASSY DACCA
AMCONSUL DHAHRAN
USMISSION GENEVA
AMEMBASSY KAMPALA
AMCONSUL KARACHI
AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMCONSUL MADRAS
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E.O. 12065: N/A

TAGS: SOPN

SUBJECT: DEPARTMENT PRESS BRIEFING JUNE 29, 1982

FOR ADDRESSEE POSTS' INFORMATION AND GUIDANCE, FOLLOWING
ARE EXCERPTS FROM TODAY'S PRESS BRIEFING. SPOKESMAN WAS
DEAN FISCHER.

Q. WHERE DO WE STAND ON LEBANON? WHAT IS HAPPENING? WHAT
IS THE UNITED STATES DOING?

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A. LET MET START WITH AMB. HABIB. IT WILL SOUND FAMILIAR
TO YOU: HE IS CONTINUING HIS DISCUSSIONS TODAY WITH THE
LEBANESE LEADERSHIP IN BEIRUT, AND AS USUAL I DON'T HAVE
ANY COMMENT FOR YOU ON ANY ONGOING ITINERARY. AS USUAL
ALSO, I CANNOT PROVIDE YOU WITH ANY DETAILS ON THE DISCUS-
SIONS THAT HE IS CONDUCTING.

I WILL SAY THAT ALTHOUGH I'M NOT ABLE TO GIVE YOU ANYTHING
SPECIFIC ON THE NEGOTIATIONS WITH RESPECT TO THE PLO OR

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OTHER ASPECTS OF THE TALKS UNDER WAY, I WILL REITERATE OUR OFTEN-REPEATED CALL FOR PRESERVING THE CEASE-FIRE SO THAT THE POLITICAL DIALOGUE CAN CONTINUE AND FURTHER LOSS OF LIFE CAN BE AVOIDED.

BY WAY OF REITERATION, I REMIND YOU OF MY REMARKS YESTERDAY WHICH INDICATED THAT OUR GOALS AND THE GOALS OF THE GOVERNMENT OF LEBANON ARE IN EFFECT GOALS WHICH WE HOLD IN COMMON.

Q. SPEAKING OF LOSS OF LIFE, DO YOU HAVE ANY ESTIMATE OF WHAT THE DEATH TOLL HAS BEEN IN LEBANON?

A. NO.

Q. DO YOU EXPECT YOU WILL EVER HAVE AN ESTIMATE, OR HAS TIME GONE SO FAR NOW THAT YOU COULD NEVER RECONSTRUCT WHAT THE CASUALTY FIGURES WERE?

A. WE DON'T REALLY HAVE ANY INDEPENDENT MEANS OF MAKING AN ESTIMATE OF THE CASUALTIES...AND I NOTE THAT THE ESTIMATES AS TO NUMBERS OF CASUALTIES VARY ENORMOUSLY. I SUPPOSE ONE DAY THERE WILL BE A COMMONLY ACCEPTED ESTIMATE, BUT WE CERTAINLY DON'T KNOW WHAT IT IS TODAY.

Q. ARE THERE ANY PLANS THAT YOU KNOW OF TO SEND AMERICAN
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TEAMS OF DOCTORS AND NURSES TO HELP IN THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY HOSPITAL, AT BEIRUT, WHICH HAS BEEN OF SUCH GREAT ASSISTANCE? ARE THERE ANY PLANS TO SEND TEAMS NOW OR TO SEND A HOSPITAL SHIP?

A. I'M NOT AWARE OF PLANS FOR ASSISTANCE FOR THAT SPECIFIC PURPOSE. WE HAVE, OF COURSE, MADE PUBLIC OUR OVERALL HUMANITARIAN AID PROPOSALS. I CANNOT ANSWER YOU SPECIFICALLY AS TO WHETHER OR NOT THAT WOULD INCLUDE ASSISTANCE AT THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY HOSPITAL.

Q. ANYTHING FURTHER ON THE CLUSTER BOMB CONTROVERSY?

A. WE HAVE YET TO HEAR FROM THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT, BUT WE EXPECT TO DO SO SHORTLY.

Q. YOU SAY THAT YOU ARE REITERATING A CALL FOR PRESERVING
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THE CEASE-FIRE SO A POLITICAL DIALOGUE CAN CONTINUE.
THAT IS A CALL THAT GOES SPECIFICALLY TO WHOM?

A. IT REFERS SPECIFICALLY TO ISRAEL; IT REFERS SPECIFICALLY TO THE PLO. THE CONTEXT IN WHICH I GAVE YOU THIS WAS THE SITUATION IN BEIRUT. TO THE EXTENT THAT THERE IS FIGHTING BETWEEN SYRIANS AND ISRAELIS, IT WOULD OBVIOUSLY REFER TO THE SYRIANS AS WELL.

Q. IF THERE ANY FIGHTING BETWEEN THE ISRAELIS AND THE SYRIANS?

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A. NOT TO MY KNOWLEDGE AT THE MOMENT IN THE BEIRUT AREA.

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Q. DOES THAT MEAN WHEN YOU CALL UPON THE ISRAELIS IN THIS CONTEXT, ONE OF THE THINGS THAT HAS COME UP OVER THE PAST COUPLE OF DAYS IS WHETHER THE UNITED STATES HAS ANY KIND OF ASSURANCE FROM THE ISRAELIS THAT THEY WOULD NOT ENTER WEST BEIRUT, AND THE ARGUMENT HAS BEEN POSED THAT IF THIS INDEED HAS BEEN PASSED ON TO THE PLO SIDE, IT GIVES THEM LESS OF AN INCENTIVE TO COME TO SOME KIND OF AN UNDERSTANDING.

WHAT IS THE BOTTOM LINE HERE? WHEN YOU ASK THE ISRAELIS TO PRESERVE THE CEASE-FIRE, ARE YOU REALLY NOT SAYING "UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES GO INTO WEST BEIRUT?"

A. I'VE ADDRESSED THIS A NUMBER OF TIMES. I REALLY HAVE NOTHING TO ADD TO WHAT I SAID ON THAT SUBJECT YESTERDAY.

Q. ARE YOU ASKING THE ISRAELIS NOT TO GO INTO WEST BEIRUT UNDER ANY CIRCUMSTANCES?

A. I WOULD PREFER TO PUT IT THAT WE ARE CALLING UPON THE PARTIES TO PRESERVE THE CEASE-FIRE.

Q. IN DOING THAT, SO THE POLITICAL DIALOGUE CAN CONTINUE, IT SEEMS TO ME THAT IS INTRODUCING A NOTE REGARDING THE POLITICAL DIALOGUE WHICH I DON'T REMEMBER IN THE PREVIOUS CALLS FOR THE CEASE-FIRE TO BE PRESERVED.

I'M CURIOUS IF YOU COULD TELL US YOUR SENSE OF THE STATUS

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OF THE POLITICAL DIALOGUE. IT WOULD SEEM TO SUGGEST THAT YOU THINK THE DIALOGUE IS GOING ALONG WELL ENOUGH TO HOLD SOME REAL PROMISE; OTHERWISE, YOU WOULDN'T BE MENTIONING IT. COULD YOU TELL US HOW IT IS GOING?

A. NO. AT THE RISK OF SOUNDING FACETIOUS, WE SOMETIMES DO INTRODUCE NEW PHRASES SO AS TO AVOID THE IMPRESSION THAT WE ARE A "BROKEN RECORD." I WOULD NOT WANT TO SUGGEST TO YOU THAT WE ARE MAKING A VALUE JUDGEMENT AT THIS POINT ON
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THE SUCCESS OR FAILURE - OR THE PROSPECTS OF EITHER..AT THIS POINT IN THE EFFORTS THAT AMB. HABIB IS ENGAGED IN.

Q. I JUST WANT TO STRAIGHTEN OUT ONE MECHANICAL PROBLEM HERE. AMB. HABIB IS PLAYING A CENTRAL ROLE IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS, RIGHT?

A. ON OUR BEHALF, THAT IS CORRECT.

Q. AND WHO ARE THE PARTIES INVOLVED?

A. HE HAS BEEN MEETING, AS I FREQUENTLY SAY, WITH LEBANESE LEADERS.

Q. SINCE THE AMBASSADOR IS PLAYING A CENTRAL ROLE, IS THIS NOT, IN EFFECT, NEGOTIATING WITH THE PLO?

A. WE DON'T HAVE ANY DIRECT DEALINGS WITH THE PLO.

Q. WOULD YOU AGREE THAT IT IS, IN EFFECT, NEGOTIATING WITH THE PLO?

A. NO.

Q. WHO IS NEGOTIATING WITH THE PLO?

A. THERE ARE LEADERS IN LEBANON WHO HAVE DIRECT CONTACT WITH THE PLO. THERE ARE OTHER PARTIES WHOM WE HAVE CONTACT WITH WHO HAVE CONTACT WITH THE PLO, AND BEYOND THAT I'M NOT PREPARED TO GO.

Q. BUT IF, AS YOU SAY, AMB. HABIB IS PLAYING A CENTRAL ROLE....

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A. ...ON OUR BEHALF.

Q. YES. THAN THOSE PEOPLE IN CONTACT WITH THE PLO ARE SIMPLY ACTING AS COMMUNICATORS, CORRECT?

A. I PREFER TO LEAVE IT JUST AS I HAVE.

Q. YOUR GOAL OF GETTING AN END TO THE ARMED PALESTINIAN PRESENCE IN BEIRUT, IF THE PLO LAID DOWN ITS ARMS, DECLARED THAT IT WAS SUBSERVIENT TO THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT...WOULD THE U.S. SUPPORT THE CONTINUED PRESENCE OF THE PLO IN LEBANON?

A. I'M NOT GOING TO COMMENT ON THOSE SPECIFICS.

Q. LET ME TRY MY QUESTION A DIFFERENT WAY. THE ISRAELIS TODAY SAID THEY'RE NOT GOING TO WAIT FOREVER - A MATTER OF DAYS - THEY FEEL THE PLO IS DRAGGING ITS FEET, ETC. NUMBER ONE, DO YOU SHARE THAT JUDGMENT?

A. WE HOPE THE CEASE-FIRE CAN BE PRESERVED.

Q. AND TWO, IF THE ISRAELIS WERE TO MOVE WITHIN THE NEXT COUPLE OF DAYS, FEELING THAT THE PLO WAS INDEED DRAGGING ITS FEET, WOULD THAT BE AGAINST THE ADVICE NOW BEING PASSED ON TO THE ISRAELIS BY THE U.S.?

A. THE VERY QUESTION YOU ASK IMPLIES THAT SOMEHOW WE ARE SITTING HERE, ATTEMPTING TO GIVE A GREEN LIGHT FOR ISRAEL TO TAKE AN ACTION WHICH WE HAVE ALREADY SUGGESTED WE DO NOT ADVOCATE BY CALLING FOR PRESERVATION OF THE CEASE-FIRE.

Q. THE VERY QUESTION I ASKED WAS WHETHER YOU ARE GIVING THEM A RED LIGHT, NOT A GREEN LIGHT.

A. I AM PREPARED TO STICK WITH WHAT I GAVE YOU AND TO GO
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NO FURTHER.

Q. IF ONE SIDE SHOULD SHELL THE OTHERS -- THE PALESTINI-
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ANS, THE ISRAELIS OR THE SYRIANS -- UNDER YOUR CALL FOR A CEASE-FIRE, SHOULD THE SIDE SUFFERING KILLED AND WOUNDED NOT RESPOND? ON THE CALL FOR A CEASE-FIRE, IF, IN THE EVENT ONE SIDE OF THREE SHOULD FIRE, SHOULD THE SIDE SUFFERING THE HIT RESPOND UNDER THE U.S. PREFERENCE?

A. CLEARLY, A CEASE-FIRE IS MOST SUCCESSFUL IF BOTH SIDES ABIDE BY IT.

Q. I'M WRITING A SCENARIO AND ONE SIDE IS TAKING ACTION.

A. RIGHT. WHEN WE CALL FOR A CEASE-FIRE, WE ARE CALLING ON ALL SIDES OR ALL PARTIES TO A CONFLICT TO ABIDE BY IT.

Q. DOES THE U.S. HAVE A POSITION ON WHETHER THE PLO CAN STAY IN LEBANON OR SHOULD LEAVE LEBANON?

A. YES.

Q. WHAT IS IT?

A. I'M NOT PREPARED TO SAY. (LAUGHTER)

Q. DOES THE U.S. GOVERNMENT THINK THE GOVERNMENT OF LEBANON SHOULD SIGN A PEACE TREATY WITH ISRAEL AND JOIN THE CAMP DAVID PROCESS?

A. AGAIN, I'M NOT GOING TO COMMENT ON THAT. THERE ARE A NUMBER OF SPECULATIVE REPORTS THAT I'VE SEEN - AND OBVIOUSLY YOU HAVE AS WELL - BUT AGAIN IT SERVES NO USEFUL PURPOSE

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FOR ME TO BE DRAWN INTO A DETAILED DISCUSSION OF THE AIMS AND OBJECTIVES THAT AMB. HABIB IS PURSUING ON OUR BEHALF AND ON AIMS AND OBJECTIVES WHICH THE GOVERNMENT OF LEBANON IS ITSELF SEEKING TO ACCOMPLISH.

A. THERE IS A REPORT TODAY THAT SAUDI ARABIA HAS OFFERED TRANSPORT FOR THE PALESTINIANS OUT OF BEIRUT.

A. THAT'S A NEW ONE. YESTERDAY IT WAS THE EGYPTIANS. I HAD NOT HEARD ABOUT THE SAUDI PROPOSAL.

Q. WELL, TODAY IT'S THE SAUDIS.

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A. I HAVE NO COMMENT.

Q. CAN YOU TAKE THE QUESTION ON THAT?

A. I'LL BE GLAD TO LOOK INTO IT TO SEE IF THERE IS SUCH A REPORT, YES.

Q. CAN YOU COMMENT FURTHER ON REPORTS THAT SAUDI ARABIA AND OTHER STATES THREATENED AN OIL BOYCOTT AT ANY TIME?

A. MY COMMENT IS THE SAME AS IT WAS EITHER YESTERDAY OR LAST WEEK. IT'S NOT TRUE.

Q. YOU SAID THAT THE UNITED STATES HAS A POSITION ON WHETHER THE PLO MIGHT REMAIN IN LEBANON UNARMED. HAS THAT POSITION BEEN CONVEYED TO THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT?

A. I DON'T WANT TO SAY ANYTHING ON THAT OTHER THAN TO SAY THAT IT IS A SUBJECT, AS THERE ARE MANY SUBJECTS, WHICH HAVE BEEN DISCUSSED IN THE NEGOTIATIONS.

Q. IS THE U.S. POSITION THE SAME AS THE ISRAELI POSITION?

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A. I'M NOT GOING TO COMMENT.

Q. HAS THE POSITION BEEN CONVEYED TO THE PLO?

A. I'M NOT GOING TO COMMENT FURTHER ON IT.

Q. YOU SAID YESTERDAY THAT THE U.S. HAS NO OBJECTION TO THE PLO MAINTAINING A POLITICAL OFFICE IN BEIRUT IF THAT WAS ACCEPTABLE TO THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT. IS THAT STILL THE SITUATION?

A. YES, THAT'S ESSENTIALLY WHAT I SAID, AND THAT IS A PROBLEM FOR THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT TO DECIDE. I STAND BY THAT.

Q. DO YOU HAVE A SIMILAR POSITION ON THE PLO SETTING UP A GOVERNMENT IN EXILE OR A POLITICAL OFFICE IN CAIRO?

A. NO, NOTHING THAT I CAN GIVE YOU TODAY ON THAT.

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Q. DO YOU HAVE ANY REACTION TO HUBARAK'S MOST RECENT REMARKS ABOUT THE UNITED STATES?

A. YES. I WOULD SAY THAT WE REMAIN IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH PRESIDENT HUBARAK AND MEMBERS OF HIS GOVERNMENT ON DEVELOPMENTS IN LEBANON AND ELSEWHERE IN THE REGION AS BEFITS THE STRENGTH AND WARMTH OF OUR RELATIONS.

OUR DISCUSSIONS WITH THE EGYPTIAN LEADERS HAVE BEEN FRANK AND WIDE-RANGING. WE BELIEVE OUR TWO GOVERNMENTS REMAIN IN BASIC ACCORD ON OBJECTIVES IN THE REGION OF THE MIDDLE EAST.

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Q. DO YOU HAVE ANY SPECIFIC REACTION TO HIS SPECIFIC CRITICISM THAT THE U.S. WAS HOLDING BACK FROM EXERTING ITS INFLUENCE ON ISRAEL?

A. THIS IS IT.

Q. BACK ON ISRAEL, DO YOU REGARD THE ISRAELI DEMANDS ON THE FUTURE OF THE PALESTINIANS IN LEBANON AS BEING CONSISTENT WITH YOUR OBJECTIVES THAT LEBANON SHOULD HAVE SOVEREIGNTY OVER ITS OWN SOIL?

A. REPEAT THE FIRST PART OF YOUR QUESTION?

Q. DO YOU REGARD THE ISRAELI DEMANDS ON THE WITHDRAWAL OF PALESTINIANS AND THEIR FUTURE ROLE IN LEBANON AS CONSISTENT WITH YOUR OBJECTIVE ABOUT LEBANESE SOVEREIGNTY? THIS COUNTRY, AS I UNDERSTAND, HAS SAID THE FUTURE OF THE PALESTINIANS SHOULD BE UP TO THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT, AND THE ISRAELIS' POSITION DOES NOT ALLOW FOR LEBANON TO DECIDE THE FUTURE PLACE....

A. ARE YOU SPEAKING OF THE 600,000 PALESTINIANS WHO LIVE IN LEBANON?

Q. IT'S NOT CLEAR WHO THEY WANT TO LEAVE, BUT APPARENTLY THEY'RE NOT WILLING TO LEAVE THIS UP TO THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT.

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A. IT'S NEWS TO ME THAT ISRAEL HAS DEMANDED THE EXODUS OF 600,000 PALESTINIANS FROM LEBANON.

Q. I'M NOT SAYING THEY HAVE DEMANDED THE EXODUS OF 600,000, BUT THEIR POSITION ON THE FUTURE ROLE OF THE PLO LEADERSHIP.

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A. THAT'S A DIFFERENT QUESTION.

; RIGHT. BUT THEY ARE NOT WILLING, APPARENTLY, TO LEAVE THAT TO THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT. I JUST WONDER WHETHER YOU REGARD THAT AS CONSISTENT WITH YOUR POSITION THAT LEBANON SHOULD HAVE SOVEREIGNTY OVER ITS OWN SOIL.

A. I'M NOT COMMENTING ON THAT PARTICULAR QUESTION, WHICH STRIKES ME AS SOMEWHAT DIFFERENT THAN RUSS'S QUESTION.

Q. YES, IT IS DIFFERENT. YOU'RE NOT COMMENTING ON IT.

A. THAT'S CORRECT. HAIG

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E.O. 12065: GDS, 6/28/88 (WELCH, DAVID)

TAGS: MILI, PEPR, PINT, ASEC, LE, IS

SUBJECT: SITREP NO. 55--LEBANON WORKING GROUP:

SITUATION AS OF 1700 JUNE 28, 1982

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1. ~~ENTIRE TEXT.~~

2. MILITARY SITUATION: ALL AREAS ARE REPORTED TO BE QUIET TODAY AS THE CEASEFIRE ANNOUNCED JUNE 25 CONTINUES TO REMAIN IN EFFECT. NO NEW TROOP MOVEMENTS WERE REPORTED ALONG THE BEIRUT-DAMASCUS HIGHWAY, WHERE ISRAELI AND SYRIAN FORCES EXCHANGED HEAVY ARTILLERY FIRE LAST WEEK. THE IDF, WHICH NOW OCCUPIES ALAYH AND BHAMDUN, HAS APPARENTLY REMAINED IN POSITIONS WITHIN THE IMMEDIATE VICINITY OF THE ROAD, WITHOUT ADVANCING "APPRECIABLY NORTH" OF THE HIGHWAY. THE ISRAELI AIR FORCE AGAIN DROPPED LEAFLETS UPON WEST BEIRUT THIS MORNING URGING

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CITIZENS THERE TO CONSIDER THEIR SAFETY AND FLEE THE AREA. THROUGHOUT THE DAY, ROADS WERE FLOODED WITH PEOPLE TRYING TO LEAVE WEST BEIRUT IN AN EFFORT TO AVOID A FEARED IDF ONSLAUGHT. DURING A JUNE 27 PRESS CONFERENCE IN TEL AVIV, ISRAELI DEFENSE MINISTER SHARON INSISTED THAT THE CABINET HAD MADE NO DECISION TO STAY OUT OF WEST BEIRUT. ALTHOUGH THE CABINET HAD DECIDED YESTERDAY TO ALLOW MORE TIME FOR NEGOTIATION, SHARON NOTED THAT THE IDF'S IMPROVED DEPLOYMENT PROVIDED ISRAEL WITH "MORE THAN ONE SOLUTION" IN THE EVENT THAT THE PRESENT CEASEFIRE SHOULD BREAKDOWN.

3. DIPLOMATIC DEVELOPMENTS: BRITAIN ANNOUNCED THE CLOSING OF ITS EMBASSY IN WEST BEIRUT TODAY, CITING THE DETERIORATING SECURITY SITUATION IN LEBANON AS THE BASIS FOR THE DECISION. BRITISH DIPLOMATS IN THE EMBASSY WILL WORK FROM THE OFFICES OF CYPRUS AIRWAYS IN EAST BEIRUT,

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WHERE CONSULAR FACILITIES HAVE ALREADY BEEN ESTABLISHED TO ASSIST THOSE BRITISH NATIONALS WISHING TO LEAVE LEBANON.

4. A SIX-MEMBER COMMITTEE OF THE ARAB LEAGUE WILL MEET TOMORROW TO FORMULATE A "COMMON ARAB STAND" AS A BASIS FOR LEAGUE POLICY TOWARD LEBANON; THE MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE INCLUDE LEBANON, SYRIA, SAUDI ARABIA, KUWAIT, ALGERIA, AND THE PLO.

5. UNRWA PRESS RELEASES RECEIVED BY THE U.S. EMBASSY IN VIENNA INDICATE THAT THERE MAY BE UP TO 175,000 PALESTINIAN REFUGEES IN NEED OF ASSISTANCE AS A RESULT OF THE FIGHTING IN LEBANON. UNRWA IS APPEALING TO GOVERNMENTS FOR \$39 MILLION TO COVER IMMEDIATE NEEDS.

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6. OTHER: AMBASSADOR HABIB REMAINS IN BEIRUT.
HAIG.

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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 JERUSALEM 02057

USICA FOR PGM/RC, VOA, PGM/P, NEA

USCINCEUR FOR POLAD

E.O. 12065: N/A

TAGS: SOPN, IS, JO

SUBJECT: JERUSALEM AND WEST BANK MEDIA REPORT FOR
JUNE 28.

1. SUMMARY:

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--AL QUDS EDITORIAL: HAIG RESIGNATION IS "SEVERE BLOW TO
ISRAEL".

--WEST BANK LABOR UNIONS AND STUDENT ORGANIZATIONS
DENOUNCE "AMERICAN-ISRAELI COLLABORATION" IN LEBANON.

--LEBANON: ARABIC PRESS CONDEMNS U.S. VETO IN THE
U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL AND BANNERS ARAFAT'S REJECTION OF
ALL "SUGGESTIONS OF CAPITULATION".

2. AL QUDS EDITORIAL: HAIG RESIGNATION IS "SEVERE BLOW
TO ISRAEL".

--ALL OF JERUSALEM'S ARABIC LANGUAGE DAILIES CONTINUE
FRONT PAGE COVERAGE OF THE RESIGNATION OF ALEXANDER HAIG
AND THE APPOINTMENT OF GEORGE SCHULTZ AS HIS SUCCESSOR.

ALL PAPERS CARRY REPORTS DRAWN FROM INTERNATIONAL WIRE SERVICES WHICH FOCUS ON SCHULTZ'S CONNECTION WITH BECHTEL CORPORATION AND SPECULATE ON POSSIBLE CHANGES IN AMERICAN POLICIES TOWARD ISRAEL. IN ITS LEAD EDITORIAL YESTERDAY, THE PRO-JRODANIAN AL QUDS STATES THAT THE ISRAELI INVASION "BROUGHT THE DOWNFALL OF HAIG". AL QUDS SPECULATES THAT THE APPOINTMENT OF SCHULTZ WILL STRENGTHEN THE POSITION OF CASPER WEINBERGER IN THE ADMINISTRATION AND WILL RESULT IN A TILT AWAY FROM ISRAEL TOWARDS THE ARAB. AL QUDS CONCLUDES THAT HAIG'S RESIGNATION IS "A SEVERE BLOW TO ISRAEL," HOWEVER, IT WARNS THE ARAB STATES THAT THEY SHOULD NOT BE OVERLY OPTIMISTIC ABOUT "NEW, IMAGINARY ALLIES" IN WASHINGTON. ASHAAB AND AL FAJR DO NOT COMMENT EDITORIALY ON THE APPOINTMENT OF SCHULTZ. (SEPTTEL).

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3. WEST BANK LABOR UNIONS AND STUDENT ORGANIZATIONS DENOUNCE "AMERICAN-ISRAELI COLLABORATION" IN LEBANON

-- ASHAAB AND AL FAJR PUBLISH PROMINENTLY ON PAGE ONE A STATEMENT ADOPTED BY 18 WEST BANK LABOR UNIONS AND STUDENT ORGANIZATIONS DEMANDING AN IMMEDIATE ISREALI WITHDRAWAL FROM LEBANON. THE STATEMENT REAFFIRMS WEST BANKERS' SUPPORT FOR THE PLO AS "THE SOLE LEGITIMATE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PALESTIAN PEOPLE"; CONDEMNS THE "CONSPIRATORIAL SILENCE" OF THE ARAB STATES; AND, CRITICIZES "AMERICAN IMPERIALIST COLLABORATION WITH ISRAELI POLICIES."

4. LEBANON: ARABIC PRESS CONDEMNS THE U.S. VETO IN THE U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL AND BANNERS ARAFAT'S REJECTION OF ALL "SUGGESTIONS OF CAPITULATION."

--THE CONFLICT IN LEBANON IS STILL THE MAIN STORY IN ALL OF JERUSALEM'S PAPERS. FRONT PAGE ACCOUNTS FOCUS ON THE U.S. VETO ON SATURDAY OF A FRENCH-SPONSORED UNSC RESOLUTION DEMANDING AN IMMEDIATE SEPARATION OF ISRAELI AND PLO FORCES IN BEIRUT. IN ITS LEAD EDITORIAL, AL FAJR SAYS THAT THE U.S. VETO AND THE U.S. VOTE AGAINST A SIMILAR RESOLUTION IN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY ON SATURDAY REVEAL "AMERICAN AND ISRAELI ISOLATION" IN THE FACE OF INTERNATIONAL CRITICISM, ADDING THAT THE U.S. VETO CONFIRMS AMERICA'S "CLEAR BIAS FOR HER ALLY ISRAEL." DISMISSED MAYOR BASSAM SHAK'AH IS PROMINENTLY REPORTED TO HAVE SAID THAT THE VETO IS ANOTHER INDICATION OF THE "AMERICAN-ISRAELI CONSPIRACY IN THE MASSACRE BEING IMPLEMENTED AGAINST THE PALESTINIANS IN LEBANON."

--U.S. SPECIAL ENVOY PHILIP HABIB YESTERDAY TRANSMITTED

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TO THE PLO "NEW POSITIVE AMERICAN SUGGESTIONS" FOR SOLVING
THE WEST BEIRUT CRISIS, ACCORDING TO AL QUDS WHICH ADDS
THAT THE ISRAELI CABINET HAS ADOPTED "SEVERE CONDITIONS"
FOR ANY POLITICAL SETTLEMENT, INCLUDING A DEMAND THAT ALL
PLO FORCES IN WEST BEIRUT SURRENDER THEIR ARMS AND LEAVE
LEBANON. PLO CHIEF YASSER ARAFAT'S REPORTED REJECTION OF
ALL "SUGGESTIONS FOR CAPITULATION" IS BANNERED BY
ASHAAB AND AL FAJR. ARAFAT REPORTEDLY EXPECTS AN "IMMINENT
ISRAELI ATTACK ON WEST BEIRUT" AND HE WARNS THAT "THE U.S.
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WILL PAY A HIGH PRICE IN THE NEAR FUTURE FOR ITS COLLABORATION WITH ISRAEL". IT ITS LEAD EDITORIAL "THE FUTILITY OF HABIB'S MISSION", AL QUDS PREDICTS TOTAL FAILURE FOR HABIB'S MEDIATION EFFORTS. AL QUDS CONCLUDES THAT THE UNITED STATES IS UNFIT TO PLAY THE ROLE OF MEDIATOR SINCE "AMERICAN AND ISRAELI AIMS ARE IDENTICAL".

5. ALSO REPORTED:

--A. ISRAELI SETTLERS FRIDAY FIRED ON A GROUP OF BETHLEHEM YOUTHS WHO REPORTEDLY THREW STONES AT THE SETTLERS' BUS AS IT WAS PASSING THROUGH BETHLEHEM ON THE ROAD TO HEBRON, ACCORDING TO AL FAJR. NO INJURIES OR ARRESTS WERE REPORTED, BUT SEVERAL WINDOWS OF THE BUS WERE REPORTEDLY BROKEN.

--B. ALL PAPERS REPORT THAT STUDIES WILL RESUME TODAY AT AN-NAJAH UNIVERSITY IN NABLUS. AL QUDS ADDS THAT THE DECISION TO REOPEN THE UNIVERSITY WAS ANNOUNCED YESTERDAY FOLLOWING A MEETING BETWEEN AN-NAJAH'S PRESIDENT AND THE MILITARY GOVERNOR. AL FAJR REPORTS THAT ISRAELI AUTHORITIES HAVE INFORMED THE PRESIDENT OF BETHLEHEM UNIVERSITY THAT HIS SCHOOL WILL REMAIN CLOSED "UNTIL FURTHER NOTICE" BECAUSE OF THE "GENERAL SITUATION".

--C. ISRAELI AUTHORITIES CONTINUE TO BAN THE DISTRIBUTION OF JERUSALEM'S ARABIC LANGUAGE NEWSPAPERS IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA.

--D. ASHAAB REPORTS THAT LAST FRIDAY'S SERMONS IN NABLUS AREA MOSQUES CALLED ON ARAB KINGS AND PRESIDENTS TO "BURY THEMSELVES IN THE SAND" BECAUSE OF THEIR "SHAMEFUL SILENCE" FOLLOWING THE "WAR OF EXTERMINATION AGAINST THE UNCLASSIFIED

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PALESTINIANS IN LEBANON."

--E. ACCORDING TO ASHAAB, SEVERAL LEBANESE CITIZENS HAVE BEEN SEEN IN NABLUS BUYING FOOD WITH LEBANESE CURRENCY.

--F. HUNDREDS OF ISRAELI CITIZENS DEMONSTRATED IN FRONT OF THE KNESSET BUILDING IN WEST JERUSALEM YESTERDAY DEMANDING AN IMMEDIATE END TO THE WAR IN LEBANON AND THE RESIGNATION OF DEFENSE MINISTER ARIEL SHARON, ACCORDING TO REPORTS IN ALL PAPERS. GROVE

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E.O. 12065: RDS 1, 3 6/28/02 (LEWIS, SAMUEL W) OR-M

TAGS: PEPR, MOPS, LE, US, SY, IS, PLO

SUBJECT: JUNE 27 CABINET DECISION: MORE BUT NOT
UNLIMITED TIME FOR DIPLOMACY

REFS: A. TEL AVIV 9703, B. TEL AVIV 9696 (NOTAL)

1. ~~ENTIRE TEXT~~2. SUMMARY. YESTERDAY'S ISRAELI CABINET DECISION
(REF A) GAVE THE HABIB MISSION A FEW MORE DAYS TO
WORK OUT A POLITICAL SOLUTION REGARDING THE PLO
PRESENCE IN WEST BEIRUT. HOWEVER, THE MESSAGE IS
CLEAR THAT TIME IS LIMITED. OPINION IN THE CABINET
REGARDING THE NEED FOR A MILITARY SOLUTION TO THE PLO

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PRESENCE IN WEST BEIRUT IS DIVIDED. SHOULD THE PLO
MAKE SOME POSITIVE NOISES ABOUT GOING PART WAY
TOWARDS EVACUATING AND DISARMING, THE "GRACE PERIOD"
MIGHT BE EXTENDED. HOWEVER, ISRAELIS HAVE PUT
ENORMOUS POLITICAL CAPITAL INTO GETTING THE PLO**UNCLASSIFIED**

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DISARMED AND ITS LEADERSHIP AND CADRE OUT OF WEST BEIRUT. BEGIN UNDOUBTEDLY BELIEVES THAT IF HE BACKS DOWN FROM THIS OBJECTIVE, THE PLO WILL HAVE ACHIEVED A TREMENDOUS PSYCHOLOGICAL VICTORY. THUS, ULTIMATELY, WE WOULD EXPECT BEGIN TO GO ALONG WITH A SHARON RECOMMENDATION TO MOVE INTO WEST BEIRUT IN ONE FORM OR ANOTHER, AS PAINFUL AND AS COSTLY AS THIS DECISION WILL BE IF DIPLOMACY FAILS TO BEAR FRUIT. END SUMMARY.

--

3. YESTERDAY'S (JUNE 27) UNANIMOUS CABINET DECISION WAS A CLEAR ATTEMPT TO GIVE MORE TIME TO DIPLOMACY TO DISARM THE PLO AND EFFECT THE REMOVAL OF THE PLO LEADERSHIP AND ARMED CADRE FROM WEST BEIRUT. FROM ALL ACCOUNTS THE CABINET HAS NOT YET TAKEN ANY DECISION REGARDING IDF ENTRY INTO WEST BEIRUT. AS ONE CABINET MEMBER TOLD DCM BROWN YESTERDAY EVENING, "WE HAVE THE CROWN, BUT NOT THE DIAMOND. AND WE WOULD, IF POSSIBLE, LIKE TO ATTAIN THE DIAMOND BY VEGETARIAN MEANS." MFA NORTH AMERICAN AFFAIRS DIRECTOR EITAN BENTSUR TOLD POLCOUNS TODAY (JUNE 28) THAT HE SAW THE CABINET DECISION AS FORTHCOMING, DELIBERATELY DESIGNED TO TAKE U.S. CONCERNS INTO ACCOUNT, AND NOTED THAT THE COMMUNIQUE SPECIFICALLY MENTIONED ISRAEL'S ACCEPTANCE OF U.S. GOOD OFFICES TO RESOLVE THE ISSUE BY DIPLOMATIC MEANS. BENTSUR ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE COMMUNIQUE DID LEAVE OPEN OTHER OPTIONS, SAYING THIS WAS

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NECESSARY IF THE POLITICAL OPTION WAS TO HAVE ANY CHANCE OF SUCCESS.

--

4. THE CABINET MEMBER (WHO OPPOSES IDF ENTRY INTO WEST BEIRUT) ALSO TOLD DCM BROWN THAT THE CABINET COMMUNIQUE WAS A VICTORY IN THE SENSE THAT NO DECISION WAS MADE REGARDING ENTERING WEST BEIRUT. HE ADDED, HOWEVER, THAT IF PRIME MINISTER BEGIN USED HIS PERSUASIVE POWERS TO THE FULL, HE THOUGHT THE CABINET WOULD ULTIMATELY ACCEPT A MILITARY RESOLUTION TO THE PLO PROBLEM IN WEST BEIRUT IF THE POLITICAL PROCESS DID NOT LEAD TO ANY RESULTS.

--

5. IN OUR JUDGEMENT, THE ISRAELI CABINET DECISION YESTERDAY GAVE US MORE TIME, BUT ONLY A FEW DAYS. FOR SHARON AND HIS LIKE-MINDED COLLEAGUES, THE COMMUNIQUE IS SEEN AS AN ULTIMATIUM: ISRAEL WILL WAIT FOR THE

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PLO TO LAY DOWN ITS ARMS AND LEAVE WEST BEIRUT, BUT IF IT DOES NOT ACCEPT THESE TERMS, A MILITARY SOLUTION REMAINS THE ONLY RECOURSE. SHARON SPOKE PUBLICLY YESTERDAY AFTER THE CABINET MEETING OF TAKING OTHER (I.E. MILITARY) OPTIONS, IF NECESSARY, NOTING THAT THERE IS "MORE THAN ONE SOLUTION" TO THE PLO PROBLEM IN WEST BEIRUT. SHARON ALSO NOTED THAT THE CABINET HAD NEVER DECIDED SPECIFICALLY NOT TO ENTER WEST BEIRUT AND THAT PRIME MINISTER BEGIN HAD NOT RULED OUT THIS POSSIBILITY IN HIS TALKS WITH PRESIDENT REAGAN IN WASHINGTON. THE CABINET IS CLEARLY SPLIT ON THIS ISSUE AND SOME MINISTERS WILL STRENUOUSLY RESIST IDF ENTRY INTO WEST BEIRUT. IF THERE ARE NO SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENTS

NOTE BY OCT: NSCE AND CIAE ADDED PER MR. FARROW, S/S-O.

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ON THE POLITICAL FRONT IN THE NEXT TWO OR THREE DAYS, WE EXPECT THE CABINET WILL AGAIN RECONVENE TO CONSIDER WHAT NEEDS TO BE DONE TO ACHIEVE ISRAEL'S OVERRIDING POLITICAL/MILITARY OBJECTIVE IN WEST BEIRUT.

6. A KEY FACTOR IS HOW THE UNITED STATES WILL REACT. THERE IS CLEAR APPREHENSION OVER WHAT THE U.S. POSITION WILL BE REGARDING IDF ENTRY INTO WEST BEIRUT IN LIGHT OF SECRETARY HAIG'S SUDDEN RESIGNATION. ISRAELIS WILL SCRUTINIZE EVERY WORD FROM WASHINGTON FOR HINTS IN THIS PARTICULARLY CRUCIAL TIME. ANY STATEMENT, POSITIVE OR NEGATIVE REGARDING POSSIBLE ISRAELI MILITARY ACTION WILL BE ANALYZED CAREFULLY AND WITH THE RIGHT COMBINATION OF EVENTS, COULD TIP THE BALANCE.

7. AN IDF MOVE INTO WEST BEIRUT IS NOT INEVITABLE.

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BUT THE BALL IS CLEARLY IN THE PLO'S COURT. IF THE PLO MAKES SOME POSITIVE MOVES ON LAYING DOWN ITS ARMS AND EVACUATING SOME OF ITS MEMBERS, THE GRACE PERIOD WOULD PROBABLY BE EXTENDED. BEGIN IS ACUTELY AWARE OF THE HUMAN COSTS OF AN IDF OPERATION, AND HE IS ALSO CONSCIOUS OF THE GROWING DOMESTIC OPPOSITION TO ANY IDF ACTION IN LEBANON'S CAPITAL. THE INTERNAL DEBATE IS INCREASINGLY SHARP AND DIVISIVE. IN SHORT, IF THERE IS PROGRESS ON THE DIPLOMATIC FRONT, THE PROCESS COULD BE EXTENDED WITH THE CABINET CONSIDERING INTERIM STEPS TOWARD A FINAL PLO EVACUATION. AT THE SAME TIME, THERE COULD BE INDEPENDENT ACTION BY OTHER ACTORS -- THE PHALANGE, THE SYRIANS OR OTHER ARAB STATES -- WHICH WOULD DESTROY THE CEASEFIRE AND FORCE THE IDF INTO MOVING ON WEST BEIRUT.

8. THE ULTIMATE DECISION RESTS WITH PRIME MINISTER BEGIN. BEGIN IS ACUTELY AWARE THAT ISRAEL AND THE PLO ARE ENGAGED IN A WAR OF NERVES. AT THIS LATE STAGE, ISRAEL HAS PUT ENORMOUS POLITICAL CAPITAL BEHIND THE OBJECTIVE OF DISARMING THE PLO AND EFFECTING THEIR REMOVAL FROM WEST BEIRUT.

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BEGIN UNDERSTANDS FULLY THAT IF ISRAEL BACKS AWAY FROM THIS GOAL, THE PLO WILL REAP A STARTLING PSYCHOLOGICAL POLITICAL VICTORY, WHICH WILL HAVE FAR-REACHING INTERNATIONAL REPERCUSSIONS, AND BEGIN'S INTERNAL POSITION WILL BE SEVERELY JEOPARDIZED. THE PRIME MINISTER WILL NOT WAVER FROM HIS GOAL OF DISARMING AND REMOVING THE PLO FROM WEST BEIRUT. IF THE DIPLOMATIC PROCESS DOES NOT YIELD SIGNIFICANT RESULTS RATHER SOON, WE BELIEVE HE WOULD ULTIMATELY RECOMMEND TO THE CABINET

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TO GO INTO WEST BEIRUT MILITARILY IN SOME FORM OR OTHER DESPITE THE HUMAN COSTS, DOMESTIC OPPOSITION TO SUCH A MOVE AND THE ANTICIPATED VERY SHARP REACTION FROM THE UNITED STATES. IF SUCH A DECISION WERE TAKEN, THE ISRAELIS COULD DECIDE IN THE FIRST INSTANCE TO RATCHET UP THE PRESSURE, RATHER THAN LAUNCHING AN ALL-OUT ASSAULT. LEWIS

NOTE BY OCT: NSCE AND CIAE ADDED PER MR. FARROW, S/S-O.

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USCINCEUR FOR POLAD

E.O. 12065: N/A

TAGS: MILI, MOPS, IS, LE

SUBJECT: JUNE CABINET COMMUNIQUE

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF JUNE 27 CABINET COMMUNIQUE.
COMMENCE TEXT. THE CABINET DECIDED TODAY THAT ISRAEL WILL
MAINTAIN THE CEASEFIRE IN LEBANON. IF THE ENEMY
VIOLATES THE CEASEFIRE, THE IDF WILL RESPOND WITH
FULL SEVERITY. THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL RECOMMENDS THAT
THE LEBANESE ARMY ENTER WEST BEIRUT. ALL THE 15
TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS, OF WHICH THE ROOF ORGANIZATION
CALLED THE PLO IS COMPRISED, WILL HAND OVER THEIR
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WEAPONS TO THE LEBANESE ARMY. ALL MEMBERS OF THE
ABOVE-MENTIONED TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS, WITHOUT ANY
EXCEPTION, WILL LEAVE BEIRUT AND LEBANON. THE DEPARTING
COLUMN OF TERRORISTS, UNDER THE PROTECTION OF THE
INTERNATIONAL RED CROSS, WILL MOVE ACROSS THE INTER-
NATIONAL LEBANESE-SYRIAN BORDER ALONG THE BEIRUT-
DAMASCUS ROAD. THE ISRAELI DEFENSE FORCES WILL
ENSURE THAT IN THE SECTOR OF THE ROAD THAT IS UNDER
ITS CONTROL, THE COLUMN WILL HAVE SAFE PASSAGE. IF THE

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TERRORISTS PREFER AN ALTERNATIVE ROUTE, THIS WILL BE MADE POSSIBLE FOR THEM BY THE IDF.

-- WITH THE LIBERATION OF WEST BEIRUT AND THE REUNIFICATION OF THE LEBANESE CAPITAL, THE POLITICAL NEGOTIATIONS WHICH WILL BE HELD BETWEEN ALL THE PARTIES CONCERNED WILL BEGIN WITH A VIEW TO REACHING AN AGREEMENT WHICH WILL GUARANTEE THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF LEBANON, THE DEPARTURE OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES FROM THEIR COUNTRY, ITS INDEPENDENCE AND THE PEACE OF ITS INHABITANTS. THIS AGREEMENT WILL ENSURE SECURITY AND PEACE FOR THE GALILEE AND ITS INHABITANTS, FOR ISRAEL AND ITS CITIZENS. ISRAEL WILL GLADLY ACCEPT THE GOOD OFFICES OF THE UNITED STATES TO THE NEGOTIATING PARTIES IN ORDER TO REACH THIS AGREEMENT. THANK YOU. END TEXT.

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2. JERUSALEM DOMESTIC SERVICE REPORTED AT 1154 GMT (1354 LOCAL) THAT THE CABINET HAD ADOPTED "A UNANIMOUS DECISION DETERMINING ISRAEL'S CONDITIONS FOR ARRANGING THE PROBLEM OF THE TERRORISTS' PRESENCE IN WEST BEIRUT."

3. JERUSALEM DOMESTIC SERVICE, DURING ITS 1300 GMT (1500 LOCAL) BROADCAST, REPORTED THAT "THE REPORT FROM THE U.S. THAT THE PRIME MINISTER HAD PROMISED U.S. UNCLASSIFIED

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PAGE 03 TEL AV 09703 271426Z

ADMINISTRATION LEADERS THAT ISRAEL WOULD NOT ENTER WEST BEIRUT TO CAPTURE THE TERRORIST LEADERS AND OUST THEIR ORGANIZATIONS WAS DENIED AT THE CABINET SESSION TODAY."

4. 1500 LOCAL BROADCAST ALSO REPORTED THAT, ACCORDING TO THE VOICE OF LEBANON, ISRAELI AIRCRAFT ARE "OVERFLYING BEIRUT AND DROPPING LEAFLETS TELLING PEOPLE TO GET OUT. ISRAELI TANK AND ARMORED EQUIPMENT IS LANDING BETWEEN TYRE AND SIDON AND HEADING NORTH."

5. MINIMIZE CONSIDERED DAMASCUS. BROWN

INFO OCT-00 COPY-01 ADS-00 AID-07 INR-10 EUR-12 SS-10
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
☒ RELEASE ☒ DECLASSIFIED Date: 11/3/97
☐ EXCISE ☐ DECLASSIFIED EC Citations
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STATE 178608 FOIA Exemptions _____ TS authority to
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E.O. 12065: GDS 6/28/88 (PETERS, LAURALEE)
 TAGS: MILI, PEPR, PINT, ASEC, LE, IS
 SUBJECT: SITREP NO. 53 LEBANON WORKING GROUP: SITUATION
 AS OF 1700 EDT JUNE 27, 1982

9302566

1. ~~ENTIRE TEXT~~

2. MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS: THE CEASE-FIRE APPARENTLY CONTINUES TO HOLD, ALTHOUGH ISRAELI DEFENSE MINISTER SHARON SAID LATE TODAY THAT THE PHALANGE IS BATTLING THE SYRIANS NEAR HAMMANA; WE HAVE NO CONFIRMATION OF THIS STATEMENT. THERE WERE REPORTS DURING THE DAY OF ISRAELI ARMOR AND TROOPS MOVING TO REINFORCE NORTHERN POSITIONS, PARTICULARLY IN THE ALAYH AND BHAMDUN AREAS. EARLY IN THE DAY, ISRAELI AIRCRAFT DROPPED LEAFLETS WARNING RESIDENTS TO LEAVE BEIRUT "TO SAVE THEIR LIVES". EMOASSY BEIRUT REPORTS-ROADS INTO EAST BEIRUT ARE-CHOKED WITH

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TRAFFIC AS ARE ROADS LEADING SOUTH OUT OF THE CITY. SOME 20,000-30,000 PEOPLE REPORTEDLY HAVE FLED TO EAST BEIRUT SINCE THE FIGHTING BEGAN. REUTER REPORTS A CAR BOMB EXPLODED OUTSIDE THE AFP'S WEST BEIRUT OFFICE TODAY, KILLING ONE PERSON.

3. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS: THE ISRAELI CABINET ISSUED A COMMUNIQUE AFTER ITS MEETING TODAY OUTLINING WHAT ARE BEING TERMED ITS "CONDITIONS" FOR RESOLVING THE WEST BEIRUT PROBLEM:

--ISRAEL WILL MAINTAIN THE CEASE-FIRE, BUT WILL RESPOND WITH "FULL SEVERITY" TO VIOLATIONS.

--THE GOI RECOMMENDS THAT THE LAF ENTER WEST BEIRUT

--ALL PLO "MEMBERS" TO LEAVE BEIRUT AND LEBANON, UNDER

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THE PROTECTION OF THE ICRC.

--POLITICAL NEGOTIATIONS WILL BE HELD TO REACH AN "AGREEMENT" TO GUARANTEE LEBANON'S TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY AND THE DEPARTURE OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES FROM LEBANON.

THE ARAB LEAGUE FOREIGN MINISTERS MEETING IN TUNIS BROKE UP THIS AFTERNOON WITHOUT REACHING AGREEMENT. A MINISTERIAL-LEVEL SUBCOMMITTEE WAS FORMED AND IS SCHEDULED TO MEET JUNE 29.

IN BEIRUT, PM WAZZAN RESCINDED HIS RESIGNATION TODAY AND MET LATER WITH ARAFAT. HE TOLD NEWSMEN THIS AFTERNOON THAT "PARTIAL AND TANGIBLE PROGRESS" HAD BEEN MADE, ADDING THAT THE PERIOD OF CALM BROUGHT BY THE CEASEFIRE SHOULD BE TAKEN ADVANTAGE OF "TO ACHIEVE FINAL SOLUTIONS"

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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TO THE CRISIS.

4. AMBASSADOR HABIB REMAINS IN BEIRUT. HAIG.

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PAGE 01 TEL AV 09608 251053Z
ACTION SS-25

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NEA FOR AMB. LEWIS

E.O. 12065: RDS-1, 3 6/25/92 (BROWN, WILLIAM A.) OR-M
TAGS: MILI, MOPS, IS, LE, US
SUBJECT: ISRAELI BOMBARDMENT OF WEST BEIRUT, JUNE 25

REF: RIZIK/BROWN TELECON, JUNE 25

1. [REDACTED] ~~ENTIRE TEXT.~~

2. ON RECEIVING INFORMATION (REF TELECON) I IMMEDIATELY CONTACTED DAVID KIMCHE, EXPLAINING I HAD JUST RECEIVED AN URGENT MESSAGE FROM PHIL HABIB AND LARRY EAGLEBURGER CONCERNING HEAVY ISRAELI AIR AND ARTILLERY BOMBARDMENT OF WEST BEIRUT, INCLUDING ITS DOWNTOWN AREA. HABIB HAD STRESSED IT WAS ABSOLUTELY ESSENTIAL TO STOP THIS BOMBARDMENT IMMEDIATELY; OTHERWISE IT WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE TO CONTINUE HIS MISSION. I EXPLAINED WE ARE CONVEYING A VERY STARK MESSAGE TO THE PLO VIA THE SAUDIS AND THE EGYPTIANS AND THIS ACTIVITY GREATLY UNDERMINED THIS EFFORT. IN ADDITION, HABIB HAD REPORTED

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THAT JUMBLATT WAS ON THE VERGE OF RESIGNING. (KIMCHE INTERJECTED THAT HE HAD JUST HEARD ON THE NEWS THAT JUMBLATT HAD ALREADY RESIGNED.) CONTINUING, I SAID THE ISRAELI BOMBARDMENT PUT THE ENTIRE NSC OPERATION IN JEOPARDY. WE NEEDED TO STOP THE BOMBARDMENT IMMEDIATELY.

3. I TOLD KIMCHE THAT EAGLEBURGER HAD ALREADY PASSED THIS MESSAGE TO AMBASSADOR ARENS AND REQUESTED

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THAT HE IMMEDIATELY CONVEY OUR DEMARCHE TO THE HIGHEST LEVELS. KIMCHE REPLIED THAT HE WOULD IMMEDIATELY PASS OUR MESSAGE AND WOULD KEEP US INFORMED.

4. KIMCHE CALLED BACK AT 1220 HOURS LOCAL TO SAY THAT THE ISRAELIS WERE CEASING IMMEDIATELY ALL FIRING, ARTILLERY AND AIR, IN WEST BEIRUT. THIS DECISION HAD BEEN TAKEN ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT THE OTHER SIDE WOULD STOP THEIR FIRE AS WELL. IF THE OTHER SIDE DID NOT STOP THEIR FIRE IN THE NEXT SEVERAL HOURS, ISRAEL WILL HAVE TO RESUME ITS MILITARY ACTIVITIES.

5. I REPLIED THAT I WOULD IMMEDIATELY PASS THIS MESSAGE BACK TO WASHINGTON BUT NOTED THAT I UNDERSTOOD THE NATIONAL SALVATION COUNCIL WAS SCHEDULED TO HAVE A MEETING WITH THE PLO AT ABOUT 1730 HOURS TODAY. I TOLD KIMCHE THAT THIS MEETING WOULD BE EXTREMELY IMPORTANT SINCE THE GOL WOULD BE PUTTING ITS POSITION DIRECTLY TO THE PLO AT THAT TIME. BROWN

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AMEMBASSY BEIRUT NIACT IMMEDIATE (V) RELEASE

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AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE

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BEIRUT FOR HABIB

E.O. 12065: RDS-1,3 6/22/02 (ABINGTON, EDWARD G.) OR-P

TAGS: PEPR, MILI, MOPS, IS, LE, SY, US

SUBJECT: ISRAELI AIR STRIKES AGAINST SYRIAN ARTILLERY POSITIONS

REF: DAMASCUS 4422

1. ~~ENTIRE TEXT.~~

2. DEPUTY FONMIN QADDOUR'S OFFICE CALLED AT 1145 LOCAL JUNE 22 TO INFORM US THAT ISRAEL WAS CARRYING OUT AIR STRIKES AGAINST SYRIAN ARTILLERY POSITIONS IN VICINITY OF HAMMANA. THIS INFORMATION HAD JUST BEEN RECEIVED FROM SYRIAN MILITARY SOURCES IN LEBANON. PAGANELLI

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EXDIS FOR AMB LICHENSTEIN

FOLLOWING TEL AVIV 9329 DTD JUN 21 SENT ACTION STATE BEIRUT
DAMASCUS INFO AMMAN CAIRO JERUSALEM JIDDA RIYADH BEING
REPEATED TO YOU FOR YOUR INFO:

QUOTE:

TEL AVIV 09329

DECAPTIONED

NEA FOR AMBASSADOR LEWIS

E.O. 12065: RDS-1, 4 6/21/02 (BROWN, WILLIAM A.) OR-M

TAGS: MOPS, MILI, IS, LE, SY, PLO

SUBJECT: HABIB MISSION: GETTING THE ISRAELIS TO HOLD BACK

REF: A. STATE 171148 (BEIRUT 4313), B. HILL/BROWN
TELECON 1315Z JUNE 21

1. ~~ENTIRE TEXT~~

PAGE 02

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2. EARLIER TODAY I HAD SPOKEN WITH KIMCHE ABOUT
THE HEAVY EXCHANGE OF FIRE OVER THE LAST TWELVE
HOURS. KIMCHE SAID HE SUSPECTED THAT THERE WERE
ELEMENTS IN WEST BEIRUT WHICH WERE PROBABLY NOW
COMPLETELY OUT OF (ARAFAT'S) CONTROL. WHEN I
ASKED WHAT WERE THE POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF SUCH
A ASSESSMENT, HE ADMITTED THAT THERE WAS A DILEMMA.
IN ANY EVENT, ALTHOUGH YESTERDAY STRICT ORDERS

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HAD BEEN GIVEN NOT TO SHOOT UNLESS FIRED UPON, THE IDF LEADERSHIP REMAINED DETERMINED TO REPLY TO EVERY PLO ATTACK AND NO ONE WAS THUS FAR ABOUT TO ORDER THEM TO DO OTHERWISE.

3. IN ACCORDANCE WITH MY SECURE TELECON WITH HILL AT 1515 LOCAL, I PASSED THE FOLLOWING TO KIMCHE:

-- HABIB BELIEVES THAT THE MOMENT OF TRUTH HAS JUST ABOUT ARRIVED. SAAB SALEM IS AT HABIB'S SIDE AND IN PHONE CONTACT WITH ARAFAT.

-- FOURTEEN HOURS OF IDF HEAVY SHELLING, THE IDF THREAT TO SEIZE THE AIRPORT, SOME IDF ADVANCES, AND HEAVY CASUALTIES INFLICTED BY THE IDF, HAVE SOFTENED THE PLO TO THE POINT THAT IT HAS MOVED FROM BEING DEFIANT TO FRANTIC.

-- THE PLO, HOWEVER, IS PROBABLY ON THE EDGE OF ON THE ONE HAND MOVING TOWARD GREATER IMMEDIATE FLEXIBILITY, WHILE ON THE OTHER BECOMING CRAZED WITH FEAR, DECIDING THAT THERE IS NO OTHER WAY OUT AND RESORTING TO SUICIDAL MILITARY MEASURES.

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4. I TOLD KIMCHE THAT ON HABIB'S RECOMMENDATION SECRETARY HAIG HAD JUST PHONED ARENS TO STATE THAT IN LIGHT OF THIS BACKGROUND WE WERE REQUESTING THE ISRAELIS TO HOLD THEIR FIRE FOR 24 HOURS AND HOLD BACK FROM FURTHER ADVANCES TOWARD PLO POSITIONS, E.G., SEIZING THE AIRPORT. IT WAS CRUCIAL THAT THE PLO PERCEIVE US TO BE IN A POSITION TO INFLUENCE ISRAEL ALONG THESE LINES SO AS TO OVERCOME PLO PARANOIC FEARS, E.G. THAT SHOULD THEY ALLOW THE LAF TO DEPLOY, DISARM AND SEEK SAFE CONDUCT THEY WOULD NOT BE BUTCHERED IN A SUBSEQUENT BETRAYAL. ARENS HAD TOLD THE SECRETARY THAT HE WOULD GET RIGHT TO WORK ON THIS, BY WHICH I INFERRED HE WOULD CONTACT BEGIN.

5. AT MY REQUEST, KIMCHE SAID HE WOULD PASS THIS URGENTLY TO SHAMIR AND SHARON (WHO MAY BE IN THE NORTH).

6. MINIMIZE BEIRUT AND DAMASCUS CONSIDERED. BROWN UNQUOTE HAIG

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E.O. 12065: N/A

TAGS: SOPN

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF 6/21 WASHINGTON POST FOREIGN POLICY
STORIES (FROM WHITE HOUSE SUMMARY)

9302566

FOR DEPUTY SECRETARY STOESSEL - TO/DEP 30112

1. UNCLASSIFIED ENTIRE TEXT

2. ISRAEL PLEDGES TO KEEP CEASE-FIRE IN BEIRUT - JERUSALEM
6/20 - ISRAEL SAID SUNDAY ITS CEASE-FIRE IN LEBANON IS
OPEN-ENDED AND THAT INVASION FORCES ENCIRCLING WEST BEIRUT
WILL HOLD THEIR FIRE UNLESS FIRED UPON. FOLLOWING A
MEETING FOR THE CABINET, A GOVERNMENT SPOKESMAN ALSO SAID
THAT EVEN IF PALESTINIAN GUERRILLAS LAY DOWN THEIR ARMS,
ISRAEL WILL NEVER AGREE TO NEGOTIATE WITH THE PLO. (PM
BEGIN CALLED SUNDAY FOR AN INTERNATIONAL PEACE-KEEPING FORCE
IN LEBANON THAT HE INSISTS SHOULD INCLUDE U.S. FORCES.)
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DEFENSE MINISTER ARIEL SHARON SID SUNDAY THAT ISRAEL'S
"MILITARY AND POLITICAL OBJECTIVES" WILL NOT BE ACHIEVED
UNTIL THE PLO HEADQUARTERS IN BEIRUT ARE ELIMINATED.
(CLAIBORNE)

3. RIVAL LEADERS MEET IN BEIRUT. BEIRUT (6/20) -
LEBANON'S SEVEN MAIN POLITICAL AND MILITARY LEADERS MET
FOR THE FIRST TIME SUNDAY NIGHT AS THE NEW NATIONAL SALVA-
TION COUNCIL. A FUNCTIONING COUNCIL IS CONSIDERED ESSEN-
TIAL TO EFFORTS BY LEBANON'S HOSTILE FACTIONS TO BRING
PEACE TO THEIR COUNTRY. ITS MEETING BROUGHT HOPE TO WAR-
WEARY LEBANESE THAT THE THREATENED ISRAELI ASSAULT ON
THEIR CAPITAL CAN BE AVERTED. HOLDING OF THE LONG-DELAYED
MEETING WAS A MAJOR ACHIEVEMENT FOR PHILIP HABIB. THE
FIRST ORDER OF BUSINESS ALMOST CERTAINLY WAS THE DEPLOYMENT
OF THE 21,000 MAN LEBANESE ARMY INSIDE THE CAPITAL. SOURCES
FAMILIAR WITH THE DISCUSSION SAID, HOWEVER, THAT THERE WAS
A SHARP SPLIT OVER HOW TO DEAL WITH THE PLO. (OTTOWAY)

4. CUBA SAYS FALKLANDS CRISIS EASED ISOLATION. NEW YORK - THE OUTCOME OF THE FALKLANDS CRISIS APPEARS TO BE A NET LOSS FOR BOTH LATIN AMERICA AND THE U.S. - THE FORMER HAVING SUPPORTED ARGENTINA'S LOST CAUSE AND THE LATTER HAVING SEVERELY STRAINED ITS OWN TIES WITH LATIN FRIENDS. BUT ONE COUNTRY IN THE HEMISPHERE CLAIMS TO HAVE COME OUT A WINNER. ACCORDING TO CUBAN VICE PRESIDENT RODRIQUEZ, THE CRISIS HAS FORGED "A NEW RELATIONSHIP AMONG THE COUNTRIES OF LATIN AMERICA," IN WHICH U.S. INFLUENCE WILL BE CURTAILED AND CUBA'S LONG ISOLATION IN THE REGION WILL BEGIN TO LESSEN. (DEYOUNG)

5. ARGENTINA MILITARY SQUABBLES OVER FUTURE POLICY, PRESIDENT. BUENOS AIRES 6/20 - ARGENTINA'S MILITARY JUNTA UNCLASSIFIED

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STRUGGLED AGAIN SUNDAY TO RESOLVE DEEP DIFFERENCES OVER THE COUNTRY'S FUTURE GOVERNMENT AND CHOOSE A NEW PRESIDENT TO REPLACE GALTIERI. AS THE JUNTA WENT INTO SESSION EARLY THIS EVENING, EACH OF ARGENTINA'S THREE MILITARY SERVICES WAS PROPOSING A DIFFERENT SOLUTION, RANGING FROM INSTALLING AS PRESIDENT A VETERAN GENERAL TO A CIVILIAN, WHILE INSISTING THE CHOICES OF THE OTHER SERVICES WERE UNACCEPTABLE. POLITICAL ANALYSTS SAID THE ARMED FORCES WERE SPLIT SO BADLY THAT A QUICK DECISION MIGHT BE IMPOSSIBLE. DESPITE WIDESPREAD EXPECTATIONS THAT THE ARMY WOULD MPOSE ITS WILL ON THE OTHER TWO MILITARY SERVICES, BOTH AIR FORCE AND NAVY LEADERS SUNDAY CONTINUED TO OPENLY CHALLENGE THE ARMY. AIR FORCE OFFICERS WERE QUOTED ANONYMOUSLY IN BUENOS AIRES' LEADING NEWSPAPERS SUNDAY AS SAYING THEIR SERVICE WOULD NOT ACCEPT ANOTHER MILITARY PRESIDENT FROM THE ARMY. LA NACION ALSO PUBLISHED SUNDAY WHAT AMOUNTED TO A POSITION STATEMENT FROM A "HIGH ACTIVE NAVAL OFFICIAL" DECLARING THAT THE NAVY WAS SUPPORTING THE NAMING OF A CIVILIAN PRESIDENT FOR "A GOVERNMENT OF TRANSITION." (DIEHL)

6. EUROPEAN COMMON MARKET ENDS EMBARGO ON ARGENTINE IMPORTS. LUXEMBOURG, 6/20 - THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LIFTED ITS BAN ON TRADE WITH ARGENTINA SUNDAY, BUT WARNED IT WILL BE REIMPOSED IF ARGENTINA RESUMES THE BATTLE FOR THE ISLANDS. BRITAIN ACCEPTED THE DECISION RELUCTANTLY. SOME EUROPEAN OFFICIALS DECLINED TO RULE OUT THE POSSIBILITY OF SANCTIONS AGAINST ISRAEL AS A SIGNAL OF DISAPPROVAL OVER THE JUNE 6 INVASION OF LEBANON. OFFICIALS FROM SEVERAL DELEGATIONS SAID THE MINISTERS WOULD WEIGH NEW UNIFIED DIPLOMATIC MOVES AIMED AT RESTORING PEACE TO THE MIDDLE EAST.

7. SOVIET MISSILE TEST: SCENARIO FOR WAR. 6/21 - AMERICAN INTELLIGENCE ANALYSTS SAY A BURST OF SOVIET MISSILE TEST FIRINGS LAST WEEK FOLLOWS CLOSELY THE SEQUENCE OF EVENTS THAT WOULD UNFOLD DURING A NUCLEAR WAR, WITH THE FIRST SHOT MEANT TO KNOCK OUT U.S. INTELLIGENCE-GATHERING UNCLASSIFIED

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SATELLITES. ALTHOUGH THE SOVIETS HAVE CONDUCTED TESTS OF THEIR MISSILE ARSENAL BEFORE, EXPERIENCED ANALYSTS HERE SAY SUCH TESTS ARE RARE. WHAT REALLY "DAZZLED" U.S. EXPERTS THIS TIME, AS ONE SOURCE PUT IT, WAS THE INCLUSION OF THE ANTISATELLITE TESTS, PROBABLY FOR THE FIRST TIME, INTO A LARGE-SCALE EXERCISE. THE EXERCISE FOLLOWED THE INTIAL ANTISATELLITE SHOT WITH RAPID FIRING OF OTHER LAND AND SUBMARINE-BASED MISSILES AND THEN DEFENSIVE MISSILES. SECRETARY WEINBERGER SUGGESTED THE SOVIETS MIGHT HAVE INTENDED THE TESTS TO "SEND OUT A SIGNAL," BUT OTHER SOURCES SUGGESTED THAT SUCH EXERCISES ARE PROBABLY NOT MEANT TO IMPRESS AMERICANS. RATHER, THEY SAID, THE TESTS ARE MORE LIKELY MEANT TO DEMONSTRATE TO THE SOVIET HIERARCHY WHETHER THEIR SYSTEMS WORK, AT LEAST IN CAREFULLY PLANNED EXERCISES. (GETLER)

8. ROSTOW SAYS IT'S "PLAUSIBLE" U.S. MIGHT USE A-ARMS FIRST. EUGENE V. ROSTOW, THE DIRECTOR OF THE U.S. ACDA, SAID SUNDAY IT IS "PLAUSIBLE" THE U.S. MIGHT USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS FIRST IN A CONFLICT WITH THE SOVIET UNION. ROSTOW, APPEARING ON "MEET THE PRESS," SAID THE U.S.' NATO ALLIES "ARE VERY FIRM, EXTREMELY FIRM ON THAT VERY SUBJECT" BECAUSE THEIR SECURITY DEPENDS ON THE "IMPLICIT THREAT" THAT NUCLEAR WEAPONS WOULD BE USED "TO PREVENT THEM FROM BEING OVERRUN, EVEN BY TANKS." ROSTOW ALSO SAID THAT WHILE THE PEOPLE BEHIND THE WORLDWIDE ANTI-NUCLEAR MOVEMENTS ARE "SINCERE" AND "DEEPLY CONCERNED" THERE IS "NO DOUBT" THE COMMUNISTS ARE ATTEMPTING TO EXPLOIT AND MANIPULATE THEM. (SUGAWARA)

9. "REAGAN & CO." - THOUGH IT HAS YET TO COME BEFORE THE PRESIDENT, VIETNAM VETERANS ARE ORGANIZING TO DEMAND THE OUSTER OF VA ADMINISTRATOR NIMMO, WHO IS DESCRIBED IN AN UNCLASSIFIED

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EDITORIAL TODAY IN THE USUALLY RESTRAINED "STARS AND STRIPES" AS "AN ABOMINATION." VIETNAM VETS WOULD NOW LIKE TO SEE REAGAN USE SOME OF HIS OWN WH POWER TO GET RID OF NIMMO...ON THE WAY OUT, OF HIS OWN VOLITION, IS NORMAN TURE, THE TREASURY UNDERSECRETARY FOR ECONOMIC AFFAIRS WHO HAS BEEN THE MOST OUTSPOKEN SUPPLY-SIDER WITHIN THE ADMINISTRATION...REAGAN'S ECONOMIC RECOVERY PROGRAM MAY STILL BE MORE FANCY THAN FACT, BUT IN-HOUSE POLLS TAKEN FOR THE PRESIDENT SHOW THAT REAGAN HAS REBOUNDED SLIGHTLY AFTER A LONG SLIDE. THE BOOST CAME LESS, HOWEVER, FROM "REAGAN ECONOMICS" THAN FROM GAINS RECORDED BY THE PRESIDENT ON FOREIGN POLICY ISSUES...THE PRESIDENT'S BELIEF THAT THE SOVIET UNION IS A TATTERED PAPER BEAR AND HIS DECISION TO EXTEND ECONOMIC PRESSURE IN AN ATTEMPT TO

FORCE CONCESSIONS FROM THE RUSSIANS CAME AS A SURPRISE TO SOME REPUBLICANS--BUT NOT TO RICHARD NIXON. (CANNON)
10. U.S. ASKS MARSHALLS PLEBISCITE DELAY. 6/21 --THE U.S. HAS TOLD THE REPUBLIC OF THE MARSHALL ISLANDS GOVERNMENT THAT IT WANTS TO DELAY AN AUG. 17 PLEBISCITE BY WHICH THE PACIFIC ISLANDERS WERE TO VOTE ON A COMPACT OF ASSOCIATION BETWEEN THE TWO NATIONS. IT CAME AS A 'SURPRISE' TO THE MARSHALLESE, ACCORDING TO JAMES BOYLE, A LAWYER IN HAWAII WHO HAS REPRESENTED THE ISLANDS' GOVERNMENT IN COMPACT NEGOTIATIONS THIS YEAR. A STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL SAID THE REQUESTED DLELAY IN THE PLEBISCITE "WAS NO BIG THING (AND) HAS NOTHING TO DO WITH OPPOSITION TO THE AGREEMENT." BUT A WASHINGTON LAWYER WITH ISLANDER CLIENTS SAID U.S. OFFICIALS WERE "WORRIED" ABOUT THE ELECTION.
(PINCUS) HAIG

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*** Current Classification *** UNCLASSIFIED

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AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE

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E.O. 12065: GDS 6/18/88 (WELCH, DAVID)
TAGS: MILI, LE, IS
SUBJECT: SITREP NO. 35 LEBANON WORKING GROUP: SITUATION
AS OF 1700 EDT JUNE 18, 1982

1. ~~ENTIRE TEXT~~

2. MILITARY SITUATION: INTERMITTENT ISRAELI ARTILLERY
AND TANK FIRE CONTINUED THROUGHOUT THE MORNING ON TARGETS
LOCATED NEAR THE BEIRUT AIRPORT AND IN THE BURJ
AL-BARAJINAH, SABRA/ SHATILLA AREAS OF SOUTH BEIRUT.
ACCORDING TO DAO-BEIRUT, THE ISRAELIS HAVE BEEN
CONDUCTING WHAT IS BELIEVED TO BE ONE-WAY "HARASSMENT AND
INTERDICTION" FIRE ALL DAY INTO THE AREA AROUND THE
AIRPORT. SYRIAN POSITIONS AT SUQ AL-GHARB WERE ALSO

[REDACTED]
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PAGE 02 STATE 169625

REPORTED TO BE TARGETS OF IDF SHELLING. EMBASSY BEIRUT
REPORTS THAT ISRAELI TROOPS REMAINED STATIONED IN FORCE
AT KAHR SHIMA AND SHUWAYFAT, SOUTH OF THE CITY. AP
RELEASES CLAIM THAT ISRAELI TROOPS MOVED INTO CHRISTIAN
EAST BEIRUT TODAY, AND ADVANCED WITH THE AID OF
PHALANGIST CHRISTIAN MILITIAMEN TO THE "GREEN LINE"
FRONTIER WITH WEST BEIRUT, STILL OCCUPIED BY SYRIAN AND
PALESTINIAN FORCES. ACCORDING TO MONTE CARLO RADIO,
SYRIAN AUTHORITIES TURNED DOWN A REQUEST BY LEBANESE
PRESIDENT ILYAS SARKIS TO WITHDRAW THE ARAB DETERRENT
FORCES FROM BEIRUT AND ITS SUBURBS. IN AN APPARENT MOVE
TOWARD THE RELAXATION OF TENSIONS IN SOUTHERN LEBANON,
ISRAELI DEFENSE MINISTER SHARON STATED THAT SOME IDF
RESERVISTS WOULD RETURN TO ISRAEL. A COMPARISON OF
CASUALTY FIGURES RELEASED BY THE IDF ON JUNE 11 WITH
THOSE OF JUNE 17 APPEARS TO INDICATE THAT THE NUMBERS OF
ISRAELI DEAD AND WOUNDED HAVE ROUGHLY DOUBLED SINCE THE

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CEASEFIRE WAS DECLARED LAST FRIDAY, BUT IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT THE CONSERVATIVE IDF MANNER OF REPORTING CASUALTIES MAY HAVE CAUSED DELAY IN THE LISTING OF FULL FIGURES.

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3. DIPLOMATIC DEVELOPMENTS: SECRETARY OF STATE HAIG MET THIS MORNING WITH ISRAELI PRIME MINISTER BEGIN FOR DISCUSSIONS ON THE CURRENT SITUATION IN LEBANON; HAIG WAS SCHEDULED TO MEET WITH SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTER GROMYKO LATER THIS AFTERNOON. IN VIENNA, VISITING FRENCH PRESIDENT MITTERRAND, AND AUSTRIAN PRESIDENT KIRCHSCHLAEGER AND CHANCELLOR KREISKY ISSUED A JOINT STATEMENT DEMANDING THE RESTORATION OF THE SOVEREIGNTY, INTEGRITY AND UNITY OF LEBANON AS WELL AS THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE ISRAELI FORCES. A HIGH-RANKING POLITICAL/MILITARY DELEGATION, HEADED BY IRANIAN FOREIGN MINISTER VELAYATI,

PAGE 03 STATE 169625...

IS REPORTED BY TEHRAN RADIO TO HAVE ARRIVED IN DAMASCUS FOR TALKS ON MUTUAL COOPERATION AND IRANIAN ASSISTANCE TO THE AMAL MOVEMENT, A SHI'A MILITIA IN LEBANON.

4. OTHER DEVELOPMENTS: HABIB IS STILL IN BEIRUT. EAGLEBURGER

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Date Printed: 10/03/1996

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CHANNEL: n/a

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TO ALL NEAR EASTERN AND SOUTH ASIAN DIPLOMATIC POSTS IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE

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E.O. 12065: N/A

TAGS: XF, UK, FR, GW, UR

SUBJECT: SECRETARY HAIG ON THE TODAY SHOW, JUNE 18, 1982

9302566

1. FOLLOWING IS THE MIDDLE EAST PORTION OF SECRETARY
HAIG'S REMARKS ON THE NBC TODAY SHOW JUNE 18.

2. BEGIN MIDDLE EAST PORTION: Q: IN THE MIDDLE EAST,
WHERE A NUMBER OF MODERATES -- SAUDI ARABIANS, JORDANIANS,
EGYPTIANS -- ARE JUSTIFIABLY WONDERING WHY WE WERE UNABLE
TO RESTRAIN THE ISRAELI ADVANCE INTO LEBANON, WHY WEREN'T
WE?

A: WELL, I THINK IT'S VERY CLEAR. THE UNITED STATES'
RECORD ON THE LEBANON SITUATION HAS BEEN ONE OF RESTRAINT.
ALL THE PEACE EFFORTS OF AMBASSADOR HABIB -- HIS REPEATED
VISITS TO THE AREA, THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A CEASEFIRE 11
MONTHS AGO -- WERE THE RESULT OF A UNITED STATES INITIATIVE
IN COOPERATION WITH BOTH ISRAEL AND THE MODERATE ARAB
STATES, ESPECIALLY SAUDI ARABIA.

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NOW, THE LESSONS OF LEBANON SHOULD BE CLEAR TO ALL, AND
THAT IS THAT THE CIRCUMSTANCES INTERNALLY IN LEBANON,
WHERE THERE HAVE BEEN STATES WITHIN STATES, WHERE THERE
HAVE BEEN OCCUPYING POWERS -- SYRIA, CREATE AN INSTABILITY

HICH WE NOW, IN THE WAKE OF THIS TRAGEDY, HAVE AN
OPPORTUNITY TO CORRECT, AND I THINK THAT'S WHERE WE'VE
GOT TO PUT OUR ATTENTION.

Q: YOU HAVE A MEETING SCHEDULED FOR AS SOON AS YOU LEAVE HERE WITH MENACHEM BEGIN. HOW ARE YOU GOING TO APPROACH HIM ABOUT NEGOTIATING AN ISRAELI PULLOUT OF FORCES FROM LEBANON?

A: WELL, I THINK OUR MEETING THIS MORNING WILL BE DESIGNED REALLY TO EXCHANGE VIEWS IN A VERY DETAILED WAY WITH RESPECT TO THIS SITUATION, AS A PRELIMINARY TO THE MEETING THAT PRIME MINISTER BEGIN WILL HAVE WITH PRESIDENT REAGAN ON MONDAY.

NOW, WE HAVE VERY ACTIVE DIPLOMACY UNDERWAY, HOUR BY HOUR. THE PRESIDENT FOLLOWED IT WELL INTO THE NIGHT EVERY NIGHT WHILE HE WAS IN EUROPE, ALL DAY YESTERDAY WHILE HE WAS HERE IN NEW YORK, AND THESE EFFORTS ARE GOING TO CONTINUE, BUT IT DOESN'T SERVE ANY PURPOSE TO GO INTO DETAIL.

Q: WOULD YOU BE RECEPTIVE TO THE IDEA OF U.S. TROOPS BEING USED AS PEACEKEEPING FORCES IN THE MIDDLE EAST?

A: WELL, I DON'T THINK WE HAVE THAT HIGH ON OUR AGENDA AT THE MOMENT. AS I HAVE SAID, IT'S A HYPOTHETICAL
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QUESTION AT THIS POINT. I HAVE ENOUGH CONFIDENCE IN PRESIDENT REAGAN'S SENSE OF RESPONSIBILITY THAT IF SUCH A MEASURE WERE TO REALLY MAKE A DIFFERENCE HE WOULD GIVE IT SERIOUS CONSIDERATION. I DON'T WANT TO SUGGEST BY THAT THAT THAT IS THE CASE. IT IS NOT AT THIS JUNCTURE. EAGLEBURGER

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RDS, FOR PHIL HABIB FROM THE SECRETARY

E.O. 12065: RDS-1,3 06/17/02 (HAIG, ALEXANDER M.)
TAGS: PEPR MILI IS LE
SUBJECT: ESTABLISHING A CONTACT GROUP

1. ~~ENTIRE TEXT~~

2. AS YOUR EFFORTS EVOLVE IN BEIRUT WE BELIEVE WE CAN USEFULLY BEGIN TO MOVE FORWARD WITH THE CONTACT GROUP. WE WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR VIEWS ON THE TIMING AND NATURE OF THE APPROACH WE MIGHT TAKE WITH THE SAUDIS AND FRENCH. WE CONTEMPLATE A FORMAL LETTER TO BOTH THESE PARTIES AS WELL AS A LETTER TO PRESIDENT SARKIS INDICATING THE NATURE OF OUR APPROACH, THE OBJECTIVES BEHIND IT AND SEEKING LEBANESE PARTICIPATION AND DIRECTION OF OUR EFFORTS. THE ELEMENTS THAT WE WOULD WEAVE INTO THE LETTERS TO THE FRENCH AND SAUDIS FOLLOW:

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- (A) RECOMMEND ESTABLISHMENT OF A CONTACT GROUP OF THE LEBANESE, SAUDIS, FRENCH AND U.S. TO GENERATE STRONG SUPPORT FOR THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT IN EUROPE AND THE ARAB WORLD AND TO COORDINATE ACTIONS BY OTHERS IN ORDER TO HAVE MAXIMUM IMPACT. WE WOULD HAVE AS OUR BASIC OBJECTIVE STRENGTHENING THE LEBANESE AUTHORITY SUPPORTED BY ARAB AND WESTERN FRIENDS OF LEBANON.

- (B) THE BASIC DIRECTION FOR OUR EFFORTS WOULD COME

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FROM THE LEBANESE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT. WE WOULD INDICATE THAT AS A RESULT OF YOUR EFFORTS THUS FAR THERE IS NEAR LEBANESE CONSENSUS ON THE FOLLOWING:

- -- MOVING TOWARDS PROMPT ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL, POSSIBLY PHASED, WITH INITIAL EMPHASIS ON A DISENGAGEMENT FROM BEIRUT SO THAT THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT GAINS CREDIBILITY AS NOT BEING DIRECTED BY THE GUNS OF OUTSIDE FORCES.

- -- PHASED DISARMAMENT OF THE PLO AND FACTIONAL ARMIES FIRST IN BEIRUT AND POSSIBLE INTEGRATION OF FACTIONAL FORCES INTO THE LEBANESE ARMY. THE LEBANESE ARMED FORCES SHOULD ASSUME SECURITY DUTIES IN BEIRUT, FORTIFIED, IF NECESSARY, BY NEUTRAL ARAB OR OUTSIDE FORCES.

- -- ESTABLISHING CONDITIONS IN BEIRUT THROUGH WITHDRAWAL OF OUTSIDE FORCES, DISARMING OF THE PLO, AND INTEGRATION OF FACTIONAL ARMIES SO THAT THE CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENTS FOR A LEBANESE ELECTION CAN BE MET AND A STRONG GOVERNMENT BE ESTABLISHED.

- -- ENDING THE PALESTINIAN STATE WITHIN A STATE

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WITH THOSE PALESTINIANS REMAINING IN LEBANON AS FOREIGN RESIDENTS SUBJECT TO THE AUTHORITY OF THE GOVERNMENT.

- -- ESTABLISHING AN EFFECTIVE AND CREDIBLE INTERNATIONAL FORCE UNDER LEBANESE AUSPICES, POSSIBLY WITH A UN ELEMENT, AND WITH CONTRIBUTIONS FROM THE LEBANESE ARMY IN THE ZONE BETWEEN LEBANON'S SOUTHERN BORDER AND 40 KILOMETERS TO THE NORTH.

- -- PHASED WITHDRAWAL OF SYRIAN FORCES FROM LEBANON WITH INITIAL EMPHASIS ON BEIRUT.

- -- BRINGING AN END TO THE HADDAD ENCLAVE ON AN HONORABLE BASIS.

- (C) WE WOULD INDICATE THE NEED FOR FRENCH AND SAUDI SUPPORT FOR FORMATION OF AN INTERNATIONAL FORCE AS WELL AS WHATEVER HELP THEY CAN PROVIDE WITH LEBANESE FACTIONS, PLO AND, IN THE CASE OF FRANCE, ISRAEL. WE WOULD WANT TO PURSUE OUR EFFORTS SUCH THAT IT WAS CLEAR THAT THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT HAD THE ACTIVE SUPPORT OF THE BROAD INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY AND WAS DIRECTING

THOSE EFFORTS.

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- (D) WE WOULD SUGGEST THAT THE CONTACT GROUP BE INVOLVED IN DEVELOPING COORDINATED PUBLIC POSTURE, JOINT EFFORTS TO ESTABLISH EFFECTIVE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS, COORDINATED EFFORTS TO PROVIDE THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT WITH THE FINANCIAL SUPPORT IT NEEDS TO STRENGTHEN ITS DOMESTIC POSITION AND COMPLEMENTARY DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS ACROSS THE BOARD.

- (E) FINALLY, WE WOULD SUGGEST THAT AS SOON AS YOU CAN USEFULLY BREAK AWAY YOU WILL BE CONSULTING WITH THE SAUDIS AND FRENCH ON THE BEST MEANS FOR MAINTAINING

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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COORDINATION OF OUR ACTIVITIES AND INCREASING OUR IMPACT. WE WOULD WANT TO ENSURE THAT SAUDI EFFORTS WITH THE SYRIANS, PLO AND BAYT A-DIN MEMBERS DO NOT RUN AT CROSS PURPOSES WITH YOUR EFFORTS.

3. OUR OBJECTIVES ARE OBVIOUSLY BROADER THAN THE NARROW CONTEXT OF THE LEBANON CRISIS SINCE BY ENGAGING THE SAUDIS AND FRENCH WE HOPE TO DEFUSE SOME OF THE SEVERE NEGATIVE IMPACT OF THE ISRAELI INVASION BOTH IN EUROPE AND IN THE GULF. WE WILL WANT TO CONSIDER HOW AND WHETHER WE CAN BRING OTHERS SUCH AS THE EGYPTIANS AND JORDANIANS INTO OUR EFFORTS. EAGLEBURGER

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QUOTE

BEIRUT 4255

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DECAPTIONED

FROM HABIB FOR VELIOTES AND EAGLEBURGER

E.O. 12065: RDS-1 6/17/92 (HABIB, PHILIP)

TAGS: PEPR, XF, LE, IS, US

SUBJ: HABIB MISSION: ISRAELI CABINET DECISION

1. ~~ENTIRE TEXT~~

2. I HAVE JUST RECEIVED YOUR REPORT OF ISRAELI CABINET
DECISION ON OUR PROPOSAL.

3. I FIND IT INCOMPREHENSIBLE THAT WE CONTINUE TO ACCEPT-
APPARENTLY WITHOUT QUESTION - THE ISRAELI CONTENTION
THAT THERE IS STILL A CEASE-FIRE. THERE IS NO REPEAT

PAGE 02 STATE 167752 TOSEC 090014

NO CEASE-FIRE. WE ARE ALL TIRED BUT PLEASE TRY TO
UNDERSTAND THIS FUNDAMENTAL POINT.

4. WHAT WE ARE SEEKING IS A REAL CEASE-FIRE "IN PLACE"
IN THE BEIRUT AREA WHICH WOULD COMMENCE AT A TIME WHICH
WILL BE AGREED BY US (NOT ISRAEL) WITH WAZZAN.

5. WE OBVIOUSLY CANNOT GIVE ANY ASSURANCES OF ISRAELI
GOOD BEHAVIOR IN A CEASE-FIRE "IN PLACE" UNLESS YOU

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AND EMBASSY TEL AVIV NAIL IT DOWN THAT THIS IS A NEW REPEAT NEW CEASE-FIRE, NOT REPEAT NOT SOMETHING WHICH NEVER EXISTED FOR ALL PRACTICAL PURPOSES.

6. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF A REVISED CABINET DECISION WHICH I BELIEVE THE SECRETARY SHOULD DEMAND IMMEDIATELY:

(1) THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL HAS DECIDED TO RESPOND FAVORABLY TO THE MESSAGE OF THE U S SECRETARY OF STATE.

(2) THE GOI IS COMMITTED TO A CEASE-FIRE IN PLACE IN THE BEIRUT AREA AT A TIME TO BE AGREED WITH THE U S AND HAS NO PLANS FOR CAPTURING BEIRUT. THE IDF WILL NOT FIRE UNLESS FIRED UPON, IN WHICH CASE IT WILL USE MAXIMUM RESTRAINT IN EXERCISING ITS RIGHT TO SELF-DEFENSE.

(3) THE GOI IS FULLY RESPONSIBLE FOR THE ACTIONS OF THE IDF BUT IS NOT RESPONSIBLE FOR ANY OTHER ARMED FORCES IN LEBANON.

(4) THE GOI DOES NOT SEE IN THE PLO A FACTOR FOR ANY

[REDACTED]

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PAGE 03 STATE 167752 TOSEC 090014

SORT OF NEGOTIATION.
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AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE

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E.O. 12065: RDS-1, 3 6/16/02 (VELIOTES, N.)
TAGS: MILI, MOPS, PEPR, PGOV, PINT, LE, IS, US, PLO
SUBJECT: HABIB MISSION: RESOLVING THE WEST BEIRUT PROBLEM

REF: BEIRUT 4241

1. ~~ENTIRE TEXT~~

2. WE HAVE ACCEPTED YOUR RECOMMENDATIONS REFTEL AND ARE
BEGINNING TO IMPLEMENT THEM THROUGH CONVERSATION WITH
ARENS THIS EVENING USING THE FOLLOWING TALKING POINTS:

BEGIN TEXT:

-- WE HAVE JUST RECEIVED WORD -- COMING ON INSTRUCTIONS
FROM THE PRESIDENT AND PRIME MINISTER OF LEBANON -- THAT
A POSSIBILITY HAS OPENED UP FOR A SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM

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OF THE PLO IN WEST BEIRUT.

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-- THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT HAS ASKED FOR A 48-HOUR PERIOD IN WHICH TO START THIS PROCESS AND DURING WHICH THERE WILL BE AN ISRAELI GOVERNMENT GUARANTEE THAT NO MILITARY ACTION WILL BE TAKEN AGAINST WEST BEIRUT. THE 48-HOUR PERIOD SHOULD BEGIN AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE BASED ON AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE IDF AND THE LAF BUT, IN ANY CASE, NOT LATER

THAN 1200 LEBANON TIME JUNE 18.

-- THE AIM WOULD BE TO GET THE PLO TO LAY DOWN ITS ARMS AND TO GIVE UP THE IDEA OF CONDUCTING A MILITARY STRUGGLE IN THE FUTURE.

-- WHAT THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT NEEDS IS AN IRON-CLAD GUARANTEE FROM ISRAEL CONVEYED BY THE U.S. AND BACKED BY THE U.S. THAT YOU WILL NOT LAUNCH A MILITARY ASSAULT AGAINST WEST BEIRUT DURING THAT 48-HOUR PERIOD.

-- BASED ON WHAT YOU HAVE TOLD ME ABOUT ISRAEL'S POSITION ON THIS SITUATION, I WOULD HOPE, WITH THE PRIME MINISTER'S OKAY, TO GIVE THE LEBANESE THAT ASSURANCE, AND SAY THAT THE U.S. AS WELL AS ISRAEL STANDS BEHIND IT. THE DETAILS OF HOW THE FORCES ACT CAN BE WORKED OUT ON THE SPOT BETWEEN THE IDF AND LAF. AS YOU KNOW THEY ARE IN DIRECT CONTACT.

-- IF, DURING THIS 48-HOUR PERIOD, THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT COMES TO AN UNDERSTANDING ALONG THESE LINES THAT IS ACCEPTABLE, THEY WILL THEN WANT FROM ISRAEL AND THE U.S. THE FURTHER GUARANTEE THAT THE IDF WILL NOT INTERFERE WITH OR ATTACK THE LEBANESE ARMY AS IT MOVES INTO WEST BEIRUT AND NEGOTIATES A RESOLUTION OF THE PALESTINIAN

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PRESENCE THERE.

-- IF THE LEBANESE DO NOT ACHIEVE A NEGOTIATED SOLUTION IN THE 48 HOURS, WE WOULD THEN SIMPLY REVERT TO THE SITUATION WE ARE IN NOW -- A CEASE-FIRE -- AND WOULD HAVE TO DISCUSS THE SITUATION AT THAT POINT.

-- I ALSO WANT YOU TO KNOW THAT ISRAEL'S UNDERTAKING DURING THESE 48 HOURS WOULD NOT, OF COURSE, MEAN THAT YOU WOULD NOT HAVE THE RIGHT OF SELF-DEFENSE. BUT SHOULD ANY HOSTILE ACT TOWARD THE IDF TAKE PLACE, THEN I HOPE YOU WOULD ORDER YOUR FORCES TO ACT WITH THE UTMOST RESTRAINT.

-- IN ADDITION, IT HAS TO BE AGREED THAT THE CHRISTIAN

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FORCES WOULD ALSO BE BOUND BY THE GUARANTEE DURING THIS PERIOD. THEY ALSO WOULD NOT ASSAULT THE PLO IN WEST BEIRUT.

END TEXT.

3. AS REGARDS QUESTION OF WHAT U.S. WANTS FROM PLO, YOU ARE AUTHORIZED TO RESPOND IN MANNER YOU SUGGESTED PARA 6 REFTEL. HAIG

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NEA:CHILL
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AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE
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EXDIS FOR HABIB

E.O. 12065: RDS-1, 3 6/16/02 (VELIOTES, N.)
TAGS: MILI, MOPS, PEPR, PGOV, PINT, LE, IS, US, PLO
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PAGE 02 STATE 166587

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END TEXT.

3. AS REGARDS QUESTION OF WHAT U.S. WANTS FROM PLO, YOU ARE AUTHORIZED TO RESPOND IN MANNER YOU SUGGESTED PARA 6 REFTEL. HAIG

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INFO AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE IM/IPS/CR/IR Date: 11/3/97
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BEIRUT 4240

EXDIS

FROM HABIB

E.O. 12065: RDS-1,3 6/16/02 (HABIB, PHILIP)

TAGS: MOPS, PEPR, LE, IS, US, SY

SUBJ: HABIB MISSION: SYRIAN DEMARCHE ON CEASE-FIRE DISENGAGEMENT

REF: DAMASCUS 4269

1. ENTIRE TEXT)

2. I DO NOT HAVE WITH ME IN BEIRUT ALL THE RELEVANT REPORTS CONCERNING OUR NUMEROUS CEASE-FIRE EFFORTS AND THEIR OUTCOME, BUT I RECALL THE DETAILS VIVIDLY: --WHEN I WAS IN DAMASCUS, I CERTAINLY DISCUSSED THE DESIRABILITY OF A DISENGAGEMENT OF FORCES IN ORDER TO SOLIDIFY THE CEASE-FIRE AND FULLY EXPECTED THAT THIS WOULD BE A PRIORITY OF BUSINESS ON MY RETURN TO ISRAEL. --IN MY INITIAL MEETINGS WITH BEGIN AND SHARON AND THEREAFTER, I PROPOSED THAT DISENGAGEMENT WOULD BE A DESIRABLE STEP TO CONSIDER. SHARON INSISTED THAT THIS WAS NOT NECESSARY BECAUSE THE ISRAELI AND SYRIAN FORCES OPPOSING ONE ANOTHER WERE LARGELY ARMORED; THEY WERE NOT INFANTRY IN TRENCHES. THERE WAS, THEREFORE, A RESPECTABLE DISTANCE ALREADY SEPARATING THE FORCES.

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IN ADDITION, ISRAEL HAD ALREADY TAKEN THE COMMANDING TOPOGRAPHY.

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--ON OR ABOUT JUNE 13, I RAISED WITH BEGIN THE BREAKDOWN OF THE CEASE-FIRE IN THE BEIRUT AREA, AT WHICH POINT BEGIN PRODUCED HIS INCREDIBLE DEFINITION OF THE CEASE-FIRE: IT WAS NOT REPEAT NOT A CEASE-FIRE "IN PLACE" SINCE, AMONG OTHER REASONS, THE PRESIDENT'S APPEAL TO BEGIN HAD NOT CONTAINED THE PHRASE "IN PLACE". UNDER THIS MIND-BOGGLING DEFINITION-FOREIGN TO ANY RATIONAL DEFINITION OF A CEASE-FIRE-ISRAEL COULD WITH IMPUNITY MOVE FORWARD INTO THE TERRITORIES HELD BY ITS ADVERSARIES AND, AS LONG AS ISRAEL DID NOT FIRE FIRST, THERE WOULD BE NO VIOLATION OF THE ISRAEL'S 'UNILATERALLY DECLARED' CEASE-FIRE.

--I, OF COURSE, MADE IT THOROUGHLY CLEAR THAT THE PRESIDENT HAD APPEALED FOR A CEASE-FIRE IN PLACE AND THAT IT HAD BEEN THE BASIS FOR MY DISCUSSIONS IN DAMASCUS. SAM LEWIS SUPPORTED MY POSITION AND REMINDED BEGIN THAT IN DISCUSSING THE PRESIDENT'S REQUEST HE HAD MADE IT CLEAR THAT THE CEASE-FIRE WAS IN PLACE. BEGIN IN ESSENCE ARGUED THAT THIS MIGHT HAVE BEEN TRUE IF ISRAEL'S UNILATERAL UNDERTAKING HAD BEEN NEGOTIATED INTO A FORMAL CEASE-FIRE AGREEMENT, BUT AS IT WAS, THERE WAS SIMPLY A UNILATERAL UNDERTAKING.

--THERE WAS A FURTHER ISRAELI WRINKLE TO THEIR CASE. WHILE ISRAEL COULD ACCEPT A SIMILAR UNILATERAL UNDERTAKING WITH THE SYRIANS AS REGARDED A CEASE-FIRE ON THE GROUNDS THAT SYRIA WAS A GOVERNMENT ACCUSTOMED TO MAKING AGREEMENTS, THIS DID NOT HOLD TRUE FOR THE PLO. AS THE HISTORY OF THE 1981 CEASE-FIRE HAS MADE CLEAR, ISRAEL CANNOT ACCEPT THE PLO AS A CO-EQUAL PARTY IN ANY SENSE, WHATEVER UNILATERAL UNDERTAKING IT MAY HAVE MADE SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH THE ISRAELIS.

--ACCORDINGLY, UNDER THIS DEFINITION, THE ISRAELIS HAVE MOVED FORWARD CONSISTENTLY-BEYOND KHALDAH ON TO KEY SPOTS BETWEEN BEIRUT AND ALAYH, AND NORTH ON THE BEIRUT-DAMASCUS HIGHWAY INTO THE CHRISTIAN HEARTLAND WHOSE HILLS AND MOUNTAINS COMMAND ALL OF BEIRUT.

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--THE ISRAELIS HAVE FURTHER RATIONALIZED THEIR MOVE FORWARD BY ALLOWING THAT THEY HAVE A RIGHT TO MOVE TO PROTECT THEIR MEN FROM ATTACK. IN SHORT, WHEN FIRED UPON, THEY HAVE A RIGHT NOT ONLY SEIZE THE AREA FROM WHICH THE FIRING TOOK PLACE, THEY ALSO HAVE A RIGHT TO SEIZE TERRAIN THAT COULD NEUTRALIZE THAT FIRING.

3. WHATEVER THE RIGHTS OR WRONGS IN THE ISRAELI POSITION, THEIR ACTIONS HAVE PRODUCED A NEW REALITY. I RECOMMEND ONLY THAT AMBASSADOR PAGANELLI BE INSTRUCTED TO SAY THAT THE ISRAELIS REFUSED TO ACCEPT THE CONCEPT OF DISENGAGEMENT-DESPITE OUR EFFORTS-

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[REDACTED]

AND HAVE MADE THEIR OWN UNILATERAL DEFINITION OF A CEASE-FIRE. NEVERTHELESS, WE BELIEVE WE SHOULD CONTINUE TO URGE ON ALL SIDES THE NEED TO STOP FIRING, WITH DISENGAGEMENT AND FURTHER WITHDRAWAL TO BE NEGOTIATED LATER.

4. IF THE SYRIANS ARE TROUBLED BY THESE DEVELOPMENTS, I CAN ONLY ADD THAT HERE IN THE FIELD, I HAVE ENCOUNTERED SIMILAR PROBLEMS. TODAY I READ A TRANSCRIPT OF A STATEMENT BY OUR PRESS SPOKESMAN IN WHICH HE AVOIDED ANSWERING A DIRECT PRESS QUERY ON WHETHER THE CEASE-FIRE WAS IN PLACE OR ALLOWED FOR FORWARD MOVEMENT OF TROOPS. THE QUESTION WAS OBVIOUSLY STIMULATED BY ISRAELIS HAVING SET FORTH THEIR DEFINITION PUBLICLY.

5. DAMASCUS MINIMIZE CONSIDERED.
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INFO DAMASCUS JERUSALEM BEING REPEATED TO YOU FOR YOUR INFO:

QUOTE: BEIRUT 4214

DECAPTIONED

FROM HABIB

E.O. 12065C RDS-1,3 6/15/92 (HABIB, PHILIP)
TAGS: MOPS, PEPR, LE, IS, XF
SUBJ: HABIB MISSION: PUSHING FOR POLITICAL SOLUTIONS

1. ~~ENTIRE TEXT~~
2. FOLLOWING INTENSIVE TALKS THIS EVENING WITH SARKIS, WAZZAN, BASHIR GEMAYEL AND ABDU, I HAVE DECIDED TO REMAIN

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IN BEIRUT FOR AT LEAST THROUGH WEDNESDAY TO SEE WHETHER I CAN HELP PUT TOGETHER A "POLITICAL PROCESS" PRODUCING EITHER AN EFFECTIVE NATIONAL SALVATION COMMITTEE OR, BETTER YET, A NATIONAL UNITY CABINET. CONSTRAINED BY COMMUNICATION PROBLEMS, FOLLOWING IS BARE-BONES OF PRESENT SITUATION:

A. SARKIS HAS RUN INTO A PROBLEM IN FORMING THE NATIONAL SALVATION COMMITTEE WHICH HE ANNOUNCED YESTERDAY. JUMBLATT, WHO SITS IN HIS CASTLE IN MUKHTARA, REFUSES TO JOIN. BASHIR IS INSISTING THAT SARKIS GO AHEAD WITHOUT JUMBLATT AND ALSO FORM A NATIONAL UNITY CABINET IN PLACE OF THE PRESENT CABINET. OTHER LEBANESE POLITICAL LEADERS, INCLUDING WAZZA, ARE UNCERTAIN OF WHICH WAY TO GO AND ARE UNABLE TO BRING THEMSELVES TO SETTLE THEIR DIFFERENCES.

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B. BASHIR, WITH ISRAELI MILITARY PRESSURE AS AN AID, HAS BEEN PUSHING FOR A NEW LEBANESE GOVERNMENT WHICH COULD NEGOTIATE A SURRENDER OF PLO LEADERSHIP AND END REMAINING PLO MILITARY POWER THROUGH A COMBINATION OF NEGOTIATION AND FORCE APPLIED BY A BASHIR-DOMINATED GOVERNMENT. THIS WOULD SAVE ISRAEL THE ONUS OF A MAJOR MILITARY OPERATION IN WEST BEIRUT AND PERHAPS PAVE WAY FOR ELECTION OF BASHIR OR CHAMOUN AS PRESIDENT. THE NEW GOVERNMENT WOULD BE IN A POSITION TO DEAL WITH ISRAELIS WHILE THE IDF WOULD STAY WHERE IT IS AROUND BEIRUT AS A FORM OF BACKUP PRESSURE TO NEW GOVERNMENT'S EFFORTS WITH PLO AND LEBANESE RECALCITRANTS.

C. IN MEANTIME IDF IS NOW SOFTENING UP AIRPORT AREA AND MAY TRY TO SEIZE IT, THUS APPLYING PRESSURE TO THREAT TO MOVE ON INTO WEST BEIRUT. THIS MAY

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STIMULATE LEBANESE POLITICIANS, PARTICULARLY MUSLIMS- TO END PROCRASTINATION AND TRY TO FORM NEW GOVERNMENT. THEY DO NOT WORRY ABOUT PALESTINIANS BUT THERE IS CONCERN FOR LEBANESE MUSLIMS LIVING IN PROXIMITY TO PALESTINIANS IN WEST BEIRUT.

D. SARKIS IS READY TO MOVE TOWARDS NATIONAL UNITY CABINET BUT WILL NOT FORM A SO-CALLED CHRISTIAN CABINET OR A MILITARY CABINET SINCE THIS WOULD SPLIT AWAY THE MUSLIMS FOR GOOD, WHICH HE IS DETERMINED TO AVOID. HE INSISTS ON WAZZAN'S PARTICIPATION AND AT LEAST THE ACQUIESCENCE OF KEY MUSLIM LEADERS SUCH AS SA'B SALAM, WHOM I AM SEEING EARLIER IN THE MORNING TO GAIN HIS COOPERATION.

E. TONIGHT I PERSUADED SARKIS TO CONVENE A MEETING OF THE NATIONAL SALVATION COMMITTEE ON WEDNESDAY MORNING WITH THE OBJECTIVE OF AT LEAST SETTING THE STAGE FOR A NATIONAL UNITY CABINET WITHIN 24 HOURS. I SPOKE TO WAZZAN BY TELEPHONE FROM THE PRESIDENT'S OFFICE AND APPLIED STRONG PRESSURE TO COOPERATE. IN FACT, I HAVE BEEN APPLYING STRONG PRESSURE TO ALL LEBANESE ALL DAY, SAYING THAT THEY HAVE TO GET THEIR ACT TOGETHER AND COME UP WITH A CONSENSUS. FOR OUR PART, I ARGUED, I WOULD GIVE STRONG SUPPORT TO ANY LEGITIMATELY ORGANIZED GOVERNMENT UNDER SARKIS. BASHIR TELLS ME HE WANTS INTERIOR PORTFOLIO IN SUCH A CABINET SO AS TO BEGIN TO ESTABLISH ORDER AND NEGOTIATE PALESTINIANS OUT OF BEIRUT.

FROM HABIB

F. WAZZAN WAS RELUCTANT TO COME TO THE PRESIDENTIAL PALACE BECAUSE OF CONTINUED IDF PRESENCE IN THAT NEIGHBORHOOD. ABDU HAS ESTABLISHED A THREE-OFFICER LIAISON GROUP FOR DEALINGS WITH THE ISRAELIS. AS A RESULT, LEBANESE ARMY WILL TAKE OVER CHECKPOINTS IN THAT VICINITY AND ELSEWHERE FROM PHALANGE MILITARY

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POLICEMEN, AND THEREBY EASE POLITICAL PROBLEMS FOR POLITICIANS GOING TO PRESIDENTIAL PALACE, AMONG OTHER THINGS:

G. CONSISTENT WITH MY EARLIER FLASH RECOMMENDATIONS TODAY, IT REMAINS CRITICALLY IMPORTANT THAT THE IDF REDUCE ITS VISIBILITY IN THE BEIRUT AREA AND WITHDRAW FROM AROUND PALACE IN B'ABDA, WHICH IS BOTH A FORM OF INTIMIDATION AND "NATIONAL HUMILIATION". MOREOVER, SHARON'S REPORTED COMMENTS (WHICH I HAVE NOT YET SEEN) ABOUT THE NEED FOR A STRONG LEBANESE GOVERNMENT ARE RAISING SPECTER OF ISREALI DOMINATED GOVERNMENT-- MAKING THE MUSLIMS ANGRY AND THEREFORE RELUCTANT TO COOPERATE.

H. IF A NATIONAL UNITY CABINET IS FORMED, SARKIS AND ABDU SAID IT WOULD BE IMPORTANT THAT THE US, FRANCE AND OTHER FRIENDS OF LEBANON SPEAK OUT STRONGLY AND PUBLICLY TO ENDORSE THIS DEVELOPMENT. THE ISRAELIS SHOULD BE URGED TO REMAIN SILENT AND AVOID THE CURSE THAT OTHERWISE MIGHT FLOW FROM A SEEMING ISRAELI ENDORSEMENT.

I. LATE DEVELOPMENT. I HAD PROMOTED A MIDNIGHT MEETING BETWEEN SARKIS AND BASHIR. THIS HAS NOT OCCURRED, WITH RESULT THAT CONVENING OF THE SALVATION COMMITTEE MEETING TOMORROW (SEE ABOVE) MAY BE DELAYED WHILE BASHIR PRESENTS SOME NEW IDEAS TO SARKIS. I WILL CONTINUE TRYING TO INCREASE THE PACE OF LEBANESE POLITICAL DECISIONS.

3. TEL AVIV AND JERUSALEM. FOR AMBASSADOR LEWIS OR DCM BORWN: TEL KIMCHE-WHO GENUINELY UNDERSTANDS THE LEBANESE SCENE-THAT I HAVE BEEN PUSHING HARD

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FOR A POLITICAL CONSENSUS AND THAT I BELIEVE IT MAY BE MOVING IN THE DIRECTION OF WHAT BASHIR NEEDS. PLEASE DO NOT GO FURTHER INTO WHAT I HAVE SAID ABOVE, BUT MAKE CLEAR HOW IMPORTANT IT IS THAT THE ISREALIS TAKE INTO ACCOUNT LEBANESE SENSITIVITIES AND REMOVE THE EMBARRASSMENT OF THE IDF PRESENCE CLOSE TO THE PRESIDENTIAL PALACE. (BEIRUT NEWSPAPERS FEATURED PHOTOGRAPHS OF ISRAELI TANKS IN A FIELD WITH THE PALACE ON THE HILL JUST ABOVE.) I AM ALSO HOPEFUL THAT THE REPRESENTATIONS ALREADY MADE WILL GET ISRAELIS TO HOLD OFF ACTION AGAINST WEST BEIRUT.

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BEIRUT FOR HABIB

E.O. 12065: RDS-1,3 6/16/02 (PAGANELLI, ROBERT P.) OR-M

TAGS: PEPR, MILI, MOPS, IS, LE, SY, US

SUBJECT: SYRIAN DEMARCHE ON DISENGAGEMENT OF FORCES IN
LEBANON

1. [REDACTED]

2. SUMMARY: I WAS URGENTLY SUMMONED JUNE (*)

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WHAT QADDOUR HAD DESCRIBED AS A U.S. "COMMITMENT." HABIB HAD SPOKEN IN GENERAL TERMS OF U.S. SUPPORT FOR SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS 508 AND 509. HE HAD TOLD ASSAD THAT ISRAEL HAD REFUSED TO ACCEPT A CEASEFIRE ACCOMPANIED BY SIMULTANEOUS WITHDRAWAL AND HAD INSTEAD PROPOSED A CEASE-FIRE.

FOLLOWED BY NEGOTIATIONS ON ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL. ASSAD HAD UNDERSTOOD THAT POSITION ALTHOUGH HE HAD NOT NECESSARILY ACCEPTED IT. OUR UNDERSTANDING WAS THAT ONCE THE CEASEFIRE HAD COME INTO EFFECT, ISRAEL AND THE GOL WOULD NEGOTIATE THE MODALITIES OF WITHDRAWAL.

6. QADDOUR RETURNED TO THE CONCEPT OF A DISENGAGEMENT OF FORCES AND REPEATED HIS ASSERTION THAT HABIB HAD TOLD ASSAD THAT ONCE THE CEASEFIRE WAS ESTABLISHED, HE WOULD WORK FOR ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL ALTHOUGH NOT NECESSARILY TO THE 40 KM

NOTE BY OC/T: (*)OMISSION IN TEXT. CORRECTION TO FOLLOW.

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ZONE, BUT CONCENTRATING ON A SEPARATION OF FORCES. HE SAID THAT HABIB MUST ASK ISRAEL TO MOVE ITS FORCES BACK AND REFERRED SPECIFICALLY TO THE ENCIRCLEMENT OF BEIRUT. QADDOUR CALLED FOR THE RECORD OF HIS JUNE 14 CONVERSATION WITH HABIB AND READ THE FOLLOWING VERBATIM REMARKS MADE BY HABIB: "IT IS DIFFICULT TO MAKE PEOPLE ADHERE TO THE CEASEFIRE IF THERE IS NO BUFFER ZONE. BETWEEN YOU (I.E. SYRIA) AND ISRAEL THERE IS MUTUAL RESPECT BECAUSE ISRAEL KNOWS THAT YOU KEEP YOUR WORD. IT IS A MORE DIFFICULT SITUATION BETWEEN ISRAEL AND THE PLO."

7. I ASKED QADDOUR IF HIS DEMARCHE WAS RELATED TO THE EVENTS OF JUNE 15 IN WHICH KHADDAM HAD TOLD ME THAT ISRAEL HAD PRESENTED AN ULTIMATUM THAT SYRIAN FORCES SHOULD WITHDRAW FROM BAABDA AND ALAYH. I NOTED THAT WE HAD WORKED HARD TO PUT THIS MATTER TO REST AND HAD INFORMED THE FOREIGN MINISTRY AT 4 A.M. THIS MORNING THAT THE USG WAS FLATLY OPPOSED TO A ULTIMATUM OF THIS NATURE AND THAT THE ISRAELIS HAD TOLD US THAT THE REPORTED DEMAND ON WITHDRAWAL OF SYRIAN FORCES DID NOT HAVE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT APPROVAL. I NOTED THAT POSSIBLY THE PHALANGE HAD MADE THIS DEMAND WITHOUT CHECKING WITH THE ISRAELIS.

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8. QADDOUR SAID THAT HIS DEMARCHE WAS NOT RELATED TO THIS ULTIMATUM AND STATED THAT IT WAS BASED ON A MORE

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GENERAL CONCERN ABOUT THE SITUATION IN LEBANON, ESPECIALLY IN THE VICINITY OF BEIRUT. HE SAID THAT WITHDRAWAL, OR DISENGAGEMENT, SHOULD NOT BE CONFINED JUST TO SYRIAN AND ISRAELI FORCES OR JUST TO BEIRUT BUT IT SHOULD INVOLVE ALL COMBATANTS, INCLUDING THE PLO EVERYWHERE IN LEBANON. I TOLD QADDOUR THAT I WOULD REPORT THIS IMMEDIATELY TO HABIB AND THE DEPARTMENT AND ASK FOR GUIDANCE.

9. COMMENT: AFTER RETURNING TO THE EMBASSY I REVIEWED THE RECORD OF PHIL HABIB'S THREE CONVERSATIONS WITH ASSAD, PARTICULARLY THE LAST ONE WHICH OCCURRED ON JUNE 10 (DAMASCUS 4091). THERE IS SOME JUSTIFICATION FOR THE SYRIANS BELIEVING THAT WE HAVE COMMITTED OURSELVES TO WORK FOR A DISENGAGEMENT OF FORCES SINCE THERE WERE NUMEROUS SUGGESTIONS ALONG THIS LINE IN THAT MEETING. HABIB'S REMARKS TO QADDOUR ON JUNE 14 HAVE REINFORCED THIS IMPRESSION. (I HAVE NO RECOLLECTION OR RECORD OF THESE REMARKS AND I TOLD QADDOUR SO.) THE PROBLEM IS THAT THE JUNE 10 DISCUSSION WITH ASSAD OCCURRED BEFORE THE ISRAELI ANNOUNCEMENT OF THEIR UNILATERAL-CEASEFIRE WHICH CAME INTO EFFECT AT 12 NOON LOCAL JUNE 11, WHICH SYRIA ACCEPTED.

10. SYRIAN MOTIVATION IN MAKING THIS DEMARCHE IS QUITE CLEAR. THEY SEE A SEPARATION OF FORCES AS AN EFFECTIVE MEANS OF KEEPING THE CEASEFIRE AND ALSO PREVENTING ISRAEL FROM MAKING ENCROACHMENTS AND SEIZING ADDITIONAL TERRITORY. QADDOUR DISASSOCIATED YESTERDAY'S PROBLEM CONCERNING THE REPORTED ULTIMATUM WITH THIS LARGER CONCERN. QADDOUR ALSO SPECIFICALLY EMPHASIZED A MINIMAL DISENGAGEMENT AS OPPOSED TO ISRAELI PULLBACK TO A 40 KM ZONE, SPECIFYING THAT THE LARGER PULLBACK WAS THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE GOL - ASSAD

[REDACTED]

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MADE THIS SAME POINT TO HABIB.

11. THE QUESTION IS WHETHER THE ISRAELI ANNOUNCEMENT OF A UNILATERAL CEASEFIRE, WHICH HABIB UNDERSTOOD TO BE A CEASEFIRE IN PLACE, HAS OVERTAKEN HABIB'S EARLIER REMARKS ON THE NECESSITY FOR DISENGAGEMENT. IF THIS IS THE CASE, WE SHOULD SO INFORM THE SYRIANS. REQUEST URGENT GUIDANCE FROM DEPT/HABIB FOR RESPONSE TO QADDOUR'S DEMARCHE. END COMMENT. PAGANELLI

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RIYADH FOR DAS TWINAM; PASS AMBASSADOR HABIB

E.O. 12065: N/A

TAGS: SOPN, XF

SUBJECT: NEA EXCERPTS OF WHITE HOUSE PRESS BRIEFING 6/15

1. THE FOLLOWING ARE THE NEA-RELATED EXCERPTS OF TWO
PRESS BRIEFINGS GIVEN BY PRESIDENTIAL PRESS SPOKESMAN
SPEAKES JUNE 15, 1982..

2. 0915 EDT BRIEFING:

Q. ON LEBANON, DOES THE ADMINISTRATION HOPE THAT THE
ISRAELIS WILL ... AGAINST THE PLO, OR WHAT WOULD WE LIKE

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TO HAVE HAPPEN THERE?

A. CEASE-FIRE AND EVENTUAL WITHDRAWAL AND THE TERRITORIAL
INTEGRITY OF THE LEBANESE -- A LEBANON PROTECTED AND A
STRONG CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INSTITUTED THERE.

Q: WHAT DO YOU MEAN, "EVENTUAL WITHDRAWAL"?

A. WELL, WE WOULD HOPE THAT ALL OUTSIDE FORCES IN LEBANON

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WOULD WITHDRAW AND LEAVE IT TO THE LEBANESE PEOPLE.

Q. WOULD THAT INCLUDE THE PLO?

A: IT WOULD INCLUDE ALL OUTSIDE FORCES.

Q: THAT IS A CHANGE THOUGH, IS IT NOT, WHEN YOU SAID "EVENTUAL"?

A. YES, IT IS.

Q. BEFORE, THE RESOLUTION -- WAS IT NOT -- WAS FOR AN IMMEDIATE CEASE-FIRE, AN IMMEDIATE WITHDRAWAL?

A. SECRETARY HAIG INDICATED YESTERDAY THAT CERTAINLY WE WOULD APPROACH THIS THING FROM A PRACTICAL STANDPOINT, AND IT IS TOO EARLY TO BE DISCUSSING SPECIFICS. BUT THERE IS A PERIOD OF STABILIZATION REQUIRED.

Q. HAIG SAID THAT?

A. BASICALLY THAT.

Q. IS HE SAYING THAT THE ISRAELIS SHOULD REPLACE THE U.N.

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FORCE?

A. NO, NO.

Q. BUT YOU ACKNOWLEDGE THAT THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT HAS NOW CHANGED ITS POSITION FROM IMMEDIATE WITHDRAWAL TO EVENTUAL WITHDRAWAL?

A. NO, I DO NOT ACKNOWLEDGE THAT. WE STILL SUPPORT THE U.N. RESOLUTION, BUT WE LOOK AT IT FOR A PERIOD OF STABILIZATION THERE. AND IT IS JUST TOO EARLY TO ADDRESS SPECIFICS WHEN WE ARE STILL IN A SITUATION WHERE WE DO HAVE, FROM TIME TIME, REPORTS OF FIGHTING THERE.

Q. BUT BY "PERIOD OF STABILIZATION" YOU MEAN THE ISRAELI TROOPS IN OCCUPATION?

A. NO, I WOULD NOT LOOK AT IT IN THAT TIME FRAME, NO.

Q. WHAT DO YOU MEAN BY "PERIOD OF STABILIZATION", THEN?

A. WELL, THE WORD "IMMEDIATE", WHAT DO YOU MEAN BY THAT? DO YOU MEAN, GET OUT BEFORE NIGHTFALL? CERTAINLY, WE WOULD LIKE A WITHDRAWAL OF ALL OUTSIDE FORCES AND AT THE EARLIEST PRACTICAL TIME.

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3. 1142 EDT BRIEFING:

Q. WILL PRESIDENT REAGAN ASK CONGRESS FOR PERMISSION BEFORE HE COMMITS ANY TROOPS TO AN OCCUPATION ARMY IN LEBANON?

A. HE'LL FOLLOW THE LETTER OF THE LAW.

Q. WELL, THE LETTER OF THE LAW IS NOT VERY STRICT ON THAT. THE LETTER OF THE LAW PERMITS HIM TO SEND TROOPS IN

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THERE FOR 60 DAYS ON HIS OWN IF HE WANTS TO, AND IT'S A QUESTION OF WHETHER HE HIMSELF WILL ASK CONGRESS BEFORE HE SENDS THEM FOR 60 DAYS.

A. I'M SURE THERE WILL BE ADEQUATE DETAILED CONSULTATION WITH THE APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS ON ANY STEPS WE TAKE TOWARD A PERMANENT SOLUTION OF PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

Q. IN THE PAST, SOME OF THESE ADEQUATE CONFERENCES WITH CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES HAVE COME AFTER THE FACT. WILL HE CONFER WITH CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES BEFORE HE SENDS THE TROOPS THIS TIME?

A. WE WILL CONFER WITH CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES CONSTANTLY.

Q. IS THAT OPTION UNDER ACTIVE CONSIDERATION?

A. WHICH OPTION?

Q. U.S. PARTICIPATION IN A PEACE-KEEPING FORCE.

A. WE DON'T NORMALLY DISCUSS OPTIONS, BUT IT IS REALLY TOO EARLY TO GET INTO ANY DETAILS OF DISCUSSION ABOUT THE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST FOLLOWING THE LEBANESE FIGHTING.

Q. IS HABIB TALKING ABOUT A PEACE-KEEPING FORCE?

A. I DON'T KNOW THAT HE IS TALKING SPECIFICALLY ABOUT IT. I THINK HE IS EXPLORING A NUMBER OF OPTIONS AND SEEING WHAT THE THINKING IS ON THE ISRAELI SIDE AND THE

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LEBANESE SIDE.

Q. BUT IF HE IS EXPLORING THEM, THERE MUST BE A POSITION THAT THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT IS TAKING.

A. NO, NO, I THINK HE IS LISTENING TO SEE WHAT THE DESIRES OF THE ISRAELIS ARE, WHAT THE DESIRES OF THE LEBANESE -- WHAT ALL PARTIES ARE THAT HE IS VISITING WITH IN THE MIDDLE EAST (SIC).

Q. BUT THE ISRAELIS ARE KNOWN TO FAVOR THAT.

A. WELL...

Q. IS THE PRESIDENT GOING TO MEET WITH MR. BEGIN ON THURSDAY IN NEW YORK?

A. THERE IS NO SCHEDULED MEETING WITH BEGIN IN NEW YORK ON THURSDAY.

Q. IS THERE A POSSIBILITY? YOU COULDN'T RULE IT OUT AT THIS POINT?

A. I DON'T LOOK FOR IT. I DON'T LOOK FOR IT.

Q. THE LUNCH IS STILL ON NEXT MONDAY, ISN'T IT?

A. AS FAR AS I KNOW, IT IS. WE ARE HOPEFUL THAT THE LUNCH WILL CONTINUE AS HAS BEEN SCHEDULED.

Q. WHAT IS IN DOUBT?

Q. IS THERE ANY REASON WHY IT WOULDN'T?

A. HOPEFULLY, IT WILL. IT HAS BEEN TENTATIVELY SCHEDULED FOR A TIME, AND WE ARE HOPEFUL THAT IT WILL TAKE PLACE.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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Q. WILL THE ADMINISTRATION FORMALLY RECOMMEND THE 75 F-16S, GIVE FORMAL NOTIFICATION THIS WEEK TO GO THROUGH, OR GO ALONG WITH MR. PERCY, WHO THINKS THIS ISN'T THE TIME FOR THAT?

A. THE PRESIDENT WILL MAKE THE DECISION ON THE TIMING OF NOTIFICATION.

Q. THIS WEEK?

A. HE WILL MAKE IT WHEN HE IS READY TO MAKE IT.

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Q. BUT HE HAS NOT MADE IT AS OF YET?

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A. HE HAS NOT MADE IT, NO.

Q. BUT IS HE INVESTIGATING THE WHOLE SITUATION TO SEE WHETHER THEY HAVE VIOLATED THE LAW -- THE ISRAELIS?

A. NO, I WOULDN'T PUT IT IN THOSE TERMS.

Q. WHAT DOES HE SAY, "I WANT TO GO THROUGH WITH THE SALE"?

A. I HAVE HEARD NO PLANS TO CHANGE IN THAT INSTANCE.

Q. DO YOU MEAN THAT THE USE OF THE AMERICAN-MADE PLANES IN THE INVASION OF LEBANON IS NOT A VIOLATION OF AMERICAN LAW?

A. WELL, AS IS CUSTOMARY, WE DO REVIEW ALL MATTERS IN A SITUATION LIKE THIS.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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Q. WELL, HAVE YOU DECIDED IT IS NOT?

A. THE PRESIDENT WILL MAKE A DECISION ON THE 75 F-16S THAT WE DID THE INFORMAL NOTIFICATION ON. HE WILL MAKE THE DECISION ON THE TIMING OF GOING FORWARD WITH THE NOTIFICATION.

Q. WELL, THEN HE HAS DECIDED THAT IT IS LEGAL.

A. WELL, LOOKED CLOSELY. YES.

Q. I THOUGHT MEESE HAD SAID THAT THE DECISION THAT THEY HAD ACTED IN A DEFENSIVE FASHION HAD ALREADY BEEN MADE -- IN EUROPE.

A. I DON'T RECALL THAT. I DON'T KNOW.

Q. WELL, IS THAT UNDER CONSIDERATION -- TO DETERMINE WHETHER OR NOT ISRAEL VIOLATED THE ARMS CONTROL ACT?

A. AS I HAVE ALWAYS INDICATED FROM THE DAY THIS BEGAN, ALL MATTERS OF THIS TYPE ARE UNDER REVIEW.

Q. SO THE REVIEW HAS NOT BEEN COMPLETED?

A. I AM NOT INDICATING THAT.

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Q. HAS IT BEEN COMPLETED?

A. NO, I AM NOT INDICATING A REVIEW OF THE USE OF EQUIPMENT. I AM INDICATING THAT ALL MATTERS IN THIS AREA, AS CUSTOMARY, ARE REVIEWED.

Q. BUT I AM SPECIFICALLY ASKING ABOUT A REVIEW OF THE USE OF AMERICAN-MADE EQUIPMENT BY THE ISRAELIS IN THE INVASION OF LEBANON.

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A. AND MY ANSWER IS THAT ALL MATTERS ARE UNDER REVIEW.

Q. HOW LONG CAN THAT TAKE? THIS HAS BEEN GOING ON FOR DAYS.

A. AS LONG AS IT TAKES.

Q. DO YOU HAVE ANYTHING MORE ON THE PRESIDENT'S RESPONSE TO THE SOVIET STATEMENT? HOW SERIOUS DOES HE CONSIDER THAT TO BE?

A. THE PRESIDENT'S RESPONSE TO THE SOVIET...?

Q. TO THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT'S STATEMENT THAT WAS PUBLISHED YESTERDAY.

A. NONE.

Q HE HAS NO RESPONSE?

Q. HAVE YOU HEARD ANYTHING TO INDICATE THAT HAIG MIGHT MEET WITH BEGIN THIS WEEK?

A. I HAVE NOT HEARD ANYTHING, BUT I WILL CHECK WITH HIS PEOPLE TO BE SURE.

Q. A WOMAN FROM SAN ANTONIO JUST TOLD ME THAT THE STATE DEPARTMENT WAS 100 PER CENT BEHIND ISRAEL IN THIS FIGHT WITH LEBANON. THAT IS NOT TRUE, IS IT?

A. I DON'T KNOW WHETHER TO DOUBT A WOMAN FROM SAN ANTONIO OR NOT. (LAUGHTER).

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Q. THIS IS A SERIOUS QUESTION. I HEARD HER ON THE AIR.

SHE TALKED TO ME ON THE TELEPHONE. LISTEN, IS THE WHITE HOUSE 100 PER CENT BEHIND ISRAEL IN THIS THING?

A. THAT IS A RATHER SIMPLISTIC QUESTION THERE.
Q. IT CERTAINLY IS.

A. IT IS A LITTLE DIFFICULT TO ANSWER IN SIMPLISTIC TERMS. WE ARE FOR PEACE -- HOW ABOUT THAT?

4. MINIMIZE CONSIDERED FOR BEIRUT AND DAMASCUS. HAIG

[REDACTED]

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*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a
*** Current Classification *** [REDACTED]

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CHANNEL: n/a

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E.O. 12065: N/A

TAGS: SOPN, LE, IS, EG, IR, US
SUBJT: PRESS GUIDANCE FOR NOON BRIEFING,
-- JUNE 15, 1982

9302566

THE FOLLOWING ARE ITEMS OF PRESS GUIDANCE PREPARED FOR
THE NOON BRIEFING, JUNE 15:

1. STATUS OF AUTONOMY TALKS

Q: IS THE U.S. PULLING BACK FROM ITS LONG-STANDING
COMMITMENT TO MOVING FORWARD WITH THE PALESTINIAN
AUTONOMY TALKS?

A: -- AS THE SECRETARY SAID YESTERDAY: "IT IS OUR HOPE
THAT THE ULTIMATE SOLUTION TO THE LEBANESE CRISIS WILL-BE
A CATALYST FOR FACILITATING PROGRESS IN-THE-PEACE
PROCESS, RATHER THAN AN OBSTACLE TO PROGRESS." --

-- THE SECRETARY ALSO NOTED THAT "...UNTIL THAT
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SITUATION HAS BEEN CLARIFIED, IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO GO
ON WITH THE PEACE PROCESS AS SUCH, AND THE AUTONOMY TALKS
IN PARTICULAR."

-- THERE SHOULD BE NO MISUNDERSTANDING ABOUT U.S.
COMMITMENT TO THE PEACE PROCESS. WE REMAIN FULLY
COMMITTED TO CAMP DAVID AS THE ONLY WORKABLE APPROACH TO
ACHIEVING A RESOLUTION OF THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM IN ALL
ITS ASPECTS. WE WILL MOVE AHEAD ON THAT FRONT AS SOON AS

THE SITUATION ENABLES US TO DO SO. WE REMAIN IN CLOSE CONSULTATION WITH THE EGYPTIANS AND THE ISRAELIS ON THIS IMPORTANT MATTER.

2. REPORTS OF IRANIAN TROOPS IN SYRIA

Q: CAN YOU COMMENT ON AN FBIS REPORT THAT 400 IRANIAN TROOPS HAVE LANDED IN DAMASCUS TO ASSIST SYRIA IN BATTLING THE ISRAELIS IN LEBANON? WHAT IS THE U.S. VIEW OF IRANIAN INVOLVEMENT? WHAT DOES THE U.S. BELIEVE TO BE THE SCALE OF IRANIAN INVOLVEMENT OR INTENDED INVOLVEMENT?

A: WE HAVE SEEN THE REPORT. THE ONLY COMMENT I WISH TO MAKE IS THAT INVOLVEMENT BY OUTSIDE FORCES FROM WHATEVER QUARTER IN THE LEBANESE CRISIS ONLY TENDS TO EXACERBATE AN ALREADY COMPLEX AND DANGEROUS SITUATION.

3. U.S. CITIZENS IN LEBANON

Q: 1. WHAT IS THE SITUATION FOR U.S. CITIZENS IN LEBANON?

A: DUE TO THE SERIOUS SITUATION IN LEBANON, THE SIZE OF THE AMERICAN EMBASSY STAFF IN BEIRUT HAS BEEN DRAWN

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DOWN. DEPENDENTS OF U.S. GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES HAVE DEPARTED. AMERICAN CITIZENS IN LEBANON WERE ADVISED ON JUNE 6 THAT THEY MAY WISH TO LEAVE LEBANON TEMPORARILY IN LIGHT OF THE PRESENT SITUATION.

THE AMERICAN EMBASSY IS OPERATING IN LIMITED FASHION AND CONTINUES TO ASSIST IN FACILITATING THE DEPARTURES OF AMERICAN CITIZENS WHO SO WISH.

Q: 2. IS THE U.S. GOVERNMENT PREPARED TO EVACUATE AMERICAN CITIZENS FROM BEIRUT?

A: AMERICAN CITIZENS WHO WISH TO DEPART LEBANON ARE DOING SO BY VESSELS FROM THE PORT OF JUNIYAH. THE AMERICAN EMBASSY IN NICOSIA REPORTS THAT OVER 100 AMERICANS PLUS MANY OF OTHER NATIONALITIES HAVE ARRIVED AT THE PORT OF LARNACA IN CYPRUS. THE EMBASSY STAFF IS ASSISTING AMERICAN CITIZENS THERE. THE EMBASSY WILL PASS THEIR MESSAGES OF ARRIVAL TO RELATIVES, WHENEVER REQUESTED. OTHER COMMERCIAL VESSELS ARE EXPECTED TO CARRY ADDITIONAL AMERICANS DEPARTING LEBANON IN COMING DAYS.

4. NOTIFICATION LETTER ON F-16S FOR ISRAEL

Q: WHAT IS THE STATUS OF THE FORMAL NOTIFICATION TO THE

CONGRESS ON THE SALE OF AN ADDITIONAL 75 F-16S TO ISRAEL?

A: THE WHITE HOUSE HAS INFORMED US THAT THE PRESIDENT WILL DETERMINE WHEN THE F-16 NOTIFICATION TO THE CONGRESS WILL GO FORWARD.

5. CONFLICT IN LEBANON: U.S. POSITION ON U.N. RESOLUTIONS.

Q: CAN YOU CONFIRM THAT THE U.S. HAS BEEN TELLING MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL THAT AN UNCONDITIONAL UNCLASSIFIED

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ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL IS UNREALISTIC?

A: -- OUR POSITION IS CONSISTENT WITH SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS 508 AND 509, WHOSE GOALS ARE A WITHDRAWAL AND A CEASEFIRE BOTH IN LEBANON AND ACROSS THE LEBANESE-ISRAELI BORDER.

-- OBVIOUSLY, THE ACHIEVEMENT OF THESE GOALS IMPLIES THAT THERE BE NO RETURN TO THE STATUS QUO ANTE AND THAT APPROPRIATE STRUCTURES BE CREATED TO ORGANIZE AND MAINTAIN IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RESOLUTIONS.

-- WE ARE WORKING WITH THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT AND OTHER GOVERNMENTS TO IMPLEMENT THESE RESOLUTIONS AS PROMPTLY AS POSSIBLE.

-- WE URGE THAT EVERYONE SUPPORT CURRENT EFFORTS, SUCH AS THE MISSION OF AMBASSADOR HABIB, TO ACHIEVE THIS GOAL.

6. ISRAELI USE OF CLUSTER BOMBS

Q: CAN YOU COMMENT ON ALLEGED ISRAELI USE OF CLUSTER BOMBS IN LEBANON? WHAT IS THE U.S. VIEW OF THIS PRACTICE IF TRUE?

A: WE ARE LOOKING INTO THESE MEDIA REPORTS.

7. REPORTS OF HOSTAGES AT AMERICAN UNIVERSITY

Q: CAN YOU COMMENT ON A REPORT CARRIED BY AP THAT QUOTES ISRAELI RADIO AS SAYING SOME 75 PERSONS ARE BEING HELD UNCLASSIFIED

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HOSTAGE BY THE PLO IN THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY OF BEIRUT?

A: WE HAVE CHECKED WITH OUR EMBASSY ON THESE REPORTS AND HAVE BEEN ASSURED THAT THEY ARE UNTRUE.

8. STATUS OF HABIB MISSION

Q: WHAT IS THE STATUS OF THE HABIB MISSION TODAY?

A: AMB. HABIB REMAINS IN BEIRUT WHERE HE IS HOLDING DISCUSSIONS WITH LEBANESE LEADERS. I HAVE NOTHING FOR YOU ON THE SUBSTANCE OF HIS DISCUSSIONS OR ON HIS ONWARD ITINERARY.

9. U.S. POLICY TOWARD UNIFIL

Q: DOES THE U.S. SUPPORT UNIFIL AS A PEACEKEEPING FORCE IN LEBANON? DOES THE U.S. FAVOR RENEWING UNIFIL'S MANDATE WHEN IT EXPIRES ON JUNE 19?

A: -- THE U.S. HAS BEEN A SUPPORTER OF UNIFIL. IT HAS PLAYED AN IMPORTANT ROLE IN MAINTAINING THE FRAGILE CEASEFIRE ON THE ISRAELI-LEBANON BORDER OVER THE PAST FOUR YEARS.

-- GIVEN CURRENT UNCERTAINTIES, WE BELIEVE IT IS PRUDENT TO EXTEND UNIFIL WHEN ITS MANDATE COMES UP BEFORE THE SECURITY COUNCIL THIS WEEK. ITS MANDATE MUST NOT BE ALLOWED TO LAPSE AT THIS CRITICAL JUNCTURE.

-- LOOKING BEYOND SUCH AN EXTENSION, WE BELIEVE THAT A PEACEKEEPING ARRANGEMENT WILL BE A NECESSARY INGREDIENT IN BRINGING ABOUT AN ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL IN ACCORDANCE WITH RESOLUTIONS 508 AND 509.

10. CONFLICT IN LEBANON: SITUATION IN BEIRUT
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Q: WHAT IS THE U.S. GOVERNMENT'S VIEW OF ISRAELI TROOP MOVEMENTS AROUND BEIRUT, WHICH APPEAR TO LAY THE GROUNDWORK FOR AN ENTRY INTO ITS WESTERN SECTOR?

A: -- WE REMAIN VERY CONCERNED ABOUT REPORTS OF CONTINUED FIGHTING AND TROOP MOVEMENTS IN SPITE OF THE CEASEFIRE DECLARATIONS OF THE VARIOUS PARTIES.

-- AS THE SECRETARY SAID YESTERDAY, WE HAVE BEEN ASSURED THAT ISRAEL HAS NO INTENTION OF OCCUPYING BEIRUT, AND WE ANTICIPATE THAT ISRAELI FORCES WILL NOT TAKE THIS

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STEP.

-- WE TRUST THAT NONE OF THE PARTIES WILL DO ANYTHING
TO CONTRAVENE STATED INTENTION TO OBSERVE A CEASEFIRE.
HAIG

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AMEMBASSY BEIRUT NIACT IMMEDIATE

INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE

AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE

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DECAPTIONED

E.O. 12065: RDS-1 6/14/02 (LEWIS, SAMUEL W.) OR-M

TAGS: MILI, MOPS, IS, LE, PLO, US

SUBJECT: ISRAELI TANKS NEAR AMBASSADOR DILLON'S RESIDENCE

--CONVERSATION WITH ARIK SHARON

REF: TEL AVIV 8846

1. [REDACTED]

2. DEFENSE MINISTER SHARON TELEPHONED ME AT 1820 LOCAL (1620 GMT) WITH REFERENCE TO MY URGENT REQUEST VIA DAVID KIMCHE THAT THE GROUP OF ISRAELI TANKS BE REMOVED FROM THE PROXIMITY OF AMBASSADOR DILLON'S RESIDENCE. SHARON WAS IN A JOVIAL MOOD. HE SAID HE HAD AT FIRST UNDERSTOOD THE MESSAGE TO MEAN THAT ISRAELI TANKS WERE NEAR THE U.S. EMBASSY DOWNTOWN (*), AND HE WAS MOMENTARILY ELATED.

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HOWEVER, HE UNDERSTANDS NOW THAT HIS ELATION WAS PREMATURE. (THIS WAS SAID IN THE USUAL SHARON "HUMOROUS" FASHION; HE WAS NOT RPT NOT TELLING ME THAT THE IDF WAS HEADING TOWARD WEST BEIRUT AND OUR EMBASSY THERE, THOUGH HE WAS ADMITTING THAT HE WOULD NOT BE UNHAPPY WERE IT POSSIBLE TO DO SO.)

3. SHARON EXPLAINED THE CURRENT LOCATION OF THE TANKS AS A RESULT OF PHIL HABIB'S URGENT REQUEST TO HIM

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THIS MORNING TO REMOVE THEM FROM THE IMMEDIATE VICINITY OF THE PRESIDENTIAL PALACE AND THE DEFENSE MINISTRY HEAD-QUARTERS IN BAABDA. HOWEVER, HE UNDERSTANDS THE PROBLEM OF THE POLITICAL IMAGERY OF HAVING HABIB ARRIVE AT OUR EMBASSY RESIDENCE UNDER THE GUNS OF ISRAELI ARMOR, AND HE ASSURED ME HE WAS GIVING ORDERS IMMEDIATELY TO HAVE THEM MOVED. AGAIN, HE SAID, THEY WILL HAVE TO MOVE EASTWARD, SINCE THE ROAD BACK SOUTH "IS MUCH TOO DIFFICULT TO TRAVERSE AGAIN IN REVERSE DIRECTION."

4. IN THE COURSE OF THE CONVERSATION ARIK ALSO SAID THE FOLLOWING:

---YASSIR ARAFAT AND GEORGE HABASH ARE HOLED UP IN THE SOVIET EMBASSY.

---THE SITUATION IS GENERALLY FAIRLY QUIET. THERE IS SOME FIRE COMING FROM PLO SOURCES, BUT THE ISRAELIS ARE SHOWING "SOME RESTRAINT IN RESPONDING TO IT."

---THERE ARE SIX TO TEN THOUSAND "PLO TERRORISTS" IN WEST BEIRUT CURRENTLY AND "THEY SHOULD BE GOTTEN OUT." SHARON SAID THAT LEAFLETS WOULD BE DROPPED TOMORROW OVER WEST BEIRUT ENCOURAGING THEM TO LEAVE, AND THAT THEY WOULD BE

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PERMITTED TO LEAVE. UNFORTUNATELY I DID NOT GET A CHANCE TO PROBE THIS STATEMENT FURTHER.

5. SHARON WAS WHOLEHEARTEDLY IN FAVOR OF THE POLITICAL CHANGES IN THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT ANNOUNCED EARLIER TODAY AND SAID THAT ISRAEL WOULD ENCOURAGE IN EVERY POSSIBLE WAY EVIDENCES OF DECISIVENESS ON THE PART OF THE LEBANESE AUTHORITIES SUCH AS DEPLOYING LAF INTO THE WEST BEIRUT AREA.

6. AS IN HIS CONVERSATION WITH PHIL HABIB THIS MORNING, SHARON WAS PRESSING ON ME THE ARGUMENT THAT THE NEW SITUATION OPENS ALL SORTS OF "NEW OPPORTUNITIES" FOR U.S. INTERESTS AS WELL AS ISRAELI INTERESTS IN THE REGION. I SAID MERELY THAT THERE WAS NO QUESTION THAT IT HAD OPENED A GREAT MANY NEW PROBLEMS, AND PERHAPS ULTIMATELY SOME NEW OPTIONS AS WELL.

7. BEIRUT AND DAMASCUS MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. LEWIS

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 6771

AMEMBASSY BEIRUT FLASH

AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV FLASH

AMCONSUL JERUSALEM FLASH

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E.O. 12065: RDS-1,3 6/15/02 (PAGANELLI, ROBERT P.) OR-M

TAGS: PEPR, MILI, MOPS, IS, LE, SY, US

SUBJ: FONMIN KHADDAM ON ISRAELI ULTIMATUM RE SYRIAN

- PRESENCE IN BAABDA AND ALAYAH

1. [REDACTED]

2. FONMIN KHADDAM SUMMONED ME URGENTLY AT 1240 LOCAL JUNE 15 TO INFORM ME OF A "NEW AND GRAVELY SERIOUS DEVELOPMENT." HE SAID THAT THE COMMANDER OF THE IDF IN THE BAABDA REGION HAD CONTACTED SAMI KHATIB, THE LEBANESE COMMANDER OF THE ADF, TO INFORM HIM THAT HIS INSTRUCTIONS WERE TO GET SYRIAN FORCES OUT OF BAABDA AND ALAYAH. KHATIB WAS INSTRUCTED TO INFORM SYRIAN FORCES OF THIS AND ASKED FOR THEIR IMMEDIATE PULLBACK. IF THE FORCES WERE NOT MOVED BY 1200 LOCAL (40 MINUTES BEFORE MY MEETING WITH KHADDAM), THE IDF COMMANDER WOULD CARRY OUT HIS ORDERS. KHADDAM SAID HE HAD RECEIVED THIS MESSAGE AT ABOUT 1145 LOCAL.

3. KHADDAM SAID THAT THE SYRIAN RESPONSE TO KHATIB WAS AS FOLLOWS:

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-- SYRIAN FORCES ARE IN BEIRUT AND LEBANON UNDER THE

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[REDACTED]

APPROVAL OF THE ARAB LEAGUE AND LEGITIMATE LEBANESE
AUTHORITIES.

-- LEBANON IS AN INDEPENDENT ARAB COUNTRY.

-- SYRIA WILL DEFEND LEBANON AND THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE
WITH ALL OF ITS CAPABILITIES.

KHADDAM SAID THAT HE HOPED WASHINGTON WOULD APPRECIATE
THE SERIOUSNESS AND GRAVE CONSEQUENCES WHICH WOULD
OCCUR AS A RESULT OF THIS DEVELOPMENT. HE SAID THAT
IT WAS DIFFICULT FOR SYRIA TO BELIEVE THAT ISRAEL COULD
MAKE A MOVE SUCH AS THIS WITHOUT AMERICAN AGREEMENT.
IT WAS ALSO SUSPICIOUS THAT A WARNING SUCH AS THIS
CAME AT A TIME WHEN HABIB WAS IN BEIRUT.

4. I TOLD KHADDAM THAT I WOULD IMMEDIATELY CONVEY
THIS INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON AND TO HABIB AND WOULD
GET BACK TO HIM JUST AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. ON HIS OTHER
REMARKS, HE KNEW HABIB WELL ENOUGH TO KNOW THAT HABIB
WAS IN NO WAY INVOLVED IN THIS DEVELOPMENT. IT WAS
ALSO RIDICULOUS TO ASSUME THAT THE U.S. HAD GIVEN A GREEN
LIGHT TO ISRAEL FOR SOMETHING SUCH AS THIS. WE HAD
MADE MAJOR EFFORTS OVER THE PAST SEVERAL DAYS TO
STABILIZE THE CEASEFIRE.

5. ACTION REQUESTED: WASHINGTON, TEL AVIV AND HABIB
ACTION TO PREVENT WHAT COULD BE SERIOUS BREAKDOWN OF
CEASEFIRE IN RESPONSE TO REPORTED ISRAELI ULTIMATUM.
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INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE

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SECTION 01 OF 02 DAMASCUS 04206

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E.O. 12065: RDS-1,3,4 6/14/02 (PAGANELLI, ROBERT P.) OR-M
TAGS: MILI, MOPS, PEPR, LE, IS, SY, US
SUBJ: HABIB MISSION: JUNE 14 CONVERSATION WITH SYRIAN
- DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER

1. [REDACTED]
2. EN ROUTE FROM DAMASCUS AIRPORT TO SYRIAN-LEBANESE BORDER JUNE 14, HABIB HAD AN HOUR-LONG CONVERSATION WITH SYRIAN DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER QADDOUR. PAGANELLI WAS PRESENT.
3. HABIB NOTED THAT HE HAD SEEN BEGIN JUST BEFORE HIS DEPARTURE FROM JERUSALEM AND HE OUTLINED FOR QADDOUR SECRETARY'S INSTRUCTIONS FOR HIS FORTHCOMING VISIT TO BEIRUT. HABIB SAID U.S. GOAL WAS TO STRENGTHEN POSITION OF CENTRAL LEBANESE AUTHORITY AND PRESIDENT SARKIS TO ENABLE IT TO EXTEND GOL AUTHORITY THROUGHOUT LEBANON SO THAT ALL FOREIGN FORCES COULD WITHDRAW. HE WOULD

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BE CONSULTING WITH SARKIS AND OTHER LEBANESE LEADERS

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TO SEE HOW U.S. COULD BE HELPFUL TO LEBANESE IN ACHIEVING THIS GOAL.

4. ON IMMEDIATE CEASEFIRE PROBLEMS, HABIB DESCRIBED HIS INTENSE ACTIVITIES OVER PAST FEW DAYS WITH BEGIN AND OTHER ISRAELI OFFICIALS. HE EMPHASIZED U.S. INSISTENCE THAT CEASEFIRE BE MAINTAINED AND STABILIZED AND INFORMED QADDOUR THAT HE HAD SPECIFICALLY ASKED THAT IDF REMOVE ITS FORCES FROM AREA OF PRESIDENTIAL PALACE IN BAABDA. HABIB NOTED THAT SYRIAN-ISRAELI CEASEFIRE WAS BEING SATISFACTORILY OBSERVED. IN RESPONSE TO QADDOUR'S QUERY ABOUT CONTINUED ISRAELI-PLO FIGHTING, HABIB DESCRIBED THE WHO-STRUCK-JOHN DIFFICULTIES IN SHUTTING THESE HOSTILITIES DOWN. HE SAID HE HOPED THAT HE HAD BEEN SUCCESSFUL, AT LEAST IN STOPPING ISRAEL FROM USING AIR STRIKES IN HEAVILY POPULATED AREAS OF BEIRUT.

5. QADDOUR, SAYING THAT HE WAS NOT A NEGOTIATOR, COMMENTED, DESCRIBING HIS REMARKS AS "THINKING OUT LOUD IN A WAY THAT COULD BE HELPFUL TO U.S. EFFORTS." ACCORDING TO QADDOUR, ALTHOUGH U.S. AND SARG SHARED GOAL OF HELPING ESTABLISH STRONG GOL IN COMPLETE CONTROL OF ITS OWN TERRITORY, HE TOOK EXCEPTION TO ELEMENT OF U.S. GOAL WHICH AIMED AT WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES. QADDOUR SAID THAT THIS INDICATED U.S. WAS ADOPTING ISRAELI POSITION AND EQUATING SYRIAN PRESENCE IN LEBANON WHICH WAS LEGITIMIZED BY REQUEST FROM LEBANESE GOVERNMENT AND ARAB LEAGUE MANDATE WITH THAT OF ISRAELI PRESENCE WHICH WAS ONE OF AGGRESSOR. QADDOUR SAID THIS WOULD BE UNACCEPTABLE TO SARG. QADDOUR CONTINUED THAT LINKAGE OF ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL TO LEBANESE INTERNAL RECONCILIATION WAS A VERY DIFFICULT FORMULA. HE ASKED

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HOW LEBANESE WOULD BE FREE TO PULL THEMSELVES TOGETHER IN THE MIDST OF ISRAELI OCCUPATION. QADDOUR SAID THAT BASIC SYRIAN POSITION WAS FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION CALLING FOR CEASEFIRE AND IMMEDIATE AND COMPLETE ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL. HE ASSERTED THAT SYRIAN ACCEPTANCE OF CEASEFIRE HAD BEEN BASED ON SARG'S UNDERSTANDING THAT THIS, TOO, WAS U.S. POSITION. HE EMPHASIZED THAT SYRIAN ACCEPTANCE OF CEASEFIRE HAD BEEN BASED ON SARG'S UNDERSTANDING OF U.S. POSITION AS CONVEYED BY HABIB TO PRESIDENT ASSAD.

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[REDACTED]

6. HABIB REPLIED THAT U.S. POSITION HAD NOT CHANGED. WE STILL SUPPORTED ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL BUT THIS HAD TO TAKE PLACE IN THE CONTEXT OF THE GOL'S REASSERTION OF ITS SOVEREIGNTY OVER ALL OF LEBANON. THIS ASSERTION COULD, IF LEBANESE SO DECIDED, INCLUDE WITHDRAWAL OF OTHER FOREIGN FORCES, I.E. SYRIANS. IT WAS HIS MISSION TO ASSIST THE LEBANESE IN ANY WAY HE COULD TO GET FROM THE POINT OF REASSERTING THEIR AUTHORITY TO THEIR ABILITY TO IMPLEMENT THIS REASSERTION WHICH COULD THEN LEAD TO LEBANESE DECISION TO REQUEST WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES. LATTER WAS ESSENTIALLY A LEBANESE DECISION TO MAKE. HABIB SAID THAT HE BELIEVED SARG SHARED OUR GOAL OF A STRONG CENTRAL LEBANESE AUTHORITY AND QADOUR CONFIRMED THAT IT DID BUT REITERATED THAT ALTHOUGH SYRIA DID NOT WISH TO STAY IN LEBANON FOREVER, THE FORMULA OF A LINKED ISRAELI-SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL WAS UNACCEPTABLE TO SARG.

7. HABIB MENTIONED AS ANOTHER FIRST PRIORITY A RELIEF

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ACTION SS-25

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EXDIS
OPERATION FOR THE VICTIMS OF THE RECENT FIGHTING. HE
SAID THAT GOL SHOULD TAKE CHARGE OF THIS AND IT WOULD BE
ANOTHER ASSERTION OF ITS AUTHORITY.

8. IN CONTEXT OF REPORTS OF IRANIAN VOLUNTEERS ARRIVING
IN SYRIA, HABIB POINTED OUT WHAT STRANGE BEDFELLOWS
SYRIANS AND IRANIANS WERE. QADDOUR PROFESSED TO HAVE
NO INFORMATION ON REPORTED ARRIVALS OF IRANIAN TROOPS
IN SYRIA.

9. DURING RETURN CAR TRIP TO DAMASCUS, QADDOUR SAID
THAT HE WISHED TO REITERATE SOME OF THE POINTS THAT HE
HAD MADE TO HABIB TO ME SO THAT WE WOULD HAVE A CLEAR
PICTURE OF SARG VIEWS AS WE PROCEEDED TO WORK ON THE
LEBANESE SITUATION. HE AGAIN SAID THAT HE WAS SPEAKING
INFORMALLY BUT AS ONE WHO COULD ACCURATELY INDICATE WHAT
WE COULD EXPECT FROM SARG IN REACTION TO SOME OF THE
POSITIONS HABIB HAD LAID OUT FOR HIM.

10. ACCORDING QADDOUR, SYRIANS WANTED VERY MUCH TO

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COOPERATE WITH U.S. EFFORTS TO RESOLVE LEBANESE MESS.
AS EVIDENCE, HE NOTED RAPID SYRIAN ACCEPTANCE OF CEASEFIRE

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AND FACT THAT THEY HAD CREDITED HABIB WITH PULLING THIS OFF. HE SAID SYRIA HAD NO PROBLEM WITH U.S. GOAL OF STRONG CENTRAL GOL THAT COULD MAKE ITS OWN DECISIONS AND HANDLE ITS OWN SECURITY, HOWEVER, SARG COULD NOT ACCEPT EQUATION OF SYRIAN AND ISRAELI PRESENCES IN CONTEXT OF A WITHDRAWAL OF FOREIGN FORCES FROM LEBANON. HE EXPRESSED APPREHENSION THAT THE U.S. WAS SLIPPING INTO THE ISRAELI POSITION ON THIS AND FURTHER APPREHENSION THAT HABIB WOULD BE PRODDING SARKIS TO ADOPT THIS POSITION. HE REITERATED THAT THE SYRIANS DID NOT WANT TO STAY IN LEBANON FOREVER AND WOULD WITHDRAW IF GOL SO REQUESTED AND ARAB LEAGUE MANDATE WITHDRAWN BUT THIS SHOULD BE AFTER FULL COMPLIANCE WITH SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION CALLING FOR ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL.

11. DURING RETURN CAR TRIP, WE HEARD ANNOUNCEMENT ON RADIO NEWS BROADCAST OF FORMATION OF LEBANESE NATIONAL SALVATION COMMITTEE. I ASKED QADDOUR FOR HIS REACTION AND HE DESCRIBED IT AS "A USEFUL DEVELOPMENT."
PAGANELLI

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TO AMEMBASSY MANILA IMMEDIATE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE IM/IPS/CR/IR Date: 11/3/97
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FOLLOWING REPEAT SENT ACTION SECSTATE INFO TEL AVIV
JUNE 13

QUOTE

JERUSALEM 01903

EXDIS

FROM HABIB

E.O. 12065: RDS 1,3,4 6/13/02 (HABIB, AMB) OR-M

TAGS: PEPR, XF, MOPS, LE, IS, US, UNSC, PLO

SUBJECT: HABIB MISSION: MEETING WITH BEGIN JUNE 13

1. [REDACTED] - ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. AMBASSADOR HABIB, ACCOMPANIED BY AMBASSADOR LEWIS,
DAS DRAPER, DCM BROWN, AND KOZAK, MET FOR TWO HOURS
WITH BEGIN, BURG, SHAMIR, MINISTER UZZAN, KINCHE, BAR-ON,
YEHUDA AVNER, AND MILITARY SECRETARY COL. NEVO AT
[REDACTED]

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1730 JUNE 13.

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3. BEGIN LOOKED BONE-WEARY AND HE BETRAYED A COLD ANGER -- APPARENTLY OVER A REPORT OF TALKS BETWEEN ARENS AND THE SECRETARY. HIS PRINCIPAL PURPOSE WAS TO OUTLINE TO ME THE ISRAELI CONCEPT OF A MULTINATIONAL FORCE, BUT THE MEETING COVERED OTHER IMPORTANT ISSUES INCLUDING, INTER ALIA, THE ISRAELI DEFINITION OF THE CEASEFIRE, THE AIR STRIKES IN BEIRUT, SYRIAN JEWRY, HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE, THE FUTURE ROLE OF THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT, AND MY TRIP TO BEIRUT.

4. BEGIN OPENED BY SAYING THE CABINET TODAY HAD AGREED ON A GENERAL PROPOSAL OR PREFERRED "ARRANGEMENTS" FOR A MULTINATIONAL FORCE TO CONTROL THE 40-KM BUFFER ZONE SO AS TO ALLOW ISRAEL'S WITHDRAWAL. HE RECALLED THAT HE HAD MENTIONED THREE POSSIBILITIES TO ME AND LEWIS. THE CABINET HAD MADE A DECISION TO SUGGEST ONE OPTION: THE BASIC ELEMENTS WOULD BE (A) A MULTINATIONAL FORCE, (B) THE PARTICIPATION OF A U.S. CONTINGENT, (C) AN AGREEMENT BETWEEN ISRAEL AND THE DIRECTOR GENERAL OF THE MULTINATIONAL FORCE, AND (D) BILATERAL AGREEMENTS BETWEEN ISRAEL AND EACH PARTICIPATING COUNTRY OR, ALTERNATIVELY, A SINGLE AGREEMENT WHICH ALL PARTICIPANTS WOULD SIGN. BEGIN STATED THAT A COMMITTEE OF EXPERTS (TWO FOREIGN MINISTRY, TWO DEFENSE AND ONE MOSSAD) WOULD BE DEVELOPING THE SPECIFICS, AND GIVE US DETAILS LATER IN THE WEEK. HE ANTICIPATED THAT ISRAEL WOULD WANT EXPLICIT COMMITMENTS IN THESE AGREEMENTS THAT INDIVIDUAL NATIONAL UNITS IN THE MULTINATIONAL FORCE WOULD NOT ALLOW PENETRATION BY THE PLO, EMPLACEMENT OF WEAPONS, OR THE PRESENCE OF ARMED TERRORISTS IN THE 40-KILOMETER ZONE.

[REDACTED]

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5. BEGIN SAID HE WANTED OUR VIEWS AS TO WHETHER THIS APPROACH WAS FEASIBLE AND, IF SO, WHEN THE U.S. COULD GET IN TOUCH WITH POTENTIAL CONTRIBUTOR GOVERNMENTS. (HE SAID HE EXPECTED POSITIVE RESPONSES FROM GOVERNMENTS, JUST AS WAS THE CASE WHEN THE U.S. WAS ORGANIZING THE HFO.) BEGIN SAID HE HAD USED THE TERM "MULTINATIONAL" RATHER THAN "INTERNATIONAL" SINCE THE LATTER COULD SUGGEST A CONNECTION TO THE UNITED NATIONS WHICH ISRAEL WANTS TO AVOID. HE DESCRIBED THE HOSTILITY

[REDACTED]

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ISRAEL FACES AT THE UN.

6. UNIFIL WAS UNACCEPTABLE, HE SAID, BUT LATE IN THE MEETING SAID THAT UNIFIL COULD BE RENEWED FOR THREE MONTHS NEXT WEEK; THIS SHOULD BE DONE "WITHOUT DEBATE," KIMCHE ADDED. HE REITERATED THAT, ONCE A MULTINATIONAL FORCE WAS IN PLACE AND ASSUMED ITS DUTIES, "WE WILL BE OUT OF LEBANON COMPLETELY." HE NOTED THAT BECAUSE THE PLO HAD THE OLD 180MM GUN WITH A LONG RANGE, SOME OF HIS COLLEAGUES HAD DISCUSSED EXPANDING THE ZONE TO 43-48 KILOMETERS, BUT IN THE END THEY HAD DECIDED TO STICK WITH 40 KILOMETERS.

7. ANSWERING MY FURTHER QUESTIONS, BEGIN SAID THAT THEY DESIRED A "STRONG FORCE" ON THE ORDER OF 10,000 MEN.

8. I MADE IT CLEAR I COULD NOT GIVE AN OFFICIAL OPINION ABOUT THE PROPOSAL. I WOULD REPORT IT, HOWEVER, AND TRY TO GET AN ANSWER AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

9. I NOTED THAT BEGIN WAS LEAVING FOR THE U.S. ON TUESDAY AND I WAS NOT SURE I COULD GET AN ANSWER PRIOR TO THAT TIME. IT WAS INCUMBENT ON ME, HOWEVER, TO POINT OUT CERTAIN THINGS THAT WOULD AFFECT U.S. THINKING. FOR EXAMPLE, CONGRESSIONAL AUTHORIZATION WOULD BE REQUIRED FOR A U.S. CONTRIBUTION. THERE WOULD

[REDACTED]

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BE DIFFERENT CONSIDERATIONS THAN THOSE FACED IN OBTAINING APPROVAL TO PARTICIPATE IN THE SINAI FORCE. BEGIN INTERJECTED THAT, IN PRESIDENT CARTER'S LETTER CONCERNING THE SINAI FORCE, THE U.S. UNDERTAKINGS WERE MADE SUBJECT TO U.S. CONSTITUTIONAL PROCEDURES. I POINTED OUT THAT IN THE CASE OF THE SINAI MFO, WE HAD TRIED FIRST TO OBTAIN A UN FORCE. IT WAS ONLY WHEN THIS PROVED IMPOSSIBLE THAT THE MFO CONCEPT WAS CONSIDERED.

10. I RECALLED THAT BEGIN HAD PREVIOUSLY MENTIONED THREE POSSIBILITIES FOR MAINTAINING SECURITY IN THE 40-KILOMETER ZONE. I ASKED WHETHER IT WOULD BE CORRECT TO SAY THAT WHILE THE OPTION APPROVED BY THE CABINET IS ISRAEL'S PROPOSAL, THE OTHER TWO WERE NOT OUTSIDE ISRAEL'S RANGE OF POSSIBILITIES. BEGIN RESPONDED

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[REDACTED]

THAT ISRAEL WOULD NOT ACCEPT AN EXPANDED UNIFIL AS A SOLUTION, SINCE THERE HAD BEEN PENETRATION OF UNIFIL AREAS BY THE PLO AND REPEATED QUARRELS WITH UNIFIL. I NOTED THAT AS BEGIN HAD PROPOSED ONE OPTION AFTER CONSULTATION WITH HIS CABINET, I MIGHT COME BACK WITH OTHER PROPOSALS AFTER CONSULTATION. BEGIN RESPONDED THAT ISRAEL WOULD BE PREPARED TO DISCUSS ANY SUCH PROPOSALS.

11. AMBASSADOR LEWIS ASKED WHETHER THE ISRAELI CONCEPT OF U.S. PARTICIPATION IN A MULTINATIONAL FORCE WAS A FIRM CONDITION. BEGIN RESPONDED THAT IT WAS "NOT A SINE QUA NON." IT WAS "DESIRABLE" FROM ISRAEL'S STANDPOINT BUT, IF THE U.S. DOES NOT WANT TO SEND FORCES, THERE COULD BE A MULTINATIONAL FORCE WITHOUT IT.

12. TURNING TO ANOTHER ASPECT OF THE PROBLEM, I SAID

[REDACTED]

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THAT THE APPROACH TO THE PROBLEM OF ISRAELI SECURITY WHICH BEGIN HAD PROPOSED DEPENDS IN PART ON THE ACTIVITIES AND ROLE OF THE LEBANESE CENTRAL AUTHORITY. WE MUST BRING ALONG THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT. THIS WAS VITAL. I RECALLED THAT HE AND I HAD DISCUSSED THE DESIRABILITY OF A LEBANESE CENTRAL AUTHORITY WHOSE WRIT WOULD RUN THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY. IN THIS CONNECTION, THERE WAS THE PROBLEM OF THE PLO AS AN EXTRA-TERRITORIAL ELEMENT WHICH HAS TO BE DEALT WITH WITHIN A LEBANESE CONTEXT; THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM IS PART AND PARCEL OF THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT'S INABILITY TO CONTROL ITS OWN TERRITORY. IT WAS BECAUSE OF THE IMPORTANCE OF THE GOVERNMENT'S ROLE THAT I HAD BEEN INSTRUCTED TO GO TO LEBANON TOMORROW AND TALK WITH VARIOUS LEADERSHIP ELEMENTS ABOUT THE FUTURE ROLE OF THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT. CHANGES FOR THE FUTURE AS WELL AS THE REINFORCEMENT OF THE CEASEFIRE WERE CONNECTED CLOSELY WITH PROSPECTS FOR ISRAEL'S PROPOSALS.

13. BEGIN SAID THAT IT WAS HIS UNDERSTANDING THAT AT THIS TIME A RESHUFFLE OF THE LEBANESE CABINET MAY BE UNDERWAY. I SAID WE HAD THE SAME UNDERSTANDING AND BELIEVED THAT THIS WAS AN EFFORT TO STRENGTHEN SARKIS. MY VISIT TO LEBANON WOULD ALSO BE DIRECTED TOWARDS STRENGTHENING THE WILL OF THE LEBANESE PARTIES TO MOVE

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IN THIS DIRECTION.

14. BEGIN SAID VIRTUALLY NOTHING ABOUT SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL EXCEPT TO OBSERVE THAT HE DID NOT UNDERSTAND WHY ASSAD SAYS SYRIA MUST STAY IN LEBANON. ISRAEL WILL LEAVE AND SYRIA SHOULD LEAVE ALSO. I PRESSED FOR MORE SPECIFICS AS TO ISRAEL'S BASIC OBJECTIVES. I ASKED WHETHER BEGIN'S POSITION WAS THAT IF THE U.S. AGREES TO A MULTINATIONAL FORCE, THEN OTHER THINGS WERE POSSIBLE. BEGIN RESPONDED THAT HIS PROPOSAL RELATED TO THE BASICS, NOT TO ALL THE DETAILS. THERE WERE MORE

[REDACTED]

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PROBLEMS TO BE DEALT WITH WHICH WOULD TAKE TIME. AGREEMENT WITH THE SYRIANS, DISARMING OF THE PLO AND OTHER ISSUES WILL COME LATER.

15. I NOTED THAT A SECURITY ZONE WAS ONLY A PIECE OF THE FRAMEWORK. WE HAD TO CONSOLIDATE THE CEASEFIRE. THIS WAS CRITICAL. BEGIN STATED THAT A CEASEFIRE WAS "NOT A SOLUTION." I SAID I THOUGHT WE HAD A CEASEFIRE, BUT NOW WE DON'T, REFERRING TO ISRAEL'S CONTINUING MILITARY ACTION AND CREEPING FORWARD FROM THE CEASE-FIRE LINES.

16. THIS LED TO A LENGTHY GIVE-AND-TAKE ON THE ISRAELI VS. THE U.S. DEFINITION OF THE CEASEFIRE. OUR EXCHANGES BECAME VERY HEATED. IN ESSENCE, BEGIN ARGUED THAT THE CEASEFIRE WAS A UNILATERAL UNDERTAKING BY ISRAEL. THERE WAS NO SIGNED CEASEFIRE AGREEMENT WITH SYRIA OR ANY OTHER ELEMENT. ISRAEL UNDERTOOK ONLY NOT TO FIRE AND HAD MADE IT CLEAR THAT IT WOULD FIRE ONLY IF FIRED UPON. WHEN I QUESTIONED WHY ISRAEL WAS CREEPING FORWARD FROM THE CEASEFIRE LINES, BEGIN SAID THAT ISRAEL HAD NOT ACCEPTED THE CONCEPT OF A "CEASEFIRE IN PLACE." HE NOTED THAT THE PRESIDENT'S APPEAL HAD NOT INCLUDED ANY MENTION OF THE WORDS "IN PLACE."

17. IN A VARIETY OF WAYS, I EXPRESSED SHOCK, ASTONISHMENT AND INCREDULITY OVER THE VIEW THAT THE CEASEFIRE WAS NOT A CEASEFIRE IN PLACE. THIS CONCEPT WAS IMPLICIT IN EVERY CEASEFIRE. WHILE THIS DID NOT NECESSARILY RULE OUT TACTICAL MOVEMENTS NECESSARY TO PROTECT FORCES IN THE EVENT THEY WERE BEING FIRED UPON, A CEASEFIRE COULD NOT BE CONSTRUED AS PERMITTING ONE PARTY

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[REDACTED]

TO ADVANCE ON AND ON AS LONG AS IT DID NOT INITIATE FIRE. IN THIS CONNECTION, I POINTED OUT THAT THE

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ISRAELI EFFORT TO CUT THE DAMASCUS-BEIRUT ROAD WILL CREATE REAL PROBLEMS. THE SYRIAN FORCES MUST BE ALLOWED TO HAVE A WAY OUT. SYRIA STILL HAS ONE BRIGADE IN BEIRUT. THEY SHOULD IN FACT BE ENCOURAGED TO LEAVE BEIRUT THROUGH AN OPEN ROAD.

18. BEGIN PERSISTENTLY COUNTER-ARGUED THAT THIS WAS NOT A PROBLEM. HE WENT ON TO SAY THAT ISRAEL HAD NO PROBLEM WITH THE SYRIANS. THE SYRIANS OBSERVED THE CEASE-FIRE. OUR PROBLEM IS ONLY WITH THE PLO. THE PLO IS NOT A PARTY TO A CEASEFIRE AGREEMENT. WHEN THE PLO FIRES UPON THE IDF, WE HAVE EVERY RIGHT, HE SAID, TO MAKE STRATEGIC MOVES TO PROTECT OUR PEOPLE.

19. AT ABOUT THIS POINT, BEGIN EMOTIONALLY SAID THAT THERE WAS A TENDENCY TO BLAME ISRAEL FOR EVERYTHING. HE DESCRIBED THE ISRAELI CASUALTIES. AND NOW, HE ADDED WITH VISIBLE ANGER, THERE HAS BEEN AN OUTCRY THAT "I HAD MISLED PEOPLE." IT WAS UNFAIR TO HAVE BEEN ACCUSED OF DECEIVING PEOPLE. HE LEFT THE ROOM BRIEFLY AT THIS JUNCTURE.

20. WHILE HE WAS ABSENT, BURG DESCRIBED THE DIFFERENCES IN THE WAY ISRAEL REGARDED THE PLO AND SYRIA. THE FIRST WAS AN ORGANIZATION WHICH PRETENDED NO RESPONSIBILITY

[REDACTED]

FOR ITS SPLINTER GROUPS, WHILE SYRIA--AS A STATE--COULD BE RELIED UPON. I REPEATED MY INABILITY TO UNDERSTAND OR APPRECIATE THE ISRAELI POSITION THAT THERE WAS NOT A CEASEFIRE IN PLACE.

21. WHEN BEGIN RETURNED, I REPEATED THAT I FOUND IT HARD TO BELIEVE THAT ISRAEL WOULD DEAL THIS WAY WITH THE APPEAL OF THE PRESIDENT. CLEARLY, THE PRESIDENT HAD PROPOSED A CEASEFIRE IN PLACE. BEGIN REPEATED THAT THAT

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WOULD BE TRUE IF IT HAD BEEN NEGOTIATED INTO AN AGREEMENT. AS IT IS, IT IS A UNILATERAL UNDERTAKING. BURG REPEATED THAT THERE WERE DYNAMICS IN THE PRESENT SITUATION. THERE COULD BE NO ISRAELI UNDERTAKING TO FREEZE ITS POSITION. SAM LEWIS INTERVENED THAT IT WAS ONLY FAIR TO SAY THAT OUR DISCUSSIONS IN ISRAEL HAD BEEN ON THE CONCEPT OF A CEASEFIRE IN PLACE. I SAID THAT I MADE CLEAR THIS IS WHAT I MEANT WHEN I TALKED TO ASSAD.

22. SAM SAID THAT HE WAS CONCERNED ABOUT A POTENTIAL PROBLEM IN GOOD FAITH BETWEEN OUR TWO GOVERNMENTS. IT WAS FUNDAMENTAL. WHAT WE HAVE SAID AND WHAT ISRAEL HAD SAID EARLIER HAS TO HAVE A CERTAIN CREDIBILITY.

23. IN THE END, THE ISRAELIS MORE OR LESS CLARIFIED THEIR POSITION AS THAT THE ISRAELIS WOULD FREEZE THEIR POSITIONS ONLY WHEN THERE WAS NO FIRING. WITH FIRING THEY FELT THEY HAD A RIGHT TO MOVE TO PROTECT THEIR MEN. IN SHORT, WHEN FIRING CAME FROM A HILL, THEY COULD TAKE THAT HILL. ON THIS INCONCLUSIVE JUNCTURE, WE WENT TO OTHER MATTERS.

24. WE RETURNED BRIEFLY TO THE FORTY KILOMETER BUFFER ZONE. BEGIN EMOTIONALLY SAID THAT HE WANTED THE ISRAELI MEN TO RETURN TO THEIR HOMES AND FAMILIES. IF NECESSARY, HOWEVER, HE WAS PREPARED TO KEEP THE IDF IN LEBANON FOR FIVE YEARS OR MORE IN ORDER TO PROTECT EVEN ONE CHILD IN A NORTHERN ISRAELI TOWN FROM BEING THREATENED BY PLO GUNS. ISRAEL WOULD BE DELIGHTED IF A FORCE COULD BE ESTABLISHED, ALLOWING THE IDF TO GET HOME IN WEEKS.

25. I RAISED OUR INTEREST IN HUMANITARIAN PROGRAMS

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FOR LEBANON, AND DESCRIBED SOME OF WHAT THE U.S. AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS WERE DOING. BEGIN SAID THAT ISRAEL WOULD TAKE "A MOST POSITIVE APPROACH." I SAID THIS WAS VERY IMPORTANT AND THANKED HIM.

26. AS THE MEETING BROKE UP, I SAID TO BEGIN THAT IT WAS ESSENTIAL TO END THE FIGHTING IN THE BEIRUT AREA. I SAID THE AIR STRIKES HAD BECOME

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HEAVY AND THIS NEEDED TO BE BROUGHT TO AN END. I
WENT OUT TO THE HALLWAY AND RECEIVED FURTHER NEWS
ABOUT ADDED AIR STRIKES AND RETURNED TO BEGIN'S
OFFICE TO MAKE A FINAL APPEAL (SEPTTEL).

27. DAMASCUS AND BEIRUT NOT INCLUDED BECAUSE OF
MINIMIZE.
GORDON

UNQUOTE HAIG

[REDACTED]

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AMCONSUL JERUSALEM FLASH

AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV FLASH

AMEMBASSY BEIRUT FLASH

USDEL SECRETARY FLASH

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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Date: 11/3/97

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PA Exemptions

☐ DOWNGRADE TS to ☐ S or ☐ C

DAMASCUS 04115

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E.O. 12065: N/A

TAGS: MOPS, MILI, PEPR, IS, SY, LE

SUBJECT: DAMASCUS RADIO ANNOUNCES ASSAD ACCEPTS CEASE-FIRE.

AT 1010 ZULU DAMASCUS RADIO BROKE INTO ITS REGULAR BROADCAST TO ANNOUNCE THAT PRESIDENT ASSAD RECEIVED AMBASSADOR HABIB LAST EVENING AND TOLD HIM THAT SYRIA WOULD ACCEPT THE CEASEFIRE BUT THAT ISRAEL MUST WITHDRAW AND ON THAT BASIS PRESIDENT ASSAD GAVE HIS ORDER TO ALL TROOPS IN LEBANON TO CEASEFIRE AS OF 1200 LOCAL TODAY. EMBASSY WILL PROVIDE COMPLETE TRANSLATION AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. PAGANELLI

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EXDIS FOR AMB KIRKPATRICK

FOLLOWING JERUSALEM 1863 DTD JUN 11 SENT ACTION STATE DAMASCUS INFO
BEIRUT TEL AVIV BEING REPEATED TO YOU FOR YOUR INFO:

QUOTE: JERUSALEM 01863

DECAPTIONED

E.O. 12065: RDS-1,4 6/11/92 (GROVE, BRANDON) OR-M
TAGS: PINT, LE, SY, IS, US, XF
SUBJECT: HABIB MISSION: ISRAELI IDEAS FOR FUTURE
LEBANESE GOVERNMENT

1. ENTIRE TEXT.

SECRET

2. AMBASSADOR HABIB ACCOMPANIED BY AMBASSADOR LEWIS,
DCM BROWN, DAS DRAPER AND KOZAK MET WITH FOREIGN MINISTRY
DIRECTOR GENERAL KIMCHE AND DEPUTY DIRECTOR GENERAL

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HANAN BAR-ON FOR ALMOST THREE HOURS AFTERNOON ON JUNE 11.
THE PRIMARY FOCUS OF THE MEETING WAS KIMCHE'S DESCRIPTION
OF RECENT ISRAELI TALKS WITH BASHIR GEMAYEL.3. KIMCHE SAID THAT THE ISRAELIS HAD EARLIER FOREWARNED
BASHIR GEMAYEL THAT THEY WOULD ADVISE HIM IN ADVANCE OF
ANY MAJOR MILITARY OPERATION IN LEBANON. IN THIS CASE
THEY DID NOT, BECAUSE THEY HAD DECIDED THAT IT WOULD BE
BEST FOR BASHIR'S FUTURE. THE ISRAELIS WENT INTO THEPage 1
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OPERATION NOT EXPECTING TO MAKE ANY REQUESTS OF BASHIR OR THE PHALANGE AS REGARDS MILITARY COOPERATION. FOR THAT REASON, KIMCHE SAID, BASHIR WAS TOTALLY SURPRISED. SINCE THE SYRIANS HAD ALREADY PENETRATED THE PHALANGE, THE ABSENCE OF ISRAELI WARNING MAY HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO THE SURPRISE WHICH BOTH THE SYRIANS AND PALESTINIANS SUSTAINED IN CONNECTION WITH THE ISRAELI OPERATION.

4. KIMCHE SAID THAT ISRAELI RELATIONS WITH THE PHALANGE HAD RECENTLY BROADENED, IN THE SENSE THAT THE ISRAELIS NOW HAD CONTACT WITH A WIDE RANGE OF PHALANGE LEADERS, INCLUDING EVEN PAKRADOUNI, THE USUAL PHALANGE CONDUIT TO THE SYRIANS.

5. KIMCHE SAID THE PHALANGE AND THE SO-CALLED "LEBANESE FRONT" (A GROUPING OF MARONITE ORGANIZATIONS) WERE FULLY UNITED AND INTENDED TO PRESS DN SARKIS AND OTHERS THE FOLLOWING FOUR-POINT PROGRAM:

-- (A) IT WAS ESSENTIAL TO STRENGTHEN THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT AND MAKE IT--FOLLOWING THE ELECTIONS--A TRULY NATIONAL GOVERNMENT (THE EFFORTS BY SARKIS AND WAZZAN TO BRING WALID JUMBLATT TO BEIRUT MAY BE PART OF THIS EFFORT).

PAGE 03 STATE 166570

-- (B) THERE IS A NEED FOR SUCH A STRENGTHENED CENTRAL GOVERNMENT TO ANNOUNCE A WILLINGNESS TO CONDUCT NEGOTIATIONS FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES FROM LEBANON, INCLUDING ISRAELI FORCES.

-- (C) THIS NEWLY STRENGTHENED CENTRAL GOVERNMENT WOULD HAVE TO INSIST ON DEPLOYING THE LEBANESE ARMY THROUGHOUT BEIRUT TO MAINTAIN LAW AND ORDER (THE PHALANGE BELIEVES THE ARMY IS ADEQUATE TO THE TASK, AND WOULD NOT NEED OUTSIDE HELP).

-- (D) THE PRESENT GOVERNMENT SHOULD ACT ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT BASHIR GEMAYEL WILL BE ELECTED PRESIDENT AS THE PREFERRED CANDIDATE OF THE MARONITES AND OTHER CHRISTIANS.

6. KIMCHE SAID THAT BASHIR HAD MADE IT CLEAR THAT, TO MAKE THIS SCENARIO WORK, IT WOULD BE PREFERABLE IF ISRAEL REMAINED IN THE BEIRUT AREA FOR AN ADEQUATE TIME (PRESUMABLY THROUGH THE ELECTION PERIOD SOME TIME AFTER JULY 23).

7. BASHIR, ACCORDING TO KIMCHE, BELIEVES THAT SARKIS IS ON BOARD WITH THIS ARRANGEMENT AND SCENARIO.

8. HABIB THEN REVIEWED THOROUGHLY HIS TALKS IN DAMASCUS THIS WEEK, DESCRIBING IN DETAIL THE NUANCES IN THE SYRIAN POSITION ALONG LINES ALREADY

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FULLY REPORTED.

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9. KIMCHE AND BAR-ON THEN RETURNED TO A LENGTHY GIVE-AND-TAKE ON ISRAELI IDEAS FOR AFFECTING THE POLITICAL SCENE IN LEBANON. THEY SUGGESTED STRONGLY THAT, WITH U.S. BACKING FOR BASHIR GAMAYEL, SARKIS WOULD THEN PLAY HIS FULL ROLE ASSURING THAT BASHIR WAS ELECTED PRESIDENT.

10. HABIB REFUSED TO BE DRAWN INTO EXPLICIT SPECULATION AS TO WHAT THE U.S. MIGHT DO. HABIB

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SAID HE WOULD NOT MAKE COMMENTS ON A "PERSONAL" BASIS. HE FIRST REQUIRED INSTRUCTION OR GUIDANCE FROM WASHINGTON.

11. BEIRUT AND DAMASCUS MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. GROVR UNQUOTE HAIG

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REFERENCE= 82 STATE 158653, 82 STATE 158702

CONTROL_NBR= n/a

ENCLOSURE= n/a

LOCATOR= TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM

ERRORS= N/A

CONCEPTS= ARMISTICE, DIPLOMATIC DISCUSSIONS, NEGOTIATIONS

TAGS= MOPS, MILI, SY, LE, US, XF, IS, (HABIB, PHILIP C)

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AMEMBASSY BEIRUT NIACT IMMEDIATE
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SECTION 01 OF 02 DAMASCUS 04039

EX-105 **DECAPTIONED**

E. O. 12065: RDS-1,2,4 6/10/02 (HOWELL, W. NATHANIEL)OR-M
TAGS: MOPS, MILI, SY, LE, US, XF, IS
SUBJECT: HABIB MISSION: DISCUSSION OF PROPOSED JUNE 10
- CEASEFIRE WITH PRESIDENT ASSAD

REF: (A) STATE 158653, (B) STATE 158702

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1. ~~ENTIRE TEXT.~~

2. I MET WITH PRESIDENT ASSAD A SECOND TIME AT 2135 GMT JUNE 9 TO DISCUSS DEVELOPMENTS SINCE OUR EARLIER MEETING, PARTICULARLY WITH REGARD TO THE PROPOSED CEASEFIRE FOR 0600 HOURS BEIRUT TIME JUNE 10. KHADDAM WAS WITH ASSAD; AMBASSADOR PAGANELLI AND HOWELL ACCOMPANIED ME.

3. I BEGAN BY APOLOGIZING TO ASSAD FOR CALLING AT SO LATE AN HOUR BUT EXPLAINED THAT AS SOON AS I RETURNED FROM OUR EARLIER MEETING I FOUND A MESSAGE WAITING AT THE EM-BASSY AND HAD IMMEDIATELY CALLED THE FOREIGN MINISTRY ABOUT THE PROBABILITY THAT I WOULD SEEK A FURTHER, URGENT MEETING WITH ASSAD. I SAID THAT THE PRESIDENT HAS ASKED
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

PAGE 02 DAMASC 04039 01 OF 02 100144Z

PM BEGIN TO AGREE TO AN IMMEDIATE CEASEFIRE WITH EFFECT FROM 0600 LOCAL TOMORROW. I ADDED THAT A NUMBER OF SERIOUS DEVELOPMENTS HAD OCCURRED DURING THE DAY OF WHICH I HAD NOT BEEN AWARE DURING OUR PREVIOUS MEETING AND WHICH LED THE PRESIDENT TO THE CONCLUSION THAT THE SITUATION HAD ESCALATED TO A DANGEROUS DEGREE. I ADDED THAT I DID NOT KNOW BEGIN'S RESPONSE OR EVEN IF OUR AMBASSADOR HAD YET SEEN HIM BUT THAT I FELT, IN VIEW OF OUR PREVIOUS DISCUSSION, I COULD NOT DELAY FURTHER IN COMING TO TELL ASSAD OF THIS NEW DEVELOPMENT. IN ADDITION TO HIS WISH TO INFORM ASSAD, I SAID, THE PRESIDENT WILL ALSO BE COMMUNICATING WITH PRESIDENT SARKIS AND STEPS ARE BEING TAKEN TO MAKE CERTAIN THE PLO IS ALSO INFORMED.

4. RECALLING OUR PREVIOUS TALK, I TOLD ASSAD THAT OBVIOUSLY THE DAY'S FIGHTING HAD LED TOWARD THE SERIOUS ESCALATION WE HAD DISCUSSED, LEADING THE PRESIDENT TO ASK THAT IT BE STOPPED IMMEDIATELY SO THAT A "SENSIBLE" SITUATION CAN BE CREATED TO WORK OUT REMAINING ISSUES. CLEARLY, THE DEVELOPING FIGHTING IS BEYOND ANYTHING THAT WE SHOULD

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ACCEPT. I TOLD ASSAD THAT, UNFORTUNATELY, BECAUSE TIME IS SHORT AND EVENTS MOVING QUICKLY, I HAD NO FURTHER DETAIL AT THAT TIME TO GIVE HIM BUT WAS WAITING MOMENTARILY FOR MORE INFORMATION. MY REQUEST, I CONCLUDED, IS THAT, IF OTHERS AGREED, SYRIA SHOULD ALSO ACCEPT TO ABIDE BY THE CEASEFIRE. I SAID I WAS SURE WE WOULD BE GETTING FURTHER INFORMATION, INCLUDING ABOUT THE RESPONSES OF THE ISRAELIS AND OTHERS, AND WOULD PASS IT TO ASSAD AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

5. ASSAD REPLIED IN MEASURED MANNER THAT A CEASEFIRE WITHOUT IMMEDIATE WITHDRAWAL IS TO THE ISRAELI ADVANTAGE BECAUSE THE ISRAELIS ARE NOW PRESENT IN LOCATIONS THAT REFLECT THEIR INVASION AND OCCUPATION. HE SAID IT IS TRUE

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THAT IT IS NOT POSSIBLE TO SOLVE ALL ELEMENTS OF THE PROBLEM IN ONE HOUR, BUT WE MUST CONSIDER THE PROBLEM IN A PRACTICAL MANNER. IT IS NOT POSSIBLE TO PICK OUT A SINGLE ELEMENT OF THE SITUATION; TO BE PRACTICAL ASSAD STATED THE CEASEFIRE SHOULD BE ACCOMPANIED BY IMMEDIATE ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL TO THE 40KM ZONE I HAD MENTIONED IN OUR EARLIER DISCUSSION. IF THAT WERE DONE, HE SAID, THEN WE WOULD ALL HAVE TIME AND A BASIS FOR WORKING OUT THE REMAINING ASPECTS OF TOTAL ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM LEBANON.

6. I REPLIED THAT I WOULD LIKE TO MAKE ASSAD'S VIEW KNOWN TO THE PRESIDENT AND SECRETARY AND SEEK GUIDANCE FROM THEM. THE SITUATION IS TOO SERIOUS. I SAID, FOR ME TO RESPOND, BUT I WOULD SEEK AN ANSWER FOR ASSAD AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE. TO SUMMARIZE THE CONVERSATION TO THAT POINT, I ASKED ASSAD IF IT WAS CORRECT THAT HE DOES NOT REJECT THE PROPOSED CEASEFIRE, BUT BELIEVED IT MUST BE ACCOMPANIED BY INITIAL ISRAELI PULLBACKS? ASSAD AGREED THAT THIS REFLECTS HIS POSITION.

7. I TOLD ASSAD THAT I DO NOT KNOW HOW MUCH TIME WE HAVE TO GET AN ANSWER FOR HIM TO HIS PROPOSAL AND REPEATED THAT

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I WOULD HAVE TO COMMUNICATE WITH THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY. IN THE MEANTIME, I AGAIN URGED THAT HE ACCEPT CEASEFIRE IF ALL OTHERS AGREE. I SAID THAT IF THE LIMITED TIME BEFORE THE APPOINTED HOUR RUNS OUT AND OTHERS HAVE ACCEPTED IT, I HOPED THAT ASSAD WOULD INSTRUCT HIS TROOPS TO HONOR IT. ASSAD ASKED IF I MEANT WITHOUT AN ACCOMPANYING WITHDRAWAL AND I POINTED OUT THAT WE MIGHT REACH A POINT WITHOUT EVERYTHING IN PLACE AT WHICH AN IM-

[REDACTED]

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PAGE 01 DAMASC 04039 02 OF 02 100154Z
ACTION SS-25

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PORTANT OPPORTUNITY WOULD BE LOST. SYRIA COULD ACCEPT THE CEASEFIRE, IN THAT CASE, WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO ASSAD'S PROPOSAL IN THE EVENT I DON'T HAVE AN ANSWER. ON THE OTHER HAND, I AGAIN UNDERTOOK TO SEEK AN ANSWER SOONEST. I POINTED OUT THAT EVEN IF ASSAD'S POINT WAS ACCEPTED, WE WOULD STILL NEED SOME TIME TO WORK OUT MODALITIES OF DISENGAGEMENT AND WITHDRAWAL AND REITERATED THAT SYRIA WOULD NOT PREJUDICE ITS POSITION BY AGREEING TO WHAT THE PRESIDENT HAS SUGGESTED.

8. ASSAD SAID THE FIGHTING NOW IS ESSENTIALLY BETWEEN SYRIAN AND ISRAELI FORCES. HE SAID HE AGREES TO THE CEASE-FIRE PROVIDED IT IS ACCOMPANIED BY IMMEDIATE ISRAELI PULL-BACK TO FIRST STAGE POSITIONS (I.E., THE 40 KILOMETER LINE). OTHERWISE, HE REPEATED, THE PROPOSITION IS IMPRACTICAL. I SAID I UNDERSTOOD HIS POSITION AND WOULD GO RIGHT AWAY TO THE EMBASSY TO REPORT AND ELICIT AN ANSWER. I ASKED WITH WHOM WE SHOULD COMMUNICATE OVERNIGHT AND KHADDAM REPLIED THAT HE WILL BE AVAILABLE IN HIS OFFICE.

9. ASSAD SAID THERE IS ONE POINT ON WHICH HE WISHED TO BE CERTAIN. HE UNDERSTANDS THAT THE FINAL OBJECTIVE IS TO

PAGE 02. DAMASC 04039 02 OF 02 100154Z

BE COMPLETE ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM LEBANON. I REPLIED THAT THIS IS THE U.S. POSITION WHICH HAS NOT CHANGED SO FAR AS I WAS AWARE, REFERRING TO STATEMENTS BY THE PRESIDENT AND SECRETARY AS WELL AS U.S. VOTES IN THE U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL. I REPEATED, HOWEVER, THAT AS I HAD DISCUSSED IN OUR FIRST MEETING, THIS WAS ACHIEVABLE ONLY IN THE CONTEXT OF A NEW, AGREED ARRANGEMENT FOR THE SOUTHERN BUFFER ZONE.

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10. AT THIS POINT, REFTELS WERE HANDED TO ME. AFTER EXCUSING MYSELF TO READ THEM, I COVERED THE TALKING POINTS WITH ASSAD AND CONCLUDED THAT THESE POINTS ANSWERED MOST OF THE POINTS ASSAD HAD RAISED EARLIER IN OUR TALK. THE CEASEFIRE IS THE BEGINNING AND NOT THE END OF OUR OBJECTIVES. I ASSURED HIM THAT OTHER STEPS WILL DEFINITELY FOLLOW, BUT TIME IS SHORT TO IMPLEMENT THE PROPOSED CEASEFIRE. THE U.S. IS COMMITTED TO MOVE IN THE DIRECTION I HAD OUTLINED FOR HIM. WE WILL KNOW BEGIN'S RESPONSE TO THE PRESIDENT'S PROPOSAL SOON AND I SAID WE WILL PASS IT TO KHADDAM AS SOON AS RECEIVED.

11. ASSAD ACKNOWLEDGED THIS PRESENTATION AND REFERRED TO PORTION OF TALKING POINTS STATING THAT ISRAEL MUST WITHDRAW. TO MAKE IT PRACTICAL AND GIVE THE WORDS SUBSTANCE, HE SAID, THE FIRST STAGE OF PULL-BACK SHOULD BE SIMULTANEOUS WITH CEASEFIRE. THERE IS NOW CONTACT BETWEEN FORCES AND ALSO TECHNICAL CONSIDERATIONS. IN ADDITION, SYRIA DOES NOT WANT THE ISRAELIS TO HAVE TIME TO CONSOLIDATE THEIR HOLD ON PRESENT POSITIONS. IMMEDIATE FIRST-STAGE WITHDRAWAL WILL LEAD TO FINAL WITHDRAWAL, WHEREAS ASSAD FELT THAT FAILURE TO LINK INITIAL WITHDRAWAL WILL HAVE THE OPPOSITE EFFECT.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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12. I REPLIED THAT I CANNOT BELIEVE THAT THE CEASEFIRE IN PLACE WOULD BE LEFT WITHOUT FURTHER STEPS BUT MUST STAY WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF MY GUIDANCE. I SAID THAT EVEN WITH FORCES IN CONTACT IT SHOULD BE POSSIBLE FOR AN ORDER NOT TO PULL TRIGGERS TO BE IMPLEMENTED. I SAID I COULD ASSURE ASSAD THAT WE WILL BE MOVING ON FURTHER MEASURES AND WILL TRY TO GET HIM AN ANSWER BEFORE THE CEASEFIRE. BUT IF I CANNOT GET A RESPONSE IN TIME AND HE IS DISSATISFIED WITH THE PACE AND DIRECTION OF FOLLOW-UP STEPS, WE CAN DISCUSS HIS VIEWS. IN ANY CASE, HIS

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POSITION WILL NOT BE JEOPARDIZED BY THE CEASEFIRE.

13. ASSAD AGAIN EXPRESSED THE CONCERN THE ISRAELIS WILL STABILIZE THEIR FORWARD POSITIONS ON THE GROUND, AND I STRONGLY STATED THAT SOMETHING WILL HAPPEN IN ANY CASE AS SOON AS A CEASEFIRE GOES INTO EFFECT. ASSAD RECALLED THAT HE HAD TOLD SARKIS BEFORE THE RECENT UN SECURITY COUNCIL DEBATE THAT TOTAL WITHDRAWAL AND NOT A CEASEFIRE IS THE MAJOR ISSUE. I SAID THAT WE DO NOT DISAGREE THAT WITHDRAWAL WAS REQUIRED, AND HE NOW HAD THE U.S. POSITION DIRECTLY FROM THE PRESIDENT. NOTHING IN THE PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE I SAID IS INCONSISTENT WITH WHAT I HAD BEEN TELLING HIM.

14. WITH FURTHER FAREWELLS, WE DEPARTED WITH THE PROMISE TO STAY IN TOUCH WITH KHADDAM AS NECESSARY THROUGH THE NIGHT. PAGANELLI

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FOLLOWING STATE 158653 SENT ACTION DAMASCUS USDEL
SECRETARY TEL AVIV JERUSALEM BEIRUT WHITE HOUSE
JUNE 09 REPEATED QUOTE
S E C R E T STATE 158653 TOSEC 080360
EXDIS; FOR AMBASSADORS HABIB AND PAGANELLI
E.O. 12065: RDS 1-3-4, 6/9/02 (DRAPER, MORRIS)
TAGS: XF, SY, LE, IS, US
SUBJECT: HABIB MISSION: ESTABLISHING A CEASEFIRE FOR
THURSDAY, JUNE 10

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1. ~~ENTIRE TEXT~~

2. YOU WILL HAVE SEEN OUR EARLIER MESSAGE CONCERNING OUR
EFFORTS TO ESTABLISH A CEASEFIRE AT 0600 (LEBANESE TIME)
ON THURSDAY, JUNE 10. SAM LEWIS WILL BE DELIVERING A
MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT TO PRIME MINISTER BEGIN IN THIS
CONNECTION, AND YOU SHOULD SEEK THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE
APPOINTMENT WITH ASSAD TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING PRINCIPAL
POINTS:

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-- I AM SPEAKING ON INSTRUCTIONS FROM THE PRESIDENT, AND
ON HIS BEHALF.

--WE ARE MOST SERIOUSLY CONCERNED BY THE MAJOR ESCALATION
IN FIGHTING BETWEEN SYRIAN AND ISRAELI FORCES. IT IS
IMPERATIVE THAT THESE HOSTILITIES BE BROUGHT TO AN END
IN ORDER TO FORESTALL FURTHER TRAGEDY.

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--THE U.S. IS THEREFORE URGING THAT ALL PARTIES IN THIS
CONFLICT AGREE TO A CEASEFIRE TO TAKE EFFECT AT 6 A.M.

(LEBANESE TIME), THURSDAY, JUNE 10.

-- YOU CAN BE ASSURED THAT WE ARE URGING THE CEASEFIRE ON
ISRAEL IN THE STRONGEST TERMS. A FAILURE BY THE PARTIES
TO AGREE TO THE CEASEFIRE COULD AGGRAVATE WHAT IS ALREADY
A GRAVE THREAT TO PEACE IN THE REGION.

-- OUR APPEAL TO YOU IS CONSISTENT WITH OUR POSITION
TOWARDS THE HOSTILITIES. THIS IS THAT HOSTILITIES SHOULD
BE BROUGHT TO AN END FORTHWITH; THAT EVERY EFFORT SHOULD
BE MADE TO FORESTALL ANY ESCALATION IN THE CURRENT
HOSTILITIES AS WELL AS ANY WIDENING OF THE CONFLICT;
AND THAT ISRAELI FORCES MUST BE WITHDRAWN FROM LEBANON .

*-- IN OUR OPINION, NOW IS NOT THE TIME TO JUDGE THE RIGHTS
AND WRONGS IN THE POSITION OF ANY OF THE PARTIES, OR TO
REVIEW THE DEVELOPMENTS THAT LED TO THIS CRITICALLY
DANGEROUS SITUATION. UNQUOTE STOESSEL

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E.O. 12065: GDS 6/9/87 (LEWIS, SAMUEL W.) OR-M
TAGS: OVIP (BEGIN, MENACHEM)
SUBJECT: BEGIN'S TRAVEL PLANS

1. ~~ENTIRE TEXT~~

2. WHEN PHIL HABIB AND I MET WITH PRIME MINISTER BEGIN TUESDAY AFTERNOON, JUNE 8, AT THE KNESSET, HE TOOK THE OCCASION TO MENTION HIS TRAVEL PLANS. AS OUR MEETING WAS WINDING UP, BEGIN TURNED TO ME AND SAID MEANINGFULLY THAT HE STILL INTENDS TO GO TO THE UNITED STATES NEXT WEEK TO DELIVER HIS SPEECH AT THE UN SPECIAL SESSION ON DISARMAMENT AND TO VISIT WASHINGTON. HE SAID HE MIGHT HAVE TO DELAY HIS DEPARTURE FROM ISRAEL ONE DAY, THAT IS, FROM JUNE 15 TO JUNE 16. (HE CONFIRMED THAT THE DOCTORS WILL NOT REPEAT NOT PERMIT MRS. BEGIN TO ACCOMPANY HIM.)

3. I MADE NO SUBSTANTIVE COMMENT BUT MERELY TOLD HIM OF MY OWN TRAVEL PLANS DESIGNED TO HAVE ME IN WASHINGTON DURING HIS VISIT. LEWIS

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E.O. 12065: GDS 6/7/88 (LEWIS, SAMUEL) OR-M

TAGS: OVIP (HABIB, PHILIP), MILI, IS, LE, US

SUBJECT: SCHEDULING OF MEETING WITH PRIME MINISTER BEGIN

1. ~~ENTIRE TEXT.~~

2. BEGIN SPENT SUNDAY NIGHT AT MILITARY HEADQUARTERS
IN NORTHERN ISRAEL, WAS REPORTEDLY UP MOST OF THE NIGHT,
AND WILL NOT BE BACK IN JERUSALEM UNTIL MID-DAY MONDAY
AT THE EARLIEST. I EXPECT TO SEE HIM IMMEDIATELY UPON
HIS RETURN TO JERUSALEM, BUT TIME IS NOT YET PREDICT-
ABLE. GROVE

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E.O. 12065: RDS-1,3 6/6/02 (EAGLEBURGER, L.)
TAGS: PEPR, MOPS, XF, IS, LE
SUBJECT: U.S. EFFORTS ON LEBANON CRISIS

Page 1
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REF: CAIRO 13897

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1. ~~ENTIRE TEXT~~

2. WE HAVE RECEIVED A NUMBER OF INQUIRIES FROM POSTS ON STATUS OF U.S. EFFORTS WITH REGARD TO THE EXTREMELY GRAVE SITUATION IN LEBANON. BASICALLY, THE U.S. WILL WORK ON AN URGENT AND EXTREMELY ACTIVE BASIS TO BRING THE FIGHTING TO AN END, TO BRING ABOUT ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL, TO FORESTALL WIDER CONFLICT IN THE REGION, AND TO TRY TO DEAL WITH THE UNDERLYING CAUSES OF THE PRESENT FIGHTING.

3. POSTS SHOULD LOOK CLOSELY AT SECRETARY HAIG'S REMARKS IN HIS JUNE 6 PRESS CONFERENCE WHICH WILL BE CABLED TO YOU. AS THE SECRETARY NOTES, THE PRESIDENT MET TODAY (JUNE 6) WITH AMBASSADOR HABIB IN PARIS AND HAS DISPATCHED HIM IMMEDIATELY TO THE AREA TO SEE WHAT CAN BE DONE. AMB. HABIB HAS ARRIVED IN ISRAEL AND WILL BEGIN MEETINGS WITH THE ISRAELI LEADERSHIP IMMEDIATELY. WE WILL BE EXTREMELY CAREFUL IN OUR PUBLIC STATEMENTS TO ENSURE THAT HABIB WILL HAVE THE FLEXIBILITY HE NEEDS DURING THE NEXT 24-48 HOURS. BY SEPTTEL YOU WILL RECEIVE TEXT OF UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION WE WILL HAVE VOTED FOR WHICH CALLS FOR ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL AND AN IMMEDIATE

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CESSATION OF ALL MILITARY ACTIVITIES WITHIN LEBANON AND ACROSS THE LEBANESE-ISRAELI BORDER.

SHOULD HOST GOVERNMENTS ASK ABOUT THE LEGAL RAMIFICATIONS OF ISRAELI USE OF U.S. MILITARY EQUIPMENT, YOU SHOULD REPEAT THE SECRETARY'S STATEMENT THAT THIS IS A SUBJECT THAT WE WILL BE LOOKING INTO AS THE SITUATION PROGRESSES.

4. FYI: WE ARE THINKING OF MOBILIZING INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT FOR A HUMANITARIAN DISASTER RELIEF EFFORT, WITH A SUBSTANTIAL CONTRIBUTION FROM US. DETAILS ARE BEING WORKED OUT. END FYI.

5. FOLLOWING IS INTER-AGENCY CLEARED PRESS GUIDANCE INTENDED FOR USE TODAY. WE HAVE NOT USED IT YET BUT IT WILL BE DRAWN UPON IN MONDAY'S BRIEFINGS:

BEGIN TEXT:

EARLY THIS MORNING, ISRAEL MOVED MILITARILY INTO LEBANON, USING GROUND, SEA, AND AIR FORCES. WE DEEPLY REGRET THAT THE SPIRAL OF VIOLENCE THAT BEGAN WITH THE ASSASSINATION ATTEMPT AGAINST THE ISRAELI AMBASSADOR TO BRITAIN AND THAT MOVED ON TO ISRAELI AIRSTRIKES AT LEBANON AND PALESTINIAN SHELLING OF ISRAEL HAS NOW REACHED A NEW HEIGHT,

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WHICH THREATENS THE LIVES AND PROPERTY OF A GREAT MANY INNOCENT PEOPLE IN LEBANON.

THE UNITED STATES HAS BEEN DOING ITS VERY BEST--NOT ONLY IN RECENT DAYS BUT ALSO GOING BACK TO LAST YEAR--TO FORESTALL THE TERRIBLE TRAGEDY WHICH IS NOW UNFOLDING. LAST NIGHT, THE UNITED STATES JOINED IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL'S CALL FOR A CEASEFIRE THIS MORNING WHICH--IF OBSERVED BY ALL SIDES--MIGHT HAVE PREVENTED THESE PRESENT DEVELOPMENTS. THE U.S. HAS BEEN IN TOUCH NOT ONLY WITH THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT BUT WITH ALL GOVERNMENTS AND

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QUARTERS WHICH HAVE INFLUENCE ON THE SITUATION. OUR COUNSELS OF RESTRAINT AND CAUTION HAVE BEEN INTENSE AND CONSTANT.

WE HAD HOPED THAT IT WOULD HAVE BEEN POSSIBLE TO DEAL WITH THE UNDERLYING CAUSES OF THE PRESENT VIOLENCE THROUGH

OTHER MEANS, WHICH IS WHY THE PRESIDENT HAD ONCE AGAIN CALLED ON AMBASSADOR PHILIP HABIB TO GO TO THE REGION WITH SOME NEW IDEAS. THE U.S. STRONGLY SUPPORTS THE INDEPENDENCE, TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY, AND SOVEREIGNTY OF LEBANON WITHIN ITS INTERNATIONALLY RECOGNIZED BORDERS, AS THE SECRETARY MADE CLEAR IN HIS RECENT SPEECH IN CHICAGO.

A DIVIDED LEBANON MUST NOT BE THE OUTCOME OF THIS PRESENT VIOLENCE. ISRAEL WILL HAVE TO WITHDRAW ITS FORCES FROM LEBANON AND THE PALESTINIANS WILL HAVE TO STOP USING LEBANON AS A LAUNCHING PAD FOR ATTACKS ON ISRAEL. END TEXT. MINIMIZE CONSIDERED.

STOESSEL

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INFO OCT-00 COPY-01 ADS-00 SS-10 IO-15 NSCE-00 SSO-00
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DRAFTED BY NEA:MDRAPER
APPROVED BY ACTING SECRETARY STOESSEL
P:LSEAGLEBURGER
S/S:LPBREMER
NSC:RMC FARLANE
S/S-O:REBENSON

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE IM/IPS/CR/IR Date: 11/3/97
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STATE 155231 TOSEC 080181

E.O. 12065: GDS 6/6/88 (STOESSEL, WALTER)
TAGS:E

FOIA Exemptions _____ TS authority _____
Exemptions _____ ☐ CLASSIFY as ☐ S or ☐ C Sec. _____
☐ DOWNGRADE TS to ☐ S or ☐ C

SUBJECT: PROPOSED STATEMENT FOR THE PRESS

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1. ~~ENTIRE TEXT.~~

2. FOLLOWING IS PROPOSED TEXT OF STATEMENT FOR THE PRESS
ON CURRENT HOSTILITIES IN LEBANON.

3. BEGIN TEXT. EARLY THIS MORNING, ISRAEL MOVED
MILITARILY INTO LEBANON, USING GROUND, SEA, AND-AIR
FORCES. WE DEEPLY REGRET THAT THE SPIRAL OF VIOLENCE THAT
BEGAN WITH THE ASSASSINATION ATTEMPT AGAINST THE-ISRAELI
AMBASSADOR TO BRITAIN AND THAT MOVED ON TO ISRAELI
AIRSTRIKES AT LEBANON AND PALESTINIAN SHELLING OF ISRAEL
HAS NOW REACHED A NEW HEIGHT, WHICH THREATENS THE LIVES
AND PROPERTY OF A GREAT MANY INNOCENT PEOPLE IN LEBANON.

4. THE UNITED STATES HAS BEEN DOING ITS VERY BEST -- NOT

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ONLY IN RECENT DAYS BUT ALSO GOING BACK TO-LAST-YEAR --

TO FORESTALL THE TERRIBLE TRAGEDY WHICH IS NOW UNFOLDING.
LAST NIGHT, THE UNITED STATES JOINED IN THE SECURITY
COUNCIL'S CALL FOR A CEASEFIRE THIS MORNING WHICH -- IF
OBSERVED BY ALL SIDES -- MIGHT HAVE PREVENTED THESE
PRESENT DEVELOPMENTS. THE U.S. HAS BEEN IN TOUCH NOT
ONLY WITH THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT BUT WITH ALL GOVERNMENTS
AND QUARTERS WHICH HAVE INFLUENCE ON THE SITUATION. OUR

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CHANNEL: n/a

COUNSELS OF RESTRAINT AND CAUTION HAVE BEEN INTENSE AND CONSTANT.

5. WE HAD HOPED THAT IT WOULD HAVE BEEN POSSIBLE TO DEAL WITH THE UNDERLYING CAUSES OF THE PRESENT VIOLENCE THROUGH OTHER MEANS, WHICH IS WHY THE PRESIDENT HAD ONCE AGAIN CALLED ON AMBASSADOR PHILIP HABIB TO GO TO THE REGION WITH SOME NEW IDEAS. THE U.S. STRONGLY SUPPORTS THE INDEPENDENCE, TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY, AND SOVEREIGNTY OF LEBANON WITHIN ITS INTERNATIONALLY RECOGNIZED BORDERS, AS THE SECRETARY MADE CLEAR IN HIS RECENT SPEECH IN CHICAGO.

6. A DIVIDED LEBANON MUST NOT BE THE OUTCOME OF THIS PRESENT VIOLENCE. ISRAEL WILL HAVE TO WITHDRAW ITS FORCES FROM LEBANON AND THE PALESTINIANS WILL HAVE TO STOP USING LEBANON AS A LAUNCHING PAD FOR ATTACKS ON ISRAEL. END TEXT. STOESSEL

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*** Current Classification ***

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE IM/IPS/CR/IR Date: 11/1/97
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PA Exemptions _____ ☐ CLASSIFY as ☐ S or ☐ C Sec. _____
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AMEMBASSY DAKAR PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY BONN PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY
INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
AMEMBASSY CAIRO
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS

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EX DECAPTIONED

E.O. 12065: RDS-1,3,4 3/16/02 (TWINAM, JOSEPH)
TAGS: PEPR, XF, LE, UN
SUBJECT: BRIEFING ON AMBASSADOR HABIB'S MISSION1. ~~ENTIRE TEXT.~~

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2. AMBASSADOR HABIB'S RECENT MISSION TO THE MIDDLE EAST HAS BROUGHT RENEWED ASSURANCES OF SUPPORT FOR THE CEASE-FIRE IN SOUTHERN LEBANON AND SOME REDUCTION IN THE LEVEL OF TENSION THAT PREVAILED IN THE AREA EARLIER THIS YEAR. ACTION ADDRESSEES, WHOSE HOST GOVERNMENTS HAVE SHOWN INTEREST IN LEBANON'S SITUATION, MAY USE TALKING POINTS PROVIDED BELOW TO BRIEF APPROPRIATE OFFICIALS ON RESULTS OF HABIB MISSION AND OUR CURRENT VIEW ON SITUATION THERE. PURPOSE IN PROVIDING THIS BRIEFING, IN ADDITION TO GIVING HOST OFFICIALS UPDATED READING, IS TO UNDERSCORE THAT, DESPITE REDUCTION OF TENSIONS IN THE AREA, THE SITUATION IS STILL FRAGILE AND REQUIRES CONTINUED VIGILANCE AND EFFORT ON THE PART OF THE WORLD COMMUNITY. AS REFLECTED IN THE TALKING POINTS, WE ARE INTERESTED, IN PARTICULAR, IN ENCOURAGING HOST GOVERNMENTS TO TAKE APPROPRIATE OPPORTUNITIES TO REINFORCE CEASE-FIRE AND PROGRESS ON LEBANON THROUGH THEIR BILATERAL CONTACTS WITH

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THOSE IN THE REGION WITH WHOM THEY HAVE INFLUENCE. IN ESSENCE, WHILE AMBASSADOR HABIB BELIEVES THAT HIS MESSAGE WAS READ LOUD AND CLEAR BY THE LEADERS WITH WHOM HE MET, IT WILL NEED REPEATED REINFORCING IF THE SITUATION IS TO REMAIN CALM. AMBASSADORS OR DEPUTIES SHOULD DRAW ON THE FOLLOWING TALKING POINTS IN DISCUSSING AMBASSADOR HABIB'S

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MISSION WITH APPROPRIATE SENIOR HOST GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS.

3. TALKING POINTS:

-- AMBASSADOR HABIB WAS ASKED BY PRESIDENT REAGAN TO RESUME HIS MISSION TO STRESS TWO BROAD THEMES IN DISCUSSIONS WITH THE LEADERS OF ISRAEL, LEBANON, SYRIA, SAUDI ARABIA AND JORDAN: THE IMPORTANCE OF PRESERVING AND STRENGTHENING THE CEASE-FIRE IN SOUTHERN LEBANON AND THE NEED TO EXAMINE WHAT CAN BE DONE TO IMPROVE THE SITUATION IN LEBANON.

-- AS A RESULT OF HIS DISCUSSIONS, AMBASSADOR HABIB BELIEVES THAT THE LIKELIHOOD OF AN EARLY BREAKDOWN OF THE CEASE-FIRE HAS BEEN REDUCED. ISRAEL, LEBANON, SYRIA AND SAUDI ARABIA REAFFIRMED THE DESIRABILITY OF MAINTAINING THE CEASE-FIRE, AND AMBASSADOR HABIB WAS ASSURED THAT THE PLO, TOO, INTENDS TO OBSERVE THE CEASE-FIRE.

-- AMBASSADOR HABIB MADE CLEAR TO THE ARAB LEADERSHIP THE NEED TO AVOID ANY PROVOCATION OF ISRAEL. AT THE SAME TIME, ISRAEL'S LEADERSHIP AFFIRMED TO AMBASSADOR HABIB THAT ISRAEL WOULD NOT BE THE FIRST TO BREAK THE CEASE-FIRE.

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-- AMBASSADOR HABIB EXPLAINED VERY CAREFULLY TO EACH OF THE LEADERS HIS INTERPRETATION OF THE CEASE-FIRE. THE CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES PERTAIN TO ALL HOSTILE MILITARY ACTIVITY FROM LEBANON INTO ISRAEL. THEREFORE, ANY PLO HOSTILE ACTION FROM LEBANON THROUGH SYRIA AND JORDAN INTO ISRAEL WOULD BE A VIOLATION OF THE CEASE-FIRE. THE SAME WOULD APPLY TO ANY ISRAELI ACTION FROM ISRAEL INTO LEBANON TRANSITTING INTERNATIONAL WATERS OR FOREIGN TERRITORIES. AT THE SAME TIME, AMBASSADOR HABIB WOULD NOT ACCEPT AN ISRAELI WIDENING OF THE CEASE-FIRE DEFINITION TO INCLUDE TERRORIST ATTACKS AGAINST ISRAELIS OR

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JEWS ANYWHERE IN THE WORLD.

-- THE SAUDIS REMAIN COMMITTED TO STAYING ENGAGED IN LEBANON AND TO WORKING TO PROMOTE NATIONAL RECONCILIATION. THERE ARE DANGERS IN THE PERIOD LEADING UP TO THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS, AND THE U.S. IS COMMITTED TO SUPPORTING EFFORTS TO ENSURE THAT THE CONSTITUTIONAL ELECTORAL PROCESS IS SAFEGUARDED. THE U.S. IS FURTHER COMMITTED TO THE UNITY, SOVEREIGNTY, INDEPENDENCE AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF LEBANON, ALL OF WHICH MUST BE CAREFULLY PRESERVED DURING THIS DIFFICULT PERIOD. THE U.S. SEEKS YOUR HELP IN PROMOTING EFFORTS TO ENSURE THAT THE ELECTORAL PROCESS TAKES PLACE.

-- THE U.S. IS PARTICULARLY PLEASED BY THE RECENT SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION THAT AUTHORIZED A 1,000 MAN INCREASE IN UNIFIL. WE WILL FULLY SUPPORT UN SECRETARIAT AND UNIFIL EFFORTS TO MAKE EFFECTIVE USE OF UNIFIL'S EXPANDED FORCE, AND ASK YOU, AND UNIFIL CONTRIBUTING STATES, IN PARTICULAR, TO BE AS COOPERATIVE AND SUPPORTIVE AS POSSIBLE OF GENERAL CALLAGHAN AS HE PURSUES THESE OBJECTIVES.

-- THE CEASE-FIRE IN SOUTHERN LEBANON, NOW IN EFFECT FOR EIGHT MONTHS, HAS SAVED COUNTLESS LIVES ON BOTH SIDES OF THE BORDER. HOWEVER, IT IS NOT A PANACEA, IT PROVIDES TIME TO SEEK IMPROVEMENTS IN THE SITUATION IN LEBANON. THE U.S. BELIEVES THAT UNIFIL, WITH ITS EXPANDED FORCE, CAN PLAY A LEADING ROLE IN THIS RESPECT, PROVIDED IT HAS YOUR COOPERATION AND SUPPORT. WE CANNOT OVER-EMPHASIZE THE IMPORTANCE OF WORKING TO STRENGTHEN THE CEASE-FIRE, THROUGH UNIFIL'S PEACEKEEPING ROLE.

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4. ADDRESSEES MAY ALSO DRAW ON TEXT OF HABIB'S STATEMENT
FOLLOWING MEETING WITH PRESIDENT REAGAN, CONTAINED IN
STATE 72875.

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 PA Exemptions () DOWNGRADE TS to () S or () C

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DECAPTIONED

E.O. 12065: RDS-1,2,3 3/29/02 (DRAPER, M.)
 TAGS: PEPR, UN, IT, XF, LE
 SUBJECT: LEBANON AND ISRAEL

REF: (A) ROME 7633^{NR}, (B) STATE 81932

1. ~~ENTIRE TEXT.~~

2. IF THE SUBJECT OF THE RECENT WEST BANK DISQUIET COMES UP IN YOUR DISCUSSIONS OF HABIB'S MISSION WITH THE ITALIANS, WE SUGGEST THAT YOU EMPHASIZE THE IMPORTANCE OF PRESERVING THE CEASEFIRE TO ALL PARTIES IN THE AREA, PARTICULARLY IN VIEW OF THE LATEST TENSIONS. YOU MAY ALSO DRAW UPON THE FOLLOWING GUIDANCE PREPARED FOR, BUT NOT USED AT, NOON PRESS BRIEFING OF MARCH 29.

-- Q: WHAT IS THE U.S. RESPONSE TO REPORTED CALLS BY DFLP OFFICIALS FOR A BREAKING OF AND END TO THE SOUTH LEBANON CEASEFIRE?

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-- A: OUR VIEWS ON THE IMPORTANCE OF THE CEASEFIRE ARE WELL KNOWN. WE CONTINUE TO BELIEVE STRONGLY THAT THE CEASEFIRE SHOULD BE MAINTAINED AND STRENGTHENED BECAUSE IT SERVES IMPORTANT HUMANITARIAN INTERESTS AND IS IN THE

INTERESTS OF RESPONSIBLE PARTIES. PUBLIC STATEMENTS, SUCH AS THE ONE TO WHICH YOU REFER, FROM ANY QUARTER THAT CALL FOR THE BREAKDOWN OF THE CEASEFIRE ARE IRRESPONSIBLE. HAIG

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE IM/IPS/CR/IR Date: 11/6/82
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FOIA Exemptions _____ TS authority to
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E.O. 12065:RDS-1,3 (DRAPER, MORRIS)

TAGS: PEPR, MOPS, IS, LE, U.S.

SUBJECT: HABIB BRIEFING OF ISRAELI AMBASSADOR MARCH 16

1. ~~ENTIRE TEXT.~~

2. AMB. HABIB TALKED TO ISRAELI AMB. ARENS MARCH 16
MAINLY ON RESULTS OF REMAINDER OF HIS TRIP FOLLOWING
SECOND STOP IN JERUSALEM. NECHUSTAN AND SABEL-WERE THERE,

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ALONG WITH DRAPER AND KIRBY ON THE U.S. SIDE.- FOLLOWING-
ARE HIGHLIGHTS.

3. THE ISRAELI IDEA FOR A U.S.-ISRAELI COMMISSION TO
DISCUSS LEBANESE CONTINGENCIES, AS WELL AS BEGIN'S EARLIER
IDEA OF A TRIPARTITE COMMISSION INVOLVING FRANCE, THE
U.S. AND ISRAEL, CAME UP DURING THE TALK, PARTICULARLY
WHEN THE ISRAELIS PRESSED FOR MORE INFORMATION ABOUT -
HABIB'S TALKS IN PARIS. IN ESSENCE, HABIB SAID TO ARENS

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THAT HE HAD TOLD THE FRENCH THAT A-TRIPARTITE COMMISSION WOULD NOT BE A GOOD IDEA, THAT HE HAD MADE THIS POINT TO BEGIN AND OTHER ISRAELIS, AND THAT THE FRENCH AGREED. (COMMENT: WE WERE INFORMED BEFORE HABIB'S-DEPARTURE FROM ISRAEL THAT BEGIN HAD NOT RAISED THE TRIPARTITE COMMISSION IDEA WITH THE FRENCH, IN PART BECAUSE OF HABIB'S ADVICE AGAINST DOING SO. IN PARIS, HOWEVER, IT BECAME EVIDENT

THAT SHARON -- NOT BEGIN -- MAY HAVE MENTIONED THE IDEA IN PASSING TO A FRENCH REPRESENTATIVE. FOR THAT REASON, HABIB SPOKE AGAINST THE IDEA AND THE FRENCH INDICATED THAT THEY HAD ALREADY DISMISSED THE IDEA. IT WAS IN THIS CONTEXT THAT HABIB MADE HIS POINTS TO ARENS, ALTHOUGH HE DID NOT GO INTO THIS DETAIL. END COMMENT.)

4. AS REGARDS THE U.S-ISRAELI COMMISSION, HABIB TOLD ARENS HE INTENDED TO RAISE THE PROPOSAL WITH THE PRESIDENT, SINCE HE HAD PROMISED BEGIN HE WOULD DO SO. HE SAID, HOWEVER, THAT HE WOULD RECOMMEND AGAINST FORMING A FORMAL STRUCTURE. HE WAS CONCERNED OVER THE POSSIBILITY OF LEAKS ABOUT SUCH A FORMAL ARRANGEMENT. AT THE SAME TIME, HOWEVER, HABIB SAID TO ARENS THAT HE WOULD FAVOR MORE REGULAR AND MORE SYSTEMATIC CONSULTA-

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TIONS BETWEEN THE U.S. AND ISRAEL ABOUT LEBANON ON A STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL BASIS. ARENS POINTED OUT THAT A SIZEABLE NUMBER OF ISSUES OF COMMON CONCERN CONFRONT THE U.S. AND ISRAEL AND EXPRESSED HIS VIEW THAT THERE WAS NO ADEQUATE CONSULTATION BETWEEN OUR TWO GOVERNMENTS. RETURNING TO THE COMMISSION CONCEPT, HABIB SAID THAT HIS OWN PERSONAL PARTICIPATION IN A FORMAL GROUP ON LEBANON WOULD RUIN HIS CREDIBILITY WITH THE LEBANESE AND THE ARABS GENERALLY.

5. AS THIS PART OF THE CONVERSATION DREW TO AN END, HABIB TOLD ARENS THAT HE WAS CONFIDENT THAT THE U.S. WOULD PROPOSE SOMETHING SATISFACTORY AND VERY SPECIFIC TO THE ISRAELIS FOLLOWING THE MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT. DRAPER BROKE IN TO DRIVE HOME THE POINT THAT WE WANTED TO HAVE GOOD CONSULTATIONS WITH THE ISRAELIS.

6. AS FOR INVOLVEMENT OF THE FRENCH, HABIB MADE IT CLEAR THAT IT WAS HIS UNDERSTANDING THAT THE FRENCH WANTED TO CARRY ON CONSULTATIONS WITH THE ISRAELIS, WHICH HAD STARTED DURING MITTERAND'S VISIT.

7. HABIB REPORTED HE HAD FOUND THE FRENCH VERY PLEASED WITH MITTERAND'S VISIT TO ISRAEL AND LOOKING FORWARD TO SHAMIR'S COMING TO FRANCE. WHEN ASKED BY THE FRENCH

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WHAT THEY COULD DO AT THIS POINT TO HELP THE GENERAL CEASE-FIRE AND LEBANESE SITUATION, HABIB SAID HE HAD TOLD THEM THAT, IF THEY WISHED, THEY COULD USEFULLY SUPPLEMENT THE U.S. MESSAGE TO THE ARAB SIDE THAT A SERIOUS PROVOCATION WOULD EVOKE A VERY STRONG ISRAELI REACTION. HE HAD FOUND FRENCH THINKING PARALLEL TO OUR OWN.

8. ARENS INQUIRED ABOUT THE SYRIAN MISSILES WHICH ARE STILL IN THE BEKAA VALLEY. HABIB RESPONDED THAT THE CEASEFIRE WAS MORE IMPORTANT AND THAT THE IMPORTANT

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THING CONCERNING THE MISSILES WAS THAT THE SYRIANS WERE NOT FIRING THEM. WHILE HE HAD MENTIONED THE MISSILES, HE HAD BEEN COMPELLED BY THE SITUATION TO ADDRESS THE CEASE-FIRE AS A MORE IMPORTANT PRIORITY.

9. HABIB SAID THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE PLO AND SYRIA CURRENTLY RUN VERY DEEP. HE HAS BEEN LED TO UNDERSTAND, HOWEVER, THAT ALL FACTIONS OF THE PLO ACCEPT THE CEASE-FIRE. ARENS EXPRESSED THE VIEW THAT IF SYRIA THINKS THE CEASE-FIRE IS A POSITIVE STEP, THEN IRAQI-SUPPORTED FACTIONS OF THE PLO WOULD OPPOSE IT. HABIB SAID THIS WAS NOT NECESSARILY SO, SINCE THE FACTIONS ALLIED WITH IRAQ ARE PRIMARILY FOCUSED ON OPPOSING THE SYRIANS (AND ARE NOT NECESSARILY INTERESTED IN PROVOKING THE ISRAELIS AT THIS TIME).

10. ARENS ASKED WHAT HABIB HAD FOUND OUT ABOUT SYRIAN FORCES AT BEAUFORT CASTLE. HABIB ASSURED ARENS THAT HE HAD ASKED ABOUT THAT, AS WELL AS ABOUT THE TWO SYRIAN BATTALIONS WHICH ALLEGEDLY HAD MOVED SOUTH OF THE RED LINE IN THE NABATYYAH AREA. LEBANESE G-2 ABDU HAD TOLD HABIB PERSONALLY THAT THERE WERE NO SYRIAN FORCES AT BEAUFORT CASTLE AND THAT NO SYRIAN BATTALIONS HAD MOVED BELOW THE RED LINE. DRAPER SAID THAT OUR INTELLIGENCE AS REGARDS BEAUFORT WAS "INCONCLUSIVE" AND ADDED IN EFFECT WE WERE NOT TAKING ABDU'S STATEMENT AS THE FINAL WORD.

11. ARENS WONDERED HOW LONG THE PLO COULD JUST SIT IN THEIR PRESENT POSITIONS. HABIB RESPONDED "AS LONG AS YOU SCARE THEM." HABIB ADDED THAT THE WORD HAS GONE OUT THAT THE CEASEFIRE IS TO HOLD. WHEN THAT WORD IS CHANGED, OBVIOUSLY "ALL HELL WILL BREAK LOOSE". HABIB

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REITERATED THAT THE PLO CHAIN-OF-COMMAND SEEMS TO BE WORKING. HABIB ALSO INFORMED ARENS THAT THE U.S. WAS HOPING TO PROVIDE SOME ASSISTANCE TO JORDAN, SUCH AS SENSORS AND NIGHT DETECTION EQUIPMENT, TO IMPROVE ITS ANTI-TERRORIST CAPABILITY. DAS DRAPER ADDED THAT THE JORDANIANS HAVE SET ASIDE A ONE KILOMETER STRIP ALONG THE RIVER IN WHICH NO ONE IS ALLOWED AT NIGHT.

12. HABIB SAID ABOUT HIS TALKS IN BEIRUT THAT, WITH EACH FACTIONAL LEADER IN TURN, HE HAD STRESSED U.S. SUPPORT FOR THE INTEGRITY OF LEBANON AND OUR CONCERN OVER THE CONTINUED SYRIAN PRESENCE IN THE COUNTRY.

HABIB ALSO REMARKED ON AN INCREASED WILLINGNESS AMONG BOTH SUNNI AND SHIITE MUSLIMS TO COOPERATE WITH THE CHRISTIANS. THEIR COMMON DESIRE IS TO SEE THE DEPARTURE FROM LEBANON OF BOTH THE SYRIANS AND THE PLO. THERE IS LESS INCLINATION ON THE PART OF THE DRUZE TO COOPERATE WITH THE CHRISTIAN LEADERSHIP AND FRANJIEH IS NOT INTERESTED AT ALL. HABIB ALSO FOUND A GREATER APPRECIATION OF SARKIS THAN PREVIOUSLY, ESPECIALLY REGARDING HIS ABILITY TO WORK WELL WITH THE PRIME MINISTER.

13. HABIB FOUND BASHIR WILLING TO SUPPORT THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT AND TO ABIDE BY THE ELECTORAL PROCESS. THERE IS STILL NO MEANINGFUL DIALOGUE, HOWEVER, BETWEEN SYRIA AND THE MARONITES; BASHIR IS WILLING TO TALK BUT THE SYRIANS ARE NOT. ARENS REMARKED THAT ISRAELI ASSISTANCE TO CHRISTIAN ELEMENTS, BEGINNING IN 1976, HAD BEEN INDISPENSIBLE IN STAVING OFF DISASTER, AND AT A TIME WHEN NO ONE ELSE WAS BEING HELPFUL. REACTING TO THE IMPLICATION THAT A MASS MASSACRE HAD NARROWLY BEEN AVERTED, HABIB OBSERVED THAT, IN HIS OPINION, THE CHRISTIANS WOULD HAVE SURVIVED IN ANY CASE. (COMMENT: OUR NOTES AND COLLECTIVE MEMORY DO NOT RECORD THAT HABIB SAID- "BASHIR DOESN'T NEED YOUR HELP", ALTHOUGH HABIB SAID

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IN EFFECT THAT THE PUBLICITY ATTENDING ISRAEL'S RELATIONSHIP WITH BASHIR WAS NOT HELPING HIM. END COMMENT)-

14. AT CONCLUSION OF MEETING, ARENS VOLUNTEERED HIS STRONG MISGIVINGS CONCERNING THE RECENTLY ADOPTED UNIFIL EXPANSION RESOLUTION. ANSWERING HIS QUESTION AS TO WHAT THE FURTHER 1,000 TROOPS WOULD DO, ARENS POINTED OUT THAT THE RESOLUTION LEAVES OPEN THE POSSIBILITY THAT A LARGER UNIFIL COULD EXPAND INTO THE HADDAD ENCLAVE. HABIB AND DRAPER RESPONDED THAT THE 1,000 ADDITIONAL PERSONNEL COULD BE USED TO STRENGTHEN UNIFIL IN VARIOUS AREAS, INCLUDING THE GAP, AND TO REINFORCE SOME OF THE

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WEAKER UNITS, THEREBY MAKING IT MORE DIFFICULT FOR -
PLO FORCES TO HARASS HADDAD. THERE MIGHT BE-SOME RE-
ARRANGEMENT WITH THE WEAKER UNIFIL UNITS. ARENS WAS ALSO
REMINDING THAT CALLAGHAN IS COMMITTED TO DISCUSSING THE-
DEPLOYMENT OF THE ADDITIONAL FORCES WITH ISRAEL BEFORE
THE FACT AND THAT WE BELIEVED HE WOULD MOVE CAUTIOUSLY.
WE HAD ASKED THE ISRAELIS TO BE OPEN-MINDED. (FYI. ARENS
HAD BEEN DISSUADED FROM COMING IN TO PROTEST UNIFIL -
RESOLUTION AT THE TIME OF ITS PASSAGE, AND OBVIOUSLY
SEIZED THIS OCCASION TO CLEAR HIS BOOKS. END FYI.)
DRAPER SAID TO SABEL LATER THAT HE COULD NOT UNDERSTAND
ISRAEL'S CONCERN OVER THE RESOLUTION, WHICH COULD EASILY
HAVE BEEN FAR WORSE AND WHICH BROKE NO NEW GROUND.-

SABEL SAID REITERATION OF 425, AND ITS MENTION OF ISRAEL,
LENT THE RESOLUTION AN "UNBALANCED" NATURE. STOESSEL

[REDACTED]

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cation *** [REDACTED]

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EO Citations

FOIA Exemptions
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PARIS 09225

EX-16 DECAPTIONED

9302566

E.O. 12065: RDS-1 3/15/02 (MARESCA, JOHN J.) OR-M
TAGS: PEPR, PINT, IS, FR, LE
SUBJECT: HABIB MISSION: MEETING WITH ELYSEE SECRETARY
GENERAL, MARCH 12

1. ~~ENTIRE TEXT~~

2. AMBASSADOR HABIB AND DAS DRAPER, ACCOMPANIED BY
CHARGE AND POL OFFICER CALLED ON PIERRE BEREGOVY,
SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE ELYSEE AT THE LATTER'S REQUEST
ON THE EVENING OF MARCH 12. THE HOUR-LONG CONVERSATION
COVERED PRESIDENT MITTERRAND'S TRIP TO ISRAEL, HABIB'S
MISSION AND THE SITUATION IN LEBANON.

3. ON MITTERRAND'S TRIP TO ISRAEL, BEREGOVY SAID THERE
WERE THREE PRINCIPAL REASONS FOR IT, THOUGH HE ONLY
ENUMERATED TWO OF THESE BEFORE GETTING OFF THE SUBJECT.
THE FIRST REASON WAS TO SHOW THAT FRANCE DOES NOT
ACCEPT TO BE TOLD WHAT IT MAY OR MAY NOT DO BY ANY

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OTHER STATE. BEREGOVY NOTED THAT THE ISRAELI TRIP
WAS PRECEDED BY TRIPS TO SUCH ARAB COUNTRIES AS
SAUDI ARABIA AND ALGERIA AND THAT MITTERRAND WILL BE
VISITING MOROCCO, TUNISIA AND JORDAN.

4. THE SECOND OBJECTIVE WAS TO ALLOW FRANCE TO LAY OUT
ITS POSITION CLEARLY BEFORE THE KNESSET. HABIB ASKED
WHAT THE NEXT STEP IN FRANCE'S MIDDLE EAST POLICY
WOULD BE, TO WHICH BEREGOVY REPLIED THE VISIT TO

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JORDAN.

5. BEREGOVVOY COMMENTED THAT WE MUST FIND A SOLUTION FOR THE PALESTINIANS. HE SAID THE MEANS OF GETTING THERE IS WHAT SEPARATES THE PRESENT FRENCH GOVERNMENT FROM THE PREVIOUS ONE AND FROM ITS EUROPEAN PARTNERS. ASKED WHAT ISRAEL'S REACTION TO THE FRENCH ON THE PALESTINIAN QUESTION WAS, BEREGOVVOY SAID BEGIN HAD TOLD MITTERRAND "LET ME HAVE FIVE YEARS FOR AUTONOMY. IN FIVE YEARS WE WILL SEE." BEREGOVVOY SAID WE MUST PUSH THE PROCESS OF AUTONOMY UNTIL IT RUNS ITS COURSE, THEN WE MUST SEEK DIRECT SECRET TALKS BETWEEN ISRAEL AND THE ARABS.

6. BEREGOVVOY REMARKED THAT ISRAEL NEEDED THE U.S. IN ORDER TO BE ABLE TO FACE UP TO THE SYRIANS. HABIB REPLIED THAT JORDAN ALSO NEEDED HELP IN FACING A POTENTIAL THREAT FROM SYRIA.

7. AMBASSADOR HABIB BRIEFED BEREGOVVOY ON HIS MISSION IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND THE STATUS OF THE CEASEFIRE. IN DISCUSSING THE LEBANESE SITUATION, AMBASSADOR HABIB MADE THE POINT, EMPHATICALLY, ABOUT STAYING AWAY FROM SCHEMES WHICH ENVISAGE THE PARTITION OR CANTONIZATION OF LEBANON. THESE WOULD BE A BIG MISTAKE. BEREGOVVOY

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DID NOT DISAGREE AND, IN FACT, LATER IN THE CONVERSATION NOTED THAT THERE WAS A COMMONALITY OF VIEWS BETWEEN US.

8. BEREGOVVOY BROUGHT OUT AN ELEMENT WITH REGARD TO MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO LEBANON ABOUT WHICH WE WERE NOT PREVIOUSLY AWARE. WHEN MITTERRAND VISITED SAUDI ARABIA LAST SEPTEMBER AN AGREEMENT WAS REACHED UNDER WHICH THE SAUDIS WOULD PROVIDE THE FINANCING AND THE FRENCH THE TRAINING FOR THE LEBANESE ARMY. HOWEVER, BEREGOVVOY COMMENTED THAT "THIS HAS NOT EVOLVED WELL."

9. THIS CABLE HAS NOT BEEN CLEARED WITH EITHER AMBASSADOR HABIB OR DAS DRAPER. GALBRAITH

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE IM/PS/CR/IR Date: 11/3/97
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☐ DENY IN PART

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DECAPTIONED

PARIS FOR AMBASSADOR HABIB AND DAS DRAPER

E.O. 12065: RDS-1 3/11/97 (LEWIS, SAMUEL W.) OR-M
TAGS: PEPR, US, IS, LE, SY, JO, XF
SUBJECT: HABIB MEETING WITH LABOR PARTY LEADERS, MARCH 9

1. ~~ENTIRE TEXT~~

2. SUMMARY. AMBASSADOR HABIB BRIEFED LABOR PARTY LEADERS (PERES, RABIN, EBAN, AND DINITZ) ON THE RESULTS OF HIS CURRENT ROUND OF TALKS, WHICH HAD BEEN FOCUSED ON REAFFIRMING THE VALIDITY OF THE CEASEFIRE. THE LABOR LEADERS ENDORSED HABIB'S EFFORTS AND STATED THAT THE OPPOSITION WAS COMMITTED TO THE PRESERVATION OF THE CEASEFIRE AGREEMENT. OPPOSITION LEADER PERES WAS DISTURBED ABOUT THE DIRECTION IN WHICH KING HUSSEIN IS TAKING JORDAN AND DESCRIBED A THREE-POINT MESSAGE WHICH HE

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BELIEVED ISRAEL SHOULD CONVEY TO THE KING. THERE WAS A GENERAL REVIEW OF THE AUTONOMY NEGOTIATIONS AND THE PEACE PROCESS ON WHICH THE LABOR LEADERS GAVE A GLOOMY VIEW. END SUMMARY.

3. AMBASSADOR HABIB MET WITH LABOR PARTY LEADERS PERES, RABIN, EBAN AND DINITZ DURING A ONE AND HALF HOUR BREAKFAST MEETING ON MARCH 9. ATTENDING ON THE AMERICAN SIDE WERE AMBASSADOR LEWIS,

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DAS, DRAPER AND POL/C HARE. THE DISCUSSION CENTERED ON THREE THEMES: THE LEBANESE SITUATION AND THE CEASEFIRE, THE JORDANIAN/ISRAELI RELATIONSHIP, AND CAMP DAVID AND THE PEACE PROCESS.

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4. HABIB FIRST REVIEWED THE OBJECTIVES OF HIS MISSION, WHICH WERE TO RESTORE THE VALIDITY OF THE CEASEFIRE AND TO OBTAIN A GOOD READING ON THE INTERNAL SITUATION IN LEBANON, AND DESCRIBED THE GENERAL OUTLINES OF HIS DISCUSSIONS THUS FAR. HE HAD MADE IT CLEAR TO ALL OF HIS ARAB INTERLOCUTORS THAT THE LATE JANUARY TERRORIST INFILTRATION ACROSS THE JORDAN BORDER, COMING FROM LEBANON, WAS A VIOLATION OF THE CEASEFIRE AGREEMENT, AND WAS REASSURED THAT ALL PARTIES FULLY UNDERSTOOD THIS INTERPRETATION AND WOULD USE THEIR INFLUENCE WITH THE PLO TO SEE THAT THE CEASEFIRE WAS MAINTAINED. RABIN ASKED IF THE CEASEFIRE WOULD BE VIOLATED IF A TERRORIST GROUP ORIGINATING IN JORDAN OR SYRIA RATHER THAN LEBANON CROSSED INTO ISRAEL TO CARRY OUT A TERRORIST OPERATION. HABIB RESPONDED THAT HE HAD TOLD THE SYRIANS, WHEN THEY HAD RAISED THIS QUESTION, THAT HE WAS NOT INTERESTED IN SUBTERFUGES BUT IN REASONABLE UNDERSTANDINGS AND

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INTERPRETATIONS. THE SYRIANS UNDERSTOOD THIS POINT. AMBASSADOR LEWIS POINTED OUT THAT THE SITUATION BECAME MORE AMBIGUOUS WHEN A BOMB WENT OFF SOMEWHERE IN ISRAEL WITHOUT ANY CLEAR CONNECTION TO LEBANON.

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5. PERES ASKED ABOUT THE MISSILES. HABIB SAID THAT THIS HAD BEEN DISCUSSED BUT IT WAS NOT HIS MAJOR PREOCCUPATION. IT WAS MUCH MORE IMPORTANT AND SIGNIFICANT AT THIS STAGE TO REAFFIRM THE VALIDITY OF THE CEASEFIRE AGREEMENT DURING THIS ROUND OF TALKS.

6. IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS ON THE BUILDUP OF PLO WEAPONRY IN SOUTHERN LEBANON, HABIB SAID HE HAD WORKED HARD ON THIS PROBLEM BUT HAD NOT ACHIEVED TANGIBLE RESULTS THUS FAR. HE AGREED WITH THE ISRAELI POSITION THAT A BUILDUP HAD TAKEN PLACE, THOUGH WE MIGHT DIFFER ON NUMBERS. LEWIS STATED THAT WE ALSO AGREED THAT THE BUILDUP WAS HARMFUL; HOWEVER, IT DID NOT VIOLATE TERMS OF THE CEASEFIRE AGREEMENT, AND WAS CERTAINLY NOT SUFFICIENTLY GRAVE TO JUSTIFY A PREEMPTIVE STRIKE BY ISRAEL.

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7. PERES BRIEFLY DESCRIBED THE LABOR'S VIEWS TOWARD THE CEASEFIRE AND LEBANON. LABOR RESPECTS THE CEASEFIRE IN THE NORTH, AS WELL AS THE CEASEFIRE WITH SYRIA, AND BELIEVES IT SHOULD BE RELIGIOUSLY OBSERVED, AS LONG AS ISRAEL IS NOT

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PROVOKED. IT WOULD BE UNWISE TO TRY TO DECIDE IN ADVANCE HOW ISRAEL SHOULD RESPOND TO SPECIFIC VIOLATIONS. ONLY THE CABINET COULD MAKE THIS DECISION. WHILE LABOR SAW ONLY GRAVE HARM IF ISRAEL WERE THE FIRST TO VIOLATE THE CEASEFIRE, ANOTHER WAR OF ATTRITION IN THE NORTH WOULD BE UNACCEPTABLE AND COULD ONLY BE MET BY MILITARY FORCE. PERES THOUGHT THAT THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM

IN LEBANON MUST BE RESOLVED POLITICALLY, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE PALESTINIAN STATUS AS REFUGEES IN LEBANON.

8. RABIN SAID THE MAJOR DANGER IN THE MIDDLE EAST AT THE PRESENT TIME WAS THAT THE PLO COULD DECIDE WHEN TO "PULL THE TRIGGER." THE PROBLEM WAS FURTHER COMPOUNDED BY THE LOCATION OF SYRIAN FORCES IN SOUTH LEBANON, WHICH HE ESTIMATED AS TWO BATTALIONS, WHOSE ARTILLERY COULD REACH THE

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NORTHERN SETTLEMENTS IN THE FINGER OF GALILEE. THEREFORE, IF ISRAEL WERE FORCED TO ENGAGE THE PALESTINIANS, IT WOULD ALMOST INEVITABLY SUCK IN THE SYRIANS. HABIB AGREED ABOUT THE DANGER AND STATED THAT SYRIA HAD BEEN WARNED ABOUT THE PROBLEM OF ESCALATION OF HOSTILITIES. RABIN ALSO SERIOUSLY DOUBTED THAT THE PLO COULD KEEP QUIET FOR VERY LONG, ESPECIALLY AFTER THE WITHDRAWAL FROM THE SINAI WAS COMPLETED.

9. HABIB ASKED WHAT COULD BE DONE TO IMPROVE THE SITUATION. PERES RESPONDED THAT IT WOULD BE HELPFUL IF THE UNITED STATES PUBLICLY DESCRIBED ITS INTERPRETATION OF THE CEASEFIRE AGREEMENT IN ORDER TO REMOVE ANY AMBIGUITY. LEWIS NOTED THAT A PUBLIC DECLARATION COULD PROMPT A PUBLIC REJECTION OF THAT INTERPRETATION FROM ARAFAT AND MAKE IT IN FACT HARDER FOR HIM TO PRESERVE THE CEASEFIRE, WHOSE TERMS HE WELL UNDERSTANDS. HABIB SAID HE WOULD THINK ABOUT WHAT WE COULD SAY PUBLICLY AFTER HE HAD REPORTED TO THE PRESIDENT. PERES ALSO SAID IT WOULD BE USEFUL IF WE COULD LESSEN THE VIEW THAT ISRAEL WAS ON THE VERGE OF INVADING LEBANON. LEWIS SAID THIS IMPRESSION HAD BEEN FUELED BY SPECULATIVE PRESS STORIES ORIGINATING IN JERUSALEM AND SOME RATHER TOUGH STATEMENTS BY ISRAELI SPOKESMEN. THIS WAS WHY AMBASSADOR HABIB HAD BROUGHT AN ORAL MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT ADVISING THE PRIME MINISTER IN A FRIENDLY WAY TO CALM THE PUBLIC RHETORIC. LEWIS ALSO NOTED THAT SHARON HAD TRIED TO CORRECT THIS IMPRESSION DURING HIS INTERVIEW WITH ABC LAST SUNDAY.

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10. RABIN ADDED THAT THE U.S. SHOULD FOCUS ON THREE OBJECTIVES: PRESERVING THE CEASEFIRE, FOSTERING CHRISTIAN/MUSLIM AGREEMENT ON A PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE, AND GETTING THE SAUDIS TO MOVE ON THE SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL ISSUE. THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS, HE OBSERVED, COULD BRING ABOUT A RESUMPTION OF CIVIL WAR IN LEBANON WITH TRAGIC CONSEQUENCES FOR THE MIDDLE EAST. HABIB REPLIED THAT HE TOTALLY AGREED WITH THESE OBJECTIVES AND ADDED THAT THE SAUDIS ALSO FULLY UNDERSTOOD AND APPRECIATED THEIR SIGNIFICANCE.

11. PERES DESCRIBED HIS CONCERN ABOUT THE DIRECTION WHICH KING HUSSEIN APPEARED TO BE TAKING, ESPECIALLY OF THE KING'S INTEREST IN ACQUIRING WEAPONS WHICH HAD LED THE OPPOSITION TO JOIN THE GOVERNMENT IN OPPOSING THE AMERICAN SUPPLY OF WEAPONS TO JORDAN. THE ARABIC LANGUAGE BROADCASTS ON JORDAN RADIO HAVE ALSO RECENTLY BECOME MORE MILITANT AND ANTI-ISRAELI, WHICH CAST FURTHER DOUBT ON JORDAN'S WILLINGNESS TO ENTER INTO NEGOTIATIONS. IN ORDER TO DEFLECT JORDAN FROM THIS DANGEROUS COURSE, PERES THOUGHT THAT IT WOULD BE CONSTRUCTIVE IF A MESSAGE COULD BE PASSED TO THE KING WHICH WOULD STATE THAT: (A) ISRAEL RESPECTS THE INTEGRITY OF JORDAN'S TERRITORY AND THE RULE OF THE HASHEMITES, (B) ISRAEL WILL COME TO JORDAN'S SUPPORT IF SYRIA INVADES JORDAN, AND (C) ISRAEL WANTS TO MAINTAIN THE PRAGMATIC ARRANGEMENTS WHICH HAVE GOVERNED THE RELATIONSHIP AND ENSURED A

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PEACEFUL BORDER DURING THE LAST EIGHT YEARS. IT WAS IMPORTANT TO GET JORDAN INTERESTED IN PEACE AND NOT IN ACQUIRING MORE WEAPONS. LEWIS ASKED IF THERE WAS ANY WAY THE GOVERNMENT WOULD AGREE TO SENDING SUCH A MESSAGE TO JORDAN. PERES THOUGHT IT WAS POSSIBLE AND THAT THE OPPOSITION INTENDED TO RAISE THESE POINTS INFORMALLY WITH THE GOVERNMENT.

12. THERE WAS A GENERAL DISCUSSION OF CAMP DAVID AND THE PEACE PROCESS. THE LABOR LEADERS FEARED THAT CAMP DAVID WOULD WIND DOWN BY SEPTEMBER, AT THE LATEST, AND THE ARAB WORLD WOULD GRAVITATE TOWARD A FAHD PLAN, PULLING THE EGYPTIANS ALONG AND ALSO POSSIBLY EVOKING AN AMERICAN INTEREST, WHICH WOULD LEAVE ISRAEL ISOLATED. THEY ALSO QUESTIONED WHETHER ANY PARTIES WOULD IMPLEMENT AN AUTONOMY AGREEMENT IF A STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES

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WERE AGREED TO BY THE U.S., ISRAEL AND JORDAN.

13. LEWIS EMPHASIZED THAT IT WAS IMPERATIVE TO COMPLETE THE AUTONOMY PHASE OF THE CAMP DAVID AGREEMENTS. OTHERWISE, THE ARAB WORLD MIGHT WELL ADOPT A VERSION OF THE FAHD PLAN AND EGYPT WOULD BE TEMPTED IN THE SAME DIRECTION. ISRAEL'S NEGOTIATING POSTURE, HE ARGUED, WAS A KEY FACTOR IN REACHING AN AUTONOMY AGREEMENT. IF TOO MANY ISRAELIS KEPT TALKING ABOUT THE IMPENDING DEATH OF CAMP DAVID, THIS WOULD BECOME A SELF-FULFILLING PROPHECY. LEWIS DID NOT RULE OUT THE POSSIBILITY THAT JORDAN MIGHT TACITLY ACCEPT A

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TRANSITIONAL AUTONOMY ARRANGEMENT BUT, IN ANY
EVENT, ONE WOULD NEVER REACH STAGE 2 (IMPLEMENTATION)
UNLESS WE FIRST SUCCEEDED IN AGREEING ON STAGE 1
(STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES). HABIB SAID THERE WERE
ONLY TWO ROADS, EITHER CONTINUING WITH THE CAMP
DAVID PROCESS OR SEEING IT BREAK DOWN. IT WAS
OBVIOUS WHAT THE CHOICE WAS.

14. THIS MESSAGE WAS NOT CLEARED BY HABIB PARTY.
LEWIS

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BEIRUT 1685

DECAPTIONED

FROM HABIB

E.O. 12065: RDS-1 3/9/02 (BARRETT, ROBERT S.) OR-M
TAGS: PEPR, PINS, PINT, LE
SUBJECT: HABIB VISIT: CALL ON PRIME MINISTER AL-WAZZAN

1. ~~ENTIRE TEXT~~

2. PRIME MINISTER AL-WAZZAN AND I HAD A ONE HOUR CONVERSA-
TION ON MARCH 9, IN THE COMPANY OF AMBASSADOR DILLON, DAS
DRAPER, DCM BARRETT AND PRIME MINISTER'S CHIEF AIDE.
I GAVE HIM AN ACCOUNT OF MY JUST COMPLETED TOUR THROUGH
THE REGION AND OF THE IMPRESSIONS I HAD GAINED, MUCH AS I HAD
DONE EARLIER FOR PRESIDENT SARKIS. THE PRIME MINISTER
MADE THE FOLLOWING COMMENTS AS EACH SUBJECT AROSE:

3. CEASE-FIRE. THIS WAS PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT AT THIS
TIME BECAUSE OF THE FORTHCOMING ELECTIONS AND THE CONSEQUENT

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NEED FOR A CALM ATMOSPHERE IN WHICH TO HOLD THEM. BUT
IT WAS FRAGILE AND NEEDED TO BE BUILT UPON TO BECOME MORE
SOLID. CONCERTED EFFORTS TO ENFORCE UNSC RESOLUTIONS 425 AND 501
WOULD BE USEFUL AS THEY WOULD TEND TO DISCOURAGE BOTH THE
PALESTINIANS AND MAJOR HADDAD'S FORCES FROM BEING TOO
ACTIVE AND ENCROACHING ON THE UNIFIL AREA. IT WAS
IMPORTANT TO KEEP PRESSURE ON ALL THE ELEMENTS
INVOLVED, INCLUDING ISRAEL, AND THE UNSC RESOLUTIONS
PROVIDED THAT BASIS FOR AN ACTIVE RATHER THAN A PASSIVE

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POLICY TOWARD THE PROBLEM OF THE SOUTH.

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4. SAUDI ROLE IN LEBANON. AL-WAZZAN EXPRESSED MILD SKEPTICISM THAT THE SAUDIS WOULD RESUME AN ACTIVE ROLE IN LEBANON OR THAT THEY COULD BE EFFECTIVE. "THEY DON'T WANT TO GET THEIR HANDS DIRTY." HE SAID THAT HE HAD NOT YET RECEIVED HIS INVITATION TO SAUDI ARABIA BUT THAT IT HAD BEEN AGREED UPON IN PRINCIPLE DURING HIS RECENT TRIP TO JIDDA FOR A MEETING OF ARAB INTERIOR MINISTERS. BUT HE THOUGH THE SAUDIS SHOULD PERSEVERE AND AGREED WITH ME THAT WE SHOULD KEEP AFTER THEM TO DO SO.

5. INTERNAL SECURITY. AL-WAZZAN REPEATED HIS STRONGLY FELT OPINION THAT THERE WAS TAKING PLACE A STRONG SURGE OF POPULAR SUPPORT FOR THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT. HE SAID THAT THIS HAD BECOME MANIFEST IN TRIPOLI WHEN THE POPULATION HAD ASKED THAT THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT TAKE OVER THE PORT AREA. THE SYRIAN ADF HAD SUBSEQUENTLY ABRUPTLY LEFT THE PORT AND THE INTERNAL SECURITY FORCES (ISF) HAD HAD TO RUSH IN TO TAKE IT OVER. AL-WAZZAN THOUGH THE SAME THING MIGHT HAPPEN IN PARTS OF BEIRUT AND HE WAS READYING THE ISF FOR SUCH AN EVENTUALITY, AS THE SYRIANS WERE NOT IN THE HABIT OF GIVING MUCH

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NOTICE. HE SAID THAT THE PEOPLE OF TRIPOLI HAD ORIGINALLY ASKED FOR THE ARMY, BUT THAT THIS WAS STILL UNACCEPTABLE TO THE NATIONAL MOVEMENT AND HE DID NOT WANT TO RUSH THINGS. THE PROBLEM OF THE ARMY HAD TO BE WORKED ON, BUT IN THE MEANWHILE HE HAD TO RELY ON THE ISF WHICH HE WAS EXPANDING. HE GAVE HIS OPINION THAT THE CAR BOMBS IN WEST BEIRUT MIGHT BE THE WORK OF PRO-IRAQI ELEMENTS TAKING REVENGE FOR THE DESTRUCTION OF THE IRAQI EMBASSY.

6. PALESTINIAN ISSUE. ACCORDING TO AL-WAZZAN THE PALESTINIANS WELCOME THE CEASE-FIRE IN THE SOUTH AS THEY RECOGNIZE THAT THE LEBANESE ATTITUDE TOWARD THEM IS NOT WHAT IT USED TO BE AND BECAUSE THEY HOPE THAT IN COLLABORATION WITH THE SAUDIS AND BY MEANS OF THE FAHD PLAN THEY CAN MAKE SOME PROGRESS AT THIS TIME TOWARD A STATE OF THEIR OWN. HE SAID THAT THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM HAD TO BE SOLVED FOR IT WOULD NOT DISAPPEAR. THE PALESTINIANS COULD, LIKE THE JEWS, PERSIST FOR 2,000 YEARS IN THE QUEST FOR THEIR OWN LAND. IN THE MEANWHILE, OTHER ELEMENTS, THE COMMUNISTS, WERE THE GAINERS.

7. PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS. AL-WAZZAN SAID THAT THERE IS NOT YET MUCH ACTION IN THIS FIELD. AFTER APRIL

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THINGS WILL BECOME MORE ACTIVE. LEBANON NEEDS A MODERATE FOR PRESIDENT FOR AN EXTREMIST COULD DO NOTHING, EVEN IF HE MANAGED TO GET ELECTED. AL-WAZZAN IS HOPEFUL THAT A COMPROMISE CANDIDATE, ACCEPTABLE TO ALL ELEMENTS, WILL BE FOUND BUT BELIEVES THIS MIGHT NOT COME ABOUT UNTIL THE VERY END OF THE ELECTORAL PERIOD.

8. THIS MESSAGE HAS BEEN CLEARED BY AMBASSADOR HABIB. DILLON

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*** Current Classification *** [REDACTED]

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PARIS FOR AMB HABIB AND DAS DRAPER

E.O. 12065: RDS-4 3/11/02 (CROCKER, RYAN C.) OR-P

TAGS: PEPR, LE, US

SUBJECT: NABIH BARRI DECLINES MEETING WITH HABIB

REF: BEIRUT 1620 (NOTAL)

1. (U) TODAY'S BEIRUT PRESS CARRIES A STATEMENT BY AMAL LEADER NABIH BARRI THAT HE DECLINED TO MEET WITH AMBASSADOR HABIB "BECAUSE OF AMERICAN SUPPORT FOR THE BORDER ENCLAVE (OF SA'D HADDAD) AND THE PRESENCE OF AMERICAN RECRUITS UNDER THE ORDERS OF ISRAEL AND ITS ALLIES." BARRI WENT ON TO EXPRESS HOPE THAT THE U.S. WOULD "TAKE A DECISIVE STAND TO STOP THE CONTINUED HEMORRHAGING OF THE SOUTH AND ACHIEVE JUSTICE FOR THE DISPLACED PALESTININA PEOPLE, A POSITION IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PRINCIPLES OF THE UN AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION ITSELF."

2. (U) AS REPORTED REFTTEL, PRESIDENT SARKIS SPECIFICALLY SUGGESTED THAT AMBASSADOR HABIB SEE BARRI. WHEN WE

PAGE 02 BEIRUT 01735 111335Z

SPOKE WITH HIM MARCH 8 TO ARRANGE AN APPOINTMENT, BARRI RESPONDED VERY POSITIVELY, BUT SAID HE WAS LEAVING BEIRUT THE FOLLOWING DAY ON A PREVIOUSLY SCHEDULED TRIP AND WAS UNCERTAIN HE WOULD RETURN IN TIME. WE AGREED TO LEAVE A TIME OPEN FOR WEDNESDAY AFTERNOON, MARCH 10. BARRI WENT TO DAMASCUS ON MARCH 9 WHERE HE REPORTEDLY MET WITH KHADDAM, AND YESTERDAY WE RECEIVED A CALL FROM AN AIDE WHO SAID BARRI WOULD BE UNABLE TO MAKE THE APPOINTMENT. HE WAS APPARENTLY IN BEIRUT, HOWEVER.

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3. (S) BARRI'S REFERENCE TO "AMERICAN RECRUITS" IS PRESUMABLY BASED ON MEDIA REPORTS THAT SOME AMERICAN CITIZENS ARE SERVING WITH HADDAD'S MILITIAS, AND WE WILL BE IN TOUCH WITH BARRI TO STRAIGHTEN OUT ANY MISCONCEPTION HE MAY HAVE ABOUT U.S. POLICY IN THIS REGARD (HE HAS NEVER RAISED THE SUBJECT WITH US). WE WOULD NOT BE SURPRISED IF HIS TALKS WITH KHADDAM HAD SOMETHING TO DO WITH HIS DECISION.

DILLON

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*** Current Handling Restrictions *** EXDIS
*** Current Classification ***

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UNCLASSIFIEDPAGE 01 BEIRUT 01684 01 OF 02 101043Z
ACTION SS-25INFO OCT-00 ADS-00 SSO-00 /025 W
-----071344 101053Z /15

O 100855Z MAR 82

FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5621

INFO AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE

AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE

USLO RIYADH IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE

USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE

WHITE HOUSE IMMEDIATE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
IM/IPS/OR/IR Date: 11/3/97
☒ RELEASE ☒ DECLASSIFY
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SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIRUT 1684

DECAPTIONED

FROM HABIB

E.OM 12065: RDS-1 3/9/02 (BARRETT, ROBERT S.) OR-M

TAGS: PEPR, PINS, PINT, LE

SUBJECT: HABIB VISIT: CALL ON PRESIDENT SARKIS

1. ~~ENTIRE TEXT~~

2. I HAD A ONE HOUR AND 20 MINUTE MEETING WITH PRESIDENT SARKIS IMMEDIATELY AFTER MY ARRIVAL IN BEIRUT ON MARCH 9. I WAS ACCOMPANIED BY AMBASSADOR DILLON DAS DRAPER, AND DCM BARRETT, AND THE PRESIDENT WAS ATTENDED BY HIS CHIEF AIDE. I DID MOST OF THE TALKING ON THIS OCCASION GIVING A DETAILED ACCOUNT OF MY DEALINGS IN THE NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES SINCE OUR LAST MEETING. I WILL NOT REPORT MY PRESENTATION IN FULL BUT THE HIGHLIGHTS I EMPHASIZED WERE AS FOLLOWS:

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3. THE ISRAELIS HAD ASSURED ME THAT THEY WOULD NOT VIOLATE THE CEASE-FIRE BUT WOULD REACT STRONGLY, NOT ON A "TIT FOR TAT" SCALE, IF THE PALESTINIANS BROKE THE CEASE-FIRE, PARTICULARLY IF CASUALTIES OCCURED IN ISRAEL AS A RESULT OF PALESTINIAN ATTACKS ORIGINATING ON LEBANESE SOIL. THE SITUATION IN ISRAEL IS TENSE, HOWEVER, AS A RESULT OF THE TAKING OF THE GOLAN, THE EVACUATION OF THE SINAI, THE DIFFICULTIES WITH YAMIT, CONCERN WITH

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PALESTINIAN BUILDUP, ETC. THIS TENSION PROBABLY ACCOUNTS FOR THE SHRILL ISRAELI THREATS WHICH ARE BEING MADE. IN SYRIA BOTH THE FOREIGN MINISTER AND THE PRESIDENT SEEMED TO UNDERSTAND THE ISRAELI ATTITUDE TOWARD THE CEASE-FIRE AND SAID THEY WOULD TRANSMIT THE USG VIEWS ON IT TO THE PALESTINIANS. THE SYRIANS DECLINED TO DISCUSS THE LEBANESE SITUATION, MERELY BLAMING PHALANGE-ISRAELI TIES FOR THE INTERNAL LEBANESE SITUATION AND SAYING THEY HAD NO INTENTION OF INTERFERING IN THE LEBANESE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS. I HAD WARNED FOREIGN MINISTER KHADDAM AGAINST A SYRIAN ATTEMPT TO IMPOSE A PUPPET PRESIDENT ON LEBANON BUT KHADDAM DID NOT SEEM TO BE IN A MOOD TO DISCUSS A COMPROMISE. THE JORDANIAN GOVERNMENT DID NOT APPEAR MUCH CONCERNED WITH LEBANON BUT INSTEAD WAS LOOKING AT POTENTIAL PROBLEMS ALONG ITS NORTHERN FRONTIER WITH SYRIA. THE SAUDI LEADERSHIP HAD TOLD ME THAT IT WAS STILL VERY MUCH INTERESTED IN ITS ROLE IN LEBANON, THAT IT WOULD CONSULT THE GOVERNMENT OF LEBANON ON FURTHER ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE AND THAT IT WOULD INVITE LEADING LEBANESE, STARTING WITH THE PRIME MINISTER, TO VISIT SAUDI ARABIA. THE SAUDIS' RELATIONS WITH SYRIA HAD BEEN STRAINED BY THE HAMA UPRISING BUT THEY WERE STILL INTERESTED IN SEEING IF A PARTIAL AND GRADUAL WITHDRAWAL OF THE SYRIAN ARAB DETERRENT FORCES (ADF) COULD BE EFFECTED

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PAGE 03

BEIRUT 01684 01 OF 02 101043Z

AND WANTED TO CONTINUE AN ACTIVE ROLE IN THE ARAB FOLLOW-UP COMMITTEE. I TOLD PRESIDENT SARKIS THAT THE LEADERS OF ALL THESE COUNTRIES HAD VOLUNTARILY EXPRESSED A GREAT RESPECT FOR HIM WHICH SEEMED TO ME A NEW AND WELCOME DEVELOPMENT.

4. SARKIS EXPRESSED CONSIDERABLE INTEREST IN THE CONDITIONS OF THE CEASE-FIRE AS I DESCRIBED THEM. HE ASKED TWO QUESTIONS: (A) WHETHER, AS SHARON HAD SAID, AN ATTACK ON ISRAELI CITIZENS ANYWHERE IN THE WORLD WOULD BE A VIOLATION OF THE CEASE-FIRE AND (B) HOW I COULD HAVE PERMITTED MYSELF TO TOLERATE CONTINUING ISRAELI OVERFLIGHTS OF LEBANON. I REPLIED THAT SHARON HAD ALSO RAISED WITH ME THE ISSUE OF ATTACKS AGAINST ISRAELIS THROUGHOUT THE WORLD. IN REPLY I HAD MADE MY POSITION CLEAR THAT "AN ATTACK ON A SYNAGOGUE IN VIENNA," COULD NOT BE CONSTRUED AS A VIOLATION OF THE CEASE-FIRE ON THE SOUTHERN BORDER OF LEBANON. ON THE QUESTION OF OVERFLIGHTS, I TOLD THE PRESIDENT THAT I HAD NEVER ADMITTED THE RIGHT OF ISRAEL TO CONDUCT SUCH OVERFLIGHTS, BUT THAT IF I HAD ATTEMPTED TO HAVE THEM TERMINATED, THERE WOULD HAVE BEEN NO CEASE-FIRE. I EXPLAINED THE CAREFUL USE OF THE TERM "HOSTILE MILITARY ACTIONS" FROM ONE COUNTRY TO ANOTHER. SARKIS ALSO VOLUNTEERED THE OPINION TO ME THAT THE SO-CALLED PLO BUILDUP WAS NO THREAT TO ISRAEL AS THE PLO ARMS WERE MAINLY INTENDED FOR USE TO ESTABLISH THE PALESTINIAN POSITION IN LEBANON.

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5. SARKIS CLARIFIED FOR ME CERTAIN DEVELOPMENTS WHICH HAD RECENTLY TAKEN PLACE IN LEBANON. HE SAID THAT, CONTRARY TO PRESS SPECULATION, THE ADF WAS NOT WITHDRAWING PART OF ITS FORCES FROM BEIRUT; RATHER IT WAS REGROUPING THE INCREMENTAL ELEMENTS WHICH HAD BEEN BROUGHT INTO BEIRUT A FEW WEEKS AGO FOLLOWING THE WAVE OF AMAL VERSUS COMMUNISTS FIGHTING IN THE SOUTHERN SUBURBS.

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PAGE 01 BEIRUT 01684 02 OF 02 101059Z
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-00 ADS-00 SSO-00 /025 W
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AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE
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SECTION 02 OF 02 BEIRUT 1684

EXDIS

FROM HABIB

SARKIS ALSO SAID, WITHOUT GIVING ANY DETAILS, THAT CERTAIN STEPS HAD BEEN TAKEN TO REINFORCE THE CEASE-FIRE IN BEIRUT AND TO CALM THE SITUATION IN ZAHLAH. IN REPLY TO MY QUESTION, HE TOLD ME THERE WAS NO SUBSTANCE TO THE ISRAELI REPORT (I.E., MY TALK WITH RABIN, PERES,

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ET AL) THAT TWO ADF BATTALIONS HAD MOVED SOUTH IN THE NABATIYAH REGION HE SAID THAT THE SYRIANS CONTINUED TO RESPECT THE RED LINE REPRESENTED BY THE SIDON-JEZZINE ROAD.

6. THE PRESIDENT ALSO SAID THAT NO PROGRESS WAS BEING MADE ON NATIONAL RECONCILIATION. HE REPEATED TO ME HIS BELIEF THAT AN ALL-LEBANESE RECONCILIATION PROCESS COULD ONLY FOLLOW A PHALANGE-SYRIAN UNDERSTANDING AND THAT SO FAR, THE PHALANGE-SYRIAN DIALOGUE, SUCH AS IT WAS, HAD NOT PRODUCED ANY RESULTS IN THIS DIRECTION.

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7. COMMENT: I FOUND THE PRESIDENT NO LESS PESSIMISTIC THAN THE WEEK BEFORE, BUT IN A SEEMINGLY BETTER FRAME OF MIND. THE PRESIDENT WAS OBVIOUSLY APPRECIATIVE OF MY FULL REPORT AND I WILL BE SEEING HIM AGAIN BRIEFLY JUST PRIOR TO MY DEPARTURE FROM LEBANON ON THURSDAY MORNING. DURING ONE EXCHANGE, HE TOLD ME THAT HE COULD NEVER BE "CROSS" WITH ME FOR IF THERE WAS EVER TO BE A SOLUTION TO THE REGION'S AND TO LEBANON'S PROBLEMS IT WAS ME AND/OR THE USG WHICH WOULD BRING IT ABOUT. ON THE OTHER HAND, HE OFFERED ME NO SPECIFIC SUGGESTIONS AS TO WHAT THE USG COULD DO AT THIS TIME. AS HE PUT IT, " I WILL NOT ASK YOU TO CARRY OUT THE UN RESOLUTIONS ON SOUTH LEBANON OR THE PLAN THAT I PRESENTED TO THE ARAB FOLLOW-UP COMMITTEE." IT WAS OBVIOUS TO ME THAT ALTHOUGH HE WAS TOO POLITE TO SUGGEST ANY SPECIFIC U.S. ACTION, IT WAS ALONG THESE LINES THAT HE WISHED WE WOULD ASSIST LEBANON.

8. THIS MESSAGE HAS BEEN CLEARED BY AMBASSADOR HABIB.
DILLON

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE IM/IPS/CR/IR Date: 11/3/97
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SECTION 01 OF 02 TEL AVIV 03632

E.O. 12065: N/A
 TAGS: SOPN, PEPR, IS, LE, XF
 SUBJECT: REACTION TO HABIB VISIT

1. SUMMARY. THE ISRAELI PRESS MARCH 9 IS GIVING FRONT PAGE COVERAGE TO AMBASSADOR HABIB'S MEETING YESTERDAY IN JERUSALEM WITH ISRAELI LEADERS, STRESSING THAT

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PRESIDENT REAGAN'S PERSONAL ENVOY REASSURED THE ISRAELIS THAT ALL PARTIES WANT TO SEE THE CEASEFIRE CONTINUE AND THAT ISRAEL HAS AGREED "NOT TO CHANGE ANYTHING BY FORCE" OR ATTACK UNLESS ATTACKED. THE PRESS IS REPORTING, HOWEVER, THAT NO PROGRESS WAS MADE ON GETTING THE SYRIAN MISSILES OUT OF THE BEKAA VALLEY, NOR ON RESOLVING LEBANON'S PROBLEMS. END SUMMARY.

2. THE MORNING PAPERS PROVIDED ONLY GENERAL COVERAGE OF AMBASSADOR HABIB'S TALKS. HAARETZ, AS WELL AS DAVAR, AL HAMISHMAR, AND HATZOFEH NOTE THAT AMBASSADOR HABIB TOLD PRIME MINISTER BEND FOREIGN MINISTER SHAMIR SEPARATELY THAT "THERE IS A READINESS" IN SYRIA, SAUDI ARABIA, JORDAN AND IN BEIRUT" TO MAINTAIN THE CEASEFIRE. ALL PAPERS REPORT THAT ISRAELI LEADERS TOLD HABIB ISRAEL HAS NO INTENTION OF ATTACKING LEBANON OR INITIATING A CONFLAGRATION.

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3. HAARETZ HAS HABIB PRAISING DEFENSE MINISTER SHARON FOR HIS RESTRAINED COMMENTS ON LEBANON IN HIS MARCH 7 INTERVIEW. AL HAMISHMAR NOTES THAT "POLITICAL ELEMENTS" IN ISRAEL THOUGHT HABIB'S MISSION HAS BEEN "HELPFUL" IN MAINTAINING THE CEASEFIRE BUT OTHER PAPERS (PARTICULARLY DAVAR) ARE UNDERSCORING THAT HABIB HAD BEEN TOLD OF ISRAELI DISSATISFACTION OVER THE CONTINUED PRESENCE OF SYRIAN MISSILES IN LEBANON AND BUILD-UP OF PLO FORCES UNDER THE COVER OF THE CEASEFIRE. THEY INDICATE THAT HABIB WAS GIVEN A DETAILED BRIEFING ON ALLEGED CEASEFIRE VIOLATIONS. NOT HIGHLIGHTED IN THE REPORTING ARE STATEMENTS SO OFTEN HEARD IN RECENT MONTHS THAT ISRAEL "WILL RESPOND FORCEFULLY IF...."

[REDACTED]

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4. THE AFTERNOON PAPERS, YEDIOT AHARONOT AND MAARIV, PROVIDE MORE DETAIL OF AMBASSADOR HABIB'S TALKS AND INTERJECT A NOTE OF CRITICAL COMMENT. IN ONE OF TWO SEPARATE REPORTS RELATING TO THE HABIB VISIT, MAARIV'S ILAN KFIR CLAIMED THAT AMBASSADOR HABIB "ACCEPTED" ISRAEL'S VERSION TO THE EFFECT THAT TERRORIST DEPLOYMENT AND CONCENTRATION OF WAR EQUIPMENT, PARTICULARLY ARTILLERY, CONSTITUTE AN INFRACTION OF THE CEASEFIRE AGREEMENT, SIGNED LAST JULY. "REVEALING" THAT SYRIAN PRESIDENT ASSAD, SAUDI CROWN PRINCE FAHD, AND JORDAN'S KING HUSSEIN HAD EXPRESSED THE FEAR TO HABIB THAT ISRAEL SEEKS AN OPPORTUNITY TO STRIKE AT THE PLO BY "UNPRECEDENTED MEANS," THE PRESIDENTIAL ENVOY REPORTEDLY CALLED ON ISRAEL TO ACT WITH THE UTMOST RESTRAINT AND NOT TO LET ITSELF BE PROVOKED BY THE TERRORISTS. KFIR ALSO REPORTS THAT PRIME MINISTER BEGIN GAVE HABIB A ME FOR PRESIDENT REAGAN THAT ISRAEL IS NOT OBLIGED TO PROVE ITS PEACEFUL INTENTIONS. KFIR REPORTS THAT BEGIN'S STATEMENT WAS MADE IN RESPONSE TO A PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGE CARRIED BY HABIB.

5. YEDIOT'S ARYE ZIMUKI WRITES ALONG SIMILAR LINES, NOTING THAT HABIB FAVORS ISRAEL'S POSITION THAT AN ASSAULT ON TARGETS ON ISRAEL "FROM WHATEVER SIDE" IS A VIOLATION OF THE CEASEFIRE. ACCORDING TO ZIMUKI, HABIB SAID THAT ISRAEL'S MILITARY POWER "CONSTITUTES A SUFFICIENT GUARANTEE FOR THE OTHER SIDE TO TAKE CARE TO MAINTAIN THE CEASEFIRE."

6. MAARIV, IN A POINTED EDITORIAL, CRITICIZED AMBASSADOR HABIB FOR REFUSING TO TALK TO THE

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ACTION NEA-11

INFO	OCT-00	ADS-00	INR-10	EUR-12	SS-10	CIAE-00	H-01
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	PM-09	PA-01	MCT-02	SSM-03	INRE-00	ACDA-12	SSN-02
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AMEMBASSY KUWAIT IMMEDIATE
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SECTION 02 OF 02 TEL AVIV 03632

PRESS AND CHARGED: "NOTHING CHANGES AS A RESULT
OF HIS VISIT. THE MISSILES CONTINUE TO BE
STATIONED IN THE SAME PLACES, THE TENSION IS NOT ALLEVIATED,
THE PAPERS CONTINUE TO PUBLISH THEIR HORROR TALES
ABOUT ISRAELI PREPARATIONS FOR WAR AND ABOUT
AMERICAN WARNINGS AGAINST CEASEFIRE VIOLATIONS."
MAARIV WONDERS WHY HABIB CONTINUES TO COME TO

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THE MIDDLE EAST: "TO MONITOR THE READINESS OF THE PARTIES TO MAINTAIN THE CEASEFIRE, TO COLLECT THE AGREEMENT OF ALL PARTIES TO MAINTAIN THE QUIET, OR BECAUSE THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT HAS A PROMISE FROM PRESIDENT REAGAN THAT THE STATUS QUO ANTE IN LEBANON SHOULD BE RESTORED AND BECAUSE HE (HABIB) WISHES TO MAKE IT CLEAR THAT HE HAS NOT GIVEN UP EVEN THOUGH THE SYRIANS REFUSE TO REMOVE THEIR MISSILES? THERE ARE NO ANSWERS TO THESE QUESTIONS."

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7. ACCOUNTS OF THE HABIB TALKS IN JERUSALEM ALSO REPORT THAT THE PRIME MINISTER'S OFFICE DENIED A MARCH 15 NEWSWEEK REPORT THAT ISRAEL IS SEEKING A PRETEXT TO ATTACK PLO STRONGHOLDS AND THAT SECRETARY HAIG HAD THREATENED ISRAEL WITH A SUSPENSION OF MILITARY AID IF ISRAEL INVADES SOUTHERN LEBANON. LEWIS

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*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a
*** Current Classification ***

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TAGS= PEPR, MOPS, OVIP, XF, LE, IS, FR, US, (HABIB, PHILIP)

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ACTION SS-25

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INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE

SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1479

AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE

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FROM HABIB

E. O. 12065: GDS 3/8/88 (HABIB, P.C.)

TAGS: PEPR, MOPS, XF, LE, IS, FR

SUBJ: HABIB MISSION: SCHEDULE IN BEIRUT

REF: BEIRUT 1579

1. ~~ENTIRE TEXT~~

2. WE WILL BE HAVING MEETINGS IN TEL AVIV ON TUESDAY MORNING, MARCH 9, THE LATEST OF WHICH WILL BE AT 0900, WITH SHARON. IF ALL GOES WELL, WE SHOULD DEPART ISRAEL AT ABOUT 1030 AND ARRIVE IN LEBANON BETWEEN 1115 AND 1130 LOCAL TIME, ASSUMING FLIGHT TIME OF BETWEEN 45-60 MINUTES (ETA'S WILL BE SUBMITTED THROUGH DAO CHANNELS).

3. THIS SCHEDULE COULD SLIP, HOWEVER, AND BELIEVE THAT WE SHOULD PLAY MATTERS SAFE BY SCHEDULING CALL ON SARKIS AT 1230 IN LIEU OF 1200.

4. IF ANY OF THE OTHER MEETINGS SCHEDULED FOR TUESDAY,

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PAGE 02 JERUSA 00694 081032Z

MARCH 9, HAVE NOT YET BEEN FIRMED UP, SUGGEST YOU HOLD

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OFF, SINCE THAT DAY IS GOING TO BE A HEAVY ONE. ONE
OPENING THAT OCCURS TO US WOULD BE A BREAKFAST MEETING
AT THE RESIDENCE THURSDAY, MARCH 11, BEFORE WE LEAVE
FOR PARIS, FOR ANYONE THAT HAD TO BE RESCHEDULED FROM
TUESDAY. GROVE

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*** Current Handling Restrictions *** EXDIS

*** Current Classification ***

TRSE-00 PM-09 PA-01 SSM-03 INRE-00 SAL-01 ACDA-12
SSN-02 ICAE-00 SP-02 SPRS-02 /100 W
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O 061355Z MAR 82 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO USLO RIYADH NIACT IMMEDIATE
SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3490
AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE
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SECTION 01 OF 05 TEL AVIV 03508

RIYADH PLEASE PASS AMBASSADOR HABIB

E.O. 12065: N/A
TAGS: PEPR, MILI, IS, LE
SUBJECT: YOSEF HARIF COMMENTARY ON HABIB MISSION AND
LEBANON

REF: FBIS TEL AVIV 051738

1. ENTIRE TEXT.
2. PARAGRAPH 3 BELOW CONTAINS EMBASSY TRANSLATED
EXTENSIVE EXCERPTS OF MARCH 5 COMMENTARY BY

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YOSEF HARIF OF MAARIV WHICH DEALT EXTENSIVELY WITH
THE HABIB MISSION. MAIN THEMES OF HARIF COMMENTARY ARE:

-- ISRAEL HAS GROWN ACCUSTOMED TO "FRUITLESS"
TRAVELS OF HABIB, SO EXPECTATIONS ARE NOT THAT GREAT
FOR SUCCESS. ASSUMPTION RATHER IS THAT SO LONG
AS HABIB IS IN THE REGION OR HIS COMING IS IN THE
CARDS, A FLARE-UP IS NOT LIKELY.

-- THE U.S. HAS ALREADY "FORGOTTEN" THE ORIGINAL
PURPOSE OF THE HABIB MISSION -- TO GET THE SYRIAN
MISSILES OUT OF LEBANON. IN FACT, INSTEAD OF GOING
FIRST TO THE SYRIANS OR TO THE SAUDIS, HABIB
COMES TO ISRAEL SEEKING EVIDENCE THAT ISRAEL WANTS
TO CONTINUE THE CEASEFIRE.

-- BY CONTINUING TO "WARN" ISRAEL AGAINST
UNDERTAKING ANY MILITARY ACTION IN LEBANON, THE UNITED
STATES IS IN EFFECT CONTRIBUTING TO THE "WAR

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ATMOSPHERE" WHICH IT IS TRYING TO DISSIPATE..

-- THE UNITED STATES SHOULD REALIZE THAT ISRAEL IS NOT THE ONLY COUNTRY IN THE REGION TO WHICH MESSAGES SHOULD BE ADDRESSED IF PROGRESS IS TO BE MADE IN REDUCING TENSIONS IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

3. COMMENCE TEXT.

TITLE: REAGAN'S REQUEST TO BEGIN (IN A NOTE DELIVERED BY PHILIP HABIB) THAT ISRAEL "AFFORD PROOF" SHE IS SEEKING PEACE.

WITH LESS GENTLENESS AND MODERATION (THAN IN
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED])

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BEGIN'S EXPOSE TO MITTERRAND ON ISRAEL'S SECURITY BORDERS) BUT STILL WITHOUT "WAVING THE BIG STICK," ISRAEL IN HER COMMUNICATIONS WITH CAIRO THIS WEEK APPARENTLY LEFT NO ROOM FOR DOUBT THAT WHEREAS SHE FOR HER PART WILL NOT BACK DOWN FROM HER PAINFUL CAMP DAVID COMMITMENT TO WITHDRAW FROM THE WHOLE OF SINAI TO THE AGREED BORDERLINE, THE PROCESS CAN STILL BE STYMIED BY THE EGYPTIANS EVEN AT THIS EVE-OF-WITHDRAWAL PHASE WHEN THE IDF HAS IN FACT BEGUN TO EVACUATE THE YAMIT AREA.

ISRAEL HAS STOMACHED THE STRANGE CONDUCT OF PRESIDENT MUBARAK, WHO HAS REFUSED TO COME TO JERUSALEM. SHE HAS IGNORED THE UNPALATABLE STATEMENTS OF EGYPTIAN ENDORSEMENT OF THE DEMAND FOR A PALESTINIAN STATE. AND DESPITE THE GNAWING DOUBTS THAT HAVE ARISEN AS TO THE SUBSTANCE OF THE PEACE AWAITING ISRAEL AFTER APRIL 26, SHE IS RESOLVED TO IMPLEMENT HER PART OF THE PEACE TREATY UP TO THE UTMOST LIMIT -- ALBEIT UP TO AND NOT BEYOND. WHEN THE ARGUMENT AROSE OVER THE MARKING OF THE PERMANENT BORDER BETWEEN EGYPT AND ISREAL, AND THE EGYPTIANS INSISTED ON THEIR OWN "MARKING," ISRAEL INFORMED THEM IN UNEQUIVOCAL TERMS: IF AN AGREEMENT ON THE MARKING OF THE BORDER IS NOT REACHED BEFORE APRIL 26, THEN "WE SHALL NOT BUDGE FROM THE PRESENT LINE."

--
PRESIDENT MUBARAK WAS ABLE TO HEAR WORDS TO THE SAME EFFECT FROM FOREIGN MINISTER YITZHAK SHAMIR. THE NEW EGYPTIAN PRESIDENT MAY HAVE BEEN SURPRISED TO SEE HOW EASILY ISRAEL GAVE UP ON HIS VISIT ON ACCOUNT OF JERUSALEM (INCIDENTALLY, MUBARAK ASKED SHAMIR: "IN WHAT PART OF JERUSALEM DO YOU LIVE, WEST OR EAST?" AND SHAMIR REPLIED: "THERE'S

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H-01 IO-15 NSCE-00 NSAE-00 SSO-00 HA-06 L-03
TRSE-00 PM-09 PA-01 SSM-03 INRE-00 SAL-01 ACDA-12
SSN-02 ICAE-00 SP-02 SPRS-02 /100 W
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O 061355Z MAR 82 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO USLO RIYADH NIACT IMMEDIATE
SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3491
AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE
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ONLY ONE 'PART' -- JERUSALEM....")..... BUT ON AN
ISSUE WHICH THE EGYPTIANS HAVE REGARDED AS MARGINAL
(THE ARGUMENT OVER "A FEW HUNDRED METERS"), ISRAEL
HAS DUG HER HEELS IN: "IT IS UP TO US TO CONCLUDE
THESE NEGOTIATIONS PRIOR TO COMPLETION OF THE
WITHDRAWAL."

THE SELFSAME MESSAGE WAS VOICED BY DEFENSE MINISTER
ARIEL SHARON TO THE U.S. AMBASSADOR IN ISRAEL,
SAMUEL LEWIS, FOR TRANSMISSION TO HIS SUPERIORS IN
WASHINGTON, SO THAT THEY MAY NOT CONTENTEND THEY HAVE

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AGAIN BEEN "SURPRISED" -- IF ISRAEL DOES NOT AFTER ALL WITHDRAW FROM THE REST OF SINAI.

THE AMERICANS, IT TRANSPIRES, TOOK THE MESSAGE SERIOUSLY. THEY BEGAN TO FEAR A DETERIORATION IN EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI RELATIONS. MAYBE THAT IS WHY THEY ALSO TRIED TO PERSUADE PRESIDENT MUBARAK TO VISIT ISRAEL AS HIS PREDECESSOR SADAT HAD DONE WITHOUT BOYCOTTING JERUSALEM. (SADAT ALSO WENT TO THE EASTERN PART OF THE CITY). BUT NOT ONLY THEY, ALSO THE EGYPTIANS TOOK THE ISRAELI WARNING SERIOUSLY: THE FOREIGN MINISTER, KAMAL HASSAN ALI, WHO WAS DUE HERE ON THE 15TH OF THE MONTH, ANNOUNCED THAT HE WOULD INDEED BE COMING THEN, BUT THAT HE WOULD BE PAYING AN ADDITIONAL, EARLIER VISIT ON THE 8TH OF THE MONTH, AT THE BEGINNING OF NEXT WEEK. IT IS EASY TO DIVINE WHY THIS SUDDEN "URGENCY" ON EGYPT'S PART. DEFENSE MINISTER ARIEL SHARON'S MESSAGE, PROMPTED BY THE PRIME MINISTER, STRUCK HOME IN CAIRO: WITHOUT COMPLETION OF THE BORDER-MARKINGS, ISRAEL IS NOT GOING TO BUDGE, NEVER MIND THE BARRICADES ALREADY ERECTED IN THE YAMIT AREA.

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--
BUT THE PRIME MINISTER DID HOLD ONE CONVERSATION THIS WEEK THAT NOT ONLY LACKED GENTLENESS BUT CAME PRETTY NEAR TO "WAVING THE BIG STICK" -- NAMELY, THE CONVERSATION WITH PRESIDENT REAGAN'S SPECIAL ENVOY, PHILIP HABIB. WE HAVE ALREADY GROWN ACCUSTOMED TO THE FRUITLESS TRAVELS OF THIS LIKEABLE DIPLOMAT WHO LIVES UP TO HIS NAME (THE DICTIONARY DEFINITION OF THE HEBREW WORD "HABIB" IS "LOVABLE, LIKEABLE, AMIABLE, BELOVED, DEAR"), SO EXPECTATIONS AREN'T ALL THAT GREAT. EVERYBODY KNOWS THAT THESE MISSIONS,

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ENTRUSTED BY PRESIDENT REAGAN TO PHILIP HABIB, HAVE BUT ONE PURPOSE: TO TRANQUILIZE AND COOL TEMPER IN A REGION WHERE THE DANQER OF WAR HAS BEEN LOOMING THESE MANY WEEKS. THE ASSUMPTION IS THAT SO LONG AS HABIB IS CIRCULATING IN THE REGION AND SO LONG AS HIS COMING IS IN THE OFFING, A RENEWED FLARE-UP IS NOT IN THE CARDS.

WHICH SIGNIFIES THAT THE AMERICAN ADMINISTRATION HAS ALREADY "FORGOTTEN" THE ORIGINAL PURPOSE OF THE HABIB MISSION -- TO GET THE SYRIAN MISSILES OUT OF THE LEBANESE BEKA'A VALLEY. AND LO AND BEHOLD, INSTEAD OF HABIB GOING TO THE SYRIANS, WHETHER DIRECTLY OR THROUGH THE INTERMEDIARY OF THEIR "MODERATE" FRIEND, SAUDI ARABIA, HE COMES TO ISRAEL. SUCH IS THE IMPRESSION: RATHER THAN EXERTING INFLUENCE ON SYRIA, THE PURPOSE OF HABIB'S MISSIONS IS TO EXERT INFLUENCE ON ... MENAHEM BEGIN.

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INDEED, HABIB BROUGHT THE PRIME MINISTER A MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT REAGAN SAYING INTER ALIA -- AND THEREIN LIES ITS PRINCIPAL THRUST -- THAT ISRAEL IS REQUIRED TO AFFORD PROOF (IN THE ORIGINAL ENGLISH: "PROVIDE EVIDENCE") THAT SHE SEEKS PEACE. NO LESS AND NO MORE. IT IS ISRAEL WHO MUST PROVIDE THIS EVIDENCE....

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UNDERSTANDABLY, THESE WORDS WERE SUCH AS TO RATTLE THE PRIME MINISTER. HE ASKED PHILIP HABIB: "DO YOU PLUMB THE DEPTHS OF WHAT IS BEING SAID HERE? READ IT AGAIN*" BEGIN SAID TO HIM SEVERAL TIMES OVER.

ON THE ONE HAND, THE U.S. ADMINISTRATION IS WELL

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RIYADH PLEASE PASS AMBASSADOR HABIB

AWARE THAT THE SYRIANS ARE IN EFFECT IN COMMAND IN LEBANON AND DO THERE AS THEY PLEASE, AS IT WERE ON THEIR OWN HOME GROUND; WHILE THE TERRORISTS, WITH MASSIVE SOVIET AID, ARE REINFORCING THEMSELVES AND PREPARING FOR AN OPERATION AT A TIME TO SUIT THEMSELVES; ON THE OTHER HAND, IT IS ISRAEL WHO IS REQUIRED TO PROVIDE EVIDENCE THAT SHE IS A PEACE-SEEKING COUNTRY.

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THE LONG AND THE SHORT OF IT IS THAT WASHINGTON SEES FIT TO IGNORE THE VERITABLE STATE OF AFFAIRS. IT

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HAS GOTTEN NERVY OF LATE AND IS CONSTANTLY DEMANDING RESTRAINT ON ISRAEL'S PART. AND WHEN AMBASSADOR ARENS DROPS A HINT THAT THE PLO MAY BRING ON A SITUATION WHERE ISRAEL MAY HAVE NO CHOICE BUT TO LAUNCH A PREEMPTIVE OPERATION, UP GETS THE STATE DEPARTMENT SPOKESMAN AND SAYS THAT ACTUALLY THERE HAS BEEN NO MATERIAL CHANGE IN THE SITUATION IN LEBANON (THROUGH MASSIVE REINFORCEMENT OF THE TERRORISTS). EVEN AMBASSADOR LEWIS, WHO WAS PRESENT AT THE MEETING WITH PHILIP HABIB, WAS CONSTRAINED TO REMARK THAT THIS (STATE DEPARTMENT) STATEMENT WAS NOT PARTICULARLY CLEVER -- THIS IS A MILD PARAPHRASE, FOR TEXTUALLY THE AMBASSADOR'S REMARK WAS INCOMPARABLY MORE INCISIVE.

SO REMISS WERE THE SPOKESMAN'S WORDS, THAT SECRETARY OF STATE ALEXANDER HAIG FELT IMPELLED IN PERSON TO COME OUT WITH A DECLARATION THAT HE COULD WELL UNDERSTAND ISRAEL'S CONCERN OVER THE REINFORCEMENT OF THE TERRORISTS IN LEBANON.

--
THE AMERICANS SHARED ALL THE DATA IN ISRAEL'S POSSESSION WHEN THE AMERICAN SPOKESMAN SAW FIT TO POOH-POOH THE REINFORCEMENT OF THE TERRORISTS IN SOUTHERN LEBANON SINCE THE CEASEFIRE PROCLAIMED ON JULY 24, 1981.

SUFFICE IT TO SAY THAT SINCE THE CEASEFIRE, THE NUMBER OF ARTILLERY PIECES IN TERRORIST HANDS HAS RISEN FROM 80 TO SOME 250. ACCORDING TO INTELLIGENCE REPORTS, THE GIST OF WHICH WAS PUBLISHED IN THE AMERICAN PRESS, THE PLO HAS SINCE SIGNIFICANTLY INCREASED ITS STRIKING FORCE: 1,000 TONS OF SOVIET-MADE MILITARY EQUIPMENT, 200 TONS

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FROM SAUDI ARABIA, AND 100 TONS FROM LIBYA,
INCLUDING GROUND-TO-AIR MISSILES, AND THE AIRLIFTS
CONTINUE.

BUT THE SPOKESMAN FELT IMPELLED TO "PLAY IT DOWN,"
FOR SUCH REINFORCEMENT, ALONG WITH ATTEMPTED
INCURSIONS, COULD BE VIEWED BY PUBLIC OPINION AS
WARRANTING AN ISRAELI PREEMPTIVE OPERATION. GEN.
YEHOSHUA SHAGAI'S PUBLIC STATEMENT THIS WEEK SERVED
TO FURTHER SUBSTANTIATE THE TRUTH AS HAIG WITH HIS
SENSE OF JUSTICE SAW FIT TO EXPRESS IT: HE COULD WELL
UNDERSTAND ISRAEL'S CONCERN.

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BEGIN'S RESPONSE TO REAGAN'S MESSAGE WAS CUTTING: DO
WE HAVE TO OFFER THE WORLD EVIDENCE THAT ISRAEL
SEEKS PEACE?*

DEFENSE MINISTER ARIEL SHARON ASKED PHILIP HABIB: HOW
MANY JEWS NEED TO BE KILLED IN A TERRORIST
OPERATION, FOR ISRAEL TO BE ENTITLED, IN YOUR VIEW,
TO EXERCISE HER NATURAL RIGHT OF SELF-DEFENSE? --
TEN? TWENTY DEAD? MAYBE YOU WILL TELL US WHAT IS THE
PRICE WE HAVE TO PAY IN ORDER TO "PROVE TO THE
WORLD" THAT WE DO NOT WANT WAR?

EVEN HABIB STATED CLEARLY THAT ANY TERRORIST INCURSION,
WHETHER FROM THE JORDANIAN BORDER OR FROM ANY
OTHER SECTOR, CONSTITUTES AN OUTRIGHT INFRINGEMENT
OF THE CEASEFIRE. AND HE KNOWS THAT THE NUMBER
OF ATTEMPTED INCURSIONS HAS BEEN GREAT -- AND THAT
ISRAEL HAS NOT STRUCK BACK. CAN HE OR THEY WHO SEND
HIM ON HIS MISSIONS EXPECT ISRAEL TO TAKE IT LYING
DOWN ALL THE TIME?

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 AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE
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RIYADH PLEASE PASS AMBASSADOR HABIB

IT WOULD SEEM THAT THIS VERY DEMARCHE BY REAGAN TO BEGIN, THROUGH THE INTERMEDIARY OF HABIB, IS PROOF THAT ALSO THE AMERICANS REALIZE THERE IS A LIMIT TO ISRAEL'S PATIENCE. HENCE THE ASSESSMENT HERE THAT, ON THIS OCCASION, HABIB WOULD BE CONVEYING A DIRECT MESSAGE BOTH TO RIYADH AND TO DAMASCUS (BEFORE HIS DEPARTURE FROM HERE, THE INFORMATION WAS THAT HE WOULD ALL THE SAME BE GIVEN THE OPPORTUNITY TO SEE PRESIDENT ASSAD IN PERSON), NAMELY, A MESSAGE TO THE EFFECT THAT THE USA WILL NOT BE ABLE TO HOLD ISRAEL IN CHECK INDEFINITELY IF THINGS CONTINUE AS AT

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PRESENT, WITH SYRIA DEEPENING ITS ROOTS IN LEBANON AND THE TERRORIST\$ CONCENTRATING FORCES IN THAT SPECIFIC AREA WHICH THREATENS ISRAEL'S NORTHERN SETTLEMENTS.

ANYWAY, THE PRIME MINISTER'S WORDS TO PHILIP HABIB WERE FORCEFUL. "INSTEAD OF WARNING THEM, YOU WARN US. YOU (THE AMERICANS) ARE LARGELY RESPONSIBLE FOR THIS 'WAR ATMOSPHERE.' THROUGH THESE INCESSANT WARNINGS TO ISRAEL YOU ARE PRODUCING A WAR ATMOSPHERE."

BEGIN'S WORDS WERE IN RESPONSE TO THE "TRANQUILIZING" WORDS OF PHILIP HABIB THAT INDEED HE DOES NOT BELIEVE ISRAEL HARBORS WARLIKE INTENTIONS, BUT THAT SUCH IS THE PREVALENT IMPRESSION IN PUBLIC OPINION AND IN THE MEDIA IN THE USA. SO HABIB, JUST LIKE REAGAN, MERELY WANTED ISRAEL TO IMPROVE HER IMAGE....

IN TRUTH, THE PRIME MINISTER IS WORRIED ALL ALONG THE

LINE AT THE APPROACH OF THE U.S. ADMINISTRATION,
AND HE HAS RECENTLY FOUND DISCREET WAYS OF HIS OWN
OF CONVEYING TO THE ADMINISTRATION HIS CONCERNS ABOUT
ITS ATTITUDE TO ISRAEL.

THE THRUST OF REAGAN'S MESSAGE, GRAVE ENOUGH IN
ITSELF, IS BUT ONE OF MANY ASPECTS OF THE GENERALITY
OF MISUNDERSTANDINGS WHICH CURRENTLY CHARACTERIZE
USA-ISRAEL RELATIONS.

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AT THIS STAGE, WITH THE BENEFIT OF POST-FACTUM WISDOM,
IT LOOKS AS IF ALL THAT THE USA IS AFTER IS TO HAVE
ISRAEL WITHDRAW FROM SINAI IN AN ORDERLY FASHION, SO
AS NOT TO TANGLE WITH EGYPT, AND HAVE ISRAEL REFRAIN

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FROM ACTION AGAINST THE TERRORISTS, SO AS NOT TO TANGLE
WITH EITHER SYRIA OR SAUDI ARABIA, NOR OF COURSE
WITH THE SOVIET UNION.

IN THIS MURKY ATMOSPHERE, DOUBTS HAVE PROLIFERATED
THIS WEEK ABOUT EGYPT'S INTENTIONS. IT AMOUNTS TO
THIS, THAT NOT ONLY HAS ISRAEL NOT SOLVED HER
PROBLEMS IN LEBANON AND IN JUDEA AND SAMARIA, BUT
IT IS STILL AN OPEN QUESTION AS TO WHAT HAPPENS
AFTER APRIL 26 -- "WILL ALSO EGYPT JOIN THE RANKS
OF OUR ENEMIES?"

TO TAKE THIS LINE OF THOUGHT IS TO EXAGGERATE.
EGYPT HAS GOOD REASONS OF ITS OWN NOT TO BREACH
THE PEACE AGREEMENT WITH ISRAEL. SO WHAT IS GOING
TO HAPPEN AFTER APRIL 26 DOES NOT NECESSARILY AFFECT
ISRAELI-EGYPTIAN RELATIONS BUT ISRAEL-U.S. RELATIONS.
THE U.S. APPROACH TO THE STATUS OF JERUSALEM,
THE U.S. DESIRE THAT ISRAEL MAKE FURTHER
CONCESSIONS IN THE AUTONOMY TALKS, AND WASHINGTON'S
OBJECTIONS TO FURTHER SETTLEMENT (IN THE WEST BANK) --
ALL THESE ARE BY WAY OF ATTESTING THAT THE REAL
CONTROVERSY WILL BE RESUMED WITH RENEWED VIGOR
AFTER APRIL 26.

THE NEW ENVOY FOR AUTONOMY MATTERS, MR. FAIRBANKS,
WHO WAS HERE A FORT NIGHT AGO FOR GET-ACQUAINTED
TALKS, HEARD FROM ALL HIS INTERLOCUTORS THAT ISRAEL
WILL NEVER CONSENT TO AUTONOMY AS A SORT OF PASSAGE
WAY TO A PALESTINIAN STATE.

SUDDENLY -- IN A BLEND OF SWEET INNOCENCE AND
FEIGNED NAIVETY -- HE ASKED: IN WHAT WAY CAN THIS
SMALL THING ENDANGER ISRAEL?...

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FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
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SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3494
AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE
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RIYADH PLEASE PASS AMBASSADOR HABIB

"THIS SMALL THING" -- MEANING THAT EVEN IF SOME
INDEPENDENT PALESTINIAN ENTITY COMES INTO BEING,
WILL THAT BE SOMETHING TO ENDANGER ISRAEL?
THIS QUESTION BY FAIRBANKS WOULD SEEM TO MERIT
ATTENTION. HE MAY NOT BE ITS AUTHOR....
IN THE CONTEXT OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S AFFIRMATION
THAT THE USA IS IN EFFECT RESPONSIBLE FOR THE "WAR
ATMOSPHERE" THAT THE WORLD PRESS HAS BEEN BASKING
IN OF LATE, IT IS MOREOVER FAIR TO SAY THAT THE USA
IS ALSO LARGELY RESPONSIBLE FOR THE IMPASSE IN THE
AUTONOMY TALKS. IT WAS THE USA THAT RAISED

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EXTREMIST DEMANDS EVEN AHEAD OF EGYPT, PROMPTED BY THE DESIRE TO BRING IN JORDAN (AND THIS WAS WHERE IT ALL STARTED WITH HAROLD SAUNDERS DASHING OFF TO JORDAN, WHEN THE CAMP DAVID DELIBERATIONS WERE DO E, TO CONVEY TO HUSSEIN THE AMERICAN INTERPRETATION OF THE CAMP DAVID ACCORDS IN RESPECT OF AUTONOMY). WHEREAFTER EGYPT COULD NOT BE EXPECTED TO BE MORE MODERATE THAN THE USA.
WAY BACK IT WAS HENRY KISSINGER WHO WARNED AGAINST OVERLOADING THE PEACE CART.
WEIGH IT DOWN WITH STONES AND WHATNOT, AND YOU'LL NOT BE ABLE TO MOVE IT.

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THIS BON MOT BY KISSINGER JUST ABOUT TELLS THE STORY... ON TO THIS FRAGILE CART OF THE CAMP DAVID ACCORDS, THE USA WISHES TO PACK VIRTUALLY ALL ITS GLOBAL INTERESTS IN THE REGION. BY "AUTONOMY" THE USA SEEKS TO PLACATE SAUDI ARABIA, JORDAN AND LIKEWISE THE PLO. IT HAS CONSEQUENTLY TRIED TO DICTATE THE SUBSTANCE OF AUTONOMY, ONE ALTOGETHER UNACCEPTABLE TO ISRAEL. AND THERE IT MADE ITS MAJOR BLUNDER. IT FAILED TO APPRECIATE THE STRENGTH OF THE OPPOSITION FORTHCOMING FROM ISRAEL. INITIALLY IT HOPED THE BEGIN GOVERNMENT WOULD FALL AND BE REPLACED BY AN ALIGNMENT GOVERNMENT. WHEN THIS MIRACLE DIDN'T MATERIALIZE, IT TRIED TO WOO ISRAEL WITH THE "MEMORANDUM OF STRATEGIC UNDERSTANDING." AND WHEN THIS DIDN'T WORK EITHER, IT RESORTED TO PUNITIVE METHODS.

OF LATE THE IMPRESSION HAS BEEN THAT WASHINGTON HAS COME TO THE CONCLUSION THAT IN DEALINGS WITH BEGIN, PENALTIES WON'T DO THE TRICK.

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IN REPLY TO REAGAN'S LAST NOTE, IN WHICH THE PRESIDENT ASSURED BEGIN THAT THERE HAD BEEN NO CHANGE IN THE POSITION OF THE USA -- FOLLOWING CASPAR WEINBERGER'S DECLARATIONS -- THE PRIME MINISTER WROTE TO HIM: "YOUR WORDS ARE SUCH AS TO DISPEL FEARS, AND IT IS MY HOPE THAT THIS PROMISE OF YOURS, WHICH YOU HAVE GIVEN ME, WILL BE CONSTANTLY MET ALSO IN THE FUTURE"... THE MESSAGE THE PRIME MINISTER RECEIVED THIS WEEK THROUGH PHILIP HABIB WOULD SEEM TO SHOW THAT NOT ALL FEARS HAVE BEEN DISPELLED.

BUT THE ANSWER THE PRIME MINISTER GAVE TO HABIB'S SUPERIOR SHOULD ALSO GO TO SHOW THE ADMINISTRATION THAT THE SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEMS OF THIS CONFLICT-RIDDEN REGION DOES NOT LIE IN MESSAGES AND NOTES REMITTED EXCLUSIVELY TO ONE ADDRESS -- ISRAEL.
END TEXT. LEWIS

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INFO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS PRIORITY

AMCONSUL JERUSALEM PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY

SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5868

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

IN/IPS/GR/IR

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FROM HABIB

E.O.12065: GDS 3/4/88 (VIETS, RICHARD N.) OR-M

TAGS: PEPR, MILI, IS, LE, SY, XF, FR

SUBJECT: HABIB MISSION: PARIS STOP-OVER

REC: PARIS 7547

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1. ~~ENTIRE TEXT.~~

2. WE WILL WANT TO HAVE SOME THOROUGH DISCUSSIONS
IN PARIS. ARRIVAL IN PARIS WILL DEPEND ON HOW MUCH
TIME WE HAVE TO SPEND IN BEIRUT, WHERE WE WILL
PROBABLY ARRIVE IN THE MORNING OF TUESDAY, MARCH 9,
FROM ISRAEL. OUR OWN GUESS IS THAT MEETINGS ON FRIDAY,
MAR.12, INCLUDING A LUNCH, WOULD BE SAFEST FOR
PLANNING PURPOSES AT THIS STAGE, IN WHICH CASE WE
WOULD GO ON TO WASHINGTON ON THE DIRECT FLIGHT TO
DULLES ON SATURDAY MORNING, MARCH 13.

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3. IT IS CONCEIVABLE, HOWEVER, THAT THIS
SCHEDULE WOULD HAVE TO BE ADVANCED BY ONE DAY, WITH
THE MAIN MEETINGS ON THURSDAY, MARCH 11. WILL KEEP
YOU INFORMED. VIETS

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FM AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5388

INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE

AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE

USLO RIYADH IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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Date: 11/3/82

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FOIA Exemptions

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SECTION 01 OF 04 DAMASCUS 01525

DECAPTIONED

FROM HABIB

E. O. 12065: RDS-1, 3, 4 3/3/02 (HABIB, P. C.) OR-M

TAGS: MOPS, MILI, PEPR, XF, IS, LE, SY

SUBJ: HABIB MISSION: MARCH 2 MEETING WITH FONMIN KHADDAM

1. ~~ENTIRE TEXT~~

2. SUMMARY: I MET FOR ALMOST TWO HOURS TUESDAY EVENING MARCH 2 WITH THE DEPUTY PM AND FONMIN KHADDAM. I ASKED FOR SYRIAN COOPERATION AND THE USE OF THEIR INFLUENCE IN PRESERVING THE CEASE-FIRE, WHILE REVIEWING IN DETAIL RECENT DANGEROUS DEVELOPMENTS AND THE TENSE MOOD IN ISRAEL. I DESCRIBED FULLY THE TERMS OF THE CEASE-FIRE, OF WHICH KHADDAM PROFESSED TO BE UNAWARE, AS WELL AS OUR VIEW THAT THE RECENT FATAH OPERATION ACROSS THE JORDAN RIVER WAS A CEASE-FIRE VIOLATION BECAUSE IT ORIGINATED IN LEBANON. KHADDAM SAID THAT SYRIA COULD NOT ACCEPT AN INTERPRETA-

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TION WHICH MEANT THAT THE PALESTINIANS HAD TO ABANDON THEIR STRUGGLE IN GAZA AND THE WEST BANK, BUT THAT SYRIA HAD SUPPORTED THE CEASE-FIRE FOR THE SAKE OF THE PEOPLE OF SOUTH LEBANON. I BELIEVE, HOWEVER, THAT HE RECOGNIZES THE DANGERS AND WILL STRESS THE IMPORTANCE OF THE CEASE-FIRE DURING DISCUSSIONS WITH FATAH DUE TO TAKE PLACE IN DAMASCUS WITHIN A FEW DAYS. HE TENDED TO BRUSH ASIDE THE DANGERS INVOLVED IN THE CONTINUED FLOW OF HEAVY WEAPONS INTO LEBANON. KHADDAM RESTATED SYRIAN POLICY RE-

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GARDING PRO-FORMA SUPPORT FOR THE ARAB FOLLOW-UP COMMITTEE AND THE CONCEPT OF ACHIEVING NATIONAL RECONCILIATION. HE BLAMED A WEAK LEBANESE GOVERNMENT AND THE PHALANGE ATTITUDE FOR LACK OF PROGRESS. HE STATED THAT SYRIA WOULD NOT INTERVENE IN THE FORTHCOMING PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS. HIS WARM COMMENTS ABOUT SARKIS MAKE ME WONDER WHETHER SYRIAN SUPPORT FOR AN EXTENSION OF SARKIS'S TERM OF OFFICE MAY BE UNDER CONSIDERATION. END SUMMARY.

3. ACCOMPANIED BY DAS DRAPER, CHARGE RUGH AND POLOFF ABINGTON, I MET FOR ONE HOUR AND FORTY-FIVE MINUTES TUESDAY EVENING, MARCH 2, WITH FOREIGN MINISTER KHADDAM. ALSO WITH KHADDAM WERE DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER QADDOUR, DIRECTOR FOR AMERICAN AFFAIRS QABBANI AND KHADDAM'S TRANSLATOR, SAMIH ABU FARES.

4. I TOLD KHADDAM THAT PRESIDENT REAGAN HAD CHARGED ME WITH TWO MISSIONS FOR THIS TRIP: (A) TO DO WHAT I COULD TO STRENGTHEN AND MAINTAIN THE CEASE-FIRE AND (B) TO EXAMINE WHAT COULD BE DONE TO IMPROVE THE SITUATION IN LEBANON IN THE REGIONAL CONTEXT. I REVIEWED RECENT DANGEROUS DEVELOPMENTS AND ASKED FOR SYRIAN COOPERATION IN PROTECTING THAT CEASE-FIRE.

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5. CONCERNING THE SITUATION IN LEBANON, I SAID THAT THERE HAD BEEN NO CHANGE IN OUR POLICY OF SUPPORT FOR LEBANON'S TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY, ITS CENTRAL GOVERNMENT, AND EXTENSION OF ITS SOVEREIGNTY WITHIN ITS BORDERS. I TOLD KHADDAM THAT I FOUND MUCH CONCERN AND PESSIMISM IN LEBANON, AS WELL AS DISAPPOINTMENT OVER THE LACK OF PROGRESS BY THE ARAB FOLLOW-UP COMMITTEE (AFC). LEBANESE OFFICIALS HAD HOPED THAT MUCH MORE WOULD BE ACCOMPLISHED BY THE AFC AND HAD ALSO EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT SYRIA COULD DO MORE TOWARDS RESOLVING LEBANON'S PROBLEMS. I TOO WAS DISAPPOINTED.

6. MY COMMENTS RANKLED KHADDAM. HE BLAMED THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT AND THE PHALANGE, FOR IMMOBILIZING IT, STATING THAT IN THE NOVEMBER MEETING OF THE AFC A NUMBER OF DECISIONS WERE TAKEN WHICH WERE NOT IMPLEMENTED BY THE GOL. A COMMITTEE TO INSPECT PORTS SHOULD HAVE BEEN FORMED BY SARKIS BUT THIS HAD BEEN BLOCKED BY OBJECTIONS FROM THE LEBANESE FRONT (MEANING PHALANGE). THE NATIONAL MOVEMENT AND THE PLO HAD ACCEPTED THE CONCEPT, KHADDAM SAID.

7. I REMINDED KHADDAM THAT THE PROBLEM WAS THAT SARKIS'S AUTHORITY DID NOT EXTEND TO IMPORTANT SECTIONS IN LEBANON. THERE WAS A DE FACTO SITUATION WHEREBY THE ADMINISTRATION OF LARGE PARTS OF LEBANON WERE IN THE HANDS OF OTHERS --

THE NATIONAL MOVEMENT, THE LEBANESE FRONT OR THE PALES-

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ACTION SS-25INFO OCT-00 ADS-00 SSO-00 /025 W
-----204661 031415Z /41O 031433Z MAR 82
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EXDIS

TINIANS -- AND THEIR FORCES WERE SUPERIOR TO THAT OF THE GOL. IN ADDITION, IT SEEMED THAT THE AFC SHOULD NOT HAVE ALLOWED NON-IMPLEMENTATION OF ITS RECOMMENDATION ON PORT INSPECTION TO BLOCK PROGRESS ON OTHER FRONTS. FOR EXAMPLE, THE DIALOGUE BETWEEN THE PHALANGE AND SYRIA SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUSTAINED AS WELL AS THE DIALOGUE BETWEEN THE LEBANESE FRONT AND THE NATIONAL MOVEMENT. KHAD-DAM RAISED THE USUAL OBJECTION THAT THE PRECONDITION FOR THIS DIALOGUE WAS THE FULL BREAKING OF RELATIONS BETWEEN THE PHALANGE AND ISRAEL. WHEN I REMINDED HIM OF BASHIR

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GEMAYEL'S LETTER TO SARKIS DISTANCING THE PHALANGE FROM ISRAEL, HE RAISED THE USUAL OBJECTIONS THAT THE LETTER WAS NOT A STATEMENT BY THE LEBANESE FRONT, IT WAS NOT PUBLICLY ANNOUNCED, AND IT DID NOT EXPLICITLY STATE THAT THE PHALANGE WOULD SEVER RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL. ALTHOUGH HE ADMITTED THAT THE AFC HAD DECIDED TO CONSIDER THE LETTER AN "ADEQUATE", POSITIVE STEP, HE STRESSED THAT IN FACT THERE HAD BEEN NO CHANGE IN THE PHALANGE-ISRAELI RELATIONSHIP.



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8. I TOLD KHADDAM THAT, DESPITE THE CURRENT STALEMATE OF THE AFC, I HAD CONCLUDED THAT THERE HAS TO BE SOME KIND OF ADJUSTMENT IN THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SYRIA AND THE PHALANGE ON THE ONE HAND AND BETWEEN THE PHALANGE AND THE OTHER LEBANESE FACTIONS ON THE OTHER. I COULD SEE NO OTHER WAY IN WHICH PROGRESS TOWARD NATIONAL RECONCILIATION COULD BE ACHIEVED. I WAS SORRY THAT THE AFC HAD NOT BEEN MORE ACTIVE, EVEN AS AN OBSERVER. I HAD THE DISTINCT IMPRESSION THAT ON A MASS LEVEL IN LEBANON, PEOPLE WERE ANXIOUS TO RESTORE NATIONAL UNITY. I ALSO SAID THAT SARKIS AND OTHERS WERE PLEASED WITH THE RECENT EXPANSION OF UNIFIL BY AN ADDITIONAL 1,000 TROOPS. THE GOL WANTS UNIFIL TO EXTEND ITS AUTHORITY SOUTHWARD AND I HAD TOLD THE LEBANESE THAT I HAD CONFIDENCE THAT GENERAL CALLAGHAN WOULD NEGOTIATE THE USE OF UNIFIL IN THE BEST WAY POSSIBLE.

9. I SAID THAT I HAD FOUND MUCH CONCERN IN ISRAEL OVER THE THREAT FROM THE PLO. MY DISCUSSIONS HAD BEEN HEATED AND AT TIMES DIFFICULT BUT I HAD LEFT ISRAEL BELIEVING THAT ISRAEL FULLY UNDERSTANDS THE U.S. POSITION ON MAINTAINING THE CEASE-FIRE. HOWEVER, IF A SUBSTANTIAL PROVOCATION WERE TO OCCUR, THE SITUATION COULD BECOME VERY DANGEROUS. IN THIS REGARD, ISRAEL HAD BEEN EXTREMELY UPSET BY THE LATE JANUARY INFILTRATION ACROSS THE JORDAN RIVER

BY A FATAH TEAM WHOSE MISSION WAS TO ATTACK ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS. I STATED FLATLY THAT THIS INFILTRATION ATTEMPT WAS A CEASE-FIRE VIOLATION SINCE THE CEASE-FIRE TERMS STATED THAT HOSTILE MILITARY ACTION WOULD NOT BE LAUNCHED AGAINST ISRAEL FROM LEBANESE TERRITORY. THE MISSION, I SAID, HAD ORIGINATED IN LEBANON.



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10. KHADDAM PROFESSED TO BE UNAWARE OF THE DEFINITION OF THE CEASE-FIRE, AND ASKED ME TO EXPLAIN IT. I REVIEWED FOR HIM THE THREE PRIMARY ELEMENTS OF THE CEASE-FIRE (NO HOSTILE MILITARY ACTIVITIES FROM LEBANESE TERRITORY AGAINST ISRAEL BY LAND, SEA OR AIR; NO HOSTILE MILITARY ACTIVITIES FROM ISRAEL AGAINST LEBANON BY LAND, SEA OR AIR; AND THE SAME PROHIBITIONS CONCERNING HADDAD'S AREA). (I EXPLICITLY SAID THAT THE TERM "HOSTILE MILITARY ACTIVITY" DID NOT FORECLOSE ISRAELI OVERFLIGHTS OF LEBANON AND KHADDAM SIGNIFICANTLY DID NOT OBJECT). I POINTED OUT TO KHADDAM THAT THESE TERMS HAD BEEN CLEARLY UNDERSTOOD AND ACCEPTED BY ALL THE PARTIES CONCERNED, DESPITE THE CALCULATED AMBIGUITY. THE PROOF OF THIS HAD BEEN THAT FOR EIGHT MONTHS THE CEASE-FIRE HAD BEEN OBSERVED BY ALL SIDES AND THERE HAD BEEN NO LOSS OF LIFE. KHADDAM INTERJECTED THAT HE DID NOT INTERPRET THE CEASE-FIRE AS MEANING THAT THE PLO SHOULD RENOUNCE ITS STRUGGLE IN GAZA AND THE WEST BANK. I RESPONDED THAT IF THE MILITARY OPERATION CAME FROM LEBANON, IT WAS CLEARLY COVERED BY THE CEASE-FIRE. THE WORD "FROM" WAS IMPORTANT, I.E. ACTION FROM ISRAEL OR FROM LEBANON. I TOLD HIM, HOWEVER, THAT I HAD REJECTED ISRAEL'S INITIAL VIEW THAT THE CEASE-FIRE SHOULD APPLY TO TERRORISM AGAINST JEWS OR ISRAELI TARGETS IN EUROPE OR ANYWHERE IN THE WORLD.

11. I SAID THAT THE PRESENT MOOD IN ISRAEL WAS TENSE AND TROUBLED, REINFORCED BY THE IMPENDING WITHDRAWAL FROM SINAI, UNCERTAINTY OVER DEALINGS WITH MUBARAK, AND UNHAPPINESS WITH CERTAIN U.S. STATEMENTS.

THIS HAD LED TO

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EXDIS

A FEELING IN ISRAEL OF ENCIRCLEMENT. THE SITUATION HAD BEEN ESPECIALLY TENSE TWO WEEKS AGO WHEN THERE WAS A STRONG POSSIBILITY THAT THE CEASE-FIRE WOULD HAVE BROKEN DOWN. OUR EFFORTS HAD PREVENTED THAT. IT HAD NOT BEEN EASY FOR ME TO IMPRESS UPON ISRAELI LEADERS THE IMPORTANCE OF MAINTAINING THE CEASE-FIRE. THEY SEE INDICATIONS THAT THE PLO IS ATTEMPTING TO INITIATE HOSTILE ACTIONS AGAINST ISRAEL FROM LEBANON. THEY WERE PARTICULARLY CONCERNED ABOUT THE BUILDUP OF HEAVY WEAPONS BY THE PLO WHICH WERE SO POSITIONED TO DIRECTLY THREATEN ISRAELI TERRITORY.

12. WE WOULD CONTINUE TO USE WHAT INFLUENCE WE HAD WITH ALL PARTIES TO SEE THAT THE CEASE-FIRE WAS MAINTAINED. I ASKED KHADDAM IF SYRIA WOULD DO THE SAME.

13. TURNING FIRST TO LEBANON, KHADDAM SAID THAT SYRIA HAD EXERTED MAJOR EFFORTS FOR SUCCESS OF THE AFC AND CONTINUED TO BELIEVE THAT THIS WAS THE PREFERABLE MECHANISM FOR RESOLVING LEBANON'S PROBLEMS. HOWEVER,

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THE AFC COULD ONLY FACILITATE THE PROCESS OF NATIONAL RECONILIATION. IT COULD NOT IMPOSE A POLITICAL SOLUTION ON LEBANON, NOR COULD SYRIA. SYRIA DID NOT OBJECT TO DIALOGUES WITH THE PHALANGE AND IT WAS NOT BLOCKING EFFORTS TOWARDS SUCH DIALOGUES. THE NATIONAL MOVEMENT OBJECTED TO THE PHALANGE'S RELATIONSHIP WITH ISRAEL AND THIS WAS WHAT WAS BLOCKING PROGRESS.

14. I PROBED FOR SYRIAN VIEWS OF THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS. AT PRESENT THE FIELD WAS FULL OF PRESIDENTIAL ASPIRANTS, BUT WE WOULD HOPE TO SEE AN EARLY COMPROMISE IN WHICH TWO OR THREE MAIN CANDIDATES WOULD EMERGE, ACCEPTABLE IN THE MAIN TO ALL PARTIES. IT WAS EXTREMELY

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IMPORTANT THAT THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESS BE PRESERVED AND THAT THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS TAKE PLACE AS SCHEDULED. KHADDAM SUGGESTED THAT WE WERE TRYING TO INFLUENCE THE ELECTIONS TO WHICH I DISAGREED. I NOTED THAT THE LEBANESE WERE CONSTANTLY LOOKING OVER THEIR SHOULDER TO SEE WHICH CANDIDATE SYRIA WAS BACKING. KHADDAM SAID THAT THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION PROCESS SHOULD BE LEFT TO THE LEBANESE AND SYRIA SHOULD NOT INVOLVE ITSELF IN THE ELECTIONS. I NOTED THAT SYRIA HAD A CERTAIN DEGREE OF POLITICAL INFLUENCE IN THE FORM OF ITS 30,000 TROOPS.

15. CONCERNING THE CEASE-FIRE, KHADDAM SAID THAT THE ARAB LEAGUE HAD WELCOMED THE PLO DECISION TO ACCEPT THE CEASE-FIRE. ACCORDING TO SYRIAN INFORMATION THERE HAD BEEN NO VIOLATION BY THE PLO OF THE CEASE-FIRE. THE FLOW OF WEAPONS INTO LEBANON WAS SOMETHING DIFFERENT. NO ONE COULD DENY THE RIGHT OF THE PLO TO DEFEND ITSELF, ESPECIALLY IN VIEW OF CONSTANT ISRAELI THREATS. I RESPONDED TO KHADDAM'S REMARKS ON PLO WEAPONS BY SAYING THAT THE CEASE-FIRE DID NOT INCLUDE THIS ISSUE, BUT IT WAS

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PRUDENT TO KEEP IN MIND ACTIONS WHICH COULD BE INTERPRETED BY ONE SIDE OR THE OTHER AS AN IMMINENT THREAT. THE IMPORTANT THING WAS TO AVOID ACTIONS WHICH COULD UNINTENTIONALLY LEAD TO A BREAKDOWN OF THE CEASE-FIRE. IT WOULD THEREFORE BE USEFUL IF CAUTION WERE EXERCISED BY THE PLO (AND SYRIA) CONCERNING THE BUILDUP.

16. KHADDAM CONTINUED THAT SYRIA WAS NOT A PARTY TO THE CEASEFIRE BUT, AS IT UNDERSTOOD THE TERMS OF REFERENCE, SYRIA COULD NOT AGREE TO THE ISRAELI INTERPRETATION THAT, IF THE PALESTINIANS EXPLODED A BOMB IN GAZA OR THE WEST BANK, THIS VIOLATED THE CEASEFIRE. I TOLD KHADDAM THAT IF THE PERSON WHO PLANTED THE BOMB CAME FROM LEBANON THEN IT WAS REASONABLE TO INTERPRET HIS ACTION AS A VIOLATION. WHATEVER THE SYRIAN VIEW, SYRIA SHOULD NONETHELESS USE ITS INFLUENCE TO PRESERVE THE CEASEFIRE, WHICH COULD BE BROKEN BY EVENTS SUCH AS WE HAD DISCUSSED.

17. KHADDAM SAID THAT SYRIA COULD NOT TELL THE PALESTINIANS TO ABANDON THEIR STRUGGLE AGAINST ISRAEL. FOR THE SAKE OF THE POPULATION OF SOUTHERN LEBANON, HOWEVER, SYRIA HAD DONE WHAT IT COULD TO HELP MAINTAIN THE CEASEFIRE. SYRIA WOULD SUPPORT WHATEVER THE PLO AGREED TO.

18. COMMENT: THE ATMOSPHERE WAS CORDIAL THROUGHOUT, EXCEPT WHEN HE MENTIONED ISRAELI "ARROGANCE." KHADDAM TOLD ME SEVERAL TIMES THAT I WAS ALWAYS WELCOME TO RETURN

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EXDIS

TO SYRIA. I BELIEVE THAT I GOT THE MESSAGE ACROSS TO
HIM ON THE NECESSITY OF THE PLO AVOIDING ANY PROVOCATIVE
ACTIONS LEADING TO A BREAKDOWN OF THE CEASEFIRE AND
THAT SYRIA WILL CONVEY THIS DIRECTLY TO THE PLO. KHADDAM
IS SCHEDULED TO MEET IN THE NEXT SEVERAL DAYS WITH TOP
PLO OFFICIALS.

19. THIS CABLE CLEARED BY DAS DRAPER. RUGH

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ACTION SS-25

TEL AV 03220 01 OF 03 021441Z

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AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE

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E.O. 12065: RDS 1,3,4 03/02/92 (LEWIS, SAMUEL W.) OR-M

TAGS: XF, MOPS, JO, IS, LE, SY, PERP

SUBJ: HABIB MISSION: MEETING WITH MINISTER OF DEFENSE SHARON

1. ~~ENTIRE TEXT.~~

2. SUMMARY. I ASSURED MINISTER OF DEFENSE SHARON THAT I WOULD HAVE ISRAELI CONCERNS OVER CEASE FIRE VIOLATIONS UPPERMOST IN MY MIND AND SAID I WOULD ADDRESS THEM IN MY FORTHCOMING MEETINGS ELSEWHERE. WE SEEMED TO HAVE A GENERAL MEETING OF THE MINDS ON THE ULTIMATE POLITICAL SOLUTION TO THE LEBANON PROBLEM EVEN IF THERE WAS A VARIANCE, AT TIMES, ON THE EVALUATION OF METHODOLOGY AND PROGRESS. SHARON'S MAIN POINTS CONTINUE TO BE: GET THE SYRIANS OUT; REMOVE THE PLO TERRORISTS; AND THEN LEBANESE FACTIONS CAN COME TOGETHER FOR THE ULTIMATE POLITICAL SOLUTION, WHICH CAN BE WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE EXISTING LEBANESE CONSTITUTION. COUNSELLING DISCRETION AND FORBEAR-

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ANCE IN ISRAEL'S DEALING WITH ALLEGED CEASE FIRE VIOLATIONS, I LISTENED TO HIS EXPRESSED CONCERN ON MATTERS OF ISRAELI DEFENSE, SUCH AS THE POSSIBLE ENHANCEMENT OF JORDAN'S MILITARY CAPABILITY, WITHOUT COMMENTING AS TO THEIR APPLICABILITY. I SUGGESTED THAT ISRAEL CAN HELP STRENGTHEN THE CEASE FIRE AND LEBANESE STABILITY BY WORKING BETTER WITH UNIFIL.

3. I MET WITH MINISTER OF DEFENSE SHARON FOR AN HOUR AND

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A HALF ON THE AFTERNOON OF MARCH 1, ACCOMPANIED BY DAS DRAPER, AMB LEWIS, DCM BROWN, AND ARMA RAINES. I BEGAN THE SESSION BY ASKING SHARON WHAT HE HAD IN MIND THAT MIGHT BE USEFUL IN MY EFFORTS TO STRENGTHEN THE CEASE FIRE.

4. IN CONTRAST TO HIS PUGNACIOUS AND SARCASTIC INTERVENTIONS EARLIER THAT DAY, SHARON WAS BUSINESSLIKE, RELATIVELY RELAXED AND ALMOST AFFABLE. REFERRING TO THE MORNING MEETING WITH PRIME MINISTER BEGIN (SEPTTEL), SHARON SAID HE DIDN'T THINK HE COULD ADD A GREAT DEAL. WHEN HE ASKED ME WHAT MIGHT BE EXPECTED FROM THE OTHERS, FOR INSTANCE THE SAUDIS, I TOOK PAINS TO EXPLAIN, AT LENGTH, THAT I EXPECTED THE SAUDIS TO BE ACCURATE TRANSMITTERS OF INFORMATION AND SUGGESTIONS. I WOULD SPEAK TO THEM ABOUT ISRAELI CONCERNS SUCH AS THE MEHOLA INCURSION, MOVEMENT OF PLO HEAVY WEAPONS AND THE LIKE, AND EXPECT THEM TO DEAL WITH THE PLO ON THEM.

5. I SUGGESTED, IN CONNECTION WITH MY COMMENTS IN THE MORNING MEETING WITH THE PRIME MINISTER, THAT IT WOULD BE WRONG TO FORMALIZE ANY TRIPARTITE CONSULTATIONS WITH THE FRENCH ABOUT LEBANON. SHARON SPOKE ABOUT THE NEED FOR ME TO MEET ALL FACTIONS AND TO SEE THE LIFE, PEOPLE, TROOPS, ETC., IN THE CHRISTIAN MARONITE AREA. IN RESPONDING, I

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POINTED OUT THAT I HAD SEEN A GREAT DEAL AND HAD TALKED TO MANY PEOPLE IN THE PAST; DRAPER EVEN MORE SO. ON THIS TRIP MY INTENTION WAS TO SEE THOSE PEOPLE WHO COULD HELP STRENGTHEN THE CEASE-FIRE AND CONTRIBUTE TO THE BETTERMENT OF THE OVERALL SITUATION IN LEBANON, BEARING IN MIND THE SYMBOLISM ATTACHED, RIGHTLY OR WRONGLY, TO MY MISSION HERE.

6. SHARON COMMENTED THAT THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT WAS LEGITIMATE BUT WAS NOT REALLY SOVEREIGN THROUGH LEBANON. I AGREED THAT THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT EXERCISED PRECIOUS LITTLE SOVEREIGNTY OVER SOME AREAS OF THE COUNTRY, BUT EMPHASIZED STRONGLY THAT FORMAL PARTITION WAS NOT THE ANSWER. WITH PARTITION, THE DIFFICULTIES IN THAT BELEAGUED COUNTRY WOULD LIKELY INCREASE. I STRESSED THAT, WITH THE IMPROVEMENT IN COMMUNICATION BETWEEN THE FACTIONS, WE COULD HOPE FOR A SOLUTION MUCH PREFERABLE TO ONE WHICH UNDOUBTEDLY, IN THE END, WOULD DEPEND ON ISRAELI MILITARY INTERVENTION.

7. SHARON SEEMED IN AGREEMENT WITH ME ON THE SUBJECT OF PARTITION, BUT EXPRESSED, AT LENGTH, HIS CONCERN OVER THE POSSIBILITY THAT NO 'LEGITIMATE' LEBANESE GOVERNMENT COULD BE ESTABLISHED AS LONG AS THE SYRIANS CONTROLLED 'LARGE AREAS' OF LEBANON. HE ADDED THAT THE SAME CONCERN APPLIED

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FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
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AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE
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USLO RIYADH IMMEDIATE
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EXDIS

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (MRN 03220 VICE 03227)

TO THE FLOURISHING TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS. I TOLD HIM
THAT I HAD THOUGHT THE PROCESS HAD BEGUN TO INFLUENCE
EVENTS TOWARD AN ULTIMATE WITHDRAWAL OF SYRIAN FORCES, AND
WOULD TRY TO GET THAT EFFORT ON TRACK. I ALSO CONVEYED
MY IMPRESSION THAT A PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE ACCEPTABLE TO ALL
FACTION WAS A WORKABLE POSSIBILITY.

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8. I POINTEDLY ASKED SHARON AGAIN IF HE HAD ANYTHING TO OFFER ME, STRESSING THE NEED TO TALK QUIETLY TOGETHER. SHARON'S REITERATION OF THE TERRORIST PRESENCE IN LEBANON AND THE CONSEQUENT THREAT TO A STABLE GOVERNMENT WERE PROMINENT IN HIS RESPONSE, BUT NEVERTHELESS IT WAS TEMPERED BY HIS ACCEPTANCE OF THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE VARIOUS FACTIONS COULD WORK SOMETHING OUT. HE AGREED THAT THE SOLUTION IN LEBANON MUST BE TIED TO THE LEBANESE CONSTITUTION (I.E., CHRISTIAN PRESIDENT, MUSLIM PRIME

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MINISTER, ETC.). WHEN HE CAME BACK TO THE SUBJECT OF THE SYRIAN PRESENCE, HE SAID THAT HE HAD NEVER BEEN ABLE TO FIND ANY RECORD OF U.S. CRITICISM OF SYRIAN PRESENCE IN LEBANON. I TOOK EXCEPTION, CLEARLY STATED U.S. POLICY IN THAT REGARD, AND OFFERED TO PROVIDE A RECORD OF OUR PUBLIC STATEMENTS. STRESSING THAT THE U.S. WANTED THE SYRIANS TO WITHDRAW, I WENT ON TO SAY THAT WE HAVE TOUCHED ON THIS SUBJECT WITH THE SAUDIS AND MENTIONED A LEBANESE WORKING PAPER THAT WOULD HAVE PROVIDED FOR A STAGED WITHDRAWAL OF THE SYRIANS AND THEIR REPLACEMENT BY LEBANESE TROOPS AS WELL AS THOSE OF THE ARAB LEAGUE. SHARON SAID THAT THE MARONITES COULD BE MUCH MORE INFLUENTIAL WITHOUT THE SYRIAN PRESENCE. WE WANT THE SYRIANS AND THE TERRORISTS OUT AND A FRIENDLY AND PEACEFUL GOVERNMENT IN, HE SAID. I TOLD HIM THAT THAT IS EXACTLY THE WAY WE SEE IT.

9. SHARON, IN REFERRING TO ISRAELI CONTINGENCY PLANS AND TROOP DEPLOYMENTS TO THE NORTH, TOOK PAINS TO REASSURE ME THAT SENSATIONALIST MEDIA STORIES TO THE CONTRARY, HE HAD NO INTENTION (AS OPPOSED TO CONTINGENCY PLANS WHICH EVERY MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT PRODUCES) TO ATTACK THE PLO OR SYRIAN FORCES IN LEBANON. HE WAS NOT TRYING TO DRAG THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT INTO SUCH A CONFLICT, 'ALTHOUGH THE GOVERNMENT SHOULD KNOW WHAT IS POSSIBLE' (AN ALLUSION TO CABINET DISCUSSIONS). IN SEEKING TO AVOID WAR, ISRAEL MUST MAINTAIN A CREDIBLE DETERRENT, HE ADDED, WHICH IF MISHANDLED COULD BE LOST OVERNIGHT (HERE HE CITED, AS A NEGATIVE EXAMPLE, ISRAEL'S FAILURE TO ATTACK THE SYRIAN MISSILES IN THE BEKAA VALLEY. REFERRING TO PLO ARTILLERY/MORTARS, HE EMPHASIZED THAT THEY HAVE ALMOST AS MUCH AS ISRAEL, 500-600 TUBES, WITH DEPLOYMENTS, ONLY TEN DAYS AGO, OF THREE BATTERIES OF 130MM PIECES JUST NORTH OF THE LITANI RIVER WHICH COULD HIT NORTHERN ISRAEL.

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10. TAKING CREDIT FOR DEFENSE BUDGET CUTS OF TEN PERCENT IN 1981 AND MORE THIS YEAR, SHARON SAID THAT ISRAEL CANNOT DEPEND ONLY ON (ORAL) COMMITMENTS OF THE U.S. REPEATING MUCH OF WHAT HE TOLD AMBASSADOR LEWIS LAST WEEK: THAT ISRAEL WAS NOT IN AN ARMS RACE AND WOULD NOT ADD A SINGLE TANK OR AIRCRAFT TO ITS INVENTORY 'INTO THE 1990'S', SHARON SAID ISRAEL WOULD ONLY REPLACE AGING EQUIPMENT. HE SPOKE OF ISRAEL BEING OUTNUMBERED IN TANKS BY ITS NEIGHBORS BY A RATION OF 5 TO 1 BY THE END OF THE 1980'S. HE OUTLINED SEVERAL UNACCEPTABLE SITUATIONS WHICH WOULD TRIGGER AN ISRAELI MILITARY REACTION, THE SO-CALLED 'RED LINES,' WHICH HAVE ALL BEEN REPORTED SEPARATELY BY SAM LEWIS. AT THIS POINT SHARON PRODUCED MAPS COLORED TO SHOW AREAS OF ISRAEL THAT WOULD BE COVERED BY JORDANIAN SAMS, OBVIOUSLY REFERRING TO POSSIBLE ACQUISITION OF U.S. I-HAWK MISSILES, AND 180MM (SIC) WEAPONRY. THE RED COLORED PORTION OF THE MAP SHOWED ALMOST ONE HALF OF ISRAEL COVERED LENGTHWISE FROM NORTH TO SOUTH SHOULD MOBILE SAMS BE PLACED ON THE JORDANIAN RIDGE LINE. A BAND OF YELLOW EXTENDED THE COVERAGE OF ISRAEL BY ABOUT A QUARTER INTERDICTING MOST OF ISRAEL'S AIRFIELDS BY SIMILARLY PLACED HEAVY WEAPONRY. ANOTHER OVERLAY INDICATED AN F-16/F5-G STRIKE RADIUS OUT INTO THE MEDITERRANEAN. SHARON SAID THAT ISRAEL IS NOT EAGER FOR WAR; HE HAS PARTICIPATED IN IT FOR THIRTY YEARS AND DOESN'T LIKE IT, BUT MUST BE READY.

11. SHARON TOLD ME THAT HE PERSONALLY HAS RESTRAINED HADDAD SINCE LAST JULY IN AN EFFORT TO KEEP THE CEASE FIRE, EMPHASIZING HOWEVER THAT 'INFLUENCE' WAS NOW 'CONTROL.'

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TEL AV 03220 03 OF 03 021508Z

INFO OCT-00 ADS-00 SSO-00 /025 W
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FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3363
INFO AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE
USLO RIYADH IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE

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EXDIS

I REPLIED THAT HE HAD DONE AN EXCELLENT JOB IN THAT RESPECT, AND COMMENTED THAT ISRAEL AND HADDAD MIGHT HELP STRENGTHEN THE CEASEFIRE, EVEN MORE BY BRINGING UNIFIL INTO THE PICTURE WHEN VIOLATIONS OCCUR IN HADDAD'S AREA. I ALSO SUGGESTED THAT THE ADDITIONAL UNIFIL TROOPS MIGHT ALSO BE HELPFUL. SHARON HAD A FEW DISPARAGING REMARKS ABOUT UNIFIL'S ABILITY TO CONTROL THE PLO AND WENT ON TO CHARACTERIZE UNIFIL'S POLICY AND OPERATIONS AS A PROBLEM IN SOME RESPECTS, SUCH AS IN NOT CONFISCATING WEAPONS OF PLO INFILTRATORS, ETC. HE SAID THAT HADDAD'S THREAT COMES NOT ONLY THROUGH UNIFIL BUT FROM THE UNIFIL AREA, WHERE HUNDREDS OF ARMED TERRORISTS RESIDE, AND MORE TROOPS WON'T HELP CHANGE THE POLICY. I ASKED HIM TO TALK MORE ABOUT THESE THINGS TO CALLAGHAN AND HE SEEMED INCLINED TO DO SO. I TOLD HIM THAT IT WAS UP TO ISRAEL TO WORK THESE THINGS WITH UNIFIL AND SEE HOW IT COMES OUT. I SAID THAT THERE HAD BEEN NO SUGGESTION THAT HADDAD'S AREA SHOULD BE ELIMINATED THROUGH UNIFIL'S EXPANSION. I EMPHASIZED AGAIN

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THAT WE WERE TRYING TO STRENGTHEN THE CEASEFIRE AND NOW MAYBE UNIFIL CAN BETTER HELP, IF ISRAEL WOULD DISCUSS NEXT STEPS AND KEEP AN OPEN MIND.

12. WE THEN SPOKE FOR A WHILE ABOUT ENCOURAGING CONTACTS AMONG THE LEBANESE FACTIONS AND HOW GEMAYEL MIGHT BE HELPFUL. SHARON COMMENTED THAT ISRAEL HAD 'SAVED' THE MARONITES AND HELPED THEM TO HAVE A 'NORMAL' LIFE IN THEIR AREA OF LEBANON. 'WE DID OUR PART AND THEY KNOW IT. IF OUR HELP IS A BARRIER... YOU TAKE OVER.' I ADVISED HIM THAT HE SHOULD SIMPLY PLAY DOWN A BIT THE ISRAELI CONNECTION WITH THE PHALANGE.

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13. I CLOSED BY ASSURING SHARON THAT I HAD ISRAELI CONCERNS VERY MUCH IN MIND AND WOULD CONTINUE TO ADDRESS SUCH ISSUES AS CEASEFIRE VIOLATIONS THROUGH JORDAN AND SYRIAN WITHDRAWALS FROM LEBANON. SHARON THEN ASKED ABOUT PLO HEAVY ARTILLERY AND THE REPORTED SYRIAN 4 MAN 'OUTPOST' AT BEAUFORT CASTLE, INFORMATION ON WHICH COMES FROM ONE OF THE THREE TERRORISTS CAPTURED DURING THE JANUARY 29-29 FATAH RAID. I TOLD HIM I WOULD ALSO RAISE BOTH THOSE ISSUES AND WOULD REPORT WHEN I COME BACK TO ISRAEL, BUT THAT I NEEDED FURTHER HARD INFORMATION ABOUT THE 'OUTPOST.' FINALLY, I REMINDED SHARON OF WHAT I HAD TOLD BEGIN: ISRAEL HAS A GROWING IMAGE PROBLEM ABROAD IN VIEW OF THE BELLICOSITY ATTRIBUTED TO SENIOR ISRAELI OFFICIALS IN JERUSALEM AND ELSEWHERE. LEWIS


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*** Current Handling Restrictions *** EXDIS
*** Current Classification *** 

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FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3352
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE
USLO RIYADH IMMEDIATE

Error in Date - this should be March
Note subject line

DEPARTMENT OF STATE IM/IPS/CR/TR Date: 11/3/97
☒ RELEASE ☒ DECLASSIFY
☐ EXCISE ☐ DECLASSIFY EO Citations
☐ DENY IN PART

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FOIA Exemptions _____ TS authority
Exemptions _____ () CLASSIFY as () S or () C Sec.
() DOWNGRADE TS to () S or () C

DECLASSIFIED

9302566

FROM HABIB

E.O. 12065: RDS-1, 3, 4 3/1/92 (LEWIS, SAMUEL W.) OR-M
TAGS: MOPS, MILI, PEPR, XF, IS, LE, SY
SUBJECT: HABIB MISSION MARCH 1 MEETING WITH FOREIGN
MINISTER SHAMIR

1. ~~ENTIRE TEXT~~

2. SUMMARY: DURING A RELAXED 45-MINUTE MEETING WITH
FOREIGN MINISTER SHAMIR, WE REVIEWED THE INTERNAL
SITUATION IN LEBANON IN LIGHT OF THE UPCOMING
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION. I ASKED SHAMIR TO USE HIS
INFLUENCE WITH THE PRIME MINISTER TO PUT INTO
PERSPECTIVE THE WORDS I HAD USED TO DESCRIBE THE
PRESIDENT'S VIEWS. I ALSO SAID THAT WE SHOULD
CONTINUE, AND INTENSIFY, OUR DISCUSSIONS ON LEBANON
BUT SHOULD AVOID ESTABLISHING FORMAL MECHANISMS --

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INCLUDING WITH THE FRENCH -- FOR OUR DIALOGUE. I
SAID I DID NOT WANT TO ENGAGE IN TRILATERAL DISCUSSIONS
WITH THE FRENCH, SINCE THEIR VIEWS ARE NOT ALWAYS
IDENTICAL TO OURS, OR FOR THAT MATTER TO THOSE OF
ISRAEL. END SUMMARY.

3. I HAD A 45-MINUTE MEETING WITH FOREIGN MINISTER
SHAMIR WHICH CONCLUDED MY DISCUSSION IN JERUSALEM
DURING THIS ROUND OF TALKS. ATTENDING ON THE

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ISRAELI SIDE WERE MFA DIRECTOR GENERAL KIMCHE, DEPUTY DIRECTOR GENERAL BAR-ON, DIRECTOR FOR NORTH AMERICAN AFFAIRS BEN-TSUR, CHEF DE CABINET BEN AHARON, AND MFA DIRECTOR OF POLITICAL RESEARCH ALIAV. I WAS ACCOMPANIED BY AMBASSADOR LEWIS, DAS DRAPER, DCM BROWN, AND POLITICANSELOR HARE.

4. MY CONVERSATION WITH SHAMIR AND HIS COLLEAGUES WAS RELAXED AND RAMBLLED ACROSS A VARIETY OF ISSUES, ESPECIALLY AS WE DISCUSSED INTERNAL DEVELOPMENTS IN LEBANON. AT THE OUTSET, I ASKED SHAMIR NOT TO LET THE PRIME MINISTER OVER-REACT TO THE WORDS WHICH I HAD CONVEYED ON THE PRESIDENT'S BEHALF THIS MORNING (SEPTEL). I STRESSED IT WAS NOT A PRESIDENTIAL "MESSAGE" AND THAT IT ONLY CONSTITUTED ADVICE FROM ONE FRIEND TO ANOTHER. THE PRESIDENT, I EMPHASIZED, KNOWS AND APPRECIATES ISRAEL'S DESIRE FOR PEACE. THERE SHOULD BE ABSOLUTELY NO QUESTIONS ON THIS SCORE. SHAMIR REPLIED THAT MY MESSAGE CAME AT A TIME OF GREAT TRAUMA (REFERRING TO THE YAMIT DEVELOPMENTS). AMBASSADOR LEWIS SAID THE LAST THING THE PRIME MINISTER SHOULD DO WAS TO WRITE THAT HE WAS OFFENDED BY USE OF THE TERM "EVIDENCE", WHICH WAS NOT INTENDED IN A LEGALISTIC SENSE, BUT TO

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ILLUSTRATE THAT ISRAEL SHOULD IMPROVE THE PERCEPTION WHICH OTHERS HAVE OF IT. SHAMIR REPEATED THAT ISRAEL WAS GOING THROUGH A PERIOD OF SUFFERING AND DIFFICULTY.

5. I THEN SAID IN A FOLLOW-UP TO MY CONVERSATION OF THIS MORNING THAT WE SHOULD NOT FORMALIZE OUR DISCUSSIONS THROUGH THE CREATION OF A COMMISSION, THOUGH I BELIEVE OUR TWO GOVERNMENTS NEEDED TO STAY IN TOUCH, ESPECIALLY AS THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS IN LEBANON APPROACHED. THIS COULD BE DONE THROUGH THE EMBASSY AND ALSO BY DRAPER. I SAID QUITE FRANKLY THAT I DID NOT WANT OUR DISCUSSIONS TO INVOLVE THE FRENCH SINCE THEIR VIEWS WERE NOT ALWAYS IDENTICAL TO OURS, AND I WARNED THEY WERE NOT NECESSARILY THE SAME AS ISRAEL'S. I TOLD SHAMIR TO BE CAREFUL IN ISRAELI DISCUSSIONS WITH THE FRENCH, THOUGH I AGAIN NOTED I WOULD BE STOPPING IN PARIS TO COMPARE NOTES.

6. IN DISCUSSING THE ELECTIONS, I SAID THAT IF THE SYRIANS ATTEMPTED TO DOMINATE THE RESULTS, THERE WILL EITHER BE NO ELECTIONS OR THE ELECTION RESULT WILL NOT BE ACCEPTED, NOT ONLY BY THE CHRISTIANS BUT ALSO BY THE MUSLIMS. UNDER CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES, THE

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POSSIBILITY OF EXTENDING SARKIS'S TERM OF OFFICE
COULD NOT BE EXCLUDED. IT WAS NOT CLEAR WHETHER THE
SYRIANS HAD GIVEN UP THEIR OBJECTIVE OF INSTALLING
A PUPPET. I SAID I WOULD TALK ABOUT THIS WITH SYRIAN
FONMIN KHADDAM, WHO WAS HEAVILY INVOLVED IN SYRIAN
POLICY TOWARD LEBANON. WE DISCUSSED VARIOUS
PRESIDENTIAL POSSIBILITIES. I OBSERVED THAT MANY
CANDIDATES WERE IN THE RUNNING BUT THE SITUATION
WOULD NOT SHAKE DOWN POSSIBLY UNTIL JULY. I
REPEATED THAT WE SHOULD STAY IN TOUCH AND COMPARE
ASSESSMENTS FURTHER DOWN THE ROAD. MFA DEPUTY
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DIRGEN BAR-ON OBSERVED THAT WE MIGHT NOT GET THE
TYPE OF OUTCOME WE BOTH DESIRED UNLESS THE SAUDIS
AND KUWAITIS STOPPED THEIR FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE
TO SYRIA.

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FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3353
*INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE
USLO RIYADH IMMEDIATE

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7. SHAMIR ASKED WHAT THE PROSPECTS WERE FOR THE REMOVAL OF SYRIAN TROOPS FROM LEBANON. I REPLIED THAT WHILE EVERYONE AGREED THEY SHOULD GO, SERIOUS DISCUSSION OF THIS ISSUE HAD VIRTUALLY STOPPED IN THE ARAB FOLLOW-UP COMMITTEE. I SAID I WOULD HAVE TO TALK TO THE SAUDIS ABOUT THIS, AS WELL AS ABOUT THE FLOW OF HEAVY WEAPONS TO THE PLO AND THE DANGERS THAT IT POSED FOR THE CEASE-FIRE. I OBSERVED THAT EVERYONE HAD RECEIVED THE MESSAGE OF HOW CLOSE WE HAD COME TO THE DANGER POINT AFTER THE INFILTRATION FROM JORDAN. SHAMIR REMARKED THAT ABU IYAD CONTINUED TO MAKE THREATENING STATEMENTS, TO WHICH I REPLIED THAT AS LONG AS HE DID NOT KILL ISRAELIS THE CEASE-FIRE SHOULD HOLD. SHAMIR THOUGHT THAT OBJECTIVELY THE PLO HAD A PROBLEM IF THEY DID NOT DO ANYTHING. KIMCHE REFERRED TO THE NUMBER OF BOMBS WHICH HAD BEEN FOUND RECENTLY AND FORTUNATELY HAD NOT LED TO ANY ISRAELI CASUALTIES, THEREBY INDICATING THE PLO

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HAD NOT CEASED THEIR TERRORIST ACTIVITIES AGAINST ISRAEL.

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8. AFTER COMPARING NOTES ON THE SITUATION IN SYRAI (IN WHICH OUR ASSESSMENTS ARE VIRTUALLY IDENTICAL) SHAMIR AGAIN ASKED WHY THE SAUDIS AND KUWAITIS WERE BACKING OUT OF THE PROCESS. I REPLIED THAT ORIGINALLY A MEETING HAD BEEN SCHEDULED FOR TODAY (MARCH 1) AND, WHILE I WAS IN BEIRUT, SARKIS HAD RECEIVED A MESSAGE FROM THE SAUDI FOREIGN MINISTER THAT THE MEETING SHOULD NOT BE HELD. THE REASON GIVEN WAS THAT NO PROGRESS COULD BE MADE. THE PROBLEM WAS THAT THE SYRIANS INSISTED ON TALKING ABOUT CONTROL OF THE PORTS AND BASHIR GEMAYEL'S RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL, WHICH HAD EFFECTIVELY PARALYZED THE DISCUSSIONS. THE LEBANESE WANTED TO GET THE SAUDIS ENGAGED SINCE THIS GAVE THEM A SOURCE OF PROTECTION AGAINST THE SYRIANS. I SAID I WOULD REPORT BACK AFTER MY DISCUSSIONS IN RIYADH, ADDING THAT I HOPE THE SAUDI COMMITMENT TO LEBANON HAD NOT CHANGED.

9. WE TOUCHED ON EGYPTIAN AND JORDANIAN ATTITUDES TOWARD LEBANON. I STATED THAT WHILE EGYPT SHARED OUR HOPE THAT LEBANON WILL REMAIN INTACT, I DID NOT ANTICIPATE AN ACTIVE EGYPTIAN ROLE. DRAPER NOTED THAT SADAT HAD GIVEN UP NASSER'S INTELLIGENCE OPERATION IN LEBANON AND HAD NO REAL INFLUENCE. WITH RESPECT TO JORDAN, I SAID KING HUSSEIN KNEW THE IMPORTANCE OF THE CEASE-FIRE AND HAD AGREED TO HELP IN ITS PRESERVATION. BAR-ON OBSERVED THAT IF JORDAN SHARED OUR INTEREST IN SEEING THE SYRIANS OUT OF LEBANON, HE MIGHT APPLY HIS INFLUENCE ON THE SAUDIS TO STOP THEIR FUNDING OF ASSAD. DRAPER SAID IT WAS

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KNOWN THAT HUSSEIN WAS FURIOUS ABOUT SAUDI ASSISTANCE TO SYRIA.

10. IN CONCLUDING, I THOUGHT WE COULD WORK TOGETHER AS LONG AS WE AGREED ON THE NEED FOR AN INTEGRAL AND SOVEREIGN LEBANON AND THAT LEBANESE LEGITIMACY COULD ONLY BE PERPETUATED THROUGH THE CONTITUTIONAL PROCESS. SHAMIR NODDED HIS AGREEMENT THAT A UNITED LEANON WAS IN OUR INTEREST. I ALSO SAID IT WAS GOING TO BE HELPFUL TO ME TO BE ABLE TO STATE THAT ISRAEL REMAINED COMMITTED TO THE CEASE-FIRE, IN RESPONDING TO THE INEVITABLE ACCUSATINS THAT THE UNITED STATES WAS COLLABORATING WITH ISRAEL IN LEBANON. LEWIS

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FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1434
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATEDEPARTMENT OF STATE IM/IPS/CR/IR Date: 11/3/97
☒ RELEASE ☒ DECLASSIFY
☐ EXCISE ☐ DECLASSIFY EO Citations
☐ DENY IN PART

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EXDIS DECAPTIONED

FOIA Exemptions _____ TS authority to
PA Exemptions _____ ☐ CLASSIFY as ☐ S or ☐ C Sec.
☐ DOWNGRADE TS to ☐ S or ☐ C

9302566

FROM HABIB

E.O. 12065: RDS 1,3,4 3/1/02 (HABIB, PHILIP C.)
TAGS: PEPR, MOPS, XF, LE, IS, SY, SA, JO
SUBJECT: HABIB MISSION: MEETING WITH PRIME MINISTER BEGIN1. ~~ENTIRE TEXT~~.

2. SUMMARY: I MET WITH BEGIN FOR TWO HOURS MORNING OF MARCH 1. HE WAS IN A DEFIANT MOOD AND DIFFICULT TO ENGAGE IN A SERIOUS DIALOGUE; NONETHELESS WE HAD SOME VERY FRANK EXCHANGES WHICH MAY HAVE HELPED TO CLEAR THE AIR. OBVIOUSLY UNDER SEVERE STRAIN BECAUSE OF THE YAMIT SITUATION, HE DISPUTED SHARPLY VARIOUS STATEMENTS MADE FEBRUARY 26 BY DEAN FISCHER ON THE FLOW OF WEAPONS TO THE PLO SINCE THE CEASE-FIRE AND ON OUR NOT CONDONING VIOLENCE FROM ANY QUARTER, WHICH HE FELT OVERLOOKED ISRAEL'S RESTRAINT SINCE LAST JULY DESPITE PALESTINIAN VIOLATIONS AND PUT ISRAEL AND THE PLO ON THE SAME PLANE. HE ALSO TOOK ANGRY EXCEPTION TO SOME COMMENTS MADE BY THE PRESIDENT TO ME TO THE EFFECT THAT EVIDENCE IS NEEDED TO DEMONSTRATE ISRAEL'S "BASIC PATIENCE AND PEACEFUL NATURE". BEGIN BELIEVES THIS AMOUNTS TO ISRAEL BEING PUT ON "PROBATION", A SENTIMENT WHICH IS REINFORCED BY THE CONTINUED SUSPEN-

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SION OF THE MOU ON STRATEGIC COOPERATION TO WHICH HE ALSO REFERRED. BEGIN CONSTANTLY CAME BACK TO THE THEMES OF THE BUILDUP OF THE PLO INFRASTRUCTURE AND THE ARMING OF ISRAEL'S ENEMIES AS ERODING ISRAEL'S QUALITATIVE EDGE AND ENDANGERING ITS SECURITY. ON LEBANON, HE EMPHASIZED ISRAEL'S COMMITMENT TO THE CONTINUATION OF THE "CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES" AS LONG AS POSSIBLE AND WAS OBVIOUSLY PLEASED TO HEAR MY INTERPRETATION THAT PLO OPERATIONS ORIGINATING IN LEBANON AND CROSSING THE JORDANIAN BORDER

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WERE VIOLATIONS OF THE AGREEMENT. HE SUGGESTED ESTABLISHING A "SPECIAL COMMISSION", WHICH COULD INCLUDE THE FRENCH, TO LOOK AT CONTINGENCY PLANS FOR LEBANON, FEARING ESPECIALLY SYRIAN MOVES AGAINST THE EXPOSED PHALANGE STRONGHOLD. I DISCOURAGED THIS IDEA AND SUGGESTED THAT INFORMAL BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS COULD BE MORE EFFECTIVE. THE SYRIAN MISSILES WERE ONLY RAISED IN PASSING. BEGIN AGREED THAT I SHOULD REPORT BACK AFTER MY SWING THROUGH THE ARAB CAPITALS. END SUMMARY.

3. I MET WITH PRIME MINISTER BEGIN TODAY, MARCH 1, FOR TWO HOURS. ALSO SITTING IN ON THE ISRAELI SIDE WERE FONMIN SHAMIR, DEFENSE MINISTER SHARON, DIRECTOR OF MILITARY INTELLIGENCE GENERAL SAGUI, MFA DIRECTOR GENERAL KIMCHE AND DEPUTY DIRECTOR GENERAL BAR-ON. A STENOGRAPHER RECORDED THE MEETING. I WAS ACCOMPANIED BY AMBASSADOR LEWIS, DAS DRAPER, DCM BROWN AND POLITICAL COUNSELOR HARE.

4. I FIRST REVIEWED THE TWO PURPOSES OF MY MISSION WHICH WERE TO STRESS THE IMPORTANCE OF THE CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES AND ITS CONTINUATION AND ALSO TO EXAMINE THE INTERNAL SITUATION IN LEBANON, WHICH WAS BECOMING INCREASINGLY TENUOUS, AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR THE REGIONAL SITUATION. I EXPLAINED THAT DURING MY VISIT TO BEIRUT I HAD ONLY MET

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WITH LEBANESE OFFICIALS (THE PRESIDENT, PRIME MINISTER, FOREIGN MINISTER AND DEFENSE MINISTER) AND NOT WITH ANY POLITICAL FIGURES, AT THE REQUEST OF PRESIDENT SARKIS, THOUGH I INTENDED TO MEET WITH OTHER LEBANESE PERSONALITIES DURING MY NEXT VISIT TO BEIRUT. IN ALL OF MY DISCUSSIONS IN BEIRUT, I HAD UNDERScoreD THE INHERENT DANGERS OF THE CURRENT SITUATION AND THE IMPORTANCE OF RESTRAINT BY ALL PARTIES, AND HAD ASKED THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT TO USE ITS INFLUENCE WITH ALL PARTIES TO GET THIS POINT ACROSS. THE LEBANESE WERE OF COURSE COMPLETELY COOPERATIVE.

5. I TOLD BEGIN THAT I FOUND PRESIDENT SARKIS VERY DISTURBED AND TROUBLED. THE WRIT OF THE GOVERNMENT RUNS LESS THAN IT HAD BEFORE AND ITS CAPACITY TO FUNCTION IS STEADILY BEING REDUCED, FOR EXAMPLE, IN THE AREA OF THE COLLECTION OF TAXES AND CUSTOMS DUTIES. I ALSO SAID I HAD DISCUSSED WITH SARKIS PRIVATELY HIS INTENTIONS WITH RESPECT TO THE ELECTIONS AND HAD EXPLICITLY ASKED HIM IF HE WAS PREPARED TO EXTEND HIS TERM. SARKIS HAD REPLIED WITH A VERY FLAT NO. I TOLD BEGIN THAT I BELIEVED THERE WERE SOME AROUND SARKIS WHO WERE URGING HIM NOT TO CLOSE THE DOOR ALTHOUGH SARKIS BELIEVES IT IS IMPORTANT THAT THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESSES BE OBSERVED. I SAID THAT I HAD FOUND THAT THE MUSLIMS AND THE CHRISTIANS

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AGREED THAT IT WAS POSSIBLE TO FIND A SUITABLE PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE AND OBSERVED THAT THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE VARIOUS COMMUNITIES HAVE IMPROVED CONSIDERABLY, PARTICULARLY BETWEEN THE SUNNIS AND THE CHRISTIANS. I STATED

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EXDIS

THAT IF SYRIA TRIED TO IMPOSE A PUPPET, THE MARONITES WOULD NOT STAND FOR IT AND THERE WOULD NOT BE ANY ELECTIONS. IF THE SYRIANS PLAYED THIS SPOILING ROLE OR IF FOR SOME OTHER REASON, SUCH AS THE INABILITY TO OBTAIN A TWO-THIRDS MAJORITY FOR ANY PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE, I WOULD NOT EXCLUDE SARKIS' STAYING ON. SOME OF HIS FOLLOWERS, I NOTED, SAY HE CAN BE PERSUADED.

6. I EXPLAINED THAT SARKIS WAS VERY PESSIMISTIC ABOUT THE SYRIANS AND FELT THAT HE NEEDED ARAB SUPPORT TO APPLY PRESSURE UPON THEM. THERE IS NO QUESTION, I ASSERTED, THAT THE KUWAITIS AND SAUDIS HAVE BACKED OFF, LARGELY BECAUSE OF THE RECALCITRANCE OF THE SYRIANS. PRESIDENT SARKIS AND OTHER LEBANESE OFFICIALS HAD HOWEVER ASKED ME

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TO SPEAK TO THE SAUDIS IN AN EFFORT TO GET THEM RE-ENGAGED IN THE PROCESS. I HAD ASSURED SARKIS ON INSTRUCTIONS FROM THE PRESIDENT THAT WE WERE COMMITTED TO AN INTEGRAL AND SOVEREIGN LEBANON AND SAW NO VALIDITY IN OTHER SCHEMES WHICH WOULD FORMALLY PARTITION AND FRAGMENT THE COUNTRY. THE CONSEQUENCES OF SUCH SCHEMES, I EXPLAINED, WOULD BRING ABOUT PROBLEMS GREATER THAN THOSE THAT WE CONFRONT NOW. PRESIDENT SARKIS WAS PLEASED TO HEAR THIS RESTATEMENT OF POLICY.

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7. AFTER THIS INITIAL PRESENTATION, BEGIN, WHO WAS IN A VERY SOMBER AND DEFIANT MOOD, PROCEEDED TO REVIEW THE HISTORY OF THE NEGOTIATIONS, REFERRING BACK TO BASIC DOCUMENTS. HE READ SPECIFICALLY FROM THE PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE OF MAY 3, 1981 IN WHICH THE PRESIDENT HAD STATED INTER ALIA THAT WE AGREE WITH ISRAEL THAT SYRIA HAD CROSSED THE THRESHOLD AND THAT THE STATUS QUO ANTE MUST BE RESTORED. HE ALSO REFERRED TO HIS MESSAGE OF JANUARY 18, 1982 IN WHICH HE HAD EXPLAINED HIS INTERPRETATION OF MY INITIATIVE TO RESTORE THE STATUS QUO ANTE, WHICH INCLUDED THE REMOVAL OF SYRIAN MISSILES FROM LEBANON, THE REMOVAL OF SYRIAN TROOPS FROM THE SANIN RIDGE, THE REMOVAL OF ADDED SYRIAN MISSILES LOCATED ON THE LEBANESE/SYRIAN BORDER, AND NON-USE OF SYRIAN MISSILES AGAINST ISRAELI RECONNAISSANCE FLIGHTS. CONTINUING IN HIS LEGALISTIC FASHION, BEGIN READ FULLY THE TERMS OF THE JULY 24 CEASE-FIRE AGREEMENT AND SPOKE OF THE SUPPLY OF HEAVY WEAPONS TO THE PLO AND OF HIS CONCERN ABOUT ANY HOSTILITIES DIRECTED AT JEWS ANYWHERE IN THE WORLD. BEGIN ALSO READ MY LETTER TO HIM REGARDING ISRAELI RECONNAISSANCE FLIGHTS OVER LEBANON.

8. BEGIN SAID HE HAD TOLD ME THAT ISRAEL WOULD REGARD AN ATTACK ON JEWS ANYWHERE IN THE WORLD AS A BREACH OF THE CEASE-FIRE.

9. HE THEN SAID THAT THE PLO HAD ATTACKED THE HADDAD AREA TIME AND TIME AGAIN AND THAT THEY HAD CARRIED OUT ATTACKS IN VARIOUS EUROPEAN CITIES SINCE THE CEASE-FIRE WHICH HAD RESULTED IN NINE PERSONS KILLED AND OVER TWO-HUNDRED WOUNDED. HE DESCRIBED IN DETAIL THE JANUARY 28-29 INFILTRATION ACROSS THE JORDANIAN BORDER, WHERE THE TERRORISTS HAD BEEN EQUIPPED WITH 49 HAND GRENADES, TEN KILOS OF

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EXPLOSIVES AND OTHER WEAPONS. FROM THEIR INTERROGATION OF THE TERRORISTS IT WAS CLEAR THAT THE TERRORISTS INTENDED HOSTILE ACTION AGAINST THE ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS ON THE WEST BANK. BEGIN EXCLAIMED COULD WE POSSIBLY IMAGINE HOW MANY PEOPLE COULD HAVE BEEN KILLED IF THIS TERRORIST GROUP HAD NOT FORTUNATELY BEEN DETECTED AND SEIZED. HE SAID THAT THE QUESTION ALSO AROSE WHETHER THIS INCIDENT WAS A BREACH OF THE CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES. I REPLIED THAT I HAD TOLD SECRETARY HAIG THAT ANY TERRORIST EFFORT THAT ORIGINATES FROM LEBANON AND GOES INTO ISRAEL VIA SYRIA AND JORDAN IS A VIOLATION OF THE CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES, THOUGH AS BEGIN WELL UNDERSTOOD I DREW A DIFFERENT CONCLUSION WITH RESPECT TO ACTIVITIES IN EUROPE. (DRAPER NOTED THAT THE SECRETARY AND VELIOTES HAD SAID ALSO THAT THIS INCIDENT HAD BEEN A CEASE-FIRE VIOLATION).

10. AT THIS POINT IN THE CONVERSATION, THERE WAS CONSIDERABLE DEBATE ABOUT THE PREVIOUS POSITION THAT THE ADMINISTRATION HAD TAKEN WITH RESPECT TO INFILTRATION ACROSS THE JORDANIAN BORDER. BEGIN ARGUED (CORRECTLY) THAT HE HAD RECEIVED DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF OUR POSITION BUT THAT NOW, ON HEARING MY VIEW, HIS DOUBTS WERE DISPELLED AND HE WAS AT PEACE. I SAID THAT I HAD ALREADY TAKEN STEPS TO ENSURE THAT ALL PARTIES UNDERSTOOD THIS INTERPRETATION OF THE CEASE-FIRE, ALTHOUGH I WOULD LIKE TO HAVE MORE TIME TO UNDERSCORE THIS POINT DURING THIS TRIP. BEGIN INTERJECTED THAT THE PLO INSISTS IT CAN CONDUCT TERRORIST ACTIVITY OUTSIDE OF THE NORTHERN BORDER AREA. I SAID THAT I HAVE REASON TO BELIEVE THAT

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INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE

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EXDIS

ARAFAT UNDERSTANDS OUR POSITION, WHATEVER HE MAY SAY
PUBLICLY.

11. BEGIN THEN UNBURDENED HIMSELF ON A STATEMENT WHICH
PRESS SPOKESMAN DEAN FISCHER HAD MADE FEBRUARY 26, READING
FROM A TRANSCRIPT IN WHICH FISCHER HAD STATED THAT IN
EFFECT VIOLENCE CAN ONLY EXACERBATE THE SITUATION AND
THE US CANNOT CONDONE VIOLENCE FROM ANY QUARTER. BEGIN
SAID THIS WAS A PREPOSTEROUS STATEMENT, WHICH PUTS THE
ISRAELIS ON A PAR WITH THE PLO. DID IT MEAN, HE ASKED,
THAT IF ISRAEL DEFENDED ITSELF AGAINST A PLO ATTACK THIS
WOULD NOT BE CONDONED BY THE US? AMBASSADOR LEWIS
IMMEDIATELY INTERVENED TO SAY THAT THE PRIME MINISTER WAS
READING FISCHER'S STATEMENT IN THE WRONG CONTEXT.
SPECIFICALLY, FISCHER WAS REPLYING TO A PRESS QUESTION
ABOUT AMBASSADOR ARENS' SUGGESTION THAT ISRAEL WOULD TAKE
PREEMPTIVE MEASURES IF MODERN AMERICAN ARMS WERE DELIVER-
ED TO SUCH ARAB STATES AS JORDAN (THE ISRAELIS HAD ONLY
THE TEXT OF ANSWERS BY THE SPOKESMAN, NOT THE QUESTIONS
THAT PROVOKED THE ANSWERS).

12. BEGIN SAID HE DID NOT BELIEVE THAT ARENS USED THE
WORDS "PREEMPTIVE ACTION". IF HE DID HE WAS DOING IT
ALL ON HIS OWN. HOWEVER, HE EXPLAINED THAT ISRAEL IS

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LIVING UNDER THE CONSTANT THREAT OF VIOLENCE AND THAT
THE PLO IN LEBANON WAS NOW ARMED WITH 300 ARTILLERY
PIECES AND 200 MORTARS, OF WHICH MANY WERE 130MM WITH A
RANGE OF 27KMS, AND THAT THE PLO NOW HAD 60-70 TANKS,
INCLUDING T-54S, WHEREAS THEY HAD 30-40 TANKS PRIOR TO
THE CEASE-FIRE, ALL T-34S. YOU CAN ADD THE MULTIPLE-
LAUNCHED KATYUSHA MISSILES TO THE PLO INVENTORY. BEGIN
SAID HE FREQUENTLY THOUGHT ABOUT WHAT WOULD HAPPEN TO
HIS PEOPLE IF ALL OF THESE WEAPONS WERE EMPLOYED AGAINST
ISRAEL, KILLING SCORES OF HIS PEOPLE IN THE FIRST ROUND
OF ATTACKS.

13. AS HE HAD WARNED THE SECRETARY, ISRAEL WOULD THEN

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ENTER LEBANON AND DESTROY THE PLO. BEGIN WONDERED, HOWEVER, IF IT WAS MORAL FOR HIM TO WAIT UNTIL SUCH AN EVENTUALITY MIGHT OCCUR AND RHETORICALLY ASKED WHETHER THIS WAS NOT A FORM OF "WEAKNESS". AFTER DESCRIBING SOME BOMBS WHICH HAD BEEN FOUND INSIDE ISRAEL IN THE LAST FEW DAYS, HE STATED THAT, WHILE ISRAEL ACCEPTED THIS MORAL DILEMMA, OUR SPOKESMAN STILL REFERRED TO THE UNACCEPTABILITY OF VIOLENCE FROM ANY QUARTER, WHICH HE REITERATED WAS PREPOSTEROUS, CONSIDERING THE BEHAVIOR OF THE TERRORISTS AND TOTAL ISRAELI RESTRAINT SINCE LAST JULY.

14. I EMPHASIZED TO BEGIN THAT THE SPOKESMAN WAS RESPONDING TO A DIFFERENT KIND OF QUESTION, AS AMBASSADOR LEWIS HAD CORRECTLY POINTED OUT, AND NOTED THAT I HAD ALWAYS SAID THAT EVERY NATION HAS THE RIGHT TO DEFEND ITS CITIZENS. RECALLING THE PRIME MINISTER'S VIVID STATEMENTS TO ME DURING THE SHELLING OF THE NORTHERN SETTLEMENTS IN WHICH HE HAD TALKED ABOUT THOSE ISRAELIS WHO HAD BEEN KILLED, I STRESSED THAT THE CEASE-FIRE HAD HELD FOR ALMOST

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EIGHT MONTHS, MANY LIVES HAD BEEN SAVED, AND WE MUST NOW WORK NOT ONLY TO PRESERVE THE CEASE-FIRE BUT TO STRENGTHEN IT.

15. AFTER ALLOWING A POSSIBLE MISUNDERSTANDING ON THE SPOKESMAN'S REMARKS, BEGIN SAID THAT ISRAEL HAD NOT RESPONDED TO REPEATED TERRORIST INCIDENTS AND HAD KEPT THE PEACE. ALL OF HIS MINISTERS WANTED THE "CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES" TO CONTINUE INDEFINITELY AND HE WANTED ME TO REPORT THIS TO THE PRESIDENT. BUT HE ASKED, HOW LONG CAN THE PRESENT SITUATION GO ON? HE FOUND IT INCREDIBLE THAT THE AMERICANS HAD THE ATTITUDE THAT ISRAEL SHOULD NOT TOUCH THE PLO, AN AGENT OF THE SOVIET UNION, A SUPPLIER TO THE RED BRIGADES IN ITALY AND A CENTER OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM. IF ISRAEL MOVES, BEGIN ASSERTED, IT SHALL SMASH THE PLO TO PIECES (INCLUDING THE SYRIAN ARMY) BUT HE UNDERSTOOD THE PRICE WHICH SUCH AN OPERATION WOULD HAVE IN TERMS OF ISRAELI CASUALTIES. DURING HIS CONVALESCENCE, HE HAD OFTEN THOUGHT ABOUT THE HUNDREDS OF ISRAELI BOYS WHO WOULD BE HOSPITALIZED IF WAR WERE TO BREAK OUT, WHICH ONLY UNDERScoreD HIS HOPE THAT THERE WOULD BE NO WAR.

16. BEGIN SAID HE HAD SPOKEN TO BASHIR GEMAYEL, WHO HAD DESCRIBED THE DANGERS WHICH SYRIA POSED TO THE CHRISTIAN COMMUNITY. IN VIEW OF THIS DANGER, BEGIN ASKED WHETHER WE SHOULD NOT REASON TOGETHER AND MAKE JOINT CONTINGENCY PLANS IN THE EVENT THAT THE SYRIANS ACTED AGAINST THE PHALANGE TO ANNIHILATE THE CHRISTIANS. HE

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SAID HE WOULD BE ASKING MITTERAND, IN VIEW OF FRANCE'S TRADITIONAL ROLE AS THE PROTECTOR OF THE MARONITE COMMUNITY IN LEBANON, THE SAME QUESTION. HE THOUGHT THAT IT

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ACTION SS-25

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EXDIS

WOULD BE USEFUL IF A SPECIAL TRIPARTITE COMMISSION OF SPECIALISTS WERE FORMED TO EXAMINE THIS ISSUE BUT, BEGIN CONTINUED, INSTEAD OF REASONING TOGETHER ISRAEL IS BEING DELUGED BY WARNINGS, WHILE SAUDI ARABIA PROVIDES MILLIONS OF DOLLARS TO THE TERRORIST PLO.

17. I SAID THAT I WOULD CONVEY THE FLAVOR AS WELL AS HIS WORDS TO THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY. WHILE I AGREED WE SHOULD DO MORE, I STATED THAT I COULD NOT ACCEPT THE CHARGE THAT WE WERE ONLY ENGAGING IN RHETORICAL GESTURES. I EXPLAINED THAT THERE HAD BEEN A NUMBER OF RECENT STATEMENTS AND PRESS STORIES WHICH PAINTED ISRAEL AS READY TO LEAP INTO LEBANON, AND THAT UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES ONE HAD TO EXPECT OUR SPOKESMAN TO BE QUESTIONED ABOUT THESE STORIES. I SAID THAT, WHILE I HAD NO DOUBT ABOUT THE PRIME MINISTER'S COMMITMENT TO PEACE, THE IMPRESSION GAINED IN RECENT DAYS WAS THAT ISRAEL WAS BECOMING MORE BELLICOSE. THIS IMAGE NEEDED TO BE REPAIRED. UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES,

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I REPEATED, WAS THE US ATTEMPTING TO COMPARE OR TO PUT ON THE SAME LEVEL ISRAEL AND THE PLO.

18. BEGIN THEN SEIZED ON ANOTHER PART OF FISCHER'S STATEMENT ON FEBRUARY 26 WHICH HE STATED IN EFFECT THAT WE HAD NOT DETECTED ANY MAJOR INFUSION OF ARMS TO THE PLO

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WHICH SIGNIFICANTLY ALTERED THE BALANCE OF FORCES. BEGIN SAID THIS CONTRADICTED WHAT THE SECRETARY HAD SAID ON THE SAME SUBJECT. I REPLIED THAT I PERSONALLY WOULD HAVE PREFERRED TO AVOID SUCH TERMS AS "BALANCE" IN DESCRIBING WHAT HAD OCCURRED SINCE THE CEASE-FIRE. AMBASSADOR LEWIS INTERJECTED THAT THE GUIDANCE GIVEN TO THE SPOKESMAN WAS UNDOUBTEDLY POORLY DRAFTED. LEWIS ADDED HE WAS DELIGHTED TO HEAR FROM THE PRIME MINISTER THAT AMBASSADOR ARENS HAD NOT SUGGESTED A PREEMPTIVE STRIKE. BEGIN REPLIED THAT THE USE OF THE WORD "PREEMPTIVE" WAS A FOOLISH FORMULATION "FOR IF YOU PREEMPT, THERE WILL BE WAR AND HOW DO YOU PREVENT WAR IN THAT WAY". I SAID THAT IT WAS POSSIBLE THAT AMBASSADOR ARENS HAD NOT USED THE WORD PREEMPTIVE, BUT HE HAD CREATED THAT IMPRESSION, ESPECIALLY IF ISRAEL SAYS THAT IT WILL STRIKE AGAINST ANY ADVANCED AMERICAN WEAPONS WHICH ARE DELIVERED TO ANY ARAB COUNTRIES. BEGIN REPLIED THAT WE HAD TO UNDERSTAND HIS CONCERNS. WHILE HE HAD RECEIVED A COMMITMENT FROM THE PRESIDENT THAT ISRAEL'S QUALITATIVE EDGE WOULD BE MAINTAINED, THERE WAS A RULE THAT QUANTITY CAN CREATE A NEW QUALITY AND THAT IF THE RATIO OF FORCES CHANGED FROM THREE-TO-ONE TO FIVE-TO-ONE ISRAEL WOULD BE IN GREAT TROUBLE. SYRIA WAS AN IMPLACABLE ENEMY AND JORDAN HAD ALIGNED ITSELF WITH IRAQ AND HAD ASKED FOR MOBILE I-HAWKS WHICH IN EFFECT WERE OFFENSIVE AND IN ANY CASE COULD ONLY BE USED TO SHED JEWISH BLOOD. HE SAID HE TREMBLED AT THE THOUGHT OF THE US PROVIDING F-16S TO JORDAN WHICH WOULD BE ABLE TO FLY OVER TEL AVIV IN A FEW MINUTES TIME. EVEN IF THE ISRAELI AIR FORCE WERE ABLE TO SHOOT DOWN NINE OUT OF THE TEN AIRPLANES, THE REMAINING AIRCRAFT COULD STILL CREATE HAVOC IN ISRAEL.

19. I SAID THAT THE PRESIDENT UNDERSTOOD ISRAELI CONCERNS

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AND THAT HIS COMMITMENT TO ISRAEL'S SECURITY REMAINED FIRM. THE PRESIDENT HAD SAID TO ME THAT U.S. IS NOT GOING TO RETREAT FROM ITS COMMITMENT TO ISRAEL. IF THERE ARE MISUNDERSTANDINGS, THE U.S. WILL DO ITS BEST TO RECTIFY

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THEM, BUT ISRAEL MUST DO SO ALSO. I THEN SAID THAT THE PRESIDENT HAD ASKED ME TO SAY TO HIM THAT "WHAT IS NEEDED RIGHT NOW IS FOR ISRAEL TO PROVIDE THE WORLD EVIDENCE OF ISRAEL'S BASIC PATIENCE AND PEACEFUL NATURE". THERE IS A LIMIT, I EXPLAINED, TO THE NUMBER OF TIMES WE CAN BE CONFRONTED WITH NEW STEPS, WHICH WE HAVE TO CRITICIZE. BEGIN ANGRILY RETORTED THAT HE UNDERSTOOD THIS STATEMENT TO MEAN THAT ISRAEL WAS "ON PROBATION". I SAID THAT THE PRESIDENT HAD ALSO STRESSED REPEATEDLY THAT WE DID NOT INTEND TO DO ANYTHING TO BREAK OUR LINK OR OUR COMMITMENT TO ISRAEL. BEGIN REFUSED TO BE BUDGED ON THIS POINT, SAYING WITH ALL DEFERENCE TO THE PRESIDENT'S WORDS THAT HE COULD NOT CONCEIVE HOW ISRAEL COULD BE "PUT ON PROBATION" UNTIL IT DEMONSTRATED OR PROVED ITS PEACEFUL INTENTIONS. THE DEFENSE MINISTER, WHO HE SAID IS CONSIDERED BY SOME TO BE HAWKISH, AND HE, HAD TAKEN UPON THEMSELVES THE RESPONSIBILITY LAST FRIDAY TO PUT UP ROADBLOCKS IN THE SINAI

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HICH "PLACED THE GOVERNMENT IN CONFRONTATION WITH THOUSANDS OF GOOD YOUNG PEOPLE". BEGIN SAID THE STEP HAD BEEN TAKEN BECAUSE ISRAEL HAD SIGNED A COMMITMENT AND WOULD FULFILL IT. WHY, HE REPEATED, DO WE HAVE TO PROVE OUR CREDENTIALS? HE SAID THAT MUBARAK HAD TAKEN THE

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1438
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE

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EXDIS

POSITION HE COULD NOT VISIT JERUSALEM AND AS A RESULT MUBARAK'S VISIT TO ISRAEL WOULD NOT TAKE PLACE. THIS WAS SERIOUS. HE MIGHT NEVER AGAIN BE ABLE TO TALK TO MUBARAK IF HE WOULD NOT VISIT JERUSALEM, SINCE IT WAS THE TURN OF THE EGYPTIAN LEADER TO VISIT ISRAEL. THIS HAD OCCURRED DESPITE THE FACT THAT DURING THEIR MEETING AT ALEXANDRIA LAST YEAR SADAT HAD ACCEPTED AN INVITATION TO VISIT AND THEN AT SADAT'S FUNERAL MUBARAK HAD ACCEPTED THE INVITATION AGAIN. DESPITE THIS DEVELOPMENT, ISRAEL WAS GOING AHEAD WITH ITS WITHDRAWAL COMMITMENTS.

20. I STRESSED REPEATEDLY THAT THE PRESIDENT WAS NOT SAYING THAT ISRAEL DID NOT SEEK PEACE AND THAT HE SHOULD NOT TAKE THE PRESIDENT'S WORDS AS A CHALLENGE. THE PRESIDENT WAS SUGGESTING, AS A FRIEND, THAT ISRAEL'S PEACEFUL NATURE WAS NOT UNDERSTOOD AND THIS FALSE PUBLIC IMAGE NEEDED TO BE RECTIFIED. BEGIN SAID THAT ISRAEL'S POSITION WAS NOT UNDERSTOOD BECAUSE SOME CIRCLES IN THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT, ESPECIALLY THE "ARABISTS", WERE BUILDING UP THE IMPRESSION OF ISRAEL'S BELLICOSITY. BEGIN STATED FLATLY THAT ISRAEL DOES NOT HAVE TO PROVIDE EVIDENCE OF ITS PEACEFUL INTENTIONS. AMBASSADOR LEWIS SAID THAT IT WAS NOT SO-CALLED ARABISTS IN THE STATE DEPARTMENT WHO WERE FUELING THE STORY; RATHER, DURING THE LAST TWO

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MONTHS, THERE HAD BEEN A SERIES OF ENDLESS MEDIA COMMENTARIES COMING OUT OF JERUSALEM QUOTING HIGH ISRAELI OFFICIALS, WHICH HAD CREATED A PUBLIC MOOD IN THE U.S. THAT ISRAEL WAS PREPARED TO INVADE LEBANON WITH VIRTUALLY NO PRETEXT. THE PRESIDENT, AMBASSADOR LEWIS EXPLAINED, WAS ONLY SAYING THAT THIS FALSE ILLUSION MUST BE DISPELLED. BEGIN REPEATED THAT THE NEED FOR "EVIDENCE" HAD "HURT HIM VERY MUCH, VERY DEEPLY".

21. BEGIN THEN ENUMERATED THE WEAPONS WHICH THE US WAS SUPPLYING TO ISRAEL'S ENEMIES (AWACS, THE F-15 ENHANCEMENT PACKAGE, AND POSSIBLE SALES TO JORDAN). HE SAID THAT, WHILE HE WAS NOT GOING TO REQUEST ANY COMPENSATORY MEASURES, HE HAD NOTED THAT NO ONE HAD APPROACHED ISRAEL ON THIS SUBJECT. AMBASSADOR LEWIS REPLIED THAT HE UNDERSTOOD THAT IN THIS YEAR'S BUDGET THE ADMINISTRATION WAS REQUESTING THE INCREASE OF \$300 MILLION IN FMS CREDITS IN

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RECOGNITION OF THE ADDED DEFENSE BURDEN WHICH THE AWACS MIGHT POSE TO ISRAEL. BEGIN REPLIED THAT THIS WAS A LOAN WHICH CARRIED A VERY HIGH INTEREST AND DID NOT SOLVE ISRAEL'S PROBLEMS, THOUGH ISRAEL WOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR SUCH AN INCREASE. HE NOTED THAT THE MOU ON STRATEGIC COOPERATION WAS STILL IN SUSPENSE AND \$300 MILLION IN AID HAD BEEN STOPPED BY THIS ACTION. HE FELT THAT WHILE THE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST WAS DYNAMIC, THE ONLY THING THAT WAS STATIC WAS THE SECURITY RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE US AND ISRAEL. AND THIS WAS AN OMINOUS DEVELOPMENT.

22. I EXPLAINED THAT IT WOULD BE BETTER IF THE PRIME MINISTER SPOKE TO AMBASSADOR LEWIS ABOUT THESE ISSUES SINCE MY MANDATE WAS MORE CONCENTRATED. I NOTED THAT IN MY PUBLIC SPEAKING ENGAGEMENTS IN THE US I HAD TRIED TO PUT ISRAEL'S COMMITMENT TO PEACE IN PERSPECTIVE BUT

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I COULD TELL HIM THAT THERE WAS A PERCEPTION AMONG MANY AMERICANS OF ISRAELI BELLICOSITY AS A RESULT OF RECENT STATEMENTS.

23. I NOTED THAT I WOULD NOW BE GOING TO DAMASCUS, AMMAN AND SAUDI ARABIA AND AS USUAL I WOULD LIKE TO COME BACK TO JERUSALEM AND REPORT ON MY DISCUSSIONS. I STATED I WOULD FOCUS ON THE IMPORTANCE OF THE CEASE-FIRE AND ITS CONTINUATION AND THE PROBLEM OF LEBANON IN THE CONTEXT OF THE REGIONAL SITUATION. I HOPED IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO REENGAGE THE SAUDIS AND STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF OUR CONTINUING TO TALK TOGETHER ABOUT THESE PROBLEMS. IN RESPONSE TO BEGIN'S SUGGESTION ON A SPECIAL COMMISSION, I SAID A FORMAL MECHANISM COULD POSE PROBLEMS AND THAT INFORMAL TALKS COULD BE JUST AS EFFECTIVE. MOREOVER, I NOTED FRENCH AND AMERICAN APPROACHES TO THE SITUATION IN LEBANON DID NOT ALWAYS COINCIDE. THOUGH I SAID I WOULD BE STOPPING IN PARIS ON MY WAY BACK HOME TO COMPARE NOTES.

24. SUMMING UP, BEGIN SAID THAT WHILE OUR DISCUSSIONS HAD BEEN DIFFICULT "THEY WERE GOOD". HE SPOKE OF THE DIFFICULTIES OF LIVING UNDER PERMANENT THREAT TO ISRAEL'S SECURITY AND BEING EXPOSED TO VIOLATIONS OF THE CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES. HE SAID THAT HE CONTINUED TO RECEIVE CRITICISM FROM THE OPPOSITION ON THE CONTINUED PRESENCE OF THE SYRIAN MISSILES IN LEBANON AND IN RESPONDING HAD SAID THAT I HAD PROMISED TO GET THEM OUT. IN ORDER TO QUIET THE OPPOSITION, HE HAD ALSO EXPLAINED THAT ISRAELI

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1439
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE

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EXDIS

RECONNAISSANCE FLIGHTS WERE CONTINUING AND THAT, IF ISRAEL WERE TO STRIKE THE MISSILES, THIS WOULD LEAD TO WAR. HOWEVER, BEGIN SAID THAT I REALLY SHOULD DO SOMETHING ABOUT THE MISSILES. I REPLIED THAT THIS HAD BEEN THE MOST DIFFICULT EFFORT IN MY DIPLOMATIC CAREER AND ALLUDED TO VARIOUS WELL KNOWN CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH HAD COMPLICATED MY TASK. BEGIN THEN ASKED ME TO READ AGAIN THE WORDS I HAD USED TO DESCRIBE THE VIEWS OF THE PRESIDENT, EXPLAINING HE WANTED TO SEND A LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT. I READ THE SENTENCE TO HIM SLOWLY AS HE WROTE IT DOWN ON A PIECE OF PAPER. I PROTESTED HE HAD MISINTERPRETED THE MEANING OF WHAT THE PRESIDENT HAD MEANT, STRESSING THAT THE PRESIDENT WAS ONLY SPEAKING TO BEGIN AS A FRIEND TRYING TO POINT OUT THAT NOW WAS THE TIME FOR ISRAEL TO EMPHASIZE ITS PATIENCE AND PEACEFUL NATURE. I URGED HIM NOT TO INITIATE A FRUITLESS DEBATE OVER THE ISSUE. (UNFORTUNATELY, I DOUBT THAT I DISSUADED HIM FROM HIS INTENDED COURSE.) GROVE

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FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM

TO AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS NIACT IMMEDIATE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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Date: 11/2/97

INFO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE

☒ RELEASE☒ DECLASSIFY

AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE

☒ EXCISE☒ DECLASSIFY

EO Citations

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AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY KUWAIT IMMEDIATE

USLO RIYADH IMMEDIATE

FOIA Exemptions

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PA Exemptions

☐ DOWNGRADE TS to ☐ S or ☐ C

TS authority to

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JERUSALEM 00607

DECAPTIONED

FOR CHARGE RUGH FROM HABIB

E.O. 12065: RDS-1,3 2/28/02 (GROVE, BRANDON) OR-M

TAGS: PEPR, IS, LE, SY

SUBJECT: HABIB MISSION, MEETING WITH ASSAD

REF: DAMASCUS 1421V

1. ~~ENTIRE TEXT~~2. THANK QADDOUR FOR HIS MESSAGE, GIVE HIM MY BEST REGARDS,
AND SAY I WILL BE LOOKING FORWARD TO MEETING WITH FONMIN
KHADDAM AND PRESIDENT ASSAD IN ACCORD WITH HIS MESSAGE.3. PRESENT PLANS ARE FOR DEPARTURE FROM ISRAEL AT 0700 ZULU
(0900 LOCAL) TUESDAY, MARCH 2, VIA CYPRUS, WITH ETA DAMASCUS
TO BE SENT VIA DAO CHANNELS. GROVE

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FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5489

INFO AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY

AMCONSUL JERUSALEM PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY JIDDA PRIORITY

USLO RIYADH PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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FOIA Exemptions

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TS authority to
☐ CLASSIFY as ☐ S or ☐ C Sec.
☐ DOWNGRADE TS to ☐ S or ☐ C

BEIRUT 1404

EX DECAPTIONED

FOR THE SECRETARY FROM HABIB

E.O. 12065: RDS 1, 3, 4 2/27/02 (HABIB, PHILIP C.)

TAGS: PEPR, MOPS, XF, LE, IS, SY, SA, JO, EG

SUBJECT: HABIB MISSION: IMPRESSIONS OF TALKS IN LEBANON

1. ~~ENTIRE TEXT~~

2. WE HAVE SENT DETAILED REPORTS OF DISCUSSIONS WITH THE PRINCIPAL LEBANESE GOVERNMENT LEADERS. I AM HOLDING IN ABEYANCE MEETING WITH A WIDER RANGE OF POLITICAL ACTORS. MENAWHILE, THE PRINCIPAL CONCERNS AND VIEW SOF LEADERS IN THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT AT THIS STATE CAN BE SUMMARIZED AS FOLLOWS:

--FIRST OF ALL, THEY DEEPLY FEAR AN ISRAELI ATTACK, THE CONSEQUENCES OF WHICH WOULD BE GRAVE-- INCLUDING FOR THE CHRISTIAN COMMUNITIES IN THE MIDDLE EAST IF LEBANESE CHRISTIAN LEADER BASHIR GEMAYEL COOPERATES

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WITH THE ISRAELIS.

-- THE BASIC POLITICAL SITUATION WITHIN LEBANON HAS NOT IMPROVED; THERE HAS BEEN NO SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS IN FINDING A COMPROMISE PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE. THERE IS STILL TIME FOR SUCH A COMPROMISE, BUT HOW IT WILL COME ABOUT REMAINS OBSCURE.

--SAUDI AND GENERAL ARAB EFFORTS HAVE NOT PRODUCED USEFUL RESULTS, AND THE LEBANESE ARE BOTH DISILLUSIONED AND DISAPPOINTED; ALTHOUGH TO SOME EXTENT STILL LOOKING

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TO THE MODERATE ARABS FOR HELP.

-- THE SYRIANS ARE MORE INTRANSIGENT AND INFLEXIBLE THAN EVER; SYRIA'S INTERNAL TROUBLES ARE UNLIKELY TO MODERATE SYRIAN ATTITUDES TOWARDS THE LEBANESE SITUATION. THE ABSENCE OF A DIALOGUE BETWEEN THE SYRIANS AND THE MILITANT CHRISTIAN LEADERSHIP IS A FORMULA FOR NO PROGRESS.

--WHILE THE MASS OF CHRISTIANS AND MUSLIMS ARE PREPARED FOR A POLITICAL RECONCILIATION, THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE POLITICAL MOVEMENTS IN EACH COMMUNITY-- SUCH AS THE NATIONAL MOVEMENT AND THE PHALANGE -- ARE BROAD, AND PROBABLY CAN ONLY BE NARROWED IF THE CHRISTIANS REACH A MODICUM OF UNDERSTANDING WITH THE SYRIANS.

-- A FORM OF DE FACTO PARTITION EXISTS IN WHICH DIFFERENT ARMED ELEMENTS EXERCISE CONTROL OVER PIECES OF LEBANESE TERRITORY. THIS FRUSTRATES THE GOVERNMENT FROM ASSERTING ITS AUTHORITY, ADMINISTERING ITS TERRITORY AND OBTAINING ADEQUATE REVENUES THROUGH CUSTOMS AND TAXES. NEVERTHELESS, FORMAL PARTITION IS STILL VIEW AS A DISASTER AND REJECTED AS A SOLUTION TO LEBANON'S ILLS.

---THEY STRONGLY WISH THE CEASE-FIRE TO CONTINUE.

-- THEY WELCOMED UNIFIL'S EXPANSION AND SOME ARE THINKING OF CONSTRUCTIVE MOVES TO IMPROVE THE SITUATION

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IN THE SOUTH.

-- IN SUM, THE LEBANESE HAVE NO READY MADE SOLUTIONS. THEY CONSIDER THEMSELVES PAWNS IN A LARGER GLOBAL AND REGIONAL GAME. THUS, THEY LOOK ELSEWHERE FOR AN ANSWER: THEY HOPE FOR PEACE TO SOLVE THEIR PALESTINIAN PROBLEM; THEY HOPE THAT THE US WILL RESTRAIN ISRAEL FROM MILITARY ACTION; AND THEY HOPE THAT OUTSIDE PLAYERS -- INCULUDING THE U.S. AND SAUDI ARABIA -- WILL BE ABLE TO INFLUENCE EVENTS IN A DIRECTION COMPATIBLE WITH THEIR OWN OBJECTIVES.

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FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT

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AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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Date: 11/1/97

EO Citations

FOIA Exemptions

PA Exemptions

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SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIRUT 1401

DECAPTIONED

E.O. 12065: RDS- 2/26/02 (HABIB, PHILIP)

TAGS: PEPR, PINS, PINT, LE, IS

SUBJECT: HABIB VISIT: CONVERSATION WITH PRESIDENT SARKIS

1. ~~ENTIRE TEXT~~

2. SUMMARY: I FOUND PRESIDENT SARKIS EVEN MORE PESSIMISTIC THAN DURING MY VISIT LAST DECEMBER AS HE PAINTED FOR ME THE FOLLOWING BLACK PICTURE OF THE SITUATION IN LEBANON. THE PALESTINIANS ARE ON ALERT FROM BEIRUT TO THE SOUTH EXPECTING AN ISRAELI ATTACK. THERE ARE FIGHTS AND EXPLOSIONS IN WEST BEIRUT EVERY TWO OR THREE WEEKS. TRIPOLI HAS BEEN THE SCENE OF SEVERE FIGHTING. THE NATIONAL MOVEMENT, FOLLOWING THE EXAMPLE OF THE PHALANGE, HAS NOW STARTED COLLECTING TAXES IN ITS TERRITORY. NEITHER THE ARAB FOLLOW UP COMMITTEE (AFC) NOR THE ARAB LEAGUE COMMITTEE ON SOUTH LEBANON ARE ACCOMPLISHING ANYTHING. THERE IS GREAT ANXIETY ABOUTT THE COMING YEAR.

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THE CONTENDING PARTIES ARE FORTIFYING THEIR POSITIONS ALONG THE BEIRUT DEMARCATION LINE. THE SYRIANS AND PHALANGE ARE NOT HAVING ANY SERIOUS DISCUSSIONS AND ARE AT A STATEMATE CONCERNING A COMPROMISE CANDIDATE FOR THE PRESIDENCY. IF NO PRESIDENT IS ELECTED THERE WILL BE EVEN GREATER DE FACTO PARTITION OF THE COUNTRY. LEBANON IS REGRESSING FAST AND THE COUNTRY IS ON THE EDGE OF MORAL, POLITICAL AND MATERIAL BANKRUPTCY. IF LEBANON GOES UNDER, THE GULF COUNTRIES WILL BE NEXT.

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3. NOR DID THE PRESIDENT HAVE ANY SUGGESTED REMEDIES. HE SAID THERE IS A GREAT POPULAR DESIRE FOR NATIONAL RECONCILIATION ACROSS RELIGIOUS LINES, BUT HE PRESENTED NO WAY THIS COULD BE EXPLOITED. IN ANSWER TO MY QUESTIONS AS TO POSSIBLE HELPFUL U.S. ACTIONS HE SAID HE SAID HE WAS THE PATIENT, THAT HE COULD SUBMIT TO ME, AS ONE OF THE DOCTORS, A FULL MEDICAL REPORT, BUT THAT HE COULD NOT SUGGEST ANY TREATMENT. AT DINNER LATER, THE SAME DAY, SARKIS REITERATED IN STRONG TERMS HIS UNWILLINGNESS TO CONTINUE IN OFFICE BEYOND HIS ALLOTTED TIME. HE WELCOMED THE UNIFIL EXPANSION RESOLUTION. END SUMMARY.

4. ACCOMPANIED BY DAS DRAPER, AMBASSADOR DILLION, AND DCM BARRETT, I MADE A ONE-HOUR CALL ON SARKIS, WHO WAS ATTENDED BY HIS PRINCIPAL CIVILIAN AIDE, SHORTLY AFTER MY ARRIVAL IN LEBANON ON FEBRUARY 27.

5. I BEGAN THE CONVERSATION BY INFORMING PRESIDENT SARKIS OF THE TWO MISSIONS GIVEN ME BY PRESIDENT REAGAN FOR THIS TRIP: TO UPHOLD AND STRENGTHEN THE CEASE-FIRE IN THE SOUTH, AND TO EXAMINE THE SITUATION IN LEBANON AS IT FIT INTO THE REGIONAL PICTURE. I REITERATED OUR POLICY OF SUPPORT FOR DEMOCRATIC LEBANON AND ITS CENTRAL

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GOVERNMENT AND ASKED THE PRESIDENT FOR HIS ANALYSIS OF THE PRESENT PRESENT SITUATION.

6. THE PRESIDENT DESCRIBED A BLEAK SITUATION, ADDING CONSIDERABLE DETAILS TO THE FOREGOING SUMMARY. THE GOVERNMENT OF LEBANON (GOL) HAD COLLECTED ONLY 400 MILLION LEBANESE POUNDS IN CUSTOMS REVENUE LAST YEAR AS AGAINST A PROJECTED 2 BILLION. THE 6 BILLION POUND BUDGET FOR 1982 WHICH HAD BEEN PRESENTED TO THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY WOULD HAVE AN ESTIMATED 75 PERCENT DEFICIT. THE GOVERNMENT WAS DIGGING INTO ITS RESERVES TO PAY SALARIES BUT THIS COULD NOT GO ON FOREVER. THE GOL CONTROLLED ONLY A SMALL PART OF THE NATIONAL TERRITORY AND EVEN THERE IT COULD NOT EXPAND ITS AUTHORITY. USG SUPPORT NOTWITHSTANDING, THERE HAD BEEN NO PROGRESS FOR FIVE YEARS AND THE PRESIDENT REGRETTED THAT HE HAD TO TELL ME THAT OVER THE PAST YEAR (THE PERIOD DURING WHICH I HAVE BEEN VISITING LEBANON) THE SITUATION HAD GOTTEN WORSE. PEOPLE COULD NOT COUNT ON ANYTHING, DID NOT KNOW WHETHER TO SEND THEIR CHILDREN TO SCHOOL OR GO OFF ON TRIPS, NEVER KNOWING WHAT VIOLENCE MIGHT COME UP.

7. THE PRESIDENT WAS PARTICULARLY SCATHING IN HIS CRITICISM OF THE ARAB COUNTRIES AND THE TWO COMMITTEES FORMED BY THE ARAB LEAGUE TO HELP LEBANON. THE ARAB FOLLOW UP

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Date Printed: 10/09/1984 Doc NUMBER: 82BEIRUT01401

CHANNEL: n/a

COMMITTEE (AFC) HAD ACCOMPLISHED NOTHING. HE WOULD CALL OFF THE AFC MEETING SET FOR MARCH 1 EXCEPT FOR FEAR THAT THIS MIGHT SET OFF RENEWED FIGHTING ALONG THE BEIRUT CONFRONTATION LINE. INSTEAD OF ADDRESSING THE GOL'S PLAN, PRESENTED LAST JULY, FOR A COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT OF THE COUNTRY'S PROBLEMS, THE AFC HAGGLED ENDLESSLY

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SECTION 02 OF 02 BEIRUT 1401

EXDIS

OVER THE PHALANGE TIES WITH ISRAEL AND CONTROL OF ARMS IMPORTS BY SEA INTO LEBANON. IT COULD NOT EVEN OPEN UP THE SODECO PASSAGE IN BEIRUT. THE ARAB LEAGUE COMMITTEE ON SOUTH LEBANON HAD MET FOR A FEW HOURS TO RECEIVE A SUGGESTED PLAN OF ACTION PRESENTED BY THE GOL AND THEN ADJOURNED. NEITHER THE SAUDIS NOR THE KUWAITIS, BOTH ON THE AFC, WERE WILLING TO STAND UP TO THE SYRIANS. THE MEMBER COUNTRIES OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE SOUTH WERE NOT

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EVEN ON SPEAKING TERMS. SOME OF THESE COUNTRIES' GOVERNMENTS HAD ADMITTED TO THEIR POWERLESSNESS AND THE SAUDIS HAD EVEN ASKED FOR THE LEBANESE ARMY'S REMOVAL FROM THE DEMARCATION LINE, AS DEMANDED BY THE LEFTISTS, WHEN THE GOAL OF THE AFC WAS TO RESTORE GOL AUTHORITY' THE PLO HAD SENT A MEMO TO THE ARAB LEAGUE SAYING IT WOULD ACCEPT NO CONTROL OVER ITS IMPORTS OF ARMS AND THIS HAD PROBABLY BEEN THE REASON WHY THE AFC HAD NOT MET AS SCHEDULED IN JANUARY. THE PRESIDENT HOPED IT WOULD NOT MEET ON MARCH 1.

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8. THE PRESIDENT PRAISED THE LEBANESE ARMY WHICH HE DESCRIBED AS GOOD BUT ASSERTED THAT POLITICAL DECISIONS WERE NECESSARY BEFORE IT COULD DEPLOY OVER THE OTHER AREAS OF THE COUNTRY AND ESTABLISH THE GOVERNMENT'S AUTHORITY. EVEN WITH ALL THE REORGANIZATION ALREADY EFFECTED TO DECHRISTIANIZE THE ARMY THE MUSLIM LEFT WAS STILL NOT SATISFIED.

9. THE PRESIDENT SAID THAT AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE PHALANGE AND THE SYRIANS WAS A PRECONDITION FOR AGREEMENT AMONG ALL LEBANESE FACTIONS BUT THAT THERE WAS NO CHRISTIAN-SYRIAN DIALOGUE ON MATTERS OF SUBSTANCE. NEITHER THE PHALANGE NOR THE SYRIANS WERE LOOKING FOR A COMPROMISE CANDIDATE FOR THE PRESIDENCY. IF NO ELECTION OCCURRED, THE PRINCIPAL ARMED FACTIONS WOULD SEIZE THE EXCUSE OF THE ABSENCE OF A CENTRAL GOVERNMENT TO IMPOSE COMPLETE RULE ON THEIR RESPECTIVE REGIONS, "PENDING THE RETURN OF THE STATE'S AUTHORITY". SYRIAN FOREIGN MINISTER KHADDAM HAD BRUSHED OFF THE PRESIDENT'S MENTION OF THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS DURING THEIR MEETING IN JANUARY.

10. ALL MY PRODDING FOR A HOPEFUL SIGN OR SOME SUGGESTED COURSE OF ACTION TO REVERSE THIS DOWNWARD TREND MET WITH NO PROPOSALS FROM THE PRESIDENT. THE GOL'S IDEAS HAD BEEN PRESENTED TO THE AFC LAST JULY AND HAD BEEN IGNORED. LEBANON WAS GETTING NO HELP FROM ARAB COUNTRIES. THE SAUDIS HAD NEVER REALLY STARTED ANY HELPFUL ACTION. ALL THEY COULD DO WAS CONTINUE TO TRY TO BUY OFF THE PALESTINIANS AND THE SYRIANS. THIS IN SPITE OF THE FACT THAT IF LEBANON WENT UNDER THE GULF COUNTRIES WOULD FOLLOW.

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11. I TOLD THE PRESIDENT THAT I WOULD BE VISITING OTHER COUNTRIES OF THE REGION TO SEE WHAT COULD BE DONE IN AN EFFORT TO REDRESS THE SITUATION IN LEBANON AND THAT I WANTED TO CONTINUE TO DISCOURAGE AN ISRAELI ATTACK, WHICH WOULD TEAR UP LEBANON, AND TO MAINTAIN AND BUILD ON THE CEASE-FIRE. THE PRESIDENT SAID HE WAS ALL IN FAVOR OF THIS AS THE CEASE-FIRE WAS VERY IMPORTANT AND A NECESSARY PRECONDITION TO ANY PROGRESS. HE ALSO SAW A RAY OF HOPE IN A GENERAL POPULAR DESIRE FOR NATIONAL RECONCILIATION, BUT THOUGHT AN EFFECTIVE PHALANGE-SYRIAN DIALOGUE WAS A NECESSARY FIRST STEP. I TOLD THE PRESIDENT THAT I HAD HAD HIGH HOPES LAST YEAR FOR EFFECTIVE SAUDI ACTION IN LEBANON AND WOULD CONTINUE IN MY EFFORTS TO OBTAIN IT. THE PRESIDENT WISHED ME LUCK BUT WAS PESSIMISTIC OVER THE POSSIBILITY OF THE SAUDIS DOING MORE THAN "DOLING OUT MORE ASPIRINS."

12. WE GOT TOGETHER LATER AT DINNER WHEN SARKIS WAS JOINED ONLY BY COLONEL JOHNNY ABDO, INTELLIGENCE CHIEF. AMBASSADOR DILLON AND DRAPER WERE WITH ME. SARKIS STRESSED IN THE STRONGEST POSSIBLE TERMS THAT HE WAS UNWILLING TO STAY IN OFFICE BEYOND HIS ALLOTTED TIME. HE ALSO MADE THE POINT THAT I SHOULD NOT SEE POLITICAL LEADERS OTHER THAN IN THE GOVERNMENT ON THIS PARTICULAR VISIT TO BEIRUT (FEBRUARY 26-27), SINCE IT COULD BE COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE. I ASKED ABOUT SEEING OTHERS WHEN I RETURNED TO BEIRUT IN A WEEK OR SO, AND HE ROLIED THAT PERHAPS SEEING A SELECTIVE CROSS-SECTION OF POLITICAL LEADERS COULD BE USEFUL AT TH AT TIME.

13. SARKIS SAID HE WAS PLEASED WITH THE OUTCOME OF THE SC DEBATE ON UNIFIL EXPANSION.
DILLON

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AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY JIDDA PRIORITY

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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Date: 11/3/97

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EO Citations

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SECTION 01 OF 02 ROME 04771

EXD DECAPTIONED

E.O. 12065: RDS-1 2/26/02 (BRIDGES, PETER S.) OR-M

TAGS: PEPR, IT, XF

SUBJECT: HABIB MEETING WITH ITALIAN FOREIGN MINISTRY
OFFICIALS1. ~~ENTIRE TEXT~~

2. AMBASSADOR HABIB, ACCOMPANIED BY AMBASSADOR RABB, MADE WHAT WE THINK WERE VERY USEFUL CALLS FEBRUARY 25 ON FOREIGN MINISTRY SECRETARY GENERAL Malfatti and Political Director Bottai. With each, Habib outlined his intentions during his forthcoming mission, stressing our gratitude for the recent Italian demarches, particularly to the PLO, aimed at lessening the heat in and around Lebanon. Habib also expressed our appreciation for Italy's role in the MFO, and invited an Italian critique of and comments on his mission.

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3. BOTH BOTTAI AND Malfatti stressed Italy's strong support for Ambassador Habib's efforts. Malfatti believed that the present Lebanese situation was both dangerous and important; the West had a fundamental interest in the preservation of Lebanon, which for a considerable period had managed successfully to hold together the diverse elements within its borders. If Lebanon should be destroyed, Malfatti thought that there could be no chance of a Palestinian solution, and if Lebanon should be

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PARTITIONED IT WOULD BE AT BEST ONLY A TEMPORARY SOLUTION WHICH WOULD GREATLY INCREASE THE THREAT OF WAR. HABIB SAID HE WAS ESPECIALLY PLEASED TO HEAR THIS LAST, SINCE SOME EUROPEANS ON OCCASION SEEMED TAKEN WITH THE IDEA OF "CANTONIZATION", WHICH WAS NONSENSICAL.

4. Malfatti suggested that it was of fundamental importance to arrive at the Sinai withdrawal date of April 25, while avoiding a situation in which Israel decided it must compensate on one side for what it was losing on another. It was crucial to this end that the Israelis be convinced that the Americans would not let them down. Habib said that he would in fact attempt to provide additional assurances to the Israelis when he visited there.

5. Malfatti continued that another fundamental fact was that the Soviet Union was not for now playing a major role in the Middle East. We must keep them out. At the same time, as had been impressed on Foreign Minister Colombo when he recently visited the area, we needed to keep the greatest possible number of Arabs in the moderate camp. To do that, we must make it possible for the moderates to say that their


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LINE BROUGHT SOME SUCCESSES. HOWEVER, THE SAUDIS HAD RECENTLY EXPRESSED CONCERN TO THE ITALIANS THAT IT MIGHT NOT BE POSSIBLE TO SHOW ANY SUCH SUCCESSES. Malfatti commented that it should not be forgotten that if Israel did take some untoward step in Lebanon, this could also be seen in part as a failure of Saudi policy. Malfatti continued that the situation in Syria was an additional reason for concern. Although Syria was weak and Kuwait was reportedly refusing financial assistance, Syria might in the Italian view be tempted to carry out some sort of diversionary action in Lebanon.

6. THE MAIN THING, Malfatti thought, was to have a process, and to demonstrate to the moderates that we were doing all possible. Malfatti assured Habib that the Italians would do all possible to support the American efforts. Habib assured Malfatti that we would not hesitate to ask the Italians to help out where we thought it might be useful.

7. DISCUSSING ATTITUDES IN ISRAEL, Malfatti suggested that it might be useful to impress on the Israelis what Talleyrand said to Napoleon: "ONE COULD ALWAYS USE BAYONETS, BUT ONE COULD NOT SIT ON THEM." HABIB AGREED,

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NOTING THAT THE ISRAELIS WERE UNDERSTANDABLY ALWAYS PREOCCUPIED WITH THEIR OWN SECURITY AND THAT BEGIN'S DECISION TO EVACUATE THE SINAI HAD INDEED BEEN A MAJOR DECISION. Malfatti reiterated his view that it was FUNDAMENTAL FOR THE ISRAELIS TO BE ASSURED OF AMERICAN SOLIDARITY.

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8. Malfatti said that looking beyond Lebanon, the situation in Iran, and particularly the new Soviet effort there, had the Italians worried, as did the Pakistan situation. This argued all the more for taking steps where possible now to consolidate the Middle East situation. Speaking very frankly and not for the record, the Palestinian situation had gone on for thirty years and could continue, but the Lebanese

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SITUATION COULD NOT CONTINUE AS IT WAS AND, AT THE SAME TIME, THE LEBANESE PROBLEM SHOULD BE SOMEWHAT EASIER TO RESOLVE THAN THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM. HABIB INDICATED HIS AGREEMENT AND CONCLUDED THAT AMERICAN AND ITALIAN VIEWS ON LEBANON SEEMED VERY CLOSE.

9. AMBASSADOR HABIB DID NOT SEE THIS CABLE BEFORE HE LEFT ROME.
RABB

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EO Citations

FOIA Exemptions

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Date: 11/3/97

BEIRUT 1391

DECAPTIONED

EXDIS

9302566

FROM HABIB

CORRECTED COPY ADD EO, TAGS, SUBJ

E.O. 12065: RDS-1, 3, 4 2/26/92 (HABIB, PHILIP C.)

TAGS: PEPR, MOPS, XF, LE, IS, SY, SA, JO

SUBJECT: LEBANON-ISRAEL: CEASE-FIRE

REF: LONDON 3547^{NR}**UNCLASSIFIED**1. ~~ENTIRE TEXT~~.

2. EXCEPT FOR FYI SECTION, FOLLOWING IS BACKGROUND FOR USE BY LONDON WITH FCO ON JULY "CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES":

3. ACTUAL TEXT OF THE DEFINITION OF THE CEASE-FIRE, WHICH CAME INTO EFFECT JULY 24, 1981 IS AS FOLLOWS:

--THERE WILL BE NO HOSTILE MILITARY ACTIVITY FROM LEBANON

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DIRECTED AT TARGETS IN ISRAEL, BY LAND, SEA AND AIR;

--THERE WILL BE NO HOSTILE MILITARY ACTIVITY FROM

ISRAEL AT TARGETS IN LEBANON, WHETHER BY SEA, LAND, OR AIR;

--THE SAME WILL APPLY TO HOSTILE MILITARY ACTIVITY

DIRECTED INTO HADDAD'S AREA OR FROM IT.

4. FYI: IN ADDITION, WE DECIDED WE COULD NOT REALISTIC-

ALLY FORECLOSE ISRAELI RECONNAISSANCE FLIGHTS OVER

LEBANON. WITHOUT SUCH FLIGHTS, IN FACT, THE CHANCES ARE

FAR GREATER THAT ISRAEL WOULD OVERREACT MILITARILY TO

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MINOR CEASE-FIRE VIOLATIONS. IN THE NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE ISRAELIS, THEREFORE, WE MADE IT CLEAR THAT, WHILE WE DID NOT WISH TO CONDONE VIOLATIONS OF LEBANESE SOVEREIGNTY, THE DELICATE SITUATION IN THAT COUNTRY COMPELLED US TO ACCEPT THE FACT THAT THERE WOULD BE "NON-HOSTILE" RECONNAISSANCE FLIGHTS BY ISRAEL. THE WORDING OF THE UNDERSTANDING ON THE CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES TOOK THIS INTO ACCOUNT. OUR UNDERSTANDING REGARDING OVER-FLIGHTS WAS INCORPORATED IN A WRITTEN MESSAGE FROM AMBASSADOR HABIB TO PRIME MINISTER BEGIN. END FYI.

5. AT ONE POINT IN THE NEGOTIATIONS, BEGIN INSISTED THAT THE CEASEFIRE SHOULD ALSO APPLY TO TERRORISM AGAINST JEWS OR ISRAELI TARGETS IN EUROPE OR, FOR THAT MATTER, ANYWHERE IN THE WORLD. HABIB REFUSED TO ACCEPT SUCH A BROAD INTERPRETATION.

6. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE ISRAELIS BROUGHT UP ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS--BUT DID NOT PRESS HARD FOR AN EXPLICIT RESPONSE--THE PROSPECT THAT THE PALESTINIANS WOULD HONOR THE CEASE-FIRE IN SOUTHERN LEBANON BUT WOULD FEEL FREE TO CARRY OUT TERRORIST ATTACKS AGAINST ISRAELI TARGETS BY MOVING PEOPLE THROUGH SYRIA AND JORDAN. HABIB AND OTHER REPRESENTATIVES DID NOT RPT NOT EXPLICITLY ACCEPT THE ISRAELI ARGUMENT

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THAT THIS WOULD BE A CEASE-FIRE VIOLATION BUT MADE CLEAR THEIR CONVICTION THAT JORDAN WOULD DO ITS BEST TO PREVENT INFILTRATION. THE ISRAELIS GENERALLY GAVE THE JORDANIANS GOOD MARKS ON THIS SCORE.

7. IT HAS TO BE BORNE IN MIND THAT THESE NEGOTIATIONS WERE FOCUSED PRIMARILY ON THE SECURITY SITUATION IN SOUTHERN LEBANON AND NORTHERN ISRAEL, AND ON "HOSTILE MILITARY ACTIONS" FROM EITHER ISRAEL OR LEBANON. NEVERTHELESS, IT HAS TO BE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE ISRAELIS HAVE A POINT WHEN THEY ARGUE THAT PALESTINIANS TRAINED AND ORGANIZED IN LEBANON AND THEN SENT TO ATTACK ISRAELI TARGETS AFTER INFILTRATION FROM SYRIA OR JORDAN CONSTITUTE A VIOLATION OF THE CEASE-FIRE, SINCE SUCH HOSTILE MILITARY OPERATIONS COULD BE SAID TO ORIGINATE FROM LEBANESE TERRITORY. IT MUST ALSO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT, HOWEVER, THAT THIS PROSPECTIVE SCENARIO WAS NOT EXAMINED IN DETAIL WITH THE SAUDIS, WHO WERE OUR PRINCIPAL INTERMEDIARIES IN OBTAINING THE AGREEMENT WITH THE PLO ON THE CEASE-FIRE. IF WE HAD PRESSED FOR A PLO UNDERSTANDING AS REGARDS INFILTRATION FROM JORDAN, WE WOULD NOT POSSIBLY HAVE BROUGHT ABOUT THE CEASE-FIRE UNDERSTANDING THAT WAS ACHIEVED. IT WAS A MATTER OF FIRST THINGS FIRST. MOREOVER, WE COULD HAVE EASILY GOTTEN INTO QUAGMIRE OF DETERMINING WHETHER CEASE-FIRE TERM--

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"TARGETS IN ISRAEL--WOULD APPLY TO TERRORIST OPERATIONS MOUNTED FROM LEBANON, THROUGH SYRIA AND JORDAN, BUT HITTING ONLY TARGETS IN WEST BANK, NOT ISRAEL PROPER.

8. HAVING SAID ALL THIS, WE REGARD RECENT FATAH OPERATION AS A TECHNICAL VIOLATION OF CEASE-FIRE.

9. OBVIOUSLY, WE WILL WANT TO AVOID A LEGALISTIC OR POLITICAL ARGUMENT AS TO WHETHER THE ISRAELI OR ARAFAT'S VERSION OF THE CEASE-FIRE UNDERSTANDING IS CORRECT.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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10. THEREFORE, IMPORTANT POINT AT THIS JUNCTURE IS NOT WHETHER OR NOT JANUARY 30 INFILTRATION FROM JORDAN OR ANY OTHER SPECIFIC ACTION CONSTITUTES CEASE-FIRE VIOLATION. RATHER, POINT TO BE MADE IS THAT ALL SIDES TO POTENTIAL CONFLICT MUST CONTINUE TO AVOID ACTIONS WHICH COULD ESCALATE INTO LARGE-SCALE HOSTILITIES.

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INFO AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE

SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5479

AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE

AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORPY

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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Date: 11/3/97

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EO Citations

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FOIA Exemptions

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EXDIS

DECAPTIONED

9302566

FROM HABIB

E.O. 12065: GDS 2/26/88 (HABIB, PHILIP C)

TAGS: PEPR, MOPS, XF, LE, IS, SY, SA, JO

SUBJ: HABIB MISSION: TIMING OF VISIT TO SAUDI ARABIA

REF: STATE 50259 (NOTAL)

1. ~~ENTIRE TEXT~~.

2. STATE REFTEL INDICATED THAT FAHD WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO RECEIVE HABIB EVENINGS OF MARCH 3-4.

3. FOR CHARGE PLACK: WE CAN PROBABLY ADJUST OUR SCHEDULE TO MAKE POSSIBLE A VISIT TO RIYADH IN THE MARCH 6-7 TIME-FRAME. THIS WOULD ENTAIL SOMETHING LIKE THE FOLLOWING:

--FEBRUARY 26, 27, 28-LEBANON

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--FEBRUARY 28, MARCH 1,2-ISRAEL

--MARCH 2, 3, 4-SYRIA

--MARCH 4, 5, 6-JORDAN

--MARCH 6 EARLY MORNING GO TO SAUDI ARABIA FROM JORDAN AND STAY THROUGH THE MORNING OF MARCH 8, AND TRAVEL

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THEREAFTER TO ISRAEL

--MARCH 9-LEBANON

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4. I BELIEVE IT IS ESSENTIAL FOR ME TO SEE FAHD, AND THEREFORE AM PREPARED TO ADJUST SCHEDULE AS OUTLINED ABOVE. IF IT IS NOT POSSIBLE TO MEET WITH FAHD ON MY INITIAL VISIT TO SAUDI ARABIA, I WOULD OF COURSE BE READY TO SEE SAUD, AND WOULD DISCUSS WITH HIM WHEN A FAHD APPOINTMENT WOULD BE POSSIBLE, FOR EXAMPLE, FOLLOWING A QUICK TRIP TO ISRAEL.

5. OTHER ADDRESSES MAY WISH TO COMMENT. TICKS ABOVE INCLUDE DATES AT EACH STOP FROM TIME OF ARRIVAL TO TIME OF DEPARTURE.
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FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3248

AMEMBASSY ROME IMMEDIATE

INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE

AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
☒ RELEASE ☒ DECLASSIFY
☐ EXCISE ☐ DECLASSIFY IN PART
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FOIA Exemptions _____ TS authority to
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DECAPTIONED

ROME FOR AMBASSADOR HABIB

E.O. 12065: RDS-1, 3 2/25/02 (LEWIS, SAMUEL W.) OR-M

TAGS: PEPR, IS, LE, SY

SUBJECT: HABIB MISSION - THE VIEW FROM ISRAEL

1. ~~ENTIRE TEXT.~~

2. SUMMARY. IN THE ISRAELI VIEW, THE SITUATION IN SOUTHERN LEBANON HAS BEEN SLOWLY DETERIORATING SINCE AMBASSADOR HABIB'S LAST VISIT IN DECEMBER 1981 AND OUR DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS IN ARRESTING THIS DECLINE HAVE BEEN INEFFECTUAL. THIS DETERIORATION HAS PUT BEGIN UNDER INCREASED PRESSURE FROM VARIOUS SEGMENTS OF ISRAELI SOCIETY TO RESPOND MILITARILY TO WHAT ARE SEEN AS PALESTINIAN VIOLATIONS OF THE CEASE-FIRE, THOUGH AN

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INFLUENTIAL BODY OF OPINION IS DEEPLY CONCERNED ABOUT ISRAEL'S PROVOCATIVE POSTURE TOWARD LEBANON. BEGIN HAS CONTINUED TO STRESS THAT ISRAEL WILL NOT MAKE THE FIRST MOVE IN LEBANON BUT WILL NOT HESITATE TO REACT TO A "CLEAR PROVOCATION" BY THE PALESTINIANS. HIS THRESHOLD, HOWEVER, HAS BEEN MORE NARROWLY DEFINED IN RECENT DAYS. THE LEVEL OF TENSION ON THE NORTHERN BORDER REMAINS HIGH, AS DOES ISRAEL'S MILITARY DISPOSITION ALONG THE BORDER, BUT THE WAR FEVER PITCH WHICH PREVAILED AFTER THE JANUARY 28-29 TERRORIST INFILTRATION FROM JORDAN HAS EBBED. THE GENERAL CONSENSUS HOWEVER IS

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THAT IT IS ONLY A MATTER OF TIME BEFORE THE PVIOLATES THE CEASE-FIRE AND IS RETALIATES. THE ISRAELIS CONTINUE TO BELIEVE THAT THEY MADE MOST OF THE CRUCIAL CONCESSIONS LAST JULY, AND THAT THE PLO HAS TAKEN ADVANTAGE OF THE CEASE-FIRE TO REBUILD ITS INFRASTRUCTURE IN LEBANON, WHILE ISRAEL HAS HAD ITS HANDS TIED. IN THEIR VIEW, THE UNITED STATES AND ISRAEL MUST ADDRESS ALLOF THE ELEMENTS INVOLVED IN LEBANON, INCLUDING ISRAEL'S SECURITY, STRENGTHENING OF THE LEBANESE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT, THE MISSILES, AND EVENTUAL SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL FROM LEBANON. ANYTHING LESS THAN THIS WILL BE VIEWED AS UNACCEPTABLE. THE ISRAELI POSITION THAT THE SAUDIS HAVE NOTHING TO OFFER AND CANNOT PLAY A USEFUL ROLE REMAINS UNCHANGED. END SUMMARY.

3. SINCE AMBASSADOR HABIB'S LAST VISIT TO THE AREA IN DECEMBER 1981, THE SITUATION IN LEBANON HAS, FROM THE ISRAELI POINT OF VIEW, CONTINUED TO DETERIORATE SLOWLY AND STEADILY. THE GENERAL PERCEPTION IS THAT OUR DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS HAVE FAILED AND THAT THERE IS VIRTUALLY NO PROSPECT FOR MOVEMENT ON THIS TRACK. THE PRIME MINISTER HAS COME UNDER INCREASING PRESSURE

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TO RETAILIATE MILITARILY TO WHAT ARE SEEN BY A WIDE NUMBER OF ISRAELIS AS VIOLATIONS OF BOTH THE SPIRIT AND THE LETTER OF THE CEASE-FIRE, THOUGH THERE IS AN INFLUENTIAL BODY OF OPINION WHICH IS DEEPLY CONCERNED ABOUT PROVOCATIVE NATURE OF THE GOVERNMENT'S POSITION TOWARD DEVELOPMENTS IN LABANON. MANY OF THE FACTORS WHICH GIVE RISE TO THESE PRESSURES HAVE NOT CHANGED SUBSTANTIALLY FROM THE TIME OF THE LAST HABIB MISSION. FOR EXAMPLE, WECONTINUE TOHEAR FROM THE ISRAELIS ABOUT THEIR CONCERNS WITH RESPECT TO THE BUILD-UP OF THE PALESTINIAN INFRASTRUCTURE IN SOUTH LEBANON, AND IN PARTICULAR THE INCREASE IN THE NUMBER OF HEAVY ARTILLERY PIECES IN THE AREA WHICH THEY NOW ESTIMATE AT 300 TUBED ARTILLERY PIECES (OF WHICH 100 ARE LONG RANGE) AND 60 MULTIPLE ROCKET LAUNCHERS, MOST OF ARE THE BM-21 VERSION. AS WE HAVE NOTED BEFORE, THESE ARTILLERY PIECES ARE A MAJOR CONCERN TO THE ISRAELIS, WHO REMEMBER ALL TOO WELL THE EFFECTIVE ROLE THAT THEY PLAYED IN THE EXCHANGES OF FIRE LAST JULY, INFLECTING UNACCEPTABLE DAMAGE TO THE NORTHERN SETTLEMENTS. IN ADDITION, THE SYRIAN MISSILES REMAIN IN LEBANON, SOME TEN MONTHS AFTER THEY WERE ORIGINALLY INTRODUCED. THEIR PRESENCE WASMOST GRAPHICALLY DEMONSTRATED ON JANUARY 19, WHEN TWO SAMs WERE FIRED, APPARENTLY AT OR NEAR ISRAELI AIRCRAFT FLYING OVER LEBANON. FINALLY, THE PALESTINIAN EFFORTS TO ATTACK JEWISH TARGETS OUTSIDE OF ISRAEL OR TOINFILTRATE ISRAEL ACROSS THE JORDAN BORDER HAVE PUT INCREASING

PRESSURE ON THE GOI TO RESPOND BY TAKING ACTION
AGAINST THE PLO IN SOME FORM.

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4. THERE ARE THOSE IN THE HIERARCHY OF THE MOD AND
IDF, INCLUDING PERHAPS SHARON AND CHIEF OF STAFF
EITAN, WHO BELIEVE THAT UNDER CURRENT CIRCUMSTANCES, --
EGYPTIAN PREOCCUPATION WITH THE RETURN OF THE SINAI,
SYRIAN INTERNAL DIFFICULTIES, ISRAELI MILITARY
DISPOSITIONS IN THE NORTH, AND LEBANESE EAGERNESS
TO SEE THE SYRIANS OUT OF LEBANON ONCE AND FOR ALL --,
THE TIME IS RIPE FOR ISRAEL TO STRIKE AGAINST THE
PLO IN LEBANON. BEGIN (SUPPORTED BY SOME OF HIS
CIVILIAN MINISTERS) DOESN'T WANT HOWEVER TO TAKE
ANY ACTION IN SOUTHERN LEBANON UNLESS IT CAN BE
DEMONSTRATED THAT ISRAEL IS REACTING TO A "CLEAR
PROVOCATION" AND VIOLATION OF THE CEASE-FIRE BY THE
PALESTINIANS, FEARING OTHERWISE A LACK OF DOMESTIC

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5. SINCE THE MID-DECEMBER ENACTMENT OF THE GOLAN LAW, ISRAEL SUBSTANTIALLY REINFORCED ITS FORCES ALONG THE NORTHERN BORDER AND THE GOLAN HEIGHTS, INCREASING TROOP LEVELS TO 25,000 MEN. THE PATTERN OF THE REINFORCEMENT WAS DIRECTED NOT ONLY AGAINST A POSSIBLE SYRIAN RESPONSE TOWARD THE GOLAN, BUT NORTHWARD TOWARD LEBANON AS WELL. THIS REINFORCEMENT, WHICH THE ISRAELIS CHARACTERIZED AS PRECAUTIONARY, LED TO SERIOUS CONCERN IN THE REGION AND ELSEWHERE THE ISRAELIS WERE LOOKING FOR A PRETEXT TO GO INTO LEBANON. THE IDF HAS SINCE DRAWN DOWN ITS FORCES IN THE NORTH (LATEST ESTIMATE DOWN TO 16,000 MEN), BUT THE LEVEL OF ISRAELI MILITARY PRESENCE IN THE NORTH REMAINS WELL ABOVE NORMAL (THE PRE-GOLAN PERIOD) AND FUELS SUSPICIONS ABOUT ISRAELI INTENTIONS. WHILE THE IDF IS NOT CURRENTLY PREPARED TO LAUNCH A MAJOR STRIKE INTO LEBANON, IT COULD MOBILIZE SUFFICIENT FORCES WITHIN 24 HOURS.

6. ON JANUARY TWO SYRIAN SAMs WERE APPARENTLY FIRED AT OR IN THE VICINITY OF ISRAELI AIRCRAFT OVER LEBANON AT THE TIME. THERE IS SOME DOUBT AS TO WHETHER THE ISRAELI AIRCRAFT WERE IN FACT THE INTENDED TARGETS, AND THIS MAY EXPLAIN THE ISRAELI EFFORTS TO MINIMIZE THE INCIDENT. THE GOI CHOSE TO TAKE THE POSITION THAT ITS PILOTS HAD NOT SEEN ANY MISSILES FIRED AT THEM, AND THE FILE WAS CLOSED. NONETHELESS, THE INCIDENT BROUGHT HOME TO THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT IN A DRAMATIC FASHION THE FACT THAT THE MISSILES REMAIN IN LEBANON AND ARE A THREAT TO VITAL ISRAELI RECONNAISSANCE FLIGHTS.

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7. MOST RECENTLY, THE ISRAELIS INTERCEPTED AN ATTEMPTED INFILTRATION BY PALESTINIAN TERRORISTS ACROSS THE JORDANIAN BORDER NEAR MEHOLA ON JANUARY 28-29. THE ISRAELIS GAVE MAJOR PRESS PLAY TO THE INCIDENT, AND THERE WAS SPECULATION THAT THE GOI WAS ATTEMPTING TO TURN THE INCIDENT INTO A RAISON D'ETRE FOR LAUNCHING A MAJOR STRIKE AGAINST THE PALESTINIANS IN LEBANON. THE ISRAELIS EMPHASIZED THAT THIS TERRORIST OPERATION HAD ORIGINATED AND BEEN PLANNED IN LEBANON, AND THAT IT WAS A CLEAR VIOLATION OF THE CEASE-FIRE. WE BELIEVE THAT THE ISRAELI REACTION

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WAS PRIMARILY INTENDED TO SET DOWN A MARKER FOR THE POL, THE U.S., AND THE JORDANIANS THAT SUCH ACTIVITIES WERE VIOLATIONS OF THE CEASE-FIRE AND WOULD NOT BE TOLERATED IN THE FUTURE. THERE WERE ALSO REPORTS THAT THE MINISTER OF DEFENSE AND THE CHIEF OF STAFFESSED THE PRIME MINISTER APPROVE AT LEAST A LIMITED STRIKE INTO LEBANON IN RESPONSE TO THE MEHOLA INCIDENT BUT WERE OVERRULED BY THE PRIME MINISTER, WHO CHOSE INSTEAD TO SEND SPECIAL EMISSARY SAGI TO EXPLAIN DIRECTLY TO SECRETARY HAIG THE GRAVITY OF THE SITUATION.

8. THE MEHOLA INCIDENT SERVED TO LOWER THE THRESHOLD AND FURTHER DEFINE THE LEVELS OF PROVOCATION WHICH WOULD TRIGGER AND ISRAELI RESPONSE OF SOME KIND. WHILE MAKING IT CLEAR THAT ISRAEL WILL NOT BE THE FIRST TO ATTACK, BEGIN HAS PUT FURTHER DEFINITION ON WHAT WOULD CONSTITUTE A "CLEAR PROVOCATION" WHEN HE SAID IN A COLUMBIAN TELEVISION INTERVIEW (ACCORDING TO FEB 23 NEWS REPORTS) THAT "MOST OF THE BOMBS HAVE BEEN FOUND BY OUR PEOPLE BEFORE THEY

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EXPLODED AND NO PEOPLE DIED. BUT IF SOME PEOPLE GET KILLED, WE WILL TAKE IMMEDIATE ACTION." THIS SHOULD BE READ IN THE CONTEXT OF REPEATED STATEMENTS THAT ISRAEL WOULD NOT BE DRAWN INTO ANOTHER "WAR OF ATTRITION" ALONG THE NORTHERN BORDER. THE NOOSE WAS TIGHTENED FURTHER DURING A FEB 23 "URGENT" BRIEFING OF OUR ARMY ATTACHE BY AN IDF INTELLIGENCE OFFICER IN WHICH THE ISRAELI OFFICER EXPLAINED THAT ISRAEL COULD NOT TOLERATE ANYMORE TERRORIST ATTACKS AGAINST JEWISH AND/OR ISRAELI TARGETS, WHEREVER THEY MIGHT OCCUR. ISRAEL, HE ASSERTED, WOULD RESPOND MILITARILY AGAINST THE RESPONSIBLE HEADQUARTERS WHICH CARRIED OUT THESE TERRORIST ACTIVITIES. ASIDE FROM THE BROADENING

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OF THE TERMS UNDER WHICH ISRAEL WOULD RETALIATE, IT APPEARS THAT THE IDF IS CONSIDERING MORE SELECTIVE STRIKES (AS POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVES TO A LARGE SCALE OPERATION INTO LEBANON) IN RESPONDING TO LOWER ORDERS OF TERRORIST PROVOCATION.

9. ISRAEL CONTINUES TO MAINTAIN CONTROL OVER HADDAD, IN RECOGNITION THAT HIS INTERESTS DO NOT ALWAYS PARALLEL THOSE OF ISRAEL. HADDAD HAS MAINTAINED ALL ALONG THAT SUCH INCIDENTS AS MINING OF ROADS AND MORE RECENTLY THE DISCOVERY OF TWO BOMBS IN THE ENCLAVE CONSTITUTE "GROSS VIOLATIONS" OF THE CEASE-FIRE. IT IS LIKELY THAT HADDAD HAS CONTINUED TO PRESS THE ISRAELIS TO GIVE HIM MORE FREEDOM OF ACTION TO RESPOND TO PALESTINIAN PROVOCATIONS IN THE ENCLAVE.

10. THE ISRAELIS IN THEIR MEETING OCTOBER 12 WITH DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY DRAPER, SET OUT WHAT THEY CONSIDER SHOULD BE OUR GOALS IN LEBANON. THEY WERE: (1) REMOVAL OF THREATS TO HADDAD, ISRAEL AND THE LEBANESE CHRISTIANS, AND (2) CREATION OF CONDITIONS WHICH WOULD PERMIT FREE ELECTIONS TO BE HELD IN LEBANON. THE ISRAELIS LISTED THE FOLLOWING AS SPECIFIC ELEMENTS WHICH SHOULD BE ADDRESSED IN THE NEXT STAGE: (A) THE SYRIANS MUST BE OUT OF BEIRUT, THE BEIRUT-ZAHLE ROAD, AND THE AREAS SOUTH OF THE "RED LINE," INCLUDING AYSHIA; (B) THE MISSILES MUST BE REMOVED FROM LEBANON; (C) THE PLO MUST LEAVE THE UNIFIL AO AND TYRE; AND (D) UNIFIL MIGHT BE AUGMENTED

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BY LAF TROOPS NOT UNDER SYRIAN DOMINATION, PROVIDED
OF COURSE THAT AUGMENTATION DID NOT IN ANY WAY TAKE
PLACE AT HADDAD'S EXPENSE. IN THE MAIN, WE BELIEVE

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THSE REMAIN VALID STATEMENTS OF HOW ISRAEL BELIEVES
THE NEXT STEPS SHOULD BE FRAMED. WITHOUT QUESTION
ISRAEL CONTINUES TO BELIEVE THAT IT MADE MOST OF THE
CONCESSIONS LAST SUMMER, AND THE NEXT STEPS ARE UP
TO THE OTHER SIDE. THEY WILL CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN
THAT ANY APPROACH WHICH DOES NOT ADDRESS ALL OF THESE
ELEMENTS IS UNACCEPTABLE.

11. THE ISRAELIS REMAIN COMPLETELY DISDAINFUL OF
ANY ROLE WHICH THE SAUDIS MIGHT PLAY IN FURTHERING
AND EXPANDING THE CEASE-FIRE. IN THEIR VIEW, THE
SUBSTANTIAL AID WHICH THE SAUDIS HAVE PROVIDED TO
THE PLO IMPAIR THEIR CREDENTIALS AS A PARTY
GENUINELY INTERESTED IN MAINTAINING THE CEASE-FIRE.
BEGIN MADE A SPECIAL POINT LAST WEEK OF CALLING OUR
ATTENTION TO A PUBLIC EXCHANGE BETWEEN ABU IYAD AND
A SAUDI NEWSPAPER - IN WHICH THE SAUDI JOURNALIST
REMINDED ABU IYAD THAT "WE PAY FOR THE BULLETS YOU
USE." EVEN MORE TO THE POINT, THE LACK OF SUCCESS
WHICH THE SAUDIS HAD AT FEZ WAS AMPLE DEMONSTRATION
THAT THEY DO NOT HAVE THE STATUS AND AUTHORITY AMONG
THE ARABS TO PLAY A USEFUL ROLE IN LEBANON.

12. WITH THIS BACKGROUND, WE BELIEVE THE ISRAELIS
ARE LIKELY TO SOUND THE FOLLOWING THEMES DURING
THE HABIB VISIT. A NUMBER OF THEM WILL BE FAMILIAR
REFRAINS, PLAYED OUT LAST DECEMBER. HOWEVER, WE
EXPECT THAT THERE WILL BE ONE OR TWO NEW POINTS
AS WELL.

-- CONTINUING PALESTINIAN TERRORIST ACTIVITIES --
BOMBING JEWISH INSTITUTIONS IN EUROPE, INFILTRATIONS
ACROSS THE JORDAN BORDER -- ARE UNACCEPTABLE AND WILL
LEAD TO AN ISRAELI RESPONSE, THOUGH ISRAEL WANTS
TO PRESERVE THE PEACE AS LONG AS POSSIBLE. THE
ISRAELIS WILL ESPECIALLY WANT TO NAIL DOWN THEIR

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CLAIM THAT INFILTRATIONS ACROSS THE JORDANIAN AND
EGYPTIAN BORDERS ARE VIOLATIONS OF THE CEASE-FIRE
AGREEMENT, AS NEGOTIATED BY AMBASSADOR HABIB.

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SHARON WILL ALSO GO INTO INCREASED SHIPMENT OF EXPLOSIVES AND WEAPONS BY FATAH INTO GAZA, VIA SINAI. (THE ROUTE IS SAID TO BE BY SEA TO NORTH SINAI FROM LEBANON, THEN BY DESERT TRACK (BEDUIN CAMEL TRANSPORT) ACROSS THE BORDER.) SHARON TOLD US THURSDAY OF WORRISOME INDICATIONS OF NEW EGYPTIAN "COOPERATION" WITH FATAH IN THIS REGARD.

-- THE CONTINUED BUILDUP OF THE PLO INFRASTRUCTURE IN SOUTHERN LEBANON, IN PARTICULAR THE FURTHER ADDITION OF LONG RANGE ARTILLERY PIECES TO THE PALESTINAIN INVENTORY, RUNS COUNTER TO THE UNDERSTANDINGS REACHED AT THE TIME OF THE CEASE-FIRE AGREEMENT AND CONSTITUTE A GRAVE THREAT TO ISRAELI SECURITY IN THE NORTHERN REGION. THEY WILL PRESS FOR STEPS WHICH, AT A MINIMUM, WILL REMOVE THE

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ARTILLERY FROM RANGE OF ISRAEL'S NORTHERN BORDER, ESPECIALLY SINCE IT NOW APPEARS LIKELY THAT UNIFIL WILL RECEIVE 1000 ADDITIONAL TROOPS.

-- SYRIAN CONDUCT, IN PARTICULAR ASSAD'S ALLEGED ANNOUNCEMENT THAT SYRIA WOULD NOT MAKE PEACE WITH ISRAEL EVEN IF THE PLO DID, SUGGESTS THAT DIPLOMACY IS UNLIKELY TO BE EFFECTIVE WITH SYRIA IN MOVING FORWARD ON THE CEASE-FIRE.

-- ISRAELI PATIENCE ON THE CONTINUED PRESENCE OF THE MISSILES IS NOT ENDLESS, AND THEY WOULD LIKE TO SEE THE PRESIDENT'S NINE MONTH-OLD COMMITMENT FULFILLED. THEY WILL PROBABLY POINT OUT THAT ISRAEL, TAKING HEED OF AMBASSADOR HABIB'S ADVICE DURING HIS DECEMBER VISIT, HAD REMAINED SILENT ON THE MISSILES. AND YET, THERE IS NO SIGN THEY WILL BE MOVED. (THEY WILL NOT NOTE, OR EVEN ADMIT, THAT THE GOLAN LAW HAS ENORMOUSLY COMPLICATED HABIB'S TASK WITH THE SYRIANS.)

-- CONTINUED PALESTINIAN PROVOCATIONS AGAINST HADDAD'S ENCLAVE MAKE IT MORE AND MORE DIFFICULT FOR THE ISRAELIS TO CONTROL HADDAD, THOUGH THEY ARE IMPRESSING UPON HIM THE NEED FOR RESTRAINT.

-- IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO HAVE FREE ELECTIONS IN LEBANON SO LONG AS SYRIAN FORCES REMAIN IN LEBANON. THE BEIT-A-DIN PROCESS IS EFFECTIVELY STALLED. IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY AGREEMENT THAT THE SYRIANS

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SHOULD PULL BACK, THE U.S. SHOULD DIRECT ITS EFFORTS
TO POSTPONING THE ELECTIONS AND KEEPING SARKIS IN
OFFICE.

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-- THE U.S. SHOULD LEND MORE SUPPORT TO BASHIR GEMAYEL,
AS THE ONLY VIABLE FORCE IN LEBANON WHO CAN STAND
AGAINST THE SYRIANS. LEWIS

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5438

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BEIRUT 1310

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ROME PLEASE PASS TO AMB HABIB

E.O. 12065: NA

TAGS: LE, US, PEPR

SUBJ: HABIB-AS-SAFIR CONVERSATION

1. LEFTIST AS-SAFIR ON FEBRUARY 24 FRONT-PAGED AN ACCOUNT OF OF A CONVERSATION BETWEEN PHILIP HABIB AND AS-SAFIR WASHINGTON CORRESPONDENT SHAWKI RAFAH THAT ALLEGEDLY TOOK PLACE FEBRUARY 22 DURING A DINNER PARTY GIVEN BY ARAB LEAGUE REPRESENTATIVE CLOVIS MAKSOUD IN HONOR OF NATIONAL MOVEMENT LEADER WALID JUMBLATT. FOLLOWING IS TEXT.

2. BEGIN TEXT: THE AMERICAN ENVOY TO THE MIDDLE EAST, PHILIP HABIB, SAID THAT SUCCESSIVE AMERICAN ADMINISTRATIONS HAVE ALWAYS TREATED LEBANON AS A "SPECIAL COUNTRY," UNLIKELY THAT ISRAEL WOULD ATTACK LEBANON IN THE NEAR FUTURE.

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3. ALL OF THIS WAS EXPRESSED IN A SHORT CONVERSATION WITH AS-SAFIR THE NIGHT BEFORE LAST AT A DINNER PARTY GIVEN BY CLOVIS MAKSOUD, THE ARAB LEAGUE REPRESENTATIVE TO THE UNITED NATIONS, IN HONOR OF NATIONAL MOVEMENT CHIEF WALID JUMBLATT AND THE DELEGATION ACCOMPANYING HIM. THE DINNER WAS ATTENDED BY HABIB AND A NUMBER OF AMERICAN OFFICIALS, INCLUDING SENATOR CHARLES PERCY, CHAIRMAN OF THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE. HABIB: "AS-SAFIR, YOU ARE WRITING VERY NASTY THINGS

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CHANNEL: n/a

ABOUT ME." WITH THESE WORDS, HABIB BEGAN THE CONVERSATION, BEFORE TURNING TO ONE OF THE OFFICIALS IN THE AMERICAN DEPARTMENT OF STATE AND SAYING WITH A SMILE, AS-SAFIR IS THE OPPOSITION AND IS ALWAYS ATTACKING ME."

4. THEN CONVERSATION CONTINUED AS FOLLOWS:

--AS-SAFIR: DO YOU EXPECT THAT WE WILL ENJOY A PERIOD OF CALM BEFORE THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS?

--HABIB: ASK YOUR POLITICAL COLLEAGUES (POINTING TO WALID JUMBLATT, WHO SAID "I'M NOT A POLITICAL LEADER-- I'M A GUEST NOW.")

--AS-SAFIR: WHEN WILL YOUR TRIP BEGIN?

--HABIB: IN THE NEXT FEW DAYS.

--AS-SAFIR: HOW LONG WILL IT LAST?

--HABIB: LESS THAN A WEEK.

--AS-SAFIR: WHENEVER YOU VISIT THE AREA, THE SITUATION IN LEBANON EXPLODES.

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--HABIB: NO, WHENEVER I VISIT, IT CALMS DOWN.

--AS-SAFIR: YOU MEAN AFTER YOU LEAVE THE AREA.

--HABIB: THEN TELL THEM THIS TIME TO CALM DOWN BEFORE MY VISIT.

--AS-SAFIR: BUT WHAT THE WHITE HOUSE HAS OFFERED THEM UP TO NOW HAS NOT GREATLY ENCOURAGED TRANQUILITY.

--HABIB: THAT'S NOT TRUE. EVERY AMERICAN ADMINISTRATION HAS DEALT WITH LEBANON AS A SPECIAL COUNTRY.

--AS-SAFIR: INCLUDING THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION?

--HABIB: YES, INCLUDING THE CURRENT ADMINISTRATION.

--AS-SAFIR: BUT SINCE THE WAR SEVEN YEARS AGO UP TO NOW, AND ESPECIALLY IN THE LAST YEAR, THE SITUATION HAS DETERIORATED.

--HABIB: THEN I THINK I HAVE A LOT OF WORK TO DO.

--AS-SAFIR: YOU ARE FROM SAIDA. WHEN DID YOU LAST VISIT SAIDA?

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--HABIB: IN 1968.

--AS-SAFIR: WILL YOU BE ABLE TO TELL THE PEOPLE OF THE SOUTH, STARTING FROM AT LEAST SAIDA, THAT ISRAEL WILL NOT ATTACK BEFORE APRIL?
HABIB RAISED HIS HANDS.

--AS-SAFIR: WHAT DOES THAT MEAN?

--HABIB: TELL THEM TO BE OPTIMISTIC. I'M ALWAYS OPTIMISTIC.

PAGE 04 BEIRUT 01310 241530Z

5. BEFORE THE CONVERSATION ENDED, HABIB SAID "WHO DRAWS THE CARICATURES OF ME FOR AS-SAFIR?"

--AS-SAFIR: NAJI ALI, HE'S A FAMOUS ARTIST.

--HABIB: HE MAKES ME LOOK VERY UGLY. IS IT POSSIBLE TO CONVINCE HIM THAT I'M A GOOD MAN AND NOT THAT BAD?

--AS-SAFIR: CONVINING NAJI WILL BE THE MOST DIFFICULT PART OF YOUR MISSION IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

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PAGE 01 PARIS 06293 231757Z
ACTION SS-25

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FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
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INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY AMMAN

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☒ EXCISE ☒ DECLASSIFY
☒ DENY ☐ IN PART
Date: 11/3/77
EO Citations: _____

FOIA Exemptions: _____ TS authority to
PA Exemptions: _____ ☐ CLASSIFY as ☐ S or ☐ C Sec. _____
☐ DOWNGRADE TS to ☐ S or ☐ C

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PARIS 06293

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E.O. 12065: RDS-1 2/23/02 (MARESCA, JOHN J.) OR-M
TAGS: OVIP (HABIB, PHILIP), PEPR, LE, FR
SUBJECT: HABIB MISSION

REF: STATE 4613

~~ENTIRE TEXT~~

2. WE BELIEVE IT WOULD BE EXTREMELY USEFUL IF PHIL HABIB COULD ARRANGE A STOPOVER IN PARIS EN ROUTE BACK FROM HIS CURRENT MISSION. THE FRENCH HAVE REPEATEDLY EXPRESSED A DESIRE TO CONSULT WITHUS ON THE MIDDLE EAST, AND IF TIMING PERMITS, WE MIGHT BE ABLE TO FACTOR IN THE RESULTS OF THE HABIB MISSION TO PREPARATIONS FOR PRESIDENT MITTERRAND'S MARCH 3-5 VISIT TO ISRAEL.

3. THE DESIRE FOR CLOSER CONSULTATIONS ON THE MIDDLE EAST CAME UP DURING THE RECENT VISIT OF ASSISTANT SECRETARY VELIOTES AND WAS REPEATED IN RECENT MEETING BETWEEN THE DCM AND THE QUAIS POLITICAL DIRECTOR.

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PAGE 02 PARIS 06293 231757Z

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PAGE 01. STATE 049595
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INFO OCT-00 ADS-00 SSO-00 /025 R.

DRAFTED BY NEA/ARN:AEJONES:JVW
APPROVED BY NEA/ARN:WNHOWELL
NEA:PHABIB (SUBS)
S/S-O:ESHERMAN
EUR/WE:DKAEUPER

-----353731 250354Z /65-62

O R 250013Z FEB 82
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
USLO RIYADH

DEPARTMENT OF STATE IM/IPS/CR/IR *CD* Date: *11/3/97*
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FOIA Exemptions _____ TS authority to
PA Exemptions _____ ☐ CLASSIFY as ☐ S or ☐ C Sec. _____
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E.O. 12065: GDS 2/24/87 (HOWELL, W. NATHANIEL)

TAGS: OVIP (HABIB, PHILIP)

SUBJECT: HABIB MISSION

REF: PARIS 6293 (NOTAL)

1. ~~ENTIRE TEXT.~~

2. AMBASSADOR HABIB PLANS TO STOP OVER IN PARIS
EN ROUTE BACK FROM HIS CURRENT MISSION, ALTHOUGH HE

PAGE 02 -STATE 049595

PROBABLY WILL NOT HAVE COMPLETED HIS STOPS IN THE MIDDLE
EAST BEFORE THE MARCH 3-5 MITTERAND VISIT TO ISRAEL.
HABIB WILL BE IN TOUCH WITH EMBASSY PARIS FROM THE AREA
REGARDING TIMING FOR PARIS STOP ONCE HE HAS A BETTER IDEA
OF HIS ONWARD TRAVEL PLANS.

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PAGE 01 STATE 046113
ORIGIN SS-25

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INFO OCT-00 ADS-00 SSO-00 CCO-00 /025 R

DRAFTED BY NEA/ARN:AEJONES:JVW
APPROVED BY NEA:MDRAPER
NEA/ARN:WNHOWELL
NEA/EX:LLESSER
S/S-O: TSTRICKLER
NEA/IAI:CHILL

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE
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AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY ROME IMMEDIATE
USLO RIYADH IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT PRIORITY

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

IM/IPS/CR/IR

Date: 11/3/97

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E.O. 12065: RDS-1 2/22/92 (DRAPER, MORRIS

TAGS: OVIP (HABIB, PHILIP), PEPR, LE

SUBJECT: RESUMPTION OF HABIB MISSION

1. [REDACTED] TEXT.

PAGE 02 STATE 046113

2. HABIB HAS BEEN ASKED TO RESUME
HIS MISSION ON LEBANON. HE PLANS TO LEAVE THE U.S. ON
WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 24 AND WILL BE ACCOMPANIED BY NEA
DAS DRAPER AND GENEVIEVE BURKOT, SECRETARY FOR THE PARTY.
PLEASE NOTE THAT THEY WILL BE TRAVELLING UNDER ASSUMED
NAMES (INITIALS MATCH REAL NAMES); P. HARRIS, M. DAVIS
AND MRS. G. BURNS.

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
UNCLASSIFIED

3. WE HAVE NOT YET WORKED OUT AN ITINERARY, BEYOND THAT PROVIDED BELOW. A MORE DETAILED SCHEDULE WILL BE CABLED AS SOON AS WE HAVE FEEDBACK ON THE AVAILABILITY OF SENIOR HOST GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS. IN ADDITION, THERE MAY BE ADJUSTMENTS TO THE SCHEDULE AS THE MISSION PROGRESSES. PLEASE NOTE THAT A USAF AIRCRAFT WILL BE USED FOR ALL MIDDLE EAST STOPS.

-- WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 24: DEPART U.S. BY COMMERCIAL
- AIRCRAFT

-- THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 25: ARRIVE ROME

-- FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 26: DEPART ROME IN EARLY MORNING
- (0900) FOR BEIRUT BY USAF AIRCRAFT

-- SUNDAY, FEBRUARY 28: PROCEED TO ISRAEL (ARRIVING
- AFTER CABINET MEETING)

-- HABIB WILL ALSO VISIT SYRIA, SAUDI ARABIA,
- AND JORDAN.

4. APPOINTMENTS:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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PAGE 03 STATE 046113

-- AT EACH STOP, AMBASSADOR HABIB WOULD LIKE TO BEGIN WITH A BRIEFING BY THE AMBASSADOR AND APPROPRIATE MISSION OFFICIALS. HE AND DRAPER WILL THEN PROCEED WITH APPOINTMENTS WITH APPROPRIATE SENIOR HOST GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS. HABIB WOULD LIKE TO SEE THE SAME RANGE OF OFFICIALS AND LEADERS HE HAS SEEN ON HIS PREVIOUS TRIPS. PLEASE ASCERTAIN AVAILABILITY OF HOST GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS DURING THIS PERIOD.

-- FOR BEIRUT: IN ADDITION TO THE PRESIDENT, PRIME MINISTER AND FOREIGN MINISTER, IT MAY BE USEFUL FOR HABIB TO SEE, AS HE HAS BEFORE, A RANGE OF OTHER LEBANESE LEADERS, KEEPING IN MIND THE NEED FOR BALANCE. FYI: HABIB MET WITH WALID JUMBLATT IN WASHINGTON ON FEBRUARY 19 AND 22.

-- FOR DAMASCUS: YOU SHOULD ADVISE SARG OF HABIB'S TRAVEL PLANS AND SUBMIT REQUEST FOR MEETING WITH PRESIDENT ASSAD, PROBABLY FOR ABOUT TUESDAY OR WEDNESDAY, MARCH 2-3. KHADDAM'S STATEMENTS RE WISHING TO MAINTAIN A DIALOGUE WITH THE U.S. (DAMASCUS 1141) ARE PARTICULARLY TIMELY.

5. PASSPORT INFORMATION ON MEMBERS OF PARTY FOLLOWS. VISAS WILL HAVE BEEN OBTAINED FOR ALL MEMBERS OF THE PARTY.

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FOR GENERAL TRAVEL

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PHILIP C. HABIB

NO. X 120911

PLACE ISSUED: WASHINGTON, D. C.

DATE ISSUED: AUGUST 15, 1977

EXPIRES: AUGUST 14, 1982

MORRIS DRAPER

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STATE 046113

NO. X 137604

PLACE ISSUED: WASHINGTON, D. C.

DATE ISSUED: SEPTEMBER 19, 1978

EXPIRES: SEPTEMBER 18, 1983

GENEVIEVE BURKOT

NO. Y 1745018

PLACE ISSUED: WASHINGTON, D. C.

DATE ISSUED: MAY 27, 1981

EXPIRES: MAY 26, 1986

FOR ISRAEL ONLY:

PHILIP C. HABIB

NO. X 143399

PLACE ISSUED: WASHINGTON, D. C.

DATE ISSUED: OCTOBER 22, 1979

EXPIRES: OCTOBER 21, 1984

MORRIS DRAPER

NO. X 139912

PLACE ISSUED: WASHINGTON, D. C.

DATE ISSUED: APRIL 12, 1979

EXPIRES: APRIL 11, 1984

GENEVIEVE BURKOT

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STATE 046113

NO. Y 1745019

PLACE ISSUED: WASHINGTON, D. C.

DATE ISSUED: MAY 27, 1981

EXPIRES: MAY 26, 1986

IMPORTANT THAT EXPECTATIONS NOT BE RAISED UNDULY BY THE PROSPECT OF ANOTHER VISIT BY AMBASSADOR HABIB. HIS PURPOSE WILL BE TO FOCUS ON ISSUES RELATED TO THE CEASE-FIRE AND THE ORIGINAL TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR HIS MISSION. AS IN THE PAST, THE DEPARTMENT'S SPOKESMAN WILL NEITHER DIVULGE DETAILS OF AMBASSADOR HABIB'S SCHEDULE NOR ENGAGE IN DISCUSSIONS OF HIS MEETINGS, EXCEPT AS AGREED TO BY HABIB.

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7. ADMINISTRATIVE ARRANGEMENTS: AMBASSADOR HABIB IS VERY APPRECIATIVE OF HOSPITALITY AND ARRANGEMENTS MADE FOR HIM AND HIS PARTY ON PREVIOUS TRIPS, AND MUST ONCE AGAIN RELY ON POSTS FOR ASSISTANCE IN CARRYING OUT HIS MISSION.

-- ACCOMMODATIONS: FOR REASONS OF SECURITY AND CONVENIENCE, ALL THREE MEMBERS OF PARTY SHOULD BE HOUSED TOGETHER WHENEVER POSSIBLE. IF ACCOMMODATIONS ARE IN A HOTEL, THREE SINGLE ADJOINING ROOMS SHOULD BE RESERVED, IF POSSIBLE.

-- FOR ROME: PLEASE SECURE HOTEL RESERVATIONS AS DISCUSSED WITH DCM BY PHONE.

-- EQUIPMENT: WOULD APPRECIATE POSTS PROVIDING IBM SELECTRIC TYPEWRITER FOR USE BY MRS. BURKOT WHEREVER HER ACCOMMODATIONS ARE LOCATED. PLEASE ALSO ENSURE THAT SHE HAS SAMPLE FORMAT FOR OUTGOING EMBASSY/CONGEN/USLO CABLES, APPROPRIATE TYPING ELEMENTS AND RIBBON, AND OTHER SUPPLIES.

-- AIRCRAFT CREW: WOULD APPRECIATE THE DAO'S ASSUMING RESPONSIBILITY FOR COORDINATING ACCOMMODATIONS AND OTHER

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ARRANGEMENTS FOR AIR FORCE CREW OF THE MILITARY AIRCRAFT. EUCOM WILL BE IN TOUCH WITH DAO'S WITH DETAILED REQUIREMENTS.

8. TRAFFIC: AS WAS ARRANGED ON PREVIOUS TRIPS, PLEASE PROVIDE HABIB AND DRAPER UPON ARRIVAL AT EACH STOP COPIES OF RELEVANT CABLES, INCLUDING NODIS AND OTHER SENSITIVE TRAFFIC. CABLES PROVIDED SHOULD COVER REGIONAL DEVELOPMENTS AS WELL AS ITEMS OF SPECIFIC RELEVANCE TO THE HABIB MISSION. COPIES OF WIRELESS FILE AND LATEST NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL PRESS REPORTS SHOULD ALSO BE MADE AVAILABLE TO HABIB PARTY AT EACH STOP.

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9. LATERAL DISTRIBUTION OF NODIS TRAFFIC: TO FACILITATE AMBASSADOR HABIB'S MISSION, IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT HE HAVE ON A TIMELY BASIS ALL IMPORTANT CABLE TRAFFIC (INCLUDING NODIS) BEARING ON THE LEBANON SITUATION. FOR THE DURATION OF HABIB'S MISSION, THEREFORE, ADDRESSEES ARE REQUESTED TO ENSURE THAT PERTINENT CABLE TRAFFIC, SLUGGED FOR AMBASSADOR HABIB AND DRAPER, IS AVAILABLE AT POSTS BEING VISITED. IN ADDITION, FOR THE DURATION OF THE HABIB MISSION, ADDRESSEE POSTS ARE AUTHORIZED TO TRANSMIT LATERALLY ALL NODIS TRAFFIC RELATING TO THE ISRAELI-LEBANON SITUATION TO THE POSTS AT WHICH HE WILL STOP.

10. SECURITY: POSTS SHOULD MAKE SAME ARRANGEMENTS FOR PARTY'S SECURITY AS WERE MADE FOR PREVIOUS TRIPS TO THE AREA BY AMBASSADOR HABIB AND HIS PARTY.

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 *** Current Classification *** [REDACTED]

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INFO OCT-00 ADS-00 INR-10 SS-10 CIAE-00 DODE-00 IO-15
NSC-05 NSAE-00 PM-09 SSM-03 SSN-02 SP-02 /067 RDRAFTED BY NEA/ARN:MGROSSMAN
APPROVED BY NEA/ARN:WNHOWELL
NEA/ARN:AEJONESP 091838Z FEB 82
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY211222 091835Z /52/IPS/CR/IR Date: 11/6/97
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FOIA Exemptions () CLASSIFY as () S or () C Sec.
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E.O. 12065:RDS-1 2/9/02 (HOWELL, W. NATHANIEL)

TAGS:PEPR, MILI, LE, IS, XF

9302566

SUBJECT: LEBANESE CEASEFIRE TEXT

REF: AMMAN 1174

1. ENTIRE TEXT).

2. FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF THE DEFINITION OF THE DE FACTO
CEASEFIRE NEGOTIATED BY AMBASSADOR HABIB WHICH CAME INTO
EFFECT AT 1130 HOURS GMT FRIDAY JULY 24, 1981.

BEGIN TEXT -

--THERE WILL BE NO HOSTILE MILITARY ACTIVITY FROM LEBANON
DIRECTED AT TARGETS IN ISRAEL, BY LAND, SEA, AND AIR;--THERE WILL BE NO HOSTILE MILITARY ACTIVITY FROM ISRAEL
AT TARGETS IN LEBANON, WHETHER BY SEA, LAND, OR AIR;

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--THE SAME WILL APPLY TO HOSTILE MILITARY ACTIVITY DIRECTED
INTO HADDAD'S AREA OR FROM IT.

END TEXT.

3. THIS DEFINITION IS STILL SECRET. YOU MAY, HOWEVER,
PASS A COPY TO THE KING OR DISCUSS IT WITH HIM THE NEXT
TIME YOU SEE HIM.STOESSEL

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ACTION NEA-11

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PM-09 PA-01 SSM-03 SAL-01 ACDA-12 SSN-02 ICAE-00
SP-02 SPRS-02 /105 W

-----337036 281706Z /53

R 281549Z DEC 81
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1854
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY CAIRO
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
USLO RIYADH

DEPARTMENT OF STATE IM/IPS/CR/IR Date: 11/1/97
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TEL AVIV 19803

E.O. 12065: RDS-1, 4 12/28/96 (HARE, PAUL) OR-M
TAGS: PEPR, SOPN, SY, IS, US, UR
SUBJECT: JERUSALEM RADIO ALLEGATION OF HABIB/SYTENKO
- MEETING
REF: A. STATE 339282, B. FBIS TA 221423 Missions
- C. AMMAN 9358

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1. [REDACTED] ENTIRE TEXT.

2. PER INSTRUCTIONS REF A, POLCOUNS DECEMBER 24
CONVEYED TO MFA NORTH AMERICAN DEPARTMENT DIRECTOR
BEN-TSUR OFFICIAL U.S. DENIAL OF ISRAEL RADIO REPORT
THAT AMBASSADOR HABIB RECENTLY MET WITH A SOVIET
OFFICIAL IN AMMAN TO DISCUSS MIDDLE EAST DEVELOPMENTS,
AND UNDERScoreD THAT SUCH MISLEADING INFORMATION SERVES
NEITHER OF OUR INTERESTS. BEN-TSUR TOOK THE POINT,
NOTING ONLY THAT RADIO REPORT CITED (UNSPECIFIED)

PAGE 02 TEL AV 19803 281650Z

"ARAB SOURCES" AND ALLUDING IN GENERAL TO THE DIFFICULTY
OF TRYING TO RIDE CLOSE HERD ON A FREE PRESS. LEWIS

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PAGE 01 STATE 025415
ORIGIN SS-25

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INFO OCT-00 ADS-00 SSO-00 /025 R

DRAFTED BY NEA:MDRAPER:CF
APPROVED BY NEA:MDRAPER
IO:MLEVITSKY
S/S-O :ESHERMAN
NEA/ARN:WNHOWELL

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE
INFO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY JIDDA PRIORITY

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E.O. 12065: RDS 1-3-4, 1/29/02 (DRAPER, MORRIS)

TAGS: UNSC, LE, IS, SY, PEPR, MOPS

SUBJECT: FORTHCOMING UNSC MEETING ON LEBANON

--

1. ~~ENTIRE TEXT.~~

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2. JOINED BY USUN POLITICAL OFFICER MICHAEL DAVIS, DAS
DRAPER MET FOR ONE HOUR ON JANUARY 28 IN NEW YORK WITH
LEBANESE UN PERMREP TUEINI. HABIB AND DRAPER HAD EARLIER

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IN THE DAY TALKED WITH TUEINI, AND HABIB WITH GREAT INSIST-
ANCE URGED THAT TUEINI NOT RPT NOT COMPLICATE THE PRESENT
UNEASY SITUATION IN THE LEBANESE-ISRAELI ARENA WITH A
DEBATE ON THE RESOLUTION WHICH CALLS FOR TOO MUCH. THE
THRUST OF HABIB'S REMARKS WAS THAT THE HADDAD PROBLEM
COULD NOT BE DEALT WITH PREMATURELY.

3. THEREFORE, IN THE FOLLOW-UP MEETING, DRAPER ASKED
TUEINI WHAT HE WANTED. A SECURITY COUNCIL DECISION TO

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INCREASE UNIFIL'S STRENGTH BY BETWEEN 1,000 TO 2,000 MEN, HE REPLIED, ALONG WITH A STAGE SETTING FOR THE INTRODUCTION OF MORE LEBANESE TROOPS INTO SOUTH LEBANON, POSSIBLY INCLUDING IN TYRE. WHEN ASKED WHY THE LEBANESE WANTED AN INITIATIVE OF THIS OR SOME OTHER KIND "AT THIS TIME", TUEINI EXPLAINED THAT IT WAS TIED UP INTIMATELY WITH LEBANESE EXTERNAL POLITICS AND THE FUTURE ROLE OF THE ARMY IN THE FOLLOWING WAY:

-- THE LEBANESE ARMY IS NOT TRUSTED BY THE MUSLIMS. THEY WILL NOT BE ALLOWED INTO WEST BEIRUT EVEN IF SOME DEAL SUCCEEDS THROUGH WHICH THE ARMY CAN REPLACE AT LEAST PART OF THE PHALANGE FORCES NOW IN EAST BEIRUT.

-- THEREFORE, IN ORDER TO GAIN CREDIBILITY, THE LEBANESE ARMY MUST BE SEEN AS BEING POINTED AT SOME FORCE WHICH THE SUNNIS WILL ACCEPT AS THEIR OWN ADVERSARY. FROM THIS LOGIC FLOWS THE CONCEPT THAT ADDITIONAL LEBANESE ARMY FORCES IN SOUTH LEBANON WOULD BE FOCUSED AGAINST HADDAD AND ISRAEL.

-- OVER TIME, ACCORDING TO THIS MADDENING SCRIPT, THE LEBANESE ARMY WOULD REASSERT REAL CONTROL NOT ONLY OVER TYRE BUT ALSO NABATYYAH AND HASBAYA; AND THE LEBANESE

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ARMY WOULD BE SEEN AS TAKING OVER THE "FRONT LINES" FROM THE PALESTINIAN FIGHTERS.

-- TIMING IS ALL IMPORTANT. A CREDIBLE NATIONAL ARMY, ACCEPTABLE TO THE PRINCIPAL FACTIONS, IS ESSENTIAL TO PRESERVE AND ENHANCE THE AUTHORITY OF THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT. LEBANON IS ON THE VERGE OF FACING A SERIOUS CRISIS IN THE FORTHCOMING PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS, WHICH COULD DECIDE THE FATE OF THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT IN LEBANON'S CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE.

4. IN RESPONSE, DRAPER MADE THE FOLLOWING PRINCIPAL THREE POINTS:

-- THE U.S. IN PRINCIPLE WOULD LIKE AN EXPANSION OF UNIFIL, BUT BELIEVES IT MUST HAVE UNEQUIVOCAL SYRIAN SUPPORT IN ORDER TO FORESTALL A SOVIET VETO. THE U.S. WILL NOT WILLINGLY TAKE ANY CHANCES WITH A SCENARIO THAT WOULD JEOPARDIZE UNIFIL. (TUEINI SAID HE THOUGHT THAT ARAB LEAGUE SECRETARY GENERAL KLIBI MIGHT BE ABLE TO MOBILIZE A FULL ARAB CALL FOR UNIFIL'S EXPANSION, AND WITH SYRIA'S ACQUIESCENCE.)

-- THE U.S. IN PRINCIPLE ALSO WOULD LIKE TO SEE A MORE SUBSTANTIAL LEBANESE MILITARY AND CIVIL PRESENCE IN

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SOUTH LEBANON.

-- THE PRESENT PERIOD UP TO ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM THE SINAI IN APRIL WILL BE EXCEEDINGLY TENSE AND SENSITIVE, IN PART BECAUSE OF THE NATIONAL TRAUMA THAT ISRAEL MAY BE EXPERIENCING. MILITARY PROVOCATION BY THE PALESTINIANS COULD IGNITE A TRULY MAJOR ISRAELI MILITARY ACTION EXCEEDING IN SCOPE THE 1978 OPERATION. ANY STEP, HOWEVER INNOCENT IN INTENT, WHICH WOULD APPEAR THREATENING OR CHALLENGING TO HADDAD (AND THE ISRAELIS) IS SIMPLY NOT WORTH THE RISK.

PAGE 04 STATE 025415

5. BY THE END OF THE MEETING, TUEINI FULLY UNDERSTOOD OUR PREFERENCES THAT THERE BE NO RESOLUTION OR INITIATIVE WHICH COULD APPEAR CHALLENGING TO HADDAD OR THE ISRAELIS. TUEINI WAS ALSO TOLD IN THE STRONGEST TERMS THAT THE PALESTINIANS AND SYRIANS MUST BE REGULARLY REMINDED NOT TO DO ANYTHING WHICH COULD LEAD TO A RUPTURE OF THE CEASEFIRE. IN ADDITION TO OVER THE BORDER OPERATIONS, DRAPER SAID THAT A SIGNIFICANT REINFORCEMENT OF SYRIAN MILITARY PRESENCE IN LEBANON COULD ALSO IGNITE AN ISRAELI MILITARY REACTION. HAIG

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PAGE 01 TEL AV 03192 021131Z
ACTION SS-25

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FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3

INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE

AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE

USLO RIYADH IMMEDIATE

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PA Exemptions: () DOWNGRADE TS to () S or () C

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DECAPTIONED

FROM AMBASSADOR

E.O. 12065: RDS-1,3 3/2/02 (LEWIS, SAMUEL W.) OR-M

TAGS: PEPR, MILI, IS, SY, LE, US

SUBJECT: HABIB MISSION: UNWANTED PUBLICITY ELICITS WELL-DESERVED HABIB BLAST

1. ~~ENTIRE TEXT~~

2. RADIO AND PRESS REPORTS MONDAY EVENING AND TUESDAY MORNING, MARCH 2, ON HABIB'S MEETINGS WITH ISRAELI LEADERS HIGHLIGHT HABIB'S INTENTION TO PURSUE THE PROBLEM OF THE SYRIAN MISSILES IN DAMASCUS AND THE SYRIAN MILITARY PRESENCE GENERALLY AT STRATEGIC POINTS IN LEBANON. NEWS REPORTS ALSO ARE BOTH INACCURATE AND MISLEADING IN SOME OF THE THINGS THEY SAY ABOUT HABIB'S COMMENTS TO ISRAELIS ON THE LEBANESE INTERNAL SCENE. HABIB IS ALSO QUOTED WIDELY AS HAVING AGREED WITH THE ISRAELI ASSERTION THAT INFILTRA-

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PAGE 02 TEL AV 03192 021131Z

TION ATTEMPTS ACROSS ANY OF ISRAEL'S BORDERS REPRESENT VIOLATION OF THE AGREEMENT ON CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES.

3. ON ROUTE TO BEN GURION AIRPORT TUESDAY MORNING, HABIB AND I BOTH LANDED ON MFA DEPUTY DIRGEN HANAN BAR-ON WITH BOTH FEET. HABIB STRESSED THAT THIS KIND OF PUBLICITY FOR ASPECTS OF HIS MISSION, WHETHER ACCURATE OR DISTORTED AS MUCH OF IT WAS, UNDERMINES HIS ABILITY TO HAVE ANY EFFECTIVE IMPACT IN OTHER ARAB CAPITALS, ESPECIALLY DAMASCUS

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WHERE HE IS ARRIVING THIS MORNING. HABIB TOLD BAR-ON THAT HE FRANKLY WAS NOT AT ALL SURE HE WOULD EVEN BE RECEIVED IN DAMASCUS IN LIGHT OF THIS PUBLICITY ABOUT THIAN PRESENCE IN LEBANON AND THE SYRIAN MISSILE ISSUE. HE STRESSED THAT ANYTHING HE COULD DO ON PRECLUDING FURTHER PLO INFILTRATION ATTEMPTS ACROSS THE JORDANIAN BORDER HAD ALSO BEEN UNDERMINED AND THAT HE NOW NATURALLY EXPECTED PLO SPOKESMEN TO REJECT HABIB'S INTERPRETATION THAT THE AGREEMENT INDEED COVERED ALL OF ISRAEL'S BORDERS IN SO FAR AS INCURSIONS ACROSS THEM HAD ORIGINATED IN LEBANON. HABIB AND I REMINDED BAR-ON THAT ON HIS PREVIOUS TRIPS HERE THERE HAD BEEN PROBLEMS OF A SIMILAR NATURE BUT NONE AS ACUTE AS THIS TIME, DESPITE EFFORTS HABIB MADE AS HE LEFT HIS MEETING WITH BEGIN TO STRESS THE NEED FOR CONFIDENTIALITY. THE CONVERSATION CONTINUED IN THIS VEIN FOR 15 OR 20 MINUTES WITH BAR-ON SADLY AGREEING THAT THE MEDIA COVERAGE WAS "AWFUL" AND NOT ATTEMPTING TO DEFEND IT EXCEPT BY MAKING THE OBVIOUS AND UNFORTUNATELY CORRECT POINT THAT LEAKS ARE ALL TOO COMMON IN WASHINGTON AS WELL AS IN JERUSALEM. HE ALSO INSISTED THAT CARELESSNESS RATHER THAN DELIBERATE EFFORTS TO SABOTAGE HABIB'S MISSION SHOULD BE BLAMED.

4. BAR-ON HAS ASSURED ME THAT HE WILL MAKE CERTAIN THE PRINCIPAL ACTORS UNDER SUSPICION, THE PRIME MINISTER'S

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OFFICE AND DEFENSE MINISTER SHARON AND HIS COLLEAGUES ARE FULLY INFORMED OF HABIB'S IRE AND THE UNFORTUNATE CONSEQUENCES THESE PRESS STORIES COULD PRODUCE. BAR-ON ALSO KNOWS THAT HABIB MAY DECIDE ON FUTURE VISITS TO THE REGION TO LEAVE HIS STOP IN ISRAEL TO THE END OF HIS ROUNDS IN ORDER TO AVOID REPETITION OF THESE DAMAGING LEAKS PRIOR TO HIS VISITS TO OTHER CAPITALS. LEWIS

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INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE

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AMEMBASSY DOHA IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY KUWAIT IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY MUSCAT IMMEDIATE

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JERUSALEM 03597

E.O. 12065: GDS 12/07/87 (DRAPER, MORRIS) OR-M

TAGS: PEPR, IS, LE, XF

SUBJECT: GOI PRESS STATEMENT ON HABIB/SHAMIR MEETING,
DECEMBER 7REF: JERUSALEM 3503^{Missing}

1. (C)

2. MFO SPOKESMAN DID NOT MAKE STATEMENT ANTICIPATED
REFTEL. HE HAS INFORMED US THAT HE TOLD

PAGE 02 JERUSA 03597 071043Z

JOURNALISTS ON BACKGROUND: (1) THAT AMB HABIB
BRIEFED FOMIN SHAMIR ON HIS TALKS IN SAUDI
ARABIA; (2) THAT AMB. HABIB HOPES THE CEASEFIRE WILL
CONTINUE; (3) THAT FOMIN SHAMIR REITERATED THE
GOI'S POSITION ON THE ISSUE; AND (4) THAT AMB. HABIB
WOULD NOT RETURN TO ISRAEL DURING THIS ROUND, BUT
WOULD VISIT SOME OTHER COUNTRIES. GROVE

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FOR AMBASSADOR MURPHY FROM HABIB; BRUSSELS HOLD FOR HABIB
AND DRAPER

E.O.12065: RDS 1,3 12/8/91 (DRAPER, MORRIS)
TAGS: PEPR, MOPS, XF, SA, IS, LE, SY, US
SUBJECT: HABIB MISSION: MESSAGE FOR CROWN PRINCE FAHD

1. [REDACTED] (ENTIRE TEXT.)
2. IN ADDITION TO SEEING TO THE DELIVERY OF THE FOLLOWING
MESSAGE FROM ME TO CROWN PRINCE FAHD, YOU MAY--AT YOUR
DISCRETION--WISH TO DRAW SELECTIVELY AND CAUTIOUSLY
ON REPORTS OF MY MEETINGS IN ISRAEL AND LEBANON (SEPTELS)
TO FILL IN THE CROWN PRINCE MORE FULLY.

3. BEGIN TEXT:

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YOUR ROYAL HIGHNESS:

DURING OUR GOOD MEETING IN RIYADH, YOU ASKED THAT I LET
YOU KNOW--THROUGH AMBASSADOR MURPHY--OF THE RESULTS OF
MY TALKS IN ISRAEL AND LEBANON.

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IN ISRAEL, PRIME MINISTER BEGIN WAS STILL UNABLE TO
RECEIVE ME IN HIS HOSPITAL ROOM. I THEREFORE MET WITH
FOREIGN MINISTER SHAMIR AND HIS ADVISORS. I URGED THAT
ISRAEL REMAIN CAUTIOUS AND PATIENT WHILE POSITIVE FORCES
IN THE REGION WORKED TO REDUCE TENSIONS AND HOLD IN CHECK
DANGEROUS DEVELOPMENTS. IN THIS CONNECTION, I MADE IT
CLEAR THAT THE KINGDOM OF SAUDI ARABIA WAS PREPARED TO
CONTINUE PLAYING ITS CONSTRUCTIVE ROLE.

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OUR MEETING IN ISRAEL ENDED ON A POSITIVE NOTE. THE FOREIGN MINISTER AGREED WITH ME ON THE IMPORTANCE OF MAINTAINING THE CEASE-FIRE. ISRAEL, HE MADE CLEAR, WILL DO NOTHING TO UPSET CEASE-FIRE ARRANGEMENTS. HE EXPRESSED UNDERSTANDING OF THE DESIRABILITY OF CONTINUING DIPLOMATIC AND POLITICAL EFFORTS TOWARDS RESOLVING OTHER PROBLEMS.

IN LEBANON, I MET WITH PRESIDENT SARKIS AND INFORMED HIM THAT IT WAS MY UNDERSTANDING THAT SAUDI ARABIA INTENDS TO STAY ENGAGED--THROUGH THE QUADRIPARTITE ARAB FOLLOW-UP COMMITTEE--IN EFFORTS TO PROMOTE NATIONAL RECONCILIATION AND TO DEAL WITH LEBANON'S MANY OTHER PROBLEMS. BASED ON MY DISCUSSIONS WITH HIM, AND EARLIER WITH OTHER LEBANESE OFFICIALS AND POLITICIANS, I HAVE CONCLUDED THAT IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT THE SYRIANS SHOULD BE MORE FLEXIBLE AND ACCOMMODATING TOWARDS THE LEBANESE. AS YOU INDICATED TO ME, THE SYRIANS SHOULD SHOW THEIR GOOD INTENTIONS AND ALLOW THE LEBANESE A REAL OPPORTUNITY TO MANAGE THEIR OWN AFFAIRS. OTHERWISE, WE CAN EXPECT EXTREMELY NEGATIVE DEVELOPMENTS. IF SYRIA TRIES TO IMPOSE A PUPPET PRESIDENT IN LEBANON, THE MILITANT CHRISTIANS WILL RESIST. SOMEHOW THE POLITICAL PROCESS WHICH WILL BE GOING ON NEXT YEAR IN LEBANON MUST, THROUGH COMPROMISE, SETTLE UPON A

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ATHENS 20046 041612Z

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BROADLY ACCEPTABLE PRESIDENTIAL CHOICE.

YOUR ROYAL HIGHNESS, I AM MORE THAN EVER CONVINCED AS I LEAVE THE REGION OF THE GREAT VALUE OF THE CEASE-FIRE WHICH OUR TWO COUNTRIES HELPED ARRANGE IN JULY. TOGETHER WE MUST DO EVERYTHING WE CAN TO SUSTAIN AND REINFORCE THAT CEASE-FIRE. TOGETHER WE MUST ALSO DO WHAT WE CAN TO ELIMINATE OTHER CAUSES OF TENSION AFFECTING NOT ONLY THE CEASE-FIRE BUT THE INTERNAL SCENE IN LEBANON.

WITH WARM GOOD WISHES,

RESPECTFULLY, PHILIP C. HABIB
END TEXT. STEARNS

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AMEMBASSY BEIRUT PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS PRIORITY

AMCONSUL JERUSALEM PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY JIDDA PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY KUWAIT PRIORITY

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AMMAN 08904

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E.O.12065: RDS-1&4, 12/6/01 (VIETS, RICHARD N.)OR-M

TAGS: PEPR, PINS, PINT, IS, LE, SY, XF, EG

SUBJECT: HABIB MISSION: MEETING WITH FOREIGN MINISTER

- SHAMIR: TERRORIST ACTIVITY AGAINST ISRAEL FROM

- JORDAN

REF: TEL AVIV 18682

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1. [REDACTED]

2. TWO SUPPLEMENTARY POINTS NEED TO BE MADE TO PARA (4)
REFTEL DISCUSSION OF PLO INFILTRATION THROUGH JORDAN
TO ISRAEL.

3. FIRSTLY, AS REPORTED REFTEL, BOTH KING HUSSEIN
AND BIN SHAKER TOLD HABIB THEY WERE "ON TOP OF THE
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

PAGE 02 AMMAN 08904 061214Z

SITUATION," THAT THEY WERE WATCHING IT VERY CLOSELY,
AND THAT THEY WERE CONFIDENT OF THE ABILITY OF
JORDANIAN ARMY AND SECURITY FORCES TO CONTROL THE
PROBLEM. IN DISCUSSING THIS TOPIC THE KING SPECIFICALLY
AMENDED HIS COMMENTS, HOWEVER, WITH AN ASIDE THAT
IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE TO SEAL THE BORDER COMPLETELY.
THE ISRAELIS UNDERSTAND THIS BETTER THAN ANYONE ELSE, OF
COURSE. BUT WE URGE THAT WHENEVER THIS SUBJECT IS
DISCUSSED WITH THE GOI THE POINT BE MADE THAT WHILE

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THE JORDANIANS ARE CLEARLY DOING THEIR BEST TO STOP ALL TERRORIST ACTIVITY LAUNCHED FROM JORDANIAN TERRITORY AGAINST ISRAEL, THERE IS NO GUARANTEE OF ONE HUNDRED PERCENT SUCCESS. IN THE PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES SHOULD AN ISOLATED EPISODE OCCUR OF SUCCESSFUL PENETRATION OF JORDAN AND RPT AND ISRAELI BORDER DEFENSES, THIS SHOULD NOT BE INTERPRETED BY THE ISRAELIS AS REPRESENTING ANY TRIMMING OF JORDANIAN DETERMINATION.

4. SECONDLY, WE NOTE WITH DISMAY THIS MORNING A FBIS TEL AVIV (050949Z DEC 81) REPORT OF A JERUSALEM DOMESTIC SERVICE BROADCAST STATING KING HUSSEIN PROMISED HABIB THAT THE JORDANIAN GOVERNMENT "IS DOING EVERYTHING IN ITS POWER TO PREVENT TERRORIST ACTIVITY AGAINST ISRAEL FROM JORDAN'S TERRITORY." WE HOPE EMBASSY TEL AVIV WILL FIND AN APPROPRIATE OPPORTUNITY IN THE NEXT COUPLE OF DAYS TO MAKE THE POINT YET AGAIN THAT EACH TIME THE ISRAELIS PUBLICLY BLAB ABOUT THIS SENSITIVE SUBJECT, IT SIMPLY INCREASES THE PRESSURES ON THOSE PEOPLE ON THIS SIDE OF THE JORDAN RIVER WHO ARE GENUINELY TRYING TO HELP. VIETS

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E.O. 12065
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NEA FOR AMBASSADOR LEWIS

E.O. 12065: RDS-1,4 12/05/01 (BROWN, WILLIAM A.) OR-M
TAGS: PEPR, PINS, PINT, IS, LE, SY, XF
SUBJECT: HABIB MISSION: MEETING WITH DEFENSE MINISTER
- SHARON

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1. [REDACTED]
2. AMBASSADOR HABIB, ACCOMPANIED BY CHARGE BROWN, DAS DRAPER, POLITICAL COUNSELOR HARE, AND ARMY ATTACHE RAINES, MET WITH MINISTER OF DEFENSE SHARON IN JERUSALEM FOR ABOUT ONE AND A HALF HOURS DECEMBER 4. ACCOMPANYING SHARON WERE MAJOR GENERAL TAMIR, MFA DEPUTY DIRECTOR GENERAL BAR-ON, BG YAARI (DEPUTY DMI), AND MFA DIRECTOR FOR NORTH AMERICAN AFFAIRS BENTSUR.
3. IN RESPONSE TO HABIB'S QUERY, SHARON OUTLINED

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WITH MAPS HIS CONCERNS ABOUT THE SITUATION IN LEBANON. HE STATED OUR GOAL SHOULD BE TO ESTABLISH A LEGITIMATE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT AUTHORITY, CAPABLE OF EXERCISING ITS INFLUENCE THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY, ASSOCIATED WITH THE FREE WORLD, AND AT PEACE WITH ISRAEL. SHARON STATED THIS OBJECTIVE COULD NOT BE REALIZED AS LONG AS THE SYRIANS OCCUPIED LEBANON, AT LEAST IN THE BEIRUT AREA AND ALONG THE BEIRUT/ZAHLE CORRIDOR. WHILE ISRAEL WOULD NOT LIKE IT, SHARON BELIEVED IT

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WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO HAVE FREE ELECTIONS IF THE SYRIANS WERE CONFINED TO THE NORTHERN BEKAA AND THE TRIPOLI AREA. HOWEVER, POINTING TO HIS MAPS, SHARON EXPLAINED HOW BECAUSE OF SYRIAN ENCROACHMENTS THE CHRISTIAN CONTROLLED AREA OF LEBANON HAD BECOME SMALLER AND SMALLER, UNTIL IT WAS NOW CONFINED TO AN AREA 36 KILOMETERS IN LENGTH AND 35 KILOMETERS IN WIDTH. THE SYRIAN ARMY POSITION HAD CORRESPONDINGLY INCREASED IN STRENGTH OVER TIME.

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4. THE SECOND FACTOR OR PROBLEM WERE THE 15,000-20,000 ARMED "ARAB TERRORISTS" IN THE SOUTHERN REGION, EXTENDING FROM THE WESTERN SIDE OF BEIRUT TO TYRE. AS LONG AS THESE (PLO) TERRORISTS REMAINED, FREE ELECTIONS COULD NOT BE HELD, SHARON ASSERTED.

5. THE THIRD CONCERN WAS THE THREAT TO THE CEASE-FIRE. SHARON STATED SEVERAL TIMES THAT HIS GOVERNMENT FULLY INTENDED TO MAINTAIN THE CEASE-FIRE AS LONG AS POSSIBLE. WHILE UNIFIL AND HADDAD'S FORCES WERE DOING THEIR BEST TO PREVENT TERRORISTS FROM GETTING TO ISRAEL'S BORDER, HADDAD DOES NOT BELIEVE A CEASE-FIRE EXISTS ANY LONGER AS EVIDENCED BY THE FACT THAT THREE OF HADDAD'S MILITIAMEN HAD BEEN RECENTLY KILLED BY A LAND MINE.

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SHARON HAD PERSONALLY VISITED HADDAD TWICE IN ORDER TO RESTRAIN HIM FROM RESPONDING TO TERRORIST PROVOCATIONS. DURING THESE VISITS, HE HAD SEEN FOR HIMSELF THE SOPHISTICATED MINES, BOOBY TRAPS, REMOTE CONTROLLED ROCKET LAUNCHERS AND OTHER EQUIPMENT WHICH THE TERRORISTS EMPLOYED. THERE WAS ALSO THE PROBLEM OF POSSIBLE ATTACKS THROUGH JORDAN AND TERRORIST ACTIVITIES IN EUROPE. ALL OF THESE ACTIONS ENDANGERED THE CEASE-FIRE.

6. FINALLY, THERE WERE THE SYRIAN MISSILES. ISRAEL WAS IN A DIFFICULT POSITION SINCE IT DOES NOT HAVE GOOD (PHOTO) INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE OF THE AREA EAST OF DAMASCUS, WHERE SURFACE TO SURFACE MISSILES, THE SYRIAN STRATEGIC RESERVE, AND OTHER KEY MILITARY INSTALLATIONS ARE LOCATED.

7. HABIB AGREED WITH SHARON THAT THE KEY QUESTION WAS THE FUTURE STATE OF LEBANON AS A WHOLE, WHICH WAS WHY HE WAS CONCENTRATING NOT ONLY ON THE CEASE-FIRE AND MISSILES, BUT ALSO ON INTERNAL DEVELOPMENTS DURING THIS TRIP. HABIB REVIEWED THE PROSPECTS FOR THE 1982 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION AND SAID IT WAS CLEAR OUTSIDE PRESSURES -- AS WELL AS INTERNAL DEMANDS -- WERE REQUIRED IF THE SYRIAN

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FORCES WERE TO BE WITHDRAWN OR REDEPLOYED AND FREE ELECTIONS HELD. HE HAD TALKED TO ASSAD DIRECTLY ON THIS POINT AND HAD NOT RECEIVED A DIRECT ANSWER ON SYRIAN INTENTIONS. HUSSEIN WANTS TO SEE THE

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AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE
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SYRIANS OUT AND HAD TALKED ABOUT A DEVELOPING MAJORITY AMONG THE MODERATES IN THE "ARAB NATION" WHO WERE INTERESTED IN SEEING A SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL. SHARON ASKED SARCASTICALLY HOW THIS COULD BE DONE -- BY PLACING OTHER ARAB FORCES IN LEBANON? HABIB RESPONDED THIS WAS A POSSIBILITY AND REVIEWED THE EARLIER HISTORY OF ARAB DISCUSSIONS ON THIS SUBJECT, WHICH HAD NOT HOWEVER LED TO ANY RESULTS. SHARON ABRUPTLY INTERJECTED "WE WILL NOT ALLOW THAT TO HAPPEN," REFERRING TO OTHER ARAB TROOPS BEING INTRODUCED INTO LEBANON. HABIB REPLIED HOW COULD SHARON POSSIBLY SAY THAT WITHOUT KNOWING THE CIRCUMSTANCES UNDER WHICH THEY MIGHT ENTER. SHARON REITERATED THAT ISRAEL WOULD REJECT COMPLETELY ANY "HOSTILE" TROOPS BEING INTRODUCED IN LEBANON. HABIB SHARPLY

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RETURNED THE VOLLEY, STATING THAT SHARON WAS CREATING A NEW CONDITION; ON BEHALF OF THE U.S., HE COULD NOT

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ACCEPT IT; AND REFERRED TO HIS EARLIER CONVERSATIONS WITH THE PRIME MINISTER ON THIS SUBJECT, WHERE NO SUCH PRE-CONDITIONS WERE CITED. HABIB ADDED THIS WAS ONLY A POSSIBILITY AND WOULD PROBABLY NOT HAPPEN IN ANY EVENT. HUSSEIN HAD ONLY MENTIONED THIS AS ONE POSSIBLE WAY TO GET THE SYRIANS OUT. THE MARONITES AND OTHER LEBANESE, HABIB ASSERTED, ALSO WANTED TO REACH THIS SAME OBJECTIVE.

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8. AFTER THIS EXCHANGE, HABIB SAID HE DIDN'T QUITE UNDERSTAND THE LEVEL OF ISRAELI CONCERN ABOUT CEASE-FIRE VIOLATIONS IN HADDAD'S ENCLAVE. BG YAARI DESCRIBED THE 23 ACTIVE VIOLATIONS OF THE CEASE-FIRE WHICH HAD ALLEGEDLY OCCURRED SINCE JULY -- ELEVEN SHELLINGS AND 12 GROUND ACTIONS. YAARI FELT THAT ALTHOUGH THEY WERE CARRIED OUT BY EXTREME PLO ELEMENTS, FATAH KNEW OF THESE ACTIVITIES SINCE THE SOUTHERN HEADQUARTERS OF FATAH AND THE EXTREMISTS WERE COLOCATED. HABIB EMPHASIZED THAT HE HAD SPOKEN SPECIFICALLY OF THE IMPORTANCE OF REFRAINING FROM ACTION AGAINST HADDAD OR ISRAEL AND HAD BEEN TOLD THAT THE PLO NOT ONLY AGREED TO THE CEASE-FIRE BUT WANTED TO SEE IT PRESERVED. HE HAD ALSO WARNED THAT ANY PLO ACTION AGAINST HILL 880 WOULD BE A PROVOCATION. THE SYRIANS SEEMED TO UNDERSTAND THIS POINT.

9. SHARON OUTLINED HIS WORRIES IN MORE DETAIL. AFTER THREE OF HIS MEN HAD BEEN KILLED, HADDAD DID A NATURAL THING IN TAKING THE HILL; IT WAS A GOOD OBSERVATION POST LOOKING DOWN INTO HIS TERRITORY AND TERRORIST TRACKS HAD BEEN FOUND ON THE HILL. SHARON MADE IT CLEAR HE WAS NOT BLAMING UNIFIL FOR WHAT HAD HAPPENED, GIVEN THE TERRAIN AND DIFFICULTY

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OF ACCOMPLISHING THEIR MISSION. BUT WHAT WILL HAPPEN, SHARON ASKED, IF THERE IS ANOTHER SIMILAR VIOLATION? HADDAD WILL MOVE ANOTHER 300 YARDS FORWARD AND TAKE ANOTHER HILL. TENSIONS WILL INCREASE AND THE CEASE-FIRE WILL BE PUT INTO FURTHER JEOPARDY. THERE WAS ALSO THE WORRY OF SAUDI MONEY AND ARMS SHIPMENTS TO THE TERRORISTS. THEY NOW HAD 250-270 GUNS OR ARTILLERY PIECES IN SOUTHERN LEBANON. THE ISRAELI'S ALSO HAD INFORMATION THEY WERE TRYING TO OBTAIN SOVIET 180MM CANNONS, CAPABLE OF A RANGE OF 43,000

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YARDS. THESE WERE OTHER WORRISOME INDICATIONS WHICH COULD IGNITE THE SITUATION AT ANY TIME, DESPITE ISRAELI RESOLVE TO MAINTAIN THE CEASE-FIRE AS LONG AS POSSIBLE. SHARON EXPLAINED THAT IF SOMETHING HAPPENS, HE DID NOT WANT TO TAKE US BY SURPRISE. HE APPRECIATED WHAT HABIB HAD DONE AND WAS TRYING TO DO, BUT HE HAD TO SAY FRANKLY THAT ISRAEL WILL NOT ACCEPT A WAR OF ATTRITION ON HER NORTHERN BORDERS AGAIN. HE HAD INSTRUCTED HIS CHIEF OF STAFF TO BE ABLE TO RESPOND AT ONCE, IF SOMETHING OCCURED AND ISRAEL WAS PROVOKED.

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10. HABIB ASKED WHETHER SHARON DISTINGUISHED BETWEEN DIFFERENT DEGREES OF PROVOCATION. HE ASSUMED HE DID. SHARON SAID OF COURSE HE DID. ISRAEL HAD NOT REACTED TO THE 23 VIOLATIONS AGAINST HADDAD, OR THE INCIDENTS IN EUROPE, OR THE KILLING OF ONE ISRAELI LIEUTENANT AND THE WOUNDING OF EIGHT SOLDIERS BY A MINE NEAR THE JORDANIAN BORDER. IF ONE SUMMED UP ALL OF THE VIOLATIONS, THEY TOTALED ABOUT 40 SINCE JULY. BUT, SHARON ASKED, HOW COULD ONE BE SURE THAT THE SITUATION WOULD NOT BE DIFFERENT TOMORROW?

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NEA FOR AMBASSADOR LEWIS

11. HABIB SAID HE WOULD NOW BE GOING TO SAUDI ARABIA TO FIND OUT THE MOOD AFTER FEZ AND TO TALK TO THEM IN DETAIL ABOUT THE VIOLATIONS, THE FLOW OF HEAVY WEAPONS, AND INTERNAL DEVELOPMENTS IN LEBANON. HE WOULD COME BACK AND REPORT. BUT ONE MUST RECOGNIZE THAT THE CEASE-FIRE HAD LASTED FOUR MONTHS AND TWO WEEKS AND WHILE NOT TOTALLY SATISFACTORY, IT WAS BETTER THAN THE SITUATION WHICH HAD PREVAILED BEFORE. SHARON AGAIN REPEATED HIS DETERMINATION TO MAINTAIN THE CEASE-FIRE AND EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR HABIB'S EFFORTS. HABIB SAID HE HAD LEFT THE WARNING THAT ISRAELI PATIENCE WAS NOT UNLIMITED. HE HAD LAID IT ON THE LINE WITH ASSAD. HABIB ASSERTED THAT HE WANTED TO SEE RESULTS AND REPEATED WHAT HE HAD EARLIER SAID TO THE FOREIGN MINISTER THAT THE SYRIANS KNEW THAT THE ISRAELIS COULD "KICK THE CRAP" OUT OF THEM, IF PROVOKED.

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12. AT THE END, SHARON ASKED IF THE MISSILES HAD BEEN FORGOTTEN. HABIB EXPLAINED THAT HE HAD ALREADY FULLY BRIEFED THE FOREIGN MINISTER ON DEVELOPMENTS ON THIS SUBJECT.

13. THIS MESSAGE CLEARED WITH DAS DRAPER. BROWN

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FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4386

INFO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE

AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE

USINT BAGHDAD PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY KUWAIT PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY

USLO RIYADH PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY

DEPARTMENT OF STATE IM/IPS/CR/IR Date: 11/3/97
☒ RELEASE ☒ DECLASSIFY
☐ EXCISE ☐ DECLASSIFY EO Citations
☐ DENY IN PART

FOIA Exemptions _____ TS authority to
PA Exemptions _____ ☐ CLASSIFY as ☐ S or ☐ C Sec. _____
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DECAPTIONED**UNCLASSIFIED**

JIDDA PLEASE PASS TO AMBASSADOR HABIB AND DAS DRAPER

E.O. 12065: RDS-1, 12/6/01 (VIETS, RICHARD N.) OR-M

TAGS: PEPR, IS, SY, LE, JO, US

SUBJECT: HABIB TRIP: AMBASSADOR HABIB'S CONVERSATIONS
WITH JORDANIAN FOREIGN MINISTER AND PRIME MINISTER
CONCERNING LEBANON

1. [REDACTED]

2. SUMMARY: AMBASSADOR HABIB HAD EXCELLENT
EXCHANGES WITH JORDANIAN PRIME MINISTER BADRAN
AND FOREIGN MINISTER KASIM ON DECEMBER 3 ON
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

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LEBANON, (A DETAILED DISCUSSION OF THE ARAB
SUMMIT CONFERENCE IN FEZ HAS BEEN REPORTED IN
SEPTEL). HABIB TOLD HIS JORDANIAN INTERLOCUTERS
THAT PRESIDENT REAGAN INSTRUCTED HIM TO VISIT
AMMAN AND TO CONSULT FULLY WITH JORDANIAN
OFFICIALS ON HIS PRESENT MISSION TO THE AREA. HE
STRESSED THAT FOLLOWING THE KING'S SUCCESSFUL
VISIT TO THE UNITED STATES, THE PRESIDENT WANTED
TO ENSURE CLOSE AND CONTINUING SUBSTANTIVE

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CONSULTATIONS BETWEEN THE USG AND THE GOJ ON IMPORTANT REGIONAL ISSUES. HABIB'S DISCUSSIONS INDICATED THERE WAS A BASIC CONSENSUS OF USG AND GOJ VIEWS ON THE LEBANESE SITUATION. FOREIGN MINISTER KASIM TOLD HABIB HE WAS CERTAIN THE SAUDIS WOULD CONTINUE TO PLAY AN ACTIVE ROLE IN LEBANON AND THAT THEY HAVE NOT BEEN DETERRED FROM POLITICAL ACTIVISM IN LEBANON OR IN THE REGION AS A RESULT OF THE FEZ SUMMIT83-::94\$8,& TO THE JORDANIANS, THE SYRIAN ROLE OF INTIMIDATION IN LEBANON IS CAUSING A SERIOUS AWAKENING IN THE ARAB WORLD. ALSO, HE SAID THERE ARE MORE HOPEFUL SIGNS FOR A PALESTINIAN/LEBANESE RECONCILIATION. KASIM ALSO REVEALED THAT THE IRAQIS HAD TABLED A MEMORANDUM ON LEBANON AT THE ARAB FOREIGN MINISTERS' MEETING IN FEZ WHICH ESSENTIALLY ASKED FOR THE REPLACEMENT OF THE ADF WITH AN INTER-ARAB FORCE. THE JORDANIANS AGREED IT WILL TAKE A COMBINATION OF ARAB AND NON-ARAB PRESSURES TO HELP RESOLVE THE LEBANESE CRISIS SINCE THE LEBANESE CANNOT ACHIEVE A SOLUTION BY THEMSELVES. IN THIS RESPECT THEY WERE CRITICAL OF PRESIDENT SARKIS' ROLE AND FELT THAT MORE ASSERTIVE LEADERSHIP WAS NEEDED.

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THE JORDANIANS AGREED THAT SAUDI ARABIA MUST PLAY A KEY ROLE IN ANY FUTURE LEBANESE SOLUTION. IN VIEW OF THEIR CONCERN OVER A SPILLOVER EFFECT, THE JORDANIANS EXPRESSED SATISFACTION THAT THE SITUATION IN SOUTHERN LEBANON HAS EASED SOMEWHAT. THE JORDANIANS ALSO TOOK THE OPPORTUNITY TO CONDEMN THE RECENT TERRORIST INCIDENT IN DAMASCUS AND FULLY DISASSOCIATED THEMSELVES FROM SUCH ACTS, DESPITE THE CURRENT POOR STATE OF RELATIONS BETWEEN SYRIA AND JORDAN. END SUMMARY.

3. AMBASSADOR HABIB, ACCOMPANIED BY AMBASSADOR VIETS, DAS DRAPER AND DCM DJEREJIAN PAID SEPARATE CALLS ON FOREIGN MINISTER MARWAN KASIM AND PRIME MINISTER MUDAR BADRAN PRIOR TO THE MEETING WITH KING HUSSEIN (REPORTED SEPTTEL) ON DECEMBER 3 IN AMMAN.

4. AMBASSADOR HABIB TOLD FOREIGN MINISTER KASIM THAT THE PRESIDENT HAD ORDERED HIM TO COME TO AMMAN TO BRIEF KING HUSSEIN AND JORDANIAN OFFICIALS FULLY ON HIS PRESENT MISSION AND TO CONSULT WITH THEM. HE EXPLAINED THAT HIS AMMAN STOP WAS A CONCRETE MANIFESTATION OF THE RESULTS OF THE KING'S HIGHLY-SUCCESSFUL VISIT TO THE UNITED

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STATES AND THE EXCELLENT PERSONAL RELATIONSHIP
ESTABLISHED BETWEEN THE KING AND PRESIDENT REAGAN.
HE SAID ONE OF THE PRINCIPAL PURPOSES OF HIS
PRESENT TRIP WAS TO ASSURE MAINTENANCE OF THE

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FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4387
INFO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE
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AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS PRIORITY
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USLO RIYADH PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY

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EXDIS

CEASEFIRE IN THE SOUTH OF LEBANON WHICH HE
DESCRIBED AS REPRESENTING THE INTERNATIONAL
ASPECT OF THE PROBLEM. HE WAS ALSO INVESTIGATING
WHAT CAN BE DONE TO FOSTER A PEACEFUL EVOLUTION
OF THE INTERNAL LEBANESE SITUATION USING
WHATEVER MECHANISM PROVES TO BE MOST FRUITFUL.

5. HABIB EXPLAINED THAT HE HAD MET A CROSS-
SECTION OF LEBANESE LEADERS WHILE IN BEIRUT
INCLUDING THE PHALANGE, THE FOREIGN MINISTER
AND THE SPEAKER OF THE LEBANESE PARLIAMENT.

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THE LEBANESE HE SPOKE WITH DID NOT HAVE
DISSIMILAR VIEWS. THEY FAVOR A CONTINUATION OF

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THE CEASEFIRE AND WILL USE THEIR AUTHORITY TO
TRY TO ASSURE THIS. EVERYONE WITH WHOM HE
TALKED FEARED OUTSIDE INFLUENCE IN THE PRESIDENTIAL
ELECTION PROCESS WHICH COULD CAUSE SERIOUS INTERNAL
CONFLICT. IT SEEMED WIDELY ACCEPTED BY LEBANESE
LEADERS THEY CANNOT HAVE AN EXTREMIST
PRESIDENT AND THAT SOMEONE WITH INDEPENDENCE
AND ENERGY IS NEEDED. BECAUSE OF CONSTANT
PHYSICAL THREATS AGAINST LEBANESE POLITICAL
LEADERS OF ALL STRIPES, THE POLITICAL DISARRAY
CONTINUES. NEVERTHELESS, THERE IS WIDE AGREEMENT
THAT THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESS IN LEBANON BE
PRESERVED. ELECTIONS MUST BE HELD PRIOR TO
SEPTEMBER 1982. HABIB THOUGHT THAT DESPITE
CURRENT RUMORS, NO SERIOUS EFFORT WOULD BE
MADE TO CHANGE THE NATIONAL PACT UNDERSTANDING
THAT THE PRESIDENT OF LEBANON MUST BE A
MARONITE. FONMIN KASIM COMMENTED THAT
SYRIAN STRATEGY IN LEBANON IS PROBABLY AIMED
AT GETTING SARKIS TO RUN AGAIN WHILE, AT
THE SAME TIME, ENCOURAGING OTHER POLITICAL
SURROGATES. DRAPEC
COMMENTED THAT 75 OF
THE MEMBERS OF THE LEBANESE PARLIAMENT CAN
BE SUBJECTED TO INTIMIDATION EITHER BY THE
SYRIANS OR THE PALESTINIANS. KASIM AGREED,
BUT EMPHASIZED THAT THE MOST IMPORTANT THING IS
THERE HAS RECENTLY BEEN SOME TWO-WAY COMMUNICATION
AMONGST THE LEBANESE ON SECTARIAN ISSUES. THIS
MUST BE ENCOURAGED. HABIB SAID THAT ACCORDING
TO WALID JUMBLATT, THE INTERNATIONAL MOVEMENT
WOULD LIKE TO REORGANIZE THE WHOLE SYSTEM. THIS
APPEARED TO BE THEIR LONG-TERM OBJECTIVE, BUT

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HABIB THOUGHT THEY REALIZE THE NEED FOR COMPROMISE
THIS YEAR BEFORE THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS.

6. HABIB AND KASIM AGREED THAT THE SYRIAN POSITION
WAS FUNDAMENTAL TO FUTURE INTERNAL LEBANESE
STABILITY. KASIM REMARKED THAT PERHAPS THE SYRIAN
ATTITUDE OF INTIMIDATION IS COMING TO AN END.
AMBASSADOR HABIB VOICED HIS DOUBTS. KASIM STATED
THAT AS A CONCEPT, SYRIAN INTIMIDATION IS CAUSING
A SERIOUS AWAKENING WITHIN THE ARAB WORLD. HABIB

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SAID THAT THIS MUST MANIFEST ITSELF MORE CLEARLY BEFORE THE SYRIANS WOULD TAKE HEED. AMBASSADOR VIETS ASKED HOW CLEARLY THIS HAD COME OUT AT THE FOREIGN MINISTERS' CONFERENCE IN FEZ. KASIM SAID THAT SOME VOICES WERE RAISED WHICH THE JORDANIANS NEVER EXPECTED TO HEAR. THIS WAS AN ENCOURAGING SIGN. HABIB SAID THE KUWAITIS HAVE MADE IT CLEAR THAT THEY DISLIKE THESE PRESSURES, AS DO THE SAUDIS. KASIM THEN EXPRESSED THE JORDANIAN VIEW THAT THE LEBANESE HAVE TO MAKE A STRONG MOVE AND VOICED HIS PERSONAL OPINION THAT PRESIDENT SARKIS IS PROLONGING THE AGONY OF LEBANON. HABIB REPLIED THERE ARE DIFFERENCES OF OPINION ON THIS. SOME MUSLIMS FEEL THAT HE IS DOING WELL AND COULD ENHANCE CHRISTIAN-MUSLIM UNITY. THEY CITE AS AN EXAMPLE THAT A MARONITE PRESIDENT AND A MUSLIM PRIME MINISTER ARE COOPERATING IN TANDEM FOR THE FIRST TIME IN SEVERAL YEARS. THERE ARE INDEED SIGNS FOR THE FIRST TIME OF MUSLIM-CHRISTIAN RECONCILIATION.

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7. KASIM VOLUNTEERED THAT THE PALESTINIANS SENSE A REAL NEED FOR RECONCILIATION IN LEBANON.

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FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4388
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EXDIS

THEY DO NOT KNOW FROM WHAT QUARTER THEY CAN GET HELP NOW AND THEY SEEM PREPARED TO ABIDE BY THE BEIT ADIN PROCESS. ARAB FACTIONS WILL CONTINUE TO CAUSE PROBLEMS, BUT THERE IS A DEVELOPING FEELING THAT A PALESTINIAN/LEBANESE RECONCILIATION HAS SOME POSSIBILITY OF WORKING OUT.

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HIS , OF COURSE, MEANS IN THE FIRST INSTANCE A LEBANESE/LEBANESE RECONCILIATION WHICH HAS TO BE BOLSTERED BY ARAB AND NON-ARAB EFFORTS. AMBASSADOR HABIB ASKED WHICH NON-ARABS AND KASIM REPLIED THE U.S., THE EUROPEANS AND THE VATICAN. ARAB INFLUENCE, HE AGREED, WAS BASIC, BUT IT HAD TO BE SUPPORTED FROM THE OUTSIDE.

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8. AMBASSADOR HABIB SAID THAT A SERIOUS NEGATIVE ELEMENT WAS THE NATIONAL MOVEMENT AND FACTIONS UNDER SARG CONTROL. THIS IS FURTHER COMPLICATED BY THE SYRIAN DESIRE TO SPLIT THE MARIONITES. INDEED, THE MAIN PROBLEM IS HOW TO GET THE ADF OUT OF LEBANON ON A SCHEDULE WHICH IS CONSISTENT WITH LEBANON'S ABILITY TO DEAL WITH ITS OWN PROBLEMS AND, AT THE SAME TIME, PREVENTING THE SARG FROM MAKING TROUBLE. KASIM SAID THAT THE SAUDI ROLE WAS THE KEY IN THIS MATTER AND THAT SAUDI ATTITUDES WILL BE TAKEN VERY SERIOUSLY BY THE SYRIANS AND MAKE THEM THINK TWICE BEFORE THEY VENTURE FORTH IN LEBANON. IN RESPONSE TO A COMMENT BY KASIM ON THE INEFFECTICACY OF THE QUADRIPARTITE ARAB COMMITTEE, AMBASSADOR HABIB SAID THAT WE SHOULD NOT CONSIDER THE COMMITTEE DEAD YET. LEBANON SHOULD NOT FORESWEAR THE COMMITTEE AND, IN THE LAST ANALYSIS, THERE IS A NEED TO REPLACE IT WITH SOMETHING BEFORE IT DISAPPEARS. WHAT KEEPS GETTING IN THE WAY IS THIS TREMENDOUS FEAR IN LEBANON THAT DERIVES FROM SYRIAN INTIMIDATION. EQUALLY TRUE THE OTHER WAY IS THE INTIMIDATION THE PHALANGE CAN BRING TO BEAR ON NON-CHRISTIANS. IT WILL TAKE A COMBINATION OF ARAB AND NON-ARAB PRESSURES. UNILATERAL U.S. INTERVENTION IS NOT THE SOLUTION. THE ARABIZATION OF THE PROBLEM IS SOMETHING WE HAVE PUSHED. WE NEED AN ARAB SOLUTION TO HELP THE LEBANESE SOLVE THE PROBLEM THEMSELVES.

9. KASIM VOLUNTEERED THAT THE IRAQIS AT THE

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FOREIGN MINISTERS' MEETING IN FEZ FLOATED A,
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QUOTE, SEVEN-POINT PROGRAM, UNQUOTE, ON LEBANON. THE ESSENCE OF THEIR PROGRAM IS THAT THE ADF IS ONLY A SYRIAN FORCE AND HAS TO BE REPLACED BY A TRULY ARAB FORCE. THE JORDANIANS COMMENTED ON THE IRAQI PROPOSAL AND SAID THAT THE FIRST PRIORITY IS THE LEBANESE/LEBANESE ASPECT OF THE PROBLEM. ONCE SOME PROGRESS IS ACHIEVED ON THAT, THEN THE ARAB LEAGUE SHOULD MOVE TO SUPPLANT THE SARG IN LEBANON. HABIB COMMENTED THE ONLY TROUBLE WITH THE LEBANESE/LEBANESE APPROACH IS THAT IT IS INTERFERED WITH BY OUTSIDE PRESSURES.

10. KASIM SAID THAT HE COULD FORESEE THE ARAB COUNTRIES TAKING A POSITION WHICH WOULD BUDGE THE SARG TO MODIFY ITS POSITION IN LEBANON. BUT THIS WOULD HAVE TO BE CORRELATED TO SOME INTERNATIONAL MOVE. HABIB SAID INTERNATIONAL MOVES ARE GREAT IF THEY SUPPORT AN ARAB CONSENSUS. KASIM SAID THERE IS AN OPPORTUNITY FOR MORE ARAB ATTENTION TO BE FOCUSED ON LEBANON, BUT THAT THE U.S. MUST RESTRAIN ISRAEL. HABIB REPLIED THAT IF THINGS MOVE IN THE DIRECTION THE FOREIGN MINISTER MENTIONED, THE U.S.G. CAN RESTRAIN THE ISRAELIS. WHAT WOULD SERIOUSLY RAISE ISRAELI SUSPICIONS WOULD BE THE, QUOTE, WORST-CASE SCENARIO, UNQUOTE, INCLUDING AN IMPOSED PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE IN LEBANON, THE MARONITES BEING PUSHED TO THE WALL AND THE OUTBREAK OF CONFLICT. THE ISRAELIS WOULD PERCEIVE A HOSTILE LEBANON AND WOULD MOVE. HABIB MADE IT CLEAR THAT HAD IT NOT BEEN FOR

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AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY
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AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY

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EXDIS

LAST YEAR'S CEASEFIRE, A SYRIAN-ISRAELI
CONFLICT WOULD HAVE BEEN INEVITABLE.

11. KASIM ASKED HABIB WHAT THE SARG HAS
GAINED BY THE INTRODUCTION OF MISSILES INTO
LEBANON AND HABIB SAID THEY HAVE GAINED NOTHING.
ALL THEY HAVE DONE IS TO CONVINCE THEMSELVES THAT
THEY DID IT AND IN THEIR PRESENT MOOD THEY WILL
NOT BEND TO ANY ISRAELI CHALLENGE. THE MISSILES
THEMSELVES SERVE NO TACTICAL OR STRATEGIC
ADVANTAGE FOR THE SYRIANS. THE SARG SIMPLY DOES
NOT MOVE IN THE FACE OF ISRAELI DEMANDS. KASIM
SAID THE ISRAELIS BENEFIT BY MAINTAINING TENSION

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IN THE AREA OVER THE MISSILE QUESTION. HABIB
SAID HE SUGGESTED THAT THE SYRIANS WITHDRAW THE
MISSILES GRADUALLY WHILE THINGS WERE QUIET. HE
POINTED OUT TO THE SYRIANS THAT THEY HAD A
PERFECT OPPORTUNITY DURING THE FOUR MONTHS OF
CEASEFIRE TO WITHDRAW THE MISSILES. THEY
ANSWERED THAT THEY WOULD NOT DO SO AS LONG AS
BEGIN DEMANDED THEIR WITHDRAWAL. THE MISSILE
DEPLOYMENTS ARE DANGEROUS TO THE SARG BECAUSE
THEY ARE PROVOKING THE ISRAELIS. KASIM AGREED
AND SAID IT GIVES THE ISRAELIS CARTE BLANCHE
VIS-A-VIS THE PALESTINIANS AND OVERFLIGHTS.
HABIB SAID IT WOULD BE IN NO ONE'S INTEREST IF
THE ISRAELIS WENT INTO THE LITANI AND THE BEKAA.
THE ANSWER STILL LIES IN A SETTLEMENT OF THE
LEBANESE PROBLEM ITSELF.

12. KASIM REFERRED TO THE RECENT TERRORIST

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BOMBING IN DAMASCUS AND STATED THAT JORDAN IN NO WAY CONDONED INCIDENTS OF THIS NATURE. HABIB SAID THAT THIS INCIDENT HAS CREATED A SENSE OF FURY IN SYRIA, ESPECIALLY WITH THE VERY HIGH DEATH TOLL. THE PERPETRATORS ARE SYRIANS BUT THE QUESTION IS WHERE THEY WERE TRAINED AND WHERE THEY GOT THEIR EQUIPMENT. KASIM COMMENTED THAT THE SYRIANS WILL TRY TO TAG THE BLAME ON SOMEONE OR SOME GROUP WHICH WILL DIVERT ATTENTION AWAY FROM SYRIA'S INTERNAL PROBLEMS. HE REFERRED TO PAST ACCUSATIONS BY SYRIAN FOREIGN MINISTER KHADDAM THAT JORDAN WAS BEHIND MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD ATTEMPTS IN SYRIA. HE REITERATED THAT THE JORDANIANS HAVE CATEGORICALLY DENIED THESE ACCUSATIONS AS TOTALLY BASELESS AND EVEN MADE IT CLEAR TO THE SYRIANS THAT IF THEY WERE FORCED

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TO SUCH A MILITANT STANCE, THEY WOULD NOT NEED INTERMEDIARIES.

13. IN CONCLUDING THE MEETING, AMBASSADOR HABIB SAID THAT HE IS HOPEFUL THAT SAUDI ARABIA AND KUWAIT WILL CONTINUE THEIR ROLE IN LEBANON. IT WAS IMPORTANT NOT RPT NOT TO LET THE LEBANESE SITUATION DETERIORATE IN THE NEXT SIX TO EIGHT MONTHS EITHER THROUGH A BREAKDOWN IN THE CEASE-FIRE OR INTERNAL DIVISIONS WITHIN LEBANON. THE ONLY WAY IS A STRONG ARAB ROLE AND SAUDI ARABIA IS A KEY ELEMENT IN THIS RESPECT. WE HAVE TO ASSURE THAT THE SAUDIS DO NOT PULL BACK. WHAT THE JORDANIANS HAVE TOLD US, HABIB SAID, INDICATES THAT THE SAUDIS ARE OUT TO PLAY THIS IMPORTANT ROLE INDEFINITELY AND THAT FAHD IS NOT A MAN TO CUT AND RUN AFTER THE FEZ EXPERIENCE. KASIM AGREED AND SAID THAT THE SAUDIS CANNOT AFFORD TO DO SO. HOWEVER, THEY WILL HAVE TO CONSULT AND COORDINATE THEIR ROLE MORE CLOSELY WITH OTHERS AFTER THE FEZ SUMMIT.

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14. DURING AMBASSADOR HABIB'S SHORTER MEETING WITH PRIME MINISTER BADRAN, HE COVERED IN MORE SUMMARY FORM THE SUBJECTS DISCUSSED WITH FOREIGN MINISTER KASIM WHO ALSO ATTENDED THE MEETING WITH THE PRIME MINISTER. BADRAN AND KASIM INDICATED THAT SYRIAN FOREIGN MINISTER KHADDAM TOLD THE JORDANIANS THEY WILL STICK TO THE CEASEFIRE IN LEBANON. CONCERNING THE TERRORIST INCIDENT IN DAMASCUS, BADRAN REITERATED THAT JORDAN IS TOTALLY OPPOSED TO THIS TYPE OF INCIDENT, ESPECIALLY INVOLVING THE DEATH AND WOUNDING OF INNOCENT PEOPLE.

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AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE
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AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY

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EXDIS

HE SAID IT SERVES NO PURPOSE. HE REFERRED TO JORDAN'S EARLIER AND BETTER RELATIONS WITH SYRIA WHEN THERE WAS A TERRORIST INCIDENT IN ALEPPO. BADRAN SAID HE CALLED THE SYRIAN PRIME MINISTER TO OFFER ANY HELP JORDAN COULD. BUT NOW JORDANIAN-SYRIAN RELATIONSHIPS ARE BAD AND JORDAN CAN ONLY WATCH EVENTS THERE. ON THE SITUATION IN SOUTH LEBANON, HABIB ACKNOWLEDGED JORDANIAN CONCERNS OVER POSSIBLE SPILLOVER EFFECTS AND EXPLAINED THAT HE TRIED TO GET THE SARG NOT TO EXERCISE THEMSELVES UNDULY OVER THE HILL 880 ISSUE AND UNIFIL AND TO LET HADDAD AND UNIFIL WORK IT OUT. IT WAS ALSO IMPORTANT TO AVOID

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GETTING THE PLO INVOLVED IN THIS PROBLEM.
AMBASSADOR HABIB ASKED THAT THE JORDANIANS USE

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THEIR INFLUENCE VIS-A-VIS THE PLO ON THIS MATTER. HADDAD IN ANY CASE WILL NOT BE ABLE TO SUSTAIN HIS POSITION ON HILL 880 AND THERE IS NO REASON FOR IT TO BECOME A MAJOR INCIDENT. BADRAN AGREED AND SAID THAT THE SITUATION IS NOW BETTER THAN IT WAS BEFORE IN SOUTH LEBANON AND, HOPEFULLY, IT WILL CONTINUE TO EASE. BADRAN SAID THAT THE JORDANIANS WERE WATCHING THE EVENTS IN LEBANON VERY CLOSELY AND THAT KAMAL AL-ASSAD HAD SENT A LETTER TO HIM WITH A PARLIAMENTARY DELEGATION OF SHIITES FROM SOUTHERN LEBANON BEFORE THE FEZ SUMMIT. THE SHIITES ARE VERY WORRIED ABOUT PRESIDENT SARKIS, DO NOT BELIEVE HE CAN TAKE ANY MEANINGFUL INITIATIVE, AND ASKED IF KING HUSSEIN COULD DO SOMETHING TO HELP IN THE LEBANESE SITUATION. BADRAN INDICATED THERE WAS LITTLE THE JORDANIANS COULD DO ALONE. HABIB REMARKED THAT IT IS TOO SOON TO DECIDE THAT THE LEBANESE CANNOT TAKE THE NECESSARY DECISIONS ON THEIR OWN PROBLEMS; THEY ARE FEELING THEIR WAY AROUND. KAMAL AL-ASSAD SAID THAT HE WOULD TRY TO CONVEY THE PARLIAMENT IN AUGUST OR SEPTEMBER AND NOT EARLIER. THE OPINION IS THAT THE LONGER THE TIME SPAN, THE MORE THERE IS A CHANCE FOR A NON-SYRIAN-IMPOSED SOLUTION IN LEBANON. IN ANY EVENT, THE USG DOES NOT INTEND TO GET INVOLVED IN THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS.

15. AMBASSADOR HABIB ENDED THE MEETING WITH A REITERATION OF THE PRESIDENT'S INTEREST IN KEEPING JORDAN FULLY INFORMED OF HIS MISSION AND SAID WE WOULD KEEP IN TOUCH WITH THE

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JORDANIANS AS THE SITUATION EVOLVED.

16. THIS CABLE NOT CLEARED BY AMBASSADOR HABIB OR DAS DRAPER.

VIETS

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ACTION SS-30

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INFO OCT-01 ADS-00 SSO-00 CCO-00 ANAE-00 /031 W
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FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 9945
WHITEHOUSE WASHDC FLASH
AMEMBASSY JIDDA FLASH
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV FLASH
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT FLASH
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS FLASH
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK FLASH

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JERUSALEM 02242

EX DECAPTIONED

FROM HABIB

E.O. 12065: GDS
TAGS: PEPR, PINT, MILI, MOPS, LE, IS, SA, SY, XF
SUBJECT: HABIB MISSION: APPROVAL OF DE FACTO CEASEFIRE

1. ~~ENTIRE TEXT~~

2. ACTION ADDRESSEES SHOULD IMMEDIATELY INFORM APPROPRIATE PEOPLE THAT THE DE FACTO CEASEFIRE HAS BEEN ACCEPTED BY BEGIN AND WILL COME INTO EFFECT AS OF 1330 HOURS, LOCAL TIME (1130 GMT), FRIDAY, JULY 24.

3. HABIB WILL MAKE ANNOUNCEMENT AS OF 1300 LOCAL TIME (1100 GMT). ANNOUNCEMENT HAS BEEN ALTERED TO READ AS FOLLOWS: BEGIN TEXT:

I HAVE TODAY REPORTED TO PRESIDENT REAGAN THAT, AS OF 12:00 NOON JULY 24, 1981, ALL HOSTILE MILITARY ACTION

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BETWEEN LEBANESE AND ISRAELI TERRITORY IN EITHER DIRECTION WILL CEASE. END TEXT.

4. FOLLOWING IS REVISED DEFINITION OF DE FACTO CEASEFIRE, WHICH IS UNALTERED IN SUBSTANCE. BEGIN TEXT:

FROM A DATE AND HOUR TO BE SPECIFIED:

--THERE WILL BE NO HOSTILE MILITARY ACTIVITY FROM LEBANON

[REDACTED]
DIRECTED AT TARGETS IN ISRAEL, BY LAND, SEA, AND AIR;

-- THERE WILL BE NO HOSTILE MILITARY ACTIVITY FROM
ISRAEL AT TARGETS IN LEBANON, WHETHER BY SEA, LAND, OR
AIR;

-- THE SAME WILL APPLY TO HOSTILE MILITARY ACTIVITY
DIRECTED INTO HADDAD'S AREA OR FROM IT.

5. IT IS CRITICALLY IMPORTANT THAT JIDDA CONFIRM FAHD'S
RECEIPT OF THIS INFORMATION AND ANY REACTIONS.

6. DEPARTMENT: PASS REQUIRED INFORMATION TO OTHER
POSTS.
GROVE

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*** Current Handling Restrictions *** EXDIS
*** Current Classification *** [REDACTED]

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CONCEPTS= LOBBYING, ARMISTICE, BOMBING, POPULAR SUPPORT, UNSC RESOLUTIONS, AIR COMBAT OPERATIONS, POLITICAL SITUATION

TAGS= PEPR, PINT, MOPS, MILI, LE, IS, SA, SY, XF, UNSC

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TO EC COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE

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AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY RABAT IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY ALGIERS IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY TUNIS IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY TOKYO IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY ANKARA IMMEDIATE

USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY NIAMEY IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY MEXICO IMMEDIATE

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USLO RIYADH IMMEDIATE
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AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE

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DECAPTIONED

E.O. 12065: RDS-1,3, 4 7/22/01 (STOESSEL, W.)

TAGS: PEPR, PINT, MOPS, MILI, LE, IS, SA, SY, XF

SUBJECT: LEBANON: ENCOURAGING SUPPORT FOR CEASEFIRE

REF: BEIRUT 4885

[REDACTED] ~~ENTIRE TEXT~~

2. SECURITY COUNCIL PASSAGE JULY 21 OF RESOLUTION 490 CALLING FOR CEASEFIRE IN PRESENT ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN CONFRONTATION REPRESENTS IMPORTANT STEP IN FINDING A WAY TO END THE VIOLENCE. URGENT TASK NOW IS TO ENCOURAGE ALL PARTIES INVOLVED IN FIGHTING TO ADHERE TO UNSC CALL FOR END TO THE FIGHTING.

3. WE ARE MAKING MAXIMUM EFFORT WITH ISRAEL TO BRING HALT TO ATTACKS INTO LEBANON AND ARE IN CONTACT WITH UN, SAUDIS, AND LEBANESE TO URGE THAT THEY HELP IN OBTAINING PLO ACQUIESCENCE IN CEASEFIRE EFFECTIVE IN THE NEXT FEW DAYS. IN CONNECTION WITH THIS EFFORT, ACTION ADDRESSEES SHOULD SEEK URGENT APPOINTMENT WITH APPROPRIATE HOST COUNTRY OFFICIAL TO ASK FOR URGENT, ACTIVE SUPPORT FOR EFFORTS TO

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HALT FIGHTING. IN TALK WITH HOST GOVERNMENT, POST SHOULD MAKE FOLLOWING POINTS:

-- UNSC RESOLUTION 490 CALLING FOR CEASEFIRE IN PRESENT ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN FIGHTING ACROSS LEBANESE BORDER IS AN IMPORTANT STEP. IT IS NOW IMPERATIVE THAT INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY UNDERTAKE URGENT EFFORT TO GAIN AGREEMENT OF ALL PARTIES TO STOP FIGHTING.

-- WE ASK THAT YOUR GOVERNMENT UNDERTAKE URGENT, APPROP-

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RIATE STEPS WITH PARTIES INVOLVED IN THE FIGHTING WITH WHICH YOU HAVE INFLUENCE TO ENCOURAGE THEM TO SUPPORT AN EARLY DE FACTO CEASEFIRE.

-- UNDER TERMS OF THIS CEASEFIRE, THERE WOULD BE NO HOSTILE MILITARY ACTIVITY FROM ISRAEL AT TARGETS IN LEBANON, WHETHER BY SEA, LAND, OR AIR, AND THERE WOULD BE NO HOSTILE MILITARY ACTIVITY FROM LEBANON BY ANY PARTY DIRECTED AT TARGETS IN ISRAEL, BY LAND, SEA AND AIR. THE SAME WOULD APPLY TO MILITARY ACTIVITY DIRECTED FROM HADDAD'S ENCLAVE OR INTO IT. THERE WOULD NOT, HOWEVER, BE A TOTAL HALT TO ISRAELI AERIAL RECONNAISSANCE ACTIVITIES.

-- ACHIEVING AN END TO THE FIGHTING ACROSS THE LEBANON-ISRAEL BORDER IS AN ESSENTIAL FIRST STEP. IN ORDER TO CONSOLIDATE IT AND ENSURE GREATER SECURITY FOR ALL PARTIES IN THE AREA, THE CEASEFIRE WILL HAVE TO BE REINFORCED AND CONSOLIDATED BY OTHER STEPS THE AIM OF WHICH IS TO CHANGE BASIC CONDITIONS IN LEBANON AND ALONG THE ISRAEL-LEBANON BORDER (E.G., IMPROVEMENT OF UNIFIL'S MONITORING ROLE, STRENGTHENING THE CIVILIAN AND MILITARY AUTHORITY OF THE LEBANESE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT, AND SUPPORTING THE BAYT AD-DIN PROCESS, WHICH HAS BEGUN TO ADDRESS IMPORTANT ASPECTS OF THE PRESENT POLITICAL SITUATION IN LEBANON).

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-- THE U.S., IN COOPERATION WITH THE UNITED NATIONS, WILL BE EXERTING MAXIMUM EFFORT WITH ISRAEL TO ACHIEVE ACCEPTANCE OF THESE OBJECTIVES.

-- WE RECOGNIZE THIS IS A DIFFICULT AND AMBITIOUS AGENDA, BUT THE U.S. BELIEVES THAT WE ARE OBLIGED TO PURSUE THIS EFFORT FOR HUMANITARIAN REASONS AND IN THE INTEREST OF PEACE.

4. IF ARAB OR OTHER GOVERNMENTS URGE THAT THE U.S. DEAL DIRECTLY WITH THE PLO, YOU SHOULD STATE THAT WE HAVE EXPLAINED OUR POSITION ON THIS. AMBASSADOR HABIB'S MISSION IS OF THE UTMOST AND IMMEDIATE IMPORTANCE, AND THE ISSUE OF U.S.-PLO CONTACTS SHOULD NOT DIVERT ANY OF US FROM SUPPORTING HIS EFFORTS.

5. FOR OTTAWA SUMMIT PARTICIPANT POSTS: IN MAKING YOUR PRESENTATION, YOU SHOULD NOTE THAT THE EIGHT DISCUSSED

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THE NEED FOR AN IMMEDIATE CEASEFIRE ALONG THESE LINES AND THAT AMBASSADOR HABIB'S EFFORTS ARE IN LINE WITH APPROACH THEY AGREED UPON.

6. FOR USUN NEW YORK: YOU SHOULD URGENTLY BRIEF WALDHEIM AND URQUHART ON HABIB'S EFFORTS TO OBTAIN A DE FACTO CEASEFIRE, DRAW ON ABOVE POINTS, AND ASK THAT THE UN DO EVERYTHING IT CAN TO URGE THE PALESTINIANS TO COOPERATE WITH HABIB'S EFFORTS AND TO ACCEPT A PROMPT CEASEFIRE. YOU SHOULD SUGGEST THAT IN ADDITION TO WORKING THROUGH UNIFIL AND UNTSO, AND THE PLO IN NEW YORK, IT WOULD ALSO BE USEFUL FOR UN TO APPROACH SYRIA AND OTHER GOVERNMENTS TO URGE THEIR INTERVENTION WITH THE PALESTINIANS. YOU SHOULD EMPHASIZE STRONGLY THAT WE HOPE THERE WILL BE NO FURTHER ACTION BY THE SECURITY

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COUNCIL UNTIL THE DE FACTO CEASEFIRE IS ACHIEVED, EVEN THOUGH THIS MIGHT NOT TAKE PLACE UNTIL AFTER THE 48-HOUR PERIOD CALLED FOR IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL'S JULY 21 RESOLUTION, AFTER WHICH THE SYG WAS ASKED TO REPORT BACK TO THE COUNCIL. MISSION SHOULD ALSO URGE THAT WALDHEIM'S REPORT TO THE COUNCIL NOTE CURRENT EFFORTS TO BRING ABOUT AN EARLY CEASEFIRE AND RECOMMEND THAT ANY FURTHER ACTION OF THE COUNCIL SHOULD AWAIT THE OUTCOME OF THESE EFFORTS. YOU SHOULD ALSO INFORM URQUHART AND WALDHEIM THAT WE ASSUME UN WILL KEEP ISRAELIS FULLY INFORMED OF ITS EFFORTS, IN NEW YORK AND IN JERUSALEM.

7. USUN SHOULD ALSO APPROACH OTHER WESTERN AND FRIENDLY NON-ALIGNED MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL, LEBANESE AND OTHER MISSIONS THAT MIGHT BE USEFUL, AND AT YOUR DISCRETION, BRIEF THEM ON AMBASSADOR HABIB'S EFFORT, COVER TALKING POINTS IN PARA 3, AND URGE THAT NO FURTHER ACTION BE UNDERTAKEN BY THE COUNCIL WHILE AMBASSADOR HABIB'S AND THE UN'S EFFORTS CONTINUE. YOU SHOULD ALSO STRESS THAT WORKING IN COOPERATION WITH THE UN, THE US IS MAKING A MAXIMUM EFFORT TO OBTAIN ISRAEL'S AGREEMENT AND THAT THEREFORE AMBASSADOR HABIB'S MISSION URGENTLY NEEDS THE SUPPORT AND COOPERATION OF ALL PARTIES. MISSION SHOULD ALSO BRIEF ISRAELIS. HAIG

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AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE

WHITE HOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE IM/IPS/CR/IR Date: 11/3/97
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DECAPTIONED

FROM HABIB

E.O. 12065: RDS-1,3,4 7/22/01 (HABIB, PHILIP)

TAGS: PEPR, PINT, MOPS, MILI, LE, IS, SA, SY, XF

SUBJECT: HABIB MISSION: MARRYING U.S. AND UN EFFORTS FOR A
CEASE-FIRE

1. ~~ENTIRE TEXT~~

2. IF WE ARE TO GET AN EARLY CEASEFIRE, IT IS GOING TO REQUIRE A COMBINATION OF OUR EFFORTS, THOSE OF THE UN AND OF THE SAUDIS. THE LEBANESE AUTHORITIES, WITH THEIR LIMITED CAPABILITY, CANNOT PROVIDE THE ASSURANCE THAT THE VARIOUS ARMED ELEMENTS THAT EXIST IN SOUTHERN LEBANON WILL AGREE TO A CEASEFIRE AT A GIVEN HOUR. HOWEVER, THROUGH THE UN-PLO RELATIONSHIP AND THROUGH WHAT I EXPECT WILL BE THE SAUDI POSITION, WE SHOULD BE ABLE TO SATISFY OURSELVES THAT THE PLO AND OTHER

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ELEMENTS IN LEBANON WILL ABIDE BY THE CEASEFIRE. TO THE EXTENT THAT THEY HAVE ALREADY EXPRESSED THEIR VIEWS TO THE UN, THE PLO APPEARS TO HAVE TAKEN THE POSITION OF ALLOWING SUCH AN INTERPRETATION, WHETHER FRINGE ELEMENTS WILL GO ALONG IS AS YET UNCERTAIN, BUT THIS SHOULD NOT BE A DECISIVE FACTOR IN OUR PLANNING. THEREFORE, WHAT WE NEED TO DO THROUGH THE UN, AND WITH THE ASSISTANCE OF THE SAUDIS, IS ESTABLISH A JOINT FINAL TARGET OF ACHIEVING A CEASEFIRE NOT LATER THAN 12:00 NOON, FRIDAY,

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JULY 24. WHILE THIS IS SOME HOURS LATTER THAN THE 48 HOURS CALLED FOR IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION, IT WILL BE NECESSARY TO SECURE THAT EXTRA TIME IN ORDER TO INFORM THE ISRAELIS THAT THE CEASE FIRE WILL BE PLACED IN EFFECT AND GAIN THEIR ACQUIESCENCE.

3. THUS, IT BECOMES ESSENTIAL THAT THE UN AND OUR OWN EFFORTS FOR A CEASEFIRE BE SATISFACTORILY MARRIED AND COORDINATED. I PROPOSE THAT WE TRY TO MANAGE THE EVOLVING SCENARIO OVER THE DAYS AHEAD ALONG THE FOLLOWING LINES:

4. UN EFFORTS:

-- SHOULD CONTINUE THROUGH UN (INCLUDING UNIFIL AND UNTSO) REPRESENTATIVES IN THE AREA-- TO URGE PALESTINIAN ACCEPTANCE OF A CEASEFIRE SOONEST, ARGUING THAT THE U.S. AND OTHER WILL BE TRYING TO BRING ISRAEL ON BOARD. SHOULD ALSO ENCOURAGE THE SYRIANS TO PERSUADE THE PALESTINIANS TO COMPLY.

-- SHOULD TRY FOR A CEASEFIRE WITHIN THE 48 HOURS SPECIFIED IN THE SC RESOLUTION. IF UNSUCCESSFUL, HOWEVER, THE SYG SHOULD NOT FORCE THE ISSUE TO A NEW SC POSOTION BUT SHOULD INSTEAD TAKE NOTE THAT THE HABIB MISSION IS PROCEEDING IN CONJUNCTION WITH UN EFFORTS (WITH A CEASEFIRE

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DEADLINE SOME HOURS LATER) AND THAT EVERYONE SHOULD AWAIT ITS OUTCOME. THIS SHOULD ENABLE US TO HOLD OFF ANY FURTHER SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION.

-- SHOULD ECOGNIZE THAT IT WILL BE THE U.S.--NOT THE UN-- WHICH ULTIMATELY WILL BRING ABOUT ISRAELI AGREEMENT, IN PART BECAUSE ISRAEL CANNOT ACCEPT AN UNDERSTANDING WITH "THE OTHER SIDE," MEANING THE PLO, WHETHER ARRANGED BY THE STRONGLY DISLIKED UN OR EVEN BY A MORE ACCEPTABLE PARTY.

5. U.S. EFFORTS (INCLUDING MY MISSION):

-- SHOULD CONCENTRATE ON MAKING IT POSSIBLE FOR ISRAEL TO GO ALONG, MEANING THAT ISRAEL CANNOT BE VIEWED AS HAVING MADE CONCESSIONS TO THE PALESTINIANS (TO LEBANON MAY RPT MAY BE ANOTHER MATTER).

-- SHOULD SIX A CEASEFIRE TARGET DATE OF NOT LATER THAN NOON, FRIDAY, JULY 24, IN PART, BECAUSE IT FITS IN BETTER WITH MY HOPE TO RETURN TO ISRAEL ON THURSDAY OR FRIDAY MORNING, AFTER HAVING TOUCHED BASE WITH THE LEBANESE AND SAUDIS.

-- SHOULD ENSURE THAT THE SAUDIS DO THEIR SHARE (A) IN INFLUENCING SYRIA NOT THE PALESTINIANS AND (B) IN HELPING TO SET THE STAGE WITH THE LEBANESE FOR FOLLOW-UP STEP S TO CONSOLIDATE THE CEASEFIRE.

-- SHOULD (THROUGH URGENT DEPT INSTRUCTIONS TO KEY POSTS) MOBILIZE EUROPEAN, OTHER ARAB, AND THIRD WORLD

SUPPORT FOR A CEASEFIRE, AS WELL AS GENERAL SUPPORT IN PRINCIPLE FOR THE CONCEPT OF TRYING TO CHANGE SOME OF THE BASIC CONDITIONS IN LEBANON WHICH HAVE LED TO THESE CONFRONTATIONS.

-- MAKE CLEAR TO ALL CONCERNED THAT OUR DEFINITION OF A DE FACTO CEASEFIRE IS THAT THERE WILL BE NO HOSTILE MILITARY ACTIVITY FROM ISRAEL AT TARGETS IN LEBANON, WHETHER BY SEA, LAND, OR AIR, AND THAT THERE WILL BE NO HOSTILE MILITARY ACTIVITY FROM LEBANON BY ANY PARTY DIRECTED AT TARGETS IN ISRAEL, BY LAND, SEA, AND AIR. THE SAME WILL APPLY TO MILITARY ACTIVITY DIRECTED FROM

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HADDAD'S ENCLAVE OR INTO ITL HOWEVER, AN END TO NON-HOSTILE ISRAELI AERIAL RECONNAISSANCE ACTIVITIES IS NOT A VIABLE POSSIBILITY.

-- MAKE CLEAR THAT THE CEASEFIRE WILL BE ONLY AN INITIAL STEP. A CEASEFIRE WILL HAVE TO BE REINFORCED AND CONSOLIDATED BY OTHER STEPS WHICH CHANGE BASIC CONDITIONS (E.G., IMPROVING UNIFIL'S MONITORING ROLE, BUILDING UP THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT'S MILITARY AND CIVIL ROLE, SUPPORTING THE THRUST OF THE BAYT AD-DIN "PROCESS," ETC).

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Date: 11/3/97

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EXD DECAPTIONED

FROM HABIB

E.O. 12065: RDS-1,3,4 7/22/01 (HABIB, PHILIP)

TAGS: PEPR, PINT, MILI, MOPS, LE, IS, SA, SY, XF

SUBJECT: HABIB MISSION: MEETING WITH PRESIDENT SARKIS AND PRIME
MINISTER WAZZAN, JULY 221. ~~ENTIRE TEXT~~2. I SPENT ONE HOUR WITH PRESIDENT SARKIS TODAY
ACCOMPANIED BY AMB. DILLON DAS DRAPER AND DCM BARRETT.
ALSO PRESENT WERE PRIME MINISTER WAZZAN, WHO IS PRESENTLY
ACTING FOREIGN MINISTER, AND A PRESIDENTIAL ASSISTANT.3. I GAVE THE TWO LEBANESE LEADERS A BRIEF ACCOUNT OF
MY STAY IN ISRAEL AND OF WHAT I WAS SEEKING TO ACHIEVE,
AND THE MANNER IN WHICH I PLAN TO GO ABOUT IT.**UNCLASSIFIED**

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I SAID THAT AS A RESULT OF MY INSISTENCE THE ISRAELI CABINET
HAD COME FORTH WITH A STATEMENT WHICH, ALTHOUGH CONVOLUTED,
WOULD PERMIT ME TO GO AHEAD WITH MY QUEST FOR A CEASEFIRE AS
INSTRUCTED BY PRESIDENT REAGAN. I EMPHASIZED THAT I WANTED
TO PUT AN END TO THE "SENSELESS KILLING" BY MEANS OF A DE FACTO
CEASEFIRE, TO BE DEFFECTIVE AT A SPECIFIED DATE AND HOUR. THE
CEASEFIRE WOULD PRECLUDE ANY MILITARY ATTACKS, BY AIR, SEA
OR GROUND BETWEEN ISRAEL AND LEBANON AND BETWEEN
HADDAD'S TERRITORY AND THE REST OF LEBANON. IF SUCH A

CEASEFIRE WERE ATTAINED, NO MATTER HOW AND NO MATTER HOW FRAGILE, IT COULD BE A POINT OF DEPARTURE FOR EFFORTS TO CALM THE SITUATION FOR THE LONGER RUN. I THEN NOTED THAT SINCE I WAS DEALING WITH LEBANON I WANTED TO KNOW IF THE GOL FOUND MY IDEAS REASONABLE AND AGREED WITH MY ENDEAVORS.

4. SARKIS THEN SAID VERY PLAINLY THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF LEBANON COULD NOT BE INVOLVED IN ANY QUEST FOR A CEASEFIRE. HE STARTED WITH THE JURIDICAL ARGUMENT THAT SINCE THE GOVERNMENT OF LEBANON CONSIDERS THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT OF 1949 STILL IN FORCE AND STILL BINDING ON THE GOL, BEING PARTY TO A CEASEFIRE WOULD IMPLY THAT THE LEBANESE HAD VIOLATED THE AGREEMENT. AS WE DISCUSSED THE GOL POSITION, SARKIS THEN ADDED THE ARGUMENT THAT HE COULD NOT SPEAK FOR THE PALESTINIANS AND COULD NOT COMMIT HIMSELF IN ANY WAY ON THEIR BEHALF. HE STRESSED THAT UNFORTUNATELY THE GOL WAS POWERLESS SOUTH OF KHALDE (FIVE KILOMETERS SOUTH OF BEIRUT). HE SAID HE HAD NO CONTROL THERE AND COULD NOT SPEAK FOR THE FORCES IN THE SOUTH, WHICH HAD BEEN FIGHTING AGAINST THE ISRAELIS AND THAT THE GOL COULD NOT BE INVOLVED IN ANY NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT AND THE PLO.

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5. I ARGUED THAT MY EFFORTS WERE NOT JURIDICAL IN NATURE AND STRESSED AGAIN THAT I WANTED A DE FACTO CEASEFIRE, NO MATTER HOW IT WAS OBTAINED. THE IMPORTANT THING WAS THAT IT BE OBSERVED AND I WOULD WELCOME ANY ASSISTANCE IN THIS. SARKIS REMAINED ADAMANT REGARDING THE GOL'S INABILITY TO ASSIST OR MAKE ANY COMMITMENTS CONCERNING A CEASEFIRE. IN REPLYING TO MY QUESTION, HE SAID THAT HE COULD NOT EVEN COMMIT THE GOL TO OBSERVE ANY CEASEFIRE AS THE WOULD BE A MOCKERY OF THE ACTUAL SITUATION IN THE SOUTH. HE CONCLUDED, HOWEVER, THAT HE WAS TAKING NOTE OF MY EFFORTS, HE APPRECIATED THEM, AND HE WISHED ME SUCCESS.

6. WAZZAN INTERRUPTED AT ONE POINT TO SAY THAT SINCE I SPOKE OF A DE FACTO SOLUTION, WE SHOULD DEAL WITH THE DE FACTO FORCES DOING THE FIGHTING. I REPLIED VERY STRONGLY THAT I COULD NOT TAKE THAT ROAD. I WANTED TO STOP THE FIGHTING AND THE FOLLY IN A REALISTIC FASHION AND IT WAS NOT POSSIBLE FOR ME TO SPEAK TO THE OTHER FORCES NOR WOULD IT GET US ANYWHERE. SARKIS THEN SAID THAT MAYBE THE SYRIANS COULD SPEAK FOR THE OTHER FORCES BUT HE COULD NOT. WHEN I ASKED HIM WHETHER HE COULD BE A CHANNEL FOR COMMUNICATIONS, HE SAID NOT IN HIS POSITION, THAT IF THE ISRAELIS WANTED TO DEAL WITH

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LEBANON THE ARMISTICE COMMISSION (ILMAC) WAS THE PROPER CHANNEL AND IT HAD BEEN USED BEFORE. IF THE U.S. COULD NOT DEAL WITH THE PALESTINIANS, THE UN COULD. WAZZAN AGAIN INTERJECTED AT THIS TIME TO SAY THAT THE GOL COULD NOT BE SEEN AS A "PARTY AGAINST ISRAEL." THEY HAD NOT FIRED ON ISRAEL AND THE MOST THEY COULD DO WOULD BE TO ACKNOWLEDGE THE FACT OF A CEASE-FIRE.

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AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE
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7. I THEN TOLD THE GOL OFFICIALS THAT MY TARGET FOR A CEASE-FIRE WAS 1200 HOURS LOCAL ON FRIDAY, JULY 24, ASKING THEM TO KEEP IT IN CONFIDENCE. IN SPEAKING OF MY FUTURE MOVEMENTS, I NOTED THE IMPORTANCE OF THE SAUDI ROLE, WITH WHICH SARKIS AGREED. AT THIS POINT, SARKIS AGAIN EMPHASIZED HOW MUCH HE APPRECIATED MY EFFORTS. HE SAID THEY HAD DONE A LOT OF GOOD AND HAD AVOIDED A WORST-CASE SITUATION. HE REALIZED THAT THE GOL POSITION AT THIS TIME MIGHT BOTHER ME A LITTLE BUT THAT IT WAS IN THE LONG-TERM INTERESTS OF LEBANON. IT WAS A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE AND LEBANON WAS TOO WEAK TO GIVE IN ON MATTERS OF PRINCIPLE. IN REPLY TO A REFERENCE ON MY PART TO THE "INFLUENCE" HE MIGHT BRING TO BEAR ON THE SUBJECT, HE DID NOT PRECLUDE HIS ASSISTING ME IN THAT WAY TO THE EXTENT POSSIBLE.

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8. WAZZAN INTERJECTED AT THIS POINT TO SAY THAT THE IMPORTANT FACTOR IN MY MISSION WAS TO DISCIPLINE OUR SPOILED

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CHILD. I EMPHASIZED THAT WE HAD DONE THING WITH REGARD TO ISRAEL IN THE PAST FEW DAYS THAT WERE UNPRECEDENTED. WAZZAN'S REPLY WAS, "YOU MUST GO FURTHER."

9. I THEN TOLD SARKIS THAT I HAD IN MIND A POSSIBLE ENLARGEMENT OF THE ROLE OF UNIFIL AND WAYS OF MAKING IT MORE EFFECTIVE. HE STATED THAT HE WAS IN FULL AGREEMENT.

10. WE DISCUSSED THE COMING MEETING IN BEIRUT, WHICH IS THE NEXT STAGE OF THE BAYT AD-DIN PROCESS AND IN WHICH I SAID WE WOULD BE GLAD TO DO WHAT WE COULD TO HELP.

11. I THEN TOLD SARKIS THAT I DID NOT THINK I WOULD BE COMING TO BEIRUT AGAIN IN MY OFFICIAL CAPACITY AND HE AND WAZZAN AGAIN EXPRESSED GRATITUDE FOR MY PAST EFFORTS. SARKIS ADDED THAT THE GOL POSITION WAS NOT "PASSIVE". IN DISCUSSING WHAT I WOULD SAY TO THE PRESS, WAZZAN RAISED THE SUBJECT OF BEGIN'S STATEMENT YESTERDAY CONCERNING "PEACE BETWEEN ISRAEL AND LEBANON." I TOLD WAZZAN HE WAS PERFECTLY FREE TO TELL THE PRESS THAT BEGIN HAD ONLY BEEN SPEAKING FOR THE ISRAELI CABINET, NOT FOR ME. FOR MY PART I WAS WORKING TO OBTAIN AN EFFECTIVE CEASE-FIRE IN SOUTHERN LEBANON, AND HE COULD SAY SO. I EXPLAINED TO SARKIS AND WAZZAN THE AMBIGUITY WHICH THE ISRAELIS FELT IT NECESSARY TO USE IN ANY REFERENCE TO THE PLO. THEY COULD NOT IMPLY THE POSSIBILITY OF ANY DEALINGS, MUCH LESS FORMAL AGREEMENT WITH THE PLO.
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Date Printed: 09/27/1996

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PAGE 01 JERUSA 02204 211920Z
ACTION NEA-07

INFO	OCT-01	ADS-00	INR-10	EUR-12	SS-15	CIAE-00	DODE-00
	H-01	IO-15	NSAE-00	SSO-00	SY-05	HA-06	L-03
	DOE-10	PM-09	PA-02	DCT-02	SSM-05	INRE-00	SMS-01
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FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9912

WHITEHOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE

USLO RIYADH IMMEDIATE

INFO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY KUWAIT IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE

UNCLAS JERUSALEM 02204

FROM HABIB

E.O. 12065: N/A

TAGS: PEPR, PINT, MILI, MOPS, SOPN, LE, IS, SA, SY, XF

SUBJECT: HABIB MISSION: U.S. AND ISRAELI STATEMENTS
OF JULY 21

REF: DRAPER/NEA TELECON, 7/21/81

1. AT THE END OF THE MEETING BETWEEN HABIB AND BEGIN
ON THE EVENING OF TUESDAY, JULY 21, BEGIN READ THE
FOLLOWING STATEMENT TO THE ASSEMBLED PRESS, FIRST IN
HEBREW AND THEN IN ENGLISH:

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BEGIN TEXT: THE PRIME MINISTER REPORTED TO THE CABINET
ON HIS TALKS WITH MR. PHILIP HABIB, THE EMISSARY OF THE
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, AND ON THE PERSONAL
MESSAGES RECEIVED FROM THE SECRETARY OF STATE, MR.
ALEXANDER HAIG.

THE CABINET DECIDED AS FOLLOWS:

(1) THE GOVERNMENT AGREES THAT MR. PHILIP HABIB EMBARK UPON CONTACTS WITH THE PRESIDENT OF LEBANON, MR. SARKIS, AND WITH THE GOVERNMENT OF LEBANON, WITH THE AIM OF ESTABLISHING PEACEFUL RELATIONS BETWEEN ISRAEL AND LEBANON FROM WHERE THE TERRORIST ORGANIZATION INCESSANTLY ATTACK THE TERRITORY OF ISRAEL AND MURDER AND MAIM ITS CITIZENS.

(2) THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL WILL UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES CONDUCT NEGOTIATIONS, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, WITH THE ARAB TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS WHOSE DECLARED AIM IS THE DESTRUCTION OF ISRAEL AND ITS PEOPLE AND WHO INTENTIONALLY TURN THEIR ARMS--WHICH ARE SUPPLIED TO THEM IN LARGE QUANTITIES BY THE SOVIET UNION, SYRIA AND LIBYA-- AGAINST THE JEWISH CIVILIAN POPULATION. LIKEWISE, THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL WILL NOT AUTHORIZE ANYBODY TO CONDUCT NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE AFOREMENTIONED TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS.

(3) THE GOVERNMENT WILL CONTINUE TO DEFEND THE CITIZENS OF ISRAEL; THIS IS ITS RIGHT AND DUTY. END TEXT.

2. THEREAFTER, HABIB MADE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT:

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PAGE 03 JERUSA 02204 211920Z

BEGIN TEXT: ON THE BASIS OF THE STATEMENT OF THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL AS PRESENTED TO ME BY THE PRIME MINISTER, I WILL PROCEED WITH MY MISSION--AS DIRECTED BY PRESIDENT REAGAN--TO SEEK TO SECURE A CEASEFIRE ALONG THE ISRAELI-LEBANON BORDER, AS A FIRST STEP TO BRING CALM TO THE AREA. END TEXT.
GROVE

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ACTION SS-30

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INFO OCT-01 ADS-00 SSO-00 /031 W

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FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9904

INFO WHITEHOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

IM/IPS/CR/IR

Date: 11/3/97

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☐ DOWNGRADE TS to ☐ S or ☐ C

FROM HABIB

E.O. 12065: RDS-1, 3 07/20/2001 (HABIB, PHILIP) OR-M

TAGS: MOPS, PINT, IS, LE, SY, SA, XF

SUBJECT: HABIB MISSION: JULY 20 MEETING WITH PERES

1. ~~ENTIRE TEXT~~

2. JOINED BY DRAPER AND CHARGE BROWN, I MET FOR WELL OVER ONE HOUR ON JULY 20 WITH SHIMON PERES. FORMER FOREIGN MINISTER EBAN AND FORMER AMBASSADOR TO THE U.S. DINITZ WERE WITH HIM. (I INFORMED BEGIN THAT I INTENDED TO HAVE THIS MEETING, AND HE POSED NO OBJECTIONS.)

3. I FIRST DESCRIBED THE PRESENT SITUATION ALONG THE LINES THAT WOULD BE FAMILIAR TO WASHINGTON, STRESSING INTER ALIA THAT I VISUALIZED A CEASE-FIRE NOT AS A FINAL STEP BUT INSTEAD AS A FIRST STEP IN CHANGING CONDITIONS SIGNIFICANTLY IN THE AREA IN A WAY THAT COULD BE HELPFUL TO ISRAEL'S LONG TERM SECURITY INTEREST. I ALSO NOTED THAT IF THE BEGIN GOVERNMENT ACCEPTED THE

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CONCEPT OF A CEASEFIRE, I WOULD NOT DEAL WITH THE PLO DIRECTLY. I WOULD INSTEAD SEE OTHERS WITH OBVIOUS INFLUENCE OVER THEM TO SECURE THEIR COOPERATION IN A CEASEFIRE THAT MUST BE "TWO-SIDED". SAYING THAT I HAD THAT MORNING READ THE LABOR PARTY'S STATEMENT ON THE PRESENT SITUATION, I COMMENTED THAT THE STATEMENT MADE CLEAR THAT THE LABOR PARTY WAS IN FAVOR OF A CEASEFIRE. PERES IMMEDIATELY SAID YES.

4. PERES WENT ON TO SAY THAT THE PRESENT SITUATION WAS OF GREAT SERIOUSNESS AND GREAT URGENCY. HE SPOKE DRAMATICALLY OF THE EXTREMELY TENSE SITUATION IN THE TOWNS OF NORTHERN ISRAEL, WHICH HAD BEEN INTENSIFIED BY THE DEATH OF A WOMAN THAT MORNING AT MISGAV 'AM. THE SITE BEARS VIVID MEMORIES OF A TERRORIST ATROCITY IN 1980. THE PEOPLE IN THE AREA, HE SAID, WERE NOT SEEKING VENGEANCE AS SUCH FOR THE PALESTINIAN ATTACKS BUT WERE INSTEAD DEMANDING THAT THE GOVERNMENT "DO SOMETHING" SO THAT THEY DON'T HAVE TO SPEND DAYS AND NIGHTS ON END IN THE SHELTERS AND RISK THEIR LIVES.

5. JOINED BY EBAN, PERES SAID THAT IF LABOR HAD BEEN IN POWER, IT WOULD HAVE GIVEN ME AN IMMEDIATE OKAY TO TRY FOR A CEASEFIRE. HE SAID HE WAS ASTONISHED THAT BEGIN COULD WAIT UNTIL TUESDAY EVENING TO GIVE ME AN ANSWER BUT HE CAREFULLY REFUSED TO SPECIFY WHAT BEGIN'S REPLY WOULD BE. AS THIS PART OF THE MEETING PROCEEDED, PERES CONCLUDED IN MORE PASSIONATE TERMS THAT THE SITUATION WAS FAST BECOMING "INTOLERABLE" AND IMPLIED THAT STRONGER ISRAELI MEASURES COULD NOT BE

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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RULED OUT (HE MAY HAVE BEEN TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE LARGE CORPS OF LABOR PARTY SUPPORTERS IN MANY OF THE NORTHERN TOWNS AND SETTLEMENTS.)

6. WHILE ALSO ADDING THAT EVERYONE IN ISRAEL BASICALLY WANTED A CEASEFIRE, HE SPECIFIED THAT THEY WOULD REFUSE DIRECT ISRAELI DEALINGS WITH THE PLO AND WOULD ONLY BE marginally LESS NEGATIVE ABOUT UN-SPONSORED EFFORTS. GROVE

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ACTION SS-30

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INFO OCT-01 ADS-00 SSO-00 /031 W

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AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE

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AMEMBASSY KUWAIT PRIORITY

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JERUSALEM 02188

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FROM HABIB

E.O. 12065: RDS-1,3,4 7/21/91 (HABIB, PHILIP)

TAGS: PEPR, PINT, MOPS, MILI, LE, IS, SY, SA, XF

SUBJECT: HABIB MISSION: NEXT STEPS

1. ~~ENTIRE TEXT~~

2. THIS IS AN ALERT MESSAGE SPELLING OUT ACTION REQUIREMENTS IN THE EVENT I RECEIVE FROM BEGIN TONIGHT, JULY 21, ENOUGH MANEUVERING ROOM TO PURSUE BROADER EFFORTS FOR A CEASEFIRE. (IN THE EVENT THAT I DO NOT RECEIVE ADEQUATE MANEUVERING ROOM, I MAY RPT MAY WANT TO STAY IN ISRAEL, IN WHICH CASE PLANS LAID OUT BELOW WOULD BE ALTERED ACCORDINGLY).

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3. FOR BEIRUT--AMB. DILLON: WE WILL PLAN TO LEAVE ISRAEL ON WED., JULY 22, AT 0845 LOCAL TIME (0645 GMT). SUBJECT TO SEPARATE CHANNEL MESSAGES CONFIRMING EXACT ETA, BEIRUT SHOULD PRESUME ARRIVAL THERE AT APPROXIMATELY 0930 LOCAL TIME (0730 GMT).

4. TO SAVE AS MUCH TIME AS POSSIBLE, I HOPE THAT YOU CAN ARRANGE A MEETING WITH SARKIS AND WAZZAN TOGETHER AT

BAABDA. WAZZAN IS, AFTER ALL, FOREIGN MINISTER AS WELL AS PRIME MINISTER. I WOULD LIKE TO COMPLETE MY MEETINGS IN BEIRUT SO THAT I COULD DEPART FOR SYRIA (OR SAUDI ARABIA) LATER IN THE AFTERNOON (SEE BELOW).

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5. FOR DAMASCUS--AMB. SEELYE: IF IT APPEARS POSSIBLE THAT ASSAD WILL SEE ME, I WILL PLAN TO DEPART BEIRUT AT APPROXIMATELY 3:00 P.M. LOCAL TIME, ARRIVING DAMASCUS AT 3:30 P.M. LOCAL TIME OR SHORTLY THEREAFTER. I WOULD PREFER TO MEET WITH ASSAD THE FOLLOWING MORNING, THURS., JULY 23, BUT WOULD BE READY TO SEE HIM ON WEDNESDAY NIGHT IF THURSDAY MORNING IS NOT POSSIBLE OR CONVENIENT. I WILL, HOWEVER, NEED YOUR BEST JUDGMENT--BASED ON YOUR SOUNDINGS OF QADDOUR AND QABBANI--AS TO WHETHER I WILL BE RECEIVED, AND THIS JUDGMENT SHOULD GET TO ME IN BEIRUT VIA FLASH MESSAGE ON WEDNESDAY.

6. FOR JIDDA--CHARGE PLACKE: IF IT APPEARS UNLIKELY THAT I WOULD BE RECEIVED IN DAMASCUS--AT LEAST AT THIS TIME-- I WOULD PLAN TO DEPART BEIRUT ON WED. AFTERNOON, JULY 22, AND PROCEED TO A DESTINATION IN SAUDI ARABIA. WE ARE NOW EXPLORING WITH THE AIR CREW WHAT MAY BE FEASIBLE, INCLUDING A LANDING AT TAIF, SO AS TO MAKE IT EASIER FOR ME TO GET TO FAHD. IT WILL BE EXTREMELY IMPORTANT THAT I SEE

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FAHD AS EARLY AS POSSIBLE FOLLOWING MY DEPARTURE FROM BEIRUT. IMPRESS ON THE SAUDIS THAT I WILL BE WORKING AGAINST THE CLOCK.

7. IF I GO TO DAMASCUS AFTER BEIRUT I WILL, OF COURSE, LET YOU KNOW HOW THIS MIGHT AFFECT ULTIMATE MEETINGS WITH FAHD.

8. FOR ALL: I WILL SEND A QUICK MESSAGE TONIGHT FOLLOWING MY MEETING WITH BEGIN TO CONFIRM OR ALTER FOREGOING TRAVEL PLANS.

9. FOR DEPARTMENT: AS YOU CAN SEE, I MAY HAVE TO MOVE EXTREMELY RAPIDLY ONCE I HAVE ADEQUATE WORD FROM BEGIN. I AM COUNTING ON S/S AND NEA TO ENSURE THAT ALL RELEVANT TRAFFIC--GENEROUSLY INTERPRETED--IS REPEATED IN TIMELY FASHION TO ALL POSTS WHERE I AM LIKELY TO BE, INCLUDING RIYADH, OVER THE CRITICAL DAYS AHEAD. THIS TRAFFIC SHOULD INCLUDE EUROPEAN, UN, AND ARAB POSITIONS AND DEVELOPMENTS.
GROVE

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PAGE 01 JERUSA 02203 211903Z
ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ADS-00 SSO-00 /031 W
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AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS NIACT IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY JIDDA NIACT IMMEDIATE
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JERUSALEM 02203

EXIII **DECAPTIONED**

FROM HABIB

E.O. 12065: RDS-1,3,4 7/21/91 (HABIB, PHILIP)
TAGS: PEPR, PINT, MILI, MOPS, LE, IS, SY, SA, XF
SUBJECT: HABIB MISSION: NEXT TRAVEL PLANS

REF: JERUSALEM 2188

1. ~~ENTIRE TEXT~~

2. WE WILL PROCEED TO BEIRUT, AS SPELLED OUT EARLIER IN JERUSALEM 2188, ARRIVING BETWEEN 0915 AND 0930 LOCAL TIME. DAMASCUS WOULD BE THE PREFERRED NEXT STOP, AS INDICATED EARLIER, AND THEN JIDDA.

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PAGE 02 JERUSA 02203 211903Z

3. FOR BEIRUT--AMB. DILLON: BY SEPTELS--AND PROBABLY IN NEWS REPORTS--YOU AND OTHER ADDRESSEES WILL BE READING THE ISRAELI CABINET STATEMENT AND MY OWN STATEMENT TO THE EFFECT THAT I WILL PROCEED WITH MY MISSION. THE ISRAELI STATEMENT MAY BE SUBJECT TO MISINTERPRETATION AND DISTORTION. IF ASKED, IT WILL BE IMPORTANT FOR YOU TO GET ACROSS OUR OWN CORRECT INTERPRETATION. AT YOUR DISCRETION YOU MAY WISH TONIGHT TO GET IN TOUCH WITH JOHNNY ABDU WITH THE

CORRECT INTERPRETATION, AS FOLLOWS:

-- THE PHRASE IN THE ISRAELI CABINET STATEMENT--"WITH THE AIM OF ESTABLISHING PEACEFUL RELATIONS BETWEEN ISRAEL AND LEBANON..."--DOES NOT RPT NOT MEAN THAT I WILL BE COMING TO LEBANON TO NEGOTIATE PEACE BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES. THE FACT IS THAT THE ENTIRE ISRAELI STATEMENT IS BASED ON THEIR CONCERN THAT THERE WILL BE NEGOTIATIONS-- DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY WITH THE PLO--AND THAT THERE COULD BE A DE FACTO ISRAELI-PLO AGREEMENT.

-- THIS KIND OF AMBIGUITY IS ESSENTIAL--AT THIS TIME--IF WE ARE TO MAKE PROGRESS TOWARDS CALMING THE SITUATION AND ENDING THE BLOODSHED.

--I BELIEVE I HAVE GAINED ENOUGH FROM THE PRIME MINISTER'S EXPLANATION OF THE CABINET'S STATEMENT SO THAT I CAN PROCEED CONFIDENTLY TO TRY TO SECURE A CEASEFIRE.

-- STRICTLY FYI: THE ISRAELIS ARE ALSO HAVING INCREASING TROUBLE WITH THE CODE PHRASE-- CEASEFIRE --BUT IT WOULD BE BETTER IF I EXPLAINED THIS PROBLEM TO THE LEBANESE. END FYI.

4. I WILL BE COUNTING ON YOU TO EASE POTENTIAL LEBANESE

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PAGE 01 STATE 183026 TOSEC 050046
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FOLLOWING REPEAT JIDDA 4881 ACTION STATE INFO WHITEHOUSE
TELAVIV JERUSALEM BEIRUT DAMASCU S RIYADH
JUL 13.

QUOTE: JIDDA 04881

EXDIS

FROM HABIB

E.O. 12065: RDS-1,3,4 7/13/91 (HABIB, PHILIP)
TAGS: PEPR, PINT, MOPS, MILI, SA, LE, IS, SY, XF
SUBJECT: HABIB MISSION: ISRAELI USE OF MINI-DRONES
OVER LEBANON

1. ENTIRE TEXT.

2. DURING MY JULY 12 TALK WITH PRIME MINISTER BEGIN IN
JERUSALEM (SEE SEPTTEL FROM JERUSALEM), I REPEATED THE
POINT THAT THE SYRIANS WERE ING MISSILES AT THE
ISRAELIS AND NOTED, IN THIS CONNECTION, THAT THE

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ISRAELI MINI-RPV WHICH HAD FALLEN INTO LEBANON RECENTLY
APPARENTLY HAD NOT BEEN DOWNED BY THE SYRIANS. IN THIS
WAY I WAS GIVING HIM THE OPPORTUNITY TO COMMENT ON THE
SIGNIFICANCE OF THE MINI-RPVs.

3. BEGIN SAID THAT THE MINI-RUESTION HAD HAD A
MECHANICAL MISFUNCTION. HE CLEARLY GAVE IT NO IMPORTANCE.
HE WENT ON TO SAY THAT SUCH MINI-RPVs WERE EXPENDABLE
AND THAT ISRAEL HAD A SUBSTANTIAL NUMBER.

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PAGE 01 JIDDA 04973 171321Z
ACTION SS-30

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FM AMEMBASSY JIDDA

TO AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS NIACT IMMEDIATE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

INFO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE

AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE

SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3996

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PA Exemptions _____ ☐ CLASSIFY as ☐ S or ☐ C Sec. _____
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FOR AMBASSADOR SEELYE FROM HABIB

E.O. 12065: RDS-1,3,4 7/17/91 (HABIB, PHILIP)

TAGS: PEPR, PINT, MILI, MOPS, LE, SY, SA, IS, XF

SUBJECT: HABIB MISSION: TRAVEL PLANS

1. ~~ENTIRE TEXT~~.

2. GIVEN CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN EBF,
(#)

THIS MESSAGE IS TO

ALERT YOU TO POSSIBILITY I WILL DECIDE NOT RPT NOT GO
TO DAMASCUS ON SATURDAY. MY DECISION WILL DEPEND IN PART
ON WHAT I HEAR FROM FAHD. WILL TRY TO GET WORD TO YOU
BEFORE NOON YOUR TIME SATURDAY.

3. MEANWHILE, WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR PERSONAL VIEWS
WHETHER ASSAD IS LIKELY TO RECEIVE ME IF MILITARY ACTIONS
CONTINUE TO HEAT UP IN LEBANON/ISRAEL ARENA.
PLACKE

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PAGE 02 JIDDA 04973 171321Z

NOTE BY OC/T:(#)AS RECEIVED.VERIFICATION TO FOLLOW

PAGE 01 JERUSA 02156 181412Z
ACTION SS-30

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FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
TO AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE
SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9873
WHITEHOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE
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FOR AMB. SEELYE FROM HABIB

E.O. 12065: RDS-1,3,4 4/18/01 (HABIB, PHILIP)
TAGS: PEPR, PINT, MOPS, MILI, LE, SY, IS, SA, XF
SUBJECT: HABIB MISSION: HOLDING THE DOORS OPEN
IN DAMASCUS

1. ~~ENTIRE TEXT~~
2. YOU SAW FROM MY REPORTING CABLE FROM JIDDA ON MY TALK WITH FAHD THAT I WILL BE GOING TO ISRAEL TODAY. I WOULD APPRECIATE, HOWEVER, YOUR DOING WHAT YOU BELIEVE COULD APPROPRIATELY BE DONE TO ENSURE THAT THE DOOR REMAINS OPEN FOR A VISIT BY ME TO DAMASCUS. I CANNOT PREDICT AT THIS STAGE WHETHER AND WHEN I WILL GO THERE. TO ASSIST IN MY DECISIONS, YOUR OWN THOUGHTS WOULD BE MOST WELCOME.
GROVE

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PAGE 01 JERUSA 02166 191745Z
ACTION NEA-07INFO OCT-01 ADS-00 INR-10 SS-15 CIAE-00 DODE-00 H-01
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FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM

TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 9886

INFO RUEADWNOEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE RUHWSLO RIYADH IMMEDIATE 0261

AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE

USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE

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E.O. 12065: N/A

TAGS: SOPN, IS, LE, PLO, SY, SA, XF

SUBJECT: STATEMENT BY AMB. HABIB

1. THE FOLLOWING IS A STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR PHILIP HABIB
TO THE PRESS AFTER HIS SECOND MEETING WITH PRIME MINISTER
BEGIN ON JULY 19, 1981.

2. BEGIN TEXT:

I THINK YOU'RE ALL AWARE THAT PRESIDENT REAGAN HAS
DIRECTED ME TO COME TO PURSUE THE PROSPECT OF A CEASEFIRE
IN TERMS OF THE SITUATION BETWEEN ISRAEL AND LEBANON.
I HAVE HAD VERY SERIOUS CONVERSATIONS WITH THE PRIME
MINISTER. THIS IS A COMPLEX PROBLEM. WE'VE DISCUSSED IT.

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THE PRIME MINISTER HAS POINTED OUT THAT THIS IS A SUBJECT

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WHICH HE WOULD NATURALLY DISCUSS IN THE CABINET. HE INFORMS ME THAT THERE WILL BE AN EXTRAORDINARY SESSION OF THE CABINET, AND HE AND I WILL THEN CONTINUE OUR DISCUSSIONS. THAT'S ALL I HAVE.

Q: WHEN WILL THIS CABINET MEETING BE, SIR?

A: TUESDAY. (END TEXT).
GROVE

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PAGE 01. BEIRUT 04608 101713Z
ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ADS-00 SSO-00 /031

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102

-----276045 101722Z /50

O 101621Z JUL 81
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2769
INFO AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE
/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE 6819
/USLO RIYADH IMMEDIATE 392
WHITE HOUSE IMMEDIATE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

☒ RELEASE☐ EXCISE☐ DENY☒ DECLASSIFY☐ DECLASSIFY

IN PART

EO Citations

IM/IPS/CR/IRCA

Date: 11/3/97

TS authority to

FOIA Exemptions

PA Exemptions

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BEIRUT 4608

DECAPTIONED

FROM HABIB

E.O. 12065: RDS 1,3,4 7/10/01 (HABIB, PHILIP)
TAGS: PEPR, MILI, PINT, MOPS, LE, IS, SY, SA, XF
SUBJ: HABIB MISSION: CALL ON PRIME MINISTER AL-WAZZAN

1. ~~ENTIRE TEXT~~.

2. I SPENT AN HOUR WITH PRIME MINISTER AL-WAZZAN ON
JULY 10 ACCOMPANIED BY AMBASSADOR DILLON, DAS DRAPER,
AND DCM BARRETT. WAZZAN HAD HIS OFFICE DIRECTOR PRESENT.
THE FOLLOWING TOPICS WERE DISCUSSED:

3. SITUATION IN BEIRUT

I CONGRATULATED THE PRIME MINISTER ON HIS PERSONAL
EFFORTS TO REOPEN ACCESS ROUTES BETWEEN EAST AND WEST
BEIRUT. HE SAID HE HAD BEEN DOING HIS BEST IN THIS
REGARD WITH THE FULL COOPERATION OF THE PRESIDENT, BUT

PAGE 02 BEIRUT 04608 101713Z

HAD NOT SUCCEEDED BECAUSE OF "STREET POLITICS."
LEADERS OF LOCAL GANGS ALONG THE SODECO ACCESS ROUTE, IN
BOTH EAST AND WEST BEIRUT, HAD FOR PURPOSES OF THEIR OWN
DONE SOME SNIPING AND EFFECTIVELY CLOSED THIS ROUTE
AFTER ITS INITIAL REOPENING.

4. BAYT AD-DIN PROCESS

WAZZAN LAID ALL THE BLAME FOR THE SUSPENSION OF THE

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JULY 5 BAYT AD-DIN CONFERENCE ON BASHIR GEMAYEL'S DELAY IN SUBMITTING A STATEMENT ON THE BREAKING OF HIS TIES WITH ISRAEL. WHEN I ASKED WAZZAN'S OPINION ON THE TEXT OF THE LETTER EVENTUALLY SUBMITTED BY BASHIR, WAZZAN RELUCTANTLY ADMITTED THAT IT WAS ACCEPTABLE TO HIM. HE ADDED, HOWEVER, THAT THE STATEMENT COULD HAVE BEEN MUCH MORE DIRECT AND SIMPLE AND THAT HIS ACCEPTANCE WAS CONDITIONAL UPON THE ABSENCE OF ANY INDICATIONS OF CONTRARY INTENTIONS BY THE LEBANESE FORCES (PHALANGE). AS FOR THE LONG RUN BAYT AD-DIN PROCESS, WAZZAN SAID THAT THE REORGANIZATION OF THE ARMY WOULD PRESENT THE MOST DIFFICULT PROBLEMS.

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5. ZAHLAH AND THE BIQ'A VALLEY

IN THE COURSE OF A DISCUSSION ON ZAHLAH, WAZZAN SAID THAT I HAD PROMISED HIM THAT IF THE ZAHLAH SITUATION WERE SETTLED I WOULD BE ABLE TO MAKE PROGRESS IN OTHER AREAS. HE SAID THAT FURTHER IMPROVEMENTS IN THE SITUATION AROUND ZAHLAH WOULD BE SLOW, BUT THAT IF THERE WERE POLITICAL ENTENTE, THIS WOULD REFLECT UNDERSTANDING WITH THE SYRIANS AND BRING ABOUT FURTHER IMPROVEMENTS IN THE ZAHLAH REGION.

PAGE 03 BEIRUT 04608 101713Z

6. THE MISSILE QUESTION

I TOLD WAZZAN THAT THE PRESENCE OF SYRIAN MISSILES IN THE BIQ'A WAS STILL A GREAT PROBLEM FOR IT COULD LEAD TO MILITARY ACTION WHICH WOULD CANCEL OUT THE PROGRESS RECENTLY ACCOMPLISHED ON TERRAIN. WAZZAN ANSWERED BY ASKING WHAT THE ISREALI POSITION WOULD BE IF THESE MISSILES WERE LEBANESE MISSILES. TO MY COMMENT THAT THIS WAS HARD TO JUDGE, WAZZAN THEN SAID: "THEN MAYBE WE SHOULD BUY THE MISSILES FROM THE SYRIANS OR RENT THEM." WAZZAN THEN WENT ON, IN HIS MOST EMOTIONAL OUTBURST SINCE I HAVE KNOWN HIM, TO DENOUNCE THE ISRAELI ATTACK ON THE IRAQI NUCLEAR FACILITY AND TO STRESS HOW THIS ACTION HAD BEEN HARMFUL TO THE US POSITION IN THE REGION, DESPITE OUR JOINING THE SECURITY COUNCIL CONDEMNATION. HE THEN DENOUNCED ISRAEL'S AMBITIONS TO BE A REGIONAL POLICE FORCE. "WE MUST FINISH WITH THIS. LET IT END." HE THEN WENT ON TO DENOUNCE ISRAELI OVER-FLIGHTS AND ASKED IF WE, THE AMERICANS, WOULD PUT UP WITH SUCH ILLEGAL ACTIONS. I REPLIED THAT I WAS NOT SO CONCERNED WITH THE LEGALITY OR LACK OF IT OR SPECIFIC ACTIONS, BUT ONLY IN CALMING DOWN A DANGEROUS SITUATION AND RETURNING TO A MORE FAVORABLE IF IMPERFECT STATUS QUO ANTE. WAZZAN SAID THAT HE WOULD NOW, IN RESPONSE TO MY PROVIOUS REQUESTS FOR HIS ADVICE, GIVE

UNCLASSIFIED

ME HIS FIRST COUNSEL. "DO NOT PUBLICLY ASK FOR THE REMOVAL OF THE MISSILES." HE WENT ON TO EXPLAIN THAT THIS WAS JUST UNACCEPTABLE AND WOULD MAKE MY MISSION DIFFICULT. HE SAID I SHOULD PRESSURE ISRAEL TO RESTRAIN ITSELF AND SOME DAY THE SYRIANS MIGHT REMOVE THE MISSILES ON THEIR OWN. I AGREED WITH HIM THAT THE IMPORTANT THING WAS RESULTS RATHER THAN PUBLIC DEMANDS, BUT STRESSED AGAIN THE SERIOUSNESS OF AN UNRESOLVED MISSILE ISSUE.

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7. WAZZAN CONCLUDED THE CONVERSATION BY SUGGESTING THAT I OUGHT TO WIDEN MY MANDATE SOMEWHAT. HE SAID

PAGE 04 BEIRUT 04608 101713Z

THAT IF I COULD HELP WORK OUT SOLUTIONS TO SOME OF THE OUTSTANDING LEBANESE REGIONAL PROBLEMS THEN THE MISSILE QUESTION COULD BE SOLVED AS PART OF THE OVERALL RESULT.
DILLON

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PAGE 01
ACTION SS-30

JIDDA 04881 131629Z

UNCLASSIFIED

INFO OCT-01 ADS-00 SSO-00 /031 W

-----334776 131631Z /40

O 131625Z JUL 81

FM AMEMBASSY JIDDA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3941

INFO THE WHITE HOUSE PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY

AMCONSUL JERUSALEM PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY BEIRUT PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS PRIORITY

USLO RIYADH PRIORITY

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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IN PART

DATE: 11/3/97

EO Citations

FOIA Exemptions

PA Exemptions

TS authority to

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JIDDA 04881

DECAPTIONED

FROM HABIB

E.O. 12065: RDS-1,3,4 7/13/91 (HABIB, PHILIP)

TAGS: PEPR, PINT, MOPS, MILI, SA, LE, IS, SY, XF

SUBJECT: HABIB MISSION: ISRAELI USE OF MINI-DRONES
OVER LEBANON1. ~~ENTIRE TEXT~~

2. DURING MY JULY 12 TALK WITH PRIME MINISTER BEGIN IN JERUSALEM (SEE SEPTTEL FROM JERUSALEM), I REPEATED THE POINT THAT THE SYRIANS WERE NOT FIRING MISSILES AT THE ISRAELIS AND NOTED, IN THIS CONNECTION, THAT THE ISRAELI MINI-RPV WHICH HAD FALLEN INTO LEBANON RECENTLY APPARENTLY HAD NOT BEEN DOWNED BY THE SYRIANS. IN THIS WAY I WAS GIVING HIM THE OPPORTUNITY TO COMMENT ON THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE MINI-RPVS.

3. BEGIN SAID THAT THE MINI-RPV IN QUESTION HAD HAD A

PAGE 02

JIDDA 04881 131629Z

MECHANICAL MISFUNCTION. HE CLEARLY GAVE IT NO IMPORTANCE. HE WENT ON TO SAY THAT SUCH MINI-RPVS WERE EXPENDABLE AND THAT ISRAEL HAD A SUBSTANTIAL NUMBER.
NEUMANN

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PAGE 01
ACTION SS-30

PARIS 20328 090808Z

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INFO OCT-01 ADS-00 SSO-00 /031 W

-----234670 090809Z /11

O 090759Z JUL 81

FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 809 DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE

AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE

INFO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE

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IN PART

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EO Citations

Date: 11/3/97

PARIS 20328

FOIA Exemptions
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DECAPTIONED

FROM HABIB

E.O. 12065: RDS 1, 3, 4 - 7/9/01 (HABIB, PHILIP) OR-M

TAGS: MOPS, MILI, PEPR, IS, LE, SY, SA, XF

SUBJECT: HABIB MISSION: VISIT TO ISRAEL

1. ~~ENTIRE TEXT~~

2. I AM PREPARED TO ARRIVE IN ISRAEL ON SATURDAY (JULY 11) AS TO BE ABLE TO MEET WITH BEGIN ON SUNDAY AFTERNOON. HOWEVER, BEGIN SHOULD BE TOLD THAT -- WHILE I AM ALWAYS READY TO MEET WITH HIM -- I WOULD PREFER TO DO THIS AFTER I HAVE HAD FULLER CONSULTATIONS ELSEWHERE. I WANT TO HAVE SOMETHING FURTHER TO SAY TO HIM THAN I EXPECT I WOULD HAVE AFTER BEIRUT.

3. TEL AVIV: AMB LEWIS: YOU MAY WISH TO PASS ON THE FOREGOING IF DEPARTMENT HAS NO PROBLEMS WITH IT. FOLLOWING RECEIPT YOUR TWO CABLES YESTERDAY, WE ASKED DEPARTMENT -- VIA SECURE PHONE -- FOR VIEWS REGARDING POSSIBLE CONFLICT WITH MCFARLAND VISIT BEFORE ANSWERING BEGIN ABOUT MY OWN TRAVEL. HARTMAN

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PAGE 02

PARIS 20328 090808Z



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PAGE 01 BEIRUT 04588 101021Z
ACTION 55-30

INFO OCT-01 ADS-00 SSO-00 /031 W
-----264754 101023Z /11

O P 101003Z JUL 81

FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT

TO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE

INFO USLO RIYADH IMMEDIATE

AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS PRIORITY

SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2751

WHITE HOUSE PRIORITY

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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☐ DENY

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IN PART

IM/IPS/CR/IR

Date: 11/3/91

EO Citations

FOIA Exemptions

PA Exemptions

TS authority to

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BEIRUT 4588

EX DECAPTIONED

FROM HABIB

E.O. 12065: RDS 1,3,4 7/10/91 HABIB, PHILIP)

TAGS: MOPS, MILI, PEPR, PINT, XF, LE, SY, IS, SA

SUBJECT: HABIB MISSION: FORTHCOMING TRAVEL TO ISRAEL AND SAUDI ARABIA

1. ~~ENTIRE TEXT.~~

2. FOR TEL AVIV--AMB. LEWIS: WE INTEND TO LEAVE BEIRUT AT 0900 LOCAL TIME ON SUNDAY, JULY 12, FOR ISRAEL, ARRIVING BETWEEN 1-1/2 AND 2 HOURS LATER. PLEASE INFORM OUR AIRCRAFT CREW, SINCE THEIR RETURN TO BEIRUT FROM TEL AVIV AND BEIRUT TURN-AROUND MAY REQUIRE MORE TIME THAN USUAL.

3. FOR JIDDA--AMB. NEUMANN: AGAIN, FOR PLANNING PURPOSES, WE INTEND TO LEAVE ISRAEL FOR SAUDI ARABIA ON MONDAY, JULY 13, STOPPING IN CAIRO FOR REFUELING.

PAGE 02

BEIRUT 04588 101021Z

PLEASE PASS THE WORD THAT I WOULD LIKE TO MEET WITH

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UNCLASSIFIED [REDACTED]

PRINCE SAUD AS WELL AS CROWN PRINCE FAHD. IN LIGHT OF YOUR OWN REQUIREMENTS FOR A SPECIAL MEETING WITH FAHD. I LEAVE IT TO YOU AS HOW BEST TO WORK THINGS OUT.

4. FOR CAIRO--AMB. ATHERTON: IF IT IS NOT TOO INCONVENIENT FOR YOU, I WOULD WELCOME AN OPPORTUNITY TO TALK TO YOU AT THE AIRPORT WHILE WE ARE HAVING A REFUELING STOP. WILL PROVIDE TIME OF ARRIVAL LATER.
DILLON

[REDACTED]

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

UNCLASSIFIEDPAGE 01 BEIRUT 04165 241125Z
ACTION SS-30INFO OCT-01 ADS-00 SSO-00 /031 W
-----252731 241128Z /14

O P 240956Z JUN 81
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2510
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY
WHITE HOUSE PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY MANAMA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY ALGIERS PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY RABAT PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY TUNIS PRIORITY
USINT BAGHDAD PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY MUSCAT PRIORITY

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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IN PART

EO Citations

FOIA Exemptions
PA ExemptionsTS authority to
CLASSIFY as () S or () C Sec.
DOWNGRADE TS to () S or () C

BEIRUT 4165

DECAPTIONED**UNCLASSIFIED**

FROM HABIB

E.O. 12065: GDS--DECLASSIFY JUNE 26, 1981 (HABIB, PHILIP)
TAGS: PEPR, MILI, MOPS, LE, IS, SY, SA, XF
SUBJECT: HABIB MISSION: PUBLIC STATEMENT TO BE ISSUED JUNE 25

1. ~~ENTIRE TEXT.)~~

PAGE 02 BEIRUT 04165 241125Z

2. FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF A STATEMENT I WILL ISSUE
IN BEIRUT ON THURSDAY, JUNE 25, ON MY RETURN TO THE US.
(THIS TEXT HAS BEEN SLIGHTLY AMENDED FROM THAT APPROVED
BY THE DEPARTMENT AND WHITE HOUSE, AS A RESULT OF
DISCUSSIONS HERE IN BEIRUT, BUT ITS BASIC THRUST IS
THE SAME.)
BEGIN TEXT:

--DURING MY SECOND VISIT TO THE MIDDLE EAST I HAVE

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BEEN CARRYING OUT THE MISSION WHICH PRESIDENT REAGAN ENTRUSTED TO ME CONCERNING THE SITUATION IN LEBANON. I HAVE CONSULTED WITH THE LEADERS OF LEBANON, SYRIA, ISRAEL, AND SAUDI ARABIA. I BELIEVE THAT ALL CONCERNED WOULD LIKE TO SEE TENSIONS REDUCED, AS IS EVIDENT FROM THE FACT THAT THE IMMEDIATE DANGER OF MILITARY ACTION THAT EXISTED WHEN THE CRISIS AROSE, ALMOST TWO MONTHS AGO, HAS RECEDED. IT HAS GIVEN WAY TO A DIPLOMATIC PROCESS IN WHICH THE UNITED STATES HAS BEEN ABLE TO PLAY A UNIQUE ROLE.

-- CONTINUED RESTRAINT ON THE PART OF ALL REMAINS INDISPENSABLE IF A PEACEFUL RESOLUTION IS TO BE ACHIEVED AND THE DANGER FROM ESCALATION AVOIDED.

-- I AM LEAVING FOR THE UNITED STATE FOR CONSULTATION WITH MY GOVERNMENT AND WILL RETURN TO THE REGION IN EARLY JULY. I WANT TO STRESS, HOWEVER, THAT THE DIPLOMATIC EFFORT WILL CONTINUE.

-- MEANWHILE, EFFORTS ARE UNDERWAY AIMED AT CALMING THE INTERNAL SITUATION IN LEBANON AND ESTABLISHING A FRAMEWORK FOR FURTHER PROGRESS ON MAJOR LEBANESE ISSUES. THIS PROCESS, WHICH INVOLVES LEBANON, SYRIA, KUWAIT, SAUDI ARABIA, AND THE ARAB LEAGUE, BEGAN AT BATY AD-DIN EARLIER THIS MONTH AND CONTINUED IN JIDDA THIS WEEK. ANOTHER MEETING IS SCHEDULED TO BE HELD

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

PAGE 03 BEIRUT 04165 241125Z

IN LEBANON ON JULY 4.

-- I WANT TO TAKE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO THANK ALL OF THE LEADERS OF THE VARIOUS COUNTRIES I HAVE VISITED FOR THEIR CORDIA WELCOME AND FOR THE USEFUL DISCUSSIONS WHICH WE HAVE HAD. END TEXT.

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PAGE 01 JERUSA 01842 181641Z
ACTION SS-30

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INFO OCT-01 ADS-00 SSO-00 /031 W
-----111413 181643Z /53 42

O 181635Z JUN 81 ZFF-4
FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
TO AMEMBASSY JIDDA NIACT IMMEDIATE
USLO RIYADH IMMEDIATE
INFO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9685
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS PRIORITY
WHITEHOUSE WASHDC PRIORITY

DEPARTMENT OF STATE IM/IPS/CR/IR Date: 11/3/97
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JERUSALEM 01842

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FOR AMBASSADOR NEUMANN FROM HABIB

E.O. 12065: GDS 6/18/87 (HABIB, PHILIP)
TAGS: PEPR, MILI, MOPS, LE, IS, SY, SA, XF
SUBJECT: HABIB MISSION: FORTHCOMING TRAVEL TO SAUDI
ARABIA

REF: JIDDA 4344 ✓

1. ~~ENTIRE TEXT~~

2. APPRECIATE YOUR HELPFUL CABLE (REFTEL). I STILL BELIEVE I SHOULD LEAVE ISRAEL ON FRIDAY, JUNE 19 RPT 19. SORRY ABOUT GARBLE.

3. IN ADDITION, I ALSO BELIEVE I SHOULD STAY NO LONGER IN SAUDI ARABIA THAN ABOUT MID-DAY MONDAY, IN VIEW OF THE QUADRIPARTITE MEETING IN RIYADH ON THE 23RD. THEREFORE,

PAGE 02 JERUSA 01842 181641Z

IF I COME AS PLANNED TOMORROW, FRIDAY, THERE MAY BE A POSSIBILITY FOR ME TO SEE AT LEAST SAUD ON ONE DAY OR ANOTHER. AS BEFORE, YOU AND I COULD WORK OUT TOGETHER HOW TO DEAL WITH A POSSIBLE FAHD APPOINTMENT. FOR MY NEEDS, AN HOUR OR TWO ON SATURDAY OR ANY TIME THEREAFTER WITH SAUD WOULD BE ENOUGH. GROVE

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ACTION SS-30

JERUSA 01830 181141Z

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-----104227 181604Z /53-50

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FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM

TO AMEMBASSY JIDDA NIACT IMMEDIATE

USLO RIYADH IMMEDIATE

INFO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9673

AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE

WHITEHOUSE WASHDC PRIORITY

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IN PART

IM/IPS/CR/IR

Date: 11/2/97

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JERUSALEM 01830

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FOR AMBASSADOR NEUMANN FROM HABIB

E.O. 12065: GDS 6/18/87 (HABIB, PHILIP)

TAGS: PEPR, MILI, MOPS, LE, IS, SY, SA, XF

SUBJECT: HABIB MISSION: FORTHCOMING TRAVEL TO SAUDI ARABIA

1. [REDACTED]

2. ADDRESSEES WILL RECALL THAT I PROMISED FAHD THAT I WOULD REPORT TO HIM ON MY MEETINGS IN SYRIA AND ISRAEL. I HAVE NOW HAD A GOOD MEETING WITH BEGIN (SEPTEL). IN THE LIGHT OF THESE MOST RECENT MEETINGS, IT IS ESSENTIAL FOR ME TO REPORT DIRECTLY TO THE SAUDIS WHERE MY MISSION NOW STANDS, RATHER THAN SENDING A WRITTEN REPORT FOR DELIVERY TO FAHD. I HAVE USEFUL THINGS TO SAY.

3. FYI: AMBASSADOR LEWIS AND I HAVE ALSO CONCLUDED IT

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JERUSA 01830 181141Z

IS BEST THAT I NOT REMAIN ANY LONGER IN ISRAEL THAN IS NECESSARY. END FYI. IT ALSO IS BEST THAT I GET TO SAUDI ARABIA WELL BEFORE THE SCHEDULED JUNE 23 FOLLOW-UP QUADRIPARTITE MEETING IN RIYADH OF THE BAYT AD-DIN PARTICIPANTS. ACCORDINGLY, I PLAN TO LEAVE ISRAEL ON FRIDAY MORNING, JUNE 28, AT ABOUT 10:15 LOCAL TIME (0815 GMT) AND PROCEED TO SAUDI ARABIA FOR MEETINGS WITH THE SAUDIS ON SATURDAY OR SUNDAY AT THEIR CONVENIENCE. (A REFUELING STOP AT CAIRO WOULD BE NECESSARY).

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PAGE 01
ORIGIN SS-30

STATE 153646

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INFO OCT-00 ADS-00 SSO-00 /030 R

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APPROVED BY NEA:NAVELIOTES
S/S-O:JTAYLOR

-----323644 120152Z /63

O 120139Z JUN 81

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE

INFO AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE

USLO RIYADH IMMEDIATE

AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE

WHITE HOUSE PRIORITY 6573

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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IN PART

EO Citations

FOIA Exemptions

PA Exemptions

TS authority to

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STATE 153646

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FOR AMBASSADOR HABIB AND DAS DRAPER

E.O. 12065: RDS 1,3,4 6/11/01 (VELIOTES, NICHOLAS A.)

TAGS: PEPR, MILI, PINT, MOPS, LE, IS, SY, SA, XF

SUBJECT: HABIB MISSION: FORWARD PLANNING

REFS: (A) BEIRUT 3857; (B) BEIRUT 3847; (C) JIDDA 4147

1. ~~ENTIRE TEXT~~

2. APPRECIATE THE IMPORTANCE OF GETTING SOME WORD RE
YOUR THINKING ON SCHEDULES TO PM BEGIN. ACCORDINGLY, WE
AGREE SAM SHOULD PASS MESSAGE ALONG LINES OF PARA 2,
REFTEL A TO HIM BEFORE SHABBAT. WE PRESUME, IF YOU
CONCUR, YOU WILL WANT SAM TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF JIDDA RECOM-

PAGE 02

STATE 153646

MENDATION (REFTEL C) THAT YOU SLIP YOUR SCHEDULE ONE DAY
TO LEAVE BEIRUT ON JUNE 13.

3. PLEASE PROVIDE DEPARTMENT, AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AFTER
YOU HAVE SEEN SAUD, CABLE REPORT OF THE SAUD MEETING ALONG
WITH YOUR RECOMMENDATIONS ABOUT HOW WE SHOULD PROCEED IN
NEXT STEPS OF YOUR MISSION. WE WILL NEED TO KEEP THE
SECRETARY CLOSELY INFORMED AND OBTAIN HIS CONCURRENCE IN
OUR STRATEGY. STOESEL

UNCLASSIFIED

THEBEKAA VALLEY OF LEBANON; IF FOR NO OTHER REASON,
IT WOULD SEEM IMPORTANT TO LET BEGIN KNOW PRECISELY
WHERE MATTERS NOW STAND AND WHAT PROGRESS MIGHT BE
EXPECTED IN THE ARAB CONTEXT SO THAT HE COULD BE
PERSUADED TO HOLD OFF FURTHER MILITARY ACTION

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4. IF THE DEPARTMENT AGREES, PLEASE CABLE AMBASSADOR
LEWIS TO GO AHEAD WITH INFORMING THE ISRAELIS ALONG
THE LINES PROPOSED ABOVE. FYI: I WOULD HOLD OFF
ON A SPECIFIC DECISION WHETHER TO GO TO SYRIA OR ISRAEL
AFTER I'VE HAD A TALK WITH PRINCE SAUD. END FYI.
DEAN

N VVZCZ

*** Current Handling Restrictions *** EXDIS
*** Current Classification ***

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UNCLASSIFIEDPAGE 01 BEIRUT 03857 111511Z
ACTION SS-30INFO OCT-01 ADS-00 SSO-00 /031 W
-----312373 111512Z /44O P 111357Z JUN 81 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 2354
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV NIACT IMMEDIATE
INFO AMCONSUL JERUSALEM PRIORITY
USLO RIYADH PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE
WHITE HOUSE PRIORITYDEPARTMENT OF STATE IM/PS/CR/IR Date: 11/3/97
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☐ EXCISE ☐ DECLASSIFY EO Citations
☐ DENY IN PART

BEIRUT 3857

FOIA Exemptions _____ TS authority to
PA Exemptions _____ ☐ CLASSIFY as ☐ S or ☐ C Sec.
☐ DOWNGRADE TS to ☐ S or ☐ C**DECAPTIONED**

FROM HABIB

E.O. 12065: RDS 1,3,4 6/11/01 (HABIB, PHILIP)
TAGS: PEPR, MILI, PINT, MOPS, LE, IS, SY, SA, XF
SUBJECT: HABIB MISSION: MISIT TO SYRIA OR ISRAEL AFTER SAUDIA ARABIA1. ~~ENTIRE TEXT.~~2. FOR TEL AVIV: AMBASSADOR LEWIS: SUBJECT TO THE
DEPARTMENT'S CONCURRENCE (SEE BELOW), PLEASE INFORM
BEGIN THAT I PLAN TO GO TO SAUDI ARABIA,
FRIDAY, JUNE 12, AND MAY WELL REMAIN THERE THROUGH THE
WEEKEND. SAY THAT I WILL LET THE ISRAELIS KNOW--THROUGH
YOU-- MY TRAVEL PLANS THEREAFTER, WHICH COULD INCLUDE
EITHER GOING TO SYRIA OR TO ISRAEL. GO ON TO SAY THAT
I HAVE BEEN CONSIDERING THE DESIRABILITY OF STOPPING
OFF IN DAMASCUS SO THAT I WILL HAVE THE COMPLETE
PICTURE TO REVIEW WHEN I MEET WITH PRIME MINISTER
BEGIN.**UNCLASSIFIED**

PAGE 02 BEIRUT 03857 111511Z

3. FOR DEPARTMENT: WOULD APPRECIATE DEPARTMENT'S
VIEWS AS TO THE DESIRABILITY OF MY VISITING ISRAEL
FAIRLY EARLY NEXT WEEK WHILE THE ISSUE OF THE ISRAELI
STRIKE ON THE IRAQI NUCLEAR FACILITY MAY STILL BE
UNDER DEBATE IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL OR ELSEWHERE IN
THE UN. IN MY VIEW, IT WILL BE IMPORTANT TO TOUCH
BASE WITH BEGIN AND TO CONTINUE THE DIALOGUE WE
HAVE BEEN HAVING WITH REGARD TO THE ISSUES INVOLVING**UNCLASSIFIED**

UNCLASSIFIEDPAGE 01 BEIRUT 03836 01 OF 02 101630Z
ACTION SS-30INFO OCT-01 ADS-00 SSO-00 /031 W
-----266320 101638Z /43

O P 101430Z JUN 81

FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2338

INFO AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS PRIORITY

AMCONSUL JERUSALEM PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY JIDDA PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY KUWAIT PRIORITY

USLO RIYADH PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY

WHITE HOUSE PRIORITY

9302566
Date: 11/3/97
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
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FOIA Exemptions () CLASSIFY as () S or () C Sec.
PA Exemptions () DOWNGRADE TS to () S or () C

SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIRUT 3836

DECAPTIONED

FROM HABIB

E.O. 120-65: RDS 1,3,4 6/10/01 (HABIB, PHILIP)

TAGS: PEPR, MILI, PINT, MOPS, LE, IS, SY, SA, XF

SUBJECT: HABIB MISSION: CALL ON PRIME MINISTER AL-WAZZAN,
JUNE 10.**UNCLASSIFIED**1. ~~ENTIRE TEXT~~

2. SUMMARY: FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF MY MISSION, THE PRIME MINISTER'S OPINIONS SUGGEST WE ARE FACING NEW COMPLICATIONS AND DELAYS. HE WAS RELATIVELY MORE PESSIMISTIC AND NEGATIVE, COMPARED WITH OUR PAST MEETINGS, CONCERNING THE SOLUTIONS WE HAD DISCUSSED FOR THE INTER-RELATED ISSUES OF THE SANNIIN, ZAHLE, AND THE SAMS, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF ZAHLE. HE CONTINUES TO PLACE THE BLAME MOSTLY ON THE PHALANGISTS FOR LEBANON'S INTERNAL PROBLEMS, AND HAS ONLY MODEST HOPES THAT PROCESS OF LEBANESE NATIONAL RECONCILIATION

PAGE 02 BEIRUT 03836 01 OF 02 101630Z

STARTED AT BAYT AD-DIN WILL SECCEED. HE POLITELY BUT FIRMLY SAID THE ISRAELI ATTACK ON IRAQ HAS BROUGHT SHAME ON THE ENTIRE ARAB NATION WHICH WILL NOW BEGIN THE EFFORT OF WIPING OUT THAT SHAME, TO THE DETRIMENT OF THE US (TO WHICH HE ASSIGNS A SHARE OF THE BLAME FOR THE OPERATION) AND THE BENEFIT OF THE USSR. HE SAYS THE SYRIAN ARMY WILL NOT LEAVE THE SANNIIN RIDGELINE AND HE DECLINED COMMENT ON THE QUESTION OF THE SYRIAN MISSILES IN THE BEKAA VALLEY WHICH I SAID CONTINUED TO CONSTITUTE A GRAVE DANGER. HE

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ASKED ME TO DO WHAT I COULD TO MAKE THE PHALANGISTS MORE REASONABLE. END SUMMARY.

3. I SPENT ONE HOUR WITH PRIME MINISTER SHAFIQ AL-WAZZAN ON JUNE 10, ACCOMPANIED BY AMBASSADOR DEAN, DAS DRAPER AND DCM BARRETT. WAZZAN'S CHIEF AIDE WAS PRESENT. WAZZAN WAS THOUGHTFUL, POLITE, BUT CRITICAL OF RECENT DEVELOPMENTS. THE ISRAELI RAID ON IRAQ OVERHUNG THE ENTIRE CONVERSATION.

4. WAZZAN EMPHASIZED THE NEED FOR THE LEBANESE FRONT (PHALANGE) TO COOPERATE WITH THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT AND ABANDON THE PATH OF FORCE. HE EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR THE INVOLVEMENT OF THE ARAB LEAGUE AND THE QUADRIPARTITE COMMITTEE IN THE LEBANESE QUESTION, SAYING IT WAS BETTER THAT THESE OUTSIDE COUNTRIES ACT TOGETHER, RATHER THAN INDIVIDUALLY PULL STRINGS WITH THEIR SUPPORTERS IN LEBANON. HE THOUGHT THIS INVOLVEMENT COULD HELP, AND HE ACKNOWLEDGED MY ROLE IN HAVING BROUGHT IT ABOUT, BUT HE EMPHASIZED THAT IT WAS UP TO THE LEBANESE THEMSELVES TO WORK OUT THEIR DIFFERENCES. HE THOUGHT THIS WAS MORE UNDERSTOOD NOW THAT THE QUADRIPARTITE COMMITTEE HAD PRODUCED SUCH MEAGER RESULTS, AT LEAST FOR THE TIME BEING. THE LEBANESE HAD EXPECTED MUCH BUT NOW SAW MORE

PAGE 03

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THAN EVER THAT THE PROBLEM WAS MAINLY THEIRS TO SOLVE. THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT, SINCE IT REPRESENTED ALL LEBANESE, HAD THE MAIN ROLE. THE PROCESS STARTED BY THE BATY AD-DIN MEETING WAS THE ONLY RECOURSE LEBANON HAD AND HE HOPED IT COULD BE PURSUED TO A GOOD END.

5. AS USUAL, AL-WAZZAN DEFENDED THE SYRIAN ARMY AND THE UNWILLINGNESS OF THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT TO INTERFERE IN ITS OPERATIONS. HE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT PRESIDENT SARKIS WAS NOMINALLY THE COMMANDER OF THE ADF BUT SAID SINCE THE SYRIANS HAD COME IN AT THE REQUEST OF THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT TO HELP IT, THE GOVERNMENT COULD NOT INTERFERE WITH ITS TACTICAL DECISIONS. HE ALSO CITED AN EXAMPLE OF THE UNPROVOKED ASSAULTS PERPETRATED ON INDIVIDUAL SYRIAN SOLDIERS, WHICH EXPLAINED SOMEWHAT THE SYRIAN WILLINGNESS TO RETALIATE SO STRONGLY.

6. WHEN I STARTED TO POSE SPECIFIC QUESTION RELATING TO MY MISSION, AL-WAZZAN IMMEDIATELY WENT ON TO SAY HOW BADLY THE ISRAELI RAID ON THE IRAQI NUCLEAR FACILITIES HAD HURT US AND OUR POSITION IN THE REGION. HE SPOKE AT LENGTH OF THE SHAME THIS HAD CAUSED TO ALL ARABS, THEY THEY, A RICH AND NUMEROUS PEOPLE, SHOULD SUFFER SUCH A HUMILIATION. HE SAID EFFORTS WOULD BE MADE TO WIPE OUT THIS SHAME AND THIS BODED ILL FOR THE

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US, AND WELL FOR THE USSR, WHICH COULD JUST SIT IDLY BY AND REAP THE BENEFITS OF THE ACTIONS OF THE USG'S SPOILED CHILD, WHICH FEARS NEITHER PUNISHMENT NOR EVEN SCOLDING FROM ITS INDULGENT FATHER.

[REDACTED]

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ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ADS-00 SSO-00 /031 W
-----266415 101641Z /43

O P 101430Z JUN 81
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2339
INFO AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS PRIORITY
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY JIDDA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT PRIORITY
USLO RIYADH PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY
WHITE HOUSE PRIORITY

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[REDACTED] SECTION 02 OF 02 BEIRUT 3836

EXDIS

7. MY STRONG REMINDER THAT THE US HAD CONDEMNED THE RAID AND HAD NOT KNOWN OF THE RAID IN ADVANCE, MADE LITTLE OR NO IMPRESSION ON HIM, ALTHOUGH HE WAS POLITE. HE SAID NO ONE BELIEVED THAT THE US COULD NOT HAVE KNOWN OF THE RAID, IN VIEW OF THE AMERICAN CAPABILITIES, SPECIFICALLY THE AWACS.

8. I DESCRIBED TO AL-WAZZAN THE EVER-SERIOUS NEED TO DEAL WITH THE ISSUES INVOLVED ON MY MISSION. HE SAID THAT THE PRESENTLY PROPOSED PLAN, FOR PHALANGE WITHDRAWAL FROM ZAHLE AND INTERNAL SECURITY FORCE ENTRY INTO THE CITY, WAS THE ONLY PRACTICAL ONE. HE HOPED THE SYRIAN BLOCKADE WOULD BE LIFTED. HE SAID THERE WAS NO REASON FOR AND NO POSSIBILITY OF A SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL FROM THE SANNIIN RIDGELINE. (IN THIS RESPECT HE WAS MORE NEGATIVE THAN SARKIS.) HE DID NOT RESPOND AT ALL TO

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MY MENTION OF THE MISSILES, IMPLYING THAT, AFTER THE ISRAELI RAID, THE SYRIANS WOULD NOT, AND NO ONE WOULD

[REDACTED]

PAGE 02 BEIRUT 03836 02 OF 02 101638Z

MAKE THEM, TAKE ANY ACTION WHICH SEEMED AT THE BEHEST OF ISRAEL AND THE US. HE SMILINGLY EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT I MIGHT STAY AROUND THE REGION FOR A WEEK OR TWO TO PREVENT THAT PARTICULAR PROBLEM, THE MISSILES, FROM ESCALATING, WHICH I HAD PRESENTED TO HIM AS A REAL THREAT.

9. WHEN I ASKED AL-WAZZAN IF HE HAD ANY ADVICE FOR ME, HE SAID HE HAD JUST ONE REQUEST. THAT IN MY CONTACTS WITH THE LEBANESE FRONT I SHOULD URGE THEM TO CHOOSE THE WAY OF DETENT AND PEACEFUL DISCUSSION OVER THE USE OF FORCE. THE FACTIONS ON THE OTHER (MUSLIM) SIDE WERE NOT BEARING ARMS AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT, OR OPERATING INDEPENDENT LOCAL ADMINISTRATIONS. THE LEBANESE FRONT SHOULD SEE THAT IT IS IN THEIR INTEREST TO WORK WITH OTHER LEBANESE SO THE LEBANESE COULD FACE, ON A BASIS OF UNITY, SUCH PROBLEMS AS THAT OF THE PALESTINIANS. THE GOVERNMENT DID NOT HAVE FOR FORCE TO OBLIGE THE LEBANESE FRON TO CHOOSE THE PEACEFUL PATH. HE HOPED THA WE COULD PERSUADE IT IN THAT DIRECTION.
DEAN

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[REDACTED]

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*** Current Handling Restrictions *** EXDIS
*** Current Classification *** [REDACTED]

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PAGE 01
ORIGIN SS-15

STATE 148521

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INFO OCT-00 ADS-00 SSO-00 /015 R

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DRAFTED BY: NEA/NAVELIOTES
APPROVED BY: NEA/NAVELIOTES
NEA:VELIOTES
S/S-O: WMCGLYNNR 062133Z JUN 81
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
INFO AMEMBASSY PARIS

-----175547 062212Z /71

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

☒ RELEASE☐ EXCISE☐ DENY☒ DECLASSIFY☐ DECLASSIFY

IN PART

EO Citations

STATE 148521

DECLASSIFIED

FOIA Exemptions

PA Exemptions

CLASSIFY as () S or () C Sec.

DOWNGRADE TS to () S or () C

FOLLOWING DAMASCUS 3642 DTD 06 JUN, SENT ACTION GENEVA
INFO STATE BEIRUT TEL AVIV, BEING REPEATED FOR YOUR INFO:

QUOTE [REDACTED] DAMASCUS 03642

EXDIS FOR HABIB

E.O. 12065: GDS 6/6/87 (SEELYE, TALCOTT W.) OR-M

TAGS: PEPR, MOPS, LE, US, SY, XF

SUBJECT: MESSAGE FOR PRESIDENT ASSAD FROM AMBASSADOR
HABIB

REF: STATE 148053 (NOTAL)

1. (C- ENTIRE TEXT).

2. DELIVERED YOUR MESSAGE TO QABBANI THIS MORNING,
JUNE 6, FOR TRANSMITTAL TO ASSAD. WHILE NOTING THE
ABSENCE OF SUBSTANCE, QABBANI COMMENTED FAVORABLY ON
THE TENOR OF THE MESSAGE.3. HE TOOK THIS OPPORTUNITY TO CONDEMN USG FAILURE
SPECIFICALLY TO REFUTE BEGINS PUBLIC CLAIM THAT,
IN YOUR MEETINGS WITH HIM, YOU HAD NOT RPT NOT TAKEN
EXCEPTION TO BEGINS UNDERTAKING TO RESUME ATTACKS

PAGE 02 STATE 148521

ON PALESTINIAN BASES IN LEBANON. QABBANI WAS AWARE
OF DEPT PRESS SPOKESMANS STATEMENT DENYING WE HAVE
GIVEN ISRAEL "GREEN LIGHT" IN THIS REGARD, BUT QABBANI
THOUGHT THIS WAS INADEQUATE.4. I REPLIED THAT I THOUGHT THAT PRESS SPOKESMAN'S
STATEMENT FULLY CLARIFIED OUR POSITION, NAMELY, THAT THE
USG DOES NOT RPT NOT ENDORSE THE CURRENT ISRAELI ATTACKS
IN LEBANON. YOUR TALKS WITH BEGIN, I SAID, SHOULD BE
VIEWED IN THIS CONTEXT. IT IS HARDLY CONCEIVABLE THAT

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YOU WOULD CONSIDER YOUR MISSION OTHER THAN ADVERSELY
AFFECTED BY SUCH ATTACKS. WE COULD NOT RPT NOT,
HOWEVER, GO BEYOND THE 'GENERAL STATEMENT ALLUDED TO AND
REFER TO THE SPECIFICS OF THE HABIB-BEGIN DISCUSSIONS
SINCE IT IS OUR PRACTICE NOT RPT NOT TO REVEAL THE
SUBSTANCE OF CONFIDENTIAL DIPLOMATIC EXCHANGES.
SEELYE UNQUOTE HAIG

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ACTION SS-30

DAMASC 03642 061114Z

INFO OCT-01 ADS-00 SSO-00 /031 W

-----172761 061114Z /14

O 061045Z JUN 81 ZFF-4

FM AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS

TO USMISSION GENEVA NIACT IMMEDIATE

INFO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2518

AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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IN PART

EO Citations

TS authority

☐ CLASSIFY as ☐ S or ☐ C Sec. ☐ C☐ DOWNGRADE TS to ☐ S or ☐ C

DAMASCUS 03642

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12065: GDS 6/6/87 (SEELYE, TALCOTT W.) OR-M

TAGS: PEPR, MOPS, LE, US, SY, XF

SUBJECT: MESSAGE FOR PRESIDENT ASSAD FROM AMBASSADOR
HABIB

REF: STATE 148053 (NOTAL)

1. ~~ENTIRE TEXT~~.2. DELIVERED YOUR MESSAGE TO QABBANI THIS MORNING,
JUNE 6, FOR TRANSMITTAL TO ASSAD. WHILE NOTING THE
ABSENCE OF SUBSTANCE, QABBANI COMMENTED FAVORABLY ON
THE TENOR OF THE MESSAGE.3. HE TOOK THIS OPPORTUNITY TO CONDEMN USG FAILURE
SPECIFICALLY TO REFUTE BEGINS PUBLIC CLAIM THAT,
IN YOUR MEETINGS WITH HIM, YOU HAD NOT RPT NOT TAKEN
EXCEPTION TO BEGINS UNDERTAKING TO RESUME ATTACKS
ON PALESTINIAN BASES IN LEBANON. QABBANI WAS AWARE
OF DEPT PRESS SPOKESMANS STATEMENT DENYING WE HAVE
GIVEN ISRAEL "GREEN LIGHT" IN THIS REGARD, BUT QABBANI
THOUGHT THIS WAS INADEQUATE.

PAGE 02

DAMASC 03642 061114Z

4. I REPLIED THAT I THOUGHT THAT PRESS SPOKESMAN'S
STATEMENT FULLY CLARIFIED OUR POSITION, NAMELY, THAT THE
USG DOES NOT RPT NOT ENDORSE THE CURRENT ISRAELI ATTACKS
IN LEBANON. YOUR TALKS WITH BEGIN, I SAID, SHOULD BE
VIEWED IN THIS CONTEXT. IT IS HARDLY CONCEIVABLE THAT
YOU WOULD CONSIDER YOUR MISSION OTHER THAN ADVERSELY
AFFECTED BY SUCH ATTACKS. WE COULD NOT RPT NOT,
HOWEVER, GO BEYOND THE GENERAL STATEMENT ALLUDED TO AND**UNCLASSIFIED**

REFER TO THE SPECIFICS OF THE HABIB-BEGIN DISCUSSIONS
SINCE IT IS OUR PRACTICE NOT RPT NOT TO REVEAL THE
SUBSTANCE OF CONFIDENTIAL DIPLOMATIC EXCHANGES.
SEELYE

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*** Current Handling Restrictions *** EXDIS
*** Current Classification *** [REDACTED]

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ENCLOSURE= DG ALSO R1, & R3

LOCATOR= TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM

ERRORS= N/A

UNCLASSIFIED

CONCEPTS= PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE, ITINERARY, VISITS

TAGS= MILI, MOPS, PEPR, LE, IS, SY, SA, XF, (HABIB, PHILIP C)

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PAGE 01 STATE 146351
ORIGIN SS-30

FOIA Exemptions _____ TS authority to
PA Exemptions _____ ☐ CLASSIFY as ☐ S or ☐ C Sec. _____
☐ DOWNGRADE TS to ☐ S or ☐ C

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APPROVED BY NEA:MDRAPER
S/S-O JEBECKER
NEA/EX - MR KRYG
NEA - AMB VELIOTES
NEA/ARN - MR HOWELL

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Q 050203Z JUN 81
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE
USLO RIYADH IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY
INFO AMEMBASSY BERN IMMEDIATE
USMISSION GENEVA IMMEDIATE

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3. HABIB STRESSED THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT A REPORT GIVING THE SAUDI IMPRESSION OF THE QUADRIPARTITE MEETING REACH HIM AT ONE OF THESE EUROPEAN STOPS. AL-HUJAYLAN THEN SAID HE THOUGHT THAT PRINCE SAUD MIGHT BE IN LONDON

ON SUNDAY, JUNE 7, TO ACCOMPANY KING KHALID ON HIS VISIT THERE. THE AMBASSADOR THOUGHT THAT THE OFFICIAL PART OF THE VISIT COMMENCED ON MONDAY, JUNE 8. HABIB SAID THAT, IN THAT CASE, HE COULD COME OVER QUICKLY TO LONDON FROM PARIS VIA THE MILITARY AIRCRAFT AT HIS DISPOSAL IF THIS WOULD BE HELPFUL, AND THAT HE WOULD HOLD UP ANY PLANS FOR A POSSIBLE ROME VISIT. AL-HUJAYLAN WILL BE LOOKING INTO THIS, BUT EMBASSY JIDDA SHOULD ALSO FOLLOW UP, SQUARING THE CIRCLE IN COMMUNICATIONS TO CROWN PRINCE FAHD AS THE EMBASSY KNOWS HOW BEST TO DO.

4. RETURNING TO THE QUESTION OF HIS INITIAL ITINERARY IN THE MIDDLE EAST, HABIB REPEATED TO AL-HUJAYLAN--AND EMBASSY JIDDA SHOULD INCORPORATE THIS IN ANY OF ITS SOUNDINGS--THAT HE WAS PREPARED TO MAKE SAUDI ARABIA HIS INITIAL STOP AT THIS STAGE OF HIS MIDDLE EAST TRAVELS. HE WOULD APPRECIATE SAUDI ADVICE AGAIN. OTHERWISE, HE COULD GO USEFULLY TO LEBANON OR TO ISRAEL BUT, IN THE

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[REDACTED]

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CASE OF ISRAEL, HE SHOULD HAVE SOMETHING TO SAY ABOUT THE OUTCOME OF THE QUADRIPARTITE MEETINGS.

5. FOR ALL ACTION AND INFO ADDRESSEES: ABOVE CONSTITUTES INTERIM GUIDANCE REGARDING HABIB MISSION TRAVEL PLANS. APPRECIATE YOUR ADVANCE UNDERSTANDING THAT WE MAY NOT BE ABLE TO PUT TOGETHER EXACT ITINERARY AS EARLY AS HOPED. HAIG

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ALL NEAR EASTERN AND SOUTH ASIAN DIPLOMATIC POSTS
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
AMEMBASSY OSLO
AMEMBASSY DUBLIN
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
AMEMBASSY VIENNA
AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN

[REDACTED] STATE 146351

DECAPTIONED

EXDIS - ALLIED POSTS TAKE AS PRIORITY

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[REDACTED]
PAGE 02. STATE 146351

E.O. 12065: RDS 1-3-4, 6/4/91 (DRAPER, MORRIS)

TAGS: MILI, MOPS, LE, IS, SY, SA, XF, PEPR

SUBJECT: HABIB MISSION: FORTHCOMING TRAVEL

1. [REDACTED] ENTIRE TEXT.

2. THE HABIB PARTY WILL BE LEAVING WASHINGTON FOR EUROPE AND THE MIDDLE EAST ON FRIDAY, JUNE 5, VIA TWA 890 ARRIVING PARIS SATURDAY MORNING, JUNE 6. THE PARTY WILL CONSIST OF AMBASSADOR PHILIP C. HABIB, DAS MORRIS DRAPER, AND SECRETARY, MRS. GENEVIEVE BURKOT. PASSPORT AND VISA INFORMATION IN SEPTTEL TO M.E. POSTS.

3. WE WILL OVERNIGHT IN PARIS SATURDAY, JUNE 6, AND LEAVE FOR GENEVA ON SUNDAY, JUNE 7, OR MONDAY, JUNE 8, VIA MILITARY AIRCRAFT, TO MEET WITH PRINCE SAUD. WE WILL KEEP POSTS INFORMED. HABIB IS PREPARED TO MEET WITH FRENCH ON SATURDAY. AFTER GENEVA MEETING, PARTY WILL GO TO BEIRUT.

4. AGAIN, MILITARY AIRCRAFT WILL CARRY HABIB PARTY THROUGH-

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OUT TRAVELS IN THE MIDDLE EAST (REQUIRED INFORMATION ON OVERFLIGHT NEEDS, ACCOMMODATIONS FOR CREW, ETC., WILL NORMALLY BE TRANSMITTED IN MILITARY AND DAO CHANNELS TO INVOLVED POSTS).

5. ONCE AGAIN, WOULD APPRECIATE IT IF EUROPEAN, MIDDLE EASTERN AND NORTH AFRICAN POSTS WOULD RELAY TO POSTS WHERE HABIB PARTY IS STAYING ALL RELEVANT REPORTING TOUCHING ON HABIB MISSION OBJECTIVES, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY. GENERAL AREA DEVELOPMENTS ARE HELPFUL TO MISSION. IF IN DOUBT,

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[REDACTED]

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ERR ON GENEROUS SIDE. IT PROBABLY WOULD BE BEST TO INCLUDE BEIRUT, DAMASCUS, TEL AVIV, JIDDA, JERUSALEM, RIYADH ON ALL SUCH TRAFFIC ROUTINELY FOR THE NEXT WEEK OR SO.

6. ALL SUCH TRAFFIC SHOULD BE SLUGGED "FOR HABIB AND DRAPER."

7. WOULD AGAIN APPRECIATE IT IF HABIB PARTY COULD BE HOUSED TOGETHER, IN OFFICIAL RESIDENCES IF POSSIBLE AND CONVENIENT, OR IN CONTIGUOUS HOTEL ROOMS, AND WITH REASONABLY QUICK ACCESS TO COMMUNICATIONS THROUGH EMBASSY COURIER. IN MIDDLE EAST STOPS, WOULD LIKE TYPEWRITER WITH CORRECT TYPING ELEMENTS FOR CABLE USE AVAILABLE WHEREVER WE ARE HOUSED ALONG WITH CABLE FORMS, STATIONERY, AND SAMPLE FORMAT. ALSO PLEASE PROVIDE LOCAL PRESS SUMMARIES, NEWSPAPERS, INTERNATIONAL EDITIONS, WHEN POSSIBLE, ETC.

8. MEMBERS OF HABIB PARTY WILL REIMBURSE HOSTS FOR EXPENSES INVOLVED FOR MEALS, HOSPITALITY, ETC. THIS IS THE ONLY FAIR ARRANGEMENT BEARING IN MIND THE TIME WE SPENT IN RESIDENCES ON FIRST TRIP, AND WE INTEND TO STICK TO IT.

9. PARTY APPRECIATES SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS AS ON PREVIOUS

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TRIP. UNDERSTAND YOUR RSO HAS ALREADY BEEN ADVISED BY
SEPARATE SY CHANNEL MESSAGE.

10. APPRECIATE YOUR FINE COOPERATION, LAST TIME AND
THIS TIME.

11. GENEVA AND BERN: WE AND SAUDIS WANT TO KEEP MEETING
IN GENEVA AS SECRET AS POSSIBLE. WOULD APPRECIATE HOW
THIS COULD BEST BE DONE. HAIG

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*** Current Handling Restrictions *** EXDIS
*** Current Classification *** [REDACTED]

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PAGE 01
ACTION SS-30

TEL AV 08415 271512Z

INFO OCT-01 ADS-00 SSO-00 /031 W
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O 271503Z MAY 81 ZFF-4

FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

TO AMEMBASSY JIDDA NIACT IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS NIACT IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY BEIRUT NIACT IMMEDIATE

INFO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7348

WHITEHOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE

USLO RIYADH IMMEDIATE

AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

☒ RELEASE☒ DECLASSIFY☒ EXCISE☒ DECLASSIFY☒ DENY

IN PART

EO Citations

TS authority to

FOIA Exemptions

PA Exemptions

☐ CLASSIFY as ☐ S or ☐ C Sec. ☐☐ DOWNGRADE TS to ☐ S or ☐ C

TEL AVIV 08415

DECAPTIONED
EX-11

FROM HABIB

E.O. 12065: RDS 1-3-4 05/27/91 (HABIB, PHILIP)

TAGS: PEPR, MILI, MOPS, IS, US, LE, SY, XF, SA

SUBJECT: HABIB MISSION: TEMPORARY RETURN TO WASHINGTON
FOR CONSULTATIONS1. ~~ENTIRE TEXT.~~

2. FYI: IN EXCHANGES WITH WASHINGTON, IT HAS BEEN
DECIDED THAT I SHOULD GO THERE FOR CONSULTATIONS
WITH THE PRESIDENT AND SECRETARY AND RETURN TO THE
REGION NEXT WEEK. IN YOUR HANDLING OF THIS
DEVELOPMENT, YOU MUST STRESS EMPHATICALLY THAT OUR
DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS ARE CONTINUING AND THAT I WILL
BE RETURNING. FOR VARIOUS REASONS, I HAVE CONCLUDED
IT WILL BE POSSIBLE FOR ME TO LEAVE THE REGION FOR A
FEW DAYS AND LET VARIOUS DEVELOPMENTS--IN PARTICULAR
THE SAUDI INITIATIVE--JELL A LITTLE MORE. END FYI.

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TEL AV 08415 271512Z

3. THE WHITE HOUSE HAS ISSUED A SHORT STATEMENT
WHICH NOTES THAT THE

PRESIDENT HAS ASKED ME TO RETURN FOR CONSULTATIONS
PREPARATORY TO MY CONTINUING THIS IMPORTANT
MISSION.

4. I HAVE JUST MADE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT TO

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PRESIDENT HAD ENTRUSTED ME TO DEAL WITH THE IMMEDIATE PROBLEM OF THE BAKAA AND SANNIN HEIGHTS AND THAT I BELIEVED FIRMLY THAT, IN ADDRESSING THESE PROBLEMS, IT WAS NOT NECESSARY TO JEOPARDIZE THE SECURITY AND NATIONAL INTERESTS OF ANY OF THE PARTIES INVOLVED. WE BELIEVE THAT THE SITUATION THAT HAS ARISEN IS DANGEROUS BECAUSE IT HAS THE CAPACITY TO ESCALATE. THE INTEREST OF ALL PARTIES WOULD BE SERVED BY FINDING A LOGICAL SOLUTION TO THE IMMEDIATE PROBLEMS WHICH WOULD ALLOW LONGER TERM PROBLEMS TO BE DEALT WITH IN A RATIONAL WAY. I THEN DEFINED FOR ASSAD THE ISSUES AS I SAW THEM:

- THE SITUATION IN ZAHLE ITSELF;
- THE SITUATION AROUND ZAHLE;
- THE SITUATION OVERLOOKING ZAHLE AND THE BAKAA UP TO THE SANNIN RIDGELINE;
- THE SITUATION IN THE BEKAA PLAIN INCLUDING THE SECURITY SITUATION AND THE EMPLACEMENT OF THE MISSILES THERE.

I NOTED THAT EACH OF THESE ISSUES COULD BE LOOKED AT FROM THE STANDPOINT OF BEING AN INTERRELATED SET OF NEW

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OCCURRENCES IN WHICH WE COULD RATIONALLY DEFINE THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE LEBANESE AUTHORITIES AND FACTIONS PLUS SYRIA AND ISRAEL.

5. ASSAD RESPONDED THAT IN TAKING MY APPROACH WE HAD TO HAVE A SET OF AGREED-UPON STARTING POINTS WHICH HE THEN PROCEEDED TO DEFINE. WE SHOULD FIRST AGREE THAT WE WERE DEALING WITH LEBANON AS AN INDEPENDENT, UNITARY, AND SOVEREIGN COUNTRY. SECONDLY, THE ADF WAS LOCATED IN LEBANON BY VIRTUE OF A DETERMINATION BY THE LEGITIMATE AUTHORITIES IN LEBANON AND ENDORSED BY PAN-ARAB DECISIONS. I TOLD ASSAD THAT HIS FIRST POINT HAD BEEN THE BASIS OF MY DISCUSSIONS WITH PRESIDENT SARKIS AND THE OTHER LEBANESE WITH WHOM I MET. I HAD STATED THIS PRIVATELY IN THOSE DISCUSSIONS AND PUBLICLY AFTER THE MEETING WITH SARKIS. THIS POSITION WAS AS ENUNCIATED TO ME BY PRESIDENT REAGAN. ON THE SECOND POINT, I REMINDED ASSAD THAT WE HAD SUPPORTED THE ENTRY OF THE ADF IN 1976 AND HAD MADE THAT CLEAR PUBLICLY. NOTHING I WOULD SAY SHOULD BE INTERPRETED TO SUGGEST AN ALTERATION IN THE AUTHORITY OF THE ADF AS DEFINED IN ITS ARAB LEAGUE MANDATE AND ACCEPTED BY US IN 1976. THERE HAVE BEEN CHANGES IN THIS REGARD OVER TIME IN LEBANON AND THE ADF FORMED AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE ONGOING DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN SYRIA AND THE GOL PARALLEL WITH THE EFFORTS FOR NATIONAL RECONCILIATION. ASSAD THEN SAID

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THAT AGREEMENT ON THESE TWKYEXOIMATE FORCE IN THE HANDS OF THE GOL IT WOULD BE WRONG TO REGARD THE ADF AS BEING AGAINST ONE FACTION OR THE OTHER...

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ACTION SS-30

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6. ASSAD THEN REVIEWED THE HISTORY OF ADF INVOLVEMENT IN LEBANON, CONCLUDING WITH THE FAMILIAR THEME THAT SYRIA HAS NO INTEREST IN STAYING IN LEBANON AND IF THE GOL REQUESTED ADF WITHDRAWAL, SYRIA WOULD COMPLY. IN COMMENTING ON MY DESCRIPTION OF THE CURRENT ISSUES, ASSAD EMPHASIZED THAT WHEN THE ADF ENTERED LEBANON IT HAD DONE SO AT THE REQUEST OF THE GOL AND THE CHRISTIANS. OVER TIME AND AS THE RESULT OF PROBLEMS SIMILAR TO THOSE OF TODAY, IT HAD BEEN SUGGESTED THAT THE ADF TURN OVER POSITIONS TO THE LAF AND THE ISF. WHEN SYRIA HAD COMPLIED, THE NET RESULT HAD BEEN THAT THESE POSITIONS HAD THEN BEEN TAKEN OVER BY THE PHALANGISTS OR THE CHAMOUNISTS. THESE AREAS WHICH THE ADF HAD GIVEN UP ARE NOW CONTROLLED BY THE PHALANGE, WHICH EXERCISES IN THEM THE FUNCTIONS OF A GOVERNMENT. LEBANESE "NATIONALIST" FORCES IN AREAS IN WHICH THE ADF IS PRESENTLY LOCATED DO NOT EXERCISE SIMILAR FUNCTIONS AND AUTHORITY OF THE GOL IS WHAT MATTERS IN THOSE AREAS.

7. IN COMMENTING ON ASSADS REMARKS I ASKED WHETHER, AS REGARDS ZAHLE AND SANNIN AND ON THE BASIS OF WHAT ASSAD

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SAID ABOUT SUPPORT FOR THE AUTHORITY OF THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT, WOULD IT BE POSSIBLE TO ARRIVE AT A PROPOSAL IN

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COOPERATION WITH THE GOL WITH APPROPRIATE SAFEGUARDS WHICH WOULD NOT SERVE THE SPECIAL INTEREST OF ANY FACTION YET WOULD SUPPORT THE LEGITIMATE LEBANESE AUTHORITY WHICH WE BOTH SUPPORTED? I COULD SEE A PROPOSAL SUCH AS THIS RUNNING ON A PARALLEL TRACK WITH EFFORTS TOWARDS NATIONAL RECONCILIATION IN A WAY WHICH STRENGTHENED THAT OBJECTIVE AND STILL DEALT WITH A TENSE SITUATION. TURNING TO SPECIFICS, FOR EXAMPLE, ON THE QUESTION OF SANNIN, AT THE PRESENT TIME THERE ARE A NUMBER OF PARTIES ON THE RIDGELINE, SOME ADF, SOME PPS, SOME PHALANGE. IT SEEMS THAT THE ALTERNATIVE IS NOT SIMPLY TO STAY THERE OR TURN OVER POSITIONS TO ONE ELEMENT OR ANOTHER. THE REAL QUESTION WAS WHETHER SYRIA WOULD ACCEPT A SOLUTION TO NEUTRALIZE THE RIDGELINE SO THAT WHATEVER PRESENCE ON THE RIDGE WOULD NOT BE A THREAT TO THE ADF OR ANY OTHER PARTY. SPECIFICALLY, WOULD IT BE POSSIBLE TO PUT TOGETHER A LAF UNIT UNDER THE AUTHORITY OF THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT THAT WOULD NOT BE CONTROVERSIAL IN MAKE-UP AND LEADERSHIP AND THEREFORE ACCEPTABLE TO ALL AND THREATENING TO NONE. IN MY VIEW IT WAS POSSIBLE TO CONSTRUCT SUCH A FORCE. THE PHALANGE WOULD HAVE TO WITHDRAW FROM THE RIDGELINE. THIS WAS A REQUIREMENT. THIS SOLUTION WOULD REMOVE THE PROBLEM OF THE RIDGELINE WHICH WAS ALSO RELATED TO THE PROBLEM OF ZAHLE.

8. ASSAD RESPONDED THAT ANY SOLUTION AGREED ON BY LEGITIMATE AUTHORITIES WOULD BE ACCEPTED BY SYRIA. HE THEN CONTRADICTED HIMSELF BY REPEATING THE STANDARD REFRAIN THAT THERE IS NO NATIONAL ARMY IN LEBANON AND THAT A SIGNIFICANT PORTION OF LAF OFFICERS SUPPORT THE PHALANGE. TURNING THE RIDGELINE OVER TO THE LAF IN EFFECT MEANT GIVING IT TO THE PHALANGE, WHICH HAD NO RIGHT TO BE THERE.

9. I TOLD ASSAD THAT BASED ON MY DISCUSSIONS WITH GOL

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AUTHORITIES I THOUGHT IT WAS POSSIBLE TO FIELD A LEBANESE ARMY PRESENCE WHICH WOULD BE BROADLY ACCEPTED IN TERMS OF ITS LEADERSHIP AND COMPOSITION. HOWEVER, SYRIAS OPINION ON THIS WAS DEEMED TO BE ESSENTIAL BEFORE THE PROCESS COULD MOVE FORWARD. ASSAD HAD EARLIER INDICATED HIS WILLINGNESS TO ACCEPT WHATEVER WAS AGREED UPON WITHIN THE LEBANESE CONTEXT. WE HAD TO CONSIDER THAT THE AUTHORITY OF THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT WAS PARAMOUNT IF WE WERE TO BE CONSISTENT WITH WHAT HAD BEEN AGREED UPON EARLIER RE STRENGTHENING THE AUTHORITY OF THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT.

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10. RE ZAHLE WE SHOULD LOOK AT IT IN THE SAME FRAMEWORK AS SANNIN. THE BEGINNING OF SOLVING THE ZAHLE PROBLEM COULD BE FOUND IN THE CHTAURA AGREEMENT. I THEN ENUNCIATED THE POINTS AS I UNDERSTOOD THEM:

-- THE PHALANGE MILITARY ELEMENTS NOT NATIVE TO THE CITY WOULD LEAVE;

-- ZAHLE WOULD ONCE AGAIN BE OPEN TO DAILY LIFE, I. E., THE BLOCKADE WOULD BE ENDED.

-- ON THE QUESTION OF LAW AND ORDER AN ELEMENT OF THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT WOULD BE USED, EITHER THE LAF, OR THE ISF.

ASSAD NODDED HIS AGREEMENT TO ALL OF THESE ELEMENTS. I ALSO POINTED OUT THAT HAVING THE ISF GO INTO ZAHLE WOULD BROADEN THE CAPABILITY OF THE GOL TO DEAL WITH OTHER PROBLEMS SINCE THE ISF WAS UNDER THE PRIME MINISTERS AUTHORITY. THESE CONCEPTS ON BOTH SANNIN AND ZAHLE HAD DEVELOPED

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EXDIS

CORRECTED COPY (TEXT - PARA 13)

FROM MY CONVERSATION IN LEBANON AS WELL AS MY DISCUSSION YESTERDAY WITH KHADDAM. ON THESE TWO ISSUES I COULD SENSE SOME COMMON DIRECTION. I WANTED TO REEMPHASIZE, HOWEVER,

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THAT WE WOULD PROPOSE NOTHING THAT WOULD JEOPARDIZE THE SECURITY OF THE ADF OR THE LEGITIMACY AND SOVEREIGNTY OF THE GOVERNMENT OF LEBANON.

11. I THEN TURNED TO THE ISSUE OF THE MISSILES, RECOGNIZING THAT THEIR EMPLACEMENT HAD BEEN PRECEDED BY A CLASH BETWEEN ISRAEL AND ADF GROUND FORCES, THE FIRST SUCH TO HAVE OCCURRED. THE SYRIAN ACTION HAD FLOWED FROM THE NEW CIRCUMSTANCE OF THE ISRAELI ACTION. I WAS NOT QUESTIONING THE RIGHT OF SYRIAN TROOPS TO DEFEND THEMSELVES, BUT I WAS MORE INTERESTED IN THE PRINCIPLE THAT HAD SUSTAINED THE AVOIDANCE OF CLASHES BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES PRIOR TO APRIL 28. MENTIONING MY FORTHCOMING TRIP TO ISRAEL, I ASKED IF THERE WERE NOT A FORMULA WHICH WE COULD USE TO RETURN THE SITUATION TO A NON-CONFRONTATIONAL ONE WHERE THERE WOULD BE NO DANGER TO THE ADF AND NO SET OF CIRCUMSTANCES THAT PRODUCED NEW CIRCUMSTANCES AND NEW CONDITIONS.

12. ASSAD RESPONDED WITH SOME DETERMINATION THAT THE

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PROBLEM WAS NOT WITH SYRIA BUT WITH ISRAEL. HE DESCRIBED THE SAMS AS AN AIR DEFENSE WEAPON WHICH HAD BEEN INTRODUCED TO DEFEND SYRIAN FORCES. THE ADF WAS IN LEBANON AS A LEGITIMATE FORCE. ISRAELI VIOLATION OF LEBANESE AIR SPACE VIOLATED LEBANESE SOVEREIGNTY, SOMETHING TO WHICH SYRIA HAD NEVER AGREED. I SAID IT WAS NOT A QUESTION OF RECOGNIZING ISRAEL'S RIGHT TO USE LEBANESE AIR SPACE BUT A QUESTION OF NOT CHANGING PREEXISTING CONDITIONS. BOTH ISRAEL AND SYRIA HAD DONE THAT BY THEIR ACTIONS. WE WANT TO WORK IN THE DIRECTION OF RESTORING THE PREVIOUS SITUATION. THIS WOULD NOT GIVE ANY RIGHTS TO ISRAEL NOR REDUCE THE AUTHORITY OF THE GOL. THE GOL HAD TOLD ME THAT THE ISSUE OF HELICOPTERS AND SAMS SHOULD BE SETTLED BETWEEN SYRIA AND ISRAEL. I WOULD SEEK PARALLEL RESTRAINT IN ISRAEL SO AS TO AVOID THE DANGER OF ESCALATION. I ASKED ASSAD SPECIFICALLY WHAT HE WOULD WANT ME TO SAY IN ISRAEL THAT WOULD HELP TO RETURN TO THE PREVIOUS SITUATION IN WHICH THERE WERE NO CLASHES AND TENSION. THIS WAS A PRACTICAL PROBLEM AND I WOULD BE BALANCED IN MY APPROACH IN ADDRESSING IT IN ISRAEL AS I HAD TRIED TO BE IN MY DISCUSSIONS IN LEBANON AND SYRIA.

13. ASSAD RESPONDED WITH SOME FIRMNESS, STATING THAT THE BEKAA WAS NEXT TO SYRIA'S FRONTIER, NOT ISRAEL'S. SYRIA DID NOT HAVE THE RIGHT TO ASK ISRAEL TO REMOVE ITS DEFENSIVE UNITS; THE SAME WAS TRUE FOR ISRAEL. ISRAEL HAD NO RIGHT TO STRIKE AGAINST SYRIAN FORCES AND THEN EXPECT THEM NOT TO DEFEND THEMSELVES. IT HAD NO RIGHT TO INTERVENE IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF A SOVEREIGN AND INDEPENDENT COUNTRY. I TOLD ASSAD I UNDERSTOOD THE FRAMEWORK OF HIS CONCERNS. WE WERE NOT ASKING THAT SYRIAN UNITS NOT DEFEND THEMSELVES. WE WERE ASKING IF IT WERE POSSIBLE TO CREATE A

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SITUATION WHEREBY THE NEED WOULD NOT EXIST AND THE TENSION

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ENDED. I FELT THAT I HAD NOT GOT ALL THE ANSWERS THAT I WANTED FROM ASSAD BUT I HAD ALL OF THE QUESTIONS. I COULD SEE THE EMERGENCE OF A CONSENSUS ON TWO OF THE THREE RELATED ISSUES, I.E. SANNIN AND ZAHLE AND THE SURROUNDING AREA. THE QUESTION WAS WHAT TO DO WITH THE THIRD ISSUE, THE BEKAA PLAIN, THE CLASH WITH ISRAEL AND THE SYRIAN REACTION. ON THIS ISSUE WE SHOULD ENDEAVOR TO FIND A WAY TO RECREATE A SITUATION WHERE NEW CLASHES WOULD NOT ARISE AND THERE WAS NO DANGER OF ESCALATION.

14. ASSAD SAID HE WANTED TO COMMENT ON THE THIRD POINT ABOUT REMOVING THE DANGER OF ESCALATION IN THE SITUATION. IT WAS CLEAR THIS MEANT WITHDRAWAL OF THE AIR DEFENSE WEAPONS. THIS WORARABPAGE AND LEFT SYRIA WITH NOTHING. WHAT WAS NEW IN THE SITUATION WAS THE ISRAELI ATTACK ON SYRIAN GROUND FORCES IN THE BEKAA. BY ASKING FOR THE MISSILES TO BE REMOVED, THE SITUATION WOULD NOT BE RESTORED TO ITS PREVIOUS CONDITION. THE U.S. WAS SAYING THAT SYRIA SHOULD WITHDRAW THE MISSILES IN ORDER TO PREVENT AN ISRAELI ATTACK. ASSAD SAID IF THERE WERE AN ATTACK BY ISRAEL IT WOULD BE AN ATTACK UNDER AN AMERICAN DECISION. HE WOULD NOT ACCEPT ANY DEMANDS BY ISRAEL. HE DID NOT WANT A WAR BUT IF ISRAEL WANTED ONE SYRIA WOULD FIGHT WITHOUT ANY RELUCTANCE. SYRIA HAD NOT ENTERED LEBANON TO ATTACK ISRAEL AND THIS WAS WELL KNOWN BY ALL. TO ASK SYRIA NOT TO DEFEND ITSELF, HOWEVER, WAS UNPRECEDENTED. I RESPONDED THAT WE WERE NOT BACKING THE ISRAELI ACTION OF ATTACKING THE SYRIAN FORCE AND WE WERE NOT ASKING SYRIA NOT TO DEFEND ITSELF. WHAT WE WERE TRYING TO DO WAS TO CREATE CONDITIONS WHICH WOULD AVOID THE KIND OF CLASH WHICH HAD TAKEN PLACE. WE WERE TRYING TO RECREATE A SITUATION WHERE ISRAEL WOULD REFRAIN FROM CERTAIN ACTIONS, AS WOULD SYRIA. WE WERE NOT SUGGESTING A ONE-SIDED

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AFFAIR DEPENDING ON SYRIAN ACTIONS. THE ISSUE WAS WHETHER IT WAS POSSIBLE TO RETURN TO A SITUATION WHICH HAD EXISTED FOR FIVE YEARS, TO WHICH ASSAD RESPONDED THAT IT DEPENDED ON ISRAEL, NOT SYRIA.

15. I TOLD ASSAD THAT HIS OBSERVATION WAS AN INTERESTING ONE. I WILL GO TO ISRAEL FOR DISCUSSIONS ON THE GENERAL PROBLEMS AND HOW TO ACHIEVE A BALANCE AMONG THE PARTIES. IT WOULD BE NECESSARY FOR ME TO RETURN TO BEIRUT TO DISCUSS ZAHLE AND SANNIN WITH THE GOL. I THOUGHT IT WOULD BE USEFUL IF I SUMMED UP OUR DISCUSSIONS SO THAT ASSAD HAD AN IDEA IN WHICH DIRECTION I WAS PROCEEDING:

--RE SANNIN, SYRIA HAS NO INTRINSIC DESIRE FOR THE ADF TO BE STATIONED THERE AND WOULD NOT REJECT THE POSSIBILITY OF LEBANESE AUTHORITIES TO ASSUME RESPONSIBILITY THERE IN A WAY WHICH THREATENED NO ELEMENT AND SUPPORTS THE INTEGRITY OF LEBANON.

--RE ZAHLE THE PRINCIPLES OF THE CHTAURA AGREEMENT SHOULD BE REVIVED WITH THE GOL TAKING THE LEAD AS APPROPRIATE ON

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THE NECESSARY ELEMENTS, INCLUDING THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE "STRANGERS," AN OPEN CITY, ENDING THE BLOCKADE, RETURN TO A NORMAL SITUATION AND A LEBANESE ELEMENT, IN PRINCIPLE THE ISF, TO RESTORE AUTHORITY IN THE CITY.

--RE THE PROBLEM OF THE BEKAA PLAIN, I WOULD BE DISCUSSING THE GENERAL SITUATION WITH ISRAEL ALONG THE LINES OF SEEKING THE RE-CREATE A SITUATION WHERE SUCH ACTIONS THAT LED TO THE CURRENT TENSION WOULD NOT RECUR. I WOULD NOT SUGGEST THAT SYRIA DID NOT HAVE THE RIGHT OF SELF-DEFENSE BUT WOULD TRY TO SUGGEST THAT CONDITIONS OF THE PAST BECOME THE PATTERN OF THE FUTURE.

16. I BELIEVED IT WOULD BE USEFUL FOR ME TO CONTINUE MY MISSION AND SAID THAT I HOPED ASSAD WOULD PERMIT ME TO RETURN IF NECESSARY FOR FURTHER TALKS. I FELT THE NEED FOR A SENSE OF URGENCY IN RESOLVING THE ISSUES. ASSAD SAID

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I WOULD BE WELCOME TO RETURN.

17. COMMENT: ASSAD INDICATED FLEXIBILITY ON THE PROBLEM OF ZAHLE, I.E., THE CHTAURA AGREEMENT COULD BE AN ACCEPTABLE BASIS FOR SETTLING THIS PROBLEM. A POSITIVE ELEMENT IS POSSIBLE SYRIAN ACCEPTANCE OF THE PRINCIPLE THAT THE ISF WOULD BE UNDER THE AUTHORITY OF THE GOL RATHER THAN THE ADF. RE THE SANNIN RIDGELINE, IT WAS APPARENT THAT ASSAD HOLDS A DEEP DISTRUST FOR THE LAF. WE WILL HAVE TO TACKLE THIS PROBLEM IN GREATER DETAIL IN ORDER TO CONVINCE HIM THAT AN ACCEPTABLE UNIT CAN BE CREATED WHICH WOULD RETAIN ITS INTEGRITY AND LOYALTY TO THE GOL. FINALLY, ASSAD SHOWED NO FLEXIBILITY ON THE QUESTIONS OF THE MISSILES. THIS WAS TO BE EXPECTED. I SENSED, HOWEVER, THAT HE WAS INTERESTED IN WHAT I WOULD BE HEARING FROM THE ISRAELIS, I.E., WHETHER THERE WAS ANY GIVE IN THEIR POSITION. IN

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SUMMATION, ASSAD WAS TOUGH BUT DID NOT REJECT CONSIDERATION OF ANY OF THE ISSUES. SEELYE

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO ALL NEAR EASTERN AND SOUTH ASIAN DIPLOMATIC POSTS IMMEDIATE

ALL EUROPEAN DIPLOMATIC POSTS

AMEMBASSY TOKYO IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY MOGADISHU IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY BEIJING IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY SUVA IMMEDIATE

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FOIA Exemptions
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ROME ALSO FOR VATICAN, BRUSSELS ALSO FOR USEEC

E.O. 12065: N/A

TAGS: PEPR, MOPS, MILI, LE, US, IS, SY, XF

SUBJECT: LEBANON: RETURN OF AMBASSADOR HABIB FOR
CONSULTATIONS

ALL ALEDP POSTS TAKE AS IMMEDIATE ACTION

1. WHITE HOUSE ISSUED FOLLOWING ANNOUNCEMENT MORNING MAY 27
REGARDING AMBASSADOR HABBIB'S RETURN TO WASHINGTON FOR
CONSULTATIONS:

BEGIN TEXT:
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THE PRESIDENT HAS ASKED AMBASSADOR HABIB TO RETURN TO WASHINGTON FOR CONSULTATIONS ABOUT THE PROGRESS AND FUTURE OF HIS MISSION IN THE MIDDLE EAST. AS THE PRESIDENT'S SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE, AMBASSADOR HABIB HAS BEEN ENGAGED IN TALKS WITH THE LEADERS OF LEBANON, SYRIA, ISRAEL, AND SAUDI ARABIA DURING THE LAST THREE WEEKS. THE PRESIDENT BELIEVES THAT THIS IS AN APPROPRIATE MOMENT TO RECEIVE FIRST HAND AMBASSADOR HABIB'S VIEWS AND TO DISCUSS WITH HIM THE FUTURE OF

HIS CONTINUING MISSION IN THE CONTEXT OF EFFORTS PEACEFULLY TO RESOLVE THE CRISIS INVOLVING EVENTS IN LEBANON.

END TEXT.

2. POSTS MAY USE FOLLOWING ADDITIONAL GUIDANCE REGARDING HABIB'S RETURN ON AN IF ASKED BASIS:

Q: WHEN WILL AMBASSADOR HABIB RETURN? HOW LONG WILL HE BE IN WASHINGTON?

A: HE WILL BE ARRIVING IN WASHINGTON ON THURSDAY. HIS SCHEDULE AT THIS TIME IS FLEXIBLE AND I CANNOT TELL YOU EXACTLY WHEN HE WILL RETURN TO THE MIDDLE EAST.

Q: HOW WOULD YOU CHARACTERIZE THE PROGRESS OF HIS MISSION?

A: WE ARE PLEASED THAT AMBASSADOR HABIB HAS BEEN WELL RECEIVED BY THE LEADERS OF THE COUNTRIES HE HAS VISITED AND THAT HE HAS FOUND THAT ALL WISH TO AVOID HOSTILITIES. THE DIPLOMATIC PROCESS INITIATED BY AMBASSADOR HABIB'S MISSION WILL CONTINUE, AND WE WILL REMAIN ENGAGED IN THE EFFORT TO FIND A PEACEFUL RESOLUTION OF THE CRISIS. BEYOND THAT I WILL NOT TRY TO CHARACTERIZE THE RESULTS OF AMBASSADOR UNCLASSIFIED

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HABIB'S MISSION. HAIG

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RIYADH FOR AMBASSADOR HABIB/DRAPER

E.O. 12065: RDS-I 5/16/01 (DEAN, JOHN GUNTHER) OR-M

TAGS: PEPR, PINT, PINS, LE, SY, IS

SUBJECT: (C) MEETING WITH PRIME MINISTER AL-WAZZAN - MAY 16

1. ~~ENTIRE TEXT~~

2. SATURDAY MORNING, MAY 16, I CALLED ON PRIME MINISTER SHAFIQ AL-WAZZAN AT HIS REQUEST. ONE HOUR EARLIER THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR HAD MET WITH THE PRIME MINISTER.

3. THE PRIME MINISTER ASKED WHETHER I COULD TELL HIM ANYTHING ABOUT THE MOVEMENT OF THE AMERICAN NAVY SHIPS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN, AND SPECIFICALLY WHETHER ANY MEANING SHOULD BE ATTACHED TO REPORTS THAT THE SS FORRESTAL WAS MOVING TOWARD THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN. I REPLIED THAT

[REDACTED]

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I HAD NO INFORMATION ON THIS SUBJECT.

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4. THE PRIME MINISTER THEN ASKED IF I KNOW ANYTHING ABOUT SOVIET NAVAL ACTIVITY IN THE MEDITERRANEAN. AGAIN I REPLIED THAT I HAD NO INFORMATION, ALTHOUGH I NOTED THAT SOME PRESS STORIES HAD REPORTED SUCH MOVEMENTS.

5. TURNING TO A DIFFERENT SUBJECT, AL-WAZZAN SAID THAT HE HAD BEEN APPROACHED BY SOME FORMER PRIME MINISTERS (HE SPECIFICALLY MENTIONED RASHID KARAMI) WHO VOICED DISAPPOINTMENT IN WHAT APPEARED TO THEM TO BE AMBASSADOR HABIB'S DEFENSE OF CERTAIN ISRAELI POSITIONS. KARAMI TOLD AL-WAZZAN THAT IN ESSENCE ISRAEL IS ASKING SYRIA TO AGREE TO THREE NEW ELEMENTS IN THE CURRENT SITUATION: (1) THE ISRAELIS HAVE THE RIGHT TO ATTACK THE ADF; (2) THE ISRAELIS HAVE THE RIGHT TO DOMINATE LEBANESE SKIES; AND (3) THE ISRAELIS HAVE THE RIGHT TO INTERVENE IN INTERNAL LEBANESE AFFAIRS. PRIME MINISTER AL-WAZZAN SAID THAT HE AND MOST OF THE CONSERVATIVE MUSLIMS FEEL THAT ANY AGREEMENT WORKED OUT BY MR. HABIB MUST IMPLY APPROVAL FOR THESE THREE ISRAELI DEMANDS. THE GOL IN ANY CASE CANNOT ACCEPT THEM.

6. PRIME MINISTER AL-WAZZAN SAID THAT HE HOPED PRESIDENT REAGAN WOULD USE HIS INFLUENCE IN ISRAEL TO GET THE ISRAELIS TO BACK OFF FROM THE CONFRONTATION. AL-WAZZAN SAID BEGIN IS PUBLICLY SUPPORTING ONE OF THE SIDES IN THIS "TRIBAL STRUGGLE" IN LEBANON. AL-WAZZAN THOUGHT THIS WAS A MISTAKE AND HE HOPED THE U.S. WOULD NOT LET ITSELF BE SUCKED INTO THIS EMBROGLIO WHICH IS EXACTLY WHAT WOULD HAPPEN IF WE DID NOT STOP THE ISRAELIS FROM TAKING MILITARY ACTION.

[REDACTED]

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7. HE THOUGHT PERHAPS ONE WAY TO DEFUSE THE CRISIS, IN ADDITION TO THE UNITED STATES MAKING IT KNOWN TO THE ISRAELIS THAT ADDITIONAL TIME WAS NEEDED TO DEAL WITH THE SITUATION, WAS FOR THE LEBANESE AND SYRIANS TO START AGAIN THEIR DISCUSSIONS IN BEIRUT AND MAKE CAUTIOUS PROGRESS ON ONE OR TWO ITEMS. IN THIS MANNER, IT IS POSSIBLE THAT SUFFICIENT TIME WILL ELAPSE AND THE ATMOSPHERE WILL CHANGE SUFFICIENTLY SO THAT THE ISRAELI-SYRIAN CONFRONTATION MIGHT DISSIPATE BY ITSELF.

8. WITH REGARD TO THE LEBANESE-SYRIAN DIMENSION OF THE CURRENT CRISIS, AL-WAZZAN NOTED THAT THE SYRIANS ARE BECOMING MORE AND MORE ADAMANT THAT DEPLOYMENT OF

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THE LEBANESE ARMY ON THE SANNIN RIDGE IS NOT AN ACCEPTABLE ALTERNATIVE. PERHAPS THE EASIEST WAY TO HANDLE THE SANNIN PROBLEM WOULD BE TO AGREE THAT NOBODY OCCUPIES THE HILLTOPS AND THAT SATELLITE PHOTOGRAPHY WOULD INSURE THAT THE POSITIONS REMAINED EMPTY. IF SYRIAN-LEBANESE NEGOTIATIONS WERE TO START UP AGAIN IN BEIRUT AND THE PHALANGE WERE TO APPROACH THESE TALKS IN A CONCILIATORY SPIRIT, PERHAPS PROGRESS COULD BE MADE.

9. AL-WAZZAN ASKED ME TO EXPRESS HIS PERSONAL THANKS AND THAT OF THE MODERATE ELEMENTS HE REPRESENTS FOR THE STRENUOUS EFFORT THE U.S. GOVERNMENT THROUGH MR. HABIB IS MAKING TO PREVENT FURTHER VIOLENCE IN LEBANON.

10. BEFORE LEAVING I INFORMED THE PRIME MINISTER ABOUT THE DEPARTMENT'S DECISION TO EVACUATE OUR DEPENDENTS. I ALSO TOLD HIM THAT WE WOULD INFORM THE AMERICAN COMMUNITY INFORMALLY ABOUT THIS DEVELOPMENT, SUGGESTING THAT ONLY AMERICAN WHO NEED TO BE IN LEBANON SHOULD REMAIN HERE. AL-WAZZAN TOOK NOTE OF THIS

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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PAGE 04 BEIRUT 03130 161331Z

DECISION, AND SAID IT WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY BE INTERPRETED BY THE LEBANESE PUBLIC AS AN INDICATION THAT MORE VIOLENCE LIES AHEAD. HE HOPED THAT THE DEPARTURE OF OUR DEPENDENTS COULD BE GIVEN MINIMUM PUBLICITY. I REPLIED THAT I WOULD WORK IN THAT DIRECTION.

DEAN

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ACTION SS-30

DAMASC 02881 01 OF 04 110744Z

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INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE

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SECTION 01 OF 04 DAMASCUS 02881

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EXCISE FROM HABIB

E.O. 12065: RDS-1-3-4 5/10/01 (HABIB, PHILIP)
TAGS: PEPR, MILI, MOPS, LE, SY, IS, US, XF
SUBJECT: HABIB MISSION: MEETING WITH PRESIDENT ASSAD

REF: DAMASCUS 2877✓

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2. I HAD LENGTHY MEETING SUNDAY WITH PRESIDENT ASSAD WHICH LASTED THREE HOURS AND 45 MINUTES. ALSO IN ATTENDANCE WERE FOREIGN MINISTER KHADDAM, DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER QADDOR, AMBASSADOR SEELYE, DAS DRAPER AND POLOFF ABINGTON. IN MY TALKS WITH ASSAD I DEVELOPED WITH HIM THE SAME THEMES WHICH I EMPLOYED IN MY DISCUSSION YESTERDAY EVENING WITH KHADDAM. MY OBJECTIVE WAS TO ENGAGE ASSAD IN DEALING WITH THE SPECIFIC ELEMENTS OF THE SITUATION IN THE BEKAA RATHER THAN THE LARGER GLOBAL ISSUES. I STARTED THE MEETING WITH ASSAD BY GIVING HIM PRESIDENT REAGANS MESSAGE. ASSAD SEEMED TO BE PLEASED BY THE MESSAGE AND INQUIRED ABOUT THE PRESIDENTS HEALTH, WISHING HIM A SPEEDY RECOVERY.

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3. ASSAD PICKED UP ON THE THEME OF DIRECT CONTACT AS EXPRESSED IN THE PRESIDENTS MESSAGE AND STATED THAT THIS IN HIS VIEW WAS THE BEST WAY TO RESOLVE PROBLEMS. HE AGREED THAT WE SHOULD NOT DELAY COOPERATION IN MATTERS OF URGENCY AND I SAID WE ALSO FOUND VALUE IN DIRECT COMMUNICATION.

4. I THEN REPEATED WHAT I SAID TO KHADDAM: THAT THE

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[REDACTED]

HAD SECOND THOUGHTS LATER. I TOLD SHAMIR I THOUGHT SYRIA WANTED TO CONSOLIDATE A KIND OF SUZEREIGNTY OVER EVENTS IN LEBANON AND PREVENT THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN INDEPENDENT CHRISTIAN HEARTLAND.

9. AT THIS JUNCTURE I MADE THE POINT THAT, ACCORDING TO KHADDAM, BASHIR HAD PROPOSED IN A TETE-A-TETE WITH SYRIAN REPRESENTATIVE, GENERAL KHOULY, A SOLUTION WHEREBY LEBANON WAS IN EFFECT PARTITIONED IN A WAY THAT SYRIA GOT THE BEKAA AND PARTS OF LEBANON IT WANTED AND THE PHALANGE GOT THE CHRISTIAN HEARTLAND. BASHIR HAD GIVEN

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ME A DIFFERENT VERSION OF HIS TALKS WITH KHOULY, I.E., THAT HE HAD MERELY ASKED WHAT SYRIA WANTED, THE LOST "FOUR PROVINCES," FOR EXAMPLE, AND GOT NO ANSWER. IN ANY EVENT, I WANTED TO CHECK THIS OUT WITH SARKIS, TO WHOM KHADDAM CLAIMED KHOULY'S VERSION HAD BEEN GIVEN.

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EXDIS

MY SOMEWHAT STARTLED ISRAELI INTERLOCUTORS AND I AGREED THAT WE COULD PROBABLY BELIEVE AT BEST 50 PERCENT OF THE BASHIR AND KHOULY VERSIONS. MY OWN IMPRESSION WAS THAT BASHIR FAVORED A LOOSE FEDERATION OF CANTONS. CHAMOUN ASKED FOR TOTAL WITHDRAWAL OF THE SYRIANS WITHIN SIX MONTHS, WHICH IS OBVIOUSLY NOT IN THE CARDS, ALTHOUGH IT REMAINS OUR LONG-TERM GOAL TO GET THEM OUT. I SAID THAT CHAMOUN HAS A GREAT FAITH IN ISRAELI CAPACITY TO INFLUENCE EVENTS IN LEBANON. I SAID I DID, TOO, BUT I DIDN'T NECESSARILY WANT TO SEE THEM EXERCISE IT. THIS GOT A LAUGH.

10. I EMPHASIZED THAT THE SYRIANS HAD NOT REJECTED MY DELIBERATE INSISTENCE ON PARALLEL PROGRESS ON BOTH THE INTERNAL LEBANESE AND THE "INTERNATIONAL" (I.E., SYRIAN-ISRAELI) TRACKS. ASSAD HAD EVEN PAID LIP SERVICE TO THE LINKAGE, FOR WHILE HE KEPT INSISTING THAT DEPLOYMENT OF THE SAM'S WAS MERELY FOR SELF-DEFENSE OF THE ADF HE ALSO HAD SAID THAT IF THE GOL WERE TO REQUEST THAT THE MISSILES BE WITHDRAWN HE WOULD DO SO. THIS WAS OBVIOUSLY A SMOKESCREEN BUT IT HAD PROMPTED ME TO PLAY WITH THE IDEA OF GETTING SARKIS TO MAKE SUCH A REQUEST AS PART OF A PARALLEL COORDINATED PROCESS WHEREBY

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SYRIAN SAM'S WERE REMOVED FROM THE BEKAA (HERE I NOTED IN PASSING THAT THE ISRAELIS HAD HITHERTO MANAGED TO LIVE WITH SAM-6'S ON THE SYRIAN-LEBANESE BORDER) AND THERE WOULD BE NO ISRAELI THREAT TO THE ADF. (HERE I NOTED THAT BEFORE THE CRISIS THE ONLY ATTACK ON THE ADF HAD BEEN A SINGLE ARTILLERY SHELLING OF AN ADF UNIT NORTH OF NABATTIYAH, WHICH THE ISRAELIS HAD PROMPTLY LABELED AS A MISTAKE.) THUS BOTH ISRAEL AND SYRIA COULD TOGETHER GO BACK TO THE STATUS QUO ANTE WITHOUT

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LOSS OF FACE. THERE WOULD BE NO VICTOR AND NO VANQUISHED. WHAT DID THE ISRAELIS THINK OF THE CONCEPT AS I HAD ELABORATED IT YESTERDAY AND TODAY?

11. AT THAT POINT THERE WAS LENGTHY SILENCE. FINALLY SHAMIR SAID WHAT I HAD BEEN WAITING TO HEAR: "YOUR CONCEPT IS GOOD, BUT WILL THEY (THE SYRIANS) ACCEPT IT?" I QUICKLY MOVED IN TO POINT OUT THAT ISRAEL WOULD HAVE TO DO ITS SHARE TO MAKE A RECREATION OF THE STATUS QUO ANTE ACROSS THE BOARD WORKABLE. IN SUM, ISRAEL WOULD HAVE TO AGREE NOT TO ATTACK THE ADF WHERE IT HAS BEEN SINCE 1976 (INCLUDING HELICOPTERS) IN RETURN FOR THE SYRIAN AGREEMENT TO THE STATUS QUO ANTE. SHAMIR DID NOT DISPUTE THIS POINT.

12. WHEN FOREIGN MINISTER SHAMIR SAID THERE MUST BE AN ARRANGEMENT COVERING THE PHALANGISTS, I ASSURED HIM THAT THEIR POSITION WOULD NOT BE JEOPARDIZED. I HAD ALWAYS TAKEN VERY SERIOUSLY PRIME MINISTER BEGIN'S GENUINE CONCERN FOR THE CHRISTIANS. BASHIR WAS NOW IN A PRETTY GOOD POSITION MILITARILY BUT HE HAD TO EXERCISE RESTRAINT. I PRESUMED THAT THE ISRAELIS WERE GIVING HIM SOME GOOD ADVICE TO THAT EFFECT. HE WOULD NOT GO AFTER

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FRANJIAH, FOR EXAMPLE, SINCE THE SYRIANS WOULD THEN INTERVENE.

13. I SAID I WAS CERTAIN THAT A WAY COULD BE FOUND TO GET THE PROPER LAF PRESENCE ON THE SANNIN RIDGE. SARKIS HAD AGREED THAT ALL HE NEEDED WERE 100 WELL-PICKED LAF PERSONNEL. AS FOR ZAHLE, WE COULD PUT IN THE ISF WHICH HAD THE ADVANTAGE OF BEING UNDER THE MINISTRY OF INTERIOR AND THEREFORE UNDER THE MUSLIM PRIME MINISTER WHO THE ISRAELIS READILY AGREED WAS, AS KIMCHE PUT IT, MUCH BETTER THAN AL-HOSS.

14. HERE KIMCHE SAID THAT WE ALL AGREE THAT A RETURN TO THE STATUS QUO ANTE MUST BE THE BASIS FOR ANYTHING TO BE ACHIEVED BUT HOW COULD WE GET IT WITH THE SYRIANS, BASHIR, AND ISRAELIS EACH MAINTAINING A FIRM POSITION AND SARKIS STILL THE WEAK LINK? PICKING UP ON MY EARLIER LEAD, KIMCHE NOTED THAT INDEED ONE WAY OF REACHING THE STATUS QUO ANTE WAS FOR SARKIS TO MAKE A STATEMENT ASKING FOR SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL OF THE SAM'S, FORTHAT WOULD ENABLE THE SYRIANS TO CLIMB DOWN FROM THEIR HIGH TREE. I REPEATED THAT I HADN'T YET EXPLORED THE POSSIBILITY WITH SARKIS

I WOULD NEED SOMETHING FROM BOTH THE SYRIANS AND THE ISRAELIS, BUT THE ROLE OF SARKIS WOULD BE IMPORTANT IN MAKING THE OVERALL

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CONCEPT WORK. THAT'S WHY I WOULD GO FIRST TO BEIRUT--
TO NAIL DOWN SARKIS--AND THEN GO TO DAMASCUS. IN
THIS CONNECTION, I ASSUMED THAT PRIME MINISTER BEGIN
WAS NOT SERIOUS WHEN HE ASKED YESTERDAY, "WHY GO BACK
TO DAMASCUS?" SHAMIR HASTENED TO ASSURE ME THAT WAS
NOT THE CASE.

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15. AGAIN SHAMIR ASKED WHAT I WANTED FROM BEGIN. I
REITERATED: ACCEPTANCE OF STATUS QUO ANTE ACROSS THE
BOARD WITH AN INTERNAL LEBANESE AND AN INTERNATIONAL
(SYRIAN-ISRAELI) PARALLEL TRACK TOWARD REMOVING THE
SAM'S. ISRAEL WOULD AGREE NOT TO ATTACK THE ADF.
AGAIN THERE WAS A LONG SILENCE. DRAPER AND I REMINDED
SHAMIR THAT ASSAD HAD NOT REJECTED THE CONCEPT ALTHOUGH
HE HAD COMPLAINED THAT RESTORATION OF THE STATUS QUO
ANTE WOULD NOT RETURN HIS LOST HELICOPTERS AND SOLDIERS.

16. AT LENGTH, SHAMIR SAID, "MAYBE IT IS POSSIBLE TO
ACCEPT THIS CONCEPT BUT THE DETAILS WOULD BE SO
COMPLICATED." I HASTENED TO ASSURE HIM THAT IF I COULD
GET ACCEPTANCE OF THE STATUS QUO ANTE CONCEPT FOR ZAHLE
AND SANNIN, IT WOULD RAPIDLY ACQUIRE A LIFE OF ITS
OWN FOR APPLICATION ACROSS THE BOARD AND THAT WAS WHY
I HAD LAID OUT MY APPROACH AS I HAD YESTERDAY TO THE
PRIME MINISTER. ON THAT MILDLY ENCOURAGING NOTE WE
ADJOURNED TO MOVE ON TO A VERY INSTRUCTIVE TWO-HOUR
MEETING WITH DEPUTY DEFENCE MINISTER ZIPORI, COS EITAN,
AND DMI SAGI, WHICH IS BEING REPORTED BY SEPTTEL.

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S/S-O:TLRANDALL, JR.
NEA:MDRAPER(SUBS)
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AMEMBASSY ROME IMMEDIATE

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AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS PRIORITY

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EO Citations

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STATE 343274

DECAPTIONED

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR

TAGS: OVIP, OTRA (HABIB, PHILIP, DRAPER, MORRTS) IS,

SUBJECT: TRAVEL PLANS OF AMBASSADORS HABIB AND DRAPER

1. [REDACTED]
2. AS POSTS WILL BE AWARE FROM PRESS REPORTS, AMBASSADORS HABIB AND DRAPER WILL BE RETURNING TO THE REGION NEXT WEEK. THE PRINCIPAL INITIAL STOP WILL BE ISRAEL, BUT DRAPER WILL GO TO BEIRUT FOR ONE DAY IN ORDER TO MEET WITH PRESIDENT GEMAYEL IN ADVANCE OF THEIR JOINT

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STOP IN TEL AVIV.

3. DETAILS OF TRAVEL ARE STILL TENTATIVE, BUT AT PRESENT STACK UP AS FOLLOWS:

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* HABIB PLANS TO LEAVE FLORIDA ON TUESDAY, DECEMBER 14, AND ARRIVE DECEMBER 15 IN ROME FROM NEW YORK ON TWA 840 AT 0915. HE WILL TRANSFER IMMEDIATELY TO A U.S. MILITARY FLIGHT, ARRIVING AT BEN GURION AIRPORT APPROXIMATELY 1500 HOURS ON WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 15. INFORMATION ON POSITIONING AND ARRIVAL OF USAF AIRCRAFT WILL BE PROVIDED TO ROME AND TEL AVIV THROUGH DAO CHANNELS. EMBASSY SHOULD SEEK A MEETING WITH PRIME MTNISTER BEGIN FOR HABIB AND DRAPER ON THURSDAY, DECEMBER 16.

4. DRAPER PLANS TO LEAVE WASHINGTON ON MONDAY, DECEMBER 13 AND IS WAITLISTED ON MEA 210, ARRIVING IN BEIRUT-AT-1610. ALTERNATIVELY, HE WOULD ARRIVE AT 2015 VIA ALTA AIRLINES. EMBASSY SHOULD ARRANGE FOR A MEETING WITH PRESIDENT GEMAYEL ON TUESDAY EVENING OR WEDNESDAY MORNING AND WITH ANYONE ELSE WHOM GEMAYEL WOULD LIKE-HIM TO SEE. DRAPER THEN PLANS TO PROCEED TO ISRAEL ABOUT MID-DAYON WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 16.

5. FOLLOW-ON TRAVEL SCHEDULE IS NOT YET SET AND WILL BE PROVIDED AS PLANS BECOME FIRM.

6. AS USUAL, HABIB AND DRAPER WILL BE TRAVELLING AS P. HARRIS AND M. DAVIS.

7. FOR LEWIS: IN DECEMBER 10 TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH AMBASSADOR ARENS, HABIB MENTIONED FOR ARENS' INFORMATION HIS RETURN TO THE REGION WITH FOCUS ON HIS ARRIVAL IN

[REDACTED]

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ISRAEL AND AN APPOINTMENT WITH PRIME MINISTER BEGIN. DAM

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AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE

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DEPARTMENT PASS AMB. HABIB AND DRAPER

FROM DRAPER MISSION (ROSS)

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PEPR, MOPS, SY, PLO, LE, US, IS

SUBJECT: DRAPER MISSION: ISRAELI VIEW OF NEGOTIATING
- IMPASSE

1. [REDACTED]

2. FOR WHAT IT IS WORTH, ISRAELI MFA LIAISON OFFICER
YITZHAK LEOR WENT OUT OF HIS WAY IN DECEMBER 9 MEETING
WITH ROSS TO SUGGEST THAT BOTH ISRAEL AND LEBANON
SEEMED READY TO ACCEPT A "FACE-SAVING FORMULA" FOR
BREAKING THE PRESENT IMPASSE ON VENUE. LEOR HAD NO
SPECIFIC FORMULAS TO SUGGEST, SAYING THAT THE US WAS

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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"VERY GOOD" AT SUCH THINGS.

3. LEOR EXPRESSED RELIEF AT THE RAPID CALMING OF THE
DECEMBER 8 INCIDENT BETWEEN THE LAF AND IDF NEAR
YARZE. HE OBVIOUSLY FELT THAT THIS INCIDENT COULD HAVE
DEVELOPED INTO SOMETHING MUCH MORE SERIOUS AND WAS
HAPPY IT HAD NOT. DILLON

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INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY JIDDA PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY

USELO RIYADH PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY TUNIS PRIORITY

WHITEHOUSE WASHDC PRIORITY

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EXCERPTS

DECAPTIONED

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, MOPS, MARR, LE, US, IS, XF

SUBJECT: HABIB/DRAPER MISSION: MARCH 4 DISCUSSION
OF NEED TO PROTECT PALESTINIAN CAMPS

1. [REDACTED]

2. IN THE SMALL MEETING HABIB, DRAPER AND LEWIS
HAD WITH SHAMIR, KIMCHE, AND BAR-ON ON THE MORNING
OF MARCH 4, AMBASSADOR LEWIS RAISED THE PROBLEM
OF ISRAELI PROTECTION FOR THE PALESTINIAN REFUGEE

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CAMPS IN SOUTHERN LEBANON. HE SAID THAT ISRAEL'S
OPPOSITION TO THE USE OF UNIFIL IN CONNECTION
WITH SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS IN SOUTHERN LEBANON
FOLLOWING IDF WITHDRAWAL MADE IT NECESSARY FOR
HIM TO MENTION THE CURRENT PROBLEM OF SECURITY
AROUND THE CAMPS, PARTICULARLY MIYAH-MIYAH NEAR
SIDON. HE SAID THE IDF WAS NOT PROVIDING ADEQUATE
PROTECTION AND A SENSE OF SECURITY IN THESE AREAS,
AND THAT ISRAEL WAS, AS A CONSEQUENCE, TAKING

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TERRIFIC RISKS. ANY MAJOR SECURITY INCIDENT THERE COULD CAUSE TREMENDOUS DAMAGE.

3. LEWIS WENT ON TO SAY THAT, WHILE THE IDF HAD STEPPED UP SOME PATROLLING ACTIVITIES, IT STILL WAS NOT ENOUGH. FIXED POSTS WERE NECESSARY. THE PRESENCE OF HADDAD'S FORCES IN THE AREA WAS BETTER THAN NOTHING, BUT THEY COULD NOT DO THE JOB ADEQUATELY. HE URGED THAT SHAMIR PERSUADE THE IDF TO DO MORE ABOUT THIS SERIOUS AND PRESSING PROBLEM.

4. SHAMIR SAID HE AGREED WITH AMBASSADOR LEWIS ABOUT THE RISKS. HE TURNED TO KIMCHE AND DIRECTED THAT HE IN TURN TELL THE MILITARY TO DO MORE ABOUT THIS PROBLEM. GROVE

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C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (TEXT)

DEPARTMENT PASS AMBASSADORS HABIB AND DRAPER

FROM DRAPER MISSION (ROSS)

E.O. 12356: N/A

TAGS: SOPN, PEPR, MOPS, LE, IS, SY, PLO, US

SUBJECT: DRAPER MISSION: LEBANESE MEDIA ON NEGOTIATIONS

1. IN THE TWO DAYS SINCE AMBASSADOR DRAPER'S RETURN TO WASHINGTON ON CONSULTATIONS, LEBANESE OFFICIAL MEDIA AND SOURCES HAVE FOCUSED STRONGLY ON THE CENTRAL ROLE OF THE US IN NEGOTIATIONS FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF FOREIGN FORCES FROM LEBANON. THEY HAVE ALSO BROUGHT SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS 508 AND 509 INTO PUBLIC FOCUS.

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2. IN A STAGE-SETTER FOR DRAPER'S MEETING WITH PRESIDENT GEMAYEL AND OTHER LEBANESE LEADERS, LEADING INDEPENDENT AN-NAHAR (OWNED BY GHASSAN TUENI) WROTE DECEMBER 6:

-- A GOVERNMENT SOURCE HAS MADE IT CLEAR THAT TODAY'S MEETING...IS TO PUT THE FINISHING TOUCHES ON THE POSITION OF THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT ON THE ISRAELI CONDITIONS AND THE BOTTOM LINE THAT THE LEBANESE STATE

CAN ACCEPT TO ENTER NEGOTIATIONS TO DRAW UP A PROGRAM OF ISRAELI FORCE WITHDRAWALS FROM LEBANON.

-- THE SOURCE EMPHASIZED THAT THE POSITION OF THE GOVERNMENT HAS BECOME CLEAR AND KNOWN, ESPECIALLY TO THE FUERICAN PARTNER. IT IS THAT LEBANON HAS NO ISSUES TO RAISE BEYOND THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION CALLING FOR ISRAEL'S UNCONDITIONAL WITHDRAWAL FROM LEBANON. THE NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN LEBANON AND ISRAEL, WHICH HAVE BEEN BLOCKED THANKS TO THE ISRAELI CONDITIONS AND THE FIRM LEBANESE POSITION IN REJECTION OF THESE CONDITIONS, WILL BE PUT OFF IN ANTICIPATION OF AMERICA'S DECISIVE WORD IN THIS REGARD...

-- THE SOURCE INDICATED THAT LEBANON IS BETTING ON A FIRM POLITICAL DECISION ON WASHINGTON'S PART TO SUPPORT THE LEBANESE POSITION ON THE ISRAELI CONDITIONS, ESPECIALLY SINCE GOING TO JERUSALEM IS NOT IN THE CARDS. AFTER ALL, NOT ONE OF THE WORLD'S STATES HAS RECOGNIZED JERUSALEM AS ISRAEL'S CAPITAL TO DATE. INDEED, THE RESOLUTIONS OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE SECURITY COUNCIL HAVE CALLED ON ISRAEL TO REVOKE ITS ANNEXATION OF JERUSALEM, AND THE VATICAN AND SAUDI

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ARABIA HAVE REJECTED THIS ANNEXATION.

3. THE OFFICIAL NATIONAL NEWS AGENCY REPORTED ON DRAPER'S DECEMBER 6 MEETING IN THE FOLLOWING TERMS:

-- GEMAYEL STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF THE TIME . ELEMENT AND DECLARED THAT LEBANON REFUSED TO COMPROMISE ON THE BASIC PRINCIPLES INVOLVED.

-- LEBANON HAS ASKED FOR A CLEAR-CUT AMERICAN POSITION AND HAS STRESSED THAT THE LEBANESE AUTHORITIES WOULD NOT STAND BY AND WATCH ISRAEL CREATE OBSTACLES AND DEADLOCKS, BUT WOULD SEEK TO TAKE ACTION COMPATIBLE WITH THE HIGHER INTERESTS OF THE COUNTRY.

-- THE LEBANESE LEADERS REITERATED THE LEBANESE POSITION AND STRESSED THAT LEBANON WOULD NOT CREATE A FUSS OVER FORMALITIES. ON THE OTHER HAND, IT REFUSED TO GIVE ADDITIONAL POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS TO THE TALKS AND FLATLY REFUSED ANY POSSIBLE ISRAELI PRESENCE ON LEBANESE SOIL. LEBANON INSISTS THAT ISRAEL ACCEPT IN ADVANCE THE PRINCIPLE OF UNCONDITIONAL WITHDRAWAL AS SET FORTH IN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS AND 509.

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-- THE AUTHORITY STRESSED THAT THE REQUIRED SYRIAN AND PALESTINIAN WITHDRAWALS WOULD NOT BE AN OBSTACLE ONCE THE PRINCIPLE OF TOTAL WITHDRAWAL FROM LEBANON WAS AGREED ON.

4. ON DECEMBER 8, AN-NAHAR COMMENTED:

LEBANON GAVE AMBASSADOR DRAPER THE MOST IT COULD ACCEPT TO ENTER NEGOTIATIONS WITH ISRAEL TO ACHIEVE THE WITHDRAWALS. IT WANTS PEACE WITH ISRAEL, BUT WITHOUT IGNITING A WAR IN LEBANON OR WITH THE ARABS.

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ACTION NEA-07

INFO	OCT-00	COPY-01	ADS-00	INR-10	SS-10	CIAE-00	DODE-00
	H-01	IO-15	NSCE-00	NSAE-00	SSO-00	HA-08	L-03
	PM-09	PA-02	INRE-00	SAL-01	ACDA-12	SSN-02	USIE-00
	SP-02	SPRS-01	/084 W				

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FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0411
INFO AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY CAIRO
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
USLO RIYADH

UNCLAS SECTION 02 OF 02 BEIRUT 09109

DEPARTMENT PASS AMBASSADORS HABIB AND DRAPER

FROM DRAPER MISSION (ROSS)

WILL THE US SUCCEED IN HARMONIZING THE LEBANESE AND
ISRAELI POSITIONS AND OPEN THE WAY TO NEGOTIATIONS?
DILLON